The Transcendental Panentheism Of Xavier Zubiri In

Nature, History, God And Man And God

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Abstract

Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) was perhaps the most original and systematically rigorous thinker in contemporary Spanish philosophy; but he may also be the least known, due to circumstances of his life that prevented him from occupying the center stage in Spain's intellectual life. This paper intends to show that Xavier Zubiri's theology is in fact a form of panentheism, a view of God where the world is in God via an ontological link, and yet God and the world are not identical. After a summary review of literature relevant for understanding the question and some basic notions on panentheism, we analyze Zubirian theology as shown in two of Zubiri's most important works: Nature, History, God and Man and God. The conclusion of this study is that Zubiri's theology may be in fact a form of transcendental panentheism.

Resumen

Xavier Zubiri (1898–1983) fue quizás el pensador más original y más sistemáticamente riguroso de la filosofía española contemporánea; pero también es el menos conocido, debido a circunstancias de su vida que le impidieron ocupar un lugar central en la vida intelectual de España. Este trabajo busca mostrar que la teología de Xavier Zubiri es de hecho una forma de panenteísmo, una visión de Dios en donde el mundo está en Dios mediante un vínculo ontológico, y aun así Dios y el mundo no son idénticos. Después de una breve reseña de la literatura pertinente para comprender la cuestión y algunas nociones básicas de panenteísmo, se hace un análisis de la teología zubiriana tal como se muestra en dos de las obras más importantes de Zubiri: Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, y el Hombre y Dios. La conclusión de este estudio es que la teología de Zubiri puede ser en realidad una forma de panenteísmo transcendental.

1. Introduction

Panentheism (or Lack Thereof) in Zubiri Scholarship

Since this is a study examining the panentheism in the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri, it is convenient to give a cursory examination to how this problem was presented by the students of Zubiri's philosophy.

There is unanimous consensus that for Zubiri the problem of God was one of three problems that challenged him during his entire life, and he devoted considerable thought to it.¹

Surveys of Zubiri's views on God are offered by Garagorri,² Cescon,³ Juan José García,⁴ Zárraga Olavarria,⁵ and Melero Martínez,⁶ among others.

However, most studies treat Zubiri's theology from existential lines, or simply assume that Zubiri’s theology is just an-
other version of classical theism. However, there are some hints that Zubiri’s theology might be considered as a form of panentheism. Rivera Cruchaga, in an obituary for Zubiri, unconsciously alludes to the possibility of panentheism in Zubiri’s philosophy. He remembers an anecdote where Zubiri said to him: “When we are in the truth, we are in the Word of God, we live in God”.7 Cescon hints that Zubiri could have understood the God-world relationship in panentheistic fashion, without using the specific term. Since Zubiri understood each thing as a manifestation of God, because it is not God and yet it is formally constituted in God,8 Cescon concludes that for Zubiri a separation between God and the world was inconceivable.9

A thorough study of the concept of religation and his correlation with human experience of God is done by Correa Schnake.10 Without realizing it, Correa describes religation in strongly immanentist terms that might hint at panentheism: “religation is a presence of God in things precisely in order to constitute them as real, and specifically in the human person as that which is constituting its mission to the ground of its own personal reality in the configuration of himself.”11

Marquínez Argote sees a remarkable similarity between the theologies of Zubiri and another panentheist thinker, Paul Tillich, despite evidence that Tillich was not aware of the thought of the other. Marquínez attributes this similarity to the fact that both were disciples of Heidegger.12 For Marquínez, the similarity lies specifically in the analogy between the devices of the “depth of the ultimate” in Tillich and religation in Zubiri. Corominas also point out the deep influence of Heidegger in the formulation of Zubiri’s theology, making it instrumental in the abandonment of Zubiri’s previously held modernistic convictions.13

Zárraga Olavarría, after offering an elaborate explanation of Zubiri’s view of God, states that the problem of God was for Zubiri the “north” to which all his philosophic system is directed, and without it would not be understandable.14 He implicitly recognizes a panentheism in Zubiri when he states: “God is effectively in everything, but not “exactly” as the pantheist would have it”.15

Despite all these hints, at the present time the author is not aware of any identification of Zubiri as a panentheist, save perhaps a brief, ambiguous and inconclusive mention by Franciscan theologian Félix Alluntis.16

**Panentheism**

Panentheism can be described as “a ‘vision’ of God in the world and the world in God”. This quote, which for now shall remain unattributed, shows how according to this particular view of the God-world relationship, God and the world are joined together in some sort of ontological link.

Panentheism can be generically defined as the view of God where “God and the world are ontologically distinct and God transcends the world, but the world is in God ontologically.”17 According to Palmquist, “panentheism typically refers to a synthesis between traditional theism and pantheism, whereby the whole world (and everything in it) is believed to be in God, though God transcends the boundaries of the natural world and is more than nature.”18

That is, the world and everything in it is in the being of God or ontologically in God.

The notion that the world is in the being of God, that is, ontologically in God, is key for panentheism and it serves to distinguish it from modern statements of classical theism which strongly emphasize the notion of divine immanence. Cooper explains that for the classical theist, God is not only immanent; he could be absolutely immanent because God’s transcendence is absolute.19

David H. Nikkel offers a thorough characterization of the concept:

“Panentheism” literally means “all in God.” (The word was coined by the early nineteenth-century German phi-
It holds that the non-divine individuals are included in God, are fully within the divine life. God knows all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though God’s knowledge and valuation are more than the creaturely experiences that are wholly included in the divine experience). God empowers all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though there is genuine indeterminacy and freedom of choice and action which God empowers in the creaturely realm). This is in contrast to traditional theism, which has tended to regard God as utterly distinct from the creation and the creatures. Deism is an extreme of this tendency. On the other hand, panentheism also distinguishes itself from pantheism (literally “all [is] God”). It holds that God is not reducible to the nondivine individuals, to the universe as a whole, or to the structure of the universe; but rather God transcends them, having a reality—an awareness and a power—that includes but is not exhausted by thereality of the creation and the experiences and actions of the creatures.

The ontological link between God and world is well described in the explicitly panentheistic theology of Jürgen Moltmann, who states: “God’s essence has in itself the idea of the world from all eternity”. Since God’s essence is also His existence, creation is necessary and an extension of the divine Being, instead of the utterly contingent characterization of creation prevalent in classical theism.

Systematic analyses of panentheism are available from Culp and Cooper. In his work, Cooper offers a matrix for analyzing and classifying the various strands of historical and contemporary panentheism according to the following distinctions:

1. **Explicit or implicit panentheism.** Explicit panentheism is distinctly assumed by its proponents, while other thinkers have a panentheistic theology while avoiding use of the term or simply not using it.

2. **Personal or nonpersonal panentheism.** Some panentheistic thinkers see God as nonpersonal while others see God as personal.

3. **Part-whole or relational panentheism.** Some panentheists regard the world as part of God, without fully being God. Others see God distinct from the world, but ontologically linked in a symbiotic fashion.

4. **Voluntary or natural panentheism.** Some panentheist thinkers regard creation of the world as necessary for God. Others see the world as the product of a free creative act from God.

5. **Classical or modern panentheism.** Classical panentheism affirms most theistic attributes of God including omnipotence, while the modern panentheism states that God is affected by creaturely freedom.

This paper will use Cooper’s distinctions as useful tools for the analysis of Zubiri’s doctrine of God.

**Note on Versions Employed**

In order to write this study, both *Nature, History, God and Man and God* were examined in their original Spanish, in the latest editions available to this writer. Now, expressing the plenitude of Zubiri’s thought in English can be a very difficult undertaking. Melero Martinez ably puts it:

Xavier Zubiri’s style is unique. He invents neologisms, changes the meaning of some terms. He is precise and almost pedantic in his terminology even when that makes for a not very elegant Spanish. He gives a precise philosophical meaning to expressions from the ordinary language and from other sciences, such as: personality,
personality, reity, reality, religation, theological, theologal, sentient, truthing. These are just some examples.26

In order to quote the text in this work, the author used the English versions available. For Nature, History, God the Fowler version was used.27 For Man and God, the version employed was that of Joaquin A. Redondo.28 These translators deserve a lot of credit and admiration for ably expressing the nuances of Zubirian thought in good English.

Throughout the work, quotes from Zubiri will be taken from these sources with some corrections or emendations from the author when, in his criterion, a better or more precise rendering of a particular phrase could be used. Therefore, any responsibility for any errors or mistakes in translation should lie with the author of this paper and not with the translators of the two previously mentioned works by Zubiri.

Zubiri’s Panentheism in Nature, History, God

Nature, History, God was Zubiri’s second book (the first one was his dissertation), and it contains a showcase of his early thought. Published initially in 1944, it contained a series of articles and essays of diverse provenance, published between 1932 and 1944.29 The fifth edition saw the inclusion of an additional essay, “Introduction to the Problem of God”. Therefore, any responsibility for any errors or mistakes in translation should lie with the author of this paper and not with the translators of the two previously mentioned works by Zubiri.

This study shall approach each study on its own, and then a concluding synthesis will be attempted. It must be noted the texts under study are three isolated essays, which show a theology in development. Many statements are fragmentary, vague or incomplete. However, even so, they provide a good view of the initial stages of Zubiri’s theology.

Introduction to the Problem of God

Although “Introduction to the Problem of God” is the first of the essays on Nature, History, God dealing specifically with Zubiri’s theology, it was a later addition. It appeared only in the fifth Spanish edition (1963). The date would appear to situate this essay on Zubiri’s mature period; however, in the Preface to the sixth edition Zubiri states:

It is basically a lecture given some 15 years ago, which will enable the problems treated in the chapters In Regard to the Problem of God and Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology to be situated in proper perspective.30

Zubiri begins stating that the current time is perhaps one of the times which “most substantially lives the problem of God.” It is necessary to examine this problem from the intellectual way; and more specifically, from philosophy. This is despite the fact that this way is the most vexing of them, because it is destined to leave almost no one satisfied.31

In the essay, Zubiri describes God in a paradoxical way. “In a certain rigorous and authentic sense”, the reality of God is “the most unreachable of all realities.” However, “the reality of God, though on one hand the most distant and unreachable of all realities, is also on the other the closest of them all.” The problem of God affects to the very core of human existence. Man seeks an answer to this question because he feels shaken by it at its very root.

However, a review of the status of the problem of God in the history of philosophy shows that the philosophical way is not as simple as it would appear at first. Intellection of God, which here means an intellectual justification of God’s reality, is only achieved at the end of the path. What path is this? A cursory examination would

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form the impression that is just another existential analysis. However, right behind the existentialist language lies the procedure of phenomenological analysis: a series of methodological reductions in order to examine the structures of consciousness with the purpose of apprehending universal truths. This has not gone unnoticed. Several studies have pointed out the key place of phenomenology in Zubiri’s thought and specifically in his reflections on the problem of God. Melero Martínez, for example, states that phenomenology is the general humus (substrate) of Zubiri’s philosophy.

The first step is an analysis of human existence. Here we begin to see the initial steps of Zubiri’s phenomenological and transcendental view of God: man is always positioning himself in respect of something which Zubiri calls “ultimateness”. This is because man is not a mere thing; but as a strictly personal reality, it stands against the whole world in an absolute way and his acts are the actualization of his absolute reality. What is this ultimateness? Zubiri responds:

This ultimateness is not merely something in which man “is,” but rather something in which man has to be in order to be able to be what he is in each of his acts. Thus the ultimateness has a grounding character.

This grounding effected by the ultimateness determines the absolute character of human reality, although Zubiri still does not disclose at this point what or who this ultimateness is. This ultimateness makes the man religated to it. Thus, Zubiri introduces a key concept in his explanation, something that would be place at the center of his view of the God-world relationship. Religation is “the absolute personal character of human reality actualized in the acts which it carries out”. As one commentator put it, religation is the ontological link to the ground of existence, or, more clearly, is the ontological link by which man has access to God. By religation man is shown everything that is real. It is no mere experience of man, nor a psychological or social phenomenon, or moral conscience, but the very principle and ground of any possible experience, including these four aspects.

This religation exposes man to that ultimateness which Zubiri calls deity. This is another key concept to which Zubiri will return later in Man and God. Here, it is described as not necessarily being God as a reality in and of Himself. “Deity” is here just a trait, and an enigmatic one to boot, by which man is being shown all that is real. The discovery of this deity is thus the principle, the beginning of any possible experience. Now, deity as described is just an enigma and because of this enigmatic condition, deity forces human intelligence to learn about it.

The second step is thus the solution of the enigma of the deity, and this step is for Zubiri strictly demonstrative. Deity is inexorably grounded on “reality-deity” or “divine reality”. It is this reality-deity as a character of the ultimate reality or as first cause. Since it is the first cause of all things, including human realities equipped with intelligence and will, it is a first reality which is also intelligent and free-willing. This reality is beyond the world in order to ground the world as a reality. Now, this poses a question: is this ultimate reality, is this first cause, God? This leads us to the third step.

The third step points out that the first cause which was shown in the second step to be also free and personal, is essentially a personal, transcendent reality, and this an “absolutely absolute” reality. To this reality we can call him God. Now, how can we say that God is the grounding, the foundation of the world? For Zubiri, the answer lies in an act of pure donation. Since it is a self-donation of a pure and perfect will, it is also pure ecstasy, of pure love. This pure love is the highest form of causality. Thus, God is the grounding of the world out of pure self-donation in love.
In summary, the three steps are the following:

1. Analysis of the human existence: discover the ultimate reality, or “deity”.
2. Deity as first cause or “divine reality”.
3. First cause as an absolutely absolute, free and personal reality; that is, God.

Zubiri ends this reflection saying that even though finding God from the philosophical way is possible by tracing these three steps, it is impossible to grasp adequate concepts about God. Man think by abstracting concepts from things. Some of these concepts are “representative”, which are inadequate for thinking about God. But others are “directionals”, which could be Zubirian-speak for the phenomenological intentionality; they point out to other things. They could help in our way towards God; but we must discern ways to God that are possible from others which are not. In other words, and inasmuch as Aquinas’ arguments for God are ‘ways’, we have the outline of a via phenomenologica to God.41

This paper by Zubiri purports to be a mere introduction. However, in a few pages Zubiri manages to present several key concepts of his thinking, such as deity and religation, or the hierarchy of absolute realities. There is no explicitly panentheistic statement here, although it should be noted that God is shown as the ground and foundation of any reality by “ultimateness”, and man is intimately linked to Him by “religation”. God is thus shown as a transcendental reality which is the ultimate ground of existence for any being, enabling their existence by their link to him in deity or religation.

In Regard to the Problem of God

In Regard to the Problem of God is a much larger text which was initially published as a journal article in 1935.42 There, Zubiri formulates a more detailed introduction to the problem of God, and here the key issue of God’s relation to the world is explored with more detail than in the previous chapter. According to Corominas, this essay was heavily influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy.43

Zubiri again uses a phenomenological method to access God as a reality, with religation as his key concept. In order to know if there is a God, we must begin from human existence. This is the starting point of Zubiri’s phenomenological access to God. Now, this is possible because for Zubiri phenomenology is not only ontological (as in Husserl), but also a way to analyze reality and not only consciousness.

Man’s personhood is his being. Personhood is implanted into being in order to realize itself while living with other things. Now, the “with” is one of human personhood’s formal ontological traits in itself. Man has to realize himself as a person during his own life. This life is a mission; life is something sent to man, and existence is imposed upon him. What makes this imposition is also what “impels” (move, prompt, make do) man to live.

Now, what is what impels man into living? It’s something previous or “anterior”. This is something into which man holds onto in order to exist and realize himself. This is unavoidable since man cannot “be” by himself. “[M]an needs to be prompted to make himself. His ontological nihility is radical”.44 There is something, then, that makes us to be.

At this stage, Zubiri introduces his key concept in his access to God. This is a point that was identified as essential for both his theology and anthropology.45 We are prompted into being, we are obligated to exist, because we are ontologically linked to what makes us to be: We are religated. Religation, thus, is that ontological link to something that previously makes us to be.46 It’s a link to something from which we come and “makes there to be”. Religation evidences the fundamentality of human existence, something that causes that we are being being. Man is not only religated; he is constitutively religated.
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Now, since man exists "with" things, and man is religated, the something that religates man, religates with him the whole world. In religation, "the whole material universe appears".47

This means that religation is our way to access all reality. This begs the question: What is that something that religates man? For Zubiri, this is "what we call God": a reality which Zubiri names as deity.48 But this isn't God per se yet; it's a reality that opens up for us the ultimate reality of God and shows that we are grounded in that reality. God is ens fundamentale, the being which grounds us. Groundness is God's chief attribute.

Religation shows us that God is not a thing. Man is not with God (as it is the case with things); man is in God. Zubiri here quotes Acts 17:28, "In him we live and move and have our being". Man does not need to arrive to God; he is coming from Him. The problem of God is thus the problem of religation.49 While many have seen the concept of religation as an original feature of Zubiri, Yáñez points out its roots in the thought of José Ortega y Gasset, Zubiri's mentor and professor of philosophy in Madrid.50

God is thus a transcendental reality accessed through religation. By religation, humanity and the whole world is "in God" ontologically. Zubiri describes his panentheistic vision in this terms:

God is not something which is in man as a part of him, nor is He something which is added to him, from outside; nor is He a state of conscience; nor is He an object. What of God there may be in man is only the religation through which we are open to Him, and in this religation God becomes patent to us. Hence one cannot, strictly speaking, talk of a relationship with God.51

But who is God? Even the verb "is" is troublesome because God is beyond Being; He is the One who makes being possible as ens fundamentale.

There is no identification of the being of metaphysics with God. In God the "there is" surpasses infinitely with respect to the "is." God is beyond being. Prima rerum creatorum est esse, being is before created things, the medieval Platonists said. Esse formaliter non est in Deo ... nihil quod est in Deo habet rationem entis, being is not formally in God ... nothing which is in God has the form of being, repeated Master Eckhardt, and with him, all of the Christian mystics.52

The concept of being becomes problematic, and here is where panentheism comes full circle for Zubiri: Since God is beyond being, we need a different concept of what a being is. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, paired with the Aristotelian idea of substance, could lead to the undesirable outcome of pantheism. Anything that "is" is anything that comes from God. Since God's status is now a metaphysical problem, the world also becomes problematic at once. What is the answer? Panentheism:

Religated existence is a "vision" of God in the world and the world in God.53

The quote may be familiar to the reader, because it was used to characterize panentheism at the beginning of this paper. This is the core of Zubiri's panentheism. "God remains linked to the world 'by reason of being'."54 And the existential link is what Zubiri calls religation.

What is atheism, then? Atheism denies deity; it is a negative position regarding deity.55 Atheism comes when the man feels that he is unbound; ignores his religation, and identifies his being with his life. This happens when the person feels self-sufficient. "Success is the great creator of atheism".56 Human life is the ultimate absolute and, quoting St. John, Zubiri states that man falls into "pride of life".57 That's why pride is the capital sin among all capital sins. This prompts Zubiri to make an interesting insight:
The present time is a time of atheism; it is a time that is proud of its own success. Atheism today affects, *primo et per se*, our time and our world. Those of us who are not atheists, are what we are despite our time, as the atheists of times past were so despite theirs... As an historical period, our time is one of “unbinding” and dis-fundamentation. For this reason, the religious problem of today is not a problem of differing faiths, but the problem of religion-irreligion.58

Since this position is not sustainable, man has tried to clutch himself in all kinds of supports. Today, Zubiri says, is the time of philosophy. But philosophy cannot be a way of life. Yet, “at the bottom of a great part of contemporary philosophy lies a surreptitious deification of existence”.59

Again, panentheism could be atheism’s demise:

Surely the hour will come when man, in his intimate and radical failure, will awake as if from a dream finding himself in God and failing into the realization that in his atheism he has done nothing but be in God. Then he will encounter himself religated to Him, not so as to flee from the world, and others, and himself; but the other way around, in order to sustain and maintain himself in being. God does not manifest Himself primarily as negation, but as fundamentation, as what makes it possible to exist. Religation is the possibilitation of existence as such.60

In this article Zubiri begins a phenomenological analysis of human existence and ends with a panentheistic vision of God as a transcendental agent beyond being but the ground where all beings have their existence. Man apprehends the world by being linked to this transcendental agent by religation. Without even begin to define anything related to God’s character, Zubiri’s panentheism is already an essential part of his theology.

**Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology**

This is the last chapter on *Nature, History, God*, and it is made from the notes of two courses Zubiri gave; one on *Hellenism and Christianity* in Madrid (1934-1935) and the other in Paris (1937-1939). Zubiri says almost defensively “They are simply an exposition of some New Testament texts, as seen by the Greek tradition. They are, therefore, simple historical pages, nothing more. I must emphasize this.”61 Despite this disclaimer, however, this chapter has very little of actual New Testament theology and a lot of Christian Neoplatonism, incorporated almost wholesale into Zubiri’s theology. Zubiri actually admits his partiality some lines below, where he uses “Greek theology” as a synonym with Christian Neoplatonism: “Personally I shall not hide my affection for Greek theology. Without any exclusivism whatsoever, I have yielded in the following pages to this propensity.” All in all, this is no minor footnote in Zubiri’s thought. It is a key development of his thinking62 and the basis for many concepts of his theology, such as religation.63

Melero Martínez explains the importance of this essay for Zubiri:

The inclusion of a text of theology, *Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology*, which closes the book, invites to reflection: Why should a theological discourse appears in a text of philosophy? Why the last word in Zubiri is theological? The seriousness of these questions is heightened because it was an unpublished text that could have been silenced. Only those who attended the course at Madrid, 1934-1935, or those of the *Foyer international des étudiants catholiques* of Paris in 1937 could have known of its existence. At this time, Zubiri is a secularized priest writing about theology. This text was the last one to pass the ecclesiastical censors in October 27, 1944, which held back the printing of the book.
Only the internal need of this discourse would justify its inclusion.\textsuperscript{64}

Zubiri begins by investigating the being of God and to the effect he draws heavily from ideas from Plato, Aristotle, and the “Greek fathers”, which for Zubiri usually denotes the Christian Neoplatonist philosophers, among whom Pseudo-Dionysius is heavily mentioned.\textsuperscript{65} “God is love” is no mere statement; it is a \textit{metaphysical definition} mediated by the dialectic between \textit{agape} and \textit{eros}.\textsuperscript{66} God’s being is nothing static but \textit{energéia}, power, operating activity.\textsuperscript{67} God is power; both as power that unfolds Himself to the world (\textit{agape}) and as a power that seeks its own and natural perfection (\textit{eros}).\textsuperscript{68} God’s love is both ecstatic and effusive manifesting itself in an internal emanation or “effusion”, the Trinitarian life; and an external effusion/emanation, a creation and a “deifying” self-donation or \textit{deification}.\textsuperscript{69} This insight by Zubiri was noted by some as the basis for the later Zubirian concept of “the power of the real”.\textsuperscript{70}

The Trinity is the mysterious mode of being an infinite God which is yet one by nature. In order to develop his view of Trinity, Zubiri turns to Richard of St. Victor. Richard’s doctrine on the Trinity were used for Zubiri as building blocks to develop a trinitarian theology of eternal, personal emanations.\textsuperscript{71} God is an infinite being whose infinity is pregnant with love, understood as the very ecstasy of being. God is a personal reality full of love and manifests itself as a personal reality (the Father) which due to his own perfection eternally generates as an emanation another person (the Son), which is the personification of the power, the \textit{dynamis} of the Father. This perfection, when it is an actuality that reverts upon its essence is the person of the Holy Spirit. Zubiri describes in this way the \textit{procession—perichoresis}, circumincession—of the Godhead.

Each person is distinguished from the others by the way of having the divine nature. In the Father, it is a principle; in the Son, as constituting agency; in the Holy Spirit, as self-donation in act.\textsuperscript{72}

Being simultaneous and eternal emanations, both the Son and the Holy Spirit are images, \textit{eikón} (icons) of God with a distinctively Neoplatonic flavor:

The Son is \textit{eikon} because He proceeds immediately from the Father; the Holy Spirit is so because He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and consists in manifesting the identity of the Father and Son: \textit{pneúma ek Patrós di’hyioû ekporeuómenon}. Such is the Greek scheme.\textsuperscript{73}

This Neoplatonistic chain-of-being depiction of the internal structure of the Trinity is essential to Zubiri’s view of God and determines a panentheistic view of God’s relationship to the world. The Trinity is not only a model of divine life; “Let us not forget that this expresses not only the nature of the Divine life, \textit{but also the structure of creation and of deification}”.\textsuperscript{74} God’s personal life is extended by ontological emanation (effusion) into creation and deification.

The trinitarian structure of divine life, then, causes the ontological and dialectical unity of God and the world that is the distinctive mark of panentheism. By creation, God produces what is “the other” but as an emanation of God Him “self”. If there is any doubt that his could be panentheism, let’s take a look at the very own words of Zubiri:

And hence the creation, at the same time it produces things distinct from God, maintains them in ontological unity with Him through effusion.\textsuperscript{75}

In keeping with this idea, Zubiri explicitly rejects pantheism.\textsuperscript{76} By \textit{via negativa}, Zubiri states that the transcendence production of creation is opposed to the immanent procession of the Divine persons. This is why Zubiri prefers the term “effusion” to emanation. For him, “emanation” has a pantheistic connotation.
Creation produces the otherness in God and in creatures is an ascending attraction to God and is patterned, as it was previously stated, in the life of the Trinity. The emanations inside the Trinity set the pattern for a chain of being in creation: “in the transcendental act of creation, the three persons fulfill the same function in the order of causality as in the life of the Trinity.” Only God truly “is”, and His creation is an absolute action in nothingness. How this happens is interesting:

Creation, then, as an absolute act of God, is a voice of God in nothingness. The logos has a subject: nothingness; and a predicate: the Divine ideas. The outcome is clear: nothingness is transformed (if I may be permitted the expression) into “someone” (subject), and the ideas are projected onto this someone making of him a “something” (predicate). In this way the ontological structure of creation is determined; the finite entity is above all a duality between that it is and what it is.

This leads to another statement that is rather obliquely panentheistic and a quotation of Acts 17:28, a locus classicus of many panentheists:

Thus it is clear how, without blurring the distinction between God and creatures, everything there is in them of positive being is owing to the presence of God in them. If, dealing with finite causality, the action of the agent is received in the patient, then in regards to the creator-actor the patient and its passivity only exist due to their presence in the agent. We are, we move, and we live in Him, St. Paul will say, probably repeating a formula already current in his day.

Zubiri now works the consequences of his panentheism. First, there is an elaborate, Neoplatonic chain of beings, “the ontological hierarchy of beings according to their greater or lesser formal perfection.” This hierarchy has three orders in the material realm: bodies (soma), whose being is its light (phos); then the living beings, whose being is their life (zoe); and finally, personal beings, whose being is their spirit (pneuma).

Second, there is the cosmic unity of creation: “Being, as active unity, unifies things in themselves and is unified with God. But we added that it also unifies each thing with all others of its species.”

But there is more. A second effusion from the Trinity where God personally gives Himself to the world: deification. By deification, creatures get re-united with God’s personal life and the cycle of divine love gets completed. Deification has two specific moments: First, God makes the nature of a creature —man— the nature of His own personal being. This is the reality of Christ in the Incarnation. Second, through Christ humankind participate their personal life into God’s personal life. To this, Zubiri calls Sanctification. Even through deification’s chief object is man, the whole material creation cannot be completely excluded from this process and somewhat is affected by it. In this way, Zubiri’s panentheism grounds his philosophical interpretation of Christian and Roman Catholic doctrine.

Thus, in “God and Deification” we have a Neoplatonic theology which is strongly immanentistic and, in the opinion of this writer, even panentheistic. God is viewed as effusive love and the Trinity is His life as emanations or “effusions” of His love. Outside Trinity, God’s love emanates or effuses in two ways. Naturally, in creation by effusing or emanating a hierarchy of beings which remain ontologically linked to God’s transcendental reality. Supernaturally, by “deifying” His whole creation by a personal Incarnation in Christ and sanctification by grace for humanity. Deification is a way for creation to return to God’s intimate life.

Summary

In Nature, History, God Zubiri offers a fairly complete account of his theology. God is the ground of all beings and the ultimate transcendental reality. All things
are ontologically linked to Him by religation. Religation is the vehicle for a panentheistic view of God. Probing deeper, this panentheism comes from an understanding of God highly influenced by Christian Neoplatonism.

In the next section the study shall examine Zubiri’s view of God at the other end of his work, via the posthumous work *Man and God*.

1. Zubiri’s Panentheism in *Man and God*

*Man and God* was published posthumously in 1984. As such, it reflects the last, mature stage of Zubirian thought. When Zubiri died in 1983 the book was almost ready for publication. With *The Philosophical Problem of the History of Religions* and *The Theological Problem of Man: Christianity*, it was part of his “theological” trilogy.

For Zubiri, the problem of God has two facets or aspects. First, it is necessary to determine whether there is something which we call God. Second, if there is a God, it is necessary to determine if man can have any kind of access to Him. Thus, in *Man and God* he approaches the issue in three parts:

1. Human reality.
2. The problem of divine reality.
3. Man as experience of God.

The first part is devoted to questions of philosophical anthropology; the second, to problems of philosophical theology; and the third, to issues of theological anthropology. For reasons of efficiency, this study will focus mainly on the second part of the work, where the whole of Zubiri’s theology lies.

In tackling the question of God’s existence (or more properly, God’s reality) Zubiri examines three points: the problem of God’s reality per se, the “justification” of God’s reality (really, an argument for God’s reality), and the characteristics of such reality.

### The problem

Zubiri begins by stating that all classical arguments or ways for proving God’s existence are insufficient. For Zubiri, arguments for God’s existence have started from two points of departure: reality, considered as nature—via *cosmologica*—, or the study of a particular aspect of human nature—via *anthropologica*—, and all of them are found insufficient.

Concerning the cosmological sets of arguments, Zubiri examines Thomas Aquinas’ five ways and finds them inconclusive because they depend on a certain set of metaphysical presuppositions, a specific metaphysical interpretation of sensible reality: these ways take the validity of Aristotle’s metaphysics for granted and fail to take account of man’s true place in the universe. In addition, they may point out to something, but it is not clear at all whether the end to which they point out is the same thing.

The first way leads to a first unmoved mover; the second, to a first efficient cause; the third, to the first necessary being; the fourth, to a being in the plenitude of being; the fifth, to a supreme intelligence. But do these five “primarities” refer to one and the same being? That must be proved.

But there’s more: even if we take for granted that Thomas’ ways point out to the same supreme being, it is not clear if that being is God. Duns Scotus saw it and formulated a two-way argument where he started by proving the existence of a first being, and then he argued that this first being is infinite and is thus God. But this is by no means clear, because it is not evident that infinitude should be an exclusive or necessary attribute of the divine.

The anthropological way, so far as it has been presented, is also unsatisfactory for Zubiri. He summarizes anthropological arguments in three types: an argument from intelligence and truth (Augustine), from the will and moral duty (Kant), or a feeling of dependence (Schleiermacher). In
the eyes of Zubiri, all of them fail. First, because they are reductionistic: these arguments do not consider man as a whole, but just a portion of him (intelligence, will, feelings). Second, these arguments presuppose a certain kind of dualism: “the truth” against “other truths” in Augustine; the categorical will against all other volitions in Kant; the feeling of dependence against all other feelings in Schelerma
ccher. Third, the arguments require opposing and distinguishing man from cosmos; man is considered as very different, to the point of opposition, to the world. But this is false because man is in the world. It is an “impossible antithesis”.

How, then, can we arrive to God?

In order to arrive to God, Zubiri turns to the now familiar phenomenological device of religation. Religation is the ontological link of the whole human existence to the power of the real. “Religation is not mere linking or sentiment of dependence, but the constitutive and formal turning towards the power of the real as fundament of my personal life.” Religation is thus the very root of the human being.

This might appear to be just another anthropological way, but Zubiri claims this is not the case. Religation is not a merely anthropological phenomenon. It is the very structure where the power of the real happens. Religation is anthropological, cosmological and ontological in character. “From this follows that religation is not something human in contradistinction to the cosmic, but the very occurrence of all reality in man and of man in reality.” In religation, the power of the real shows itself as something ultimate, possibilitat-
ing, and impelling. This is a key feature of Zubirian cosmology and his phenomenological constitution of reality towards God. The significance of this concept is such that Cescon would write in 2007, “the Zubirian concept of ‘religation’ represents the superseding of Thomism and the introduction of existentialism in Spain.”

Religation provides an idea of God based on three points. First, God is the foundation of the power of the real. Second, it is a supreme reality. But here Zubiri makes an interesting point, which would echo the Neoplatonists and Jakob Böhme: God is a supreme reality but not a supreme being. God is beyond being. Third, God is an “absolutely absolute reality”. The experience of religation is enigmatic because it offers an idea of God but immediately poses the question: Does such reality exists? Zubiri now goes to justify the reality of God’s existence.

Zubiri’s Justification of God’s Reality

How can we say that God exists, then? Zubiri does so by resorting to a phenomenological epokhé, that is, the suspension of judgment about the existence or nonexistence of the phenomena and the exclusion of any factual data or anything that would prevent the apprehension of the phenomena while fully describing them, starting from his view of religation. He builds a “justification” of God’s existence, which in fact is an explanation of God’s existence analogous to an argument or demonstration. Thus, one can think of Zubiri’s justification of God as a via phenomenologica, or phenomenological argument for God even though it may not be strictly a syllogistic argument. It is a long series of concatenated conclusions where another key feature of Zubirian thought makes its appearance: sentient intelligence.

Reality is apprehended in two different, yet simultaneous, moments. First, the mind apprehends the quality of the thing (a thing is red, heavy, etc.) and second, the mind has a distinct impression of the reality of the thing. Now, “since to apprehend reality is intelligence, and to have impressions is sensing, it follows that the intellectual apprehension of man is sentient: his intelligence is a sentient intelligence.”

Man has a sentient living in reality. His life consists in acts made within reality and this constitutes him as a person. When man acts, he does more than merely perform an action; he is slowly actualizing
and building his Self, his person. Man is a substantive reality and the Self consists formally in the actualization of this reality in the world. Due to this actualization, the Self can stand in front of any reality and is thus an “ab-solute” being. However, the Self, which is absolute, is also acquired; and due to this tension, man only a “relatively absolute” being, and is radically restless in life. Man’s personal life then, is a process of actualization of the Self, which is a relatively absolute being.

Man’s person is constituted in respect to reality; reality is a constituting respectivity of the human person as long as the person is with the things. Since this is what constitutes the human person, the reality is ultimate. Moreover, since reality is what enables the human to be his Self, reality is also possibilitating. Man’s reality is then constantly in the making; and since reality impels (moves, drives) to man to actualize his Self, reality is also impelling. This reality dominates with its power, but this dominance is not the result of physical force, but it makes us physically aware of this reality. Thus, religation physically determines man’s absolute being. Reality is “what makes me be I.”

What is reality, then? It’s not something like a sea that bathes or submerges things. Reality is a character of things; but the reality of things exceeds their being. “The impression of reality is physically transcendental to each thing. Because of this, real things have the power of determining my relatively absolute being.” In each thing we infer that being real is more than being this or that. Each thing, in reality, determines the power of the real and the ontological link to reality manifested as religation, and determines the absolute being of man. The “more” present in each thing constitutes the power of the real and determines human personality.

The power of the real is based on the “strange unity” between what a thing is concretely and the moment where being real is being “more”. What is this character of reality itself where things understood as real “more” than the things themselves? Zubiri explains this maintaining that each thing is a vehicle of a character and power that is not exhausted in the concrete things, but surpasses them.

But this is not clear by any means, and this uncleanness comes from things themselves. This is the “enigma” of reality; reality is constitutively enigmatic. Because of this, we are religated to the power of the real in an enigmatic way. The enigma of reality makes us restless because in every action, man feels a double question: “What is going to become of me, of my absolute being? And, What am I going to make of myself since I am making that being?”

The power of the real throws intelligence towards this enigma, and makes intelligence aware of the radical foundation of each real thing in religation. “Religation is religation to reality in its enigma.” The root of this enigma is that the power of the real is grounded in reality itself; but this reality is beyond each concrete thing in itself. There is another reality which grounds “the” reality; and since this reality determines my relatively absolute being, it must be an absolutely absolutely reality. Zubiri identifies this absolutely absolute reality with God.

The power of the real can be found in the concrete reality of each thing. Since the power of the real is God as an absolutely absolute reality, He “is present formally in things constituting them as real.” Thus, the relationship God-world is panentheistic:

The presence of God in real things is primarily that of a formal character. God is not primarily present in real things as the cause is in its effect, but is present constituting them formally as real. The possible effective causation of God with respect to things is an ulterior interpretation required by something prior: by the formal presence of God in things. And this presence consists in the fact that the reali-
God is in things themselves and things are in God. That’s why each thing is ambivalent: on one hand each thing is its own reality but on the other is constituted in the absolutely absolute reality that is God. “Each thing, on one hand, concretely is its own irreducible reality; but, on the other, is formally constituted in the absolutely absolute reality, in God. The ambivalence of reality simply consists in this double moment of not being God, yet being now, formally, constituted in God.”

Consequently, God exists, and is formally and wonderfully constituting the reality of each thing. Because of this He is the fundamento of the reality of each thing and of the power of the real in it.

Zubiri summarizes his via phenomenologica to God on these steps:

1. Man’s personal life consists in actualizing his Self, a relatively absolute Self, by religation.
2. This Self is acquired and actualized by the physical operation of the power of the real as ultimate, possibilitating and impelling.
3. This power of the real is more than reality itself.
4. But the power of the real is grounded in the very structure of reality, distinct from real things, but constituting things as such. This reality is God.

We see, then, that in order to prove God’s existence, Zubiri resorts to a panentheistic view of God where He grounds all reality by the ontological link of religation.

After establishing his via phenomenologica, Zubiri discusses some specific aspects of his transcendental view of God.

a) God as an Ultimate, Possibilitating and Impelling Reality

Zubiri describes the transcendental reality (God) as reality with three modes: ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling.

God is an ultimate reality not because He is the Creator (though He is Creator). God is the ultimate reality because for things, the reality is a physical moment of them grounded in God’s presence in them. “Without God, things would not be real. God is, then, the ground of the ultimate-ness of reality and of its power.” God is also the ground for reality being possibilitating, because God is the possibility of possibilities; He is the absolute possibility and Giver of possibilities. This enables man the possibility of actualize his Self from God. Finally, God is impelling in the building of the Self. Since God is the absolute reality, He impels man to build his (relatively) absolute being.

By these modes God is the ground of reality; He constitutes it beyond the four classical causes. This grounding is called by Zubiri the power of the real.

b) The Power of the Real and Deity in Zubiri’s Panentheism

The ground of all reality is for Zubiri the power of the real. This power comes from God’s formal and constituting presence in all real things. It is not God’s power, but it is a vehicle of it.

This ontological structure of the power of the real is another vehicle of God in Zubiri’s panentheism:

Certainly, the power of the real is not formally the power of God, just as a real thing is not formally God. But the power of the real “transports” the power of God, transports God as power: real things are, on that account, the “seat” of God as power. Insofar as it is founded in God, the power of the real is “vehicle” and “seat.”

God is in all things constituting them in their reality. The power of the real is manifestation of the absolutely absolute reality which is God. Things are “seat” of

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God. It is an ontological condition which is far beyond being mere effects. Insofar as things are seat of God, they are deity.\textsuperscript{124} Deity is reality itself when they show that they are constituted in God. “Real things \textit{qua} real are the deity which manifests God, who is in them formally, constituting them. And because of this character of deity they are the manifestation, the vehicle of God.”\textsuperscript{125}

Here we have the three cornerstones of the ontological structure of Zubirian panentheism:

1. God is present in all things and all things are in God; and God grounds their reality by the power of the real.
2. Things are a seat of God’s immanent presence and this gives them “deity”.
3. Finally, man accesses this reality by the phenomenological device of religation.

In Zubiri’s own words:

God regarded as God is the absolutely absolute reality as ultimateness, possibilization and impellence, formally present in real things and constituting their reality. That reality is eo ipso deity and manifestation of God, not in a general and abstract way, but in all the concretion history reveals to us. Such is the reality of God, justified by the way of religation.\textsuperscript{126}

c) God as Ground of the Human Self and The Reality

By the link of religation, God is the ground of any reality and specifically of human life; He is the reality-ground. As such, God grounds human freedom, the course of human life and the execution of human actions.\textsuperscript{127} However, Zubiri is adamant in maintaining the distinction between God and man but the core of this distinction stems from his panentheistic view of God: “precisely because man is not God, it is God who is making that man not be God, and that this “not-being-God” be a way of being “in” God.”\textsuperscript{128} The relationship between God and human Self is not a boundary; it is a \textit{theological tension}.\textsuperscript{129}

The theological tension constitutes the human Self. Each human build his own Self; but it is God the One who makes each human build his own Self. “God is not mere \textit{natura me naturans}, but \textit{realitas me reificans}.”\textsuperscript{130} Since this is essential to God’s function, it also follows that man is \textit{implanted} into God, “metaphysically immersed” into him.

Zubiri is now ready to offer a more specific description of his theology.

\textbf{Characteristics of God’s Reality}

Once he worked out the details of his phenomenological-transcendental variety of panentheism, Zubiri offers a view of God’s reality in two stages: first, he deals with characters dealing with God considered in Himself and then he considers some aspects of the God-world relationship.

a) God considered in Himself

Zubiri starts by stating that God is the “absolutely absolute” reality: “an absolutely absolute reality is the reality, which is “in and by itself” full and absolute reality considered as reality.”\textsuperscript{131} This does not mean, however, that God is the highest Being, or the classical theistic notion that identifies God’s essence with His existence. The reason is that God’s existence is fundamentally different to any other existence of real things. God is “a reality, which through elevation is not only above and beyond the difference of essence and existence, but also above and beyond its alleged identity.”\textsuperscript{132} God’s metaphysical essence of God is to be an absolutely absolute reality, and the identity of essence and existence in God are consequential to this, and not the reverse.

Since this absolutely absolute reality is one and unique, the world is one and unique and its foundation, i.e., God, is
also one and unique. Because of this, Zubiri regards any polytheism as metaphysically impossible. The unicity belongs to God as a transnumerical character. The absolutely absolute reality (God) cannot be one because there are no other similar realities; God is one because the absolutely absolute reality is absolutely one in and of itself.

Besides being one, God is also a concrete reality, an absolutely concrete reality. This concretion manifests in a personal reality: “In His absolute concretion, God is essentially personal.”133 Moreover, it is a dynamic reality. “Dynamic” does not mean here that God is subject to a development process as in Hegelian thought or process philosophy; “Dynamism is neither action nor operation; to my way of thinking, it is what I have called ‘giving of oneself’”134 and “the divine life is not a becoming”.135 Dynamism means here the self-possession of the reality in itself; and for Zubiri this is the essence of life itself. Thus, God as an absolutely absolute reality implies His aseity, His self-actuality, and therefore He is Absolute Life in Himself. To put it in other words, God is an absolutely absolute reality, and thus He is a personal reality, and therefore He is a living reality.

God’s self-actuality is above all an actuality in the sense of presentation of reality to Himself and thus, God’s self-actualization is also His intelligence. Since this intelligent self-actuality is self-possession, it is also fruition in the fullness of His own reality. Because of this, God’s self-actuality considered as self-possession is also God’s will. Therefore, God’s self actualization is in fact the key to God’s intelligent and rational life. Note that when speaking about God, Zubiri inverts the chain of faculties in human psychology: Intelligence and will are moments of God’s life, which in turn is a consequence of His personhood, which in turn is a grounding principle of God’s metaphysical reality:

In God, to my way of thinking, personhood is not consequent upon substantive reality nor upon His life, but is the very principle of it. Intelligence and volition are the way of being absolutely His-own, the way of realizing Himself with respect to what He already is as person. This clearly shows that, in God, intelligence and volition are necessary intrinsic moments of His substantive reality. The His-ownness (suidad) is the fundament of life, and life is the fundament of intelligence and volition.136

In summary, Zubiri ascribes the following characters to God when considered in Himself: absolutely absolute reality, unicity, uniqueness, concreteness, dynamism (in the sense of actuality, not development), personhood, life, intelligence and will. It is fair, thus, to conclude that Zubiri’s inner picture of God is fairly classical and roughly consistent with classical theism.

b) God Considered in Respect to Real Things and the World

Zubiri understands God’s relation to real things as a panentheistic relationship. God is the grounding reality or realitas fundamentalis.137 However, God as an absolutely absolute reality is independent of things. We cannot know God effectively in Himself, but only as a ground and foundation of real things.138 However, Zubiri seems to imply that the God-things relationship is different from a typical World-Soul relationship:

God is not grounding things as a kind of spirit underlying them; this would be an absurd animism. God is grounding things as an absolute self-giving. To ground is to self-give.139

Zubiri then specifies the relationship God-things among panentheistic lines. The formal presence of God in things is intrinsic to real things, to the point that there is no physical or metaphysical separation among God and things; but there is a real distinction between God and things. For
Zubiri, this is God's “transcendence”: “This characteristic, according to which God is present in things with a formal and intrinsic presence, yet things are not God, is precisely what I call the transcendence of God “in” reality.” God is not transcendent to things; God is transcendent in things:

The transcendence of God does not consist in being beyond things, but the other way around. Transcendence is precisely a mode of being in them, that mode in accordance with which they could not be real in any sense, unless they formally included in their reality the reality of God, without this in any sense making God identical to the reality of things.140

Zubiri thinks that by applying his concept of “transcendence” he can avoid both extremes of pantheism and deism or agnosticism. He denies pantheism because God’s being “in” things is also an alterifying (or otherifying) “in” and thus an identity between God and things would be impossible. He also denies deism and agnosticism, i.e., stating that God is absent from things, because things without God would not be real. “The transcendence of God is neither identity nor remoteness, but transcendence in things.”141

The panentheism of Zubiri is reinforced by universalizing the statements with respect to things to the world. Things in reality have the attribute of respectivity, and the unit of respectivity is the world. Therefore, anything that can be predicated of the God-things relationship can be said also of the God-world relationship:

Hence, the formal and transcendent presence of God in things is a presence in the whole world as such. God is transcendent in things, and because of this He is transcendent in the world. Indeed, for the same reason that the transcendence of God is not identity or remoteness, the presence of God in the world is neither remoteness nor identity.142

Consequently, Zubiri also denies God's identity with the world and God's absence from it as it would be in deism or agnosticism; and the relationship between God and the world is also a classic statement of panentheism:

God is simply transcendent “in” the world. The fundamentality of God is the worldly transcendence of God. The world formally carries God in itself.143

God’s presence in things is not only formal and intrinsic, but also a constituting presence. God makes things real and thus God, as an absolutely absolute reality is a fountain-ality of reality; God is realitas fontanalis.

For Zubiri, then, God is an absolutely absolute reality, concrete, personal, living, intelligent and willing, the power of the real, the ultimate, possibilitating and impelling reality, and the ground of religation.

Summary

In Man and God, Zubiri develops an impressive feat: expound a coherent natural theology where he develops a transcendental view of God that is yet compatible to standard Roman Catholic doctrine. Using religation as a key phenomenological device, he embarks in an explanation or justification of the reality of God via a phenomenological epokhê or analysis. He finds God as the ground of all reality, the foundation of the power of the real, an absolutely absolute reality that is ultimate, possibilitating and impelling. In Himself He is one, personal, living, intelligent and willing; and with respect of the world He is the ground of all reality. God is ontologically linked to the world as a transcendental personal power, grounding and giving Being to all reality.

A comparison of Zubiri’s theology in Man and God with the theology developed in Nature, History, God shows that Zubiri’s theology is now more complete, with
themes that were previously hinted now fully developed (i.e., religation). Despite the span of almost forty years between these two books, the coherence of thought between the ideas in both books is remarkable.

2. Conclusions

After considering the distinctive features of Zubiri’s theology in both Nature, History, God and Man and God, the remarkable uniformity and conceptual coherency between two works that are separated by a time span of roughly four decades is nothing short of remarkable. There are developments, of course, such as the concept of the power of the real; but the key concepts such as religation, deity, and the phenomenological epokhé as a method to access God’s reality show an amazing continuity. Nevertheless, there is a refinement of concepts and themes in the latter work. By Man and God, Zubiri shows his theology as one of the pillars of his thought, and a powerful contribution to philosophy in itself.

This study shall conclude by first examining the issue of whether there is a panentheism in Zubiri’s theology; second, by considering whether this panentheism could be described as a transcendental panentheism; third, by contrasting the peculiar aspects of Zubiri’s panentheism against Cooper’s 5-point matrix; and then a final evaluation will be attempted.

There Is a Panentheism in Zubiri’s theology

There is no doubt that Zubiri’s view of God is strongly immanentistic, a characterization that is common to both panentheism and modern classical theism. Many statements given by Zubiri are consistent with panentheism, but they cannot exclude a strongly immanentistic version of classical theism. God is the power of the real and the ground of all reality. For Zubiri, God is in the world and constitutes any and all reality.

However, there are other statements that are consistent with panentheism. There are places in both Nature, History, God and Man and God where Zubiri speaks not only of God’s presence in the world, but also of the world in God. In view of this evidence, this study concludes that there is a panentheism in the theology of Xavier Zubiri.

Zubiri strongly affirms the immanence of God in the world at an extent that borders on pantheism. In “God and Deification” he maintains that a necessary consequence of the chain of being is the cosmic unity of creation and the unity of being and God (who Himself is beyond being). Religation guarantees this ontological link of immanence.

At the same time, Zubiri denies emphatically that his view of the God-world relationship should be considered as pantheism; that is, he denies that the God-world relationship should be understood as an identity. Zubiri denies such identity and instead maintains a distinction between God and the world. Furthermore, the necessary character of the unity of God and the world should not be extended to the act of creation itself. Once created, the cosmic unity of being and God is necessary; but creation itself is contingent because it is the product of God’s freedom.

A good summary of the God-world relationship in Zubiri is provided by Antonio González, who does so while managing to avoid the use of the term “panentheism”.

This means then that God is not segregated from the world, and the access to Him is not, then, a fleeing from the world, but a deepening in the reality of things. This is not pantheism because God is an absolutely absolute reality with respect to the world. But also it is not possible to maintain that God and the world are “two” realities. God and the world are not two, but they are not one, neither. It is not about identity or duality, but precisely about transcendence. God is transcendental “in” things, without being separated from them. This is what Zubiri means when he writes “God
transcends the world, but the world is immanent to God.”

Since Zubiri states both the ontological immanence of God in the world and the world in God, and the distinction between God and His creatures, his view of God is a form of panentheism.

**Zubiri’s Panentheism Is a Transcendental Panentheism**

For Zubiri, God is the power of the real. Religation exposes man to an ultimate reality which Zubiri calls “deity”. What deity does, among other things, is to present all that is real to man by religation and manifest what is real as being grounded with God. This characterization of God could be described as transcendental. In fact, Zubiri describes the absolutely absolute reality as transcendental to things.

In fact, since God constitutes all reality and is behind of all things as the power of the real accessed by religation, it is inescapably a transcendental reality. God is a reality which determines our existence, using the power of the real as a condition for the apprehension of things, and is timeless and universal, the ground of both objects and subject.

Moreover, this is not an accidental or side feature of Zubiri’s panentheism; it is mediated by the key themes of religation, deity, the power of the real, the absolutely absolute reality, and transcendence. Thus, it is an essential, distinguishing, pervasive characterization of Zubiri’s view of God.

Therefore, this study concludes that Zubiri’s panentheism can be thought of as a transcendental panentheism.

**Zubiri’s Panentheism and Cooper’s Matrix**

As previously stated in this paper, Cooper offers a matrix of distinctions to study panentheism. These are:

1. Explicit or implicit panentheism.
2. Personal or nonpersonal panentheism.
3. Part-whole or relational panentheism.
4. Voluntary or natural panentheism.
5. Classical or modern panentheism.

This matrix will now be applied to Zubiri’s panentheism.

**Explicit or implicit panentheism**

There are some contemporary panentheists who never identified themselves as such despite meeting with the standard definition, such as Teilhard de Chardin or Pannenberg. On the other hand, there are other thinkers who explicitly identified themselves as panentheists, such as Moltmann or Philip Clayton. Where does Zubiri falls in this distinction?

The answer should be evident. Even though Zubiri’s view of God is clearly panentheistic, Zubiri never identified his view as such. Therefore, Zubiri’s panentheism should be regarded as an implicit panentheism.

A question could be raised on why Zubiri did not identify himself as a panentheist. Of course, perhaps he was not aware of the concept; but there are two difficulties to this notion: first, because Zubiri was one of the leading philosophical minds of his time, regarded as a peer by Husserl and Heidegger, and possessed an astonishing breadth of knowledge.

Thus, it is somewhat unlikely that he was not exposed to this concept. Secondly, it should be kept in mind that Zubiri is a Spaniard, raised at the beginnings of the 20th century. Krause, the inventor of the term “panentheism” was highly influential in Spain, to the point that Julián Marías states that his thought “enjoyed an unusual vitality” in that country. Krausism was mediated in Spain by his chief Spanish apologist, Julián Sanz del Río (1814-1869) and later by Francisco Giner de los Ríos (1839–1915). The term “panentheism” was well known in Spain by the time of Zubiri’s formative years. And yet, Zubiri does not use the word...
“panentheism” even once despite being a term well known because of the Krausist influence in Spain.

There may be a reason for that. Corominas points out a little known fact of Zubiri’s life, his excommunication in 1922 for his adherence to Modernism, the Roman Catholic counterpart to Liberal Protestantism who was thoroughly condemned by Pope Pius X in his encyclical letter Pastendi dominici gregis (1907). Zubiri later recanted from his Modernist views, but he was always suspicious in the eyes of the Nationalist-Catholic establishment that ruled Spain after the Spanish Civil War. As Corominas aptly puts it:

For Zubiri, Modernism was no mere anecdote. It marked indelibly his life and work, somewhat conditioned the free expression of his faith, and made him adopt a certain restraint up to the end of his days in expressing certain theses. [Zubiri] wanted to be sure that everything that he said was orthodox and he was willing to remain silent before entering again in a conflict with the Church.

This circumstance may explain why Zubiri never wanted to identify his theology as panentheism: he wanted to avoid even the slightest suspicion of heresy. But this is an argument from silence. The real answer, of course, is unknown.

Personal or ground-of-being panentheism

For some thinkers, mostly those of the Neoplatonic tradition, God is the non-personal Ground of Being. For others, mostly modern and contemporary panentheists, God is personal and their panentheism is relational or interpersonal.

On one hand, Zubiri clearly follows the Neoplatonic tradition, and this is clearly shown in the theology of his essay “Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology.” God is the ground of any and all beings and any and all reality; He is the absolutely absolute reality, the ultimate, possibilitating, impelling reality. This would place Zubiri in the ground-of-being field.

On the other hand, however, Zubiri affirms the personal reality of God and describes Him as a personal, living, free, intelligent, and willing reality. Thus, Zubiri’s God would hardly be the non-personal being of non-personal panentheists such as Ruether or Tillich.

Therefore, even though he is influenced by Neoplatonism, it can be maintained that Zubiri is a personal panentheist, because for him God is both the ground-of-being and an eminently personal reality.

Part-whole or relational panentheism

Certain types of panentheism maintains that the world is part of divine nature while others view the world as a relational correlate of God. For Zubiri, the world is “in God”. Moreover, creation is an emanation from God and things are kept in ontological unity with Him. However, Zubiri still maintains a firm distinction between God and the world. Thus, Zubiri should be regarded as a part-whole panentheist, with some qualification.

Voluntary or natural panentheism

This distinction stems from how different panentheisms have answered the question: “Could God exist without a world?” If the answer is that the world is a necessity for God, then this panentheism is natural; while if the answer is that God is free and creation is an act of divine freedom, then we have a voluntary panentheism.

Zubiri’s position on this distinction is clear. He maintains unequivocally the attribute of divine freedom and affirms creation as a product of God’s free agency. Moreover, Zubiri affirms divine freedoms explicitly against gnosticism and Plotinus. He does not even hint to the “compatibilist” compromise on divine freedom. Therefore, in Zubiri we have a distinctly voluntary panentheism.

Classical or modern panentheism

The final distinction is between a panentheism that affirms divine omnipotence and does not allow for creatures to
affect God, which was the case of classical panentheists, or stating that God is affected by human action. In the case of Zubiri, his panentheism is a way to explain how God is the ground of all reality; God affects creatures by the power of the real, but creatures do not affect God. Therefore, Zubiri’s panentheism is a classical panentheism.

Final Evaluation

The contribution of Xavier Zubiri to philosophy is of such a significance that he could be counted, in all justice and without any exaggeration, among the greatest philosophical minds of all time. His approach to the problem of God shows the breadth and depth of thought in Zubiri, as well as the formulation of a theology highly original and yet deeply respectful of Roman Catholic doctrine.

Upon careful examination of the relevant texts in both Nature, History, God and Man and God, this study finds that the theology of Xavier Zubiri is a transcendental panentheism, mediated by a phenomenological device (religation), and characterized as implicit, personal ground-of-being, part-whole, voluntary, and classical. Zubiri maintains a personal God, but modified by a modified Neoplatonic ontology of “chain of being.”

In all, this is the work of a genius, a towering mind who despite his physical self-exile influenced and still remains influential for much of the current Roman Catholic philosophy and theology, and a significant contribution to the history of philosophy.

Notes

4 García, “Inteligencia sentiente, reidad, Dios.”
10 Correa Schake, “Zubiri: la experiencia como vía de acceso del hombre a Dios. Una aproximación inicial a su trilogía religiosa.”
11 Ibid., p. 492.
12 See Germán Marquinez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de Dios,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 8 (2006): 103-110; for Tillich’s panentheism, see John W. Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), chap. 8; David H. Nikkel,


16 Félix Alluntis, quoted by Francisco-Xavier Sotil Baylos, “La conceputación zubiriana de la presencia eucarística de Cristo: críticas y valoración de las mismas,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9 (2007): p. 43, note 186. Here is the relevant part: “Alluntis remembers that Zubiri identifies that presence of God with His transcendence, understood by him—in a way that is different of the traditional sense of the term—not as “being beyond” things (transcend “to”) but precisely as their mode of being “in” them (transcend “in”), by virtue of which things are different of God but not separate from Him. And Alluntis comments that in this point Zubiri “uses expressions that [...] gave motives to people to talk about a Zubirian ‘kind of pantheism’ (pantheism-panentheism). We believe there is no basis for that.”

17 Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 27.


19 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 329-330.


22 For example see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Suma de Teología, Edición dirigida por los Regentes de Estudios de las Provincias Dominicanas en España, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1994), I, q. 19 a. 3 ad 5; I, q. 46, a. 1.


24 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, “Basic Terms and Distinctions in Panentheism”, in Chapter I, pp. 26-30.


32 An existential analysis is an ontological analysis of the existent (Dasein), prior to any psychological, biological or theological descriptions of consciousness, which reveals the consciousness as a phenomenon of the existent (Dasein) presented to it as calling. For a cursory description see Jesús Conill, “La fenomenología en Zubiri,” Pensamiento 53 (1997): p. 121.
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37 Ibid., p. 398.


42 According to the official Zubiri bibliography: *Revista de Occidente* 149 (1935) 129-159.

43 Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista.”


47 Ibid., p. 429.

48 Ibid., p. 431.

49 Garagorri, *La filosofía española en el siglo XX: Unamuno, Ortega, Zubiri*, p. 131-134.


52 Zubiri, *Naturaleza, Historia, Dios*, p. 441. This quote not only echoes Eckart, but also Scotus Erigenea as well, as Zubiri acknowledges in footnote 50 of the essay. See also Cooper, *Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers*, p. 47-52.


54 Ibid., p. 444.


57 Ibid., p. 449; see 1 John 2:16.

58 Ibid., p. 452.

59 Ibid., p. 453.

60 Ibid., p. 453.


62 Ibid., p. 457. Zárraga Olavarria, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 48, note 32 points out that this chapter came out from Zubiri’s exposure to the Russian Orthodox theologian Myrra Lot-Borodine, who was a vehicle for Russian mystics such as Berdiaev, Chestov, Soloviev, Boulgakov and Lossky, among others. Zárraga quotes O. González de Cardenal about the impact of this exposure to Zubiri: “This is the world that Zubiri discovers (in Paris) that it means a revolution for his theological horizon”. On the impact of this course on the whole of Zubiri’s theology, see also Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista”; Melero Martínez, “El problema teológico del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 57.
63 Marta Jiménez Valverde, “La religación en el pensamiento de Xavier Zubiri,” Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 2, no. 6 (1959): 59-64.

64 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 57.

65 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473ff; Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, pp. 45-47.

66 “There is a profound difference, indeed almost an opposition, between agape and eros. But this opposition always occurs within a common root; it is an opposition of direction within the same general line: the ontological structure of reality.” Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 464.

67 Ibid., p. 467-468.

68 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473.

69 Ibid., p. 480-481.


71 Interestingly, when Moltmann explicitly assumes his panentheism in Trinity and the Kingdom he also gives credit to Richard of St. Victor. “The basis [of Moltmann’s panentheism] is Richard of St. Victor’s doctrine of the Trinity” See Moltmann, Trinidad y Reino de Dios: La doctrina sobre Dios, chapter 4, note 17 (p. 122).

72 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 486.

73 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 490.

74 Ibid., p. 491.

75 Ibid., p. 493.

76 See ibid., p. 493, 496.

77 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 495.

78 Ibid., p. 496.

79 Ibid., p. 497. Emphasis of this author.

80 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 497.

81 Ibid., p. 499.

82 Ibid., p. 501.


88 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 118-121.compare with Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 2 a. 3 resp.

89 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121.

90 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121-122.

Alonso and Juan José Ruiz Cuevas (Barcelona: Luis Miracle, Editor, 1958), pp. 254-255.

92 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 123.

93 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 126.


95 Even though Zubiri appears to reject cosmological arguments—based on an outdated notion of causality—in favor of a phenomenological approach based on religation to the power of the real, some have argued that the power of the real in Zubiri is just another notion of causality; see Thomas B. Fowler, “Causality and Personal Causality in the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 10 (2008): 91-112. On the other hand, Antonio González points out that in one of his minor writings, Zubiri appears to have endorsed a cosmological argument for God; see Antonio González, “La vía cósmica hacia Dios según Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 7 (2005): 91-107.

96 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129.

97 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129.


100 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 131.


102 See García, “Legitimidad de las opciones no teístas en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri.”

103 For a concise explanation of the concept, see Fowler, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 10-13.

104 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 135.

105 Ibid., p. 136.

106 Ibid., p. 136.

107 Ibid., p. 140.

108 Ibid., p. 141.


110 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 146.

111 Ibid., p. 80.

112 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 147.

113 Ibid., p. 148.

114 Ibid., p. 148. Emphasis in the original.

115 Ibid., p. 149. Emphasis of this writer.

116 Ibid., p. 149.

117 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 149.


120 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 154-155.

121 See ibid., Appendix 1, p. 89-91; p. 155-156.

122 Ibid., p. 154-155.

123 Ibid., p. 155.

124 Ibid., p. 155-156.

125 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 156.

126 Ibid., p. 157.
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127 Ibid., p. 161. Zubiri claims that these predicates could be valid for any God, and not only for the Christian God.
129 Ibid., p. 161.
130 Ibid., p. 162.
131 Ibid., p. 165.
132 Zubiri, *El hombre y Dios*, p. 166; emphasis of the author of this paper.
133 Ibid., p. 168.
134 Ibid., p. 168.
135 Ibid., p. 169.
138 Ibid., p. 173.
139 Ibid., p. 173.
141 Ibid., p. 176.
142 Ibid., p. 176.
143 Zubiri, *El hombre y Dios*, p. 177; emphasis from the author of this paper.
147 Zubiri, *El hombre y Dios*, p. 141; see also Hernanz Moral, “La constitución del orden transcendental en la metafísica de Xavier Zubiri.”
149 Cooper, *Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers*, chapter 5, p. 121-122.
151 See Aubert, “Modernism.”
154 For example see Fowler, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 6: “[Zubiri] rejects the traditional notion of God as a reality object, instead conceiving of Him as a reality fundament or ground” (Emphasis of the author of this paper).
157 See Cooper, *Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers*, p. 29.
158 However, see Juan Alejandro Navarrete Cano, “Materiales para la elaboración de una teología de la creación desde Zubiri: Análisis de un párrafo del libro “El problema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo,“ *Revista realidad*, no. 112 (2007): 247-257, who tends towards the necessity of the world from what Zubiri wrote in *The Theological Problem of Man: Christianity*. 

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