Beyond Nomological, Hermeneutic, and Dialectical Knowledge: Zubiri’s Radicalization of Scholastic Realism and the Hidden Ground of the Human-Social Sciences

Manuel Mejido Costoya
University of Santiago
Santiago, Chile

Abstract

For Zubiri the human being is more than stimulus-response and more than meaning; the social is not the sum of individuals nor a supra-individual reality; and the historical is not a prolongation of nature nor a rupture with it. This is precisely why the human-social sciences are not reducible to the nomological sciences of nature or to the hermeneutical sciences of history; that is, these sciences are not reducible to the explanation of objectively observable events or to the interpretation of (inter-)subjective meaning. The implications of Zubiri’s philosophy for the human-social sciences can be traced back to a single idea: namely, the power of the real. The power of the real is the hidden ground of the human-social sciences. On the one hand, the power of the real is what mediates and unifies the personal, social, and historical moments, and, on the other hand, it is what links these three moments to reality as de suyo and as the sentient intelligence. From here the anthropological question concerning the animal of realities brings forth the power of the real as the problem of relegation; the sociological question concerning the turning toward the rest brings forth the power of the real as the problem of language; and the historical question concerning traditive transmission brings forth the power of the real as the problem of memory.

Resumen

Para Zubiri el ser humano es más que estímulo-respuesta y más que sentido; lo social no es una suma de individuos ni una realidad supraindividual; y lo histórico no es continuación ni tan poco ruptura con la naturaleza. Es precisamente por ello que, desde una perspectiva zubiriana, las ciencias humanos-sociales no se pueden reducir a las ciencias nomológicas de la naturaleza ni a las ciencias hermenéuticas de la historia. Esto es, éstas no se pueden limitar a la explicación de eventos objetivos ni a la interpretación de sentido intersubjetivo. Las implicaciones de la filosofía de Zubiri para las ciencias humano-sociales se puede rastrear a una idea: a saber al poder de lo real. Efectivamente, el poder de lo real es el fundamento oculto de las ciencias humano-sociales: Por un lado, el poder de lo real es lo que une a lo personal, a lo social, y a lo histórico; y por otro lado, es lo que vincula estos tres momentos a lo real qua de suyo y qua inteligencia sentiente. De aquí, la cuestión antropológica respecto al animal de realidades plantea el poder de lo real como problema de la relegación. La cuestión sociológica respecto la versión hacia los demás plantea el poder de lo real del problema del lenguaje. Y la cuestión histórica respecto a la transmisión traditiva plantea el poder de lo real como problema de la memoria.
Introduction

Our purpose here is to explore the implications of the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri for the human-social sciences. We will not, however situate the human-social sciences within the trajectory of the Zubirian philosophy. We will rather attempt to see how the Zubirian philosophy interpolates the trajectory of the human-social sciences. These reflections are situated within that area of research initiated by Ignacio Ellacuría and advanced by Antonio González.¹

Drawing on the early Jürgen Habermas, we can say that the human-social sciences have historically labored under either the nomological sciences of nature, the hermeneutic sciences of history, or the critically oriented sciences of emancipation.² Each of these frames of reference were generated by and thus presuppose specific philosophical traditions. Thus, for example, the nomological sciences are rooted in positivism, and specifically behaviorism; the hermeneutic sciences are rooted in phenomenology and the existential analytics of Dasein; and the critically oriented sciences are rooted in the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic. As the title of the article suggests, the thesis we will develop here is that, understood as a radicalization of Scholastic realism, Zubiri’s philosophy pushes beyond nomological, hermeneutic, and dialectical knowledge and uncovers the power of the real as the hidden ground of the human social sciences.

I. Beyond Nomological Knowledge: Behaviorism

In the name of that teleology of scientific progress that can be traced back to the positivist doctrines of Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach,³ behaviorism normatively subsumed all questions concerning the human being under the model of the natural sciences, nomologically restricting valid or legitimate anthropological knowledge to objectively observable events. Thus the human being is reduced to the causal model of stimulus-response. S/he is grasped as “conditioned” by or as a “product” of his/her environment.⁴

By the turn of the 20th century behaviorism had colonized most of the human sciences: As biologist behaviorism reduced the problem of hysteria to neurological cybernetics,⁵ and the problem of anxiety to orgonomy.⁶ While as psychologists it reduced the problem of consciousness to parallelism,⁷ and the problem of language to the mimesis of vocal gestures.⁸ Pragmatism was a noble attempt to overcome this scientific one-sidedness.⁹ But in the final analysis even the pragmatist idea of communicative interaction was not able to break free from the behaviorist frame of reference.¹⁰ This is evident from the classical naturalism of a John Dewey or from the postmodern, linguistified naturalism of a Richard Rorty.¹¹ Together with the Neo-Scholastic approaches to the natural sciences,¹² and the philosophy of action,¹³ Zubiri does not deny that the human being is an animal, and that like all other animals, s/he has material and bio-chemical aspects rooted in nature. Here in this sense the behaviorist analysis of the human being is appropriate. But that human action has a stimulative dimension does not mean that it can be reduced to the biologist, psychologistic, and/or cybernetic model of stimulus-response. Here Zubiri breaks with behaviorism. The human being confronts things differently that do other animals: The human confrontation with reality is in the final analysis not a “stimulative confrontation” but a “real confrontation.” S/he confronts things not as “stimuli” but as “realities.”¹⁴

The human being, Zubiri tells us, is the “animal of realities.” An essence can either be transcendentally closed or open. The human reality is the only intramundane reality that is transcendentally open; all other realities are transcendentally closed. A transcendentally closed essence is de suyo “en sí” (“in itself” in its own right) and “nothing more.” That is, it is de suyo only materially; it only belongs to
itself (se pertence); its aperture to reality (if it is a living reality, i.e., a non-human living organism) is only stimulative. The transcendentally open essence that is the human being, by contrast, is “en sf” such that his/her de suyo is not simply a function of the notes s/he has and “nothing more,” but s/he is, in addition, a function of the proper character of reality. The human being is open to reality qua reality; s/he is de suyo “formally and reduplicatively” (“formal y reduplicativamente”). S/he has that specific way of belonging to her/himself that consists in possessing her/himself (poseerse) in her/his own proper and formal character of reality. In and through taking charge of reality things present themselves to the animal of realities not as a medium, that is not as a system of stimuli, but as a world (mundo), that is, as the transcendentally of reality as de suyo.

Behaviorism’s reduction of the real to the stimulative ultimately stems from its failure to grasp the primordiality of the apprehension of reality, that is, it stems from its eclipse of the sentient intelligence. Behaviorism fails to see that reality is not apprehended as a stimulative object, but rather as something that “stays”: Reality is apprehended as actuality. In other words, that the sentient intelligence apprehends, Zubiri tells us, is the way something “stays” in my apprehension. The actuality of reality is different than the actuality of a pure stimulus, it is a new type of formality: Although the human being is stimulated s/he does not apprehend what stimulates stimulatively, in stimulative fashion; s/he apprehends it rather as a stimulative reality: Thus, for example, I apprehend something as hot not because it is burning me but because it is hot: “The stimulating heat stays in my apprehension as something that is ‘already’ hot, and this is why it stimulates.”

Zubiri calls this “already” the “prius of formality. The prius is the physical moment of what is apprehended by the apprehension, and as such it transcends not away from the stimulative response but in and through it. Indeed, behaviorism’s reduction of the real to the stimulative is not only a reduction of the sentient intelligence to sensibility, it is at the same time the reduction of reality qua reality to this or that reality, that is a reduction of the transcendental to the palliative. But reality is not only the “cosmos” or this or that “field,” it is also “world,” the receptivity of reality as such. Here Zubiri seems to be moving in the direction of that historic-hermeneutic tradition that was radicalized by Martin Heidegger’s existential analytics of Dasein.

II. Beyond Historic-Hermeneutic Knowledge: The Existential Analytics of Dasein

The problem of historic-hermeneutic knowledge is rooted in Giambattista Vico’s equivalence between the verum and factum. We may recall that this principle was intended to replace the classical equivalence between the verum and the esse. Vico’s equivalence maintained that we know the truth of things we make better than we know the truth of created things, that is, in other words, that the knowledge of things we make is the basis of all our knowledge, the basis, for example, of the knowledge of created things.

Yet, as a formal field of knowledge hermeneutics was inaugurated by Friedrich Schleiermacher, who drawing on the German Romantic tradition, against Kant’s cognitive reductionism, argued that knowledge was an interpretative task made possible through “empathetic” recreation – that process by which the interpreter transposes him/herself into the world from which the text derives its meaning.

It was Wilhelm Dilthey, however, with his analysis of the tension between the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, that systematized Schleiermacher’s critique of the cognitive reductionism of transcendental philosophy. Epistemology, Dilthey argued, should not be grounded in cognition, but rather in the being-there-for-me of the totality of lived-
experienced. In this way he opened up the possibility of understanding the problem of hermeneutics as the most primordial of all problems of knowledge. Indeed, for Dilthey, nomological explanations are ultimately always grounded in hermeneutical interpretations.22

Dilthey’s subsumption of the nomological under the hermeneutic would pave the way for Edmund Husserl’s critique of the positivist restriction of the meaning of science, his positing of the “lifeworld” over and against the “mathematization” of reality.23

But it was Martin Heidegger’s shift from the transcendentality of consciousness to the transcendentality of time that radicalized the problem of historico-hermeneutic knowledge. As finite, as existing “there,” Dasein finds itself “thrown,” that is as being “ahead-of-itself-already-in-the-world,” and as being “towards-the-end,” that is as “being-towards-death.” “Thrown,” Dasein initially finds him/herself in the state of “falling,” that is s/he finds him/herself “there” in the world in an “everyday manner” immersed in “idle talk,” “curiosity,” and “ambiguity.” The state of falling is the state of inauthenticity.24 But, through the phenomenon of anxiety [angst], Dasein uncovers the possibility of pushing beyond the state of falling. Indeed, anxiety, Heidegger argues, paves the way toward Dasein’s authenticity by disclosing the world as world, as Dasein’s being-a-whole.25

The phenomenon of anxiety remains a negative gesture – it destabilizes Dasein, makes Dasein “out of joint” in the world. But through this gesture emerges “the formal existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole,” or care [Sorge, cura]. Dasein’s being is essentially care to the extent that it “means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world as Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world”: “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [‘vor’] every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori...”26 “Care,” Dasein’s “authentic being-a-whole,” the being-present to the structural totality of its being-towards-death is precisely the new idea of infinity. And this meaning of infinity, of being-present to the structural totality of being-towards-death, finds its radical ground in “temporality as primordial time.”27 Indeed, the idea of temporality as primordial time is the radical ground of the Heideggerian project, it is the Heideggerian transcendental. It is a critique of the ontological function of time in traditional metaphysics, a critique of the Kantian “recoil,” and the possibility of a radicalization of the historical-hermeneutic sciences.

The existential analytics of Dasein demonstrates that measured time is rooted in Dasein’s temporality: “Along with the temporality of Dasein as thrown, abandoned to the ‘world’, and giving itself time, something like a ‘clock’ is also discovered – that is, something ready-to-hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible in one’s making present awaitingly.” Indeed, “the explicit making-public of time as an object of concern...is grounded in the temporality of Dasein, and indeed in a quite definite temporalizing of that temporality.”28 This temporalizing of temporality, that is the “making present” of time, is possible because temporality is “ecstatically open”; and temporality is ecstatically open because Dasein is temporal, that is existing, “futural,” authentically being-towards-the-end.29

While the idea of temporality as primordial time functions negatively as a destabilization of the classical ontological function of time and as a critique of the Kantian “recoil,” that is while it functions negatively as the destruction of the history of ontology,30 it functions positively as a radicalization of that historical-hermeneutic tradition inaugurated by Schleiermacher and systematized by Dilthey. The shift from the horizon of consciousness to time is the rupture with the tyranny of the positivistic attitude, the tyranny of the nomological sciences, a rupture with the reduction of time to space to which even Bergson and his du-
The conditions of possibility of historicico-hermeneutic knowledge, argues Heidegger, is grounded in the interpretation of temporality to the extent that “authentic Being-towards-death – that is to say, the finitude of temporality – is the hidden basis of Dasein’s historicity.” Indeed, the purpose of the analysis of the historicity of Dasein is not to show that Dasein is temporal because s/he exists in history, but rather, inversely, its purpose is to show that Dasein exists historically because, from the bottom of his/her being, Dasein is temporal.

As we have already suggested, against Behaviorism’s reduction of reality to objective reality, the sentient intelligence to sensibility, the transcendental to the tali-tative, and the world to the cosmos and/or this or that field, Zubiri turn to the historicico-hermeneutic tradition. But the Zubirian philosophy cannot be reduced to this tradition. This is clear from Zubiri’s critique of Heidegger’s existential analytics of Dasein, and in particular the Heideggerian notions of world, being, time, understanding, and throwness.

“World” for Zubiri is not first and foremost that in and through which the human being understands him/herself and in and through which s/he encounters things and others. That is, “world” for Zubiri is not primarily the possibilities that are there for Dasein; it is not “project” (Entwarf); it is not “my world,” or “our world.” World for Zubiri is first and foremost the “transcendental respectivity of the real, that is, the respectivity of real things inasmuch as they a real.”37 The world is not grounded in the worldliness of the human being; rather the human being is worldly because s/he exists in the world: “Only because the human being is a reality that is constituted as a reality in respectivity to other things, that is only because s/he is already “worldly” as reality, can s/he make the world “his/her own” as project. Worldliness is the respectivity of the real as real; it has nothing to do with the human being.”38

Heidegger’s problematic understanding of “world” and “worldliness” stems from a problematic understanding of being. Zubiri, it is true, gives credit to Heidegger because Heidegger turned to the category of being as a way of pushing beyond the Kantian horizon of consciousness and Husserl’s phenomenology. Yet, while Heidegger’s merit was that – against the philosophy of reflection – he took as his point of departure the idea of being as the transcendental, his idea of being was plagued by two problems: On the one hand, with Scholasticism, Heidegger, failed to differentiate reality and being – indeed, he subsumed reality under being: But, as Zubiri tells us, “[it is not esse reale, but realitas in essendo...“Being is ulterior to reality...being is always the being of reality.” On the other hand, with the Kantian inversion, Heidegger reduces being to the being of Dasein. Being for Zubiri, however, as we shall soon see, is not the understanding or the meaning of being; being is first and foremost “the worldly actuality of the real. This respectivity...is the same as the real thing itself.” From here it follows that “this actuality, this being, is the real things intrinsic real reactualization.”
ing being: It is no longer a question of being in general, but of being in its generality for Dasein. And it is no longer a question of eternity but of temporality as the horizon for the interpretation of being. Indeed, the two pillars open which stand the Heideggerian philosophy—Dasein and primordial time—interlock at the problem of interpretation; for this is the way in which Heidegger recasts the Kantian inversion: We may recall that, against Ernst Cassirer, Heidegger argued that the Kantian philosophy was not an attempt to elucidate a theory of knowledge, it was not an attempt to ground the science of nature, but rather it was an attempt to develop a theory of being, an attempt to ground a general ontology in light of the finitude of Dasein. Indeed, the Kantian inversion, the “Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics, is not the dissolution of ontology by the problem of finitude, but the opposite: the attempt to ground ontology in and through finitude. The ground of ontology for Heidegger is precisely the radicalization of the historico-hermeneutic tradition: That is, once again, it is the restriction of the problem of being to the interpretation of the meaning of being for Dasein in light of the totality of being, that is in light of primordial time.

For Zubiri this way of recasting the Kantian problem of finitude is unacceptable; it is a symptom of the extent to which Heidegger fails to break with Transcendental Idealism. For Zubiri the problem of finitude is not a problem of interpretation but a problem of apprehension. That is, in other words, that the problem of finitude is not the problem of historico-hermeneutic understanding of the meaning of being, but the problem of the apprehension of the real of reality, a problem of the sentient intelligence and of reality as de suyo: “What formally constitutes the human being is not the ‘understanding of being,’ but rather the apprehension of reality....The human being moves in being not because s/he is Dasein, but because Dasein is sentiently open to real things which, inasmuch as they are real, are already de suyo. The primum cognitum...is not being but reality—a reality which is felt in and through the impression of reality. Aperture is not understanding but impression....The human being is not the ‘interpreter of being,’ s/he is not the house and pastor of being; s/he is the ‘animal of realities.’” Here, against the historico-hermeneutic tradition, Zubiri seems to turn toward nomological knowledge; for there exists in reality qua reality an objective, physical absolute affirmation that is prior to all human action. Indeed, against Heidegger’s radicalization of hermeneutics this means more concretely, for example, that human time is not reducible to cosmic time.

III. Beyond Critically Oriented Knowledge: The Hegelian-Marxian Dialectic

The previous two sections have attempted to show how Zubiri’s philosophy cannot be reduced to either nomological or hermeneutic knowledge, how it stands as a critique of both behaviorism and the existential analytics of Dasein. Indeed, the nomological reduction of reality to objective, empirical reality does not justify the historico-hermeneutic reduction of reality to the being of Dasein and visa versa. The nomological reduction of the sentient intelligence to sensibility does not justify the historico-hermeneutic reduction of the sentient intelligence to intelligence understood as understanding and visa versa. The nomological reduction of the transcendental to the talitative does not justify the historico-hermeneutic reduction of the talitative to the transcendental understood as the totality of Dasein’s being and visa versa. The nomological reduction of the world to the cosmos and/or this or that field does not justify the historico-hermeneutic reduction of the cosmos and or this or that field to the world understood as the worldliness of Dasein and visa versa. And the nomological reduction of time to space does not do justify the historico-hermeneutic reduction of space to time understood as primordial time and
visa versa.

Here, in this sense, the Zubirian philosophy seems to have affinities with the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic to the extent that this tradition also attempted to overcome the one-sidedness of both the no-mological sciences of nature and the hermeneutic sciences of history. Yet while it is true that all three—Hegel, Marx, and Zubiri—understood this one-sidedness as a symptom of the idealism of Western thought, Hegel and Marx attempted to overcome this idealism dialectically while Zubiri attempted to overcome it in and through the radicalization of Scholastic realism.

Hegel understood the idealism of Western thought as Transcendental Idealism, that doctrine developed by Kant and radicalized by F.W.J. Schelling and J.G. Fichte. Transcendental Idealism was a problem, Hegel argued, because it reduced reason to the abstract universality of self-consciousness, the substantiality of spirit to the subjectivity of the subject—a reduction that manifested itself, for example, as the subordination of metaphysics to mathematics, and as the subordination of the “ethical life” to individual morality.

Hegel attempts to overcome Transcendental Idealism by phenomenologically grasping the self-formation of thought as it is mediated by the unfolding of being which thought itself, as a moment of this unfolding, uncovers. This is the Hegelian dialectic which is not a method but an ontology: Indeed, the structure of thought for Hegel is dialectical because being itself is dialectical.

We could thus say that for Hegel the idealism of Western thought ultimately manifests itself as the illusion of immediate knowledge. The dialectic is what brings to the fore and also overcomes the problem of the mediation of knowledge. Only when knowledge is dialectically grasped as it is mediated by its self-formation will the spurious linearity of scientific advance achieve a genuine circularity: For “then, the beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle.”

Marx, on the other hand, understood the idealism of Western thought as the philosophy of identity (which included the Hegelian system). The philosophy of identity was a problem Marx argued because it reduced nature to mind—a reduction that manifested itself, for example, as the subsumption of the “species-being” under the “abstract citizen,” and through the fallacious, “Robinson Crusoe assumptions” of the eighteenth-century political economists (e.g., Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus).

Marx attempts to overcome the philosophy of identity by turning the Hegelian dialectic “right side up”: Instead of grasping the self-formation of thought as a moment of the unfolding of being, Marx grasps the self-formation of the human species as it takes form in and through the synthetic activity of social labor.

Following Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx outright repudiated the point of departure of the philosophy of identity—namely, the idea that mind is the ground of nature; for Marx, rather, nature was the ground of mind. In other words, Marx substituted the idealistic dialectic of mind and nature with the materialist dialectic of subjective bodily nature and objective nature, the Hegelian phenomenology of consciousness with the natural history of the self-formative process of the human species. On the other hand, however, Marx was not satisfied with the materialism he had inherited as it failed to account for the active side of human activity, that is, labor. In this sense Marx returned to the subjective presuppositions of the philosophy of identity to critique Feuerbachian materialism: The self-formative process of the species, the process by which human beings emancipate themselves from the external compulsion of nature, is possible only through the synthetic activity of social labor understood as the dialectic of praxis and poiesis, interaction and labor, com-
municative and instrumental action.\textsuperscript{54}

By contrast to Hegel and Marx, Zubiri understood the idealism of Western thought as the eclipse of the primacy of reality. This eclipse manifests itself in modern philosophy as four false substantivizations: Things do not exist in space or in time as Immanuel Kant argued; rather, as the New Physics has confirmed, things are spatial and temporal. Intellection is not an act of consciousness as Edmund Husserl maintained. There is no consciousness; there are only conscious acts. And reality is not a moment of being as Heidegger argued. The real being, the \textit{esse reale} does not exist; what exists is being as a moment of reality, \textit{realitas in essendo}.\textsuperscript{55} The eclipse of the primacy of reality was a problem for Zubiri because it had led to the reduction of things to facts (i.e., positivism, behaviorism), the reduction of reality to efficiency (i.e., pragmatism), and the reduction of truth to this or that situation (i.e., historicism).\textsuperscript{56} Zubiri attempts to overcome the eclipse of the primacy of reality through a radicalization of Scholastic realism, that is through a “return” to a Scholastic realism that does not stop at the critique of that voluntaristic tradition that had reached its apogee with Kant, but continues to push beyond the return “to the things themselves” (Edmund Husserl) and the return to the being of things (Heidegger), in order to achieve the primacy of reality.

Voluntarism, we may recall, is the annihilation of the Scholastic doctrine of being, the shift from the transcendentality of being to the transcendentality of consciousness. This tradition can be traced through, for example, Avicena’s subordination of being to essence, John Duns Scotus’s distinction between the philosophical contemplation of being and the theological pursuit of the \textit{sumnum bonum}, G. Wilhelm Leibniz’s subordination of the real to the logical, René Descartes’s egology, his \textit{cogito, ergo sum}, which granted pride of place to the \textit{verum} over the \textit{ens}, which favored the problem of verification over the problem of being. But Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics, his subordination of speculative to practical reason and his reduction of being to existence, marks the apogee of the voluntaristic tradition.\textsuperscript{57} Several important Post-Kantian philosophies have attempted to push beyond this voluntaristic tradition (qua philosophy of reflection/transcendental consciousness) by anchoring themselves in a “return” to Scholastic realism, a return to that doctrine of being that can be traced through Francisco Suárez, John Duns Scotus (focusing on his doctrine of the univocity of being), Thomas Aquinas, Averroes, and Aristotle. Zubiri’s philosophy, we are arguing, is a radicalization of this “return” to Scholastic realism exemplified by Maréchal and Heidegger (Husserl and Franz Brentano can also be included here) to the extent that, as we have already suggested, Zubiri is not satisfied with the return to things, or the return to being, but rather he wants to go back to primordial reality, to reality qua reality.\textsuperscript{58} Philosophy for Zubiri, in other words, does not ultimately concern itself with objectivity or being, but with reality qua reality. Philosophy is not phenomenology or ontology, but rather metaphysics.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, Zubiri develops his radicalization of Scholastic realism as, on the one hand, a critique of the entification of reality (\textit{entificación de la realidad}), and, on the other, a critique of the logification of intelligence (\textit{logificación de la inteligencia}).

From the Zubirian point of view, the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic is the obfuscation of the static and dynamic aspects of reality. It is the reduction of the structural dynamism of reality to the logic of contraries as a principle of movement. It is the predominance of mediation and negation of reality over reality as a \textit{de suyo que consiste en dar de si}. Indeed, Hegel and Marx suture the aperture of reality by the formal logic of the dialectic. And yet despite the fundamental and irreconcilable differences that exist between the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic and Zubirian realism, it is true that, vis-à-vis the nomologi-
cal and hermeneutic sciences, they have certain affinities. Thus, for example, in the Introduction to his *magnum opus* Ignacio Ellacuría writes: “Our discussions of Hegel, Marx, and Zubiri have been by no means trivial for they tease out, and, in a certain sense, prepare the ground for what we are arguing here is the object of philosophy.”\(^6^0\) Indeed, for Ellacuría, Hegel, Marx, and Zubiri prepare the ground for the elucidation of historical reality as the proper object of philosophy to the extent that they understand the object of philosophy to be the real and physical (and not logical and conceptual) unity of all things, that is, in other words, to the extent that each, in his own way, attempts to overcome the idealism of Western thought.\(^6^1\) But, once again the differences between them are clear: Hegel and Marx, against Transcendental Idealism and the philosophy of identity respectively, grasp this real unity through the *dialectic* as what uncovers the illusion of an immediate knowledge that abstracts from the totality of things. While Zubiri, against voluntaristic rationalism, phenomenology, and the existential analytics of *Dasein*, grasps this real unity through a radicalization of Scholastic realism that returns to the primacy of reality, and thus uncovering the entification and logification of the totality of things.

**IV. The Power of the Real: The Hidden Ground**

The Zubirian philosophy is not reducible to nomological, historicohermeneutic, or dialectical knowledge. Indeed, understood as a radicalization of Scholastic realism, the Zubirian philosophy pushes beyond behaviorism, the existential analytics of *Dasein*, and the Hegelian-Marxian dialectics.

Reality as a *de suyo que consiste en dar de sí* and intellection as a sentient intelligence, from here stem something like the Zubirian base concepts of the human-social sciences: namely, i) the idea of the human being as the *animal of realities*,\(^6^2\) ii) the idea of society as *turning toward the rest*,\(^6^3\) and iii) the idea of history as the *traditive transmission of forms of being in reality*.\(^6^4\)

But these base concepts, however, are grounded in a single idea: the power of the real.\(^6^5\) Indeed, the power of the real is, from the Zubirian point of view, the hidden ground of the human-social sciences: The problem of the foundations of the human-social sciences can, from the vantage point of the Zubirian philosophy, be recast as the problem of the power of the real. On the one hand, the power of the real is what mediates and unifies the personal, social, and historical moments, and, on the other hand, it is what links these three moments to reality as *de suyo* and the sentient intelligence: The anthropological question concerning the animal of realities brings forth the power of the real as the problem of religation. The sociological question concerning the turning toward the rest brings forth the power of the real as the problem of language. And the historical question concerning traditive transmission brings forth the power of the real as the problem of memory.

We will in a future article need to unravel this idea of the power of the real as the hidden ground of the human-social sciences and develop each of its three constituting moments–religation, language, and memory.

**Notes**

3 Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, 4 (Paris: Borrani et Droz, 1852), and Ernst Mach, Knowledge and Error (Boston: D. Reidel, 1975).
6 Wilhelm Reich, Selected Writings (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cuadahy, 1960)
16 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre el hombre, 23.
17 Ibid., 24.
18 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre la esencia, 357-373.
19 Ibid., 427. See also Xavier Zubiri, Inteligencia y logos (Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1982), 21-32.
25 Ibid., 232.
26 Ibid., 237-238.
27 Ibid., 274-278.
28 Ibid., 466-468.
29 Ibid., 460.
30 Ibid., 41-49.
31 Ibid., 382.
32 Ibid., 438.
33 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre la esencia, 432-433.
34 Ibid., 428.
36 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre la esencia, 435.
37 Ibid., 433. See also, Xavier Zubiri, “Respectividad de lo real,” in Realitas III-IV, Trabajos del Seminario Xavier Zubiri (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1979), 43.
40 Xavier Zubiri, Sobre la esencia, 452.
41 Ibid., 451.
50 Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, in Ibid., 166-167.
56 Ibid., 3-31.
59 Ibid.
60 Ignacio Ellacuría, *Filosofía de la realidad histórica*, 30.
61 Ibid., 18, 25, and 30.
62 Xavier Zubiri, “El hombre, realidad personal.”
63 Xavier Zubiri, *Sobre el hombre*, 223-341.

**Biography of the author**

Manuel Mejido Costoya, Ph.D. (mmejido@usach.cl) is an Associate Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Avanzados of the Universidad de Santiago de Chile and Adjunct Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (Santiago). He has taught and published in the areas of social theory, sociology, and theology. He has recently translated into English Xavier Zubiri’s *La dimensión histórica del ser humano*, and is currently translating Ignacio Ellacuría’s *Filosofía de la realidad Histórica* for Marquette University Press.