

Part II

Intelligence and Logos

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this book, we investigated intellectual knowing and its primary and radical mode. This is the problem which I propounded under the title *Intelligence and Reality*. But intellection admits of two *ulterior modes* of intellection; these will be the subject of the second and third parts of the book.

In order to commence this study it will not be out of place to set down some of the essential ideas expounded in Part I; I hope that they will facilitate correct comprehension of Part II.

Above all, intellectual knowing is not an act of consciousness, nor an act of realizing something, because to realize what is intellectually known, it has to be present in the intellection. And this act of capturing something and making it present is what we call *apprehension*. This is the radical act of intellectual knowing, an act of apprehension.

What is this apprehension? Every intellection is an act of apprehension, but not every act of apprehension is intellection. Sensing is also apprehension. These two apprehensions can be directed to the same object, for example a color, a rock, etc. Hence, in order to conceptualize what intellectual apprehension is, the {12} most direct road consists in studying the modes of apprehension of this terminus which is common to both of them.

In the apprehension of this common terminus, for example color, the apprehension has its own radical character: it is sentient apprehension. Sentient apprehension consists in apprehension in impression. Impression is not just an affection of the apprehendor; rather, in this affection the impression presents to us something other than the apprehendor and his affection. This other thing has three constitutive moments: a *content*, a *mode of being other* (which I have called the 'formality of otherness'), and a *force of imposition*. For our problem what is essential is found in the moment of formality. What is apprehended remains in the apprehension according to its for-

mality; this is what I have called *actuality*. Actuality is not presence, but a *being actually* in presence. It is therefore a physical moment of what is apprehended.

Now, this actuality, this being situated or being actually present can have two modes. Something can be actually present as a mere response sign; this is the actuality which I have called 'arousal'. It is the *formality of arousal* or *stimulation*. The characteristics of what is apprehended, for example its luminous intensity or its sound, are thus determining moments of a response. For this reason what is apprehended has an actuality but only as forming part of the response in itself. This is what constitutes *pure animal sensing*.

But there are apprehensions in which the characteristics of what is sensed in an impression are characteristics which are formally apprehended as pertaining to what is apprehended *as its own*: the intensity of a color or a sound is a moment apprehended as a character of its own of the color or the sound. This is what I call *formality of reality*. Reality is the mode of being "of its own", *within* the apprehension {13} itself. "Of its own" signifies that it pertains to what is apprehended even before the apprehension itself (*prius*). As this mode of being situated in the apprehension is a mode of being situated in impression, it follows that the apprehension is an act of *impression of reality*. In it, its content is actual in the impression, but with no reference whatsoever to a response. This is what I call *mere actuality*: what is apprehended is present and is just present. Now, these three moments (impression, of its own, and mere actuality) unitarily constitute what I call being *de suyo*. This is the formality of reality: a mode of otherness which consists in the *de suyo*. It does not refer to reality in the sense of the real as something "outside" of the impression, but to a formality present "in" the apprehension itself. And as such this formality is a physical moment of what is apprehended.

This apprehension of something in the formality of reality is just *sentient intellection*, or if one wishes *intel-*

lective sensing. To apprehend the real as real is precisely the formal character of intellection. Being an impression is the formal character of sensing. Hence the impression of reality is the only act constituted by two moments: impression (sensing) and reality (intellective knowing). This apprehension is a sensing, but not a pure sensing as in the animal, but an intellective sensing, a sensing in which reality is sensed as reality. Man has this human sensing which the animal lacks, but also has a sensing which is purely on an animal level of stimulation in certain zones of his reality. Animal sensing is certainly a sensing “of man”, but is not a “human” sensing. In human sensing, the sensing is already a mode of intellective knowing, and intellective knowing is already a mode of sensing reality. Sensing and intellective knowing are thus not two acts, either successive {14} or concurrent; nor are they partial acts. Rather, they are two structural moments of a single act. This unique structure is therefore *sentient intelligence*, a formal structural unity whose only act is just the impressive actualization of the real.

Since it pertains of its own to what is apprehended, it follows that this formality of reality has two aspects, one opening onto what is apprehended, the other onto the sentient intelligence. The first aspect submerges us in and makes us penetrate into the real itself. The second, on the other hand, leads us to submerge ourselves in the intellection itself. This is what is important to us here, although the two aspects neither are nor can be independent.

The formality of reality is open *qua* reality; a single impression of reality encompasses the most diverse contents. This openness is transcendental; it is not a concept of maximal universality, but a physical commonness of reality and therefore a moment of communication. In virtue of this openness, each thing is *de suyo* real only with respect to others; i.e., every real thing opens onto a *field of reality*. This does not refer to an extrinsic relation among things but to the moment formally constitutive of the openness of each real thing as real. Each real thing has, then, two moments. One, the individual moment (so to speak) of its own reality; the other, the moment of opening up or onto a field, the moment of field nature. They are two moments of a single reality; everything real is individually and in this field-sense real, and is always apprehended in these two moments.

Thus we have here what intellective knowing is, viz. the mere actualization of the real in sentient intelligence.

This intellection has diverse modes, i.e. diverse manners of actualization in the sentient intelligence {15} *qua* intellection, determined, as I said in Part I, by the respectivity of reality itself, by the modes of actualization.

Above all, there is the primary and radical mode, what I have termed the *primordial apprehension of reality*. This primordiality comprises two characteristics. First, what is apprehended is actualized directly, immediately, and unitarily (despite its possible complexity of content, for example in the case of a landscape). This is the apprehension of the real *in and by itself*. The reality thus actualized has twin moments, individual and in a field; but they are apprehended indivisibly as moments of a real thing itself. This is what I term the *compact* apprehension of reality. But primordial apprehension has a second characteristic: it not only apprehends the real compactly in and by itself, but moreover apprehends it “only” in and by itself. The “only” is the modal characteristic of the primordial apprehension of reality.

But there are other modes which are *ulterior modalizations* of this primordial apprehension. The real, in fact, can be apprehended not only as something which has the characteristic of being in a field, but also as something which, by opening up a field, is included in it. Thus the real is not only apprehended as *being in a field*, but the *field itself is apprehended in the same way*, i.e. by means of the field which the real has determined. The moment of being in a field which in the primordial apprehension is actualized compactly together with the individual moment, is now autonomized so to speak with respect to the individual moment. The field is no longer just a compact moment of the real thing, but is the *ambit of reality*, an ambit which encompasses many real things. Thus each real thing should be intellectually known therein not just in and by itself but also with respect to the other {16} realities of the field. In this way we intellectually know not just that the thing *is real* but moreover what the real thing is *in reality*. This “in reality” is an ulterior modalization of the intellection of the thing as real.

Now, the actualization of a thing (i.e. one already intellectually known as real) within the ambit of reality of other things is the intellection which we call *logos*. It is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality, i.e. with respect to other real things. This *logos* is a mode of sentient intellection. It is above all a mode of intellection by being a mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence; this mode is a “re-actualization”. As such, the *logos* is an intellective moment. But this real thing is reactualized in a movement which *bears it* to others, and in function of them; only thus is a real thing reactualized. In accordance with this moment the *logos* is an impressive movement; it is the sentient moment. In it is where what the real thing is in reality is re-actualized. Hence it follows that the *logos* is sentient intellection; it is a *sentient logos*. The sentient *logos* is intellection within a field; it

is a modalization of the impression of reality. To intellectually know what something is in reality is to restore the unity of the field nature moment and the individual moment of the real.

It is essential to observe that we are not dealing with a process but with a structure. When one intellectually knows what something is in reality after having intellectually known it as real, this ‘after’ does not mean that what one does is to “set oneself” to the task of intellectually knowing what that thing is in reality. The intelligence does not “set itself” the task of understanding what something is in reality; rather that task is *already thrust upon it* by reality itself, by the unity of its individual and field aspects. It is reality itself which, upon being apprehended as real, determines its {17} intellection “in” the unity of the field-nature moment and the individual moment. This is not an act which starts from me, but rather is a mode of actualization which starts from reality itself *qua* formally sensed reality. It is the sensed character of

the real which necessarily determines us to understand what something is in reality.

To be sure, the real is not respective only to other things which are real within a field; it is at one and the same time respective to other real things *qua* real, i.e. *qua* of the world. World is the respective unity of everything real *qua* real. But I shall deal with the world and its respectivity to the field in Part III of the book. The second part is devoted to the *sentient intelligence as logos: Intelligence and Logos*.

This study will be conducted in three sections:

Section 1. The intellection of things in the field of reality.

Section 2. The formal structure of sentient logos I: logos as movement, as dynamic structure.

Section 3. The formal structure of sentient logos II: logos as mediated intellection. {18}

SECTION I

INTELLECTION OF THINGS IN THE FIELD OF REALITY

In order to study the intellection of things in the field of reality, we must start from a conceptualization of that field. Every real thing has two moments in its formality of reality: the moment of individual reality and the moment of reality within a field. Hence, the field is a dimensional moment of a real thing. This field-nature moment can be considered in different ways. The field is something determined by each real thing, and this determination has two aspects. One, the most obvious, is that of being actually determined by the real thing itself; the other, that of being something which, determined by each thing, is a field which encompasses all sensed real things. According to the first aspect, reality is something *open* in itself, and according to the second aspect it is something which *includes* all things, it is the *ambit of reality*. Comparing the field to light, we might say that a real thing is above all a source of light, it is *luminous*, it is what bathes the field in light. But seeing that a thing is luminous is not the same thing as seeing that all other things, and the illuminator itself, are *illuminated* by the light which emanates from this real thing. The light from the illuminator insofar as it is such is a note determined by this luminous thing. But if we consider the light as something which illuminates real things, then this light is no longer just a note of each thing, but an ambit which encompasses everything {20} in the ambit of illumination, including the source of light itself. It is indeed not the same thing to see how the light shines forth from the luminous thing as it is

to see this thing as illuminating, as spreading its light over everything else. In this comparison, the light is the field. And through its being determined by each thing, when I apprehend something in primordial apprehension, I do so not just in its moment of individual formality, but also in the moment of its formality within a field. This is true both with respect to it being a note of the illuminator, as in its being an illuminating source of reality. The field is the compact unity of these two aspects.

Granting this, if we apprehend things in the field of reality we can in turn apprehend them in two ways. One, as things which are included in the field; this is to intellectually know them *as of field-nature*. But we can also apprehend them as a function of the field in which they are included; this is to intellectually know them *in the field sense*, i.e., *from within the field*. Apprehending a thing in a field is proper to the primordial apprehension of reality. Apprehending it from within the field is proper to the logos.

Hence there are two steps in our problem:

1. The field of reality.
2. The real as intellectually known from within the field.

They will be the themes of the next two chapters, respectively.

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CHAPTER II

THE FIELD OF REALITY

The field is first and foremost a moment of the formality of each real thing. Therefore understanding the field is something proper to the primordial apprehension of reality. The field is not just something privative with respect to the logos; indeed, it is not a primary moment of the logos. It *is* a moment of the logos, but one which is consequent, i.e., derived from immediate apprehension. It is necessary to insist upon this point: everything we may say about the field is already given in the primordial apprehension of reality of each real thing. Hence, this study should have been included in the first part of the book; but nonetheless I have reserved it for the second part because it is here that the field discharges its most important function.

We shall study the field in three successive phases:

1. General characteristics of the field of real things.
2. Strict concept of the field.
3. Internal structure of the field itself.

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§ 1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD OF REAL THINGS

In general, language has only terms taken from visual apprehension to describe the field. And so, it might seem that the field is only a visual one. But this is a simple limitation of our language. Thus, recall that there are such things as background music, layers of footprints, etc., and that there is a field of displacement as much of things as of my own body. So taking the problem in all of its generality, we may say that the field is the unity of all

these things insofar as all of them *are actually* in it, and therefore the field *encompasses* them. Even when we employ visual language, what is designated by that language is much broader than just the visual. Thus we are treating the field as the ambit of reality.

The field has a general structure which is very important. Above all there is in the field one or several things which are directly apprehended; they constitute the *first level* of the field. And when this first level is reduced to a single thing, that thing then acquires the characteristic of the *center* of the field. With respect to this first level, other things constitute the domain of *the rest*. And the rest of the things have a precise relation to the first level. In the first place, some of them constitute the *background* against which the things of the first level are apprehended. This dimension is what constitutes *standing out*: the things {23} of the first level stand out against the background of the others. But in the second place there are other things which are not part of the background, but simply something which is in the *periphery* of the field. Thanks to this, the rest of the things of the field acquire a dimension of *proximity* or distance. The periphery is not strictly speaking a line but a variable zone. As one extends the things of the periphery, they recede further and further until they are lost. For this reason the periphery is the zone of the indefinite, both because it can remain indeterminate in itself, and because even when it is determined it can remain unnoticed by me. First level, background, and periphery are the triple dimension, so to speak, of the field. To be sure, these structures are not fixed. For example, I can vary the first level—which automatically changes the background and the periphery.

The field thus constituted is so, if I may be permitted the expression, in a private way, because the totality of this field in its three zones (first level, background, periphery) is surrounded at the same time by a line which positively determines what the field encompasses; this is

precisely its *horizon*. The horizon is not merely a line circumscribing it, but an intrinsic moment of the field itself. To be sure, it does not pertain directly to the things apprehended; but it does pertain to them insofar as they are encompassed in my apprehension of them. This circumscribing has two aspects. One determines the things which constitute the field as a totality, with its own character; every field has this kind of total character which we call, in visual terminology, a *panorama*. The intrinsic pertaining of the horizon to the field makes of the latter a panorama. The mode of apprehension of this panorama is *syn-opsis*. The placement of things within the synoptic panorama {24} is *syn-taxis*. Synopsis and syntaxis are the aspects of the panoramic unity of apprehension.

But the horizon also has another aspect. An horizon is what marks that which is outside the field. This is not “other” things but the pure “outside”. It can be other things outside the field, or something which is outside of everything, viz. the “undefined”. It is necessary to stress that “indefinite” is not the same as “undefined”. The indefinite is a mode of definition; the “undefined” is not defined even in the sense of indefinite. This difference is essential. The things outside of the field are the undefined.

To be sure, as I have already indicated the structure of the field is not fixed but variable. That dimension of it by which the field is variable is what we call *amplitude*. The amplitude is variable as much by amplification as by retraction. And by this I do not just refer to the quantity of things which the field encompasses, but to the mode of its unity as a field. This variation depends not only on me, but also on things. Above all, new things modify the horizon; this is the *displacement* of the horizon. Moreover, every new thing which is introduced into the field, removed from it, or moved inside of it, determines a change in the first level, in the background, and in the periphery; this is a very profound *reorganization* of the field. Displacement of the horizon and internal reorganization are the two aspects of variability of the field. They are not always independent of each other, but we cannot get into this question or other problems concerning the field because it would take us away from the central question. Let what has been said suffice for now.

Next we shall try to conceptualize with some rigor what this field is.

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§ 2

THE STRICT CONCEPT OF FIELD

Let us proceed step-by-step.

1) Above all, we are here posing a very fundamental problem. The panoramic constitution of the field in its two aspects of apprehensive synopsis and positional syntaxis might lead one to think that the field is always something extrinsic to things. But this, as we are going to see, is not the case. The field is nothing beyond real things; I shall repeat that over and over. And even when describing the field I spoke of what is “beyond” the horizon, this “beyond” pertains to the things of the field themselves. Without these things it would not make sense to speak of “beyond them”. The field, then, is something in the things themselves. We shall see this immediately.

The field of which we have been speaking can be described first of all through its content, by the things that are in it: rocks, trees, the sea, etc. But the field can and ought to be described according to its own unity. This unity, from the viewpoint of the things it contains, constitutes what can be called the *perceptive field*. But this denomination is quite inappropriate as we shall see forthwith. Clearly, in this sense the field does not concern the things themselves. That some of them may be near or far, that some may be in the center or the periphery of my apprehension, has nothing to do with the things themselves (at least formally). It is only my perceptive act which encompasses them in a single field. {26} The character of the field is constituted in this case only by my perceptive act. The field is thus extrinsic to the things. To be sure, the things themselves are not completely detached from their position in the field; their size, for example, is not indifferent to their position in the field. But even so, these things which the perceptive act encompasses in unity, are things by reason of their specific content.

Nonetheless, these same things can and ought to be described not only by their content but also by their formality; they are things which are formally real in apprehension. Therefore it is necessary to speak of a *field of reality*. That which, as I said, we improperly call a ‘perceptive field’ is nothing but the apprehended content of the field of reality. Strictly speaking, one ought to speak only of a field of real things. The field of reality, in contrast to what up to now we have called the perceptive field, is open in and by itself; in and by itself it is unlimited. On the other hand, described from the point of view of the content of things, the field is closed by the things which constitute and limit it. The merely perceptive field

offers a panorama of things; the field of reality offers a panorama of realities. In fact, let us suppose that in this perceptive field there is a light which is turned off, and all of a sudden it is turned on. From the point of view of the content, i.e., with respect to what we have called the perceptive field, there is something new: a new light in the meadow or on the mountain. But from the point of view of the field of reality there is a real thing which comes from beyond the reality that was apprehended before. And it comes not only to the meadow or the mountain but also to the *reality* of my field; it is something new *in reality*. With it the horizon of reality has been pushed back, although not so for the {27} horizon of the things seen. With the entrance of the light in the merely perceptive field, this field has been additively enriched; viz., another thing has been added to those that were there before. But from the point of view of reality, there is not properly speaking an addition; rather, what has happened is that the character of the field of reality has encompassed, so to speak, a real thing which previously was not in it.

Therefore, this amplification of the field of reality is not properly speaking “addition” but rather “expansion”; what constitutes the formality of the new thing is numerically the same character of reality which constituted the rest of the things of the field. The real as “thing” is now distinct; but this thing as “real”, i.e. its formality of reality, is physically and respectively the same in number. Whence it follows that what has happened is that the field of reality has been expanded in order to encompass a new thing. The amplification or contraction of the field of reality, i.e. the changes of the field of real things perceptively apprehended as real is not additive but expansionary. Thus, in contrast to the perceptive field (in the sense of a thing contained in the field), which is extrinsic to things, the field of reality is intrinsic to them; it is given to me in the impression of reality. This reality is, as we saw, formally and constitutively open. And this openness concerns the impression of reality as such, and therefore all the modes of presentation of the real. Among them there is one, the mode of the “toward”. What is now important about this “toward” is that the other realities are in this case, as we have already said, other real things *with respect to which* each is what it is. Now, this respectivity is formally what constitutes the moment of each real thing in virtue of which each thing is in a field. This field is thus determined by each real thing with {28} respect to itself, from which it follows that each real thing is intrinsically and formally of a field nature.* Even were there no

more than a single thing, this thing would be *de suyo* of field nature. That is, every real thing, besides having what we might loosely call ‘individual respectivity’, formally and constitutively has field-nature respectivity. Every real thing, then, has the two moments of individual “thingness” and field-nature thingness. Only because each real thing is intrinsically and formally of field-nature, only for this reason can the field be constituted by many things.

If we wish to express in a single word the nature of the field such as we have just described it, we can say that the field “exceeds” or “goes beyond” a real thing inasmuch as it is an opening toward others. The field-nature moment is a moment of “excedence” of each real thing. And because this moment is at the same time constitutive of the real thing, it follows that the field is both excedent and constitutive; it is a “constitutive excedent”. So more concretely, What is this field-nature moment of the real, i.e., what is this excedence, this going beyond?

2. The field, we said, is “something more” than each real thing and therefore something more than their simple *sum*. It is a proper *unity* of real things, a unity which exceeds what each thing is individually, so to speak. Since thing and field have, as we saw in Part I, a cyclic character, i.e., each thing is a “field-thing”, that excedence can be seen from two points of view: the field as determined from real things, and real things *qua* included in the field.

A) Viewed from real things, the field-nature excedence is a mode of what in Part I we called ‘transcendence’. Transcendentality is a moment of {29} the impression of reality, that moment in virtue of which reality is open both to what each thing really is, to its “its-own-ness”, and to what each thing is *qua* moment of the world. It is, in a synthetic formula, “openness to the its-own-ness of the world”. And because this openness is constitutive of the impression of reality as such, it follows that the openness is what makes each real thing, by being real, to be more than what it is by being green, sonorous, heavy, etc. Every real thing is in itself, *qua* real, something which is itself and only itself; but by being real it is more than what it is by its simple content. This is a transcendental excedence, and it is proper to every real thing in and by itself. But when there are many real things in the same impression of reality, then transcendentality is what makes it possible for these things to comprise a supra-individual unity; this is the field-sense unity. “Field” is not formally transcendentality, but a field is a sentient mode (though not the only one) of transcendentality. The respectivity of the many sensed things becomes field-nature respectivity in virtue of transcendentality. Tran-

* [‘Field nature’ translates Zubiri’s *campal*. It means being within a field, and furthermore that this is an essential characteristic of the thing.-trans.]

scendentality is what sentiently constitutes the field of reality; it is the very sentient constitution of the field of reality. The field as exceeding real things is the field of their transcendental respectivity. In this way, the field is a moment of physical character.

B) But it is also necessary to see things from the standpoint of the field. In this sense, the field is something more than the real things because it “encompasses” them. Upon apprehending the formality of reality, we apprehend it as something which, to be sure, is in a thing and only there, but which exceeds it as well. And thus this formality acquires a function which in a certain way is autonomous. It is not only the formality of each real thing, but {30} that “in which” all things are going to be apprehended as real. It is the formality of reality as *ambit of reality*. The field is excedent not only as transcendental, but also as the ambit of reality. It is the same structure but seen now not from the standpoint of things but *vice versa*, so that things are seen from the standpoint of the field.

The ambit is a physical characteristic of the field of reality the same as its transcendentality; it is the ambit of a real thing itself.

The ambit is not some sort of material *covering* or *wrapping*, like some atmosphere which envelopes the real things. In particular, I stress that the ambit is not space. In the first place, space is not a radical part of things, but something determined by something radical in them, viz. spaceness. Things are spacious, and only because of this is there space. Spaceness is neither relative nor absolute space. But neither is the ambit spaceness. What spaceness and space are is something which has to be understood with respect to the ambit, and not the other way around—as if the ambit were either space or spaceness. The ambit is rather something like the *ambience* which things generate. Therefore it is nothing which goes beyond them. The ambience is ambient “in” things themselves just as transcendentality is transcendentality “in” them. Nonetheless, things and their ambience of reality are not formally identical. The ambit is the ambience “in” things; it is a physical characteristic of them, consisting above all in being the ambient of real things. The ambience is not the atmosphere which surrounds things but the ambience which they themselves determine. This is respectivity as ambit. And for the same reason this ambience is not a *void of reality*—that would be for us to leave real things altogether and is impossible. The ambit is the ambit of the proper formality of reality, which is {31} perfectly physical. Encompassing is just a physical moment of the formality of reality; it is respectivity *qua* constitutive of the field.

In summary, the field of reality has two important characteristics which express its excedence with respect to real things. The field is “more” than each real thing, but is more “in” them. The field is, in fact, the respectivity of the real *qua* given in the impression of reality. And this respectivity is at one and the same time transcendentality and ambit. They are the two characteristics which give to respectivity its full meaning. Like transcendentality, the respectivity of the real leads in a certain respect from each real thing to other realities. As ambit it is the ambient which encompasses each real thing. Ambit and transcendentality are but two aspects of a single characteristic: the field-nature of the sensed real. This characteristic is what we shall always call *transcendental ambit*. The formality of the real thus has two aspects. On one hand, it is the formality of each thing in and by itself, what loosely speaking might be termed “individual formality”. But on the other hand it is an excedent formality in the thing, i.e., it is a field-nature formality. And this field-natureness is transcendental ambit.

Anticipating some ideas I may say that according to the moment which I have termed ‘individual’, the intellection of a real thing consists in intellectually knowing it as real: “this thing is real”. According to the moment which I have termed ‘field-nature’, the intellection of the real thing intellectually knows reality as being this thing in this way in reality: “reality is this thing”. They are not two different apprehensions but two moments of a single apprehension; but as moments they are distinct.

In the transcendental ambit we have the general character, {32} or the global character, so to speak, of what we call the ‘field of reality’. But it is necessary to take one more step; it is necessary to ask ourselves, in fact, What is the intrinsic structure of the field of reality, of the transcendental ambit of reality? This is the subject of the next section.

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§ 3

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIELD OF REALITY

In virtue of being a transcendental ambit, the field of reality can contain many real things. But it does not contain them in just any form, i.e., as some mere multitude; on the contrary, this multitude has very precise structural characteristics. They are the very structure of the field of reality. It is a structure which, as I will state, is given in the primordial apprehension of reality.

1

Some Things “Among” Others

In order to discover the structures of the field of reality, let us start from the fact that reality, such as it is given to us in impression, has different forms, one of which is the “toward” by which reality inexorably leads us to other realities. This does not refer to an inference or anything of that nature, nor is it a going toward reality; rather, it is an apprehending of reality itself in the mode of “toward”, in a directional mode as a moment of reality. This “toward” is not just a mode of reality’s presenting itself, but is, like the other modes, a mode of presentation which is transcendently open. This means that every thing *by virtue of being real* is in itself of field nature; every real thing constitutes a form of reality “toward” another. To be sure, the “toward” is formally {34} a form of reality; but the “toward” in transcendental openness (proper to the impression of reality) is formally of field nature. And since this impression is numerically identical in all real things apprehended in an impression, it follows that in the field determined by the reality of *each* thing all the others are there as well. This is a structural and formal moment of the field; the field determines the reality of each thing as a reality “among” others. The “among” is grounded in the field nature and not the other way around; it is not the case that there is a field because there are some things situated among others, but rather some things are situated among others only because each and every one of them is in the field. And there is a field precisely and formally because the reality of each thing is formally of field nature. The “among” is not just a conglomeration; nor is it the mere relation of some things with others. Rather, it is a very precise structure, that of the actualization of one thing among others.

To be sure, the “among” is a moment of the *actuality* of the real: a real thing as such is among others. But the “among” also has a characteristic of *actuality*: the thing is actualized “among” others. Clearly these two aspects of “among” do not coincide, because there can be many things situated among others which are not intellectually present in actuality. What is important to us here is the “among” of actuality. It is a positive characteristic proper to each real thing *qua* of field nature. The “toward” of field-natureness is above all a “toward” in “among”, or in other words, an “among” which positively has the characteristic of a “toward” of reality. If this were not the case, the “among” would be pure emptiness. But it is a field because it is reality open in a “toward” from each

thing to all the others. And it is so because that openness is in turn determined by the reality of each thing. By being determined by the reality of each thing, the “toward” is a {35} real “toward”; it is reality in “toward”. And it is in this that the field as “among” consists. Because of this things are not only some among others, so to speak materially, i.e. in actuality; but moreover they have a *position* with respect to others, they are among others by reason of their actuality. The field as the first plane, as the periphery, as the horizon, is just the structure of positionality; i.e., the structure of the “among” as a “toward”. The field is not only something which *encompasses* things, but prior to doing so is something in which they are *included*, each and every one. Prior to encompassing things, and in order to be able to encompass them, the field includes the things in itself. And this inclusion is grounded in the field-nature characteristic of each real thing *qua* real. Hence: 1) the real thing determines the field; 2) the field determines the inclusion of the real in it; and 3) the field encompasses what is included in it. Such is the first structural moment of the field, *viz.*, the position in the “among”. Etymologically ‘among’ means the interior determined by two things. But each one represents the possibility of this determination because each thing is real in the “toward”. In this way the “among” is a moment of the transcendental ambit.

But this is not the only structural moment of the field, because things are not only *various* but *variable*.

2

*Some Things as a “Function” of Others**

All things are variable in the field of reality. Above all, they can enter and leave it, or change their position with respect to other things. But in addition, each note, for example {36} color, size, etc., taken in and by itself, is something which can change and does change. Now, when we apprehend various things in a field, none of them is apprehended monolithically, so to speak, as if the unity of the field were merely additive. On the contrary, each thing is actualized together with others, or after them, or outside of them, or on the periphery of the field, etc. Each real thing in a field is actualized not just “among” other things but also as a function of them. Po-

* [Zubiri is here adopting language from mathematics, e.g. variable x is a *function* of y and z . The sense is that each thing is connected in an essential way to others, and changes in terms of (or as a “function” of) their actions.-trans.]

sition, so to speak, is proper to a thing “among” others, but this is an “among” in which each thing has the position it does as a function of the others, and changes as a function of them. A real thing can disappear from the field; but this is never a type of volatilization of the thing, but a ceasing to be “among” the other things. Hence, it always (and only) disappears as a function of them. The unity of the field-nature moment and the individual moment is a functional “among”; it is what I term the *functionality of the real*. Here ‘functionality’ is taken in its broadest sense, and hence without any allusion to the diverse types of functionality which can be present. The fact that a thing is of field nature implies a character of functionality that is radical. Conversely, real things are not primarily *encompassed* by the field, but rather each is *included* in it, as we say; encompassing is grounded upon inclusion. Now, the mode of field-nature inclusion of each real thing has the intrinsic and formal characteristic of *functionality*.

What is this functionality? I have already described it: it is dependence in the broadest sense of the word. This functional dependence can assume diverse forms. We may cite some which are of special importance. Thus, a real thing can change as a function of another real thing which has preceded it; this is pure {37} succession. Succession is a type of functionality. The same must be said of something which is not successive but rather coexistent, namely when one real thing coexists with another. Coexistence is now functionality. From this point of view, every real thing in the field occupies a position by virtue of a field-nature function, in the field; it is next to other things, it is in the first plane or on the periphery, etc. But there are still other forms of functionality. Real material things are constituted by points. Each point is “outside” of the others; it is an *ex*. But it is not something which is simply outside; rather, the *ex* is a unity constructed with respect to the other *ex*’s as points of the thing. We express this by saying that every *ex* is an “*ex-of*”. In virtue of this every point has a necessary position with respect to other points by reason of its “*ex-of*” or “*out-of*”. This quality of position in the “*ex-of*” is what I call *spaciocity*. It is a property of each material reality. Now, the functionality of real spacious things *qua* spacious is space; this is *spacility*. Space is grounded in *spaciocity*. And this functionality depends upon the other notes of the things. That is to say, it is things which determine the structure of the functionality, i.e. the structure of space. As I see it, this determination is movement; the structure of space is thus the geometric cast of movement. (Naturally, I do not refer to geometric space but to physical space.) It can be quite varied: topological, affine, and metric structures, for

example, and under this latter there are different metrics, viz. Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Succession, coexistence, position, *spaciocity* and *spacility*, etc., and types of functionality. I do not claim to have made anything like a complete enumeration; I have only mentioned these cases to exemplify functional dependence. {38}

This functionality is, I said, an intrinsic and formal characteristic of the field; i.e., it is not the case, for example, only that B depends upon A; rather, there is an inverse function as well. In the case of temporal succession, B may certainly succeed A, i.e., be dependent upon A. But in turn, A precedes B; it is the antecedent. Functionality, then, is not a relation of some things with others, but is a structural characteristic of the field itself *qua* field; some things depend upon others because all are included in a field which is intrinsically and formally a functional field. This means that every real thing, by virtue of its moment of field nature-ness, is functional reality. Moreover, the functionality is an intrinsic field-nature characteristic because it pertains to each real thing by the mere fact of being of field-nature: each thing determines the field-nature-ness, and therefore its own functionality. Field-nature reality itself is, *qua* reality, of a functional character. That each real thing depends upon another is owing to the proper reality of both of them, to the intrinsic functional character of the field itself. The field is in itself a field of functionality. Only on account of this can each thing depend upon others. But it can also be independent of some of them. Independence is a mode of functionality.

I repeat, functionality is a moment of the reality of each field-nature thing. And each thing is a “toward” which is transcendently open to other real things. Each thing is formally real by being *de suyo*. Now, each real thing is *de suyo* transcendently open, and this openness has a dimension which is formally functional. This field-nature functional actualization is proper to the unity of all the modes of sensed reality, one of which is the “toward”. What is of field-nature is functional in the “toward”.

Whence arises an essential characteristic of functionality. It is not {39} a functionality which primarily concerns the content of the notes of the real, but rather concerns their actualization as real. It is not that a body, for example, is of functional character *qua* body; i.e., it is not that a body depends upon some other body or some other content. That will always be problematic. What is not problematic is that by being real, the body is in functional dependence with respect to other reality *qua* reality. Hence we are dealing with the *functionality of the real* as *real*. This is the essential point, as we shall see forthwith.

Now, this functionality is what is expressed by the

preposition “by”. Everything real “by” being field-nature real is functionally real, “by” some reality. This “by” is something sensed and not something conceived. Human sensing is an intellectual sensing that is radically an impression of reality; it is something given “physically”. Hence any subsequent intellection physically moves in this already physically given reality. Intellection does not need to get to reality because it is formally already there. Now, because this reality is actualized in a field-nature way, the field-nature-ness is a moment of the impression of reality; and therefore the functionality itself is a moment which is given in the impression of reality. It is given as one of reality’s formal moments. Thus we are not dealing with inference or anything of that nature, but rather with a datum which is immediately and formally given in the impression of reality.

Conversely, the datum is a datum of simple functionality. It is essential to insist upon this point in order to preclude serious errors.

Above all, ‘functionality’ is not synonymous with ‘causality’. Causality is but one type of functionality among others. In classical philosophy a cause is that from which something {40} proceeds by means of a real influence upon the being of the effect. Now, causality is not something given. We never perceive the productive influence of a real thing upon another. Thus, as I see it, the experimental studies (otherwise of the first rank) dealing with the presumed immediate perception of causality are radically incorrect. Our perception never perceives causality, but always does perceive the functionality; in the field of reality we sense reality in its functional moment as a field-nature moment of the impression of reality. We perceive that a thing is real as a function of others, and functionality which can be and is quite varied. Causality is only a type of functionality, and moreover very problematic. For example, with respect to efficient causality no refutation of metaphysical occasionalism is possible in the intramundane order. But for now I leave aside human actions; they will be taken up again in Part III. The “by” is functional, but this does not mean that it is causal. The “by” is something which we always perceive.

In the second place, this functionality is formally sensed, i.e., not only is it something accessible, it is something for which access is already physically given in sentient intellection, in the transcendental “toward”. Whence the error of Hume’s critique. For Hume, causality is not given, but only temporal succession. Now, I have just said myself that causality is not given. But Hume did not notice that there are two different aspects of the question. First of all, he did not see that temporal succession is just a form of functionality. In the second

place, the succession is not the succession of *two* impressions, but the *same* impression of reality, one which is of successive nature—which means that what is essential about functionality does not concern the *content* of the impressions {41} but their *formality of reality*. In Hume’s example, the ringing of the bell just follows upon the pulling of the cord. Now, it is not the case that the bell’s ringing is *qua* ringing a function of the pulling of a cord *qua* cord; rather, the fact is that it is the reality of the ringing *qua* real which is a function of the reality of the pulling of the cord *qua* reality. And this is something perfectly given, even supposing that the ringing were not a function of the pulling of the cord. Functionality is functionality of the real inasmuch as it is real. In this sense it is a concept which encompasses many possible types. This formality, this “by” as such is given in the impression of reality. Hume’s whole critique is based upon the content of sensing, but he erred on the matter of formality. Content is always problematic. There isn’t sensing “and” intellectual knowing, but only sentient intellection, impressive intellection of the real *qua* real.

In the third place, let us observe that the exordium of Kant’s *Critique* is Hume. Since causality is not given, for Kant it is an *a priori* synthesis, a synthetic *a priori* judgement as the possibility of objective knowledge. Now, this is unacceptable. Above all, functionality is neither an analytic judgement (Leibniz) nor a synthetic judgement (Kant). Functionality is given in impression, not in its content but in its formality of reality, because it is a moment of the “toward”. And the “toward” is not a judgement. As such it is not something *a priori* to the logical apprehension of objects, but a datum of the impression of reality. Whence the formal object of knowledge is not causality but functionality. The science of which Kant speaks (Newtonian physics) is not a science of causes but a science of functions of the real *qua* real.

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In summary, the field of reality has a structure which is determined by two moments: the moment of the “among”, and the moment of the “by”. Each thing is real in the field among other real things and as a function of them. These two moments are not independent. Functionality, the “by”, is rigorously speaking the form of the “among” itself. The form of being “among” is functional.

With this we have set forth in broad outline the structure of the field of reality. In order to preclude false interpretations it is not out of place to stress again the

concept of the field. Above all, the field of reality is a moment which concerns things, but in their formality of otherness; i.e., it concerns things when they are intellectually known. The field is not a moment of these real things *qua* real beyond impression. The field is a dimension of the real such as it is given in apprehension itself. But on the other hand the field is not something which depends upon sentient intellection as an act of mine; it is not therefore something so to speak “subjective”. The field is a dimensional moment of the real given in sentient intellection, but only as actualized therein. It is a moment of actuality, not of actuity. To be sure, this actuality is only given in apprehension, in sentient intellection; but it is a physical moment of the real which is apprehended

qua reality. This actuality is merely actual-ity, and as such constitutes an intellection. As actuality, it is always and only actuality of reality itself. Therefore the field as a dimension of the actuality of the real is not a moment of the real beyond apprehension; but neither is it a subjective moment. It is a moment of actuality of the real as real in sentient intellection. {43}

In this field thus determined in and by each real thing we apprehend in subsequent intellection what the things already apprehended as real are in reality. This is a modal intellection of its primordial apprehension. Which? That is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE REAL INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN WITHIN A FIELD: THE SENTIENT LOGOS

In primordial apprehension one apprehends each real thing in its twin dimensions as individual and in a field. But to intellectually know something in this latter way is not necessarily to intellectually know it in the field manner, i.e., as in a field. Being in a field concerns the *notae* of the real thing; the field is a dimension of these *notae*. But intellectually knowing something as in a field is something different: it is intellectually knowing the real thing inasmuch as it is included in the field which it itself has previously determined by its *notae*; it is to intellectually know not the field-thing but to intellectually know it “in” the field.

The intellection of a real thing in the field of reality is, as I have already said, an ulterior intellection or modalization of the primordial intellection of something real. To be sure, this modalization is not only about being in a field; every intellection of a real thing has the modalization of being intellectually known as a moment of the world. In both cases we not only intellectually know something as “real”*, we also intellectually know what this real thing is “in reality”. But in field-type* intellection we intellectually know what something is in reality with respect to other real sensed or sensible things; while in the worldly intellection we intellectually know what something is in reality in the world. {46} In this second part of the book I refer only to what something is in respect to other things within a field.

In order to see what this intellection is, we must explicate two great problems: (1) In what does field intellection as such consist? And (2) What is the basic structure of this intellection? {47}

* [“field-type”, “being in a field”, “in the field manner”, and “as within a field” all translate the Spanish adverb *campalmente*, which literally means “field-ly”.-trans.]

§ 1

FIELD INTELLECTION AS SUCH

This intellection has two distinct aspects and moments. In order to encompass them in a single denomination I shall employ the classical word *logos*.

This word has many meanings in Greek. But here I refer only to that meaning in which the logos consists in declaratively saying something about something. Now, as I see it, this logos was not conceived by the Greeks in a sufficiently radical way. To do this, I need to rigorously pin down how I understand the logos.

1) Logos stems from the verb *legein* which means “reunite”, “gather together”. This is the meaning which still survives in words such as “anthology”. In the problem with which we are concerned, the Greeks anchored their idea of *legein* in this idea of reunion. Now as I see it, this is inadequate. To be sure, *legein* means “reunite”, “gather together”; but reunite what? This is what one must begin by explaining. The Greeks did not attend to this problem. In fact, one reunites and gathers together what is in the field of reality. Whence *legein*, rather than denoting the reunion itself, should serve to designate an act of reunion *qua* “field”: it is a *field legein*, i.e., a *legein* within a field. Beneath the reunion one must go to the fieldness of the *legein*.

2) From *legein* the Greeks derived both the word *logos* and its corresponding idea. From its meaning of “to reunite”, *legein* came to mean “to enumerate”, “to count”, etc., whence it acquired the meaning of “to say”. And this is what the word *logos* means. Logos has the {48} two meanings of “to say” (*legon*) and “that which is said” (*legomenon*). And there the Greeks anchored their reflection. When that which is said is a declaration of what a

thing is, the Greeks claim that one deals with the logos in an autonomous sense: declarative logos (*logos apophantikos*). This declarative logos consists in “declaring something about something” (*legein ti kata tinous*). The logos always involves a certain duality of “somethings”. But the Greeks did not concern themselves with the first “something”; they thought that that which is said can be in itself just an idea. But as I see it this is untenable because the so-called ‘ideas’ always come from things, and only from them. Whence the declaration of what something is cannot be fully carried out *except as based on something else in the field*. What something is in reality cannot be understood except by referring it to some other thing within the field. Therefore logos, prior to being a declaration, is intellection of one thing in the field based upon another. And this means that the logos itself is a mode of intellection and hence is not a structure which rests upon itself. The tendency of the Greeks was always in the opposite direction, a tendency which I have termed *logification of intellection*. At the dawn of philosophy, in Parmenides, there is a growing intervention of *phrazein*, of expressing; a tendency which culminates in a “discerning with logos”, *krinein logoi*. And this was not just a manner of speaking: the proof is that Parmenides’ disciple Zeno is presented to us by Plato as a theoretician of dialectical discussion. Even in theology, logos has been attributed to God, in the philosophical sense of judgement. But this is impossible. Intelligence is not logos; rather, logos is a human mode of intellection. God has intelligence but does not have logos. One cannot *logify intellection* but on the contrary must *intelligize the logos*. {49}

3) For the Greeks, logos was a problem of the first magnitude. But they always understood this problem seeing in the logos the supreme form of *nous*, of *intelligence*; i.e., the *nous* as expressed or expressible. After Parmenides, only this logos type of intellection is intellection in the strict sense; the rest is mere *doxa*, opinion. Regardless of what Parmenides himself understood by *doxa*, it is certain that Plato and Aristotle understood that *doxa* is *aisthesis*, sensing. And so with Parmenides thus ensconced in *nous*, he tells us that to intellectually know something is the same (*tauton*) as to intellectually know that this something “is”: that which is intellectually known is *on*, being. The logification of intellection thus brought along with it the entification of reality. And as the logos always involves a certain duality, Parmenides therefore insists that the *on*, being, is one, *hen*.

To the Greeks the force of all this was overwhelming. And the proof is the manner in which Plato and Aristotle disputed with Parmenides. To Plato, the identity of what is intellectually known with being leads to the prob-

lem of negation: one says of something that it “is not”. Hence the “parricide” which Plato believes he is committing against Parmenides is but an act of supreme fidelity: to intellectually know that something “is not” is always to intellectually know that what “is not”, “is”. That was the idea of the being of non-being in Plato. Aristotle confronted the problem of Parmenides not from this identity of the *legomenon* with the *on*, but from the presumed unity of being itself. For Aristotle “being” is expressed in many ways; the unity of being is not destroyed but rather being is endowed with diverse types of unity. His logos is a copulative “one” which possesses different modes of unity.

In the final analysis the Greeks saw the radical problem of logos in the formal plane of being and unity, i.e. in the plane of what is said or expressed. But as I see it the discussion should not have been carried to this formal plane; {50} rather it should have descended to a more fundamental plane.

In the first place, is it true that logos formally falls back upon an “is” (including also the “is not”)? The truth is that the Greeks never tell us in what, formally, intellectual knowing consists. Nonetheless they believe that intellectual knowing and therefore logos is always intellection of the “is”. Now as I see it the formal act of intellectual knowing is not intellectually knowing the “is”, but rather consists in apprehending reality; the formal *terminus* of intellectual knowing is not being but reality. I have explicated this already in the first part of the book. One cannot *entify reality*, but on the contrary must *reify being*.

Hence intellectual knowing is something previous to any logos, because the real is proposed to the logos in order to be declared. In virtue of this, intellectual knowing is not formally judgement, nor saying what the real “is”. One cannot *logify intellection*, but must do the reverse, viz. *intelligize the logos*; i.e., conceptualize the logos as a mode, as a modalization of intellectual knowing, which is to say of the apprehension of the real as real.

Entification of reality and logification of intellectual knowing are the two great presuppositions of Greek philosophy. For my part I think that it is necessary to reify being and intelligize the logos. And with that, one reaches the fundamental plane of the logos. What is the nature of this plane?

For the Greeks, intelligence (*nous*) and sensing (*aisthesis*) were always opposites. Be as it may the *doxa* of Parmenides, there is no doubt that Greek philosophy always ascribed the *doxa* to sensing. But what is sensing? It is of course the presentation of something which in one or another way has a moment of reality. But if this is so,

there is never a {51} structural opposition in man between intellectual knowing and sensing. As intellectual knowing is apprehending the real, it follows that if the real is already presented in and through the senses as real, then intellection itself already has a radically sentient character. There is then no opposition between intellectual knowing and sensing, but rather a structural unity. Intellectual knowing and sensing are just two moments of a single act, the act of impressively apprehending reality. It is the *sentient intelligence* whose act is impression of reality. Logos is a modalization of this impression of reality. Logos is not intellection of being but of reality sensed in impression; the “is” of the logos is but the human expression of the impression of reality. Hence ultimately the logos is intrinsically and formally a mode of sentient intellection; it is *sentient logos*. What does this mean in more concrete terms? We shall answer that question in detail throughout the course of this book; but to orient the reader I shall anticipate some ideas which will be developed later.

Most importantly, I do not refer only to the fact that the logos is based on an impression of reality; in such case it would be only a *sensible logos*. Rather, I mean that the impression of reality is itself what has need of the logos. And this necessity is what confers upon the logos its sentient character. Logos in effect tells us what something is in reality. And the difference between “real” and “in reality” is determined by the impression of reality in its field moment.

Furthermore, I do not mean that what is intellectually known in the logos is sensed the same as a color or a sound; I can intellectually know, in my logos, irrational numbers, for example. But the fact is that both the color and the irrational numbers pertain to the content of what is intellectually known, whereas the intellection itself in its sentient mode concerns not the content but the mode in which this content shows up in the apprehension. {52} We shall investigate this at some length below. The irrational numbers are not apprehended like a color, but just as color they are apprehended in the same formality of reality, in the same impression of reality in which color is apprehended. An irrational number is not the same as a color, but it is real in the same formality of reality in which the color is real. In both cases the formality of reality is numerically the same. Logos is sentient not by virtue of what is intellectually known, but by virtue of the mode of its intellection; it is an intellection within the formality of sensed reality.

What is the structure of this logos?

In the first place, logos as mode of intellection is an ulterior mode of mere actualization of the real. This mode

consists in being a “re-actualization” within a field of what has already been actualized in the primordial apprehension of reality. Underlying every act of logos is the reactualization of the real within a field. This is what makes of the logos a mode of intellection, a mode of actualization of the real. Logos is to be understood with respect to intellection; we thus have an intelligization of the logos.

In the second place, this actualization is imposed by the impression of reality; it is what bears us from the immediately real to what that real is in reality. What is intellectually known in the logos is what is real in its field moment, i.e., within a field, because every impression of reality is of *field-type*. Nonetheless the real thus apprehended is not necessarily sensed *as within a field*. Every impression of reality is, in fact, of field-type; it has a moment of transcendental openness to other sensed things. The sensed real has thus a formality of reality with two moments: an individual moment, so to speak, and a field-type moment, a moment within a field. But apprehending the real in the field manner is something different; it is not apprehending that the individual reality opens up a determinate field, but is {53} apprehending the individual reality based on the reality field itself. And it is not necessary that this always occur; it is not necessary that the individual formality be apprehended in the field manner. But on the other hand, apprehending the individuality in the field manner, i.e. based on the field, is necessarily a mode of sensing. And in this mode of sensing I sense not just that what is apprehended is real, but also what the apprehended thing is in reality. Now, apprehending what something is in reality is nothing but logos. Hence the logos is the field-type mode of sensing reality, and conversely sensing the real in the field manner is already an incipient logos. The logos is, then, a mode of sensing, and sensing is incipiently a mode of logos; it is *sentient logos*. It is the mode of sensing the real in a field, i.e., the mode of intellectually knowing the real based on the field of sensed reality.

In the third place, the impression of reality sentiently “bears” us to the logos. Hence sensing in the field manner is formally movement. It is not a movement which bears us from one intellection to another; but rather the movement itself is that in which reality is formally reactualized. What is this movement? It is not a simple intentionality, nor a directing of oneself to one terminus from the other. Beneath the *intention* there lies something more radical: *attention*. Attention is not merely a psychic phenomenon, but a properly intellectual moment, yet not the most radical one. Attention, in fact, is *borne* from one terminus to the other. And that which attentionally bears us is there-

fore prior to attention itself. And this is precisely the movement in which the logos formally consists: only because we are moving ourselves do we attend to different termini; and only by attending to different termini do we also have different intentions. Now, that movement is {54} strictly and formally sentient. In order to apprehend something real based on the field we need, within the field itself, to distance ourselves or to *step back** from the real thing in question. This is not a stepping back with respect to space, but in the ambit of reality, of a reality sensed as formality. That stepping back is thus sentient; it is structurally found to be based on the moment of the “towards” of sentient intellection. It is therefore a stepping back in sentient intellection. And with the thing thus apprehended by stepping back, in the field manner, from the field “toward” it, affirming what it is in reality. Affirmation is the reversion of sentient intellect to the real. Distance is a stepping back in sentient intellection, and the reversion to the thing in sentient intellection is the very essence of affirmation, is the logos. It is a sentient intellection in stepping back within a field. Dynamism, formally constitutive of logos, is being an intellectual movement in which we have stepped back in the sensed field of reality.

Reactualization of the real, movement within a field, is what logos essentially is, viz., sentient logos. An intelligence which was not sentient would not be able to have, nor would it need to have, any logos whatsoever. In contrast to classical philosophy, it is necessary to think, then, that logos is formally and constitutively sentient logos.

Granting this, it is necessary to explain at greater length this structure. It will be done in two steps: What is the *basic* structure of any logos? And What is the *formal* structure of the logos? As this second step is quite involved, it will constitute by itself a separate section, Section 2, of this volume.

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§ 2

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE LOGOS

This basic structure has, as I have already pointed out, three moments. First, the logos says something about something. Therefore there are two somethings; this is the dual structure of the logos as a mode of intellection. In

what does this duality consist? Secondly, the logos moves in this duality. In what does this movement consist? Thirdly, the logos declares what something is in reality, and how it is installed in a reality field as a reality constitutive of the medium of intellection itself. The basic structure of the logos has these three moments: duality, dynamicity, mediality. Only upon this base can there be a declarative logos about something. Let us examine these moments in turn.

I. *The duality of intellection* in which the sentient logos consists. We shall repeat what has already been said in order to explain it in a coherent fashion. The logos tells us something about a real thing, and what it tells us is what this thing is in reality. And what it tells us of the thing is in turn based on the prior intellection of another real thing, because what it tells us, the so-called ‘ideas’—as I have already indicated—do not exist on their own but are the intellection of things. The fact that the logos tells us something about a real thing means that we do not intellectually know what this thing is in reality except by intellection of something prior. Now, these two things—that of which we seek to know what it is in reality, and that prior thing by which we intellectually know it—are each {56} a terminus of a primordial intellection. And the result is that in the intellection of what something is in reality two apprehensions intervene. First, this thing is apprehended as *real* in a primordial apprehension; for example, I apprehend something as a reality in a landscape. But there is another apprehension, the apprehension of this same real thing already apprehended, and inasmuch as it is what it is *in reality*: from what was apprehended in the primordial apprehension we now say that it consists in being a tree. For this, I recur to the previous apprehension of something that was a tree. And it is based on the intellection of this tree that we intellectually know that the real thing in the landscape consists in reality in being a tree. This second apprehension is not a primordial apprehension of reality; it is something different: an *apprehension* which I shall term *dual*. For it is certainly true that a real thing is apprehended, but it is so with reference to something previously apprehended.

That which is apprehended, instead of being apprehended directly, is apprehended as a function of a previous apprehension. One has, so to speak, one foot on the thing which is being intellectually known, and the other on something which has already been so known. For this reason, the apprehension is dual. It is thus intellectually known that the thing (of which we seek to know what it is in reality) is the same, similar to, or different from that first and previously known. The apprehension of the real as “real-among” is constitutively dual because this appre-

* [The English *to step back* is used as the most natural translation of the Spanish *distanciar*, a word which expresses a concept Zubiri has derived from Heidegger. - trans.]

hension involves the apprehension of the real thing and the apprehension of that “among” which the thing is. If there were no “among”, the apprehension would never be dual. But having an “among”, the apprehension is necessarily dual. And as the “among” is sensed, so also is the duality.

What is this duality? Dual apprehension is a mode of actualization of the real. It is not constituted by the fact {57} that some *notae* of its content are complete. That has nothing to do with the matter, because even the most simple part of its content can be intellectually known in a dual apprehension; the simplicity of content would be a derogation or absorption of all complexity. It is therefore not this which constitutes the dual apprehension. Dual apprehension is a mode of actualization of this content, simple or complex, a mode of being present to me. Hence, dual apprehension is contrasted with the primordial apprehension of reality, which is constituted as a mere actualization of reality. They are then two structurally different modes of actualization. The primordial apprehension is the actualization of the real in and by itself; the dual apprehension is its mode of actualization based on another thing. I repeat, this is a structural difference, and therefore not a difference which is psychic or vital in character.

It is clear that this apprehension is not rigorously dual, but rather plural, because I can and in general do start not from one single thing but several. But in order to simplify matters I shall lump them together under the rubric ‘dual’.

In primordial apprehension every possible type of thing is apprehended in a unitary mode; for example, a landscape with trees. But now we do not apprehend these things unitarily; we do not apprehend, as we did before, the landscape with many things. Rather, we apprehend each thing that there is in the landscape. We do not apprehend a “varied landscape”, but “various things in a landscape”. These diverse things are certainly in the same field, and therefore in “one” actualization; but this “one” actualization is not “unitary”. It is rather what I term *differential* (or ‘differentiated’) *actualization*. We are dealing, then, with a unity, but one which is “differential”, and not simply “varied”. In differential actualization there is a strict unity; otherwise it would not be {58} “one” actualization. But with respect to this unity, things are not merely *notae* of the landscape; rather each of them is in and by itself a thing. Hence the unity of actualization is differentiated in things, which are differently moments of the unity of actuality.

The differential actualization is a mode of intellectual actualization, a mode of a real thing being present to

us in sentient intellection. This does not mean that the content of the differential actualization is multiple, but that it is positively actual differentially. Now, upon being differentiated, the apprehension of the real thing becomes converted into something of which we say what it is in reality.

This brings us to a stricter conception of what duality is. To intellectually know what a thing is in reality among others is to go from something priorly apprehended toward something of which I desire to intellectually know what it is in reality. If one were to think that the duality consisted in two apprehensions, the apprehension of the thing of which I desire to intellectually know what it is in reality, and the apprehension of the prior thing to which I recur, then what I would have would be “two” primordial apprehensions of reality; but not “one” dual apprehension. Two “ones” do not make a “two”. Duality does not consist in two primordial apprehensions but is a dual apprehension.

In the second place, one might think that this prior presence of the thing, on the basis of which one intellectually knows what another thing is in reality, consists in an internal fusion (the name does not matter), a type of radical reminiscence, so that the apprehension of what the thing is in reality would in large measure be a composite of apprehension and reminiscence. But this is not what constitutes the duality of which we are here speaking. For whatever this fusion may be, {59} the presence of one apprehension in the other is not a fusion; i.e., the duality is not a composition.

The duality in question is thus neither duplicity nor a composition of primordial apprehensions. And this is because duplicity as well as composition affect only the content of intellection, the content of what is dual; but the duality itself is something much simpler and decisive. And this in turn is because the dual apprehension is the apprehension of a “real” thing which I want to apprehend as it is in reality; and in this reality, and not in its content, is where the duality is formally found: to be *in_reality* what is *real*. Reality has intervened twice, and in this identical formality consists the unity of the two apprehensions. The dual apprehension consists in something like apprehending the reality of a thing in light of the reality of something else priorly apprehended. The prior apprehension is present in the thing which we wish to intellectually know like a light by which this thing is apprehended as it is “in reality”. The “based upon” is the light generated by the apprehension of the thing priorly known. And this is the essential point. But it is necessary to fix more precisely just what this light is.

One might think that it is just a type of “comparison” between the second apprehension and the first. But this is not so, because any comparison presupposes an “appearing together” of what is compared and is based on that appearing. And it is precisely in this appearing where the dual impression is found. The real thing appears in the light which constitutes the reality of the prior thing. And this light or clarity of appearing is just the dual apprehension. This apprehension is “an” apprehension, but is an apprehension in the light of something priorly apprehended. What we here term “light” {60} is but the moment of each real thing in a field which constitutes reality itself. We are dealing with the fact that it is in the light of the reality in a field of the thing previously apprehended that one apprehends what a real thing is in reality, be it the same, similar, or completely different from the prior thing. And precisely because of this the entire process of intellection along these lines is always saddled with the weight of the old, because the old makes it possible to apprehend what the new is in reality; but it tends to excessively assimilate the new to the old.

In order to prevent misunderstandings, let us summarize what has been said. The primordial apprehension of a real thing, and the apprehension of what this real thing is in reality, are two apprehensions; but only the second is in turn dual. Let us not confuse the two acts of apprehension (primordial apprehension and apprehension of what something is in reality) with the internal duality of the second of the two apprehensions.

Now, this brings us to the possibility of a logos.

1. Every real thing, besides being individual, is *de suyo* of field nature, i.e., within a field. And this field nature is what determines the field of reality in which the thing is included and which encompasses all the others. This field, then, has been generated by the reality of each thing; which means in turn that the unity of being in a field and being individual is a unity which constitutes within the thing itself a type of *unfolding* of the two moments in the thing: its “reality”, and its “in reality”. The logos is intrinsically and formally based on the fact that a real thing *refers*, within a field, in transcendental openness, to another real thing. The logos is referring intellection, a mode of actuality {61} which refers from the reality of something to what this something is in reality.

2. This unfolding is in turn the intrinsic and formal foundation of the ambit of its actualization in *intellective duality*. When we refer to a prior thing, the ambit takes shape in which the logos is going to be constituted in a dual intellection. This is the ambit of the proper intelligibility of the logos.

3. This duality is the intrinsic and formal foundation of the *apprehension of the two somethings*, of the something which is said (*ti*), and of the something of which it is said (*kata tinos*). Only because we are referred to something prior can it be intellectually known what this something is. The ambit of the intellective duality is what makes the two apprehensions possible. Only because there is an intellective referral can there be apprehension of an prior thing which illuminates us. With this, the something of this prior thing is constituted in a principle of intelligibility of the real thing.

4. Finally, these two apprehensions are the intrinsic and formal foundation which permits one to say, to intellectually know, a “something” based upon another “determinate something”; i.e., this is the foundation of the logos itself, of the intellection of what something real is in reality. It is the formally dual constitution of the logos. The logos is then radically based upon a modalization of the primordial apprehension of reality. For this reason it is a mode of sentient intellection which in turn has to be conceptualized from within intellection and not the two apprehensions which intervene in saying what something is.

And here we have the first basic structural moment of the logos: duality. But there is a second essential moment, that moment by which *one goes* from a real thing to another prior one, and inversely from the latter to the former. This “going” is {62} manifestly of dynamic character. The logos “says” something about something, and this saying is a “going”, a dynamic intellection. The modalization in which the sentient logos consists is a dynamic modalization; and we must now proceed to examine it.

II. *The dynamism of intellection* in which the sentient logos consists. As we have just said, in the logos there are two “somethings”. And of these two somethings, the logos in dual intellection “says” or “speaks” about one based upon the other. This saying or speaking has its own essential, basic, structure. The logos involves a duality, but not static duality; rather, one in which sentient intellection apprehends one real thing while going, so to speak, from another. The logos, then, consists in a duality in which the two termini are two moments of a unitary movement. This is a dynamic duality, and is the second basic structural moment of the logos. In what does it consist?

1. Above all, this movement starts from the thing already apprehended as real in primordial apprehension. This apprehension as a point of departure is an apprehension in which we already are here-and-now present in the

real. What is this “being here-and-now present”? It is just what constitutes a *state* [*estado*]. This is an essential concept. Modern philosophy in general has erred regarding the reality of the state. To my way of thinking, this reality must be recovered. In our problem, a state is not a mode of affection counterposed, for example, to acts. If that were so, the state thus understood would be, together with all of its indispensable nuances, a *psychological state*. Here we are not referring to that at all, but to the state in another sense: “being here-and-now” is a “being situated in” something. Every impression has, as we have already seen in the Part I, a moment of affection. But every impression has another moment, the moment of otherness, which consists in that what is present in an impression doing nothing but remain in accordance with its own formality, be it of {63} stimulus or reality. Here we are interested only in the formality of reality, the “remaining”^{*} of what is presented as something on its own. And this remaining is here the essential point; it is the very essence of the “being here-and-now”. A state is above all a “remaining”. And this “remaining”, that in which we have remained, is the point of departure of the movement of the logos.

But it is necessary to forestall certain misunderstandings. First, this is not a “relation” but a “respectivity”, and moreover a respectivity common to the impressive intellection of the real and to the real itself. This “remaining” is not something static; i.e., “remaining” is not opposed to “not quiescent”, because remaining is neither quiescent nor not quiescent. These two characteristics do not have to do with remaining but with the content of reality as mine, as much as with things. But “remaining” is something which concerns the mode in which reality, be it quiescent or not, is situated in my impression.

In the final analysis, a state is above all a “remaining in” as a mode of being here-and-now, and a “being here-and-now” as a mode of “remaining”; it is a “to be remaining”. And this state is therefore a physical and real moment. But primordial apprehension as a point of departure of sentient intellection, in which the logos consists, is not any type of remaining.

From what has been said it might seem that state is nothing more than another name for actualization. But this is not the case, because as the point of departure of movement, remaining has a precise formal character which is essential and decisive. Impression, in fact, besides the moment of affection and the moment of other-

ness, has a third moment which I have called the force of imposition of the real. Now, as point of departure of intellectual movement, this imposition force of what is intellectually known in primordial intellection, consists in this: the real thing apprehended, in moving us toward {64} what is in reality, retains us insofar as it is real. This is the *retention* of the real. We are in the real, we remain in the real, and we remain retained by the real. We continue to be retained not in this red color *qua* red, but in this red *qua* real. By the expression “remain in the real as real”, we are referring to a state; by “being retained in it” we mean a formally initial state. Retention is not a certainty or anything like that; because every certainty and even every intellectual intention is grounded in a previous retention. The real retains us. But how?

2. We are retained by the real according to all the modes of reality, one of which is the “towards”. The “towards” is a mode of the real presenting itself. Insofar as it determines intellection it has a particular character. On the one hand we go “towards” that which is presented as real in the “towards”. But we do not go outside of the real; just the opposite: continuing to be retained in the reality which we left, we go to more reality. And therein consists the intellectual movement as movement: it is by being in the process of moving in reality that we are retained and sent forth by it. Toward what? Toward the diverse real things “among” which the real, which we seek to intellectually know, is. This is a concrete movement by reason of retention of the point of departure, and by reason of the field-nature “among” towards which we go. It is a movement in reality. Hence it is a movement of sentient character, a movement of sentient intellection. The logos is sentient logos not only by virtue of being dual, but in virtue of being movement in reality as a field. The logos is not simply “to go” by moving oneself; but rather “points” to a terminus which can be unknown, or even empty. This is proper to a sentient movement. If it were not sentient, there would not be movement in the logos. {65}

3. This movement goes from what we seek to intellectually know toward something else priorly apprehended in the real itself, a second something based on which we, moving ourselves, seek to intellectually know the first thing. In virtue of this, that based on which we are going to intellectually know the new thing, is something distinct from it. This is *distancing* or *stepping back* in the reality field. It does not refer to a merely verbal distinction, but to a stepping back in the field. The two moments of the formality of reality, the individual moment and the moment within a field, are in a certain way autonomized in the real thing itself. In the field, things are included, and

^{*} [The Spanish *quedar* means to remain or to stay, as in Tennyson’s poem *The Lady of Shalott*: “She stayed to look down to Camelot.”—trans.]

the field encompasses them; so that the field itself, as we said, acquires a certain autonomy of its own. And this field “exceeding” with respect to each thing, actualizes each of them in a very precise way, viz. through its stepping back. This is a rigorous distance; not simply longitude or distinction. Longitude is distance only when it is or is supposed to be traversed. Intellectual movement traverses the “among”, and hence the position of some things “among” others acquires the character of distance. Intellectual movement is distancial, so to speak; distance is the *traversed* distinction.

4. This distance is traversed in a very precise manner. The point of departure in the “towards” points to its terminus, toward that based on which it is intellectually known. With this terminus the movement itself is not univocally fixed, but it needs to be. Whence the intellectual movement in stepping back is essentially an oriented movement. The orientation is not a type of extrinsic collocation of the intelligence so that it can let fly its movement; but rather is the character of the intellection itself as intellection. Every apprehension of things in a field bears the imprint of the orientation in which they have been {66} primordially known intellectually. The orientation does not consist so much in that the “from” and “towards” of the movement are fixed, but rather that even within this fixing, different trajectories of intellection will fit. These trajectories express what I here understand by ‘orientation’. With the same “from” and with the same “toward” there can be and there are different orientations for going from one thing to another. This diversity of orientations is ultimately arbitrary; it is the result of an intellectual choice. Whence the optative character of concrete intellection in movement. Here, naturally, the problem of this option *qua* option does not interest us; we are only concerned with its foundation in the reality of what is intellectually known. This foundation is just the sentient character of intellection; it is by being sentient that this intellection is oriented.

5. Finally, intellection in distance or stepping back is not defined only by reason of the trajectory, but also by reason of the terminus to which it points the “towards” from which it is started. I can, indeed, choose somewhat arbitrarily that on which I am going to base myself in order to intellectually know a thing; I can go toward different things, things which are more or less arbitrarily selected. The movement which constitutes intellection of what something is in reality is not univocally determined in that from which one starts. And this lack of univocity actualizes the field of reality precisely as a *field of liberty*. In large measure, the intellection that differentiates what something is in reality is a free intellection. By this I do

not mean that this intellection is an arbitrary act of the will, but that the intellectual movement toward the thing, and toward what it will determine in the intellection, is a movement which is not univocally determined other than by a free act. {67}

This intellectual movement, as we saw, is not something primarily of the intelligence, as Hegel thought. Intellectual movement (‘dialectic’, Hegel called it) is not the formal structure of “the” intelligence, but “a” determination of the intelligence according to the differential mode of presentation of the real. Moreover, as this differentiality is constituted by the character of reality impressively given, it follows that intellectual movement is a determination not of “the” intelligence but of the “sentient intelligence”, and of this intelligence *qua* ulterior and field-nature actualization of reality. For these two reasons, I say, the idea of the Logic of Hegel is false in its very root. No dialectic is mounted upon itself.

6. What is the character of this intellectual movement? The real retains us not so much by its content as by its formality of reality, as I have pointed out above. Now, we have already seen that we intellectually sense the formality of reality as being “more” than the reality of each thing. I have already said this, and repeat it for greater clarity in this other context. The “more” is not exterior to the real thing, but is an intrinsic and formal characteristic of its reality; it is precisely the moment of the thing’s reality within a field. The real has the two moments of formality: individual and within a field, and this formality in its two moments is what has us retained.

This retentivity or retention in turn has two of its own moments in reality. First, the real, by being in a field, retains us in a very concrete form, viz., by thrusting us to the field of reality. This is the impelling moment of the retentivity of the real, the *impellence* of the real. What is real about a thing is something which impels us to this “more”, this “beyond”, which is proper to reality. {68}

But it does not pull us out of reality; rather, it keeps us there. In thrusting us impellently to that “more”, it does not make us abandon the thing, but just the opposite; all impelling involves a constitutive *reversion* toward the thing. It is not a strict reversion because we have not left the reality of the thing; it is a reversion in the sense of a constitutive avoidance of such leaving. And it is this avoidance which I call reversion; it is the reversion of the field-nature moment to the individual moment. This reversion is what is expressed by the phrase “This thing is this in reality”. While the impelling retains us by opening up for us, by going from a thing to its field, being in the

field retains us by carrying us from the field to the thing. This moment of going from the field to the thing is what I call *intentum*. Permit me to explain, because as I see it this is an essential concept.

The *intentum* is what, etymologically, the word means, viz. a “tending to”. It is not primarily an intention—as we shall see forthwith—but a tending. But this tending is not a “tendency” in the psychological sense; rather, it is a structural *tension*, the tension by which reality retains us in the thing from which we have stepped back. Every apprehension of the real is on this side a tension. Let us discuss this concept.

The *intentum* as tension is, as the word itself expresses, an intent. But this intent as a tension is not an intent to reach the reality of the thing, since we have never left it; it is the retentivity itself of the thing which tensely retains us in it. Hence, the intent in question is not an *intentum of reality*, but *reality in intentum*. If one desires to employ the metaphor of light, it is the reversion of clarity upon the illuminating sources themselves. {69}

Nor is *intentum* a type of effort to apprehend the real thing. In our language, “intent” is something like “attempt”; but with respect to its origins, *intentum* is not attempt, nor an attempt to go to reality, because we already *are* in the reality of the thing and cannot abandon it. It does not make sense, then, to speak of an attempt. It is in order not to confuse intent with attempt that I recur to the Latin word *intentum*.

Neither is *intentum* formally intentionality. ‘Intentionality’ is a word and a concept which uses philosophy from the past centuries. In general terms, it is an act, or at least the character of the act in which we look at something, at what is intellectually known. This is the acceptance of willful intention translated into the act of intellection. This intentionality has at least two senses. In the scholastic sense, intentionality is the character which what is intellectually known has, considered only as intellectually known. As so known, it is the terminus of an intellectual glance. And if something has no entity other than being intellectually known in intention, a scholastic would say that it has only intentional existence. In contemporary philosophy the idea of intentionality is not exactly that. For phenomenology, intentionality is not a character of an entity intellectually known, but a character of the act of consciousness; consciousness is a “referring oneself to” something, a *noesis* which as such is referred to something which is therefore its *noema*. Now, the *intentum* of which I am speaking is not intentionality in either of those two senses. Both, indeed, are based upon the idea of intellection being a glance toward something.

But *intentum* is not that, because such an intentional glance presupposes that by its own nature we have to go “toward” reality, so that reality would be something toward which one must go. Ultimately, one would be dealing with a correlation. And this is false. {70} We do not go toward reality; rather, we are already in it and retained by it. The *intentum* is not a “going” but a “being here-and-now” tensively in the real thing, retained by it. There can only be intentionality because there is basically an *intentum*. This we shall see in another chapter.

Whence the *intentum* does not have an intentional but a “physical” character. In the first place, intentionality itself is not something purely intentional, but something physical. It is, as I see it, a physical act of the intelligence, the physical reference to what is intellectually known; and it is also and above all the strictly physical character of the act of intellection. It is the very physics of intellection—something like virtue. Virtue is not just a value at which I decide to aim, but is the physical character of being now in this value, or of having incorporated it into my physical reality. It is not an act of will which accepts some value as an object; but rather a physical character of this act of accepting itself, a valuable affecting in itself *qua* acceptance. Virtue is “moral physics”. Now, intentionality is just the physical character of the intellectual act. It is a mode of the *intentum*. It is because of this that I have said, and will go on saying, that there is no intentionality except as a mode of the *intentum*. We shall see forthwith what this mode is. Moreover, the *intentum* is in itself something physical. As we are already in the real, the reversion is not a “going toward” but a “being-now-tense-in”. Both *noesis* as well as *noema* are grounded upon the *intentum*. But the *Nous* is an *ergon*. And this *ergon* is the *intentum*. The primary structure of intellection is not noetic but noergic. Strictly speaking, *noergia* is not a character exclusive to the *intentum* because the *intentum* is an ulterior moment of the primordial apprehension of reality. And it is this apprehension which formally and constitutively is noergic. Retained by reality, we are {71} physically impelled to what is in the field, and are also physically tense in the real thing. The physical actuality of the real is physically retentive in its two moments of being impelled and reversion.

Ultimately, the real in impression retains us in its two aspects, individual and within a field, not as aspects juxtaposed, but in the radical unity of the impression of reality. This structure has the double moment of being impelled and of *intentum*. They are not something added to the impression of reality, but rather constitute the very structure of the impression of reality *qua* of field nature. As intrinsically and formally of field nature, the impres-

sion of reality is *impelling* and is *intentum*. Conversely, being impelled and *intentum* are what they are only as structural moments of the impression of reality insofar as we are, in the field manner, retained in it.

7. This intellectual movement, precisely on account of its moment of being impelled, is a movement in distance. And *qua intentum*, it has a very definite character. Starting “from” a prior real thing and going “toward” another in a movement oriented across the field of reality: this is how we apprehend what reality this real thing is. Now, as we have still not yet apprehended it, we do not yet have dual apprehension, but only dual movement toward it; this is *expectation* in the most etymological sense of the word, a “looking at from afar” (from which has been derived the meaning of “to expect”). Intellectual movement is formally and constitutively expectant. Expectation is not a psychological state of general tension in waiting, but an intrinsic and constitutive character of intellectual movement *qua* intellectual. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation of itself as other. It is a mode of {72} intellection; we intellectually know what a thing is in reality in a movement from afar, and therefore expectant. One might tend to think that this means that we are surreptitiously *asking ourselves* what the thing is in reality. But this is not the case: asking is but the propositional form of expectation, and not the other way around. We ask because we are intellectually expectant. Moreover, we are generally expectant without asking or asking ourselves anything; we simply “are”. The question is always something intentional; expectation on the other hand is something noergic. Expectation is intellection as distanced *in via* as intellection. What we expect is what the thing already apprehended as reality is in reality.

This intellectual movement is that in which the logos’ own “saying” consists. Naturally I am not referring to “saying” as such but rather to what is said *qua* said in this saying. Logos is sentient intellection in which we are retained by the real in its field moment, i.e. in the “towards” of reality. The terminus of this “towards” is something distanced from the particular real thing which we wish to intellectually know. To this terminus we are impelled by the real, but retained by this real to which we see ourselves turned by this thing itself. Logos is not simply a dual intellection, but one in which this duality is intellectually known over some time period, in a movement. Intellection is not just dual, but traverses this distance of the dual. And over this time period, from one terminus to the other, intellection is a movement which consists in saying (or explaining) what one thing is in reality from or based on another. The basic radical structure of the “saying” is movement. Hence I do not refer

only to the fact that my act of intellection is dynamic, but moreover to the fact that the real sentiently actualized is actualized in a dynamic duality. {73} This is, I repeat, an intrinsic moment of the sentient actuality of the real. And as we have already seen, this actualization is what makes the “saying” possible. The dynamism of the intrinsic duality of each real thing is what makes possible the movement of saying something about something else.

But there is more. The logos with which we here occupy ourselves not only has two “somethings”, and not only says something about something else: this “saying” has a supremely precise character: *declaring*. And this declaration is a time period in a medium of intellection. It is the third structural moment of the logos.

III. *The Mediality of Intellection* in which the sentient logos consists. The “saying” of the logos can and in fact does adopt many different forms. But for the purposes of intellection there is only a declarative “saying”, *apophantikos*. This is a movement in which something is intellectually known from something else by declaring what the first thing is in reality. What is the basic radical structure of declarative intellection?

The intellection of the logos moves in the duality of a field of reality. But let us recall what this field of reality is. Every real thing *qua* real is open to other real things; this is the “towards” as transcendental openness. In virtue of this, every real thing is among other real things. This “towards” of the “among” is what formally constitutes the *field of reality*. As this field is the same in all the things included in it, it follows, as I have said many times, that this field takes on a certain autonomy of its own. The field is neither a concept nor a relation; it is a *physical moment* of the real in its actuality. Hence we say that “we are here-and-now present” in the field of reality. And it is in this field, in which we now are through {74} primordial apprehension, that we intellectually know, in the field sense, what something is in reality.

The field as reality is that “in” which the logos, “in” which the differentiating intellection, moves. That is, the field of reality is a *field of movement*. But of what movement? Not, to be sure, some kind of movement through an empty space—that would be a throwback to the idea of the field as space, and the field is not a spatial field but the field of reality. As the field of reality, the “among” has many different characteristics, for example that of physical or vital surroundings. But we are not concerned with that here; rather, we are concerned with the unity of the “among” as a “towards” of reality. In virtue of it, the field is neither a place nor some other thing which contains things; it is rather something essentially different: a

field which upon being traversed, and in the very act of traversing, constitutes the intellection; it is the *field of intellection*.

This field is intellectually known in a dynamic sense. But what is thus known is not known only as one more thing; as we have just said, the field is not a “thing”. Yet it is something which is intellectually known. How? Not like an ordinary thing or object, but like something whose function is not to be seen itself but to make things seen in themselves; it is the “medium” of intellection. What is a medium? And in what does its intellectual character consist?

1. ‘Medium’ here is not that by means of which we go from one thing to another; i.e., it is not that by which we intellectually know one thing starting from another. Were that true, every intellection of the logos would be *mediated* or made into a medium by that by means of which we know intellectually. That this could occur is undeniable; but as the formal character of the logos it is false because there is also the *immediate logos*. If I say that this paper I see is in reality white, my logos is immediate. {75} The “medium” which we are here examining is something different. In making the medium into a medium, or “mediatizing”, there are two apprehensions: (1) the apprehension of that by means of which I know intellectually, and (2) the apprehension of its mediatization function in virtue of which the apprehension of that to which this medium mediately leads us is united to the vision of the “thing-in-medium”. But in the medium which is of interest here we are not referring to something which is apprehended in some act distinct from its medial function; rather, we refer to the fact that what is apprehended is only this function itself. The function is not something which is seen but something *in* which one sees, something which allows seeing. Thus light (leaving aside psychological questions) and a mirror are not things seen but things which make other things seen. In reality, this medium is not seen in a separate, different act from that in which we see the things which it makes us see. Indeed, in order to intellectually know the medium as if it were the *terminus* of intellection, it would be necessary to bring about a type of retortion upon the thing seen; in order to see a perfect mirror a special effort of retortion is necessary so as to convert it into something seen. Every logos is *mediated*, even if it be *immediate*.

This concept of a medium is essential in all orders of intellection. Modern philosophy has considered intellection of things to be the result of two factors, so to speak: of intelligence and of the thing itself. But this is inadequate, because it is essential to consider the medium of intellection. To intellectually know a thing individually, in a cer-

tain way by itself, is not the same as to intellectually know it in a social medium. In this aspect society is a medium of intellection. It is not something which pertains to what is intellectually known, but it is nonetheless something which makes what is so known to be seen in a particular way. Moreover, in different media the same intellections can have different modalities. And I do not refer only to the social medium in general, but also to particular ones, {76} for example a guild or corporation, whose particular medium makes things to be seen in a special way. It is not the same to intellectually know something in a social medium (general or particular) as to intellectually know something in a religious medium. Society in its diverse forms, such as religion, etc., are from this point of view not what we intellectually know, but something which makes us to intellectually know things. In different media things are seen in different ways. For this reason I say that the medium is something essential to intellection in all orders.

2. But if this is true, if the nature of the medium profoundly affects the intellection of things, how can one speak of the intellection of a real thing, as we have done up to now, viz. as something determined in the field of reality solely by the thing itself? This is the essential problem.

To answer this question it suffices to consider more carefully what we have just said about the social, religious, and other media of intellection. These media are media because we see things in them, but we see them in different ways. But what things? Real things as real. Then it is clear that these different media are but different modalities of what makes me see things as real. To see real things in an individual or social medium presupposes seeing them medially as real. Thus all the different media point to a primary medium, a basic medium which makes me to know intellectually what things, as real things, are in reality. What is this primary medium?

To intellectually know real things in a movement from one to another is to intellectually know them, as we have seen, in the field of reality. And this means that the field of reality—or rather, reality as field—is just that in which we intellectually know one thing from others. That is, reality {77} within a field *qua* reality is the very medium of intellection of the logos. This is what we were seeking; all the other media are qualifications of this primary and basic medium, reality within a field *qua* reality. Why is this so? The answer is clear: intellectually knowing is the mere actualization of the real as real. In the primordial apprehension of reality we intellectually know a thing as real. But the intellection in the field manner is a modalization of the primordial intellection of the real:

we intellectually know what something is in reality in a mediated, not a direct way. Therefore this intellection is just a reactualization. Whence it follows that the field of reality, insofar as it concerns our problem, is a field of actuality, or better, a field of reactuality. Reality within a field makes us see the actuality of a real thing from another and in the process reactualizes the real. It is as a field of actualization that reality in the field sense constitutes the primary and basic medium of the intellection of the logos; it is *reality as medium*.

Logos, then, is not only dual and dynamic; it is also medial. To see a thing from another while moving in the field of reality is to actualize the real as physically real in the medium of reality. And this reactualization of the real as real is precisely its “declaration”, the logos *apophantikos*. Medial intellection is declarative intellection. The field of reality as medium of actualization is the medial

foundation of declaration. Such is the structure of the declarative logos. Only the mediality of reality as field makes the logos *qua* declarative possible.

In summary, the logos as such has a primary, basic structure: it is an intellection within a field, of dual character, dynamic and medial. Logos is a {78} sentient intellection in which one declares dynamically, in the medium of reality within a field, what one thing is in reality, based on another. This is its basic structure. Logos is sentient logos precisely because it occurs within a field.

Granting that, we now ask about the *formal* structure, rather than the radical structure, of this intellection. This formal structure has two moments: the dynamic and the medial, because duality is ultimately a characteristic of the other two moments. The study of this formal structure in its two moments constitutes the subject of the following two sections.

SECTION 2

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS:

I. DYNAMIC STRUCTURE

Even at the risk of monotonous repetition, let us once again take up the thread of our problem. The primordial apprehension of reality has as we know the two moments of individual formality and formality within a field—two moments of a single, same formality of reality of a thing. The unity of these two moments, apprehended *explicitly and formally*, is what constitutes the intellection of what a thing is “in reality”. In the primordial apprehension of reality, the unity of the individual and the field moments is immediate; and on account of this it is an apprehension which we might term ‘compact’. In differential actualization, the unity in question changes profoundly in character, because then one intellectually knows one thing “among” others. And this means that the intellectually known thing is so known in the distance that there is between it and all the others. Whence it follows that the field of reality itself is the field of taking distance or “stepping back” of the “in reality”. In differential actualization, the intellection of what a thing is in reality is, then, a *distanced* unfolding by virtue of the presentation of one thing “among” others.

In virtue of this, the intellection of what something is in reality is an intellectual movement in two phases.

First, there is the phase of the *impelling movement* of

the real thing to a field, to the field of reality itself. {80} Impelling is stepping back from what the thing is in reality. And in fact, in order to intellectually know what a thing is in reality, with respect to (i.e., among) others, one must first “stop to consider” the thing. And this stopping to consider is above all a type of intellectual suspension, a “stepping back” from the thing but in it and from it itself.

On the other hand, in this stepping back the real thing keeps us tensively in it, and therefore turned toward it in an *intentum* by virtue of the very tension of the distance we have taken. It is a *movement of the intentum* in order to intellectually know from the field what the thing is in reality. Therefore it is a referring of ourselves from the field to the thing; it is *intellective intention*. The *intentum* has become *intention*. In the “stepping back” and the intellectual intention we have the two moments of intellectual movement.

In order to study the dynamic structure of this apprehension we must examine:

Chapter 4: What is “stepping back” from a thing?

Chapter 5: What is *intellectively knowing by stepping back* what a thing is in reality?

CHAPTER IV DISTANCING OR STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS

In this intellection, a thing sends us to a field of reality in order to intellectually know therein what that thing is in reality. In other words, as we have just said, it is above all necessary to position oneself at a certain distance from the thing, or to “step back” from it.

There are then three points to examine:

1. What is distance?
2. What is “stepping back”?
3. What is the structure of that which is apprehended in this act of stepping back?

§ 1

WHAT IS DISTANCE?

We have seen that every real thing has an individual moment and a moment within a field; this is the structure of its unfolding. When this thing is apprehended in primordial apprehension, the difference between the two moments is in a way abolished; that is what I have termed ‘compaction’. But when a thing is apprehended “among” others, then the unity is just dual. Now, this unity, in unfolding, is what formally constitutes distance. Thus ‘distance’ does not mean a spatial distance, but something essentially different. Let us make this concept more precise.

A) First, unfolding is not distance from reality. Were that the case we would be situated “outside” of reality,

which is impossible. A real thing is the *terminus* of a primordial apprehension of its reality; and this very apprehension is what, because it is of reality (but without our leaving the formality of reality), situates us in the field of reality itself as something expressly distinct from individual reality. This installation in reality itself is the work of the primordial apprehension of reality, from which it is impossible to prescind.

B) But reality itself is not an ocean in which all real things are submerged; it is only a moment of each real thing. It is a moment through which each real thing, in being real in and by itself, is nonetheless in and by itself something “more”. This character of “more” is not a “beyond {83} the thing” but rather a “more in the thing”. Hence distance is only a moment within the thing itself. We do not go outside of the thing but rather we are “in it”. Not only do we not go outside of reality, we do not even go out of the thing itself; distance is a moment intrinsic to the thing, something in the thing itself. What is this moment?

C) In this distancing its two moments are not distanced correlatively from one another. What a real individual thing is in reality is distanced from this reality as individual reality. That is, the reality of an individual thing is maintained as much in its formality of reality as in its content; but we distance ourselves with respect to what it is “in reality”. That is, we make the field something autonomous, a field which has to be traversed. In this distancing the real individual thing is installed in the field of reality. Therefore, I repeat, we do not go outside of either the real thing or the field of reality; we remain in its field moment in order to intellectually know from it what, in reality, is its individual moment. Thus we go *in the real thing* from its field moment towards its individual moment; we intellectually know it in the field manner, as being in a field. That is, we traverse the distance as an internal moment of the thing; we traverse the duality as a unity in unfolding.

* [As discussed on p. 124, ‘stepping back’ is used to translate the Spanish *tomar distancia*, which would literally be rendered in this context as ‘positioning oneself at a distance’. The reader should always bear in mind that the ‘stepping back’ process is related to the concept of distance which Zubiri develops here and elsewhere. - Trans.]

This being the case, it is clear that a real thing apprehended among other other real things propels us to the field in a very precise manner: it compels us to “position ourselves at a distance” or to “step back” from the thing. What is this “stepping back”?

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§ 2

WHAT IS “STEPPING BACK”?

Naturally, it is to be carried by the thing itself in its formality of individual reality to its moment within a field differentially autonomized. This motion has several important characteristics.

1) First, with respect to what does one step back? One steps back from the thing in the field of reality precisely as that real thing is in reality. In what way? By removing ourselves from its unity within the field moment of reality.

2) The real thing is not thereby eliminated. Quite the contrary, since it is the real thing which impels us from its individual reality to the field of reality itself. Hence, this impelling does not consist in abandoning the real thing, but in maintaining us *in it*, but only as a point of departure for an intellective unfolding which leaves in suspense what that thing is “in reality”. This suspension is a particular kind of movement; it is an effort which I term *retraction*. Retraction is intellection of a real thing, leaving in suspense what it is in reality. Stepping back, then, is a “movement of retraction”. To be thrust by a formally real thing to the field of reality itself is to leave *retractively* in suspense what the thing is in reality.

3) Thus it is clear that the intelligence, without ceasing to be in reality and without abandoning real things, is surely situated in them but in a certain way “above” them. {85} In “retraction”, the intelligence is situated “above” what things are in reality. The articulation of those two moments, between the moment of retraction and the moment of being above things, is essential. Ignorance of it has been the source of a dual error. First, the intelligence “is” not above things through itself—that was the mistake of all of idealism from Descartes to Schelling, and ultimately Husserl and Heidegger as well. Rather, the intelligence “comes to be” above things through a movement of retraction in confronting them. The “above” is grounded on “retraction”. Secondly, that on which intellection “is” is not pure and simple reality, but only what real things are “in reality”. We

have seen that what the intellective movement knows intellectually is not the real *qua* real, but what the real, already understood as real, is “in reality”. I reiterate that it is for this reason that every intellective movement is only a modalization of the primordial apprehension of reality.

4) That is to say, in retraction we intellectually know reality itself as something open to what things could be in it. Hence, to be in this form in reality itself is to be *liberated*, so to speak, from what the things are in reality. But this, in accordance with what we said above, is not to abandon them. What we are doing is intellectually knowing what they may be in reality only as a free terminal point of what reality itself is, i.e., intellectually knowing that reality itself is this thing. When what the thing is in reality is thus known, the firm base of this new intellection is reality itself, and what the real might be in each case is nothing but a mere terminal point of reality itself. In retraction, therefore, we bring about a liberation from the “in reality”, basing ourselves on reality itself. Seeing what things are in reality is understanding them freely. A thing as a mere free terminus {86} “isn’t” what the thing is in reality, but only what it “might be” in reality.* The “might be” is the proper and formal mode by which the thing is maintained in retraction. The reality of the terminal *qua* merely terminal is reality as it “might be”. Real things, present now only as the terminus of a retractive apprehension, have an intrinsic ambivalence. On one hand they pertain to reality, and in virtue of that they are real in their primordial reality. But on the other hand, what they may be in reality is a merely terminal moment of intellection; it is simply what they “might be” in reality. I shall explain this forthwith.

5) In what, more precisely, do these things in retraction consist? In being impelled, intellection is no longer *primordial apprehension* of reality, but simple apprehension, the mere *terminus* of intellection. What a thing is “in reality” is now simple apprehension. ‘Simple’ here means being just the *terminus* of apprehension. Let us explain in more detail.

Classical philosophy has always conceived *a*) that simple apprehension is apprehension of something which formally has no character of reality, but on the contrary prescind from this character; *b*) that this apprehension is the first proper act of any possible intellection; and *c*) that the intellection of something formally real is always an ulterior intellection, viz. judgement. Judgement is thus the unique intellection which formally involves the moment

* [‘Might be’ is used in this context to translate the Spanish *sería*, which as the conditional literally means ‘would be’, but here has the sense of the future of probability. - trans.]

of reality. But these three affirmations are, as I see, it incorrect.

In the first place, simple apprehension does not formally prescind from the character of reality, but rather formally perseveres in it; the fact is that the apprehended real is in reality a terminal moment and only a terminal moment of reality {87} itself. In any simple apprehension whatever we apprehend a thing formally as if it were a moment of something which really and effectively is a reality. We do not prescind from reality; that would be impossible. It is apprehension alone of what the thing might be “in reality”. Thus we are not dealing with a retraction from the real *qua* real, but a retraction from what this thing, formally persevering as real, is “in reality”. And this unity of reality and retraction is what constitutes the “might be”. It is not the “might be” of “reality” but the “might be” of the “in reality”. Hence simple apprehension formally involves the character of reality. Classical philosophy has made of simple apprehension something which reposes upon itself as the material from which judgement is composed. That is, it has considered simple apprehension only as a “material” moment of the logos as judgement. This conception is the result of the logification of intellection. But simple apprehension formally involves reality. Therefore simple apprehension cannot be understood as a moment of the logification of intelligence; on the contrary, the logical moment of simple apprehension should be understood as a mode of actualization, i.e. as a mode of intelligizing of the logos.

In the second place, simple apprehension is not the first proper act of every intellection; rather, each simple apprehension is but a simple apprehension by “retraction”. It is an apprehension “retracted” from a primordial apprehension. Hence the first proper act of intellection is not simple apprehension but primordial apprehension of reality.

Finally, and in the third place, formal and effective reality is not the patrimony of judgement, but of the primordial apprehension of reality. We have already seen this: the primordial apprehension {88} of reality is what formally involves the character of reality prior to judgement. Considering only simple apprehension, the adjective ‘simple’ denotes that what a thing is “in reality” is apprehended only as a terminal moment of reality itself: reality itself is here and now, this or that, “in reality”.

What is the structure of what is apprehended in this act of stepping back which is simple apprehension?

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§ 3

STRUCTURE OF WHAT IS APPREHENDED “AT A DISTANCE”

This structure poses three serious problems. I have already spoken of them but they should be set forth clearly here: What is the origin of a simple apprehension? What is the condition of what is simply apprehended? And, What are the modes of simple apprehension?

1) *The origin of simple apprehension.* Consider simple apprehension as such. We are not dealing with what, classically, is called the origin of ideas, because not every simple apprehension is an idea. We must confront the problem of the origin of simple apprehension not along the lines of ideas but at its primary root. This origin, as we have already seen, is an *act of retraction* imposed by the real itself primordially apprehended; its field dimension is what imposes that act.

A) This retraction does not consist in a simple “prescinding”, because prescinding is always something which affects the content of what is apprehended, a content which comprises -- as we shall see forthwith -- both what is classically called ‘essence’ and what is called ‘existence’. But retraction conserves the entire content of a thing as reality; and what it leaves in suspense is not “the reality”, but what the thing is “in reality”. Reality continues to be *de suyo*, but we do not know what this *de suyo* is in reality. And this is not an unimportant subtlety. {90}

B) By the field moment of what is primordially apprehended we are thrust toward other things in the field. These latter are certainly real and are apprehended in a primordial apprehension; but through the moment of retraction the content of these things ceases to be the content “of them”, and is reduced to being the *principle of intelligibility* of the thing which directed us to them. To be a principle of intelligibility consists in being that with respect to which a real thing becomes re-actualized. And this is simple apprehension: intellection of a real principle of intelligibility. The content of these things, then, is not the content of a thing but just the principle of intelligibility of one or more other things.

C) This movement, and consequently simple apprehension, takes place within the physical field of reality. But the content of what is simply apprehended in this movement is in the field only as a principle of intelligibility. As such, this content “is” not in itself other than the content of the thing I wish to intellectually know “might

be". The "might be" is the character of the content of things reduced to a principle of intelligibility. These things are not left outside of the field of reality, nor are they in it as a content which "is"; rather, they are there as a principle of what the thing in question "might be". The principle of intelligibility pertains to the field of reality; it is there that the movement of retraction takes place and the principle of intelligibility is constituted. If, in primordial apprehension, I see a bulky form, and I do not know what it is in reality, I am therefore impelled to things which are in the surrounding landscape, for example, to the trees. These trees are apprehended in a primordial apprehension the same as the bulky form; but considered as what the form "might be" {91} in reality, they have become converted into a merely terminal moment of the apprehension of what the form is "in reality". I repeat, this does not mean any type of renunciation of their content, but rather its reduction to a real principle of intelligibility. It is a new condition of what, before, was that content. What is this condition?

2) *The condition of what is apprehended in simple apprehension.* What is apprehended remains, as we have said, as the condition of mere terminus of apprehension as a principle of intelligibility. Being thus a mere terminus is having the content of reality *qua* content stay suspended, so that this content is no longer properly speaking real, but unreal. In retraction, what things are in reality constitutes, so to speak, the sphere of the unreal. Thus everything depends on what one says is unreality.

Unreality is not just not having reality. If something unreal had nothing to do with reality, it would not be "unreal" but "a-real". To be unreal is thus a way of having to do with the real. This is obvious, indeed, since as we have said, simple apprehension is formally constituted in the very field of reality as reality. What is this way, then? That is the question. The structure of the unreal is comprised of three moments.

a) First, the unreal does not rest upon itself, but upon the real. Everything unreal is constituted by "dis-realization". And the "dis" is not a purely negative moment; if it were, I repeat, the thing would not be unreal but areal. Therefore it is a positive "dis"; it is, so to speak, a realization in the form of "dis". What is this "dis" as a form of realization? To understand that we must recall {92} what reality is. One might think, in fact, that to be real is to be existing; from which it would follow that the unreal is what does not have existence and might be only what used to be classically termed 'essence'. The "dis" would be nullity of existence. But this is impossible, because reality is not existence but being *de*

suyo. And being *de suo* is a formality beyond classical essence and existence. The existent is real only when existence belongs *de suo* to it. Otherwise the presumed existence would not make the thing something real (this is what I have termed *spectre*; it is a subject we cannot get into here). To be real is thus structurally prior to existing. Likewise, the unreal is not an essence in the classical sense, because classical essence is formally the essence of what the thing is *de suo*. In virtue of this the "dis" of disrealization includes the real thing *in toto* with respect to both its classical existence and essence. The unreal has unreal existence and unreal essence. The character of the "dis", then, leaves intact from this discussion. And the fact is that reality should not be understood as existence nor as essence, but as being "*de suo*". And then unreality consists in a "dis" of the "*de suo*". What does this mean?

In each real thing, in each *de suo*, we have distinguished an aspect of individual reality and an aspect of field reality which, autonomized, we call "reality itself". This is the unfolding; these two moments are first and foremost physical and not just conceptual moments. As moments, they are different. In the primordial apprehension of a real thing, we apprehend them unitarily. Since, however, reality is open in its mode as "towards", we understand being in a field as a distinct moment, in which the real thing is set apart from other real things in reality itself. This means that it is {93} possible to remain in the field even when suspending its unity with a specific individual formality. Then we have reality itself as the ambit but without its own proper individual reality. This "without" is just the negative outline of the positive "dis" of disrealization. Disrealization does not affect what pertains to the field, to reality itself, but to the real thing in the moment of what it is "in reality". That is, reality itself is no longer necessarily here and now this real determinate thing. Disrealizing is not suspending reality itself, but suspending the content which is real here and now, suspending that in which reality itself is realized. Now, reality is the *de suo*. Hence reality itself is a "*de suo*" which *de suo* can be realized in this or that thing. The real thing is no longer *de suo* that in which reality itself is realized "in reality". Thence arises unreality. Unreality is the dis-realized mode of being in reality itself. It is the first moment of unreality. Through this moment the unreal involves reality itself. First, it involves it formally, because it can only be unreal by being in reality itself disrealizedly, i.e. without it necessarily having a determinate content. And secondly, the unreal involves reality physically, because in the unreal reality is reality itself which we apprehend physically in the primordial apprehension

of any real thing. Reality itself is not a concept or idea or anything of that nature; it is the physical field dimension—that of being in a field—of real things. It is the “physical reality” itself of this landscape, of this rock, or of this meadow; it is, I repeat, this very physical reality which is constituted within a field in every simple apprehension of whatever type. In a centaur the reality itself apprehended is the same as in this rock. What is not the same is the content. Simple apprehension does not prescind from reality itself {94} as is usually claimed, but rather involves it formally and physically as reality without its own content.

b) This ambit of disrealization is a physical ambit of apprehension. And it is in this reality as something physical that the content of every intellectual apprehension lies actualized. Intellection, in which reality itself is actualized, is not an empty intellection but one in which the ambit is actualized at the same time that various simple apprehensions are being elaborated in it. Reality itself disrealized in every individual real thing lies actualized in the simple apprehensions of my intellection. This is the second moment of the unreal: the moment of *actualization* of reality itself in simple apprehensions.

c) But then, simple apprehension remains in reality itself, though freely realized and reduced to an intellectual principle of what the content of reality itself “might be”. Realization is actualization of something as content of reality itself. It is therefore a liberated realization, and is like the inverse of that actualization of reality itself. It is also the third moment of unreality. In virtue of being a realization that “might be”, it is a realization which is constitutively free. The unreal is not some mental object treated as if it were real, nor is it a physical thing; rather it is a *free thing*. This does not mean that I freely consider this content to be real, but rather just the opposite: I consider freely that the physical reality in a field “is thus”, i.e., that it has this determinate content. For example, the real in fictional writing does not consist in being a fiction of reality, nor in feigning reality, but as we shall see forthwith consists in being reality in fiction. What we feign is the content of the reality. Reality itself remains freely actualized in something which is realized {95} in it. That from which it is free is not reality itself but its determinate content.

Actualization of reality itself, and the free realization in it of what is intellectually known, are the two moments which intrinsically and jointly comprise the character of disrealization in a positive way. Of these two positive moments, the second is grounded upon the first: the content is realized because physical reality itself has been

actualized in intellection without content. In virtue of this first moment, that which is apprehended, i.e. the unreal, is *really* unreal; in virtue of the second moment the unreal is *unreally* real. The unity of these two moments is what constitutes the unreal, which we express in “might be”. “Might be” is the unity of an actualization disrealized and of a free realization. With it the domain of the unreal is characterized. The unreal is thus a free thing, and therefore a created thing. Creation is creation not of reality but of the content in it; correctly understood, a free realization. If one desires to speak of ideas (an odious expression, but quite common as I have said), I would say that to create is not to give reality to my ideas, but just the opposite: to give my ideas to reality. Hence the seriousness of this intellection: physical reality itself comes into play in virtue of its content; i.e. what real things are in reality. To actualize disrealized physical reality in a free content—this is the essence of creation.

To summarize, the apprehension of the real in retraction from content, i.e. in simple apprehension, has the formal character of unreality. Unreality is the intrinsic and formal unity of actualization of physical reality itself and free realization of its content; it is the “might be”. The “might be” is an *unreal mode*, not in the grammatical sense but in the sense of reality itself in the mode of its free content. {96}

Granting this, we may ask what are the modes of simple apprehension, i.e., what are the structural modes of intellection of the unreal. That is the third point we wanted to examine.

3) *The structural modes of simple apprehension.* Reality itself is preserved physically and formally as the ambit of free creation of the unreal. But neither disrealization nor creation are absolute. They are a movement which is always based upon a real thing, but which can be based on different dimensional moments of it. In that movement, these moments are actualized. As moments they pertain to every real thing, but the movement of disrealization actualizes them explicitly and formally in intellection. And in accordance with these moments, the movement of disrealization confers different characters of unreality upon simple apprehension. There are different types of simple apprehension which are not numerically distinct, but are distinct structural moments of reality itself as the ambit of free creation. Those dimensions are three, and they constitute in a positive way, and in their radical unity, the definition of what I have called being “in reality”. These dimensions of a real thing are, as I said, three.

A) Most importantly, the first thing which can be

disrealized in a freeing retraction is the content of the complete real thing. It is not the thing prescinds from reality itself, but reality itself terminates freely in this thing as that which this thing “might be” in reality. In virtue of this, the real thing is actualized in a dimension proper to itself: being “this”. Here “this” is not an adjective, i.e. “this” thing, but a noun (i.e., “this” insofar as it is a “this-ness”). Apprehending “this” thing is what constitutes the primordial apprehension of reality, {97} for example, perception. Now, the “this-ness” pointed to of “this” thing, when disrealized, is the “this” no longer “*qua* real” but “*qua* perceived”; it is the “this” of the thing *qua* mere terminus of perception. It is the “this” *qua* mere terminus of perception that I shall call *percept*. The first form of simple apprehension reduces the content of the thing to a percept. It is not a percept of reality, but reality itself in percept. It is reality itself terminating freely in “this”. The point must be emphasized, because classical philosophy, regardless of its notion of simple apprehension, never included percept among its simple apprehensions. As I see it, not only ought percept to be included among simple apprehensions, but it is in fact the primary form of them and the very possibility of every other simple apprehension.

This percept as such is a free creation. To be sure, its content is given to me. But reducing this content to just a percept is my act of liberation. I have liberated the “this”, I have liberated it from the real thing *qua* real. Moreover, it is a very concrete liberation.

This is because the liberating reduction is not an arbitrary act carried out in a vacuum, but a liberation brought about “in” the apprehension of a primary real thing as real from another thing to which I have withdrawn. Only when seen from this latter thing is the content disrealized. Liberation and therefore disrealization are only possible in a differential actualization; and in virtue of that are only possible as a function of some things determined within the actualization as a field. It is only possible when one thing is referred to the rest. And this reference always has an aura of liberty, because if I had moved toward a different thing, the aspect might have been different as well. The simple apprehension of a real thing {98} as a mere percept is (1) an act which I freely execute, and (2) that which is actualized in it has an intrinsic character of liberty of “ad-spection”, or if one wishes, of inspection.

This movement is not only “free”, it is a free “creation”, because a real thing is certainly a “this”, but reducing the “this” to a mere percept is a creation in the rigorous sense. All free “ad-spection”, i.e. every free as-

pect of a percept is a creation. This creation clearly does not concern the content of the thing itself *qua* real, but does concern its “thisness” reduced to a percept. When “this” content is reduced to a percept, the “this” is a strict aspectual creation; it is the perceptual creation of the “this”.

To summarize, when apprehended at a distance by stepping back, a thing is in reality the terminus of a simple apprehension which actualizes it to us as a “this” in a free and creative movement of reduction of this thing to its “thisness”, a mere percept. That is what “this” might be in reality.

B) But in the liberating retraction, a thing is in reality disrealized in another dimension. Every “this” is a unitary system of real notes. In accordance with this unitary system, the thing is not a mere complex of random notes, but of those notes systematized in a certain “manner”, so that if they were systematized in a different manner it would no longer be the same thing but something else. That is, a real thing in its “thisness” has in addition to its notes the “how” of its systematization. When the “this” is reduced to a percept, it retains its “perceptual how”. Now, I can withdraw so to speak, liberating myself in the “thisness” itself from its own “how”. Simple apprehension is then free to create the “how”. To be sure, I am not limited to creating the “how” by leaving the notes intact; rather, the notes deriving from perceptions can then be freely created in order to make a {99} new “how” from them. The terminus of this creative intellectual movement of the “how” is a feigned “how”, something fictitious, a *fictum*. The fictitious is formally fictitious of a “how”; the simple apprehension of a thing as a fictitious “how” is fiction.

Let us clarify a point. Fiction is above all something unreal in the sense that it is disrealized. Therefore fiction is a fictitious thing but still “in” reality. It formally involves the physical moment of reality, that moment apprehended in impression of reality. The fiction, as I have already said, is not a “fiction of reality” but “reality in fiction”. Reality itself is not feigned, but only that reality itself is “thus”. It is the “how” reality itself “might be”, i.e., how the thing might be in reality.

In the second place, the fictional work is something freely created, but it is doubly free. The work has its own “this” which is also something unreal, something disrealized, as in the case of the percept. But its “thisness” is only the notes which constitute it. These notes are given, but reduced to a mere perceptual “this”. So we have the first side of the unreality of a fictional work, namely the unreality of its notes. Therein the unreality comes to-

gether with the percept; but only with respect to the notes considered each by itself: they are unreal “this-notes”. Moreover, the fictional work has freely created the “how”, something not done by the percept. The percept is the whole thing given and reduced to a percept. In the fictional work the “how” itself is reduced. That is the second side of the unreality of the fictional work; it is a creation of the second degree, so to speak. The notes are made unreal separately and recomposed in a free “how”; this is free recombination. But it is not a recombination in a vacuum; rather, the most free of the fictional creations is always oriented by the “how” of real things {100} in order to feign them in some way, whether being like them, different from them, or even opposite to them. What does not happen and cannot happen is a fictional work which has nothing to do with something previously apprehended as real.

In the third place, this fictional work is not—as one might think and as is often stated—an image produced by the creative imagination. Creative imagination is something animals also possess. An animal has imaginary creations based on stimuli. What the animal does not possess is intellective apprehension of the creation of what was imaginatively created. The animal lacks the moment of reality. The fictional work is “reality in fiction”; it is “how” a thing might be in reality. Therefore I term this intellective apprehension *fantasy*; it is a *fantastic* intellection. Animals do not have fantasies in this sense. Man does with his imagination what the animal cannot do: fantasize. The essence of “human” imagination is fantasy. To contrast the fictional work in this sense to what is imagined, I reserve for the fictional work the word *phantasm* in its etymological sense.

And in the fourth place, simple apprehension of a real thing as fictional is an act of strict sentient intellection. It is *intellection*, because it is the intellective apprehension of “how” the thing might be in reality. It is *sentient* because the imagination is the sentient moment of this intellection. In its unity, this sentient intellection is the simple sentient apprehension of a thing in accordance with how it might be in reality; it is the fictional thing, the phantasm.

Simple apprehension at a distance actualizes for us, then, two dimensions of a real thing: the “this” and the “how”. Free expectant intellection has respectively the two forms of percept and fictional work. They are the first two forms of simple apprehension. {101}

C) But there is still more. In the liberating retraction it is not just the “this” and the “how” which are actualized in a stepping back, because “this” and “how” are two di-

mensions of what—without making any special assumptions whatever—I would call the configuration of a thing. But this configuration refers to a more precise dimension, to what is the thing thus configured. The “what” is the third dimension of things actualized when apprehended at a distance, by stepping back. In retraction the “what” as such is now actualized. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is a “what”, certainly, just as there is a “this” and a “how”. But these three dimensions are unitarily compact in a thing which is directly apprehended as real. Only in simple apprehension at a distance can they actually be discriminated: this, how, and what. Now, when a thing is disrealized by free retraction, its “what” is made unreal and reduced to a mere “what” *qua* apprehended; it is exactly what we term *concept*. A concept is not something primarily logical but something primarily real; it is the “what-concept”. A concept formally and physically involves reality; it is physical reality itself as if it were this “what”: we conceive what a thing *might be* in reality. Reality itself, I repeat, is not an intentional but a physical moment, the moment of reality apprehended in primordial apprehension. A concept is, then, reality terminated in a free “what”. Hence it is not “concept of reality” but “reality in concept”. Then the simple apprehension in respect to intellection at a distance is *conception*. The concept is what is conceived in the conception. This is not tautological: the concept is the “what” of a thing reduced to a mere terminus of conception. {102}

This concept is an unreal terminus (in the sense already explained). It is reality itself in its mere “might be” terminal. And the movement which disrealizes the “what” and reduces it to a mere concept is a free and creative movement. Let us examine this more closely.

a) It is above all a liberating movement of the “what” as made unreal. It does not tell us what a real thing is, because our intellection is still taking a step back. And in this distance we have the inexorable freedom of conceiving the “whats” in and by themselves. This does not refer to any effort to ascertain which of those “whats” the real thing is as dually apprehended. That will come later. Now we are in the simple apprehension conceiving of those “whats” *qua* termini of apprehension. In the ambit of stepping back we freely conceive the “whats”. These “whats” are, in fact, what reality itself “might be”. This is a free movement. But its freedom is bounded by the primordial apprehension of reality from which we have started in the dual apprehension. We always conceive “what” a thing, apprehended “from” one or more others previously apprehended, might be. It is the first real thing which orients us “toward” the conception of what “might be”, because despite being free, no conception is an act of

freedom *in vacuo*. It is a freedom which gives us things apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality in order to conceive the rest. And therefore it is a freedom circumscribed both with respect to its point of departure and the goal to which it is directed.

b) This liberating movement is creative. What it creates is the form in which the field of reality is actualized and the form in which real things in it are. The “what” reduced to a mere concept is the “might be”, and is so in two forms. {103}

In the first place, it is an abstract “what”. In this aspect, the disrealization of a conception is abstraction. *Abstraction* should not be confused with any sort of *extraction*. Extraction is a “division” into parts; its outcome is a “thing-extract”. Abstraction does not divide one part from another but, upon intellectually knowing one or more of them, “prescinds” from the others. It is a “precision” in the etymological sense of prescinding. The outcome is then an “abstract”. This precisive movement *qua* movement is what is essential to abstraction. Generally, when speaking of abstraction, one pays attention only to the outcome, to what is “abstracted”, thus emphasizing the negative aspect of the process, viz. prescinding. No attention is paid to the “abstraction” itself. *Qua* abstraction, it is a movement, essentially positive and creative; it is the creation of the very ambit of the “abs” as ambit of unreality. The form as reality itself terminates in a “what” reduced to a concept; this becomes the ambit of the “abs”. The abstract is the outcome of this abstraction. This abstractive movement is freely creative, because every abstraction requires a direction and is brought to completion in that direction. Moreover, this direction is never univocally determined. For example, if we abstract what we conceptualize to be the “what” of a man, we can do it in several different ways: with respect to his animal-like figure, his psycho-animal functions (language, etc.), his personal nature, the character of his collectivity, etc. Along each of these lines the “what” created by abstraction turns out to be formally distinct from the others. Abstraction involves a precise intellectual direction. What this direction does is to create, in a qualitative sense, the ambit of the “abs”. It is not sufficient to consider the abstract character of the result. This abstractive movement prescinds from notes, but does not prescind from {104} the formality of reality within a field. Therefore the abstract is not an “abstracted from reality” but “reality in abstraction”.

But, in the second place, the “what-concept” is not only *abstract*; it is also a *construct*. I employ this expres-

sion here not to designate the “construct state” but as an everyday synonym for something constructed. Traditionally philosophy has thought that concepts are abstract, that they are abstracted from real things. That is correct. But the truth is that the majority of concepts, especially scientific concepts, are not just abstracted but are constructed by the intelligence itself. Intellection of concepts is in itself constructive intellection. The “what-concept” is reality in *construction*. In a fictional work we are already present at a first manner of construction, viz. the combination of notes in the work. But here the construction has another aspect, because it does not operate on separate notes but only on “prescinded” notes, on abstract notes. Hence the outcome is no longer a fictional work but a concept, a “what”. To be sure, these two ways of construction are not necessarily independent. I can certainly construct a fictional work following the thread of a constructed concept; this, for example, is what happens in physico-mathematical construction. I can for now but allude to the problem without stopping to treat it in detail.

In the movement of retraction, in which the real is reduced to a mere concept, we have the third form of simple apprehension in reality itself.

This movement is a free and creative movement. We are habituated to seeing concepts organized, as if their organization were already logically preordained—once again the logification of intellection. To understand this it suffices to consider the organization of {105} concepts according to genera, differences, and species. Its expression is the definition. To say that man is animal “and” rational is not a definition. In order to be so, it is necessary that the concept of “animal” be the genus, that the difference be “rational”, and that the “species” then be man. But this is a free construction. To achieve it, a man whom we apprehend in primordial apprehension of reality has directed us to other things also apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality, and it is from these other things that we go on to form the generic concept. Now, these other things are freely chosen. If I choose “animal” as the thing toward which I refer the man apprehended in primordial apprehension, then clearly “animal” can discharge the function of genus. “Animal” might be a genus which is differentiated into “rational” and “irrational”. But this choice of “animal” is perfectly free. I could choose as genus simply “rational”. Then “rational” might be the genus, while “animal” might be a simple difference. “Rational” might be divided into “animal” and “spiritual”. This was basically the conception of Origen,

* [A linguistic term referring to the grammar of the Semitic languages.-trans.]

that man might be a soul, purely spiritual, which has fallen into a material animal. The strict conceptualization of what is apprehended in primordial apprehension is, then, the outcome of a free and creative movement.

To summarize, we have inquired about the mode of intellection of a real thing in reality itself, in the field of reality. This intellection has the character of a dual apprehension, and hence a character grounded in the unfolding, within each real thing, of its “reality” and its “in reality”. We have then posed the problem of the internal structure of an intellection in this unfolding. And the first thing which must be said is that we are dealing with a {106} movement of retraction in which we step back from what each thing, apprehended in primordial apprehension, is in reality. In this retraction we intellectually know in a simple apprehension what the thing might be. What the real thing is in which reality itself terminates is therefore the apprehension of the real in unreality. This “stepping back” actualizes expressly three dimensions of each real thing: its “this”, its “how”, and its “what”. These three dimensions, reduced from the real thing to the terminus of simple apprehension, give rise to three forms of simple apprehension: the percept, the fiction or *fictum*, and the concept. The “this” is apprehended in a simple apprehension as “percept”; the “how” is apprehended in simple apprehension as “fictitious”, and the “what” is

apprehended in simple apprehension as “concept”. These are the three forms of intellection of simple apprehension at a distance, the three forms of impelling actualization of the intellection of the real as differentiating.

Now, what we insist on calling ‘being “in reality”’ formally consists in the unity of the “this”, the “how”, and the “what”. Here we have what a thing is “in reality”; or rather, what the thing “might be” in reality. The real is apprehended in primordial apprehension. What reality might be is this same reality intellectually known as “this, how, what”. This intellection can be just a retraction; that is what the “might be” expresses.

But in this stepping back, and with this utilization of percepts, fictions, and concepts, the intelligence turns expectantly from its free creation to real things from which it has stepped back, intent on intellectually knowing them not merely as a terminus of apprehension, i.e., not merely as terminus of what a real thing “might be”, but as it “is” in reality. The *intentum* is thus something different from a simple apprehension. {107} It is no longer creation, but affirmation. The expectation leads, by stepping back, in the roundabout way of simple apprehension, to an affirmation. This is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality, an intellection in stepping back. The *intentum* is now an affirmative intellection.

CHAPTER V

INTELLECTION THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” FROM WHAT A REAL THING IS IN REALITY

The intellectual movement, as I remarked above, has two phases. First is the *movement that impels* from a real thing to a field, to the field of reality, in which what the thing is in reality is left at a distance through a disrealizing retraction. It is the movement in whose intellection we intellectually know by simple apprehension what the real thing “might be” in reality (percept, fictum, concept). The intellectual movement has a second phase. The real thing which has impelled us from itself to reality itself in a field constrains us tensely there; it is the phase of the movement of return to the real thing, the *intentum* for intellectually knowing, from the field, what this thing “is” in reality out of the sphere of what it “might be”. This intellection is then a discernment, a *krinein*, a judging. Dual apprehension has led us to intellectually know what a real thing is in reality in a movement of retraction toward what this thing “might be” in reality, and in a reverse movement which leads us by stepping back (i.e., “distanced”) and with discernment to intellectually know what the thing in fact “is” {110} in reality, i.e., to a *judgement*. It is this which we must now study.

A judgement is an “affirmation”. The *intentum* acquires from the field the character of affirmative intention of what the thing is or is not in reality. This “in reality” is the unity of the “this, how, and what” which generally (though not always or primarily) is expressed in the “is”. Therefore our problem is the study of the structure of affirmation as such.

Affirmation, as I said, is an intellection which returns, distanced from (stepping back from) what the real thing is in reality. It is not just a return to the real thing, as if the thing had been left abandoned; rather, it is a non-abandonment of the real, and therefore concerns an intellectual return *within the real itself*. This “within” is not

just a material “within”, so to speak. We are not talking about the fact that we are within the real; rather the “within” is a “within” which is *formally* such, i.e., this intellection is expressly and formally intellectually knowing the real in a movement of intellectual return to what the real is in reality, that is, in a *formal movement* of reality. Simple apprehension is a *retractive* intellection from what a thing “might be” to what it “is” in reality. But always “in reality”.

What is this intellection? The question is more complicated than one might think, because intellection can take on a variety of forms. Moreover, in each of them affirmation can have different modes as well. Therefore we must address three groups of questions:

1. What is affirming?
2. What are the forms of affirmation?
3. What are the modes of affirmation?

{111}

§ 1

WHAT IS AFFIRMING?

‘Affirmation’ here means a “firm” intellection as opposed to the “retracted” intellection constituting simple apprehension. Stepping back distends or relaxes, so to speak, the intellection of what the real is. Affirmation is affirming to ourselves intellectually what is the real in that stepping back, in that distension. It is always and only that which is intellectually known that is affirmed “at a

distance” or by stepping back in the process of return. What is this affirmation?

Two concepts of affirmation have been put forth, both of which are false, in my opinion, though for different reasons.

In the first place it has been thought, especially since Descartes, that to affirm something is “to believe” that what is affirmed is so. Affirmation would thus be belief. This conception can assume various shades of meaning depending upon one’s understanding of belief. It can be understood as a mere *sentiment*, so that affirming would be the expression of an intellectual sentiment. Or it can be understood not as a sentiment but as a decision of the will; thus affirming would be the expression of a *volition*. This was above all the idea of Descartes, for whom, as a consequence, the problem of truth is but the problem of the good of the intelligence, and falsehood would be its sin. Finally, one can understand that belief, without becoming a strict act of volition, is at least an act of *admission*: to affirm would be to admit something. But in any one of these forms, the conception seems to me incorrect, because on a different level, all of them {112} and any related ones minimize the intellective aspect of affirmation. And the fact is that upon saying that *A* “is” for example *B*, the questions inevitably arise what is it that is believed, what is it that is decided, what is it that is admitted. Strictly speaking, what is believed or decided or admitted is that “something *A* is *B*”. In virtue of this, prior to the whole gamut of modes of belief, there is that which is believed, decided, or admitted: “something is *B*”. And in this “something is *B*” in itself is what the affirmation consists. Affirmation does not consist in believing. This “something is *B*” is a formally intellective act. There is always a serious ambiguity when one speaks of judgement. On one hand, judging can mean the psychical act, that mental act which, so to speak, we may term *assertion*. In this sense, judging is asserting. But there is a more radical and deeper meaning of judging, namely judgement as affirmative intention, *affirmation*. Assertion and affirmation are not the same. Assertion is a mental act of mine, whereas affirmation is the intellective intention independently of whether or not it be asserted by me. Moreover, the affirmative intention forms the possibility for assertion; only because there is an affirmation, only because there is an affirmative intention, can there be an assertion. In fact the same affirmation can be the terminus of different modes of assertion. Now, here we are referring only to affirmation as affirmative intention. I shall employ the word ‘affirmation’ in this sense, in absolute contradistinction to ‘assertion’. In what does this affirmation consist?

Here we meet up with a second conception much more general than the previous one: to affirm is to say “*A* is *B*”. *B* is the predicate, but as is well known, I can and I should include *B* in the “is”, and then the predicate is “is *B*”. {113} Judging would then be predicating of *A* “being *B*”. This is the venerable conception of Aristotle which, with more or less important variants, has run throughout the course of history. It is, as I see it, a conception which is also inadmissible for two reasons. In the first place, it is assumed that affirming is “saying”. But what is understood by “saying”? Certainly no one, not even Aristotle himself, thinks that here “saying” can be expressed in some language. But the question remains: what is the intellective nature of the saying as saying? There is no alternative but to appeal to affirmation *qua* affirmative intention: saying would be having “affirmative intention”. And this is conceptualized as something irreducible. But, is it really something irreducible? And above all, in what would its irreducibility consist? That this question has not been rigorously posed constitutes a serious defect of the whole conception, as I see it. Indeed, it has been admitted without further ado that judging is affirming; without questioning formally what the affirming is. Secondly, affirmation is identified with the *predication* “*A* is *B*”. And this, as we shall soon see, is formally false regardless of what conception one has of the predicate (whether “*B*” or “is *B*”). Not every affirmation is predicative. But that is a subject which concerns not affirmation in itself but what I have called forms of affirmation, which I shall treat subsequently.

With this we are at the point of being able to formulate our problem precisely. In the first place, we are not concerned with what *assertion* might be, but with what *affirmation* is. In the second place, we are not concerned with the various kinds of *concrete affirmations*, but with the *function of affirming* itself—just as in previous chapters, when treating of intellection, I did not refer to various kinds of intellections but only to what intellective knowing consists in, {114} to the function of intellective knowing itself. Hence we shall now ask not about the various kinds of concrete affirmations but about the *function of affirming* as such.

Affirming, as we have said, is intellective knowing in a movement of return; i.e., the intellection itself is now formally dynamic. To understand that we must clarify two points: (1) in what the movement of affirmation *qua* movement consists, and (2) in what the intellection itself in this movement consists. They comprise the two essential questions—affirmation *qua* intellective *movement*, and intellective movement *qua* *affirmation*. Affirmation only is necessary and possible in a field-based intellection,

i.e. in *sentient* intellection. A non-sentient intelligence would apprehend the truth of our judgement, but would not apprehend it in the form of an affirmation. The *logos qua* affirmation is constitutively and essentially sentient; it is *sentient logos*. In what follows I shall speak in general about affirmation as sentient *logos*, prescinding from the fact that simple apprehension pertains to it; i.e., I shall speak of the *logos* only as judgement.

1) First of all, then, what is *affirmation qua movement*? Even at the risk of monotonously repeating the same idea, let me state that affirmation is an *intantum*. This *intantum* is not in itself noetic but noergic; it is the dynamic tension of returning to the real, formally already within reality, within this particular real thing. With it the *intantum* has been converted from a movement at a distance within reality, to a movement “toward” the thing; it is *intention*. This intention is, then, an internal moment of the *intantum*. It is no longer a mere “being tense” but a “movement towards” what the real thing is in reality. {115} The intention is a moment of the reversive *intantum* at a distance, i.e. from reality itself to what, through stepping back (i.e., at a distance), it is “in reality”. Intention then is not something purely noetic because it is a moment of the *intantum*, which is noergic. Intentionality is thus the physical *ergon* of intellection in stepping back, i.e., at a distance. The moment of returning is a formally constitutive moment of affirmation. Intellection, in stepping back, must fill up that stepping back, and do so in a very precise way, viz. by movement. Every stepping back, in fact, should be gone through. Otherwise the distinction between what a thing is as real and what it is in reality would not be a “distance”; it would be at best mere separation. And that is wrong.

To be gone through is formally constitutive of distance, of stepping back. Therefore intellectual going through of distance is formally constitutive of affirmation. To affirm is to “go” from one thing to another “among” the rest. The “among” of differential actualization of the real is a distancial “among”. To affirm is to come to intellectually know what a thing is in reality, but based upon others. It is a “coming to” and not a merely “being in” it. But let us avoid a possible mistake which would be very serious. The “coming to” is not a movement which consists in going from one intellection to another, but rather a movement which consists in the very mode of actually intellectually knowing each thing. It is not a “coming to affirm” but an “affirming by coming” or “coming by affirming”, a movement which constitutes intellection in the coming itself. In other words, the movement constituting intention is not the intention of directing me to one thing after another, but the intentional intellectual movement of

the *intantum* of each thing. It is not intention of intellection, but intellectual intention. Judgement therefore {116} is of formally dynamic nature *qua* intention. The intention itself is formally dynamic.

As I see it, failure to consider formally the dynamic character of judgement is one of the most serious errors in the philosophy of human intelligence from Kant to the present. Intellectual dynamism has not been a subject other than in that dynamism called ‘dialectic’, i.e., reasoning. Dialectic, as usually understood, is that movement constituting the reasoning process. It has been emphasized that the intelligence can go from some intellections to others by combining them suitably; and the first dialectical laws of this process have been rigorously established. But no one has asked why this happens. Is it just a simple fact? I do not think so. I believe that the intellectual movement of reasoning is founded in something constitutive of a mode of intellection, the intellection *qua* stepping back and returning, i.e., the affirmative intellection. Therefore this movement is not a mere fact, but something anchored in a structural moment of affirmation, namely, in stepping back. This stepping back is not something peculiar to dialectical reasoning, but a structural moment of every affirmation. Dialectical movement of reasoning should have been founded upon the structure of affirmation as stepping back. Aristotelian philosophy has never asked about this structure; it went astray on the matter of distance and stepping back, i.e., on the basic radical structure of the *logos*. What is dynamic in dialectical reasoning is founded in, and is a consequence of, the dynamic character of affirmation. It was necessary to have started from this latter, because not only dialectic but affirmation itself is structurally dynamic. To be sure, Kant saw in dialectic something more than a mere combination of affirmations; {117} but he opted to make a simple logical system out of that combination. With regard to our present question, the position of Kant concerning affirmation as such is, strictly speaking, the same as that of Aristotle.

For other philosophies, e.g. that of Hegel, dialectical movement is more than a fact; it is the formal structure of intellection. Hegelian dialectic is not the movement of some affirmations to others, but the dynamic structure of intellection as such. But this view, as I see it, is just as unacceptable as that of Aristotle, and is so for the same reason but with a different emphasis. Clearly, movement is a structural character of intellection, not a mere fact. But it is a structural character not of intellection as such but only of distanced intellection. Just as in Aristotle, there is absent in Hegel the moment of stepping back. This stepping back, this taking of distance, in fact is not a

moment of intellection in the abstract, but something which only applies to a sentient intellection. Now, sentient intellection can apprehend the real in and by itself without any stepping back, and therefore without movement. Only when sentient intellection intellectually knows at a distance do we have movement. The dialectical dynamism is, then, a structural moment of intellection; but only of affirmative intellection, because this, and only this, is distanced intellection, intellection by stepping back. Intellection in itself is not dynamic.

For Aristotle, then, dynamism is just a characteristic of reasoning and not a structural moment of affirmative intellection. For Hegel, dynamism is a structural moment of intellection, but of intellection as such. In both conceptions {118} the idea of distance and stepping back is absent and therefore I believe that they are unacceptable. Stepping back is a structural moment, but only with respect to affirmative intellection.

In what does this affirmative intention consist, not as movement but as affirmation?

2) *Intellective movement qua affirmation.* This movement is the logos. I repeat: we do not deal with particular affirmations but with affirmation in the sense of function of affirming as such. One usually considers affirming as something “added”, so to speak, to the apprehension of things, an addition which consists in a type of internal intellectual “attack” in which the intelligence “decides” to affirm something as real. Now, neither of these two characteristics (being added and being the outcome of an “attack”) describes in a rigorous way what affirming is, what intellective movement as affirmation is.

A) In the first place, consider affirming as “added” to the apprehension of things. What apprehension is meant? If one means simple apprehensions, then affirming is certainly something “more”; it is much “more” than simple apprehension. But the fact is that judgement is not based primarily upon simple apprehension, but upon the primordial apprehension of the real. Now, affirming is “more” than simple apprehension, but it is “less”, much “less”, than the primordial apprehension of reality. Every intellection is an intellective actualization of the real, and as we saw in Chapter I, in primordial intellection we apprehend something not only as if it were real, but as something which is formally and truly real and which is apprehended as real. And in this being “real” of what is intellectually known in a primordial apprehension, in an apprehension prior to any affirmation, in this “real”—I repeat—is where affirmation as such intellectually moves. {119} Affirmation, in fact, does not arise except when what is already apprehended as real is distended by step-

ping back in the field of the real. Affirmation formally but also *constitutively* involves the impression of reality. It is sentient logos in virtue of being basically and formally constituted by the impression of reality. Hence, affirmation not only does not add anything to the primordial apprehension of reality, but in fact is an “indebted” mode (because it is “grounded”) of being intellectually in what has been already intellectually known as real. It is a distended mode of being already in the real. It is a modalization of the primordial apprehension. Therefore affirmation, which in certain respects is an unfolding, an expansion, of the primordial apprehension of the real, is nonetheless something founded in a “reduction” of the primordial apprehension of the real, because it is a distensive mode of intellective actualization of the real. It is essential, in my view, to stress this reductive, distensive character of affirming as a mode of being intellectually in the real. Affirming is intellective actualization in which something is intellectually known which is real, but through returning from a stepping back. It is because of this, ultimately, that the conceptions of judgement as a “relation” are wrong. A relation adds, but affirmation adds nothing; on the contrary, it moves distendedly in what already is intellectually. Affirmation not only adds nothing, but in a certain way it subtracts, in that mode of subtraction which is distension. All of those attempts to characterize affirming as something added to apprehension, and as something irreducible to it, are in my view vitiated at their root. Simple apprehension is already a retraction, not *of* the real, but *in* the real; and affirming is a being in the real but intellectually known {120} in this stepping back, i.e., in a reduced form, a being distended. Affirmation is not reducible to simple apprehension. And not only is it irreducible to primordial apprehension; rather, one intellectually knows in it distendedly; distendedly, but *in it*. It is a reduced and distended mode in the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., in something already intellectually known in its reality. Affirmation, to be sure, is formally in reality, but is not the reason why affirming is the primary and radical mode of being intellectually in reality; that, rather, is because affirming is a reduced and distended mode within a prior intellectually being “existing” in reality. By this I do not mean that a determinate judgement is a type of “contraction” of what “the” judging would be; rather, I refer to the function of judging as such. It is not only “a judgement” but “the judging” as such, affirming as such, which is a reduced form of intellection, a reduction and a modalization of that radical and primary form of intellection which is the primordial apprehension of reality.

B) Moreover, this intellection is neither added nor

does it consist in a type of “intellective attack” which “decides” what is real; nor is it a “diving in” as it were, in order to pledge oneself to what one takes to be real. Just the opposite. Let us recall, once again, that we are not referring to concrete affirmations but to the function of affirming as such. Now, intelligence *is already formally* in reality; therefore it does not have to “go forth” to reality. Rather, it is already moving intellectually in reality. Affirmation does not consist in installing ourselves in reality, affirming that something is real, but in being already anchored in reality and intellectually knowing if this reality is “thus” in reality. It is actually being in reality {121} discernedly in sentient intellection. If I must affirm, it is because the real in which I am is intellectually known by returning from a stepping back, and only because of that. This necessity is the intellective moment which I have termed “retention”. Distended in the real, I am nonetheless always retained in the real by the real itself. It is for this reason that affirming the real is not some decision or “attack” of mine, but on the contrary a trip within the real already known intellectually as real in the formal sense. This is just the opposite of an “attack”: it is the actualization of the real in a retained form. It is not a “going” to intellectually know the real, but “intellectually knowing the real while going” from one point to another in the field. It is not, as I have already pointed out, a going from one intellection to another; nor is it an *intention of intellection*. Rather, it is a mode of this intellection, an *intellective intention*. As such, what an affirmation possesses of affirmation; i.e., affirming as such should be understood from the actuality of the real, and not the opposite, viz. the actuality of the real from the affirmation. It is not so much “I affirm” as the opposite “the real is affirmed” in my intellection. Permit me to explain.

To be sure, affirming is a movement of mine. But movement does not mean spontaneous activity. Every intellection, even the primordial apprehension of reality, is an intellection of mine; and in this sense affirmation is mine also by the mere fact of being intellection. But this does not mean that intellective movement, in virtue of being movement, is a *spontaneous* movement of mine, because intellection is primarily act and not activity. Assertion, true, is a spontaneous activity. But affirmative intention as such, affirming as such, is not. It is movement, but a movement imposed on the intelligence by the stepping back from the real in differential actualization. I am really {122} led by the real to affirm. To conceive affirmation as an “attack”, i.e., as a spontaneous activity, is to thrust upon affirmation what is proper only to assertion. And the two are very different things. As I have

said, there are many ways of asserting the same affirmation. Moreover, assertion as such is made possible by affirmation as such. Affirmative intention is, in fact, at a distance by stepping back, and distended; and it is on account of that that it opens the mental ambit of assertion, the ambit of “maneuvering room”, so to speak, of assertion. Assertion is a spontaneous attitude of mine; but this spontaneity is possible through the “maneuvering room” of affirmation and only through it. What has led to confusion between asserting and affirming is the dynamic character of affirming. The fact is that affirmative movement, affirmative dynamism, has a precise character, viz. a movement in reality, but a movement in outline or sketchy form, an outline in reality and in what the thing is in reality. Therefore this movement is anything but an “attack”, because it is not a spontaneous activity of mine. To be sure, as an outline this movement pertains to me and in this sense it can be said that it is I who affirm. But this outline, even though a dynamism of mine, is a dynamism which is just as receptive as looking, feeling, hearing, etc. can also be. This movement of my intellection is a dynamism of it, but not an action whose intentionality results from any action of mine; rather, it results from a dynamic intention in which my intelligence is found, and *precisely in this order*—I stress the phrase—my mind. It is in this sense that I say that it is not so much that I affirm as that I find myself in affirmative intention.

C) This outline in reality has a definite character and name: {123} it is *discernment*. The discerning outline is an intellection which is determined in my intelligence by the actuality of the real as stepped back from. Stepping back determines distention, and distention determines discernment; it is purely and simply the retentivity of the real. Discernment is not the mode of actually knowing intellectually, nor the mode of going to be present intellectually in reality, but on the contrary is a way of moving about in reality, in which *one already is* intellectually. Discernment, *krinein*, is something founded in primordial apprehension, i.e. in the radical intellection of the real as real. To be sure, on many occasions the intelligence affirms without sufficient discernment. But this is a different question; when speaking of the adequacy of discernment I refer to what in a subsequent part I shall call ‘evidential demand of the real’, a demand or requirement which admits many degrees. Often one affirms without discernment just because primarily discerning is given to us by the real only sketchily; it is a moment of sentient intellection.

Thus, affirmation has four constitutive moments, moments which are formally constitutive of it.

1) In the first place, affirming is actually being intellectually in the real, intellectually knowing it both formally and precisely as real. It is not just conceiving or anything like that. This moment forms part of affirmation owing to the primordial apprehension of reality, to the impression of reality. Affirming is not an autonomous function of the intelligence but a modalization of the intellectual function as such. It is a mode of intellection of the real in its physical and formal actuality of real, a formality already known intellectually in primordial apprehension. Affirmation does not innovate; nor is it the moment which immerses us in reality. Rather, it is only a modalization of the intellection of {124} reality, a reality in which we are already immersed in primordial apprehension.

2) This modalization is intellection by returning from stepping back. One intellectually knows by stepping back in *intantum* what something is in reality. By thus taking distance, by thus stepping back, the intellection is returning to the thing; by so returning, it knows intellectually what the thing is in reality. It is a modalization, then, of the intellectual function as such; the *intantum* remains modalized in *intentionality*. This is intellection in *intantum*. The *intantum* is a “going towards”, and its intellectual knowing is intentionality. Only this conception of affirmative intention as a moment of a noergic *intantum*, as I see it, can constitute an adequate concept of the essence of affirmative movement *qua* affirmative. This is the modalization of primordial apprehension in affirmative intellection.

3) This modalization is not determined by me but rather by the formally sentient nature of my intellection. Only because my intellection is sentient do I apprehend the real in two modes of actualization: unitary and differential. Only the latter gives rise to affirming. That determination does not consist in any type of impulse to affirm, but rather in the actuality of the real in differential actualization. We do not have to hurl ourselves at reality; in our own primordial apprehension of the unitary actualization we are already intellectually knowing the real in its physical and formal actuality of the real. In differential actualization, then, I am already actually in reality and have only changed the mode in which the real thing is made actual to me in sentient intelligence. This mode of actuality is actuality a reverse actuality of stepping back, i.e., a return after stepping back. And such actualization of what the real is in reality is what formally constitutes {125} affirming. Affirming is not an act of mine but a mode of actually being now in reality. What *is* mine is discerning what is affirmed. It is not a function carried out as process; rather it is something acquired but through

the mode of intellectual actualization of the real *qua* real. Ultimately, affirming is a modulation of the impression of reality.

4) This intentionality is constituted in *discernment*; but discernment is not formally constitutive of affirmation. Affirmation is that in which discernment is given, and must be given; but affirming *qua* affirming is not discerning.

To summarize, then, affirmation has four constitutive moments:

a) It has a moment of effective reality of what is affirmed as being real. It is a moment which impinges upon the judgement of the impression of reality, something given in the impression of reality.

b) It has the affirmative moment as such. It is the mode of intellectually knowing reality by stepping back in a movement of return “toward” the real, in intentional intellection.

c) It has the moment of being a differential actualization of reality within reality. It has never been formally outside of the real. Therefore affirming is not going to the real from the not real, but is going from “the real” to what is “in reality” but via unreality; it is actually reducing the retroactive reduction itself by a return. This reduction of the reduction formally consists, as we shall see, in what I term ‘realization’. It is the essence of affirming.

d) It has the moment of discernment of what is affirmed, the discernment of the many “might be’s” of that which “is”. {126}

Now, in contrast to the primordial apprehension of reality, every affirmation, in virtue of being “at a distance”, i.e., by stepping back, is dual intellection. It therefore involves first something which is judged or affirmed, and second what is formally judged in the judgement. Let us quickly review these two points: About what one judges, and What one judges.

{127}

1

About What One Judges

At first glance one might think that he is judging something to be real which has been apprehended in simple apprehension as unreal; i.e., he would think that what “might be” real is judged as something which “is” real.

Therefore that of which he judges would be the content of a simple apprehension, something unreal. Nonetheless, this is incorrect. That of which one judges is something previously apprehended as real. And for just this reason affirmative intellection is constitutively dual. It presupposes and bears in its breast the intellection of something as already real. What is then affirmed if the thing is real? We shall see that forthwith. But although philosophy is not accustomed to inquire about it, one must understand that that of which affirmation is made is not something possible or unreal, but something perfectly real.

This is evident in affirmations which refer to real things. For example, when one says that this water is warm or is freezing, he presupposes that that thing about which he judges, the water, is real. And this is true even when meaning-things are intellectually known. A meaning-thing is not formally a real-thing, but every meaning-thing bears within it a real-thing. A table is not a real thing *qua* table, but rather a meaning-thing. But the table would not be a table were it not a table by virtue of being a real-thing. Now, I can make affirmations about the table, but only thanks to the fact that “table” is the meaning of a real-thing, for example, of a thing which has {128} a certain size, shape, etc. One might say that there are many judgements which are not of this type because they refer to things which are not real; this is the case with all mathematical statements, and also of the innumerable judgements which play a part in a work of fiction, e.g., in a novel. Every such work contains judgements, even though that about which affirmations are made is fictional. It is thus not evident that that about which one judges is necessarily a reality apprehended in primordial apprehension. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate what I just said. It is certain that neither a geometric space nor Don Juan are real things in the same form as a glass of water. But, do they act, so to speak, as something purely and simply not-real? Not at all. Let us examine the two cases separately.

a) Consider first *geometric space*. No geometric space, starting with Euclidean space, is *qua* geometric a physical space. Nonetheless, a geometric space is not just a concept or synthesis of concepts. If it were, such a space would not go beyond what space “might be”. Now, mathematics does not deal with spaces which “might be”, but only with those that “are”; and it studies them very fastidiously. This means that concepts, simple apprehensions of what spaces “might be”, become concepts of what “is”. How? Concepts become concepts of something which “is” thanks to a system of postulates.

What are these postulates? I.e., what is it that the

postulates postulate? That is the question. As I see it, the postulates do not postulate “truth”, i.e., they do not ask that we admit their truth. If they did, mathematics would be purely and simply a combination of truths, {129} ultimately just a phase of logic. Many have thought this, including mathematical thinkers of genius. But that does not prevent it from being false. Mathematics is not a system of necessary truths, merely coherent among themselves with respect to the “principles” of logic; rather, it is a system of necessary truths about an object which, in its way, has reality before the intelligence. What the postulates postulate is not “truth” but “reality”; what is postulated is the reality of that about which one postulates. If one wishes to go on speaking about truths, it will be necessary to say that the postulates enunciate the “real truth” about what is postulated. That is, the postulates are not mere logical statements but statements of the characteristics which the “content” of the “reality” of what is postulated has. “Postulation” is founded upon the “might be” and formally consists in its transformation into “is”, thanks to the postulation of reality. This transformation, as we shall see in the Appendix following this section, is formally *construction*.

b) Let us consider the other case, the things which go on in a work of fiction. Such a work, as we have already seen, is how the real “would be” or “might be” in reality. But a novel, for example, does not tell us what “might be reality” but, in its way, what “is reality”. Therefore a novel is full of characteristics or notes which are very different from those initially attributed to its characters or situations. The fact is that the story told in the novel, by virtue of being told *as a real story*, has other properties than those formally enunciated in a principle. Thus one can justifiably discuss whether this fictional character, say Don Juan, is or is not an effeminate person. In general terms, a novelist feels that his characters force themselves upon him, that they bear him along, that they compel his writing, etc., in virtue of {130} properties which they have through having been realized initially in concrete situations. And this indicates to us that that about which judgements in fictional works are made is clearly not a concrete person, e.g. some citizen of Seville; but is something more than a “how it would be”, namely “it is thus”. That “is” expresses a reality not like that of a stone, but indeed a reality. All the judgements of the fictional work refer to this reality, which is that given in the impression of reality by the stone. The novelist constructs by creation in this reality “according to definite items of fiction”. This is the difference between a novel and mathematics. Both are constructions of reality, but in mathematics one constructs “according to concepts” (as we shall see forth-

with), whereas in a novel one constructs “according to items of fiction and percepts”.* To be sure, the novel has many concepts; but it is not constructed along those lines. The novel as such is not formally constituted in the creation of the reality of the fictions, but in the construction of the content in reality itself according to those fictions. The novel does not refer to fiction but to the reality constructed according to the items of fiction.

c) If we take the judgements of mathematics and those of fictional literature one by one, we shall see that in each of them that of which one judges is “something real”. The concepts, the fictions, and the percepts are simple apprehensions; they express what the real “might be”, i.e., they are formally and explicitly inscribed within reality itself. But in reality itself not *qua* terminus of a concrete content but *qua* it “might terminate” therein; that is, they express not what it “is” but what it “might be”. Therefore we say that this simple apprehension expresses something unreal. I need not emphasize it more since it was discussed above. Now, the {131} judgements of mathematics or fictional literature do not concern something formally “unreal”, but something unreal though “realized”; they consider that the reality terminates in fact in this or that thing. I use a word from mathematics to refer in a unitary sense to this “concrete” termination, namely ‘postulating’. The unreal, without ceasing to be unreal, acquires a postulated reality. When the mode of realization or “making real” is construction, then we have the reality both of mathematics and of fiction. The affirmations of mathematics and fictional literature thus refer to something unreal which is realized (made real) by constructive postulation, whether in the form of construction according to concepts (mathematics) or construction according to percepts and fictions (fictional literature). The intelligence is thus not limited to apprehending what “is already” in it, but also realizes (makes real) its concepts, its fictions, and its percepts in it, or rather, *before* it. What is intellectually known “is” not then before the intelligence but is

something “realized” by the intelligence before itself. To be sure, one can realize without constructing; this is the case with the majority of judgements whose content is realized in the real but without construction. What one cannot do is to construct without realizing. Whence the inevitable consequence that the real, when realized by postulation—despite being so according to concepts or fictions or concrete percepts—may then have, as we are going to see, more notes of its own than those *formally* included in the concepts, in the fictions, and in the percepts. It is from this reality realized by constructive postulation that mathematics and fictional literature take their point of departure for their judgements.

Thus every judgement, every affirmation, is about something real presupposed as such. When things are real in and by themselves, that presupposition {132} is formally the primordial apprehension of reality. When the things are real, but realized constructively, then the presupposition is formally postulation. Postulation is possible only by being intrinsically and formally founded in the primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the primary and radical structure of judgement is to be an affirmation of a thing already apprehended as real (in primordial apprehension) but according to its formal moment of being in a field. In virtue of this, a judgement is not an immediate intellection of something real, but an intellection modalized from that apprehension, that direct and immediate intellection; it is intellection in returning from a stepping back. What is judged in this intellection?

Before tackling this question it is advantageous to clarify just what this reality of mathematics is as postulated. Judgement presupposes the primordial apprehension of reality. But, I must emphasize, it does not deal with any presupposition of process type; i.e., one does not apprehend reality *prior* to judging. Rather, this reality apprehended prior to judging is maintained as a formally constitutive moment of judgement as such.

* [The phrase “items of fiction” is used here to translate Zubiri's *fictos*; etymologically, both derive from the Latin *fictum*, from *facere*, to make. The English plural ‘fictions’ should be understood here in this sense.—trans.]

APPENDIX

THE REALITY OF THE MATHEMATICAL

We have seen that the mathematical is composed of judgements which refer to something real by postulation. But then the inevitable question arises: What is this postulating of the mathematical real? I said above that the postulating is a postulation of reality; now let us ask ourselves in what this postulation consists. The type of reality which the mathematical possesses depends on that answer.

Stated negatively, the reality of the mathematical is not like that of a stone, for example, because the stone is something real in and by itself. On the other hand, a mathematical space is not real in and by itself, but it does not therefore become not-real. The fact is that, as we have seen at length, reality and content are not the same. In the differential actualization of the real, the moment of formality of reality in a field is formally distinct from the moment of content. Nonetheless, that formality is always physical; the same formality of reality can encompass different contents, not just simultaneously but also successively. Thus, if the color of this stone changes, the content of its apprehension will also change; but its moment of reality has been conserved as numerically the same. Whence it is revealed to us that in these conditions physical reality itself is a moment which perhaps does not have such concrete content. Reality within a field is in fact, as we saw, the autonomized “*de suyo*”. It is not a kind of ocean in which things are immersed; {134} rather, it is purely and simply the field moment proper to the formality of reality of each real thing. And we have just seen that according to this moment, each real thing is more than it is by virtue of its content. This moment of the “more” is reality itself. Reality itself is therefore a physical moment and not just a conceptive one. And precisely because it is “more” it is possible for it not to have such-and-such a concrete content, i.e., it can have some other. Under these circumstances (1) the “more” is *actualized* in concepts, in simple apprehensions; and (2) these concepts are then *realized* as content of the “more”. The unity of the these two moments is, as we saw, the unreal object

expressed in the “might be”. Now, when one postulates that the object “is thus”, then one has passed *by postulation* from the “might be” to the “is”. We have reality itself actualized in intellection, and the realization of what is conceived, but realized as a free thing. A free thing is the physical reality with a freely postulated content. Such are the objects of mathematics, for they are real objects constituted in the physical moment of reality itself in a field, the same reality according to which things like this stone are real. The *moment* of reality is identical in both cases; what is not the same is their *content* and their *mode* of reality. The stone has reality in and by itself, whereas the circle has reality only by postulation. Nonetheless the moment of reality is identical. The reality of mathematical objects is the “more”, that same “more” of every real thing in and by itself. And precisely by being a “more” it is extended to have a free content by postulation. How mathematical objects are constituted in their postulation I shall explain forthwith.

For now I should like to recall what I explained in Part One, {135} viz. that reality is not synonymous with existence. Existence and notes pertain only to the content of the real; on the other hand, the formality of reality consists in this existential content and these notes being such *de suyo*. An existence which did not *de suyo* concern what is existent would not make of it something real, but rather something which is a phantom. Existence and notes, I repeat, pertain only to the content of the real. Now, the moment of reality in a field is the moment of formality of the “*de suyo*” autonomized when things are apprehended some among others; i.e., the moment of reality is the *ambit of reality*, an ambit strictly and rigorously physical. Reality itself in a field is “physical” but not formally existent. Certainly if the content were not existent what was apprehended would not be real; but neither would it be real if it did not have such-and-such determinate notes. That is, there is no reality without content (existential and notes). What happens is that there is “field reality”, i.e., reality in a field, a field which

is *de suyo*, but without *this particular determinate* content, i.e. without such-and-such determinate notes and their determinate existence. The field moment is the *de suyo*, but in a form such that the “*suyo*” [itself] of this “*de suyo*” remains free. Both the notes and their existence remain free, but the *de suyo* persists as the formal moment of reality. The impossibility that if there is no existence there is no reality does not mean that reality is existence; it only means, as I just said, that while reality is a formality, there cannot be a *de suyo* without a content of notes and existence. These notes and this existence are what a postulate postulates for reality: they are notes and existence realized only by being postulated in reality itself. In virtue of this, the notes or properties, like their existence, are notes and existence as postulated; but these notes and this existence are real only {136} by free postulation in reality itself, in the *de suyo*. For greater clarity let me add that when, in mathematics, an existence theorem is formulated (e.g. the existence of a root of every algebraic equation, or of an integral in an ordinary differential equation, or the non-existence of an algebraic equation having e as a root), existence means the naked realization of a note in virtue of the realization of other notes. Since the naked realization of these notes involves a postulated existence, the naked realization of the content is what, with full justification, one calls mathematical existence. It is always a question of realization, but not in the sense of identifying reality and physical existence in and by itself.

In conclusion, actualization of reality itself in intellection leaves its content free. And then what the postulate postulates is that such-and-such determinate content (for example, Euclidean parallelism or non-Archimedean topology), both in its notes and in its existence, is what is realized in reality itself, in the “more”, in that same physical reality by which this stone is real. This content thus realized is, as we have said, a “free thing”. Geometric space is real with the same reality as has this stone. It is not just a concept, but is reality freely realized; free, but real, real but free. This postulation therefore postulates that reality itself is realized in such-and-such content; it is this realization which is postulated.

The mathematical mode of this postulation is what I here term ‘construction’. Geometric space is not a system of objective concepts; rather, *the construction realizes*, by postulation, these objective concepts. Constructing is not only making something an intentional and unreal terminus (that would be a question of simple content); rather, it consists in projecting this {137} unreal part of the concept onto reality itself “according to concepts”. Therefore construction is a mode of realization; it is realizing according to concepts.

One must avoid two possible errors with regard to

this idea of construction: construction in the sense of Gödel and construction in the sense of Brouwer.

Gödel calls ‘constructing a group’ the operation of generating it via the iterated application of certain operations axiomatically *defined* in the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. One must emphasize this: we are dealing with operations “defined” as such and not with the procedure to bring them about. These groups are what Gödel called *constructables*. His disciple Cohen (1963) based himself upon non-constructable groups in this sense. The elements of every group in fact have two classes of properties. Some, the *specific* ones, correspond to the postulates and operational axioms to which I have just referred. Others are *generic*, in virtue of which they form a group leaving indeterminate the specific properties, which would “force” the generic properties to be specific. The groups thus obtained having only generic characters are by definition *non-constructed*. Cohen bases himself (for his sensational discovery of the falsity of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis) on these non-constructable groups. This seems to contradict what I just said about all of mathematics being constructed. Nonetheless, the contradiction is only apparent, because what I here call construction is something different. In the first place, this is so because what Gödel and Cohen construct is ultimately the *objective concept* both specific as well as generic. But in contrast the construction to which I refer consists in *realizing* before my intelligence a concept {138} already objectively constructed (whether constructable or not). And in this sense the realization itself can and ought to be called construction. It is then something very different from construction in the sense of Gödel and Cohen. Both the constructable groups and the non-constructable ones are constructed in the sense of things realized before my intelligence. Secondly, this realization is the construction of a content in physical reality; it is an intellectually free realization in physical reality itself. It is, precisely, postulating. And this construction thus postulated is construction of the content in physical reality. The groups of Gödel and Cohen are constructed (in my concept of construction) in physical reality. So the construction itself does not formally concern concepts, nor is it a “conceptive” construction; rather, it is a realization in physical reality itself, but “according to concepts”—two completely different things. And in this sense every mathematical object is constructed by being postulated. It is for this reason that the object thus constructed is a strict reality which can have properties or notes “of its own”, or “proper”, and not just properties “deduced” from the axioms and postulates. This does not refer to deduced properties but to properties which are already formally in the object. Mathematical objects have their properties *de suyo*, i.e., they are real. The fact is that the real object made real by being postu-

lated according to concepts has, by being realized, more notes or properties than those defined in its postulation. On account of this and only on account of it are problems posed which may not be solvable with the finite system of axioms and postulates which defined its realization. What is constructed in reality itself is, by being realized, something more than what was postulated when realized. This, as I see it, is the thrust of Gödel’s theorem. It does not refer to a limitation intrinsic {139} to affirmations based on axioms and postulates *qua* affirmations—that is the usual interpretation of the theorem—; rather, it leaves the character of reality of what is constructed according to the axioms and postulates in question to be revealed before the intelligence. It is not, then, the intrinsic inadequacy of a system of postulates, but the radical originality of what is constructed by being real, a reality which is not exhausted in what has been postulated about it. This object is not a real thing in and by itself as is this stone. But neither is it only what “might be real”; rather, it is what “is real” by being postulated and constructed. That, in my judgement, is the interpretation of Gödel’s theorem. The judgements of mathematics are then judgements of something real, judgements of the “postulated real”. They are not judgements about the “possible real” but judgements about “postulated reality”.

This conceptualization of mathematical reality by construction is not, then, a type of formalism, but neither is it in any sense what has been set forth in rigorous opposition to such formalism, viz. intuitionism, especially that of Brouwer. That is the other concept of construction which it is necessary to eliminate in this problem. For intuitionism, mathematical construction is not the same as defining and constructing concepts. Intuitionism rejects the idea that mathematics is founded upon logic; a demonstration which appeals to the logical principle of the excluded middle is not, for Brouwer, a mathematical demonstration. Mathematics is not a system of *defined* concepts and operations. An operation, if it is to be mathematical, has to be an operation actually carried out, i.e., one comprised of a finite number of steps. To be sure, mathematics is not interested only in finite groups; for example, it concerns itself with the infinite digit strings making up real numbers. It is true that {140} mathematics cannot actually carry out all the operations necessary to obtain an irrational number, because the number of steps would be infinite. But they can be given, and are given, in a rule or algorithm in which the operations are continued “indefinitely”. The object of mathematics, then, would be finite groups as the terminus of operations carried out on them. Intuitionism is a radical finitism. The majority of mathematicians therefore reject Brouwer’s ideas despite its applications to topology, because to amputate the infinite series would be for them to nullify

an enormous part of the mathematical edifice. Brouwer, they tell us, if forced to be consistent with himself, would be compelled to abandon as invalid an enormous portion of infinitesimal analysis [calculus]. But let us not be concerned with this aspect of the question because in our problem the essential part is that intuitionism claims to be opposed to formalistic axiomism or *formalism* by putting forth actually carried out operations as opposed to axiomatic definitions. At bottom it is an idea of Kronecker in action: God created the whole numbers and man created the rest. The whole numbers would be a *datum* of intuition, and therefore constructing would be reduced finally to counting what is given. Defining does not suffice.

But this conception cannot be maintained because the groups—even if finite—are not formally intuitive nor do the operations carried out on them constitute the radical part of what I understand by mathematical construction.

In the first place, Brouwer’s finite group is not intuitive. Leaving aside for now the problems posed by intuition, let us say that intuition is the “vision” of something given immediately, directly, and unitarily. {141} In intuition I have the qualitative and quantitative diversity of the given, but never do I have a group. There are no strict intuitive groups, because in order to have a group I must consider, separately so to speak, the moments of the intuitive diversity as “elements”. Only then does their unity constitute a group. A mathematical group is always a group of elements, and only that. But then it is clear that no group, not even a finite one, is intuitive, because intuition gives only “*diversity of moments*”, never a “*group of elements*”. In order to have a group it is necessary to have a subsequent act of intellection which makes the moments to be elements. It is then necessary to have a construction. The so-called finite construction, presumably given in intuition, is nothing but the application of the group already intellectually constructed to the diversity of the given. This application is just a postulation: one postulates that the given is resolved in a group. Therefore rigorously speaking one cannot call Brouwer’s mathematics intuitionism. Brouwer’s group is not intuitive; it is the objective content of a concept of group which is “applied” to the intuitive.

In the second place, the very construction of the group is not, ultimately, a system of operations actually carried out. I say “ultimately”, because the carrying out of operations is not the primary component of what I have termed “construction”. The finite group is the content of objective concepts. Therefore the operations carried out on this content are operations, however much executed one may like, but always executed on objective contents of concepts. Finite or not, the groups with which Brouwer’s

mathematics is concerned and the operations carried out on them are conceptive groups and operations. And therefore they are inadequate, {142} as I see it, to ground mathematics: mathematics does not deal with “objective concepts” but with “things which are thus”. What I understand by ‘construction’ is something different. To be sure, it is not a construction of objective concepts by mere definition; but neither is it a series of operations carried out in Brouwer’s sense, because his operations are operations on objective concepts. And on this point Brouwer’s mathematics does not differ from that of Gödel and Cohen. What I am referring to is that constructing is not carrying out objective operations but projecting before my intelligence that objective content in physical reality itself. And this reality is not given in intuition but in the primordial apprehension of reality; it is given impressively. As this reality does not have determinate content, I can freely project upon it the content of what is objectively constructed operationally. This projection and not the operation is mathematical construction. The mathematical object, even if it is finite, and even if the operation which objectively produces its content is carried out, nonetheless has a radical proper reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is construction. Brouwer’s finite group not only is not intuitive, it is the result of a double postulation: the postulate that groups are applicable to what is intuitively given, and the postulate of conferring upon reality itself the content of the objective concept (operationally constructed) of group. A mathematical object is not intuited but apprehended in a primordial apprehension—two completely different things, as we shall see. Free creation, projected in this double postulation, is intrinsically and formally sentient. Only a sentient intelligence can, for example, {143} not sense the content of a continuous group, i.e. the group of irrational numbers, and nonetheless freely realize this content (conceptualized either by mere definitions, or by operations actually carried out) in a sentient way. A mathematical object, even though finite, and even though the operation which produces it is actually carried out, has, I repeat, its own reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is its construction.

Thus in summary, we may say about being constructed: (1) it is not being *defined* in the sense of Gödel and Cohen, and (2) it is not being *carried out* in the sense of Brouwer. The opposition between formalism and intuitionism is a problem internal to mathematics, and as such does not concern philosophy. For philosophy, the problem centers on conceptualizing the reality of the mathematical. And from this point of view formalism and intuitionism are not opposed to each other, because both consist only in the determination of the objective content

of concepts. Now, constructing is something else; it is creating, freely projecting into physical reality itself a content according to concepts. Postulating is postulating reality. Without this construction and primary and radical postulation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, Cohen’s groups, and Brouwer’s intuitionism would all be impossible.

Mathematical construction is thus always an act of sentient intelligence. And therefore the mathematical object has postulated reality. It is not an objective concept of reality but rather is *reality in concept*. It is, I repeat, the reality itself of any real thing sentiently apprehended, but with a content freely constructed in that reality, according to concepts. What is postulated, I repeat, is not logical truths nor operations actually carried out, but the content of the real (already defined or carried out) {144} in and by postulated construction. The mathematical object is not constituted by the postulates; rather, what the postulates define is the “construction” before the intelligence of that whose realization is postulated, and which acquires reality by this postulation.

The objects of mathematics are “real objects”, objects in reality, in this same reality with rocks and stars; the difference is that mathematical objects are constructed by being postulated in their content. A rock is a reality in and by itself; a geometric space or irrational number is a reality freely postulated. It is common to refer to mathematical objects as “ideal objects”. But there are no ideal objects; mathematical objects are real. This does not mean—and I must reiterate it—that mathematical objects exist like rocks exist; but the difference between the former and the latter concerns only content, a content given in the one case, freely postulated in reality in the second. Therefore mathematical objects do not have ideal existence but only postulated existence, postulated but in reality itself. What happens is that their content (1) is constructed, and (2) is constructed according to concepts. What is so inappropriately labeled “ideal” is the real constructed according to concepts. Both existence and properties are constructed by postulation in reality itself. Therefore a mathematical object is not real just because of its definition or because it is carried out; but neither is it a real object in and by itself like things apprehended in sensible impression. It is something real by a postulate which realizes a content (notes and existence) freely determined thanks to the postulation.

As the moment of reality is just the “more” of {145} each real sensed thing, it follows that every mathematical object is inscribed in the formality of reality given in impression. That is, it is the terminus of a sentient intellection. This does not mean that a geometric space or irrational number is sensed like color is sensed; the former

objects are clearly not *sensible*. Rather, it means that the mode of intellection of an irrational number or a geometric space is *sentient*. And this is so (1) because they are intellectually known by being postulated in a field of reality, i.e. in the formality given in the impression of reality, and (2) because their construction itself is not just conceptuation but realization, i.e. something brought about sentiently. Without sensing the mathematical, one could not construct mathematics. Here we put our finger on the difference between sensible intelligence and sentient intelligence about which I spoke at length in Part I of this work. Sensible intelligence is based on the senses; sentient intelligence intellectually knows everything sentiently, both the sensible and the non-sensible. A mathematical object is real with a content which is freely constructed in the physical reality given in impression, and its construction is postulation.

Mathematics itself has produced, among other

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2

What is Judged

In every judgement, as we have seen, one judges about something real, and does so in reality itself. I said that affirmation is a dual intellection because the same real thing is intellectually known twice: once, as that of which one judges, and another, as that which is affirmed about it. This duality of affirmative intellection is based upon a deeper dimension. Since every real thing has a moment of individual reality, and a moment of reality in a field, when a real thing is intellectually known “among” others, these two moments are differentiated and in a certain way “distanced”, i.e., stepped back from; this is a dimension of the duality of what is intellectually known itself. What impels us and puts us into the field of reality itself is just the primordial apprehension of reality of that about which one judges. And it is in this field that intellectual movement takes place. That about which one affirms in this movement is the real thing already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality. That in which the affirmation moves is reality itself (it is the medium of affirmation). So in contrast to what is usually said—or rather repeated monotonously—judging is not affirming reality itself but rather affirming “in” the reality. Prior to judging and in order to be able to judge, we are

things, two theorems whose essence, as I see it, is what I said previously, viz. the anteriority of reality over truth. Gödel’s theorem, according to which that constructed by postulation has *de suo* more properties than those formally postulated, in my view expresses that what is postulated is reality before it is truth. And Cohen’s theorem (let us call the non-Cantorian theory of groups that): groups are not just systems of elements determined by postulation; rather, prior to this, there are groups which he terms “generic” and which as I see it {146} are not generic but the simple realization of the group, without the specific properties determined by postulation. The postulated properties themselves are then real prior to being true. The specification here is not a logical difference but a real determination. It is the reality of the group prior to the axiomatic truth postulated. In my view, this is the essential meaning of the theorems of Gödel and Cohen: the priority of the real over the true in mathematics. {147}

already intellectually in reality itself. The function of reality itself is not to be a constitutive part of the judgement itself, because reality itself is also, as we have seen, a moment of simple apprehension. Reality itself is prior to every {148} intellectual movement, both simple apprehension as well as affirmation. Reality itself is not, then, a correlate of affirmation, but the formality of every intellectual apprehension whether it is judgmental or not. Judgmental intellection is an intellectual movement, and this intellectual movement in reality itself is a “realization”. Upon judging one realizes reality itself in a real thing already apprehended, i.e. one judges about the termination of reality itself in this thing; he judges that which is the real. Now, with this reality itself is reintegrated, in a certain way against every stepping back, to the real thing, to its individual formality of reality. Therefore this reintegration is the *formal* establishment of the unity of being in a field and being individual. And this formal unity is just what a thing already apprehended as real is “in reality”, viz. its “this, how, and what”. Therefore that which is judged is what a real thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. Judging is affirming what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality.

Granting that, let us once again direct our attention to this affirmative intention of judgement. What is affirmed, I repeat, is the realization (of something simply apprehended) in this real thing as real; i.e., one turns to a real thing in reality itself. Now, reality itself is that to which, impelled by a real thing already apprehended in

primordial apprehension, we have gone in retraction, elaborating a simple apprehension. Therefore reality itself has all of its unreal content from what is simply apprehended. In virtue of this, realization in a real thing is realization in it of what is simply apprehended as unreal. What a real thing is “in reality” is expressed by the realization of simple apprehension in a real thing.

The poorly named “subject” of judgement is that real thing {149} about which one judges. It is not properly “subject” but “object” of judgement. What one judges is the realization of a simple apprehension in an object, i.e. in the real. Judging is not then attributing one concept to another but realizing a concept, a work of fiction, or a percept in a real thing already apprehended as real in primordial apprehension. Affirmation is the phase of intellectual movement opposed to retraction. In retraction one goes inside the real which is given toward the unreal apprehended in simple apprehension, toward what the real thing “might be” to what it “is”. Now one is not dealing with a realization in constructive postulation but with a realization in simple apprehension as such in primordial apprehension. This realization is the judgement. Judging is not, for example, apprehending that this thing which we call a man is real; nor is it apprehending what this man is (which is but apprehending what this thing “might be”). Judging is affirming that what it “might be” to be a man is realized in this real thing which we call a man, i.e., that this real thing which we call “man” is in reality what we understand by man. And this is not a tautology, because the concept of man is not univocal but depends upon that aspect, freely selected, from which one starts in order to conceive it. Starting from the zoological ladder is not the same as starting from the capacity to make tools (for example, from *homo australopithecus* or from *homo habilis*). Similarly, starting from social organization is different than starting from the modes and general forms of the real. Thus, what this thing is in reality which we call a man, by being the realization of a concept, is once again known intellectually with respect to the primordial apprehension of reality in each case.

Every affirmation is a dynamic intellection, by returning {150} from stepping back, of something already apprehended in a primordial apprehension, a dynamism which cuts across reality itself, and whose terminus consists in intellectually knowing what that which we have intellectually known as real is in reality.

This clarifies two points for us. First that the real world, i.e. the system of things *qua* real, does not consist in being the system of what the sum total of true judgements affirms. The system of real things *qua* real does not consist in being the correlate of what is affirmed. Rather, it is the system intellectually known in my pri-

mordial apprehensions of reality, the system given in them. Reality is always prior to affirmation. And the second point is that affirming as such is an intellection that expands the return to the real (from stepping back), with respect to the field of reality.

This structure makes of judgement something essentially dependent upon the way in which primordial apprehension becomes the terminus of affirmation. The way in which primordial apprehension is constituted as terminus of affirmation is what I call the form of affirmation. After having seen what affirming is, let us now ask what the forms of affirmation as such are.

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§ 2

FORMS OF AFFIRMATION

When speaking about judgement, I am not referring to the classical division of judgements into quality, quantity, relation or modality, which is the division canonized by Kant. And this is because all these kinds of judgement are but forms of a single kind, viz. judgement as predication. Now, affirmation as such is not predication. There are, as we shall see, forms of judgement strictly pre-predicative. In predicative judgement, that about which one judges has a clear function: to be subject of the judgement. But that is not the only nor even the primary function of the reality about which one judges. Here I use the term ‘forms of judgement’ to refer to the diversity of judgements according to the function carried out by that which is judged; i.e., the diverse forms according to which a thing already apprehended is the terminus of affirmative intellection. The predicative function is just one of them. There are others, for example judgements in which the thing judged is proposed to the affirmation but not as a subject of it; these are propositional judgements but are pre-predicative. There are also judgements in which the thing judged is not proposed but only placed before the judgement. In these judgements the affirmation is not just pre-predicative but also pre-propositional; they are merely propositional judgements. Each of these forms is based upon the previous one: propositional affirmation is based upon positional affirmation, and in turn predicative affirmation {152} upon propositional affirmation. What is the structure of these three forms of affirmation?

1. Above all, judgement is what I call a *positional affirmation*. Let us begin by posing some examples. I open the window and shout, “Fire!”, or perhaps, “rain, sun”, etc. Here there is something apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality, viz. what I apprehend

upon opening the window. And I apprehend it in all its notes, in primordial apprehension, as something real and in all of its richness and variety of notes. But I do not intellectually know what it is “in reality”. Intelletively knowing it as fire, rain, etc. is just the proper affirmation of the judgement, viz. what I have apprehended is in reality. These names, as mere names, are simple apprehensions (percepts, fictional items, or concepts). But in affirmative connotation they express that what is simply apprehended is realized in what I have apprehended primordially, and is what this latter is in reality. If I did not have these simple apprehensions there would be no judgement and I could not say, “Fire!”; I would have only the primordial apprehension of this igneous reality which, without knowing what it is in reality, I apprehend primordially upon opening the window. In this sense I say that that affirmation is positional, because the thing which I judge is not previously apprehended in turn in a simple apprehension which qualifies it, as is the case in other forms of judgement. If I say that the fire is burning, the subject is already qualified as fire in a previous simple apprehension. But when I shout, “Fire!”, what I apprehend is not intellectually known previously as fire. Precisely on account of this, what I see upon opening the window is not designated by any *previous* denomination because every denomination is a denomination of something already simply apprehended. Here what is apprehended upon opening the window is the terminus of a primordial apprehension {153} of reality, but without qualification, without previous denomination. In every judgement the primordial apprehension of that of which one judges is anterior to the judging itself. But this does not mean that a real thing was already previously qualified in some previous simple apprehension. In positional judgement the real is not already qualified by a simple apprehension; rather, there is a single simple apprehension, say that of fire, which forms a part not of the subject but of the predicate, and whose realization is affirmed so to speak globally. It is for this reason a positional judgement. On one side I have the primordial apprehension of reality; on the other, the denomination. Its identification in what is in reality what I have primordially apprehended is just positional judgement. It is because of this that there are not two denominations as in other types of judgement, one of what I see and another of what I affirm as realized in what I see. There is here but a single denomination, and what is denominated is posed as reality. There is but the total, global realization, of this unique single apprehension in the primordial apprehension of reality. It is, to speak a bit loosely, the identity or identification of with simple apprehension; or from the standpoint of simple apprehension, the integral realization of it in the real. I repeat that I am not saying “this is fire” but simply “Fire!”. The positional judgement is, in a certain

way, not the denomination but the denominative affirmation of the real apprehended in its totality. When I say “Fire!” I clearly have a simple apprehension, that of fire. Otherwise I could not say “Fire!”. But that which I see upon opening the window is posed directly as global realization of this simple apprehension, without it having been {154} previously qualified by another simple apprehension. Here the function of the real thing of which one judges is to be “posed” for my denomination or identification as real.

I maintain that this is an affirmation and not a primordial apprehension of reality. In primordial apprehension of reality we have only the real thing apprehended, and this real thing immediately fills the field of reality itself. But in positional judgement this real thing is intellectually known as realization of something already apprehended in simple apprehension, as a realization of fire. We intellectually know what is apprehended via the route of *identifying it* with what is, for example, fire simply apprehended. The primordial apprehension of reality is immediate, and therefore is more than a judgement: it is the apprehension of the real thing in and by itself as real, without the necessity of affirming or judging. On the other hand, in positional judgement, the real is intellectually known as a realization of fire or rain, etc. In this intellection what is affirmed is just what *in reality* is that which we have apprehended as real upon opening the window. In this “position” the real apprehended as a whole is “placed” as realization. It is for this reason that I term it “positional judgement”. The affirmative moment of this judgement is not expressed with a new name but with a *single substantive name* (noun) having an affirmative connotation. And this connotation is expressed in the intonation; for example, by shouting. On the other hand, in primordial apprehension of reality, there is no name whatsoever: it is the mere apprehension of the reality of the real. Positional judgement, then, is pre-predicative; but it is also pre-propositional: the real thing apprehended is not a subject of judgement, nor is it proposed for judgement; it is simply “posed”.

2. There is a second form of judgement, viz. *propositional judgement*. {155} In it the real already apprehended is not apprehended only as real, but is also apprehended as something which for its part is already qualified from a simple apprehension. Let that of which one judges be *A*. *A* is not just something which I apprehend as real, but as something which is already *A*. And therefore, when it becomes the terminus of an affirmation, this *A* is not simply “posed” for the judgement but “proposed” to it, i.e., posed “as reality” for a *subsequent position* of what it is “in reality”. A proposition is a special form of position; it is the propositional judgement. Permit me to explain.

Consider some common examples in order to establish a frame of reference. “Corruption of the best, worst” (*corruptio optimi pessima*);* “Everything excellent, rare” (*omnia praeclara, rara*); “All men, equal”; “A woman, always changeable and fickle” (*varium et mutabile semper femina*); “What’s bred in the bone will out in the flesh” (*genio y figura, hasta la sepultura*);† “This, my vocation”; “Thou, the one Holy One, the one Lord”; “Thou, my God”; “Thou, Lord”.

In all these affirmations there is something, *A*, which is posed as already real; and not simply as real but as something real already qualified in a previous simple apprehension: the corruption of the best, the excellent, the woman, Thou, etc. But the affirmation is constituted in *B*, or if one prefers in the *A* not as merely real but as realization of the simple apprehension *B*; the worst, my God, changeable, all equal, etc.

In this affirmation what is affirmed clearly has two moments. One, the moment *pro*-posed *A*. This moment is not only real, but moreover its reality is already qualified and proposed as terminus of a subsequent position. There is, in addition, that of which this real thing is affirmed *B*. In itself *B* is not something real, but rather {156} a simple unreal apprehension. But upon becoming the determination of the thing already real, of *A*, *B* is realized in and by *A*. That is, the reality of *B* has been posed *qua* that of *A*, or what is the same thing, the reality of *A* has been posed not in itself (since it has been proposed as something already real), but *qua* *B*. For this reason it is, I repeat, a position which is *pro*-positional. What is this position of *B* in *A*? That is the essential question.

First of all, it is not a “positional” position in the sense explained earlier; if it were, what is affirmed would be two realities, the reality of *A* “and” the reality of *B*, but not “one” reality, to wit, the reality of *A* as *B*. But neither is it an “attributive” position: I do not affirm that *A* “is” *B*. Propositional judgement is *pre*-predicative. The force of the affirmation does not fall upon something attributed to *A*. To be sure, *A* and *B* are not identical. But:

a) *B* “is founded” on *A*; it is not attributed to *A* from outside but pertains to *A* in a way, so to speak, intrinsic to *A*.

b) This foundation is formal; it is the very “nature” of *A*, its constitutional nature, so to speak, that which founds *B*. I am not simply affirming that a woman is always changeable, but that she is so by virtue of her nature *qua* woman. Here “nature” has a connotation which is deliberately vague. It does not concern reality in itself, as if it were the essence of reality; rather, it refers to reality *qua* apprehended in primordial apprehension.

c) This *B* is not only determined intrinsically by the reality of *A*; rather, the determination itself, i.e. *B*, has reality but “in the reality of *A*”. That does not just refer to the fact that a woman by her own nature determines changeability, but to the fact that what is {157} determined—this changeability—is a moment of feminine reality itself: *B* is a moment of the reality of *A*.

The reality of *A* involves, then, *by virtue of its own nature*, the reality of *B* in *A*. This is what I affirm in a propositional judgement. Now, the unity of these three moments: being grounded on *A*, being grounded on the nature of *A*, and being a moment of the reality of *A*, is what I call *unity of constitution*: “*AB*”.§ It is not unity of attribution but unity of constitution. And this unity is that which *A* is “in reality”.

Whence arise the two parts of this affirmation. First of all, there is that which is affirmed. What is affirmed here is not a thing, i.e., neither *A* nor *B* (*A* is not affirmed but rather presumed qualificatively); what is affirmed is the constitutive unity “*AB*”. The second part is the affirmation itself. As affirmation, it consists in putting into reality itself the constitutive unity. It is this unity which is affirmed to be real, or rather, it is this unity which is that in which *A* consists in reality: *A* is in reality not just “*A*” but “*AB*”. The *intentum* has thus been changed in a two-fold way. In the first place, it is modified by being an affirmation, an intention; it is an *intentum* of intellection of a reality stepped back from, i.e., from simple apprehension; it is a judgement. But in the second place, the propositional affirmation is a modification of positional affirmation. When what is posed is formally a constitution and not a thing, then the position is constitutive. Propositional affirmation is, then, *constitutive position*, an affirmation of what a thing constitutively is in reality.

The expression of a propositional or constitutive judgement is a *nominal phrase*. It suffices to return to the (Latin) examples given earlier to discover in them two essential aspects. The nominative phrase, {158} above all, lacks a verb; it is an *a*-verbal affirmation, having only nouns. This does not refer to a verbal ellipsis but to a particular and originary mode of “*averbal*” phrase. But in

* [English does not normally use the construction to which Zubiri here makes reference in Spanish and Latin, in which the verb *to be* is omitted, so the translated sentences may sound rather peculiar—trans.]

† [Vergil, *Aeneid*, Book 4, verses 569-570. —trans.]

‡ [This is an idiomatic expression—trans.]

§ [Zubiri’s word is *compleción*, which means *constitution* in the physiological sense.—trans.]

contrast to positional affirmation which only has a noun, the nominal phrase always has at least two nouns. These two nouns do not designate a subject and predicate, but a single constitutive reality. The nominal phrase is propositional, but it is pre-predicative. On the other hand, this phrase expresses the affirmative moment of a mode which is proper to it, in the “pause” between the two nouns. The pause is the expression of the constitutive affirmation as such. It is not merely a position, nor is it copulative attribution; this aspect is what the pause expresses. The nominal phrase is generally used in invocations, but not exclusively there. The problem which interests me here is not the *when* and *where*—something that varies from language to language—but the nature of the affirmation enunciated in such sentences; this is a propositional affirmation.

This propositional judgement is not the only form of non-positional judgement. There is another form, which I shall provisionally term *predicative judgement*. In this way we have the three forms of judgement: positional affirmation, propositional affirmation, and predicative affirmation. In what does this last consist?

3. The third form of judgement, I repeat, is *predicative judgement*. For the moment, borrowing some terminology from classical logic, let us say that it is the judgement whose scheme is *A is B*. It is because I have referred to classical logic that I have termed the two previous forms of judgement pre-predicative. The linguists call everything said of something a ‘predicate’; the predicate here {159} would be *is B*, and *A* would be the subject. But this, while it may be true, nonetheless cloaks the proper character of what is affirmed in a judgement. For one of the essential moments for this judgement is that the affirmation be made using a verb, which in the foregoing scheme is the verb “is”. And there is another moment which must be pointed out. Ultimately we are dealing more with a *copulative affirmation* than a predicative affirmation; the verb *to be*, in fact, discharges the function of a copulative. Whence there is some justification in calling only *B* the predicate, in respect of which *A* would be the subject. Given this initial clarification, to which we shall shortly return, and without making the notions more precise at the moment, let us speak somewhat loosely about predicative judgement in the sense of copulative affirmation.

This affirmation is, above all, pro-positional, in the sense explained above. The *intantum*, in fact, refers to an *A* previously posited as real. And this reality already posited, *A*, is posited in turn for a subsequent determination *B*. Therefore *A* is a reality pro-posed in order to be affirmed *qua B*. In this aspect, the copulative affirmation is strictly pro-positional. By being so, the copulative af-

firmation puts the reality of *B qua B* as a moment of *A*. And this *B* is in itself the terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, item of fiction, or concept), whose reality is affirmed upon being posited in a real *A*. Hence, in every propositional affirmation, the intellectual movement is, on one hand, the position of *A qua B*, and on the other, the position of *B* in the reality of *A*. They are two aspects of the same movement.

Up to now, the predicative affirmation has only been a propositional affirmation. But the role of the predicative affirmation {160} is in the mode of position of *A* as *B*, or what comes to the same thing, of *B* in *A*. With which position are we dealing?

To be sure, it is not a positional position of either *A* or *B*. That would not be “one” affirmation but “two”. But neither is it a constitutive position, because *B* is certainly grounded on *A*, but not necessarily in the nature of the reality of *A*. And here is the difference between predicative or copulative affirmation and merely propositional affirmation. For now, one thing is clear: predicative affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation, just like this latter is a modification of positional affirmation. What is this predicative modification?

Modification of predication consists in *B* being grounded on *A*, but in such a way that this foundation of the reality of *B* in *A* is not necessarily—as in the case of propositional affirmation—the very “nature” of the reality of *A*. Rather, it consists in that *B*, though being in *A*, is so only in the sense of “merely being”. Here “being” is used in the sense of “realizing” something, independently of the character of of this realization. In propositional judgement what is affirmed is that this realization is what is in the “nature” of something. But here we are dealing with a realization in which we disregard its mode, whether necessary or not necessary. *A* and *B* each have their own entity, and their unity consists in *B* being realized in *A*. In this fashion the reality of *B* in *A*, or the reality of *A* as *B*, involves two moments. On one hand, *B* is in fact in *A*. But on the other, *B* is something which, although it takes its reality from being put in *A*, nonetheless its reality is maintained in a certain way as its own reality inside the reality of *A*; and therefore {161} even though it is in *A*, it is, in a certain way, different from *A*. Therefore between *A* and *B* there is a unity to be sure, but a unity which, within *A*, maintains a certain distinction between the reality of *A* and the reality of *B*. Hence it is not a simple constitution. The *constitution* not only puts *B* in *A* but puts this *B* in the very “nature” of the reality of *A*, whereas now *B* is put in *A* though as something formally distinct from *A*. *A* is certainly *B*, but does not consist in being *B*, nor does *B* consist in being *A*. This is no longer constitution; it is what I shall term *connection*. There is a

great difference between constitution and connection. Connection is union as well as distinction; union and separation are the two aspects of the unity of connection. This connection can have various characteristics; it can be either necessary or *de facto*. But one is always dealing with a connection “derived” from the reality of *A*. On the other hand, in the unity of constitution, rather than a “necessity of *A*”, one deals with the very “nature” of *A*. The constitution is thus more than necessary; it is in a certain way *constituting*. When one says, “femina, variabile”, one affirms that a woman is changeable by virtue of being a woman. Similarly, when one says “this paper, white”, that about which one is thinking, to wit, “this paper”, is white precisely because it is “this”, i.e. one thinks in a certain way about the nature of “this”. But when one says “this woman is changeable” or “this paper is white”, one does not affirm that “this” woman consists in being changeable nor that “this” paper consists in its whiteness. In propositional judgement one thinks more about the nature of *A* than in the reality of the “other thing”, *B*. In predicative judgement there is the reality of *A* and the realization of *B* in *A*, but in an *A* which as such has its nature independent of *B*; it is for that reason that there is connection. It is no longer *AB* but rather *A-B*. This is the connective or copulative affirmation. {162}

We see immediately that this affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation. Propositional affirmation puts the reality of *B* as a moment of the nature of the reality of *A*. Now, however, *B* is in a way less pegged to the reality of *A*. In place of constitution, we have connection; and in place of propositional affirmation, we have predicative affirmation.

This connection is not properly speaking a “relation”, because every relation presupposes the two things related. In a connection one does not presuppose the reality of *B*, but rather puts *B* in the reality of *A*; hence it is *B* which receives the reality of *A*. In this fashion the presumed relation is *consequent* upon the connection. And this brings us to the question of the parts which make up this predicative affirmation.

On the surface, this affirmation comprises three “parts”: *A*, *B*, and *is*. Whence it follows that function of the copula “is” is to express the relation between *B* and *A*. But this really doesn’t say much of importance. A correct analysis of copulative affirmation strictly requires that the affirmation have only two parts: what is affirmed and the affirmation itself.

In the first place, what is affirmed? The connective unity of *B* and *A*. That is, in what is affirmed *A* and *B* enter, and what is affirmed of them is their connection. We have, above all, *A* and *B*. Some think that *A* and *B* are two variables of the same type and that their difference is

merely *functional*: *A* carries out the function of subject, and *B* that of predicate. For just this reason it is possible to switch their functional positions, making *B* the subject and *A* the predicate. This is the so called “conversion” of propositions in formal logic: “All men are mortal”, {163} and by conversion, “Some mortals are men”. Apart from the quantifiers, *A* and *B* do not differ in the two cases other than by their functional position. But this is actually not correct. Strictly speaking, *A* is not a part of what is affirmed; rather it is simply “what” is proposed to what is affirmed. Hence, rather than being a part of the judgement, it is assumed by it. This assumption is usually called the “subject”; but strictly speaking it is not the subject but rather the “object” (*sit venia verbo*) about which one judges. The function of that which is already apprehended is now being pro-posed as “subject”. This interpretation of what is proposed to the judgement as its subject is certainly a very debatable one. It depends upon the concept one has of the structure of the unity of things and their notes. Conceptualizing a thing as the subject of its inherent accidents is nothing but a theory. In my view, this theory is unacceptable. But that is not what interests us at the moment. Rather we are concerned not with the ulterior concept of connection, but the connective character of *B* with *A*, whether or not it has the character of a subject. And only in order to clarify the expression will I call *A* the subject; it is in fact the reality already apprehended as something which is not the “subject of” *B*, but the “subject to” a connection.

On the other hand, *B* is not something which is on a par with *A*, so to speak, because in itself *B* is a term proposed not as real, but as something unreal, as terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, or concept). Hence its connection with *A* has all the character of “realization” of *B* in *A*. To identify *A* and *B* with two interchangeable magnitudes, as if they were homogeneous terms, is to speak nonsense. The subject is reality and the predicate realization. They do not function on the same level. Even when I carry out the so-called “conversion” of a judgement, the essential difference is not in the quantification of *A* and *B*, {164} but in the fact that in the second judgement *A* is by itself now a simple apprehension realized in *B*, which is the reverse of what happened before. Thus *A* and *B* are not, formally, on the same footing. The difference between them is not a difference in location in the judgement, but an essential difference. *A* and *B* can be interchanged so that *A* is sometimes the subject and other times the predicate. But their formal difference is always essential not interchangeable. The subject is always a proposed reality and the predicate is always something unreal which is realized. It is the same thing which happens in the case of all propositional judgements: it doesn’t make sense to convert the nominal proposition, “all

women, changeable” into “something changeable, woman”.

What is affirmed of *A* and *B* is their “connection”. We have already seen that this connection is not a relation; rather, the “relation” is something consequent upon the “connection” and founded upon it. The connection establishes *A* in *B*. The relation between *B* and *A* exists, but only after *B* is established in *A*, i.e., after the connection. The relation—if one desires to speak of relations—is what results from the realization of *B* in *A*, i.e., it is the result of the connection. The formal conceptualization of *A* and *B* refers to this relation, which presupposes its essential connective difference. Therefore the so-called *formal logic* is based upon the relation *resulting from* the connective affirmation. Now we see that this logic is not what is primary, because the formal relation between *A* and *B* is grounded on the affirmative connection of realization of *B* in *A*. That is, every *formal logic* is founded upon a more radical logic, the *logic of affirmation*. “Formal logic” is the play of two homogeneous variables, whereas the “logic of affirmation” is the intellection of the realization of something unreal (*B*) in something already real (*A*). And this is the essential point: the logic of the affirmative intellection of the real. As our subject is not logic, {165} it suffices to have pointed out this idea which I deem essential; we are not seeking to invalidate modern formal logic, only to found it in the logic of affirmation.

That which affirmed is, then, the realization of *B* in *A* in connective form. Thus, *A* is reality proposed, and *B* is something unreal realized in *A*; and this realization is of connective character. What is the affirmation?

The affirmation itself does not consist in connecting *B* with *A* but in putting the connective unity *A-B* into reality itself. If one desires to continue talking about relations, he must say that affirmation does not consist in affirming the relation of *B* with *A*, nor that of *A* with *B*; rather, it consists in putting this relation into reality itself. The unity of *B* in *A* moves along a line of relation. On the other hand, affirmation moves along a line which in a way is orthogonal to this latter. That is, in affirmation one does not go from *B* to *A* nor from *A* to *B* but from *A-B* to the reality of what is primordially apprehended. In propositional judgement affirmation is orthogonal to constitution. In predicative judgement affirmation is orthogonal to connection.

With this we see that predicative judgement is a modification of the *intentum*, but a modification which is threefold. The *intentum* modified has become an *intentum* of judgement, i.e. an affirmative intention. Secondly, the predicative judgement involves a propositional intention, which is a second modification of the absolute intention. And thirdly, the propositional judgement has been taken

in predicative intention.

The grammatical expression of this predicative affirmation requires some special consideration. It is the expression by the “is”. This “is” discharges, as I see it, not two but three functions: {166}

a) It expresses an *affirmation*; as such it means the “reality” of the connection *A-B*. This connection is given in reality itself.

b) It expresses the *connection* of *B* with *A*, i.e., it expresses the “connective unity” *A-B*, and what *A* is “in reality”.

c) It expresses the *relation* which is established between *A* and *B* in this connection and by it. In this aspect, the function of the “is” is to be a copula. It is the “copulative relation”.

These are the three functions of the verb *is*: “reality”, “connective unity”, and “copulative relation”. Now, these three functions have a precise order of foundation, to wit, the copulative relation is founded in the connective unity, and that in turn is founded in the affirmation of reality. This order is essential; it cannot be inverted, and so one cannot think that the primary function of the “is” is to be a copula and that the connection is merely a relation, and that this relation constitutes judgement. Such a conception is absolutely untenable. To see why, it suffices to refer to linguistic considerations. They show us quite clearly the fact that the verb *to be* (*est, esti, asti*, etc. does not in any respect constitute a special verb. In the first place, *every verb*—and not just *to be*—has the two primary functions. If I say “the bird sings, the horse runs, the man talks”, etc., the verbs ‘sings’, ‘runs’, ‘talks’ have the two functions of expressing an affirmation, i.e., the position of something in reality itself, and also of expressing a connection between the horse, the bird, and the man with some states or actions or qualities (the exact expression does not matter here). Whence the serious error of thinking that predicative affirmation is necessarily in the form “*A is B*”. The judgement “the bird sings” is just as predicative as the judgement “*A is B*”, not because “sings” {167} is equivalent to “is a singer”—which is absurd, just as absurd as saying that in the nominal phrase there is an ellipsis of the verb *to be*. The judgement affirms the connective unity of the bird and its singing. It is on account of this that I said at the beginning that I was only provisionally expressing predicative judgement in the form “*A is B*”. Now, in this very case the verb *to be* is present. Originally it was a substantive verb like all the rest; and like them, it expresses the affirmation of the connective unity of *A* and *B*. However, not all verbs—but many old verbs, e.g. in Greek or Latin—have, in addition to their verbal meaning stemming from their etymological root, a copulative character which they have gradually

acquired. Consider the verbs *meno*, *auxanomai*, *hyparkho*, *pelo*, *gignesthai*, *phyo*, etc., etc., etc... Among them is one which merits special attention. From the Indo-European root **sta* derives the Greek verb *histemi*, which as an intransitive verb means to be firmly on one's feet. Its compound *kathistemi* has, in the primitive aorist tense *katesten*, the sense of being established, constituted, installed, etc. And this aorist acquired—as one can readily understand—a copulative meaning as well. From “being established” the verb took on the meaning “is”. From the same root derives the Latin *stare*. Already in the classical period it sometimes had the meaning of a copula as a strong synonym of *esse*. It passed into the Romance languages, and in particular into Spanish as *estar*,* which unites to its “substantive” sense a copulative sense founded upon it. Later I will examine in detail what in my opinion constitutes the difference between the two Spanish verbs for “to be”: *ser* and *estar*. In all of these verbs the “connection” fades into “relation”. Now, the verb *to be* also passed from being a substantive verb to being a copula. The copulative meaning of these verbs was, then, acquired, and its acquisition was founded in the previous substantive meaning, so to speak. {168} Moreover, the copulative meaning not only was acquired, but was always secondary. So we can say that the three functions are founded in the above-mentioned form, and none is exclusive to the verb *to be*, especially if one remembers that there are very many languages which do not even have this verb.

If, for greater simplicity, we return to the predicative judgement such as it is generally used in formal logic, we shall have to distinguish in every such judgement—as I wrote some sixty years ago—its grammatical structure and its intellectual structure. Grammatically, the subject is the object expressed in only one of its aspects (*A*, this table, etc.). The predicate is another aspect of the same object, the aspect designated as *B*. The copula is the verb *to be* which designates the unity, both connective and relational, of these two aspects. But from the point of view of its intellectual structure, the subject is the real object proposed, with all of its real properties (the property of being *A* and all the remaining properties). The predicate is a simple unreal intentional apprehension of one or several notes of the object, realized in it in connective form. The copula is the affirmation that this connective unity pertains to reality, or rather, to what *A* is “in reality”.

This structure is essential for two reasons. First, because it shows us the structure of predicative affirmation; and second, because it places before our eyes something decisive, viz. that the “is”, the “to be”, does not rest upon

itself but upon reality. That is, reality is not a mode of being; rather, being is founded in reality. We saw this already in Part I, and we shall return to it in more detail in a subsequent section.

To summarize, affirmation is a moment of intellectual movement which intellectually knows what a thing, already apprehended {169} as real, is “in reality”. Moving in the field of reality itself, the intelligence steps back from a real thing in a retraction in which it intellectually knows what the thing “would be” in reality. This is simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, concept). Now, following in the field of reality itself, the intelligence turns therein to a real thing in order to intellectually know, in this stepping back, what the thing is in reality. And that intellection is, as we have seen, affirmation. Affirmation is the “distanced” *intentum* of a thing, i.e., in a stepping back. That about which one judges is something already apprehended as reality, and that which one judges of the thing is what it is “in reality”. For it, the thing of which one judges can have three functions: mere position, pro-position, and subject of predication. And each of these functions constitutes a form of affirmation.

This difference among the three functions of the real in affirmation has a formally sentient character. Only because there is an impression of reality is there a field of reality, a field of the *de suyo*. The three functions are founded in and established by the impression of reality. It is sentiently as if I see myself having stepped back from what something, already apprehended as real, is in reality; and it is sentiently I find myself retained by the real as apprehended and returned to it: this is sentient logos. In this reversion, the logos intellectually knows the realization of the simple unreal apprehension, and intellectually knows it by a determination of what has already, previously, been apprehended. This determination is, to be sure, anchored in the fact that it is my intellection which, by being sentient, is distanced or stepped back from, and which by being so returns to the real in three different forms: positional, propositional, and predicative. But it is because the real, when impelling me impressively to step back, opens to me {170} the three possibilities of determination: positional, constitutive, and connective. They are thus three ways of traversing the distance from the unreal to what the real is in reality (through stepping back and returning). They are three forms of *intentum*. A non-sentient intellection cannot step back, and therefore it cannot have the three functions: positional, constitutive, and connective; nor can it intellectually know in the corresponding triple intentionality: positional, constitutive, and connective. The logos is born from the impression of reality and returns to it in these three forms, founded upon the three forms determined by the real as apprehended primordially. Now, in what, formally, lies the difference

* [As noted earlier, *estar* has the meaning of “is” in the strong sense of “is actually” or “is here-and-now”.—trans.]

between these three functions? To intellectually know what something is in reality is to intellective know the unity of the field moment and the individual moment of the real. These two moments are moments of the formality of reality impressively given in it. Whence it follows that the three functions are three forms of the unity of what is of the field and the individual, i.e., three forms of unity of the formality of reality. In this unity something which we may call “the force of reality” is made patent; not in the sense of force of imposition of the real, but in the sense of force of unity of the moment in a field and the individual moment, i.e., *force of realization*. The strongest unity is positional form; it is the supreme form of intellectually knowing with the logos what something is in reality. Less strong is the propositional or constitutive form; it affirms unity as constitution. Weakest, finally, is predicative affirmation, which affirms the unity of the real as connection. Altogether, then, there are three degrees of force of realization, three degrees of intellectually knowing what something is in reality.

But in each of these three forms of affirmation there can be distinct modes. The problem of the forms of affirmation {171} thus leads to the third problem. After having examined what affirming is, and after examining what the forms of affirmation are, we now have to confront the problem of the modes of affirmation.

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§ 3

THE MODES OF AFFIRMATION

I said earlier that the forms of affirmation are distinguished according to the function carried out in an affirmation by the thing about which one judges. On the other hand, what I call the modes of affirmation concern the affirmative intention itself *qua* affirmative. This is our present problem.

Let us begin again to clarify the ideas. Affirmative intention or judgement is an intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back, of what a thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. This intellection has its own characteristics.

Above all it is, as I said, an intellection in movement, a movement which consists in intellectually traversing the distance in which we are with respect to what a thing is in reality, i.e., in stepping back from it. This intellective movement is, then, dual. By being so, the intellective movement which is intellectually knowing that a thing is real, is not intellectually knowing yet what this real thing is in reality. In this sense, the intellective

movement is above all an *absence* of intellection of what the thing is in reality. But it is not just a movement characterized by this absence, because it is the movement of a dual intellection, in which the movement is directed towards a fixed point, toward what the already real thing is in reality. The duality thus stamps the movement with its own character, in the sense that what is not intellectually known is going to be so, or at least is intended to be so. Whence it follows that this movement is not just an absence but something essentially different, a *privation*. {173} Privation is the character which duality stamps on intellectual movement *qua* movement. This intrinsic unity of movement and duality is what constitutes *expectation*. The movement of privation as such is what constitutes expectation. Conversely, expectation formally consists in privational intellective movement. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation as “other”. This concept already greeted us some pages back when we spoke of the concept of intellective movement.

Now it is important to repeat that expectation is what, in its etymological sense, corresponds to “looking at from afar”. But this does not refer to some psychological state of anticipation; rather, it refers to an intrinsic character of the intellective movement as such. What is this character? One might think that it consists in that intellective movement which is “questioning”. But we have already seen that this is not the case: questions are founded upon expectation, and in most cases we are in intellective expectation without asking ourselves anything.

What is it that we expect in this expectation? We have already answered many times: not pure and simple reality (because that is given to us already in primordial apprehension, prior to any judgements, and only on account of it is judgement possible); rather, what we expect is not “reality” but what the real is “in reality”.

This “expectant” movement takes place in stepping back. And in this being moved back a step, the intellection has, as we saw, its own character: intellective *intention*. It must be stressed that every intention—in order to be such—is in itself formally and constitutively expectant. I deem this concept essential. It does not refer to the fact that one must expect an {174} affirmation, but to the fact that the intention itself is the proper and formally intellective moment of expectation. If it is necessary to intellectually know that *A* is *B*, not only do I have the intentionality of *B* in *A*, but precisely because I start from *A* this point of departure constitutes an expectation of what the intentionality of *A* is going to be. Every intention is, then, formally and constitutively expectant. Conversely, every expectation, as the character of intellective movement, is formally and constitutively intentional. Intellective movement is a movement “from-toward”. In this

movement I can consider only that “toward” which one is going. That is the only thing which up to now has generally been considered; in the classical concept of intention, one considers only the fact that the intention “intends” its end, an end which therefore is usually termed “intentional”. But I believe that this is inadequate. The fact is that one can and should consider the intention itself not only as “going toward” but also as “departing from”. And then the intention is expectation. Expectation and intentionality, then, are but two intrinsically unified aspects of a single intellectual movement, which is therefore “expectant intention” or “intentional expectation”. Whence it follows that the intellectual movement in which we intellectually know what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality is, I repeat, intentional expectation or expectant intention.

Granting this, we must ask ourselves *how* this intentional expectation is resolved. Resolution is the affirmation in which expectation is molded; it is intellection itself as affirmation. But let us not get confused. There is on one hand the *intellective intention* itself *qua* intention; and this intention is intrinsically expectant. But on the other hand, there is the affirmation in which this intention is molded. {175} Since it is molded intention, I have called it and will continue to call it *affirmative intention*. Let us not confuse, then, the intellective intention with the affirmative intention. This latter is the resolution of the first, the resolution of the expectant intention. So how is intentional expectation resolved into affirmative intention?

Affirmative intellection, as the intellection that it is, is an intellectual actuality of the real. Now, this actuality of the real has different modes; and these different modes of actuality of the real determine different modes of affirmation. Each mode of affirmation thus depends essentially and constitutively upon the mode by which the actualization of the real determines or resolves the intentional expectation. Permit me to explain.

a) Above all, it is an intellectual actualization of the real, but of the real as already apprehended as real; it is therefore reactualization. And this reactualization is such with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectually know what the real is in reality. We are dealing, then, with the realization of a simple apprehension in what has already been actualized as real. Now, this realization depends first of all upon the characteristics, the traits, which are already given in the primordial actualization of the thing as real. I speak of the traits as “given”. This phrase is chosen for now to be deliberately neutral, because the real *qua* reactualization poses two questions. The first is, What is the mode by which such-and-such real thing determines the realization in it of

simple apprehension? The second is that of ascertaining in what the determining itself consists, in what the real *qua* determining principle of this reactualization in all its modes consists. We shall concern ourselves with the latter question in Part Three. For now let us fix our attention on the first, {176} in the diverse modes through which the real determines its reactualization, i.e. the diverse modes through which the given traits of the real determine the realization or non-realization of what is simply apprehended. And it is because of this that I speak about the fact that the traits are given in reactualization. To simplify the terms, in place of reactualization I shall speak simply about the actualization of traits given in the realization of simple apprehensions. Do not confuse the actualization and the realization of traits of what is simply apprehended in reality itself with this actualization of a real thing in simple apprehensions and with the realization of these simple apprehensions in the given thing. Now, the simple apprehensions are realized in different ways depending upon the nature of the actualization of the real.

b) Now, this actualization is an intrinsic determinant of the modes of resolution of intentional expectation. Thus, if the traits of the real with respect to what it is in reality are intellectually known in a confused or ambiguous way, the resolution of the intentional expectation takes on different characteristics. And in virtue of this, these modes of resolution are those expressed in the modes of intellection itself *qua* affirmative intention. Thus the ambiguity, as we shall see, is a proper mode of actualization of the traits of the real with respect to simple apprehensions; and according to this mode of actualization, affirmative intention, affirmation, has that mode which constitutes doubt. To preclude any confusion I shall systematically develop the two ideas just outlined.

First, all these modes of affirming depend essentially and constitutively upon the modes of reactualization of the real in the order of simple apprehensions. {177} Ambiguity, for example, is a mode of this actualization. It is the real itself insofar as it actualizes its traits in an ambiguous way with respect to simple apprehensions, with respect therefore to what the real is in reality. It is a characteristic prior to any affirmation; it is, let us repeat, the mode of actualizing the traits of the real with respect to what this particular thing is in reality, with respect to the simple apprehensions *at my disposal*.

In the second place, these different modes of actualization define different modes of affirmation and of affirmative intention; for example, ambiguous actualization of the real determines dubitative affirmation or dubitative affirmative intention—doubt properly so-called. In these modes, for example the doubt-mode, we are not primarily

dealing with a state of insecurity in which we are assaulted by ambiguity, in contrast to other states, such as that of security. We are not talking about states, but formal modes of affirmative intention. We do not mean that when one affirms that something is ambiguous he finds himself in a state of doubt; rather, we mean that doubt is the ambiguous affirmation of the ambiguous *qua* ambiguous. It is the affirmative intention itself which is intrinsically and formally doubting. The ambiguous is not just that to which affirmative intention refers, nor is only a characteristic of what is intellectually known; rather it is at one and the same time a characteristic of intellection and the affirmation itself. Doubt is not just an “affirmative intention about the ambiguous” but an “affirmative ambiguous intention in itself, determined by the ambiguity of the actualization of some real thing. Doubt is then a mode of affirmation, not a state consequent upon affirmation; and the proof is that both moments can be quite disparate. I can be in a state of insecurity with respect to a doubting affirmation. In such a case, I am sure that the affirmation {178} is of doubt; I am sure that the thing is in reality doubtful. The same applies *mutatis mutandis* for certitude and all other modes of affirmation, as we shall see forthwith.

Therefore what we call ‘modes of affirmation’ formally consist in the modes such as the diverse actualizations of the traits of the real which determine the resolution of intentional expectation.

In what does this modality as such consist? We have already seen that affirmation is a sentient intellection at a distance, the result of “stepping back”. And its sentient nature reveals that the return to the real has the character of a force, the *force of realization*. This force has three different degrees depending upon whether one is dealing with positional, propositional, or predicative affirmation. And this force not only has degrees, but also a quality which we might term *firmness*. It is just what the term and concept ‘a-ffirmation’ refer to. “Grade of realization” and “firmness” are not the same thing. Each of the three degrees of force of realization can be exercised with different firmness. For example, the difference between doubt and certainty has nothing to do with the force of realization, but rather with the firmness with which this force operates. I can doubt or be certain that “every woman, fickle”, or that “A is B”. The first phrase is nominal (a constitution), the second predicative (a connection); they are two degrees of the force of realization. But doubt and certainty are in the firmness with which the constitution or connection is realized. Every logos is sentient, and is so in two moments. First, because I sentiently intellectually know what something is in reality as a *force of realization*; and second because I sentiently intellec-

tively know with a certain *firmness*. That is, there is force and there is firmness. The firmness is the very mode of affirmation. Now, the differences of firmness are the different modes of affirmation. {179}

Granting this, the modalization of affirmation has a clearly defined structure. Above all, we have the real actualized with its traits in primordial apprehension. These traits are notes of the real of quite diverse character, both with respect to quality and intensity as well as position. But the real we now make the terminus of a second intellection, the intellection of what it is in reality. Then intellection *qua* act acquires its own character; it becomes intentional expectation of what that which we have already apprehended as real is in reality. The resolution of this expectation has three moments:

a) Above all it is the *moment of contribution of our simple apprehensions*, or to use common parlance (but to speak much less precisely), it is the contribution of our ideas. Only as a function of our simple apprehensions can we intellectually know what the real is in reality.

b) With respect to these simple apprehensions, the traits of the real are actualized in different ways; this is the *moment of reactualization*. These traits, as moments of the real and simply real, are what they are in and by themselves, and nothing more. But with respect to simple apprehensions, they can take on a different mode of actualization. A far-off figure is apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality as a far-off figure, and nothing more; in itself it is something actualized as real and nothing more. But if I am to intellectually know what this figure is in reality, I draw upon my simple apprehensions, for example that of shrub, man, dog, etc. Is this figure a shrub, a man, a dog, or what? With respect to these simple apprehensions, and only with respect to them, do the traits of the far-off figure acquire a reactualization, because the fact is that I seek to intellectually know if this figure realizes the characteristics of the simple apprehension of a man, {180} a shrub, a dog, etc. It is then a second actualization but—I must again insist—only with respect to the realization of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is intellection brought to fullness in the light of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is a second intellection; and this second intellection is distinguished from the first by being intellection in the light of simple apprehensions. Herein consists the “secondarity” of second intellection: in being an intellection qualified by simple apprehensions. Simple apprehensions are not merely the terminus of an intellection, but are also and formally an intrinsic qualification of intellection. Simple apprehension is the “quali-ficating” moment of second intellection itself. Second intellection is intellection at a distance, from stepping back, and in virtue of that one knows intel-

lectively only in the qualified light of simple apprehensions. A perfectly determined trait in primordial apprehension can be, as we shall see, only slightly determined with respect to the realization of a simple apprehension, because reactualization is actualization of the real as realization of a simple apprehension. And this reactualization is what has different modes: the unknown shape can reactualize the characteristics of a shrub, of a man, of a dog, etc. and actualize them in a more or less vague way, and so forth.

c) I intellectually know these diverse modes of reactualization, and I affirm them with respect to realization itself; this is the *moment of affirmative intention*, the moment of affirmation. Depending on what the modes of reactualization have been in the second moment, affirmation takes on different modalities because every affirmation is in itself modal. To be sure, this modality has nothing to do with what in classical logic is referred to as modality, viz. the difference in connection {181} of subject with predicate according to whether it is contingent, necessary, etc. Here we are not talking about the connection between subject and predicate, but about the mode in which the actualization of the notes of the real are affirmed.

Such is the structure of the modes of intellection at a distance.

The study of this structure can be made from different points of view. These modes, in fact, are mutually dependent. And this dependence is of the greatest importance in our analysis. But it is essential to delineate carefully the ideas involved, because this dependence can be of different types. “Dependence” can mean the mode in which an affirmation depends upon others with respect to its production in the mind. The dependence is then a psycho-genetic fact. But it is not this connection which is of concern to us here. The only decisive thing is the internal structure of each mode of affirmation. And it is this structure which is found to be dependent, *qua* structure, upon other affirmations. Thus it is possible that an affirmation might be doubtful as compared with a certain affirmation, for example. But this can mean two things. It can mean that the affirmation began as something doubtful and that doubt has given way to a certain affirmation. This is the psycho-genetic connection. But it can also mean that as a mode of affirmation the structure of the doubtful affirmation occupies a well-defined place with respect to a certain affirmation. This is a structural nexus or dependence. The two types of dependence are quite different. Our certain affirmation almost never comes preceded by a doubt, but is generated in other ways. Nonetheless, in every case the structure of certainty, the structure of what certainty is, is dependent constitutionally

upon the structure of what doubt is. What we are here trying to conceptualize is not a psychogenesis {182} of our affirmations, but the intellectual spectrum, so to speak, of its diverse structures. And it is only to this dependence of structural nature that I refer when I speak of the fact that some modes of affirmation are dependent upon others.

What are these modes? That is the problem we must now address.

1. In the lower part of the spectrum of affirmative structures we find a peculiar mode of affirmation. We have apprehended something as real and we seek to know intellectually what it is in reality. It can happen that we do not succeed in this effort. In that case we say that the affirmation is an affirmation of our *ignorance*; we do not know what the thing is in reality.

But this description is radically wrong and completely inadequate. In the first place, the verb “to know” [*saber*] is used.* True, up to now we have not spoken at all about what “knowing” is; that subject will occupy us elsewhere. Up to now I have spoken only of intellectual knowing [*inteligir*] and of intellection. But disregarding that for the time being—however essential it is, as we shall see—let us employ the verb *to know* as synonymous with intellection. But even so, the previous description is radically wrong. In fact, what is this business of not knowing what something is in reality? The Pithecanthropic man from Java, for example, did not know what a rock is in reality. Do we then say that he was ignorant of what a rock is in reality? As I see it, No, because being ignorant of what something is in reality is a mode of intellection of something already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality. All ignorance is therefore *always* ignorance of something already apprehended as real. We intellectually know the reality of the “rock-thing”, but we are ignorant of what it is in reality. Now, the Pithecanthropic man did not have {183} primordial apprehension of the “rock-reality”. Therefore his not knowing what the rock is in reality is not ignorance; it is *nescience*. The Pithecanthropic man did not have any intellectual actuality of the thing we call a rock. His “not knowing” here is “non-intellection”; it is an “absence” of intellection. On the other hand, in the case of ignorance

* [Zubiri employs several Spanish verbs which have the English translation, ‘to know’: *saber*, from the Latin *sapere*; *conocer*, from the Latin *cognoscere*; and *inteligir*, from the Latin *intelligere*. The first refers to knowing in the sense of intellectual or practical knowledge; the second generally means ‘to know’ in the sense of ‘to be familiar with’ or ‘to know someone’; the third is what is translated throughout this book as, ‘to intellectually know’.—trans.]

one has intellection of the real, but not yet intellection of what that real thing is in reality. Therefore it is not an “absence” of intellection, but a “privation” of it. Ignorance is privation of intellection of what something which has already been apprehended as real is in reality; it is not merely an absence of intellection. Strictly speaking, when one is ignorant of something one knows what the ignorance is of. The formal terminus of ignorance is the “in reality” of something already apprehended as real. To be sure, there are types of ignorance which refer to the mere reality of something. But no reality is intellectually known as merely real; rather, it is founded (in whatever way; that does not concern us here) upon something already intellectually known as real, where intellection of what it “in reality” demands the mere reality of something else. And it can happen that we are ignorant of this reality. But then it is clear that in its ultimate root, ignorance concerns the “in reality” of something already apprehended as “real”. Otherwise we would be in the situation described before: our non-intellection of mere reality would not be ignorance but nescience. It would be a case of not having the vaguest idea of that reality. But this is not ignorance; it is more than ignorance, it is nescience. Ignorance then is not nescience but a positive characteristic of affirmative intellection. Which characteristic?

Let us return once again to our modest point of departure. We have an intellection of a certain real thing and we seek to know intellectually what it is in reality. Intellection is {184} then a movement of intentional expectation, which has to be resolved. And the resolution of this expectation has three moments.

a) Above all we make use of our simple apprehensions, and with them try to intellectually know their possible actualization in what is already intellectually known as real. Does the figure actualize the simple apprehension of a man, of a shrub, or of something else? At this point the two other essential moments of intellection arise in the intellection.

b) Intellection of the realization of simple apprehensions (which we have at our disposal) in the real already apprehended as such, is the second essential moment. This realization can have different modes which are, so to speak, different degrees of sufficiency.

There is a lowest degree. With respect to the simple apprehensions which we have at our disposal, it can be the case that the real realizes none of them. The thing is real but it has not been actualized with respect to any simple apprehension; it is what I term *indeterminate actualization*. And this type of modal actualization constitutes a mode of realization of the order of the simple apprehensions in the real thing. And this realization is also indeterminate. What is this indetermination? Of course, it is

not a “lack” of actualization, but a positive “privation” of the “understood” actualization. In what does this privation consist?

Let us recall what it is to intellectually know what something is “in reality”. Every real thing apprehended in its formality of reality has two moments, that of individual reality and that of reality in a field. And it is precisely their intrinsic unity which formally constitutes what the real thing is “in reality”. Now, as I have already said, when one intellectually knows something real “among” others, these two moments are {185} in a certain way functionally differentiated, since the field encompasses not one but many things. Whence the unity of being in a field and being an individual is not apparent. It is rather mediated by simple apprehensions in the field of reality itself. It is the realization of these simple apprehensions which fills the field moment and its unity with individual reality; mediation is the actualization of a real individual thing in simple apprehensions. Now it can happen that individual reality is not actualized in any of the simple apprehensions we have had. In that case there is a unique actualization, viz. the actualization of the real thing as in a field, but an empty field. The real thing thus is inscribed in the “hollowness” of the field. Whence it follows that the unity of the individual thing and the field remains in suspense. That is, what this thing is in reality remains in suspense. This suspension is not just an absence, nor some lack of determination; rather, it is a positive mode of actualization, viz. *privational determination*. It is the positive actualization of the “in reality”, but in a privative mode. It is then the privative actuality of a hollowness; and this privational actuality is precisely the “indetermination”. Indeterminate, then, does not here mean indefinite, because being indefinite is a mode of determination. Indetermination means rather “un-defined”. “Un-defined” is not the same as “indefinite”. In virtue of that, the ambit of the indeterminate is constitutively open without limits; it is open to everything else. “Everything else” does not refer to other *things*, but to what the “un-defined” thing might be in reality. It is the “everything else” of the “in reality”. What is un-defined is the mode of unity of the individual and of the being in a field, i.e., what the thing is in reality. As it is the {186} un-definition of something already definite as real in primordial apprehension, it follows that this un-definition is privation. Privation is the actuality of the “hollowness” of the individual in the field; it is the “in reality” in suspense. Simple apprehensions are what determine the actuality of the indeterminate.

And here one sees the difference between the traits of a thing in and of itself, and its traits with respect to a second actualization. The traits of a real thing in and of themselves can be perfectly determinate in their individual reality, and yet their intrinsic unity with respect to the

field can be indeterminate. The real thing is determinate, but what it is in reality is indeterminate.

c) This actuality of the indeterminate, this actuality of the “hollowness” of the field of individual reality, in turn defines its own mode of intellectual affirmation because it defines its own mode of realizing something in simple apprehension. Every intellectual movement is, as we have seen, intentional expectation. And therefore, *qua* mere intellection, that movement is a privational intention; it is in just this respect that its expectant character consists. This intentional privational expectation is resolved in an affirmation whose mode is determined by the mode of the actualization. When the actualization is a privational “hollowness”, the affirmation takes on a special mode. Every expectant intention is in itself privational; when the actuality of the expected is indetermination (in the sense explained), it follows that intentional privation becomes the character of the affirmation; it is the privational aspect of intention molded into a mode of affirmation. It is not privation of intention; that would be just an intellectual deficiency. Nor is it intention {187} itself as deprived of a positive terminus, because that would be just some manifestation. It is an intention which consists in the very mode of affirming; it is the affirmation itself as privational. Privationality of the act of affirmation is vacuous affirmation. Now, this mode of affirming is precisely what constitutes *ignorance*. Ignorance is affirming “privationally” the “in reality”. It is an affirmation suspended in itself as affirmation. It is a positive mode of affirmation. A mode of affirmation such that the affirmative intention is as if folded back upon itself is a proper intentional hollowness; the empty affirmative intention as a mode of affirming is what ignorance consists in. It is like a shot in the dark. It is, then, in the first place a hollowness, but in the second a hollowness of what the real is in reality. Hollowness is then a positive affirmative ambit; a positive affirmation in hollowness, an indeterminate affirmation. The expectant privational intention is folded back upon itself, molded into a suspended affirmation. It is being suspended as a mode of affirmation itself, not merely a suspension of what is affirmed. Such is the essence of ignorance: a suspended vacuous affirmation, of the indeterminate as such.

Precisely because ignorance is a mode of affirmative intellection, man not only has to go on learning what things are in reality, he also has to learn to be ignorant. Only thus can he create new simple apprehensions which in time can lead from ignorance to other modes of affirmative intellection. The access to ignorance, on the periphery and above nescience, is a firm intellectual movement.

The realization of simple apprehensions is therefore

{188} not a simple task. Insofar as this realization progresses, real things actualize their traits in a more definite way; this is the structural emergence of other modes of affirmative intellection.

2. What a thing is in reality can begin to actualize and realize more of its traits with respect to simple apprehensions.

a) Actualization of a real thing in these simple apprehensions is not purely and simply indeterminate. The actualization, in fact, is sometimes a more or less vague, even fleeting, moment; sometimes it is extremely concrete. It is the moment in which the announcement of a determination begins to emerge, however vaguely. It is a purely dawning or inchoative moment. But it is an indication which is no more than an indication, since scarcely has the actualization been indicated when the emerging traits once again dissolve and become invalid. It is what I shall term a “revoked indication”. Now, this revoked indication formally constitutes that mode of actualization which is the *hint*. It is not mere indetermination, but neither is it determination; it is the dawning of revoked determination, the mere suggesting of a possible determination, its first indication. The hint is a mode of actualizing a real thing with respect to what it is in reality, i.e., with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectually know it. The traits of the real thing are never hints; they are what they are and nothing more. On the other hand the hint is always and only a hint or evidence of something, and this something is what is apprehended in simple apprehension. It is then only a hint of what the real thing is in reality.

b) This mode of actualization and realization moulds the affirmation in accordance with a particular mode of intention, viz. the affirmative intention of the hint as *guess*. {189} A guess is a mode of affirmation. This does not refer to guessing an affirmation, but to affirm by guessing, so to speak. The emptiness of intention, i.e., of ignorance, now gives way to that of guessing the intention. This is the intellection of the first pointer to the determination of what a real thing is in reality. One guesses only what the thing is in reality, because it is actualized for us as a hint.

This intellection naturally admits of various degrees. Merely pointing to a determination can be a pointing which tends to make itself clear. But it is a pointing quickly revoked. This mode of hint is what I call *clarescence*, the breaking of the dawn of clarity. Guessing the affirmative intention of the clarescent is *glimpsing*, the glimpsing of the clarescent. The hint can be more than just clarescence. In the revoked pointing of the hint, not only may the light which is dawning be actualized, but some traits of the thing as well. But these things, now

revoked, actualize the thing as something which is in reality poorly drawn or sketched. This actualization of the hint can be called *blurred*. Something blurred consists in traits being actualized sketchily with respect to what the thing is in reality. It does not refer to a type of mix of traits, but to a rigorous sketching. Sketching is not the privation of figure, but neither is it a precise figure. “Sketching” here refers to the revoking, which actualizes the traits as not being determinately of the thing such as it is simply apprehended. And this “not” actualizes the thing not as indeterminate but as sketched. The revoking sketches the traits of the thing actualized in simple apprehension. Nothing is blurry in itself but only is so with respect to {190} simple apprehensions. And the blurred formally consists in this sketching. Now, affirmative intention, the realization of the blurred *qua* blurred is *confusion*. This does not refer to some confusion of “ideas” or anything of that sort; rather, it is a mode of affirming, affirming confusedly that something is in reality blurred. We dimly perceive what that thing is in reality. Finally, in the repeated appearance and disappearance of actualized traits, there are some which do not point to something else, which remain as definitively revoked; whereas others continue to point insistently. The blurred thus continues to manifest vaguely its traits. So the hint is more than what is sketched of the blurry; it is realization as *indication*. It is a “pointing manifestation”, but one which is revoked as soon as it points. Therefore we say that its traits are only indicated. There is only an indication of what the thing is in reality. Now, affirmative intention of something indicated, realized as such, is what we call *suspicion*. It is a mode of affirmative intention: one suspects something which is only indicated. It is a suspicion of what the thing is in reality.

To summarize, hint can present three qualities: clarescence, blurredness, and indication. The intellectual intention of the hint as such, the guess, thus possesses three qualities determined by the hint: the glimpse of the clarescent, the confusion of the blurry, and the suspicion of the indicated.

But this last quality, suspicion, is already the inchoate transition to a different mode of affirmation.

3. In fact the peak of the indication conduces to fixing a set of traits with respect to simple apprehensions. {191} In them a real thing is actualized in a way different from and superior to the hint, and this actualization determines an affirmative intention superior to the guess.

a) What is this actualization? Recall first that in the actualization of indetermination and hint, the multiplicity of traits is always an open multiplicity: the hollowness and revocation leave open the multiplicity of actualizable traits. But now, the traits do not remain revoked or even

just manifested; they are on the contrary *sustained*. Before, even though manifested, they did not go beyond being indices, since they were going to be revoked immediately. But now, what is manifested is not revoked. Thus the manifested traits become sustained. What are these sustained traits? They form a multiplicity of a very definite character. Above all it is a multiplicity of traits which is quite fixed: something real has this or that set of traits; for example, the traits of a shrub or a dog, but not those of a man. The thing in question is in reality only a dog or a shrub. It is in this that sustaining formally consists. When they are not revoked, the traits comprise a multiplicity which is not open but closed, a *bounded multiplicity*. To be sure, the traits are not determined, but neither are they random; the scope of their non-determination is one which is bounded. Moreover, this multiplicity not only is bounded, it is a *defined multiplicity*; the traits are of a dog, a shrub, etc. The indetermination is not just bounded but also defined. The bounding of the area of indetermination, and the definition of the traits constitutes a decisive step beyond mere indetermination.

Here we have the traits of a real thing actualized now with respect to simple apprehensions. But it remains to go {192} one step further. These traits are sustained, but by whom? By the real thing itself. It isn’t enough to say that traits comprise a bounded and definite multiplicity; rather it is necessary to say in what the sustaining itself consists. The sustaining is thus the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to the simple apprehensions of dog and shrub. Hence what must be said is in what the sustaining consists as actualization. When something actualizes its traits in a sustained manner, we do not say that the thing could be one thing or another indifferently, but that it could be one thing as well as another. Sustaining is not mere insistence, but that mode of actualization of the “either one”. Now, these traits pertain to the real thing. It is the real thing which sustains the traits of the dog or of the shrub. And then this thing is no longer either indeterminate nor a hint. It is no longer one or the other, but as much one as the other: it is *ambiguous*. The mode of actualization of what a real thing is in reality now has the mode of ambiguity. In the sustaining of multiple traits of a bounded and defined multiplicity, a thing is in reality ambiguous. What is bounded and defined of the multiplicity concerns the traits; the ambiguity concerns its sustaining, its actualization; it is an intrinsic mode of actualization. Together with the mode of actualization of indetermination and hint, we now have a third mode of actualization: ambiguity. It is a real thing itself which in reality is actualized ambiguously with respect to simple apprehensions.

b) Now, actualization of a real thing as ambiguous is molded into its own form of realization of affirmative in-

tion; this is *doubt*. Doubt is formally the affirmation of the ambiguous real *qua* ambiguous. Doubt is etymologically a mode of *duplicity*. But here we are not dealing {193} with the *duality* of intellection by stepping back, at a distance, but the dual character of the actualization of the real. It is this special mode of duality which constitutes ambiguity. Let us remark in passing that when speaking of doubt and ambiguity, it is not necessary that there be only two terms (dog, shrub); there could be a greater number. But for the sake of clarity I limit myself to those cases where there are two. And this is the essential point. Doubt is not founded in disjunction; it is not founded in the fact that a real thing is in reality either a dog or a shrub. Doubt is founded, on the contrary, upon a *conjunction*, namely that something can be as much dog as shrub, i.e., upon an ambiguity. And as a mode of affirmation, doubt is not a type of oscillation or vacillation between two affirmations. It is on the contrary a mode of affirming what a real thing is ambiguously in reality. We vacillate because there is a doubtful affirmation; but there is no doubtful affirmation because we vacillate. Doubt is a mode of affirmation, not a conflict between two affirmations. We affirm yet with doubt the ambiguity of what something real is in reality. It is not a not-knowing where to turn, but knowing that the thing is in reality ambiguous. It is of course understood that the thing is really ambiguous with respect to my simple apprehensions; nothing is ambiguous in itself.

Here we have the third mode of affirmation: doubt. It constitutes a structure erected upon the structure of ignorance and of conjecture. The emptiness of indetermination is molded into the conjecture of the hint. And this conjecture or guessing grows: the glimpse of the clarescent becomes the confusion of the blurred; and this confusion is pinned down in the suspicion of the indicated. Now, the suspicion of the indicated is pinned down in the doubt of the ambiguous. In the reduction of {194} indetermination to hint and hint to ambiguity, one is so to speak stretching the circle of what the real thing is in reality. One more step, and this circle takes on a qualitatively different mode, which in turn determines a different mode of affirmative intellection.

4. In fact, it can happen that something which is present, while still ambiguous, is found to be closer to one of the two poles of the ambiguity than the other. This approximation is not just gradual but the expression of a new mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality, a mode which in turn determines a new mode of affirmation, of realization.

a) As actualization with respect to simple apprehensions, a real thing is closer to one than the other. What is this proximity? In ambiguity one deals with a multiplicity

which is bounded and limited. But now a new characteristic appears, that of “weight”, *pondus*. Actualization has a certain weight; it is not just a metaphor introduced *ad hoc*. It is something extremely precise which is expressed in a term, *pre-ponderance*. The intrinsic character of actuality is more than simple ambiguity; it is preponderance. What is preponderant is the actualization of the traits with respect to a simple apprehension. Approximation pertains intrinsically to the actualization of a thing; and this intrinsic approximation is what constitutes preponderance. In virtue of that, the actuality of a thing includes, just as in the case of ambiguity, two terms ‘bounded’ and ‘defined’; but it sustains one more than the other. Therefore the thing is no longer “one as much as the other” but “rather more one than the other”. The “rather one than” is the preponderance. In ambiguity this character of preponderance is cloaked, so to speak. From such a point of view, {195} ambiguity would be an equi-ponderance. But the converse is not true: ambiguity is a mode of actuality which is intrinsically distinct from and independent of all ponderance. The continuity of the transition is a mode of actuality to the other; its intrinsic irreducibility cannot be reduced.

b) Now, actualization of the preponderant as such determines its own mode of realization, of affirmative intention, viz. *opinion*. Opinion is formally a mode of affirmation; it is affirming not vacuously, nor by guessing, nor in a doubting fashion, but as opinion. This does not refer to an opinion one may have about a possible affirmation; rather, it is a mode of affirmation. What the thing is in reality, preponderantly, is for example a dog; and the mode of affirmation of the preponderant as such is formally opinion. Nothing is preponderant nor therefore subject to opinion in itself; rather being preponderant, to be subject to opinion is to be so only as an actuality with respect to simple apprehensions. In and by itself, the distant dim figure has all the features of a distant dim figure, and nothing more. But with respect to my simple apprehensions, this distant dim figure has the traits of a dog rather than a shrub. Affirmation as an intentional mode of the “rather than” is an affirmation which is intrinsically subjectable to opinion. Only as the terminus of this affirmation can preponderant be called subject to opinion.

As a mode of affirmation, opinion can have different characteristics depending upon the weight of the traits actualized. Preponderance, preponderant actuality, can at time be only a light tilting or attraction. It is a kind of inchoate gravitation. The affirmative intention {196} of the actual as tilting or attraction is that intention we call *inclination*. This is an expression which is most definitely ambiguous. It can suggest, indeed, the idea of a tendency or something like it, as happens when one speaks of good or bad inclinations. But here it means only inclination as

an intrinsic mode of affirming. The same thing happens with this expression as with the word ‘intention’. From meaning the intention of an act of will it came to mean the intentionality proper to intellection. I believe that it is necessary to bring about the same thing with respect to this expression as happened centuries ago with the word ‘intention’. Inclination is a modalization of this intention; it is the mode of affirming, of realizing actuality as tilting or attracting.

Just one more step and the form in which the preponderant traits are actualized will no longer be merely tilting or attracting; rather, those traits will “carry” more on one side than the other. We may term this mode of actuality *gravity*, a gravitation not merely inchoate but in a certain way macroscopic. The affirmative intention of the preponderant with gravity is *probability*. Here I refer to probability as a mode of affirmation, not of probability as a characteristic of physical reality. What physics understands by probability is as I see it what we might call the measure of possibility. All physical states of the electron described by its wave function are possible. But all are not equally possible. The quantitative structure of this of this possibility is what as I see it constitutes real probability. But here we are not dealing with that. We are not dealing with the measure of the real but with modes of affirmation; I affirm probably that a thing is such or such in reality. The modalization of the preponderance {197} according to gravity constitutes a probable intention as a mode of intention.

Finally, it can happen that certain traits have so much “weight” that their load is clearly to one side. This is the actuality of the preponderant as *conquest*. The mode of affirmation, of realization, of conquest is *conviction*. We say that traits drag us along toward an affirmation. Being in a dragged-along intention is that mode of affirmative intention constituting conviction. The “conquering” [*vincere*] within a thing is “at the same time” the “con-vincing” of the intention.

In summary, weight, preponderance, has three qualities of actuality: tilting (or attraction), gravity, and conquest. And these qualities determine three qualities of affirmation: inclination, probability, and conviction. They are the three modes of opinion.

But however much the traits drag along and determine the conviction of intellectual knowing, they are but pointed out or indicated. One more constriction in this structure might lead us to a different mode of affirmative intention.

5. It can happen, in fact, that a thing is actualized in traits which are perfectly and univocally determinate, but which nonetheless are not necessarily what the thing is in

reality. Rather, they constitute only, so the speak, the outward appearance of what it is in reality. This determines its own mode of affirmative intention.

a) What is this mode of actuality? A dim figure in the distance has all the traits proper to a dog. Here, then, we are not involved with any ambiguity at all, nor with any preponderance. The traits are neither ambiguous nor preponderant; they are on the contrary univocally determined. We say, then, and with reason, that we see a dog. {198} But is this the same thing which occurs when I see a dog in my house? I also see the dog in my house; but there is an essential difference between these two apprehensions. In my house, I see something which in fact “is” a dog, whereas that which I see in the distance, although it has all the canine characteristics perfectly defined and delineated, nonetheless only “has” them. This “having” indicates precisely the difference in actualization of the real with respect to the traits of simple apprehension of the dog. What is this having, in what does it consist, and what is the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to it? These are the important questions.

In the first place, the “having” designates a certain difference between what a real thing is in reality and its traits. Otherwise the verb “to have” would lack meaning. This does not refer to ambiguity or preponderance, because ambiguity and preponderance concern the traits of a thing and here these traits are univocally determined. The difference marking off “having” has to do with a different dimension, the effective volume of a thing. Permit me to explain. Actualized traits are univocally determined, but only constitute what is superficial—the *superficies*—or the surface of the thing’s real volume. Now, the volume *qua* circumscribed by these “facies” or *faces* has that mode of actuality termed *aspect*. Here, ‘aspect’ does not mean something which is only more or less precise, variable, or ephemeral and circumstantial. On the contrary, aspect is here something perfectly precise; and in its precision it pertains intrinsically, really, and determinately to the thing. But it does so in a special way. Aspect is only a mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality. It does not refer, I repeat, either to ambiguity or preponderance of traits; rather, it refers to the fact that, in its own precision, this group of traits {199} comprises the aspect of what the thing is in reality. What the dim distant figure has is precisely the aspect of a dog.

In the second place, What is this ‘having’ itself? The aspect is not formally what the real thing is in reality, but an aspect “of” the thing. This “of” is a genitive of intrinsic pertaining. In virtue of it the aspect is something like an envelopment or external projection of what a thing is in reality. This envelopment is not a type of encapsulating, because then the aspect would not be intrinsic to

the real thing but would contend with it. Now, having [*tener*] is not containing [*contener*]. The dimly perceived figure in the distance has the traits of a dog; nonetheless, it is but the dog's aspect. The pertaining of the aspect to a real thing is a type of pressure, by which the aspect is more or less "attached" to what the thing is in reality. What the thing is in reality is projected, so to so speak, in its traits, which are thus its "ex-pression". The unity of the aspect with what a thing is in reality is the unity of "ex-pression". And this expression is a manifestation, therefore, of the thing. Having is, as such, manifesting. Aspect is the ambit of *manifestation* of what a thing is in reality. Here we see clearly the difference between ambiguous manifestation and preponderance. The ambiguous and the preponderant are constituted in what "is now" manifested. On the other hand, with regard to aspect, one does not deal with what is now manifest, but with manifesting itself.

In the third place, "What is the mode of actualization in aspect and manifestation of what a thing is in reality? When I apprehend a dog in my house, I apprehend the dog and in it the manifestation of its traits, its aspect; I therefore say that it is in fact a dog. But when I see at a distance a figure which has the aspect of a dog, I do {200} the inverse operation: I apprehend the aspect and intellectually know in it the actualization of what the thing is in reality; I go from the aspect to the dog. The first thing which strikes me about this actualization is the dog's aspect. And this "striking me" is what, etymologically, comprises *obviousness*. In the obvious a real thing is actualized, but merely as aspect. And upon going from aspect to thing, it is obvious that the latter has been manifested in aspect: a thing is obviously what is manifested in its aspect. Precisely on account of this it never occurred to anyone to say without further ado that what is apprehended is a dog. But it is a dog only obviously. The obvious is on one hand the aspect as being "of" a thing; on the other hand this "of" admits of degrees of pressure. And in virtue of this the aspect is, in a certain way, "attached" to the a thing but with *laxity*. Laxitude is the formal character of merely "having". Laxitude of determination is univocal, but the "of" itself is lax; strictly speaking a thing could be in reality different than its aspect. Actualization has, then, a precise mode: it is the aspect which manifests as obvious what a real thing is in reality. *Obviousness* is the new mode of actualization. Like all the rest, this mode is so only with respect to simple apprehension. Nothing is obvious in itself, but only with respect to a simple apprehension. The realization of the simple apprehension as aspect is only now obvious.

b) Now, the actualization of a thing as something obvious determines a proper mode of affirmative intention of realization; it is *plausibility*. Plausibility is formally

affirmation of the obvious. It is a mode of affirming, viz. affirming plausibly that a thing is in reality such as its aspect manifests it. Plausibility is a mode of affirming, and that which is affirmed in this mode is the obvious. But since {201} the obvious is what strikes us, it follows that plausibility is the form in which intentional expectation of intellection at a distance is molded. Simple apprehension is plausibly affirmed as realized in a thing. The plausible, just by virtue of being so, is what a thing is in reality, as long as the contrary is not evident. This "as long as" expresses at once the character of the obvious reality from the aspect and the plausible character of its affirmation.

This idea of the obvious and the plausible is, as I see it, what constitutes Parmenides' *doxa*. The mind is borne to what strikes it when it apprehends things in accordance with their *form* and their *names*. *Onoma* and *morphé* are the mode in which things strike us; *náma-rupa* say some of the *Upanishads*. Forms and names are the obvious aspect of a thing. And affirming that things are thus in reality is just the plausible, the *doxa*. It is not a question of mere phenomenological appearances, nor of sensible perceptions, much less of concrete entities as opposed to being as such. As I see it, the question is one of obviousness and plausibility. All affirming of the concrete multiplicity of things is simply affirming the obvious, affirming that things are in accordance with the aspect which strikes us. Therefore that affirmation is only plausible. For Parmenides, the philosopher goes beyond the obvious and the plausible, to the true being of things. For Parmenides and the most important philosophers of the Vedanta, our science and our philosophy could only be science and philosophy of the aspectual. This mutual implication between aspect, obviousness, and plausibility is, as I see it, the interpretation both of Eleatic philosophy as well as some Vedantic thought. {202}

What a real thing is in reality is thus univocally determined, but in a lax sense. A thing "has" this or that aspect in reality, and therefore is obviously the way it is. Affirmation of the obvious as such is plausibility. The plausible is the mode of affirming the "real-manifest-thing", but nothing more.

But we are not yet finished.

6. Let us suppose, in fact, that the thing in question I do not apprehend off in the distance but nearby, for example in my house. I apprehend that the thing is a dog. Then I do not say that the thing has the aspect of dog, but that it *is* a dog. What is this mode of actualization of the thing and what is the mode of its affirmation?

a) Above all, the difference between a dog and a canine aspect is not primary. Rather, it is always posterior to the intellectual apprehension of the dog itself, and

therefore is founded in the intellection of dog. The nature of aspect is thus founded upon the actualization of what a thing is in reality, and not the other way around, as previously occurred. In this actualization what we previously called "aspect" is not, properly speaking, an aspect but a moment incorporated into the thing. Aspect is now what gives body to the thing. A thing is not just volume but body. Incorporation is the primary character of the new mode of actualization. What we previously called "aspect" is only the form of actuality of what the real thing is in reality. And as such it should be called *corporeity*. I am not referring only to the body as an organism or anything of that nature; rather to the body as merely the moment of actuality of a real thing itself. It is the moment of actuality of a simple apprehension in the real thing itself.

In the second place, precisely on account of this, the actualization {203} means that it is the thing itself and not only its manifestation which realizes my simple apprehension. This simple apprehension is not actualized only in the aspect; it is not an aspectual actualization but an actualization of what a thing is in reality. That is, what is realized from a simple apprehension constitutes a moment of the real thing itself in its reality. That is the *constitutional* character of this new actualization. Here, constitution is not a character of the reality of a thing, but only of the intellectual actualization of what that thing is in reality. 'Constitutive' here means what pertains to what the thing is in reality; it is not a character inside of the real thing by which one distinguishes other characteristics of it, for example those which are adventitious. A trait which belongs to what a thing is in reality is a trait which constitutes this "in reality" of the thing. Here the genitive "of" does not mean "having" but "constituting". The simple apprehension of the dog is not "had" by this thing; rather, it constitutes what the thing is in reality: a dog. Laxity has given way to constitution.

Then what is the mode of actualizing of a thing's traits univocally determined as constitutive moments of its actualization? The answer is simple: the traits which form a body with what the thing is in reality, and which therefore pertain to the constitution of its actuality, are traits of what the thing in fact or effectively is in reality.* Indeed, *effectivity* is the new mode of actualization. This does not refer to these traits *manifesting* what a thing is in reality, but rather that they are traits which *in effect* are of it. Of interest is not the aspect which a thing has, but something constitutive of what it is in reality.

Corporeity, constitution, and *effectivity* are three concepts which, {204} upon reflection, if not perfectly identical in this problem, at least are three concepts for which the words expressing them are ultimately synonymous. For better understanding, I shall call this mode of being actualized 'effectivity'.

Here we must pause briefly. These ideas of constitution and corporeity may seem to be the same as those characterizing the primordial apprehension of reality. A real thing apprehended in and by itself is compact; it seems, then, that what we call the actualization of a real thing in intellectual movement is only a new designation for compaction. But this is not at all the case, because affirmative intellection is an intellection at a distance (by stepping back) of mediate character; it is not intellection of a thing in and by itself. In intellectual movement we have distanced ourselves from a thing and we return to it in order to intellectually know it in a reactualization. This reactualization, however much it may be actualization, is only "re-". What does this "re-" mean? To be sure, it is not compaction in any primary sense. What we have called 'constitution' is not compaction but something similar to this; it is rather a *re-constitution*. When we step back from a real thing, not only my intellection of reality, but also my intellection of what the real thing is in reality, is distanced. The compaction is broken into incompaction. Now, in effectivity, in the constitution of actuality, what a thing is in reality is actualized not in a compact mode, but in a reconstituted mode. Seeing this white paper is a primordial apprehension of reality. Actualizing it as a piece of paper which "is white" is a reconstitution. In virtue of being so, the constitution is subsequent to the compaction. It is, if one wishes, the mode in which the non-compact becomes in a certain way compact. This becoming is reactualization. {205}

Effectivity is constitutive of the actuality of what a thing is in reality. It is a new mode of actuality: not indetermination, not hint, not ambiguity, not preponderance, not obviousness; rather, it is effectivity univocally determined.

b) This mode of actualization determines a mode of affirmative intention, viz. *certainty*. The in fact-ness of constitution determines the certain firmness of affirmation. Certainty, radically considered, is not a mental state of mine. We are not talking about being sure but rather that the thing apprehended is thus with total firmness. The word 'certainty' [*certeza*], then, is taken in its etymological sense. That is certain which is already fixed; it is the fixedness of a thing. 'Certain' [*cierto*] is an adjective derived from the verb *cernir* which means to choose with firmness, to screen. In Spanish we have the derivative *acertar* which does not mean "to be sure" but "to hit

* [The Spanish word Zubiri uses is 'effectivamente', which is stronger than the English 'effectively', although the idea is similar. It is closer to the English 'in fact', though to avoid very awkward expressions, 'effective', 'effectively', and 'effectiveness' will be used.—trans.]

upon precisely that which one aimed at”; “to be now sure of” something is not a type of security but a goal reached. Whence the verb acquired the meaning of encountering. Certainty is thus the supreme degree of firmness of intention. By the same token, we can say that it is unqualified firmness, as opposed to other modes of affirmation such as doubt or probability. Certainty is not the maximum probability, as is often said; rather, it is another mode of affirming with a different firmness. In certainty we have firmness *par excellence*. Here I again emphasize the difference between a judgement which is certainly firm and the primordial apprehension of reality. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is, if one wishes, a primary firmness of an intellection of the real in and by itself; this is the mode of intellection of the compact. But strictly speaking primordial apprehension does not have firmness; that rather is the exclusive province of certain judgements. In certainty, one deals, so to speak, with {206} a “confirmation” of what was the firmness of the primordial apprehension.

The two characteristics of re-constitution and confirmation, taken together, i.e. taking together the “re-” and the “con-”, are the two moments of certain affirmative intellection in contrast to the compact apprehension of reality; they are the two moments of certain firmness, of certainty. For this reason we can say that certain judgement recovers a real thing, but at a different level. And this different level is the “in reality”.

With this we have structurally analyzed the most important zones of the spectrum of affirmation modes. For this purpose I have had recourse to examples which make the point clearly, e.g. the dim figure at a distance. But in order to preclude incorrect interpretations it is important to point out that these modes are applied not only to what

it is to be a dog, a shrub, etc., but also to the most modest and elemental trait of the real. Thus, if we seek to intellectually know the color which a thing possesses in reality, it can happen that a thing has, in the intellectual movement of my apprehension, an indeterminate color. For example, I have a hint that the color is blue, green, or a lilac hue; it can be that it is moreblue than green, that it has a blue aspect, or that it is in fact blue.

All of these modes constitute the spectral gamut of affirmation modes. The actualization can be indeterminate, a hint (clarescent, blurry, indicating), ambiguous, preponderant (tilting or attracting, gravity, conquering), obvious, effectively. Correlatively, the modes of affirmation, of realization, are determined: ignorance, conjecture (guess, confusion, suspicion), doubt, opinion (inclination, probability, conviction), plausibility, certainty.

All these modes are so many modes of resolution of the intentional expectation in affirmation. They are {207} modes of firmness. And these modes depend upon the diverse modes in which the real is actualized differentially in intellectual movement.

But this poses a decisive question for us, because all these modes of affirmation—as we have just seen at great length—are modes in which the real determines affirmation in its dimension of firmness. But now we have to ask ourselves not what they are nor in what the modes of determination consist, but rather what is the determining itself. The study of what affirmation is, of what its forms are (force of realization), and what its modes are (modalities of firmness), has been the study of the structure of affirmation. Now we have to delve into this other important question: the real determinant of affirmation, the medial structure of the sentient logos. {208}

SECTION 3

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS

II. MEDIATED STRUCTURE

We saw in Section I of this Second Part what the intellection of a real thing is with respect to other things, i.e., what the intellection of a real thing in the field of reality is. This intellection is what we call 'logos'. This logos as intellection has three basic, fundamental characteristics. In the first place, the logos intellectually knows what a real thing is in reality; but does so based upon another thing simply apprehended through stepping back, i.e., at a *distance*. To be in reality is to be a *this*, a *how*, and a *what*. This intellectual knowing based upon another thing is the moment of duality. In the second place, in this duality one intellectually knows what the real is in reality *going* from a real thing to the other things of the field. This is the dynamic moment of intellection. This movement has, as we saw, two phases. In the first we are impelled from the thing which we seek to know intellectually toward that based on which we are going to intellectually know the former. This phase is a movement of retraction. In it one intellectually knows in simple apprehension what a thing "might be" in reality. But as we are restrained by the real thing, the movement of being impelled or retraction is going to be followed by a second phase, one which in a certain fashion is contrary to the first. This is the movement of return or *intentum* from reality itself in a field toward the thing. In this return one intellectually knows not what a thing "might be" but what

it "is" in reality; it is affirmation. {210} The study of intellectual movement in its two phases has been carried out in Section 2.

Now, the step from the "might be" to the "is" is determined in the field of reality itself. The field, we said, is not something which is seen but something that *makes* us see; it is the *medium* of intellection. Here the duality does not constitute a structural moment of the dynamism, but a moment of the "mediality". The *medium* is what makes us discern, from among the many "might be's" of the thing, that particular "might be" which is more than "might be": it is the "is". And this poses a new problem for us. In Section 2 we studied the formal dynamic structure of the logos, but now we must study the determination by which the medium of intellection, reality, makes us "discern" what a real thing is among the various "might be's". That is, what is it that determines the realization of a determinate simple apprehension of the real thing. This is the theme of Section 3, the formal medial structure of the logos. We shall center this study on two questions:

1. What is that determination in itself.
2. What is the character of the logos *qua* determinate; truth and logos

The study will be carried out in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER VI

DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF

First of all we may ask, What is the determination of the logos in itself? The medium of reality is what permits us to see this determination. And since the medium of reality proceeds, ultimately, from things themselves, it follows that the determination proceeds likewise from this or that real thing. Thus we may pose four problems:

1. What is this determination of the logos? The evidence.
2. What are the intrinsic characteristics of evidence?
3. Based on this we shall discuss some ideas about evidence accepted without discussion in philosophy, but which I believe are false.
4. We shall make our thought more precise with respect to two classical conceptions which, under another name, can correspond to our problem: intuitionism and rationalism.

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§ 1

WHAT DETERMINATION AS SUCH IS: EVIDENCE

In the phase of being impelled, we step back within the field from the thing which we seek to know intellectually. But the retaining of its reality makes us return to that real thing; the stepping back is thus an operation of approximation. We have not stepped back from the real except to see it better.

How is it possible that a real thing gets closer to us when we step back from it? This does not refer to intellection of a real thing in and by itself; rather it refers to the intellection of what this real thing is in reality. Now, intellection is mere actualization of the real as real.

Therefore it is this intellectual actuality of the real thing which, by being actuality in difference, brings us closer while we step back.

How does this take place? We have already seen that every real thing has two intrinsic and formally constitutive moments of its intellectual actuality: the individual moment and the field moment. They are two moments of each real thing in and by itself. But in a thing put at a distance, its intellection is an apprehension which is certainly "one", but also "dual". This duality concerns not only the movement in which the intellection of the logos consists, but also and above all the real thing itself *qua* actualized; the thing itself is intellectually known as a temporary duality. In virtue of this, the actualization of a real thing has, as a formal moment belonging to it, what we might term an internal "gap". The unfolding that occurs {213} in the real actualized thing between its individual and its field moment constitutes, in this actualization, an hiatus or a gap between what it is "as reality" and what it is "in reality". This does not refer, let me repeat, to a gap in the content of the thing apprehended, but to a gap in its intellectual actuality. When it becomes present "among" other things, every real thing has a gap in the constitutive actualization. It is on account of this gap that a thing impels us to step back from it, in a retractive movement, whose terminus is simple apprehension. But this gap is a gap which is filled by the affirmative moment, by affirmative intention. Affirmation fills in the distance between a real thing as real and what it is in reality. Both moments, retraction and affirmation are, as we have said, only different phases of a single unique movement: the movement by which a thing not only impels us to the field, but keeps us in its reality as well. Therefore this retaining is in the very root of the actuality of the thing which is intellectually known, in the root therefore of its own gap. This means that the gap itself has a structure of its own by virtue of being a "retaining gap". Whence it follows that the gap is not here (as it was

nonetheless in the case of ignorance) a mere emptiness or hiatus, but rather is something having a positive structure. The real thing itself, in fact, is what opens its own gap in its intellectual actuality. In its power to open a gap, the real thing confers the structure of the gap by retaining us intellectually in it. In other words, the gap is opened on the real thing itself and by the real thing itself, whose unity of reality underlies the gap and confers upon it its structure. Therefore the gap is created and structured by the primary and original unity of reality. “Filling” the gap {214} consists in overcoming the duality; therefore in making what the thing “could be” to be determined as the thing which it “is”. This determination makes the thing real. In being retained the thing itself *qua* foundation is what determines the form in which the gap has to be filled. In its power of overcoming the gap, the function of the real thing as determinant consists in being the function in accordance with which that thing determines the positive structure of the gap. What is this structure?

1. Above all, this gap is structured by the real thing *qua* actualized. Now, actuality is a physical moment of a real thing. To be sure, it is the intelligence which, in its intellection, confers intellectual actuality upon a thing. But what the intelligence *qua* intelligence confers upon it is only the intellectual character of its actuality; it does not confer the actuality *qua* actuality. And what is important to us here is the thing *qua* actual, which moves the intelligence. How does it move the intelligence? Not, to be sure, by any of its own actions, because a real thing does not “act” upon the intelligence but is only “actual” in it. But our languages do not have all of the words we would like to mean just ‘actuality’; rather, our words almost always refer to some action. Therefore we have no choice but to go back to the word ‘action’, knowing that with it we are referring not to action properly speaking but only actuality. Granting this, what is the nature of the “action” such that its actuality moves the intelligence? This action is not a governing or directing one, so to speak. It does not consist in the real thing guiding us in the intellectual movement. This guiding action, i.e. the movement going to one’s head from something is what in Latin was termed *ducere*, to lead or conduct. If one wishes to continue using the compound “to conduct”, it will be necessary to say that the action of a thing in the {215} intelligence does not consist in bearing us or conducting us or guiding us in intellectual movement. That is the false idea that intellection, by being our action, consists in things being ultimately what guides or conducts us to such-and-such intellection. This cannot be because that type of action is definitely something *ab extrinseco*. But actuality is not what moves us by itself; it is the very reality of a thing

insofar as the thing is present in the intelligence by virtue of the fact of being real. Because of this, the action with which a real thing moves is, to intellection, an action which stems from the reality of the thing; it is the real thing itself which, in its actualization, moves us *ab intrinseco*, from its interior so to speak. And it is just this intrinsic motion that in Latin has been called *agere* as opposed to *ducere*. The actuality of a real thing does not guide us but rather has us *ab intrinseco* in movement from itself; it “makes us see”. If one desires to use the frequentative of *agere*, i.e. *agitare*, one might say that a real thing, by its naked actuality in a differential actualization, agitates us, has us agitated. For what reason? In order to intellectually know what the thing is in reality. Indeed, a compound of *agere* expresses the actuality as an intrinsic motion of the real thing, viz. the verb *cogito* (from *co-agito*), to agitate intellections. The action of the intelligence and the *agere* of a thing are identical; this is what the *cum* expresses. We should not be surprised, because in intellection the actuality of a thing and the intellectual actuality of intellection are identically the same, as we saw; they are a “co-actuality”. This *agere* proper to a real thing actualized in differential actualization has the double moment of being impelled and being retained. I said before that they are not two movements but two phases of a single movement. Now, this “one” movement is the *agere*. {216}

Thus we have the first structural moment of the gap: it is being retained in *agere*.

2. But this *agere* has a characteristic moment here. That has already been indicated, in a certain way, in what we have just said; but it must be pointed out expressly. The *agere* is, as I said, a motion *ab intrinseco*. But of this motion, the *agere* does not express anything more than its being a movement proper to the actuality of a thing. It is now necessary to express more thematically the intrinsic character of this movement of the *agere*. It is, in fact, what one expresses in the strict sense with the preposition *ex*. This preposition has two meanings: it can mean “to expel” (in Greek *ex-ago*); but it can also mean *to make to leave* “from the inside”. This second meaning is more important to us here. The two meanings are not necessarily independent. In the first, a real thing pushes “toward the outside” of itself, i.e., to what we have called the field moment; this is to be impelled. Strictly speaking, if it were not an abuse of etymological formations, one could say that being impelled is being “ex-pelled”. The “ex” is in this aspect not an “outside” but an exteriorization. But the fundamental meaning is the second: a real thing makes us go out from inside of itself by an action in which the given thing does not remain left behind, because that

movement belongs to the very actuality of the thing. Therefore being expelled formally bears in its breast what I have called being retained: a real thing makes us move ourselves to the outside of it from the inside and by the inside itself; it is a movement grounded upon interiorization. The unity of both moments (being impelled and being retained) in the *agere* is the unity of the *ex*. The *ex* as moment of the *agere* thus has a very precise meaning: it is *ex-agere*, *exigir* [in Spanish], “to demand”. The structure of the gap makes a demand. The gap is not something {217} vacuous; it is the ambit of what makes a demand, a gap stuffed with the demand of realization. It is the reality of a thing *qua* actualized which demands the intellection of what it is “in reality”. The gap is an actuality that makes a demand. The function of a real thing in the differential intellection then consists in making a demand: it demands that determinate form of realization which we call “being in reality”. The “in” of the “in reality” only is intellectually known in the “actuality” in *ex*. The demand of actuality in differential actualization, i.e. in stepping back, is the demand for “realization” as such.

It is easy to understand now that this moment of making a demand is one of the forms which, in Part One of this study, I termed *force of imposition* of the impression of reality. In the differential actualization of the real, sensed intellectually as real, the field of reality is imposed as making a demand. In the differential actualization the two moments of individual formality and field formality are different, but both are “reality” sensed impressively. Now the moment of field reality has, by virtue of being a sensed reality, a force of imposition of its own, viz. It makes a demand. To make a demand is a modulation of the force of imposition of the impression of reality.

3. But this is not enough, because in virtue of that demand a real thing impels us to an intellection in stepping back from itself: one intellectually knows in simple apprehension what a thing “might be” in reality. But the demanding itself is compelling us to return to the field of reality to intellectually know what a real thing is “in reality”. This intellection is the affirmative intention. These two moments (simple apprehension and affirmation) are but two moments of a unique intellection: where it distends and steps back from what a {218} real thing is in reality “among” others. The unity of both moments is what constitutes the intellection in *ex*. What is the structure of this unity?

The idea of this demanding has led us above all to an innumerable group of simple apprehensions. And this same demanding is what makes us return to a thing, but from what we have intellectually known in being im-

pelled, i.e., from what we have apprehended in simple apprehension as what the thing “could be”. The return to the thing not only does not leave behind the being impelled which thrust us towards the simple apprehensions; rather, it is a return to the thing from these same simple apprehensions. Therefore the intellection in this return is essentially dual. The intellection of the thing in this differential actualization is not an immediate apprehension of what the thing is in reality, but the mediated apprehension of which one or many of the simple apprehensions are those realized “in reality”. Without this duality of primordial apprehension of reality and of simple apprehension, there would not be affirmative intellection of what a thing is in reality. The unity of this duality is “realization”. It is of intellectual character, and it is an intellection that makes a demand. This unity, *qua* dual, has two aspects. On one hand it is a “contribution” so to speak, of many simple apprehensions; but on the other hand it is a “selection” that makes a demand of the simple apprehensions, whether they are excluded or included in the intellection. The realization of these latter is determined by the real thing in what it demands; it is an intellectual determination that makes a demand, which happens in selection.

In what does it consist? Here we see ourselves forced, once again, to bend the lexicon of our languages. Almost all expressions referring to intellection—if not indeed all—are taken {219} from the verb “to see” [Latin, *videre*]; they express intellection as a “vision”. This is a great oversimplification; intellection is intellection in all of the sentient modes of presentation of the real, and not just the visual one. Therefore throughout this entire book I express intellection not as vision but as apprehension. But there are moments of intellection which our languages do not permit to be expressed except with “visual” verbs. There is no problem in utilizing them provided that we firmly maintain the idea that here “vision” means all intellectual apprehension, i.e., intellection in the fullest sense. Granting this, we shall say that the nature of making a demand which determines which simple apprehensions are excluded, and which are realized, is the nature of making a demand of a vision; we see, in fact, which are realized and which not. But the essential point is that we tell what vision we are dealing with. It is not a primordial intellectual vision, i.e. it is not a seeing [*videncia*], because we are dealing with a very precise vision, namely mediated vision. We see, mediately, that a real thing realizes *B* and not *C*. But neither is this the strict nature of the vision proper to affirmative intellection, because there we deal with a *determinant* vision. The determinate vision of the affirmation of realization is not

only a mediated vision “of” a thing, but is a mediated vision “from” the real thing itself, i.e., it is a *vision demanded* by it. It is a vision in the *ex*. It is just what we call *e-vidence*. The quality of a vision determined by a demand [“ex-igence”] is “e-vidence”. The vision of the evident has, as its principle, a demand [*exigencia*]. This demand is the intrinsic and formal *arkhe* of “e-vident” vision. Evidence is vision based on demand, or what is the same, a visual demand, and visual demand of a dual character, i.e. of the realization of simple apprehensions. The real thing *A* is not just evident, it is {220} more than evident. We shall explain forthwith. What is evident is that it is *B* and not *C*. And this vision is demanded by the vision of *A* in the medium of reality. Therefore the determinant function of a real thing in affirmative intellection is the demand of vision, evidence. The realization intellectually known in evidence based on demand is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality. A thing has opened the gap as ambit of the idea making a demand, and has filled this gap with the vision demanded by the medium of reality itself, with evidence. The function of reality itself in differential intellection is thus intrinsically demand, evidential. And here we have what we sought: the determination of the affirmation is in itself evidence of realization. Reality itself is what makes us see; it is the medium. And this medium which makes us see has an evidential structure: it makes us see what a thing is in reality. Whence it follows that evidence is proper only to a subsequent act of sentient intellection. Only because there is sentient intellection is there dynamic duality; and only because there is dynamic duality is there evidence. An intelligence which was not sentient would not intellectually know with evidence. Evidence is the character of “some” acts of a sentient intelligence.

And it is here that the insufficiency of purely visual language is palpable. First, because as we have just seen, all modes of intellection—not just the visual—have their own demands; all modes of sentient intellection have their own proper evidences in differential actualization. Second, because the conceptualization of intellection as vision carries with it the idea that intellection has a noetic structure. Now, vision, just like every other intellection, is not formally noetic, but rather formally apprehensive: noesis is only a {221} dimension of apprehension. Apprehension as such is formally noergic; it involves the imposition force of the impression of reality. And therefore evidence, which is a vision determined by the “physical” demand of differential actualization of a real thing, is not of noetic but of noergic character. It is a mode of capturing what things are in reality. And it does so in virtue of the radical demand of its actuality. To see that

seven plus five is twelve is not evidence but “vidence”, seeing, i.e., mere “making plain” or “making evident”. Only seeing that in seven plus five one has not the number 14 but 12, because the actualization of 12 is demanded by the actualization of the sum of 7 plus 5, only this vision as demanded, I repeat, makes the affirmation evident. In passing, it is from this point that, as I see it, one must begin to discuss the Kant’s celebrated thesis that the judgement “7 plus 5 is 12” is synthetic.

Evidence is then a demanding vision of the realization of simple apprehensions in a thing already apprehended primordially as real. In its mediating structure, the logos is evidential.

This idea of evidence requires some further elaboration:

a) Above all, evidence in this strict sense is exclusively a moment of judgement, of affirmation; only in judgement is there evidence. Evidence is the principal determinant of mediated intellection, of the logos. This presupposes that it is an intellection which *lacks* that determinant. This determination is about the simple apprehension made real in a thing already apprehended as real. And that intellection is formally judgement and only judgement. What is evident is that the thing is this or that, i.e., the evidence is evidence of realization. But it is evident, I repeat, by {222} being demanded by the real thing. If there were not this duality between simple apprehension and real thing, there would not be evidence.

A real thing in primordial apprehension is never evident; it is more than evident. In primordial apprehension the purely and simply real is or is not actualized in intellection, and nothing more. Primordial apprehension is not and does not need to be determined by anything. Primordial apprehension is the very actualization of the real. It is not determination but actualization. And actualization is always more than determination, because determination is grounded upon actualization and receives from it all of its force. It is for this reason that the logos is, as I said, a mode of actualization, the “determinate” mode. In virtue of that, to make primordial apprehension something evident is to make actualization a mode of determination, which is impossible. Primordial apprehension is thus more than evident; it is the pure and simple actualization of the real in and by itself. In primordial apprehension the vision of a thing does not “leave from” (*ex*) the thing, but rather “is” the thing itself “in” its actuality. Only the realization in it of a simple apprehension is evident, *qua* realization demanded by that real thing already actualized. Evidence, I repeat, is determination needed or demanded by a real thing. On the other hand,

in primordial apprehension a real thing is not determinant but rather purely and simply actualized. Evidence is subsequent to primordial apprehension. Evidence is *determination*; primordial apprehension is *actualization*. In evidence a real thing already apprehended determines the intellection; in primordial apprehension we have in actuality a real thing itself in its own reality. To say that primordial apprehension is evident is the same as saying that primordial apprehension is judgement. This, as I see it, {223} is absurd. So in summary, evidence is a structural moment, but only of judgement.

b) In the second place, evidence is a moment of every judgement, because every judgement has as one of its moments an evidential determinant. This could seem false, since there are, as one might observe, innumerable non-evident affirmations. For example, consider all the affirmations having to do with a faith, be it religious or secular. Now, this is true, but does not contradict what we have been saying, because—let us not forget it—the vision which evidence claims is justly claimed, i.e., it is demanded. In virtue of that, evidence is not so much a vision as a demand for vision. Strictly speaking, judgement does not have evidence but judges in evidence; evidence is *vidential demand*. This means that evidence is a “line of demand”, a line of determination within which the two opposites—what one sees and what one doesn’t see—both fit, together with all the intermediaries (which are only half seen). That is, judgement is an intellection which, by virtue of its own nature, is contained in a line of evidence. A non-evident judgement is a judgement “deprived” of evidence and not simply a judgement “lacking” evidence. Every judgement is necessarily evident or non-evident; in virtue of this, it is formally in the line of evidence. But in addition there are other considerations which I shall immediately explain and which help fix the nature of this presumed non-evidence.

c) But first, there is another essential aspect of evidence. Evidence is a necessary line of demand, but one which is traced within the domain of freedom. It cannot be otherwise, because intellection in movement is constitutively free. What is this freedom in evidence? It does not mean that evidence is in itself formally free. That would be absurd. {224} What I mean to say is something quite essential and which is often forgotten, namely that evidence is a line traced in the space of freedom. In fact, intellectual movement goes toward something, but starting from something else. Now, this other thing is freely chosen, because in order to intellectually know what a man is in reality I can start from a living thing, from a grouping, from a form, etc. Moreover it is a free creation in the field of simple apprehensions, which are made real in a thing

and are going to be affirmed with evidence. Finally, that trajectory is free which, in different orientations, is going to lead to intellection. Hence evidence is traced essentially in a domain of intellectual freedom. Evidence is only possible in freedom; it is something proper to our sentient intellection. Evidence is the demand of the impression of reality stepped back from, i.e., at a distance; it is the imposition force of the impression of reality, as we have said. In virtue of this force, the evidence acquired starting from other things, according to other percepts, fictional items, or concepts, and following other routes, is an evidence qualified by a border of freedom. One might then think that evidence does not pertain to judgement even along the line of demand. If I say, “God has a disease”, this is an absolutely free affirmation, indeed, it is an arbitrary affirmation; but it does not thereby cease to be an affirmation. An arbitrary affirmation would never be along lines of demand; it is precisely for this reason that it is arbitrary. Nonetheless, let us think for a minute why this is so. In an arbitrary affirmation, if that which is affirmed (let us call it the ‘subject’) is a reality (whether by itself or by postulation), then the judgement is not arbitrary in the order of evidence, but is simply a false judgement—something quite different. We shall concern ourselves with truth later. The false judgement {225} is also along the lines of a determination which is demanded: precisely for this reason I can describe what is false. But if the subject is not real, nor is posed as real, then neither is there arbitrariness in the order of evidence, but rather in the order of the affirmation itself. Its arbitrariness consists in being just a combination of ideas (God, disease, having). But a combination of ideas is not a judgement. To judge is to affirm the realization of a simple apprehension in a real thing; it is not to forge the idea of an affirmation freely. The idea of an affirmation is not an affirmation; it is at best an “affirmation schema”. And this affirmation schema also has an *evidence schema*. Therefore, no judgement is outside the lines of evidence.

d) This evidential line is necessary, but it can be and is of very different types, in accordance with the nature of the real thing about which one judges. Each type of reality has its own modes of demand. It would be not only unjust but in fact false to measure all demands with a single canon of demand, for example the canon of conceptual analysis. Personal reality, moral reality, esthetic reality, historical reality, etc., not only have distinct demands, but also and more importantly, demands of a different nature. And precisely for this reason the evidence of one order cannot be confused with that of another; nor can one call ‘non-evident’ everything which does not figure in the evidence of an order canonically established. In the concrete

case of faith, to which I earlier alluded, faith cannot be confounded with judgement. Faith is not a judgement; it is firm confidence or firm personal adherence. When I pronounce this adherence in a judgement, I do it determined by the demands which the reality of the person in question {226} imposes upon my affirmation. They do not cease being demands because they are personal.

e) Finally judgement affirms the realization of the simple apprehensions in a real thing (i.e., that they are made real in a real thing), and this realization admits different *modes*. That is, not only are there different *types* or forms of evidence, but also different *modes* of evidence.

In summary, we have asked ourselves what the determination of an affirmation is in itself, and the answer is that demand which I call 'evidence'. It is a quality which is only given in a judgement in the form such that every judgement is necessarily in the line of evidentiality. This line is crossed in a free intellective field, and possesses different types and different modes.

With this we have outlined in a way what evidence is. Granting this, we now have to ask ourselves what are the essential characteristics of the determination of intellection, i.e., what are the essential characteristics of evidence.

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§ 2

INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EVIDENCE

This evidential moment of affirmation has some aspects which ultimately are linked by mutual implication, but which it is convenient to stress as distinct in order more rigorously to outline what evidence is, as I see it.

1. Evidence is never something immediately given. To be sure, there is no doubt that the majority of our evident affirmations are grounded upon others, for example by reasoning. And in this sense, these examples of evidence are never immediate but mediated. But one always thinks that in one form or another, all mediated evidence refers back to certain fundamental evidence, which is in this sense primary. And we are told that this latter is immediate evidence. But I do not think this is the case, because strictly speaking there is no immediate evidence. What happens is that upon separating evidence into immediate and mediated, one gives to the mediated evidence the sense of the presence of an "intermediary" between a real thing and what, by means of evidence, one affirms

about it. And in this sense, not all evidence is mediated. But the fact is that two distinct concepts are confused here: the concept of the intermediary term and the concept of medium. Now, not all evidence has an "intermediary" term, but all evidence is based constitutively in a "medium", i.e., in the medium of reality itself. Whence it follows that if indeed not all evidence is {228} *mediated* in the sense of bringing into play an intermediary term, nonetheless all evidence *is mediated*. The confusion of these two senses of mediation is what has led to the theory of immediate evidence. In virtue of it, evidence is always and only something mediated, and therefore something "achieved", never something given. Only real things are given, and they are given in primordial apprehension. Evidence is never given, but only "achieved" in mediated fashion based upon things apprehended primordially. Intellection achieved via mediation is, in a certain way, an "effort", an effort of mediated intellection. Evidence is a demand of the real, a visual mediated demand of a real thing actualized by stepping back, i.e., at a distance. And therefore evidence is never a given, but something achieved. This characteristic of not being given but achieved and mediated is essential to evidence.

2. This evidence is not something quiescent, i.e., is not something which one has or does not have; rather, by virtue of being achieved, it is formally something dynamic. This does not refer to the fact that I make an effort to gain evidence, but rather to the fact that the effort is an intrinsic and formal dynamism of the evidence itself; evidence is a mediated vision in dynamism. Of what dynamism do we speak? Not of a dynamism which consists in a type of movement from the "predicate" to the "subject" and back again, because even leaving aside the fact that not every judgement is of subject-predicate form (for the present purpose, as every judgement involves a duality, there is no reason not to simplify the discussion by speaking of subject and predicate), that presumed movement is expressed in the verb "is", and therefore would be always—and only—a movement in the plane of being; it would be a dialectic of being. But evidence is dynamic in a much deeper and more radical sense, namely the very demand of the real which determines the dynamism of being. {229} We shall see this upon treating Reality and Being. That demand is formally a dynamism consisting in demand. The dialectic of being moves in the plane in which things and simple apprehensions "are". But the dynamism of demand moves in a third dimension orthogonal to the previous plane; it is the dynamism of reality which "demands", and not the dynamism of the reality which "is". Therefore every dialectic, every dynamism of being takes place on the surface of the real. Evidence, on

the other hand, takes place in the volume and body of the real. The danger is always in taking the surface of the real for the real itself. There is never evidence of being—we shall see this in a few pages—rather, there is always and only demanding evidence of the real. All logical and ontological dynamism is possible only as something grounded in the demanding dynamism of evidence. This dynamism is a “selective” dynamism, because among the many simple apprehensions, the demand discerns through its own dynamism that or those which are realized in a real thing. To be sure, this does not mean that the simple apprehensions which we have are in any sense the most adequate. This demanding dynamism is but the dynamism that makes a simple apprehension real in the actuality of a real thing. It is a dynamism of the real in actuality. Intellection in differential actualization is, then, in itself formally dynamic; it is the dynamism of intellectual realization. Therefore this dynamism of actuality is no-ergic, because it concerns the actuality of a thing, actuality which is a physical moment of it. And this dynamism, as I said and as we shall see again in another paragraph, is prior to the dynamism of being and is the foundation of it.

3. The classical conceptualization of evidence is based upon what is seen in evidence. But evidence is not {230} *vidence* (seeing), nor *in-vidence*, but *e-vidence*. Therefore the quality of what is seen, of what is intellectually known, is rather what I would call *constituted evidence*. It is grounded in the dynamic and demanding moment of radical evidence, which, therefore, is a characteristic that is not constituted but *constituting*. And it is so precisely because it is a sentient dynamism.

Constituted evidence is always—and only—a result. Therefore it comes too late. What is first is the constituting and demanding dynamism: evidence is formally *evindentiation* or *making evident*. This constituting character is never arbitrary; it is intrinsically *necessitating*, because the constitution does not concern the order of reality in and by itself, i.e. the order of “actuity”, but the order of intellectual “actuality”. Let us not confuse necessary being and necessitating being. *Necessary* is a mode of actuity which is opposed to the contingent. It is necessary that fire burns; it is not necessary that this book be on this table. The difference has to do with the reality of the fire and the book. But necessitating is a mode of actuality. Evidence has a necessitating character; it is the necessity that given a real thing in determinate dual actuality, it is necessary to affirm it as such with evidence. *Qua* evidence, there is no difference whatsoever between assertoric and apodictic evidence. The difference is not found in the evidence but in the reality of a thing.

Evidence is always necessitating. However much it may be a matter of fact that this book is found upon this table, it is absolutely necessary to intellectually know that it is on this table, just as necessary as intellectually knowing that two plus two are four. The demand with which the intellection of two plus two constitutes the intellection of the realization of four is not a demand which is formally different from the demand with which this book which is on the table demands that it be so affirmed. {231} This is the necessitating. All evidential demand is constituting; and while the constitution itself is not always *necessary*, it is always *necessitating*. This does not refer to the necessity with which a predicate is linked to a subject, or the necessity with which a subject is tied to a predicate; rather, it concerns the necessity with which a real concrete thing (necessary or contingent) actualized mediately in my intellection, determines my affirmations about it.

4. Thus we have the formal character of evident intellection. As a result of a “demand”, intellection in differential actualization has, as its own characteristic, to be “exact”; this is *exactitude* or correctness. Exactitude is the quality of being demanded. It is what does not have the primordial apprehension of reality. If I may be permitted a Latin mode of expression, I should say that the primordial apprehension of reality is not “ex-acta”; only differential intellection is “ex-acta”. In the incompact emptiness of its exigencies, a real thing determines the exactitude [correctness] of its intellection. This intellection is therefore strictly speaking an “exaction”. As it is a dynamic demand, exaction involves a moment of rigor. Whence the demand itself is similar in this respect to one of the meanings which *exigere* has in Latin, viz. to weigh with exactitude. Now, this is what is proper to evidence: the exactitude of the weight of intellection. Therefore evidence is contained within the strict bounds of what is demanded. And this being contained within the boundaries of demand is exactitude. To this being contained we give the name “strict”, and it is what I shall call *constriction*. All evidence is exact [correct], i.e., is determined by a constrictive demand.

Exactitude [correctness] thus understood is not modelled upon any special type of intellection which might serve as a canon for the rest. For example, what is exact or correct in mathematics {232} does not acquire its power from the fact that it is mathematical, but from the fact that the evidence is always exact or correct, i.e., from being a knowledge in which what is known is strictly determined by what is demanded or “exacted”. This exactitude or correctness does not mean “logical rigor”, even in mathematics; rather it means “a construction which

demands". The logical is simply a procedure for constraining the demand, and not the other way around—as if to be exact or correct were to be logical. Therefore all knowledge, whether mathematical or not, has its own exactitude or correctness. History itself has its type of exactitude. Moreover, it is not just science which is correct, but all differential intellection, however elemental it may be. And it is precisely on account of this that science can be and is correct: it is so by being differential intellection. Naturally, correctness, just like evidence itself, is only a line, the line of correctness. The intellection of the reality "between" is formally and constitutively in the line of correctness.

Let us summarize. Evidence is an intellection which demands. And as such it is not given to us, but is achieved mediately in a dynamism which is necessitating, evidencing, and constituting that sentient intellection, which has as its own formal character as correctness and demanding constriction. Evidence, then, is something achieved, something dynamic, constituting, and accurate.

Whence those conceptions of evidence which are accepted uncritically in modern philosophy are radically false. Let us examine them.

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§ 3

FALSE IDEAS ABOUT EVIDENCE

These ideas have been propounded since the time of Descartes and reach their highest degree of development in Husserl.

1) For Descartes, evidence is clarity: *clara ac distincta perceptio*. But this, as I see it, is radically inadequate for two reasons.

a) It is undeniable that in evidence there is clear and distinct vision. But this does not exhaust the question, because the fact that in evidence there is clear and distinct vision is not the same thing as evidence consisting in clear and distinction vision. Indeed, that which is clear to me in evidence is that I see with clarity the fact that the thing has to be seen thus as necessitated. My clarity is intrinsically determined by the demand of what I am seeing. It is a clarity which does not rest upon itself, but upon a real demand; otherwise it would be vision or non-vision but not evidence. In intellectual movement only that vision is clear in which clarity is constituted by the constrictive demand of the thing. Evidence is not *clara ac distincta*

perceptio, but rather, if I may be permitted the expression, *exigentia clarificans*; it is reality already apprehended as real, which is unfolded by demand in clarity.

b) But in addition, by being a demand, evidence is not just a moment of vision but something noergic, just as *perceptio* itself is apprehension and not simply consciousness. This does not refer to consciousness of mere "being thus", {234} but to an apprehension of the "to be here-and-now being" [*estar siendo*]. As we know, since classical times, to be here-and-now or actually, *stare*, has expressed the copula, but in a strong sense, a sense which grew in the Romance languages, especially in Spanish. And its "strong" sense consists, as I see it, in thematically connoting the physical character of that in which it is and of which it is. It is true that *ser* as opposed to *estar* tends to connote the profound and permanent dimension of something, in contrast to more or less transient determinations, as when we say that so-and-so "is" [*es*] a sick person versus saying the so-and-so "is currently" [*está*] sick. However, this does not contradict what I just said, because *estar* as a designation of a more or less transitory "state" [*estado*] connotes this state precisely because every state, in its very transitoriness, makes its character of physical actuality more prominent. And the result of this is that the distinction between *ser* and *estar* is not primarily that between the permanent and the transitory, but the difference between *ser* without allusion to physical characteristics, and *estar* as physical reality. We shall see this later at the appropriate time. For now, with respect to "to be here-and-now being" [*estar siendo*], the force of evidence is found in the noergic demand of this being.

Descartes himself offers us a good proof of this when he talks about what, for him, is the evidence of all evidence, to wit, the evidence of the *cogito*, of thinking or cogitation. It is for him an incontrovertible and indubitable evidence. But in this evidence of the *cogito*, such as Descartes describes it to us, there is not just clarity but a demand which is anterior to all clarity, the *demand of being here-and-now* [*estar*]. What is clear is that what I am doing is "thinking", and furthermore that "I am here-and-now [*estar*]" thinking. Descartes' expression therefore should not be translated "I think, therefore I am", but rather {235} "I am here-and-now [*estar*] thinking, therefore I am". This expression is an incontrovertible judgment, but is so by the noergic force of the *estar*. This and not its conscious clarity is what makes the *cogito* a *perceptio evidens*, and what confers upon it its exceptional rank. The force of the *cogito* does not come to it from "thinking" but from the "I am here-and-now [*estar*]". But Descartes, immediately thereafter, goes astray on the matter of this demand moment and once again tells us

that the evidence of the *cogito* is clarity—as if what the *cogito* gave us were supreme clarity. That is false. The supreme evidence from the *cogito* is based upon an immediate apprehension of thinking as a being here-and-now, i.e., that supreme evidence is grounded in reality. In the evidence of all evidence there is, then, the nature of the demand of the real as the foundation of clarity. Evidence is here eminently noergic; only because “I am here-and-now” [*estoy*] apprehending myself as thinking in a primordial apprehension of reality, only for this reason do I see myself constrained by this apprehension to pronounce the most evident of the judgements of Descartes, the *cogito*.

By straying on the problem with respect to clarity, i.e., by asking if clarity leads to reality, Descartes has side-stepped the noergic moment and with it has opened an unfathomable abyss between evidence and reality for all evidence other than that of the *cogito*. Indeed, the abyss is so unfathomable that in order to bridge it Descartes must appeal to nothing less than Divine veracity. But in fact there is no such abyss, because evidence is always noergic, and therefore formally involves the moment of reality. To be sure, there are errors and illusions, and what is worse, evidence which is taken as evidence of something which is not true. But this is owing to the fact that clarity does not lead to reality in any case, not even in that of the *cogito* itself; rather, it is reality which {236} in a demanding way determines clarity. Therefore the presumed abyss is not opened between reality itself and the evidence, but between reality apprehended primordially as real in an immediate intellection and what this reality is in reality: “something apprehended in a mediated intellection”. This is a difference not between intellection and reality, but between two intellections, i.e., between two intellectual actualizations of the real, already within reality. Of these two actualizations, *the second is demanded by the first*. This is the essence and problematic of all evidence, including that of the *cogito*. From Descartes’ time until Kant, philosophy took a stand on the problem of the *cogito*, but followed different paths than that which I just proposed. As I see it, we are dealing with the fact that the *cogito* as a judgement is the mediated intellection of the reality of my being here-and-now thinking, a reality apprehended in the primordial apprehension of my being here-and-now myself. In all other evidence there is also a duality between a primordial apprehension of reality and its mediated intellection; because of this all evidence is in itself problematic. But this problem does not consist in whether evidence does or does not lead to reality, but in whether the real part of reality does or does not lead to the evidence, whether things are or not thus “in reality”.

Therefore the evidence is always noergic, and is a demand imposed by the real, by the force of imposition of the impression of reality. Whence the Cartesian idea of evidence is false from its very roots.

2) A second conception seems to bring us closer to the essence of evidence. Everything evident has a moment which we might call that of *plenitude* or *fullness*, by which what we intellectually know of the thing is seen in full measure in the thing. One might then think that the essence of evidence {237} consists in this fullness. That is the conception which culminates in Husserl. For Husserl, my intentional acts have a meaning which can be either merely mentioned, so to speak, in a way actually empty of the vision of a thing, or else they can be made present in it. In this last case we have an intention which is not empty but full. Fullness is for Husserl the “fulfillment” (*Erfüllung*) of an empty intention by a full vision. When this happens, Husserl will tell us that the intention is evident. Every intentional act, for Husserl, has its own proper evidence, and the essence of this evidence is “fulfillment”. But despite the fact that this idea has been accepted without further discussion, it seems to be untenable for the same reason that the concept of evidence *à la* Descartes is untenable. Evidence is not fulfillment; that would be seeing but not evidence. What Husserl calls ‘vision’ in the full sense is a noergic vision already constituted. But its demand moment is *constitutive of* fulfillment. Husserl situates himself in evidence already constituted; but evidence has a more radical moment, the constituting moment. Its dynamic constitutionality is just the unfolding of a demand: this is making evident or evidentiation. Because of this, evidence is not a question of fulfillment. We are not dealing with the question of how a simple empty apprehension is made evident by fulfillment, but rather how an intellection of the real becomes evident by demand, i.e., how a real thing demands the realization of a simple apprehension. We are not dealing with a vision which is only noetic. Evidence is always and only evidence of realization. Therefore when Husserl tells us that the principle of all principles is the reduction of every intentional noesis to originary intuition, i.e., to the fulfillment of the intentional by the intuited, he is making a totally false statement as I see it. Just as with Descartes, {238} Husserl has taken the road from clarity to a thing, when what should be taken is the road from the thing towards its clarity. The principle of all principles is not intuitive fulfillment, but something more radical: the real demand of fulfillment. Neither clarity, nor fullness, nor full clarity are the essence of evidence. In evidence there is a full clarity, but it is like the expansion in the present of a demand of reality. What is specific about evidence

isn't "full clarity", but the "force of vision"; evidence is a "forceful vision", i.e. a vision which is demanded. Constituted evidence is always and only the result of the constituted nature of evidence.

Husserl always moves on a conscious plane. Therefore all of his philosophy has a single theme: "consciousness and being", and a single problem: absolute knowledge in a "vision". But consciousness and being are grounded in intellection and reality. Intellection and reality are the radical and basic facts. Their intrinsic unity is not the intentional correlation expressed in the preposition "of". We are not dealing with consciousness "of" being, nor with an act of intellection "of" reality, but with the mere "actualization" of reality "in" intellection, and of the actualization of intellection "in" reality. The intrinsic unity is "actualization". Actualization is in fact actuality numerically identical with intelligence and reality. And only in differential actualization does this actualization acquire the character of a demand of reality, of evidence.

To be sure, this puts us on the borders of a very serious question, the problem of "apprehension and evidence". Although what I think about this is implied in what has already been said, it is still appropriate to address the question directly.

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§ 4

EVIDENCE AND PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION

If not always, then almost always classical philosophy has contraposed apprehension and evidence. This contraposition is usually designated with the terms *intuitionism* and *rationalism*, meaning that one is dealing with an opposition between two forms of knowledge of the real: intuition and concept.

Of this opposition I should say at the outset that its two terms are not correctly defined, nor for that matter even correctly expressed.

Let us begin with the second point. One speaks of a concept as a knowledge of things. And given that conceptualizing them is in this philosophy an act of "reason", this form of knowledge has been called "rationalism". Let us leave aside the reference to reason; it is a subject of which I will treat in Part III of this work. What is important to me here, whether or not it is an act of reason, is knowing if that act consists in a "concept". Now, this

whole idea is completely false for two reasons. First, the concept is not the only thing which is opposed to what is called "intuition" in this philosophy. There are also percepts and fictional works which are modes of simple apprehension. Therefore the first incorrect thing about classical rationalism is that it speaks of concepts when it should speak of simple apprehensions. But while this error is serious, it is not the most serious one. That, rather, lies in the fact that rationalism refers to conceptual knowledge, {240} which at the same time is of the real. And here, in my view, is the second and most serious error of this presumed rationalism, because concepts do not intellectually know a real thing by conceiving it, but by affirming it according to a concept. The formal act of knowing (what is usually termed here "reason") is not then either a concept or conceptualizing, but rather affirming and affirmation. Now, the radical character of affirmation is evidence. Therefore it is necessary to say that the formally specific part of rationalism is not in the "concept" but in the "evidence"; a thing is what is designated by the concept because of the evidence.

To this evidence, intuitionism is set opposite to knowledge of the real by "intuition". Intuition can mean the instantaneous intellection of something just as if it were present before the eyes. But this is a derived meaning. The primary meaning is precisely this "being present before the eyes". It is a direct and immediate mode, besides being instantaneous, i.e., unitary. The immediate, direct, and unitary presence of something to the intellection—this is intuition. The opposite of intuition would be a concept and discourse. Intuition is supposed to be determined not by its object but by the mode of intellection. As what is conceived is abstract and universal, one often says that the object of intuition is always something singular, a *singulum*; thus spoke Ockham and Kant. Only a *singulum*, it is thought, can be immediately, directly, and unitarily present. But for Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl there is intuition of what is not singular (the Idea, the categorical, etc.). We have no reason to explore this problem, but its existence shows us clearly that intuition has to be conceptualized not by its object but by the mode of presence of its object. And this is especially true since while it may be the case that *only* the singular is intuitable, this {241} does not mean that *everything* singular is necessarily intuitable. Intuition is a mode of presence of the object. Intuition is the immediate, direct, and unitary presence of something real to intellection.

But our problem lies in calling this intuition. That is wrong for two reasons. In the first place, this knowledge is not formally an act of "vision" except in a loose way, which is what the verb *to intuit*, and its Latin original,

intueor, means. But all the modes of sentient intellection, and not just the visual, directly, immediately, and unitarily apprehend the real. Therefore if one wishes to continue using the word ‘intuition’, it will be necessary to say that intuition is not just visual intuition, but that every intuition, be it tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc., is a direct, immediate, and unitary presence of the real to the intellection. If there is agreement on this point, there will be no inconvenience in continuing to speak of intuition as if it were vision.

The major and more serious problem is something else, viz. the second error of so-called ‘intuitionism’. And the fact is that even with amplification of the expression which we just pointed out, intuition always but expresses a “mode of seeing” a real thing; it is then something which is formally *noetic*. That is, intuition would be a direct, immediate, and unitary mode of recognizing what things are, i.e., a mode of consciousness. Now, the formal part of what has been called ‘intuition’ is not this recognizing, but the fact that a thing is present to the intellection; it is not the “presence” of the thing but is “being here-and-now” present. Therefore the act is not an act of recognizing what it is, but an act of apprehending the real. It is what, throughout the course of this work, I have been calling primordial apprehension of reality. Primordial apprehension is apprehension of the real in and {242} by itself, i.e., immediate apprehension, direct and unitary. It is to the act of apprehension that, formally and primarily, these three characteristics are applied. And only for this reason, in a derivative way, can it be applied to the noetic moment. Intuition is but the noetic dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. The primordial apprehension of reality is then in itself much more than intuition; it is a *noergic* apprehension. It is not a seeing but an apprehending in the impression of reality.

In summary, the opposition between rationalism and intuitionism does not lie in an opposition of concept and intuition, but in being an opposition between evidence and primordial apprehension of reality.

But there is more. Because in this opposition, what is actually opposed, indeed, what is divided between intuition and concept? We are told that we are dealing with two forms of knowledge. But this is unacceptable, because knowing [*conocer*] is but a very special mode of intellectually knowing [*inteligir*]. Not every intellection is knowledge. We shall see that elsewhere in this work. Therefore we are not dealing with a contraposition between two forms of “knowledge” but with a difference between two forms of “intellection”: primordial apprehension and affirmation. This is not just a change of words, but a change which concerns the formal nature of what is

designated by the words. And thus the question touches upon something essential.

In order to see this, let us accept for the moment the usual words. And then let us ask ourselves above all in what, formally and precisely, does the opposition between intuition and concept consist? For beneath this duality lies a unity which is the line along which the contraposition itself is grounded. What is this unity? Here we have the two points which must be considered. {243} I shall do it very briefly, given that the ideas which come into play in this problem have already been explained at length.

1. *The difference between intuition and reason: rationalism and intuitionism.* This difference is presented to us as a “contraposition” or “opposition”. In what does it consist?

For *rationalism*, the supreme knowledge is the rational. I have already indicated that here I am not going to delve into problem of what should be understood by ‘reason’; I am employing the word so as to conform to the standard language of discussion of these matters. What is designated here by ‘reason’ is conceptual evidence (the reduction of the rational to the conceptual is also conceded without discussion). Rationalism understands that intellectual knowing [*inteligir*] is knowing [*conocer*], and that the knowledge [*conocimiento*] has to be rigorous, i.e., grounded upon strict evidence. From this point of view, what is called ‘intuition’ is not in the fullest sense either intellection or knowledge; because intuition would be confused intellection, confused knowledge [*conocimiento*]. It is on account of this that intuition would not be knowledge; it would be a problem, viz. that of converting into rational evidence what we intuit turbulently and confusedly. Intuition is rich, to be sure, but not in knowledge; rather, in problems. Therefore it would be reason, and only reason, which must resolve the problems posed by intuition. The apparent richness of intuition would therefore be an internal poverty. This is the idea culminating in Leibniz and Hegel. But is that the case? It is possible (we shall not now delve into the question) that what is intuited is what leads intrinsically and formally to evident intellection. But apart from this it is necessary to affirm that there are intuitive qualities and subtleties which intellection can never exhaust by dint of evidence. The richness of intuition always escapes strict rational evidence. Moreover, even when this evidence {244} seems to be totally given over to what is intuited and indeed absorbed into it, yet strictly speaking the irreducible individuality of the intuited is a limit inaccessible to any evidence. The intellection of the intuited real will never be exhausted in evidence. Evidence can be as exhaustive as one desires, but it will always be but evidence: a vision

of what reality demands; but it will never be the original vision of reality. This is an unbridgeable difference. Intuition has an inexhaustible richness. In this dimension, intuition is not confused knowledge but primordial intellection of the real. Intuition can only be called confused if one takes rational evidence as the canon of intellection. But this is the very thing in dispute. A mathematical circle, we are told, is “perfect”. Real circles, on the other hand, are “imperfect”. But imperfect with respect to what? Naturally, with respect to the mathematical circle. But with respect to reality the situation is inverted. With respect to the real, what is imperfect is the geometric circle. Only the concept of the configuration of the real would be perfect (if we could achieve it), a concept which may only approximate the geometric one; but that is totally irrelevant to the problem. This is the richness of the intuited. To think that despite evident conceptual determinations we could manage to apprehend totally the intuited real via infinite predicates—this is the great illusion of all rationalism, especially that of Leibniz.

This is point on which intuitionism has chosen to stand and fight. The intuited real is individual and inexhaustible in all its aspects. All rational evidence moves in approximations to intuition. Intuition is not confused intellection; rather, evident intellection is but clipped or reduced intuition. Only from intuition does rational evidence receive its value. {245} Let us consider the intuition of a color. Reason must conceptualize it making use of a system of colors previously conceived. None of these is the intuited color. But then, we are told, reason combines the colors it conceives, and by dint of these combinations it is believed that the cited color is apprehended. Impossible. Rational evidence is only impoverished intuition. I do not need to insist further on these well-known differences; it suffices to recall the example of Bergson. But is intuition purely and simply richer than evidence? I do not think so, because what is essential to evidence is not the tracing of boundaries, that tracing which has been called ‘precision’. Rigor is not precision; rather, precision is ultimately a form of rigor. The rigor proper to evidence is not precision but accuracy, viz. intellection constrictatively demanded by the real. Evidence would be and is poorer than the content of the intuited. But it is immeasurably superior in accuracy. The richest intuition will never constitute even the minimal accuracy required by the intellection of one thing “among” others. Therefore intellection should be rich but also true. Rational evidence is not a reduced or clipped intuition nor an impoverished one, but an expanded intuition, which is not the same.

This discussion also reveals to us something which,

to my way of thinking, is the essential point but which has not yet been introduced. And that is that if one considers the matter at all, one sees that the discussion we have had concerns the richness or poverty both of rational intellection and of intuition according to its content. Now, is the exact line along which the distinction between intuition and evidence is drawn? Not at all. Intuition and rationality, prior to being two fonts of intelligible known content, are two modes of intellection, i.e. two modes of apprehension of the real, {246} and therefore two modes of actualization of the real. The difference between the contents apprehended by these two modes is totally irrelevant to the problem at hand. The discussion, then, must fall back not on the richness or poverty of the *content* but on the *formality* of reality, i.e. on the modes of intellection, on the modes of actualization of the real. Is there an opposition of modes? If so, what is its nature?

The presumed opposition falls back formally on the two modes of intellection: intellection that something is “real”, and intellection of what this something is “in reality”. Now, these two modes of intellection are therefore two modes of actualization. One is the intellection of the real in and by itself; this is primordial apprehension. The other is the apprehension of a real thing “among” others: this is differential apprehension, i.e. apprehension as differentiated (essentially mediated). When the question is posed in these terms one sees above all that primordial apprehension is the supreme form of intellectually knowing, because it is the supreme form of actualization of the real in intellection. What happens is that this apprehension is inadequate with respect to the differentiation; it does not make us intellectually know what a real thing is in reality, what it is among others, i.e. with respect to others. Differential apprehension gives us this intellection, but only insofar as it is inscribed within primordial apprehension. And this inscription does not concern the content but the formality of reality, something which is given to us in primordial apprehension and only there. Now, this inscription is demanded by the primordial apprehension itself. The richest intuition in the world will never give to us men everything that the intuited is in reality. For that differential apprehension is necessary, because differential apprehension is not only grounded in upon primordial apprehension, {247} but also formally demanded by it. A real thing, intellectually known, is not just a system of notes but also a system of demands. And the formal terminus of evidence is discrimination of demands, not distinction of notes. Every thing and every aspect of it has its own demands articulated in the most precise way. As a discriminant of demands, evidence remains within the strict limits of what is demanded. And it

is in this constriction that accuracy consists: it is the rigor demanded by reality.

Here one sees that this undeniable difference between primordial apprehension and evidence is not some *opposition* or *contraposition*. It is something different, viz. a *gap*. And this gap will never disappear. The clearest intellection on earth will never succeed in eradicating the gap. A “filled in” gap is still a “gap”, albeit filled in.

In summary, there is no opposition between intuition and evidence, but only a gap of actualization demanded by the primordial apprehension which is constitutive of evidence. As we are dealing with two modes of actualization of a single real thing, it is clear that the difference between those two modes is inscribed within a unity, the unity of actualization, i.e. the unity of intellection. In virtue of this, man does not just have intuition “and” rational intellection, but this “and” is the harbinger of a more radical problem, that of the unity between intuition and reason in sentient logos.

2. *The unity of intuition and reason.* What is the unity between intuition and reason?

A) Following along the lines of intuitionism and rationalism, one might think that intuition and reason are two “fonts of knowledge”. In virtue of that their unity would constitute a single knowledge. This is the philosophy of Kant. The unity of intuition and concept would be the “unity of knowledge”. {248} Neither of the two fonts by itself, in fact, constitutes a knowledge. Now, knowledge is knowledge of an object. In virtue of that, “unity of knowledge” would be “unity of object”. Therefore intuition and concept would be the two fonts of a single knowledge by being two fonts of the representation of a single object. What is this fountainhead? Intuition gives us a multitude of qualities of an object, ordered in a spatio-temporal picture. But all these qualities are qualities “of” the object; they are not “the” object itself. To reach the object, we must go back to the concept. The concept is a reference to the object. But it is no more than a reference; and this means that when the two fonts are taken separately, i.e. intuition and concept, neither of the two offers us the representation of an object. Recall Kant’s famous phrase: intuition without concept is “blind”; concept without intuition is “empty”. Blindness of intuition in unity with the emptiness of concept: this is what, for Kant, constitutes the unity of the object and therefore of knowledge. The object is that to which the concept refers; but not just any object, only the object determined by the qualities given by intuition. The object is therefore the unity of intuition and concept. The concept would be “empty”, but in its emptiness it illuminates intuition, which by itself

would be “blind”; intuition fills the referential concept which by itself is empty. The unity of intuition and concept is thus “synthetic unity” in the object of knowledge.

But is this true? I do not think so, for what blindness and emptiness are we talking about? Naturally, the blindness and emptiness of the “object”. On this point Kant has done nothing but repeat Aristotle, whose idea has always seemed to be rather debatable because a thing is not the “object” of qualities but {249} of their “structural system”. Kant believes that the object is something in some way distinct from its qualities. And for Kant, only insofar as intuition does not give an object to the qualities can it be called “blind”; only because the concept does not contain the determinate object but just an indeterminate reference to it, can it be called “empty”. Now, this orientation of the problem toward the object is not, as I see it, what is primary and essential to either intuition or concept. It is possible that intuition may not formally contain objects (I have just indicated what is debatable in this assertion). But intuition always has a radical vision, the vision not only of the quality, but above all of the formality of reality. Like all previous philosophy, Kant assumed without question the idea of sensible impression as a mere subjective affection; but he does not have the moment of impression of reality. The *Critique* should not have been first and foremost a critique of knowledge, but a critique of impression itself. Intuition, although not a vision of the “object”, is vision of the “reality”. On the other hand, ‘concept’ is not a reference to an object, absent from the concept itself, but simple apprehension of what reality “might be”; the “might be” is not absence of reality, but a mode of its realization. Whence it follows that neither is intuition primarily blind, nor the concept primarily empty, because the formal terminus of these two presumed “fonts” is not an “object” but “reality”. Now, reality is the formal terminus of intellection; therefore every human intuition is intellective, and every human intellection is sentient. The unity of intuition and concept is not unity of object and quality, but the unity of formality, the unity of reality. And therefore its apprehension does not primarily constitute a knowledge but an intellection, viz. sentient intellection. {250} Here we have the essential point: not knowledge of an object but sentient intellection of a reality. And here is where the difference and the radical unity of intuition and concept is found. Kant’s very point of departure is already untenable.

B) The unity in question is not, then, unity of objective knowledge but a unity which is rigorously structural.

a) By virtue of being structural, it is above all a unity which is not noetic but noergic, i.e., a unity of apprehen-

sion. There are neither two apprehensions nor two fonts of knowledge, nor for that matter two principles of knowledge; there are only two moments (content and formality) of a single apprehension, of a single sentient intellection.

b) This unity unfolds in two intellections only when what is intellectually known is a real thing “among” others. Then intuition is just primordial apprehension of reality, and concept is also a mode of intellection, the mediated intellection of reality. They are but two modes of actualization of the same reality.

c) There is a unity between these two modes, not the “unity of synthesis” but the “unity of unfolding”. This unfolding is what comprises the *ex* in *evidence*. In virtue of that, there is an unquestionable supremacy of intuition over evidence, not because of its qualitative content but by virtue of the primary mode of apprehending reality. All evidence, however rich and rigorous it may be, is always intuition unfolded in the *ex*. Let me repeat once again that I am not referring to the content of what is apprehended but to the primary mode of apprehending reality. In contrast to what Kant maintains, it is not the concept which illuminates {251} intuition, but intuition which illuminates the concept. And in turn, the concept is not a mere reference to the object, but to the reality apprehended in intuition, retrieved and unfolded in the form of “might be”.

d) All knowledge is an elaboration of this primary sentient intellection. We shall see this in another chapter.

In summary, intuition and concept refer back to primordial apprehension and to evidence. Their difference does not lie in their being two fonts of knowledge, but in being two modes of actualization of the real in a single act of noergic apprehension. In this apprehension, evidence and therefore the concept is not found in a synthetic unity with intuition—as Kant thought—but in unity of unfolding. The intellection of the real in this unfolding is af-

firmation. It is found determined by the evidence as a moment that demands. The concept is accurate intuition, and intuition is demand of a concept, i.e., of its unfolding.

Thus we have examined the two questions which we posed to ourselves about what it is to intellectually know a real thing at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. To do so is to affirm, to judge. And we asked ourselves about the structure of affirmation, i.e., what it is to affirm, and what are the forms and modes of affirmation. As affirmation is not, in any obvious way, univocally determined, we had to ask after studying its structure what it is in a real thing which determines the intellectual intention of affirmation. This determination is evidential demand. With that we have finished our examination of what it means to intellectually know a thing at a distance, by stepping back. This intellectual knowing of a thing by stepping back is the second phase of a “single” intellectual moment. It is a movement in whose first phase one steps back from what the thing is in {252} reality; being impelled thus acquires the character of stepping back. But in this stepping back, at this distance, the real thing holds us fast and then the *intentum* acquires the character of affirmative intention. In both of its phases alike, this intellection is an intellectual movement in the middle of reality itself in which we intellectually know what a thing is in reality with respect to other things. It is a mode of intellection determined in the intelligence by a differential actualization in which the real thing is actualized “among” others. But prior to this, the real is already actualized in the intelligence unitarily, i.e., the real has been actualized in it in and by itself.

Now, mediated intellection of what a thing is in reality is an intellection determined by evidence, which confers upon affirmative intellection, upon the logos, its own character, viz. truth. Here the problem springs upon us: affirmation and truth. This is the theme of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER VII

SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH

When a thing is apprehended as real and intellectually known affirmatively as what it is in reality, when this intellection intellectually knows “really” what the thing is in reality, such as we affirm, then we say that the intellection is true. What is meant by ‘truth’? In order to focus correctly on the question, it will be useful to review in summary form what was said about this subject in Part I of the book.

At first glance truth seems to be a quality belonging exclusively to affirmation. But truth is a quality of all intellection and not every intellection is affirmation. Prior to affirmation there is primordial apprehension of reality, which also has its truth. Let us ask ourselves, then, what is truth as such, as a quality of intellection.

Truth involves a host of problems, because a real thing is actualized in intellection in at least two different ways, as we have seen: in primordial apprehension and in dual apprehension. Hence the different possible types of truth. The set of these questions is the problem of “truth and reality”. But as affirmation {254} has always been understood in a predicative form, it has been thought that truth would therefore only be a quality of predication; and that what constitutes truth is the “is” of the predication “A is B”. Now, since truth concerns intellection as such, and there are intellections of reality which are not intellections of the “is”, it follows that reality and being are not identical. This is a third serious problem. So here we have formulated the three questions which we must examine:

- §1. What is truth.
- §2. Truth and reality
- §3. Reality and being.

Let us now take up these problems from the standpoint of affirmation.

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§1

WHAT IS TRUTH?

In precise and formal terms, intellection as such is just actualization of a real thing *qua* real. We have already seen that this actualization has two aspects. First is the aspect which concerns the real as real: reality is a formality which consists in being *de suyo* what it is, prior to being present in apprehension. To study the real in this aspect is the immense problem of reality. But intellectual actualization has another aspect which concerns not the real thing but the intellection itself. Mere intellectual actualization of the real *qua* intellectual is just what we call truth: a thing is really that in accordance with which it is actualized.

Reality and truth are not identical because there are or can be realities which are not actualized nor have any reason to be so. In this sense, not every reality is true. Truth is a quality of actualization, and actualization is a physical moment of the real. Without adding a single note, actualization nonetheless adds truth to the real. Therefore truth and reality are not identical, but neither are they mere correlatives; reality is not just the *correlate* of truth but its *foundation*, because all actualization is actualization of reality. Reality is then what gives truth to intellection, what makes the truth or “truthifies” in it.

This excludes from the outset two conceptions of {256} truthful intellection. The first is to understand that reality is a simple correlate of truth—this is basically Kant’s thought about the question. But it is impossible, as I have just explained. The other is the most common conception of all, according to which truth and its opposite, error, are two qualities which function *ex aequo* in intellection. That was Descartes’ idea. But this involves serious mistakes, because error is precisely and formally pos-

sible only by virtue of truth. Error, in fact, is not a mere “lack” of truth but “privation” of truth. Intellection cannot possess error just the same as truth; rather, because it always involves a moment of reality, intellection is always radically truthful even though in some dimensions it can see itself deprived of this truth. How is that possible? This is the problem of truth and reality, with which we shall now occupy ourselves.

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§2

TRUTH AND REALITY

The real is intellectually actualized in different ways, in virtue of which there are different modes of truth. There is above all a simple actualization. Its truth is also simple. But the real can be actualized in field “among” other realities. It is an intellection which I have called ‘dual’. Its truth is also dual. They are two types of truth which are very different—something which I already hinted at in Part One. Now I shall repeat that discussion in summary fashion for the reader’s benefit.

We shall examine the following:

1. Simple or real truth.
2. Dual truth.
3. The unity of truth.

1

Simple or real truth

The radical mode of presentation of the real in intellection is primordial apprehension of reality. In it the real is just actualized in and by itself. Its formality of reality has two moments, individual and field, but *pro indiviso*, i.e., in a form which I have called ‘compact’, which means that a thing is real and the reality in it is “thus”. This actualization is truth; it is the primary mode of truth. {258} It is primary because this truth makes no reference to anything outside of what is apprehended. Therefore what this truth “adds” to reality is but its mere actuality; this is what I have termed *ratification*. As what is ratified is the real itself, it follows that its truth should be called *real truth*. It is *real* because in this ratification we have the real itself. It is *truth* because this ratification is actu-

alizing. In virtue of it this real truth is *simple*. It is not simple in the sense of not being comprised of many notes; on the contrary, real truth, for example the primordial apprehension of a landscape, possesses a great multitude of notes. Real truth is simple because in this actualization these many notes constitute a single reality, and the intellection does not go outside of them; it does not, for example, go from the real to its concept.

Here one sees that every primordial apprehension of the real is always true, is real truth. Error is not possible in what is apprehended primordially as such. What is thus apprehended is always real even though it may not be so otherwise than in the apprehension itself; but there it is in fact real. Hence it is false to say that what is thus apprehended is a *representation* of mine. It is not a representation but primarily and primordially a *presentation*. And this presentation does not formally consist in being *presentness* but in its *being here-and-now* present; it is an actuality of the real. Primordial apprehension is therefore an actual presentation of reality. It is of reality, i.e., of what the apprehended is in itself, *de suyo*. This “being here-and-now” in presence is just actuality, the actuality of pure being here-and-now in presence. This actuality is *ratification*.

In summary, the primary mode of actualization of the real is to actualize it in and by itself. And this actualization is {259} its real truth. This reality of what is really true is open in the field sense, and thus can be actualized in two intellections: the actuality of the real in and by itself, and the actuality in the field of this real thing “among” other realities. This second actualization of the real is thus real, but its truth is not yet real truth but what I term ‘dual truth’. It is the truth proper to the logos, to affirmation. After this summary of what real truth is, we must delve into the analysis of dual truth.

2

Dual Truth

The intellection of a real thing “among” others is, as we have seen and analyzed at length, an intellection at a distance, by stepping back. Each real thing in fact is intellectually known in the field of reality as a function of others. Through its field moment, each real thing is included in the field by its own reality, and then the field takes on a functional character and *encompasses* the rest of the things. Therefore each of them is, with respect to the field, at a distance from the others. Hence, as we have said, to intellectually know a thing among others is to intellectually know it as a function of those others and

therefore to intellectually know it at a distance, by stepping back.

But let us not confuse the field aspect of each real thing and the field of reality which it determines. Each real thing refers to others; this is the field aspect of each thing, its own field moment. The field itself is the ambit constituted by this referring; it is the field of referral. The field is thus {260} determined by the real thing. Each real thing refers to another, and in this field of referral what a referring thing is as a function of others is intellectually known. Only then has one intellectually known the *concrete* nature of the field aspect of each thing, i.e., the concrete nature of the unity of the field aspect and the individual aspect in the reality of each thing. This unity is what the thing is “in reality”.

The intellection of each thing thus takes place in the field as a *medium* in which each one of the things is intellectually known as a function of the rest. This intellection at a distance, by stepping back, is thus a *mediated intellection*; in the field of reality it is the medium of intellection. This mediated intellection is just affirmation. Affirmation formally refers back to the unity of the field and the individual, a unity intellectually known in the field of reality; i.e., it falls back upon what a real thing is “in reality”. Actualization, then, is not actualization of something real in and by itself, but actualization of what something already apprehended as real is “in reality”, i.e., among other things. Its intellection is *affirmation*.

This intellection has its own truth. What is it? Let us repeat what we have been saying: truth is the mere intellectual actualization of the real *qua* intellectual. When the actualization is not mediated, its intellection has what we have termed *real truth*, the formal ratification of the real in and by itself. And this truth, as I said, is simple. But when the actualization is mediated, then the real is made true in affirmation, not as pure and simple reality but rather as being in reality such-and-such among others. It is in this making true of the truth of the real in this mode of differentiating that the other type of truth consists, viz. dual truth. This is mediated truth.

Dual truth has its own character and structure. {261} Above all it has its own character. This intellection, in fact, is intellection at a distance, by stepping back. To intellectually know a thing “among others” is to intellectually know it from these others, and therefore to intellectually know it at a distance, by stepping back. In virtue of that, by being intellection “at a distance”, the intellection itself is an intellection that steps back. Therefore there is, so to speak, a duality and not just a distinction between the realm of intelligence and the realm of what is intellectually known in a thing. The realm of intelligence consists in being of dynamic character, i.e. in being an intel-

lection in movement. The realm of the thing is its actuality intellectually known in this movement. As the thing is already actualized in primordial apprehension of reality, it follows that this new actualization is “re-actualization”. And since dual truth is constituted in this re-actualization, it follows that this dual truth has by the same token its own character: it is an actualization “in coincidence” of two realms which are formally distinct. Here ‘coincidence’ does not mean chance or anything like it; rather, it has its etymological meaning, “to be incident with”. Dual truth then has the character of intellectual coincidence “between” the realms of intelligence (i.e. among the realms of intellectual movement) and the realms of reality. The “between” intellectually actualizes the real thing (with respect to what it is in reality) as a “coincidence” of intellection and reality; it is the actuality of the real in coincidence. Such is the character of dual truth, *coincidental*, if I may be permitted the expression. It is the “between” which determines this character of coincidental.

This requires some clarification in order to avoid possible confusion. A coinciding actuality is not, formally, truth, but rather the ambit of dual truth. Therefore—to get a little ahead of ourselves—I should say that in this coinciding actuality, in this {262} ambit, error is also constituted. Hence the duality of dual truth does not formally concern truth as opposed to error, but rather the coinciding actuality itself which is the ambit of truth. What is radically and formally dual is the coinciding actuality. We shall see this at greater length later. So for now I will cautiously say the following: (1) Dual truth is constituted in coinciding actuality, and (2) this constitution is an event; in coinciding actuality dual truth happens. And this expression has a very precise meaning, viz. that coinciding actuality is a formally dynamic actuality, as I shall frequently repeat. Here “to happen” is not something opposed to that already done or intellectually known, but the formal and dynamic character of affirmation itself.

This dual truth has not only its own character but also its *own structure*, the structure of coincidence itself. This structure is extremely complex because coincidence is the character of an intellection which “comes” to coincide just because it “fills up” the distance between the two coincident terms, between affirmative intellection and what the thing already apprehended as real is in reality. Since affirmative intellection is, as we have seen, of a formally dynamic character, it follows that the coincidence itself also has a dynamic structure, as we have just indicated. The coincidental actuality of the real, then, has a formally dynamic structure. It is for this reason that truth “happens” in this actuality without thereby being formally identical with it. And this is the essential point.

Real truth either is had or is not had. But one reaches or does not reach dual truth in coincidence. And this “reaching” is just intellectual dynamism. Therefore, I stress, dual truth is {263} essentially and constitutively dynamic. What is that dynamic structure? This is key problem.

In the first place, intellectual movement takes place in a medium. Dual truth, by virtue of being truth in coincidence, is a mediated truth. Its foundation is, therefore, the medium. In this aspect the medium is “mediation” for the coincidence, and therefore is a dynamic mediator (not an intermediary) of dual truth. In what does the essence of this mediation consist? This is the problem of the dynamic *mediating structure* of coincidence, and therefore of dual truth. The total structure of dual truth is “mediating dynamic”.

In the second place, this movement takes place in the medium, but is not univocally determined in it. It is not certainly in its point of departure; but that is not what is important to us here. What is now important to us is that this movement does not have a univocally determined direction in the medium. Therefore the fact that the movement goes toward a determinate thing which is going to be intellectually known does not necessarily mean that the direction of this movement automatically leads to a dual truth. As we shall see it may not lead there. How is this possible? That is the problem of the dynamic *directional structure* of coincidence, of dual truth.

In the third place, the movement has not only medium and direction, but also, as we have seen, different phases. Hence it follows that coincidence is not the same with respect to all phases of the movement which bridges the gap between the real and what the thing is in reality. In virtue of that, dual truth, by being truth in coincidence, has different forms. What are these forms? This is the problem of the *formal dynamic structure* of dual truth.

In summary, the problem of the structure of dual truth is the problem of the structurally mediating dynamic {264} and directional character of the coincidence between affirmative intellection and what a thing is in reality.

The conceptualization of this structure unfolds in three questions:

A) The *mediated* dynamic structure of coincidence.

B) The *directional* dynamic structure of coincidence in the medium.

C) The *formal* dynamic structure of truth in mediated coincidence.

1. *Mediating dynamic structure of coincidence.* This is a “fundamental” structure. Here I understand by “foun-

ation” the structure of that which intrinsically constitutes the fact that intellection “between” is coincidence. I say “intrinsically”, i.e. I do not refer to what originates the coincidence, but to that moment which intrinsically and formally pertains to coincidence itself, i.e. to the constituting moment of its own character. This intrinsic and formal foundation is the medium. The fundamental nature of the medium is thus, at one and the same time what is affirmed *qua* affirmed and the formal character of the affirmation itself as intellection. This “at one and the same time” is just coincidence. The medium is therefore a medium of dynamic coincidence. It is in this that its *mediation* consists. How?

A) Some pages ago we saw how the medium is constituted: it is constituted in and by the primordial apprehension of reality. Let us repeat the ideas already expounded in order to improve rigor and clarity. The real *qua* real is something which, in itself, is open to all other reality *qua* reality. This “in” is, as we already have seen in Part I, an intrinsic and formal moment of reality *qua* reality; it is its transcendental character, which here takes on more concretely the character of being in a field. The real in and by itself is {265} real in a way which is transcendently in a field. The actuality of the real then autonomously actualizes the field as transcendental ambit. Being in a field is a moment of the primordial apprehension of reality; that it can function with autonomy with respect to the individual moment does not mean that it is independent of primordial apprehension. This moment is given to us there where the real itself is given to us: in the impression of reality. The impression of reality is, then, primordial sentient apprehension of the real in its individual formality and in a field; it is transcendental impression. Now, this impression has the structural unity of all the modes of reality impressively given. One of them, as I have been stressing throughout this book, is the “toward”. The “toward” is a mode of giving ourselves reality in impression. When one considers it as transcendently open, then the “toward” is “toward the rest of the realities”; it is not only a mode of reality but the very mode of the differential actuality of reality. In virtue of this, the transcendental nature of the field moment takes on the character of a field which encompasses concrete real things. The field is thus constituted in a “medium”. So it is then clear that the medium is precisely and formally a medium because there are real things apprehended in the impression of reality. The real things, naturally, do not remain “outside” the medium, but neither are they merely “inside” it even though it encompasses them; rather, they “are” the concrete reality of the field moment itself of every real thing. Conversely, the medium as such is the field of every real thing insofar as it is in mediated fashion constituting, in each thing, the intellectual unity of some things with oth-

ers. The medium is the foundation of the intellectual unity of things, but it is a foundation which is only mediated, {266} i.e., by being intrinsically the actuality which is intellectually in the field of every real thing. To be sure, the medium, insofar as it is within the field, is not purely and simply identified with the individual part of each thing's formality of reality; but this reality is actualized in the field manner in the medium. Hence it follows that the medium is, I repeat, but a moment of the actuality itself of the real *qua* real. The medium is but the real truth of the field. The medium, then, has on one side a founded character; it is founded on the individual realities; but it is on the other hand the foundation of that differentiating unity which we call "between". The "transcendental ambit", the field, thus acquires the character of "medium". Now, the medium is founding just because it has in itself, formally, the actuality of each real thing. This cyclic unity is characteristic of the medium.

B) The medium thus constituted has the function of mediation of coincidence between affirmation and what a thing is in reality. In fact, affirmation is an intellection at a distance, by stepping back. Therefore the confidence of both terms has to be founded in something in which it is established. But, What is the nature of this something?

a) We are not dealing with some third term which "produces" coincidence. That was the absurd idea nourished in large part by the subjectivist philosophy of the late 19th century; it was the celebrated idea of the "bridge" between consciousness and reality. We leave aside that fact that we are not dealing with consciousness but with intellection. The idea in question started from the supposition that one had to encounter a third term which would reestablish the unity of the intelligence and reality, the two terms which were thought to be found "outside" of each other. Yet all this is simply absurd, in a very radical way. It is not absurd because of what the nature of this "bridge" might be (e.g., {267} some type of causal reasoning); rather, what is absurd is thinking about the necessity of the bridge, because what does not exist is the "exteriority", so to speak, of intelligence and the real. The difference between the two terms is a "stepping back", but not a "separation", which means that what establishes the coincidence is not a third thing different than the other two, but a moment which is intrinsic to them. This moment is just the medium. The medium is not some "bridge", i.e., it is not an "intermediary", but rather is that in which the two terms "already are". There is no bridge but only a medium. And this medium is easy to describe: it is just the medium in which stepping back (i.e., distance) itself has been established, to wit, reality itself. It is therein that stepping back has been established, a stepping back, but not a rupture. It is already in the real; stepping back is not stepping back *from* reality

but stepping back *in* reality. Hence coincidence is not recomposition, but only an overcoming of of distance "in" reality itself.

In fact, what judgement affirms is not reality pure and simple, but what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality. And in turn, what a thing is in reality is just the unity of its individual and field moments, i.e., the concrete unity of each thing with all others in reality itself. Stepping back, then, in reality itself is how the intelligence is situated with respect to a thing. That is, the medium is just the moment of reality itself. Conversely, coincidence is the unity of intelligence and the thing in that medium which is reality itself. Truth as coincidence is above all coincidence of affirmation and of a thing "in" reality. And this reality is then the "in" itself, i.e., it is the medium; therefore it is something which is intrinsic to intelligence and the thing.

b) Nonetheless we are not dealing with just any coincidence, {268} because it has to be a coincidence along the lines of intellection itself, i.e., along the lines of intellectual actuality of the real at a distance. For this it is necessary that the medium be not only an intrinsic moment of affirmative intellection and of the real, but that it also be something whose mediated truth as truth constitutes the coincidence between affirmation and the real. Only then will the medium have the function of mediation, of intellectual mediation. The medium has to be a true mediator of coincidence, i.e., of truth. And so it is in fact.

Let us recall that the real apprehended in primary actualization, in the primordial apprehension of reality, has in this actualization what I have called real truth. And to this real truth corresponds the truth of a thing in its field moment. In virtue of this, we say, real truth is a truth which is incipiently open, open to intellection within a field in coincidence, an intellection in which we affirm what a thing is in reality. The same thing, then, as I have already said, is apprehended twice: once, in and by itself as real; secondly, as affirmed of what that thing is in reality. Now, the primordial apprehension of the real pertains formally to affirmation itself; it is precisely that of which one judges. In turn, the medium itself is the physical actuality of the field moment of that real thing, of the primordial apprehension; i.e., it has its own real truth. This real truth of the medium is but the expansion of the real truth of the field moment of a thing apprehended as real, in order to be able to judge its reality. Hence it follows, as I have already said, that the medium is real truth; it is the real truth of reality itself of the field of reality itself. And it is in this real truth where, in mediated fashion, that coincidence between affirmation and the real thing is established. The real truth {269} of the medium is the in-

trinsic and formal mediator of what is actualized in affirmation. In contrast to what is so often said, one must realize that affirming does not consist in affirming reality, nor for that matter in affirming truth, but in affirming something “in reality”, in affirming something “in truth”. Reality and truth are the mediated and intrinsic *supposition* of all affirmation as such. The coincidence between intelligence and the real is a coincidence which is established in reality itself in which both terms are true reality, in the real truth of the medium. The real truth of the medium is thus the medium of coincidence.

This is a moment which formally and intrinsically pertains to affirmation in order to be able to be what affirmation seeks to be. A judgement does not affirm either reality or truth but presupposes them; it affirms what a real thing is in “reality of truth”. And this truth is just the real truth. Mediation consists formally in being the real truth as a medium of judgement.

c) But this is not all, because coincidence, which the medium as real truth establishes, has a precise structure, viz. *movement*. There is a profound difference between intellectually knowing something with truth and intellectually knowing it in mediated fashion in truth. When all is said and done, in primordial apprehension of reality we already have reality with truth. But there is an essential difference with affirmative intellection, because the reality of primordial apprehension of reality is actuality of a thing in and by itself in its direct immediateness. But now, affirmative intellection of reality is intellection of reality in truth *by stepping back*. And distance is something to which real truth is incipiently open, and which has to be gone through. Therefore real truth is not just something in which intellectual coincidence “is”, {270} nor is it only something which makes that possible; rather it is something which pertains to affirmation itself because the medium is not something in which real things are submerged. It is indeed the actuality of the field moment of each real thing. Hence stepping back is only the mode of intellectually knowing in the medium. That is, the medium is a dynamic mediator. It is the mediated dynamism of the real truth of the medium. The medium is not only something which “permits” coinciding with the real, but also is constitutively something which pertains to the coincidence with the real.

Here we have the mediated structure of coincidence. It is coincidence in the medium of reality itself, intellectual coincidence in its real truth, and dynamic coincidence in stepping back.

In summary, the mediated structure of affirmative intellection consists in the intellectual movement in which we intellectually know what a real thing is “in reality of truth”, i.e., in the medium of the real truth. The real truth

is incipiently open to being actualization of the real in coincidence, i.e., in reality of truth, and constitutes the intrinsic and formal medium of this last actualization.

But this coincidental dynamism does not have only mediated character. It also has a directional character. That is what we are going to see.

2) *Dynamic directional structure of coincidence in the medium*. Intellectual movement takes place in the medium, but is not univocally determined there. This movement is a movement in which we are going to intellectually know what a thing is in reality as a function of others. That is, we are going “toward” that thing, but “from” the rest. The dynamism of intellection not only takes place in a medium, {271} but is “from-toward”. This is the dynamic directional structure of coincidence. Intellection in movement is affirmation. Therefore affirmation itself is dynamic not only in mediated fashion but also directionally. This direction of affirmation has a complex structure, because both the “toward” and the “from” are fixed: the “toward” is what a thing which one desires to intellectually know is in reality, and the “from” is things as a function of which one is going to intellectually know the thing in an affirmative way. I shall lump all things in a single term, viz. that thing from which one affirms what something is in reality. Now, even with these terms fixed, affirmative movement does not have a univocally determined direction. Given the same “toward” and “from”, the intellectual movement can and does follow quite different trajectories. That is, the direction and orientation of the movement can vary. And with that variance, coincidence itself arises within the power of the intelligence, i.e., of the intellectual movement of what the real thing is in reality, and the real has a directional character. This obliges us to linger on some essential points, especially these three: A) what is, more precisely, the “direction” of affirmation; B) what is the directional part of coincidence as such; and C) in what does this bundle of directions consist which we may term the “polivalence” of affirmation with respect to the nature of coincidence.

A) *Above all, what is the “direction” of affirmation?* Let us recall that affirmation is a dual intellection which consists in the thing “toward” which one goes being intellectually known “from” the light emanating from something else. The thing “from” which one goes is present in the thing “toward”, in a certain way as the light of the intellectual affirmation of this latter. The first thing this light {272} determines is a “stopping” to consider what the thing can be which is going to be intellectually known in this light. This stopping is a stepping back, i.e., what I have called “retraction”. It is not a retraction “from” reality but retraction “in” reality.

It is a retraction which is formally intellective. What one intellectually knows in this retraction is what a thing would be as a function of the light of another. This intellection is what constitutes simple apprehension in its triple form of percept, fictional item, and concept. But simple apprehension, as we saw, does not consist in pre-scinding from the moment of reality. On the contrary, every simple apprehension is formally constituted in the medium of reality. And the way in which reality corresponds to what is simply apprehended is that mode of reality which we call “might be”. What is simply apprehended is what a thing “might be” in reality. The “might be” is not something which concerns the content of a simple apprehension as something possible in it; rather, it is the unreal mode by which the content of a simple apprehension concerns the real thing.

Even when simple apprehensions are freely created, the thing which “might be” in the form of a percept, fictional item, or concept is always mentally denoted.

Now, direction is the formality of the “might be” of simple apprehension. Therefore simple apprehension consists formally in direction. Here we have the concept of direction, which we were seeking. Intellection through stepping back is above all, as we have seen, retraction; but it is an intellective retraction in reality. This “in reality” is the “might be”, i.e., the direction. Therefore direction, I repeat, is but the intellective formality of retraction.

In virtue of this, simple apprehension is not just a {273} *representation* of some content, but a *directional focus* of what a real thing “might be” in reality. Furthermore, as I just said, this directional formality is what formally constitutes simple apprehension. In primordial apprehension there is no direction but rather immediate actuality. On the other hand, simple apprehension is a moment of distanced intellection, and its formal character is “direction”. Simple apprehension, I repeat, is formally intellective direction toward what the thing intellectually known by stepping back “might be” in reality.

To summarize, in this intellective movement which is affirmation, one comes to intellectually know what a thing is in reality as a function of others which reveal the possibilities of what it directionally might be.

Granting this, In what does the directional structure of the coincidence consist?

B) *Directionality of coincidence*. Every affirmation is a movement, and as such has direction. Toward what? We have already given the answer on several occasions: toward what a thing, intellectually known affirmatively, is in reality. This “in reality”, as we also saw, is the unity of the individual moment and the field moment of the real thing which is intellectually known.

This intellection is a movement which takes place in mediated fashion. And in this taking place, what the intellection, so to speak, does is to “go” to that unity. This “going” is but a returning from the retraction to the thing itself, i.e., going “in” the field “toward” the thing. Hence it follows that, *qua* intellectually known affirmatively, the unity in question is intellectually known as “unification”. The direction, then, is direction toward unification; it is the “might be” of the unification. In this direction the intellection seeks to reach the thing. But not as something which just is there, quiescent, {274} but as intellectually known already as real in primordial apprehension. In virtue of this, the thing which directionally we seek to reach is the thing which already has real truth, but which is incipiently open, and which therefore is dynamically unfolded as making a demand; it is the real thing as “making a demand” or “making a claim”. We have already met the concept of demand when treating the subject of evidence, where it was a vision called forth by a thing from itself, from its own reality. In the present problem this same demand has the directional function of intellection. Making a demand is always one of the aspects of the force of imposition of the real apprehended in the impression of reality.

The “might be” is direction; and what a thing “is” in reality is present to us as making a demand. Therefore the coincidence between intellective movement and a thing is a coincidence of formally dynamic character; it is the coincidence between a direction and a demand. And this coincidence between a direction and a demand is the step from “might be” to the “is” in which affirmation consists. It is, I repeat, a formally dynamic and directional moment of the mediated actuality of the real in affirmation. It is the coincidence between a simple apprehension freely created by me, and the positive or negative demand which the real has before it.

This actualization, by virtue of being dynamically directional, confers a precise structure upon affirmation. This coincidence, in fact, is not something which consists in “carrying” us to the actualization but rather is a moment of the actualization itself in its intrinsic and formal dynamic nature. This intrinsic and formal character of actuality in directional coincidence has that moment which is *rectitude*. Coincidence as “coincidence of direction and of demand” has the {275} formal moment of rectitude. This is, as I see it, the strict concept of rectitude.

This coincidence, then, is not a quiescent but a dynamic one. It is above all a mediated dynamic coincidence, viz. a thing actualized in the medium of reality, i.e. actualized in the reality of truth; but it is also a directional dynamic coincidence, viz. a thing actualized in the recti-

tude of affirmative movement. The medium and the direction are not just conditions of affirmation, but intrinsic and formally constitutive moments of it, not just as an act of intellection but as actualization of the thing which is intellectually known. *Qua* actualized in intellectual movement, a thing has a mediated and directional actuality; it is actuality in reality and actuality in rectitude.

Rectitude is perhaps what most clearly delineates the dynamic structure of affirmation. When all is said and done, one might think that the “medium” is just that in which affirmation resides, not affirmation itself. Rather, “rectitude” would clearly denote that one is dealing with a *formally* dynamic moment. Nonetheless, this dynamic character is not unique to rectitude but also applies to the medium itself, because we are not dealing with a medium in which one affirms, but rather with the mediated character of affirmation. It is the affirming itself which is mediated. Affirmation is a happening and its mediality is an intrinsic and formal moment of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed. A thing is intellectually known in affirmation; and as this intellection is at a distance, mediality is the intrinsic and formal character of the reality itself *qua* intellectually known. The medium is dynamic mediation and rectitude is—to speak pleonastically—dynamic rectitude. As I see it, one can never sufficiently insist on truth as a {276} dynamic coincidence, i.e., upon affirmation as intellectual movement.

But this only puts us face-to-face with a serious problem. It is necessary, in fact, to conceptualize in what, “formally”, this coincidence between direction and demand consists. Because the directionality of affirmation is polyvalent, and therefore its coincidence also is so. In what does this polyvalence consist?

C) *Directional polyvalence*. Naturally there is in every affirmation a plurality of directions for going “toward” what is affirmed starting “from” something else. What is affirmed, in fact, has many notes and many aspects, which means that starting “from” some thing I can go “toward” what is affirmed in many ways. “Really” the thing “from” which one intellectually knows opens to us not a direction but a bundle of directions “toward” the thing intellectually known. Once the “from” and “toward” are fixed, there is still a plurality of possible directions. I can go toward a thing intellectually known in order to intellectually know the color it has in reality, but I can also direct myself toward the thing itself in order to intellectually know any other of its notes. In order to intellectually know what a man is in reality, I can start from his zoological relatives; but here is where the multitude of directions opens up: I can go in the direction of speech, but I can also go in the direction of upright walking, or of forming groups. In the first case the man will be in reality

a speaking animal, in the second a bipedal animal (the one *par excellence*), and in the third a social animal, etc. Within this bundle of directions, I move in one of them according to an option of mine, anchored securely in the richness of what is intellectually known, but in a direction determined only by an {277} option of mine. This *plurality* of directions is, nonetheless, not what I term *directional polyvalence*. Valence is the quality of coincidence in the order of truth. Polyvalence consists in those qualities, those valences, being able to be diverse *within* each direction. It does not then refer to various directions, but to various valences within each direction with respect to the truth intended to be in them.

And this is because, as we have said repeatedly, in contrast to real truth which one “has” or does not have, dual truth is “arrived at” or not arrived at, or is arrived at by different means in the intellectual movement of affirmation. Now, in each case we have a strict coincidence between the direction and the demand of the real thing. Since in this coincidence the real is actualized, and therefore its intellectual valences are diversified, it follows that directional valence has two aspects which must be conceptualized successively, viz. the aspect which concerns the very root of all valence, i.e. the aspect which concerns the actuality of the real in affirmation, and the aspect which concerns the polyvalence of this affirmation in the order of its truth.

a) Above all, there is the root of all valence, which ultimately is the root of all polyvalence. A real thing is, as we saw, the terminus of two apprehensions. One, its primordial apprehension as a real thing about which one judges. But this same thing, without ceasing to be apprehended as real, is the terminus of what, provisionally, we shall call *second actuality*: actuality in affirmation. Of these two actualizations, the second presupposes the first: affirmation presupposes the primary actuality of a thing and returns to actualize it in affirmation. Therefore, we said, affirmation is formally “re-actualization”. What is this “re”? That is the question. {278}

The “re” is not some repetition or reiteration of the first actualization. In the first place, this is because of the formal explanation of the term ‘to actualize’: in the first actualization we have a “real” thing, but in the second we have the thing “in reality”. We have reality, then, twice, but with different aspects. In the reactualization we have the real, but actualized “in reality”. The same reality is thus actualized in two different aspects. Insofar as the second aspect is founded in the first, we shall say that that second contribution is “re-actualization”. Here, “to reactualize” is to actualize what something, already real, is in reality.

But this is not the most fundamental characteristic of the “re”, because upon actualizing what an already real thing is “in reality”, this actualization is not an actualization only of a second aspect of the same thing, but is another mode of actualization or of actuality of the thing. Upon being intellectually known according to what it is “in reality”, a real thing is actualized at a distance, i.e., by stepping back, and in the direction of demand. Therefore, in affirmative intellection the real acquires not only *another actuality*, but above all a *new mode of actuality*. The primary actuality is “reality” pure and simple. The actuality in affirmation is an actuality through stepping back, and demanded with respect to a fixed direction. We are, then, dealing not with a repetition but with a new mode of strict and rigorous actuality. Now, the demanding actuality of the real in a fixed direction is what formally constitutes *seeming*. Affirmation is affirmation of actuality in coincidence, and the actual in this coincidence is seeming. This is, as I see it, the formal concept of seeming. The “re” of reactualization is, then, actualization of the real in seeming. Here we have the essential point. It was necessary to give a strict and rigorous concept of what seeming is. {279} It is not enough to make use of the term as something which does not require conceptualization.

Let us explain this concept at greater length. Above all, seeming is an actuality of a real thing; it is the real thing in its own reality, which is actualized as seeming. It is not to seem reality, but *reality in seeming*. But in the second place, it is actuality in “direction”; otherwise the real thing would not have any seeming. Something seems to be or not to be only if it seems to be or not to be what it “might be”. That is, seeming is an actuality but in a certain direction, since as we have seen, “might be” is formally direction. But this is not yet sufficient, because the “might be” is always and only a *determined* “might be”. Something seems to be or not to be not what it might be without further ado, but what such and such a determinate thing might be. The determination of the “might be” is essential to seeming. Seeming, then, is not directional actuality but actuality in a “determinate” direction. In the third place, it is an actuality of a real thing insofar as this thing calls forth, in its actuality, inclusively as well as exclusively, determinate “might be’s”. Only then is there seeming. Without this third moment the “might be” would certainly be determined but would not go beyond being a directional moment of a simple apprehension. There is only seeming when this determinate “might be” is determined by a real thing in making a demand. Uniting these three moments into a single formula, I say that seeming is the demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. It is the actuality of the coincident *qua* coincident.

Now, what is actualized in intellectual movement has its own exclusive content; it is not the purely and simply real, but what a real thing is “in reality”, i.e., the unification of the individual and the {280} field moment of the thing. Therefore this actuality, which is seeming, is formally actuality of what a thing is “in reality”. The content of seeming is always and only that which the real thing is in reality. In other words, seeming is always and only seeming what something real is in reality. The actuality of the “in reality” is seeming, and conversely seeming is intellectual actuality *qua* intellectual of what the thing is “in reality”.

It is precisely on account of this that seeming constitutes a proper and exclusive mode of actuality of a thing in affirmative intellection. Primordial apprehension of reality is not and cannot be seeming; it is purely and simply reality. All idealisms, whether empiricist or rationalist, take for granted that what is apprehended (i.e., what I call primordial apprehension of reality), is merely seeming, and that only to reason does it fall to determine what reality is. But this is absurd, because the immediate and direct part of the real, apprehended primordially, excludes *a limine* the very possibility of all seeming. Every idealism speaks of seeming, but none has taken care to give a strict concept of this mode of actuality. What is apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality has that intrinsic compaction in virtue of which it is but real. The compaction consists in not having, nor being able to have, the moment of seeming. It is real and only is real. Therein consists, as we saw, all of its inexhaustible greatness and its possible poverty. On the other hand, in the real apprehended not primordially but differentially, there is always a radical uncompacting; uncompacting is the difference between reality and seeming.

It is fitting now to explain the concept of seeming not just saying what it is, but also saying—and very forcefully—what it is not. {281} When we say that something “seems”, we do not intend to say more than that it “only seems”. But this is absurd. Seeming is not being an “appearance”; it is a mode of actuality of the real itself, and therefore the real actualized in an affirmation—as we shall see forthwith—is real and at the same time seems to be so. Seeming is not the opposite either formally or in fact, of being real. The real intellectually known by stepping back is real and seems to be so; at least it is not excluded that it may be so. Seeming as such is not something the opposite of the real, but a mode of actuality of the real itself. If one wishes, it is “appearing”. And in fact, what is purely and simply real has its own real truth, which as we saw is incipiently open. To what? We said that it is open to another actualization. Now, we should say that that to which the real truth, i.e. what is

purely and simply real, is primarily open is to seeming to be so in an intellection in movement.

Now, this actualization in movement is just affirmation, judgement. From this arises the most strict and formal concept of judgement. Judgement, I said, is intellection through stepping back from what a real thing is in reality; it is then intellection in coincidence. Now, in this stepping back and coinciding, intellection is the actuality of a thing as “seeming”; so it follows that the formal terminus of judgement is seeming. Judgement is, so to speak, the formal *organon* of seeming. And here we have the essential point: judging is always and only intellectually knowing the real in its seeming. Correctly understood, “seeming” here has the meaning explained above. A mind of the kind we usually call “purely intuitive” (let us not again discuss the concept of intuition as a moment of the primordial apprehension of reality) would not have “seeming” but only reality. And therefore it would not have judgements {282} but only primordial apprehensions of reality. The absence of judgement would be founded upon the absence of seeming, and in turn the absence of seeming would be founded upon the compaction of the apprehended real in and by itself.

And this brings us not only to conceptualize judgement but also to give precise formal rigor to a concept which has been appearing throughout our study, viz. the concept of stepping back or distance. Negatively, as I have said on numerous occasions, ‘distance’ in this context does not mean spatial distance. Distance, I said, is that stepping back in which each thing is situated with respect to others when it is apprehended “among” them; it is the distance of the “reality-among”, the “between two” of the real. I said in chapter IV that this distance is the unity of the unfolding between the individual moment and the field moment of each real thing, i.e. the unity of the unfolding between being “real” and being “in reality”. This unfolding is distance because one must review the distinction, and because the reviewing is a dynamic form of the unity itself. But there is besides another unfolding. When surveyed, in fact, this unity is in turn a unity between reality and seeming. By stepping back, and so being at a distance, being “in reality” is thus unfolded in turn into its “in reality” and into its “seeming”. Then the distance which formally is unity of unfolding between the individual moment and the field moment inexorably grounds the unity of unfolding of the field moment itself, the unity of unfolding between “being in reality” and “seeming”. It is a modality of stepping back or distance, affirmative distance; it is a distance proper to every differential actualization and only to it, proper only to movement within a field as such. Let us not confuse the unfolding of “real” and “in reality” with the unfolding of reality and seeming. {283} This second unfolding is

proper only to the “in reality” of the first unfolding.

As this actualization is the very essence of judgement, it follows that the duality of being real and of seeming (in the actuality of each real thing thus intellectually known) confers upon affirmation an essential quality in the order of truth: a valence. Valence, we may now say, is the quality of coincidence between seeming and being. A valence can be diverse; this is polyvalence. It is a polyvalence with respect to dual truth. This is what must now be considered in greater detail.

b) Affirmation as affirmation, is in fact an intellectual movement in which a simple apprehension of mine freely forged confronts the reality of something already apprehended as real. In order for there to be affirmation there must be an intention of coincidence between the direction constituting the “might be” of my simple apprehension and the demand for rejection or admission—let us call it that—of a real thing with respect to that simple apprehension. To be sure, we are not dealing with a rejection or admission as an actuating moment of the real thing, but only of that physical moment of it which is its physical actuality. It is this actuality which, when we confront it in the direction in which my simple apprehension consists, is actualized in the form of a demand. But this is something which is exceedingly complex.

Above all, I can freely elect simple apprehension, and the direction in which I am going to confront a real thing. This option of mine is what is responsible for the fact that among the many directions which a thing opens to me when I apprehend it, only one of them acquires the character of being the direction embarked upon. The direction then turns into a *path* instead of an option, {284} the path of affirmation. Affirmation is not only a direction but a path, the path upon which I embark in order to intellectually know the real affirmatively. This option is discernment, the *krinein*, and therefore is that by which every affirmation is constitutively a *krisis*, i.e., judgement. Affirmation is judgement precisely and formally by taking place in a path with choices.

But this necessary discernment is not sufficient for intellectual movement to be affirmation. Affirmation is not just an utterance, but a positive intellection of the real. For this not only is the discernment of a path necessary, but it is also necessary that this path lead to a coincidence, i.e. that the affirmation possess rectitude and lead to the real. Now this second moment is not at all obvious, because with what has been said, rather than an affirmation we would have only an intent of affirmation. In order for there to be an affirmation it is necessary for there to be coincidence, convergence, and rectitude between simple apprehension and the real thing.

This affirmative intellection in its own coincidence has different valences, different qualities in the order of truth. Every affirmation has in some way this diversity of valences. I say, “in some way”, because this is just what we have to examine now.

aa) Every affirmation has in the order of truth an essential radical quality; it is what I call *parity*. In every affirmation there is the actualization of that about which one affirms and the simple apprehension on which is based what one affirms. In every affirmation there are, then, two poles. But it is necessary that each of them not go off “on its own”, so to speak. This quality is parity. Permit me to explain. If I ask myself how many wings this canary has in reality, and if I answer “yellow”, that response is not an affirmative coincidence but just the opposite, because what is real about {285} the question asked is along the lines of quantity (number of wings), and the given response expressed the real along the lines of quality. There is no coincidence and therefore no rectitude. The two directions are “disparate”; this is the *disparity*, disparity or absurdity [in Spanish]. To say that the number of wings of this canary is yellow is not a falsehood, but something more radical, viz. the incongruence or disparity between two lines of intellection. In order for there to be affirmation there must be “parity” between the direction of simple apprehension and the demands of the real. Only when there is parity is there coincidence and therefore rectitude. The disparity is formally and constitutively “uttered without parity”. Rectitude therefore is not synonymous with truth in even the slightest way, but is essentially pure and simple parity. What is parity? Every simple apprehension is a “might be”. Hence every simple apprehension directs us to the real not only by the mere fact of being a “might be”, but moreover in this direction a directional line of the actuality of the real *qua* real is pointed out. What is pointed out is a mode of directing myself to the real as quality (please excuse the expression) of a line of the might be is acknowledged, in which the real as real is actualized. Yellow points out the line of that mode of being directed to the real which is its actualization; it is actualization as quality. Number points out in its mode of directing itself to reality another aspect of actualization of the real, viz. as quantity. Along these lines, then, the real as real is directionally actualized. Pointing out, in Greek, is called *kategoria*. Every “might be” points out a line of actualization of the real *qua* real, and it is in this the category consists, viz. directional actualization of the real *qua* real. It is in this directional focus that, in my opinion, the problem of the categories of the real must be conceptualized. The categories are not supreme *genera* of “being” (cf. Aristotle); they are not forms of judgement (cf. Kant); {286} but rather they are the directional lines of actualization of the real *qua* real along various dimen-

sions. We shall see later the problem of the categories in all of its fullness. Returning to parity, we see that parity is parity of categorial line. Disparity is categorial disparity. So here we have the first qualitative moment, the first valence in the order of truth: parity. Its opposite is disparity. The opposition between “with-parity” and “disparity” is the first directional polyvalence of affirmation.

bb) But there is a second quality with a valence. It is not enough that an affirmation be not a disparate one; it is necessary that, even if not so, it *make sense*. “Making sense” or “being meaningful” is the second moment of valence. Making sense is not parity. Within something which is not disparate or absurd one can pronounce an affirmation whose direction does not fall back upon the possible demands of the object about which one is affirming. In such a case the direction of the simple apprehension veers toward emptiness. Direction toward emptiness is not the same thing as disparate.

This emptiness can occur in at least two ways. It can be that the sense of my simple apprehension remains outside of the demands of the real object about which affirmation is made. Then the affirmation is *nonsense* or *meaningless*. But it can happen that in the affirmation the sense of the simple apprehension destroys the positive demands of that about which one affirms; this is *counter-sense* or *contra-meaning*. And this is not some subtlety but something which has come to carry out an essential role in science and philosophy.

For example, if I consider an electron situated exactly at a precise point in space, and wish to intellectually know what its dynamic state is in reality, i.e. its momentum, there is not and cannot be any answer. To attribute to it {287} a momentum is, in itself, not something disparate but meaningless (because of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). An electron precisely localized in space cannot have any precise momentum. The “might be” of the momentum is a determinate direction, but it does not make sense to realize it in a localized electron. In virtue of this there is no directional coincidence, nor for that matter the actuality which is seeming. To fall into the void is just “not-seeming”. All the variables which physics calls ‘dynamically conjugate’ are found in this example from atomic physics. I have not cited them except by way of example. That is a problem of atomic physics which we cannot discuss further here.

The counter-sense or contra-meaning is, if one wishes, the more serious problem. It is not a falsehood, nor even a contradiction, but a destroyer of the possibility of any meaning. Thus Husserl thinks that to say that *a priori* truths are founded upon contingent facts is not something which is just false or contradictory, but is contra-meaning. The meaning of the demands of the concept

of “a priori” truth are annulled by the meaning of “empirical fact”. For Husserl the contra-meaning is the supreme form of not being true. But personally I think that there is something more serious than the contra-meaning, and that is disparity or absurdity. In disparity or absurdity, I repeat, the demands of that about which one judges have nothing to do with the direction of the simple apprehension. To intellectually know them unitarily in an object is the disparity or absurdity. On the other hand in contra-meaning there is no disparity or absurdity; what happens is that the direction of the simple apprehension does not find where to realize itself in the object.

The second valence in the order of truth is meaning. Polyvalence adopts the form of “with meaning” and “without meaning” and “contra-meaning”. {288}

cc) But there is a third quality of the coincidence in the order of truth.

Coincidence, I repeat, is dynamic coincidence between intellective direction and the direction of the demands of the actuality of the real. In this direction one is going to intellectually know not the real as real (that would be primordial apprehension of reality), but what this real is in reality. That is, a real thing in dynamic coincidence acquires a new actuality, a reactualization of the real in the order of what it is in reality. This actuality of the real in directional coincidence is, we said, what constitutes seeming, viz. the demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. Therefore affirmative intellection, what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality, is the coincidence of what it seems to be and what the real thing is in reality. Or stated more succinctly, it is the coincidence between seeming and being real (where it is understood that we are dealing with being “in reality”). This coincidental actuality is exceedingly complex. How are they “one”, i.e., in what are the two terms coincident? The coincidence is *actuality* as coinciding; therefore that in which real being and “seeming” are “one” is in being actuality. But these two terms are not independent, i.e., are not juxtaposed; rather, seeming and being real *are mutually grounded the one upon the other*. There is always actuality in coincidence, but the coincidence can have two different foundations; i.e., there are two possibilities of coincidence. First, what a real thing is in reality founds what it seems to be; and second, what it seems to be founds what the real thing is in reality. In both cases—and I repeat this over and over because it is essential—there is coinciding actuality. But the quality of this intellective coincidence is in the two cases essentially different. {289} In the first, we say that affirmative intellection, in its actuality in coincidence, has that quality which we call *truth*. In the second case, there is also actuality in coincidence, but its quality is what we call

error. Each one of the two possibilities of actuality in coincidence is what constitutes that which we have previously termed ‘path’. Path is not only a direction upon which one embarks, but a direction along the lines of one or the other of the two possibilities. The first is the *path of truth*. The second is the *path of error*. The path or way of truth is that in which it is the real which founds the seeming or appearance. The way of error is that in which it is seeming or appearance which founds reality; reality would be what appears to us. Here we have the radical complexity of every affirmation in its directional structure; it is the third valence of coincidence.

To understand it better, we must first of all clarify what each of the two paths is. So let us begin with the path of truth. Judgement, I have stated, is the formal organ of seeming or appearance as such. Now, its truth consists formally in that appearance is founded upon what a thing is in reality. It consists, then, in what determines the actuality in coincidence of an appearance being what the thing is in reality. This is the *path of truth*. It is not something extrinsic to truth, nor is it the path to arrive at truth; rather it is an intrinsic and formal moment of truth itself as such; it is “truth-path”. It is the “path-like” character of affirmation about the real. Only in a derivative sense can one speak of a truth as a quality of what is affirmed. Primarily truth is a dynamic directional characteristic of affirmation; it is the direction by which “appearance” is determined by “real” being. Truth itself is this directional determination. It is the path in which one is intellectually knowing what something seems to be in reality {290} by making the intellection converge toward what the thing really is. This convergence of the path is truth itself. Only in and by this dynamic and directional truth is it that we can have truth in what is affirmed. We shall see this below.

But there is another path, *the path of error*. Error is also primarily a path. It is the path by which the actuality in coincidence of appearance is what grounds and constitutes what a thing is in reality. Error is above all a path, the erroneous path. It is possible that what is affirmed by this path turns out to be truthful, but it would be so only accidentally, just as the conclusion of a chain of reasoning can be accidentally true even though the premises were false. This does not prevent the way from being an erroneous one, of course. This path is an error, but with respect to what? With respect to the path which leads to an actuality in coincidence in which appearance is bounded in real being. To follow the contrary path—it is in this that error consists. Every error, and therefore all error, is a constitutive *deviation*, deviation from the path [*via*] of truth. In error there can also be actuality in coincidence—this must be emphasized—but it is an actuality in a deviate path. Therefore this actuality has in its very actuali-

zation its own character, viz. falsehood. Falsehood is actuality in coincidence along a deviate path. Even when accidentally its content turns out to be truthful, nonetheless this presumed truth would be a falsehood with respect to its intellectual quality. Falsehood consists formally only in being a characteristic of actuality. It is a false actuality insofar as it is actuality. It is truly actuality but a not true actuality. The path of error is the path of a falsified actuality; it is the falsification which consists in taking my appearance (in its being appearance) as reality. Only derivatively {291} can one speak of falsity in what is affirmed. What is radical and primary is falsehood in the affirmation itself. Falsehood, I claim, is actuality in deviation, in error. Error is a dynamic and directional characteristic of affirmation itself prior to being a characteristic of what is affirmed.

Truth and error—here we have the two valences of coincidence in the order of truth. This statement may come across as confused because in it the word ‘truth’ and the concept of truth appear twice: truth as valence opposed to error, and truth as that in the order of which valence is constituted. But there is no such confusion; we shall see this forthwith. Before though let us speak of truth and error as valences. Truth is the coincidence between seeming and reality when it is reality which determines seeming, and error in the opposite case.

In contemporary philosophy there has been an effort to introduce other valences besides truth and error; there might be in fact an infinite number of them. Classical logic has always been bivalent (truth and error), but in the logics to which I allude there would be a polyvalence in the order of truth which is different from these two; this is polyvalent logic. I shall allude only to a trivalent logic because of its special importance. Besides the valences of truth and error, an affirmation can have a third valence, *uncertainty* or *indeterminism*. This does not refer to my not knowing what is real in a determinate way, but to whether an affirmation about the real is, in the order of truth, something formally uncertain or indeterminate. We shall return to the example I explained when speaking of the “meaning” of affirmation. We saw that in virtue of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle the statement that an electron which is precisely localized in space has a precise momentum would be one which makes no sense physically. Now, in trivalent logic {292} we are not dealing with the fact that such a statement has no meaning, because it does. The fact is that it would be a statement which is neither true nor false, but indeterminate in the order of truth. Thus we have three valences: truth, error, uncertainty or indetermination.

I am not going to delve into this problem; it is a topic of the logic of physics. Here I am not doing a study

of logic but of the philosophy of intelligence. And from this point of view the question changes its aspect. And this is what dispels the confusion surrounding the concept of truth to which I earlier alluded.

In fact, as possibilities truth and error in affirmation are *co-possible* just because they are paths of actuality in coincidence grounded in real truth. This does not mean that truth and error can apply to an affirmation indiscriminately, because error is always deviation. Hence error is not just an absence of truth; if it were—and in fact it has been assumed to be in most of modern philosophy—truth would be just the absence of error. It would be as if would say that having sight is the absence of blindness. And this is not true because error, falsehood, is “deviation”; therefore it is not an absence but a privation of truth. Only with respect to dual truth is error possible. Both are co-possible, but this copossibility does not mean equality; rather it means the copossibility of effective possession and privation. Therefore the Hegelian idea that error is finite truth is unacceptable. Error certainly can be given in finitude, but the fact is that dual truth also can only be given in finitude. Dual truth is not less finite than error because both are grounded in the dual stepping back from reality primordially apprehended as compact. But error is finite also by virtue of being privation. {293} Error is then doubly finite: by being, like truth, grounded in a stepping back based upon real truth, and also because this basis or foundation is privational. Truth is in some form (as we shall see) prior to error.

If we consider the presumed third valence, indetermination or uncertainty, we find ourselves again with a priority of truth with respect to it. Because with respect to what would a given affirmation be uncertain or indeterminate? Clearly it is an uncertainty in the order of truth. Without being in some way in the truth, there is no uncertainty or indetermination. Truth is, as in the case of error, prior in some form to uncertainty or indetermination. And this is essential in any philosophy of intelligence.

And this makes plain to us the confusion in the concept of truth to which I have alluded on several occasions. Valence is, let us reiterate, the quality of coincidence in the order of truth. What is this order of truth? Here “truth” is coincidence between seeming and being, prior to which this coincidence is grounded in one or the other of the two terms. This coincidence is constituted in the medium of intellection through stepping back, that is, in the field. The field is a real moment. Now, the real truth of the field is truth as ambit, as ambit of coincidence. It is the mediated truth of every affirmation. The valence of every affirmation is the quality of this affirmation in the order of truth as ambit: truth as coincidence is the foun-

dation of valence. Error is also grounded in this truth as ambit; error is not truthful affirmation, but is truly affirmation. The valence of every affirmation is so in the order of truth as ambit; mediated truth is the foundation of truth itself as valence. There is then {294} a difference between truth as ambit and truth as valence. As valence it is opposed to error, but as ambit it is the mediated foundation of truth and of error insofar as they are valences. Thus a true judgement is doubly true: it is truly a judgement and also it is a true judgement. A true judgement involves truth as ambit and as valence.

It is in this truth as ambit where every valence is constituted, not just the valence of truth. Affirmation has, in the order of mediated truth as ambit, different valences. The parity is clearly a valence apprehended in the ambit of mediated truth. Only because we move intellectually in mediated truth can we affirm with parity or with disparity. There could not be parity except as modality of truth as ambit. The same should be said of meaning: we apprehend it in mediated truth. Finally, the valence “truth” is apprehended in mediated truth. It is in the light of truth modally known intellectually that we intellectually know the light of each of the three valences: parity, meaning, and truth, and of all their respective polyvalences.

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With this we have seen the dynamic directional structure of affirmation in its different valences. Each of them is a quality of a movement in which we go from something simply apprehended toward a real thing about which we seek to intellectually know what it might be in reality. Now this movement “from-toward” takes place in the medium, but is a movement having different phases. In each of them the actuality in coincidence is not only mediated and characterized by valence, but also has its own formal character: the dynamic structure of affirmation. This is what we must now examine. {295}

3) *Formal dynamic structure of mediated coincidence.* Let us repeat some ideas. Affirmation is an intellection at a distance which is going to the real in the medium of and by the mediation of reality itself. This movement has a precise direction, viz. the direction toward the real as actualized in a coincidence. The actuality in coincidence of the real in a determinate direction is appearance. Therefore judgement is the formal organ of the appearance of the real. Coincidence is thus the actuality of the real in appearance, regardless of the determinant of this coincidence. Judgement is thus of a directional dynamic nature.

But this does not suffice, because in that intellectual movement we have considered the real up to now only

insofar as it is that toward which an affirmation moves. But now it is necessary to consider the real itself precisely and formally “*qua* affirmed”. In our problem, what is affirmed does not float on its own, but is real though only “*qua* affirmed”. In this sense we can say that what is affirmed *qua* affirmed is the precipitate of the real in affirmation. This precipitate is the valence truth-error. Truth and error as formal structure of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed are the precipitate of the real along the path of truth or of error. That is what I indicated earlier when I said that truth and error as moments of the real *qua* affirmed are structures which are only derivative with respect to the paths of truth and error. Therefore truth and error as structural moments, as formal moments of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed, also have a formally dynamic structure.

In virtue of this, dual truth and error are of a formally dynamic nature in three respects:

1. Because they are characteristics or moments of an {296} *act of affirmation*, which is an intellectual movement which takes place in a medium.
2. Because the affirmation is affirmation *along some direction*, along a path of coincidence of seeming and real being: the path of truth or of error of what is affirmed.
3. Because what is affirmed “*qua* affirmed” has a formal dynamic structure according to which what is affirmed is truth or error as *dynamic precipitate*.

What is this formal dynamic structure of truth and error? That is the problem.

To judge, I have indicated, is to intellectually know at a distance what a thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. Insofar as it is distanced, i.e., through stepping back, this affirmative intellection is directed toward the real thing from a simple apprehension. To judge is ultimately the intellection of the actuality of the realization of a simple apprehension in the thing about which one is judging.

What is this realization? Naturally we are not dealing with a physical realization in the sense of a real process of notes, but of a realization along the lines of intellectual actuality; it is the affirmation of realization as a moment of actuality. This realization is then known intellectually and formally as dynamic. A real thing, *qua* intellectually known, is intellectually known as “realizing” therein a simple apprehension. This gerund expresses the dynamic moment of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed, viz. the actuality of what is intellectually known is realizing actuality along the lines of actuality as such.

This dynamic respectivity has a very precise dynamic character. Affirmative intellection is a movement in dif-

ferent phases; it is a *phased dynamism*, because the two moments of intellection through stepping back are a retraction with respect to what a real thing is in reality, and an affirmative intention of what it is. And these two moments are {297} only phases of a single movement, the movement of intellection at a distance. It is therein where the intellective actuality of what a thing is in reality happens. As I have said, we are not dealing just with the fact that there are two phases of a movement which “drives” to an affirmation, but that they are two phases of a movement in which the intellective actualization of what a thing is in reality “goes on happening”. Hence this actualization itself is of a phased character. The realization which a judgement intentionally affirms is then phased. In this actualization the coincidence between seeming and real being happens, and likewise truth and error as structures of what is actualized also happen. Truth and error, then, are not just paths but are also *as a consequence* dynamic moments that are structurally phases of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed.

To clarify this thesis, we must understand this structure in three stages: *a)* In what, more precisely, does the character of the phases of dual truth consist? *b)* What is the nature of each of these phases? *c)* What is the unity of these phases of dual truth?

a) The character of the phases of truth. If I speak only of truth it is for two reasons. First, so that I do not have to repeat monotonously the phrase “and error” when referring to truth. And second, because error is a privation of truth; therefore the explication of what error itself is can only be brought to fruition by explaining what truth is.

In order to understand precisely the character of the phases of truth, let us take the most trivial of examples: “This paper is white”. The classical conceptualization of truth is as a phase. For philosophy in general, the content affirmed is “this white paper”, and as an affirmation it means that in this paper is found “the white” which is affirmed in the predicate, {298} or that “the white” is in this paper. Now, all that is correct but is not sufficient, because we are not here speaking of the white paper. If we were speaking, in fact, only of the fact that the white is in this paper, the usual interpretation would be correct. However, we are not dealing with this, but with the affirmative intellection that this paper is white. And then the question does not concern the fact that physically this paper “has” whiteness, but how it becomes true, i.e., how the intellective actuality of the whiteness in this paper comes to “happen”. Therefore the truth “isn’t here”, but is something which constitutively “happens”. The white is had by this paper, but truth is not so had; rather it is the intellective happening itself of the white in this paper. Truth happens in the intellective actuality of what a real

thing is in reality; it is the happening of the actuality in coincidence that this paper is really white. The “is” expresses the actuality as a happening. To be sure, I do not here take the verb ‘to happen’ as something completely distinct from ‘fact’ (this distinction is the subject of another discussion, that of the difference between happening and fact). ‘To happen’ expresses the dynamic character of every realization as actualization. Truth is given in the actuality in coincidence of the real in intellective movement. In this coincidence the real, upon being actualized, gives its truth to intellection. This “giving of truth” is what I shall call ‘making true’ or ‘truing’. Formally, what is thereby constituted in actuality in coincidence is appearance. And dual truth consists in what the real is making true as appearance. Now, the making true is, in dual intellection, the happening of truth *qua* truth of what is affirmed; and conversely, happening is the making true of the real. This happening is, then, the happening of the actuality of the real as appearance. {299}

Now, this happening is much more complex than one might think, because it has its own different phases. These phases are not just “aspects” which are intellectually known in accordance with the point of view one adopts, but rather are constituent “phases” of the actuality of what is affirmed as such; i.e., they are phases of the dual truth itself. In fact, when affirming “this paper is white”, I do not make one affirmation but two, because that affirmation consists in the intellection of the real realization of the white in this paper. And this involves two moments. One, that the quality by which this paper is intellectually actualized to me is that quality which consists in “white”. The other, that this quality is realized in this paper, and therefore is real in it. When affirming “this paper is white”, I have uttered not one affirmation but two: the realization of the white, and the realization that this paper is white. One might then think that in this judgement there are not two affirmations but three, given that besides saying that the quality is “white”, and that this quality is realized in the paper, I also say that this of which I am judging is “paper”. True, but there are still not three affirmations. First, because this does not happen in every judgement but only in propositional judgment and predicative judgement; it does not happen in positional judgment. When I open the window and yell, “Fire!”, I make two affirmations: that I see fire, and that I see it in the street or wherever. Moreover, even in the positional or propositional judgements, the subject is not affirmed but is purely and simply that of which one judges, and as such is not affirmed but presupposed and only indicated. In every affirmation there are then two moments, and only two moments. These moments are in phases; they are the phases of the intellective realization of the predicate in the real thing, for example the realiza-

tion of the white in this paper. In fact, “the white” {300} intellectually known in itself in retraction is only a simple apprehension of what this paper or some other thing “might be”. Intellectually knowing that this “might be” is now *real* is an affirmation; intellectually knowing that this reality is established as real *in this piece of paper* is another affirmation. Only by virtue of the first affirmation is the second possible. There is then a rigorous ordering which grounds these two moments in intellectual movement. The intellectual movement and the truth actualized in it structurally involve two “phases”. We are not dealing with two “aspects” but with two moments which are strictly “phases” of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed. In this two-phased movement is where the truth of an affirmation happens. The affirmation then has two phases, each of which is true for each phase. We shall see later what the unity of these phases is. Now we must clarify each of these phases in and by itself.

b) *The phases of truth.* The phases of dual truth, i.e. of the coinciding unity, are of intrinsically different character. Dual truth, as I said, happens in the actuality in coincidence of the real in the intelligence. Actuality in coincidence means not the coincidence of two actualities, but an actuality which is strictly “one” in coincidence. This actuality consists, on the one hand, in being so along a fixed direction, in accordance with a fixed simple apprehension; here actuality in coincidence is “seeming”. But this same actuality is, on the other hand, intellectual actuality of the real as real; it is what we call being “in reality”. The coinciding unity of seeming and of being real in the field is that in which truth, in phases, happens, and there are two phases.

The *first phase* of this happening consists in that which is affirmed of a subject being in itself what {301} realizes in it a fixed simple apprehension, for example “white”. White is a simple apprehension; its actuality in this role, independently of what the role might be, is the realization of this simple apprehension. Therefore when I affirm that this paper is white, the white itself is really actual, corresponding to the simple apprehension of the white. Here there is an actuality in coincidence which consists in the actual corresponding to my simple apprehension. And when this coincidence of the actual real with my simple apprehension conforms to it, the coincidence comprises *authenticity*. This is the first phase of truth. And as such, authenticity is “truth” in a certain phase. Authenticity is the actuality in coincidence as conformity of the real with my simple apprehension.

This requires some clarification. To accomplish this let us change examples and say, “This liquid is wine”. The authenticity of the “wine” is above all a characteristic, not of the wine as reality, but of its intellectual actuality. The liquid as real is what it is and nothing more; only

its intellectual actuality can be authentic. In the second place, this characteristic of the intellectual actuality is constitutively and essentially respective. The actuality of the wine can only be authentic if its actuality corresponds to the simple apprehension of the wine, or stated more crudely, to the idea which we have of wine. Without this respectivity to simple apprehension, the intellectual actuality of the wine would not be authenticity; it would be a quality apprehended as real in and by itself, for example in the primordial apprehension of reality. In the third place, it is not necessary that this simple apprehension, with respect to which I affirm that this wine is authentically wine, be a “concept” of the wine. A few lines back I employed the common expression ‘idea’ just to leave open the {302} character of the simple apprehension with respect to which this is wine. It can be, certainly, a concept; the liquid which realizes the concept of wine will be authentic. But this is not necessary; simple apprehension can be not a strict concept but a fictional item or even a percept. Thus one can speak rigorously of an authentic or non-authentic character in a literary work. One might even speak of authenticity with respect to a percept when one understands that this percept presents reality to us completely and without distortion. That wine—and only that wine—will be authentic which realizes fixed characteristics which my simple apprehension of the wine intellectually knows.

Classical philosophy grazed—no more than grazed—this entire problem when it referred created things to God, to the Divine Intelligence. For this philosophy, the respectivity to the intelligence of the creator is what comprises what is called ‘metaphysical truth’. But this is wrong on three counts. First, because every truth is metaphysical. What classical philosophy calls metaphysical truth should have been called “theological truth”. In the second place, this is not authenticity, because every created reality is conformable to the Divine Intelligence, including that reality which is non-authentic wine. For God there is no authenticity; authenticity is not theological truth but human intellectual truth. And in the third place, this truth does not refer to the naked reality of things but only to their intellectual actuality; it is not a characteristic of naked reality but of the actuality of the real. It is just on account of this that I call it authenticity. Only in a human intelligence can authenticity happen. And even so, it does not necessarily happen there. The wine in question may not be authentic but false. That is, truth as authenticity can happen {303} in the actuality in coincidence of what I call “wine”, but it may also not happen. The privation of actuality is falsity; we could be dealing with false wine. This obliges us to state with greater rigor what authenticity is as truth, and what the false is as error.

We say of something that it is authentic wine when, in its intellectual actuality, it realizes all the characteristics bundled in the simple apprehension of wine, in the “idea” of the wine. The actuality in coincidence is then a *conformity* of what is actualized with its simple apprehension. And in this consists formally that mode of truth which is authenticity. In authenticity there is a “seeming”, but it is a seeming grounded in the reality of what is actualized; this seems to be wine and it is so; it seems to be wine because it is. It is in this coincidence of seeming and of real being, grounded in actual reality, that the “conformity” of wine with its simple apprehension consists. It is in this that authenticity consists. It is not simple actuality in coincidence but an actuality in coincidence which consists in conformity.

But something different can occur, because there is the possibility that we might take as wine something which only seems to be so. And because in this seeming as such I can consider only *some* characteristics of simple apprehension which are determinant of seeming, it may occur that the actuality of the real is not just seeming, but “seeming” only. To take as wine what is only so in appearance is exactly what constitutes the *falsum* of the wine. Correctly understood—and I must emphasize this—it is a *falsum* only along the lines of respective actuality. This which we call wine is not, in its naked reality, either true or false. Only the false is the opposite of the authentic. The authentic is what is conformable with {304} what seems to be in the actuality of the real; the false is what only has the *appearance* of conformity and does not in fact *have* conformity with respect to simple apprehension. It is not just a lack, but a privation of authenticity.

Here, then, truth is authenticity and error is falsehood. I have given the example of wine. Now it should be clear that the same must be said of any predicate whatever, for example, of “white”. If white were not authentically white, my judgement (that this paper is white) would be erroneous by virtue of the inauthenticity or falsity of the predicate.

However, this is but a phase of the truth of my affirmation. Although it is necessary that white be authentically white, it is also necessary that this authentic white, that this authentic wine, be that which authentically is realized “in” this paper or “in” this liquid. For that, conformity of the predicate with simple apprehension is not enough.

Second phase. In it we intellectually know, as I just said, that a real thing (this liquid, this paper) is authentically what we apprehend the predicate to be (authentic white, authentic wine). Here the coincidence is, as in the case of authenticity, a “conformity”, but a conformity of a

different stripe. In both phases there is a conformity of intellection and reality. But in authenticity one deals with a conformity of a real thing with the simple apprehension by which we intellectually know the thing. On the other hand, in affirmation (this paper is white, this liquid is wine) what formally is known intellectually is the conformity of affirmative intellection with a real thing. They are, then, two conformities of different stripe. In authenticity one deals with a realization in what is intellectually known *measured by the intellection itself*; on account of this, what is authentic is the wine or the white. On the other hand, if I affirm that {305} this liquid is wine or that this paper is white, I am dealing with a realization *measured not by intellection but by the real itself*. It is affirmative judgement which is conformable with reality. In authenticity it is the wine or the white which is measured by the idea of the wine or the white, i.e., the real in its “seeming” is measured by the idea; whereas in affirmative intellection the “seeming” is supposed to be measured by reality. In order not to generate neologisms, I shall call affirmations of the type, “This paper is white,” or “This liquid is wine,” *affirmative intention* or *judgement*. To be sure, authenticity is also affirmation, judgement. But as there is no expression which is the homologue of authenticity, *for the time being* I shall refer to this the second type of conformity as *conformity of affirmative intention* or *conformity of judgement*. I shall forthwith return to put things in strict order. This conformity of affirmative intention, this *conformity* of judgement with the real, is what is called *truth* in contrast to *authenticity*. I insist that authenticity is also truth, but we shall now hold to the common use of language.

This requires some further clarification. In the first place, What is that real thing with which truth is conformable? Certainly it is the real itself; there is not the slightest doubt. But equally certain is the fact that it is not the real in its naked reality, so to speak, but the real actualized in coincidence in intellection. We are not dealing, then, with a conformity between an intellection “of mine” and a thing which “on its own account” wanders through the cosmos. That would be to give rise to a “material” coincidence, one which is extremely random. Rather, the conformity with which we are here occupying ourselves is a constitutive and formal coincidence. Now, a thing in its naked reality is foreign to this intellectual coincidence; {306} and the same is true of intellection itself. Coincidence is not given formally other than *in the intellectual actuality* of the real. And this actuality not only is not foreign to the real, but includes it. Intellectual actuality is of no importance to the real, but intellectual actuality formally includes the real. It is for this reason that there can be a conformity with the real.

In the second place, With what conformity are we

dealing? It is not a conformity such as the coincidence of physical notes or properties. The intelligence has no note in common with white paper or with this specimen of wine. As physical notes, the two things, intelligence and reality in actuality, are formally irreducible. We are dealing with a *conformity of a kind which is merely intentional*; that which intellection knows intellectually in its affirmative intention it knows as *realized* in the real actualized thing. This is a conformity between what is actualized as actualized and the very actuality of the real. But it is still necessary to correctly understand this realization, because we are not dealing with the case of affirming, “This paper is white” and that in fact the paper is white. Rather we are dealing with something more, the fact that formally and expressly what I affirm is the realization itself. If we were dealing with only the former, truth as conformity would be merely the conformity of a *statement* and a real thing (even though just actualized). But in the latter case, we are not dealing with the conformity of a statement but with the conformity of *the affirmation itself* as affirming a realization, with the realization itself as actualized in that affirmation.

Every judgement, then, affirms the realization of the predicate in the thing which is judged. This realization is in the first place a realization *along the lines of actuality*. And in the second place, {307} it is a *formally affirmed realization*, the affirmation of a realization. When the realization affirmed as such is intentionally conformable with the realization of the real in its actuality, then and only then is there truth in the sense of truth of a judgement.

Anticipating some ideas which belong to Part Three of this study, I may say that this intentional conformity can have different modalities. One is the conformity as something which in fact is given. That is what I just explained. But it can happen that that conformity is something more than what is just “given”; it can be that it is something which has been intellectually “sought”. In this case the conformity is not just conformity but *fulfillment*, conformable to what has been sought and how it has been sought. Truth is not only *authenticity and judgmental conformity*; it is also *conformity with fulfillment*. It is a different type of truth, truth as fulfillment, the third phase of truth. But let us leave aside this essential problem for now, and limit ourselves to the first two phases.

When there is this intentional conformity of judgement with the actualized real, we say that the judgement is truthful. Truth is a conformity of seeming with a real thing. When there is a lack of conformity, the judgment is erroneous; this is lack of conformity between seeming and real being. That form of error is quite different than the form of error which is opposite to authenticity. As oppo-

site to authenticity, the error judges seeming according to “appearances”. On the other hand, as opposed to the truth of judgement, error is a lack of conformity, or rather a “deformity”. Appearance and deformation are both privations. They do not rest upon themselves but upon the presumed truth of authenticity and conformity. In truth, whether of authenticity or conformity, seeming {308} is grounded in the real; in error of appearance and deformity, the real is grounded in mere seeming. Correctly understood, this refers to intentional foundations. But seeming is always and only an seeming of the real. And it is precisely on account of this that there can be error. Therefore, to take seeming as real in and by itself is to falsify the seeming at its root, to deprive it of what constitutes its *raison d’être* as seeming of the real. Now, judgement is the formal organ of seeming. Therefore the falsification of seeming is *eo ipso* a falsity of judgement; it is error, a privation. This also requires more detailed consideration.

Above all, truth and error are not *forms of objectivity* but *forms of reality*.

Affirmative intentionality is not objective, but is much more than objective, because it falls back upon reality itself. Ultimately, an objective error doesn’t cease to be an error because it is objective, and it is always called to be rectified at the proper time not in its objectivity but in the reality of what is affirmed. But as truth and error are forms of intellection, they inevitably pose two questions. First, How can we intellectually examine what truth and error of intellection are? And second, On what can we base ourselves to discern the error of truth?

First, let us consider the possibility of examining if something is true or erroneous. If it were a question of examining what I affirm of “external” reality, so to speak, with an affirmation of mine, I should be trapped in a circle from which there is no escape. And this is because such an examination would examine a judgement about another judgement, which would not further us in any way with respect to truth or error, because these two are what they are not as conformity of some judgements with others, but as conformity of a judgement with the real. If the real were not in a {309} judgement there would be no possibility of speaking of truth and error. But the fact is that the reality which judgement affirms is, as we have seen, not a naked reality but a reality which is intellectually actualized. Now, this intellectual actuality has two moments. One, which I have already mentioned, is the real “being here-and-now” [*estar*] from itself by the mere fact of being real. But this intellectual actuality—let us not forget—has another decisive moment. I have already indicated it in the Part I of the book. It is that being real in intellection consists in a real thing being present to us

as being *de suyo* what is presented; this is the moment which I called the *moment of prius*, which is formally constitutive of all intellection as such from its first, radical intellective act, the impression of reality. This moment is what “in the intellection” submerges it in reality. We shall see forthwith what this *prius* or prior thing concretely is in affirmative intellection. But for now let us note that the actuality which a judgement intellectually knows in coinciding is the actuality of the real in its two moments of being here-and-now present and of *prius*. Now, the actualized “real” and the “intellective” actualization of the real are the same actuality. Seeming and being real are given in the same intellective actuality. Hence the possibility of comparing not just one judgement with another, but of comparing a judgement with the real. This is but the possibility of comparing seeming and being real in the same coinciding actuality.

But this does not go beyond being a possibility. Let us then ask ourselves in the second place in what does the foundation consist upon which this possible discernment between seeming and being rests? It is a discernment which ultimately is between truth and error. To be sure it is a moment of actuality itself. But in an actuality, as I just said, the real is there {310} like a *prius* with respect to that actuality itself. Therefore in the “coinciding” actuality the real is present precisely in that very moment of *prius*. Now, the actuality in coincidence of the real is a coincidence between seeming and being real in the same actuality. Insofar as this actuality is coinciding actuality of the *prius* as such, the actual in this actuality has that formal moment of being remitted in coincidence from the seeming to what is real in that actuality. Now, this moment of remission, this moment of coincidental actuality in which the *prius* consists, is just what formally constitutes that which, a few pages back, I called *demand*. Demand is, precisely and formally, the coinciding actuality of the *prius* as such; it is coinciding actuality of the *de suyo* as *suyo*; it is the coinciding *prius* of the *suyo*. It is in this that, intellectually, demand consists. In virtue of this, demand appearing formally and expressly, leads to the real which “seems” in it. There is a seeming and a being real in the same actuality. And in it the real is being a *prius* of the seeming. This formal nature of the demand of the real with respect to seeming, this *prius* of the real with respect to seeming *in the same intellective actuality* is what not only permits but inexorably compels examination of the foundation of the coinciding of seeming and of being real. This does not refer to the fact that the seeming leads by itself to the real as something beyond the seeming itself; rather, it refers to the fact that seeming leads to the real as something real which *is now actualized in the same actuality* as the seeming. Here we have the foundation of the discernibility of error and truth: the coinciden-

tal actuality of the *prius* as such.

Since this demand is precisely evidence, it follows that in the coinciding actuality of the *prius* as such {311} the intrinsic unity of evidence and truth is constituted. It is a dynamic unity, because this unity is a unitary foundation, but one which is only of a principle. The intellective unfolding of this unity is therefore somewhat problematical; it comprises the whole problem of intellectual work, as we shall see in Part Three. This unity does not rest upon the unity of some first judgements which are self-evident with a first “immediate” truth in them. This, which has been so monotonously repeated in philosophy during the course of the last several centuries, is in reality once again to denaturalize the unity of evidence and truth. We are not dealing with a unity of judgements among themselves or of their constituent parts among themselves, but of the unity of every judgement as such with the real as such actualized in accordance with a coinciding *prius* in a single actuality. The so-called first judgements receive their truth from the same thing where all others receive it, viz. the coincidental actuality of the *prius*, from the priority of the real with respect to seeming in a single intellective actuality. To be sure, this does not mean that that unity of evidence and of truth does not have different modalities. But as I see it, that modalization of evident truth has nothing to do with what, traditionally, has been understood by *types of truth*. Let us briefly examine the matter.

Traditionally, the types of truth have usually been conceptualized as a function of the connection of the predicate with the subject. There are, we are told, truths which are *immediately evident*, those in which the predicate pertains to the subject with an evidence which is grounded in simple inspection by the mind, *simplex mentis inspectio*. In the other cases one deals with truths of *mediated evidence*, where the connection of the predicate with the subject is grounded in a third, different term. This third term could be rational unity; {312} and evident mediated truth is then what is usually called a *truth of reason*. There are cases in which the third term is not reason but experience; these are the *truths of fact* or *matters of fact*. But I think that this whole conceptualization is completely wrong, because while it is true that every judgement has a predicate and what may be termed a subject, not every judgement is a “connection” of these two. But even leaving this serious problem aside, the conceptualization which is proposed is still unacceptable.

Beginning with the last point, the division of mediated truths into two types (truths of reason and truths of fact) is inadequate. Their difference is supposed to be grounded in the necessity of the mediated connection of the predicate and the subject. Furthermore, these two

terms and their connection are conceptualized as moments of reality. It is reality itself which is either necessary or merely matter-of-fact. But to me, this difference is not adequate, even along the lines of the moments of reality. There are truths which are not of reason but which nevertheless are more than truths of fact. For example, if one says that the necessity for every effect to have a cause is a truth of reason (we won't discuss the propriety of this example; it is just one which is commonly adduced), then it will be a truth of fact, for example, that this paper is white. Nonetheless I think that there are truths which are not necessarily of reason (let us call them *truths of absolute necessity*), and which are still more than truths of fact because they are truths which deal with that structural moment of the real by which it is necessary that the real have notes of fact. Thus, for example, we have the properties of the cosmos and the properties of history. The cosmos and history are not absolute necessities of the real, {313} but nonetheless are more than just facts; they are that in which every factual reality is a fact. Every fact is necessarily produced in the cosmos and in history. The cosmos and history are thus like the necessary fact of all facts. Therefore, if I call the truths of fact *factual truths*, I may term these other truths—in order to give them some name—*factual truths*. The proper constitutive essence of every reality is a factual moment of it. Therefore, from this point of view there are not just two types of truths, but three. There are *truths of reason* (I retain the name, though it is inadequate); they are necessary truths of the real *qua* real, which does not in any sense mean that this necessity is *a priori*, nor strictly speaking absolute either. There are *factual truths*; they are truths of fact. I include among them every factual reality, with its laws; the laws are necessities “in” the factual. But there are *factual truths* which concern the necessity that in the real there be facticity. They are therefore truths which are prior to every factual truth. I just said that the factual comprises laws. But these laws are, as I said, necessities “in” the factual. On the other hand, the necessity “of” the factual is prior to every fact and to every law; it is just the factual, the necessity of the factual. The truths about the cosmos and history as such pertain to this type of truth.

But with all of the foregoing, the difference between these three types of truths (truths of reason, factual truths, factual truths) as truths is completely wrong if we deal with them formally as truths. And the reason is that this difference does not concern truth, but only the reality which is truthful. Now, truth is formally a moment, not of naked reality, but of the intellective actuality of the real. And as such, truth has an evidence {314} which is always necessary. It may be that this paper is white only in fact, and that it might not be so. But supposing that I have this white paper in my apprehension, it is just as evident and

necessary to intellectually know that this paper is white as to intellectually know that every effect has a cause, or that every fact has to be given in a cosmos and every event in a history. The difference between these three types, then, is not a difference of truth but of reality. And therefore to appeal to it is, with respect to the problem at hand, simply to step outside the question, because what we are here seeking is a difference of truths *qua* truths. The truth of fact is as truth just as necessary as the truth of reason *qua* truth. Nonetheless, there are different types of truth *qua* truth.

And from this very point of view, the conception which we are criticizing has even more serious effects. In the first place, it speaks to us of truths of immediate evidence and mediated evidence. But this difference is unacceptable. Usually one understands by “immediate evidence” that whose truth is grounded in the simple inspection of the predicate and the subject. But this is not the case. From the moment that intellection is a stepping back, its presumed connection is essentially and constitutively a connection which is given in a medium of intellection. The presumed simple inspection, however simple it may be, is always inspection in a medium, the medium of reality itself. The fact that there is no intermediary does not mean that the connection is not evident in a medium. The immediateness refers to the lack of a third term which establishes the connection; but there is a medium and a mediation in which this connection is established. Having confused *immediateness* with *immediacy* is a cardinal error.

But in the second place, the usual conceptualization understands {315} that evident truth consists in a mode of connection, wherein the content of the predicate is linked to the content of the subject. But in fact, nothing could be further from the truth, because affirmation as such, as we have seen, does not fall back upon these two contents and their connection, but upon the reality of the content of the subject and the realization in it of the content of the predicate. Therefore evident truth is not a conformity between two objective representations, but something essentially different, viz. the intentional conformity of my affirmation with the realization of the real. The constitutive *prius* of evidential demand is the *prius* of the real with respect to its coincidental actuality as real. That is, those instances of presumed immediate evidence are not immediate nor even evidences (they lack the moment of demand), which once again leaves the problem of the different types of evident truth *qua* truth as posed but not answered.

In the intellective actuality of the real, it is the real itself which “gives truth”, which makes truth or “truthifies”. Now, the real has different modes of making truth, and these different modes are just the different types

of truth *qua* truth. The forms of reality (of reason, factual, factual) are truths which differ according to their different form of coinciding actualization as such. There is a mode by which the real gives authenticity to what is affirmed in affirmation. In virtue of that I would say that the real makes truth as *authentication*. There is another mode according to which the real itself is what, so to speak, dictates to us what we must affirm of it. Let us recall the as early as Heraclitus the *logos* was something which the *sophos*, the wise man, had to “listen to”. In this regard it has for many, many years been the custom to interpret Heraclitus’ *logos* as the voice of things. Affirmation is a “verdict”, just what the word ‘judgement’ expresses. There is no word which is adequate {316} to express what I call “speaking [*dictar*] the truth”. If, for the sake of symmetry, and without any motive of employing the word outside of this context, I may be permitted to coin a new word, it should be the verb “to veridict”, to mean that the real has that mode of making truth in the judgement which I call *veridictant*. Finally, in truth as fulfillment—and I shall deal with it at length in Part Three—the real verifies the search for truth. The real then has that mode of making truth which is verification. In summary, *authentication*, *veridictance*, and *verification* are the three types of truth *qua* truth, i.e., the three modes by which the real is a *prius* in coincidental actuality.

Prescinding for the time being from the third mode, we may say that authenticity and what I have called conformity (which is veridictance) are two phases of truth, two forms of making truth. And for this very reason they are phases of a single movement in which, dynamically, the truth is formally constituted on an on-going basis. Therefore after having summarily examined each one of the phases in and by itself, it is necessary to confront the question of their unity; this is the problem of the unity of the phases of dual truth.

c) *Unity of the phases of dual truth*. Let us return to repeat some ideas. Every intellection is just intellectual actuality of the real. When this actuality is the actuality of something real in and by itself, the intellection is primordial apprehension of the real. As such that intellection has its real truth. When a thing is intellectually known which has already been apprehended as real, but “among” others, then the intellection is an intellection at a distance through stepping back; it is affirmative intellection or judgement. There one does not apprehend the real as real (that was already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality); rather, one intellectually knows what this real thing is {317} in reality. In that intellection we do not leave aside the intellectually known actuality of primordial apprehension; on the contrary, the intellection through stepping back takes place formally *within* this apprehension, but with its own character, movement. In

this movement the real thing already apprehended in primordial apprehension acquires a second actuality, viz. coinciding actuality. It is an actuality which happens in a movement. In this coinciding actuality the real acquires the character of seeming. As this movement is given within the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., within the radical intellectual actuality of the real in and by itself, it follows that seeming and being real, forged in the coincident actuality, are given in the same actuality of the real already apprehended as such. Actuality in coincidence, as coincidence of seeming grounded in real being, is dual truth. Therefore dual truth is something which “is not present” in a statement but which “happens” in an affirmative coincidental movement, because it is there that the coincidental actualization of the real happens. Hence it is that dual truth “happens”. The predicative verb “is”, when it exists, expresses the happening not of the real as such (that is a different problem), but the happening of the real actualized in coincidental actuality. There, then, seeming and being real coincide. And the possibility of intellectually knowing this unity is the moment of the *prius* of every intellectual actuality. In coincidental actuality this *prius* acquires that formal character which is demand. Demand, as I said, is coincidental actuality of the *prius* as such.

This actuality, and therefore this truth, is formally dynamic. They happen—let us repeat—in a movement which begins when we step back within a real thing in order to {318} know intellectually by retraction what it “might be” in reality, and then return intentionally to what it “is”. In this return, what the real is in reality is actualized as seeming. And its coincidence with the real already apprehended as such is the formal character of coincidental actuality, and therefore of the dual intellection of what the thing is in reality; the coincidence between seeming and being real is grounded on this. Such is the structurally dynamic character of dual truth.

The happening of this coinciding actuality has an essential character, and that is the “conformity” between what is intellectually known and the real. And this conformity is a dynamic conformation of the intellection, for the same reason that the coincidental actuality of the real is dynamic. This dynamism has, as we have seen, two phases. Above all, it is a conformity of what the real is in reality with what, in simple apprehension, we have intellectually known that it “might be”; it is conformity as authenticity. But it has a second phase, which I shall provisionally term ‘affirmative conformity’. As noted, this phrase is not strictly correct, because authenticity also is affirmative conformity. What I am calling ‘affirmative conformity’ we have already seen as veridictance (“speaking the truth”). Veridictance is affirmative conformity just as is authenticity. Therefore the unitary es-

sence of the two phases is in being *conformity*. In the actuality of conformity, the real is actualized according to the simple apprehension of what it might be; this is authenticity. It is the conformity of the real with respect to simple apprehension of what might be. In veridictance, it is conformity of what is intellectually known with the real. The two are both conformity, even if of different character. The first is the realization of a property in itself; the second is realization of this property in the {319} subject of the judgement. This is the dynamism of conformity of the phases: one goes from the authenticity of the predicate to its realization in the already-real subject. It is in this passing that the happening of dual truth as conformity consists. In its two phases it in fact deals with conformity. Therefore it is conformity itself which is essential and constitutively dynamic. Each moment of it is one of its phases. Conversely, the formal dynamic unity of authenticity and veridictance consists in being the happening of conformity. Conformity is what happens in a movement of conformation.

This is not all, however. On the basis of only what has been said, one might think that conformation is a movement, to be sure, but that the conformity itself, which the conformation conforms, is not. Nonetheless I say that the conformity is intrinsically and formally dynamic. How can this be, and why is it so?

In order to understand this it is necessary to make an essential distinction between two moments of dual truth: conformity and adequacy. The promiscuity with which these two words have traditionally been employed must not obscure the fundamental difference of what is designated by them; they are two very different moments of truthful judgements. In what does this difference consist? Hence does it arise? And above all, What is its intrinsic articulation? Here we have the three points which need to be elucidated; that will be the clarification of the structurally dynamic character of dual truth.

a) In the first place, in what does the difference consist? It is something well known. Conformity means that that which is affirmed of a real thing in the judgement is realized in it. And that happens both in what I have called 'authenticity' as well as in what I have called 'veridictance' (speaking the truth). But to be sure, this does not mean that what is affirmed will be realized in a real thing {320} in such form that there is a total recovery between simple apprehension, whose realization is effectively given in the thing, and what this thing is in reality. Only if there were this recovery would there be a strict "equation"; this is "ad-equacy". Conformity would then be more than mere conformity, it would be adequation. Conformity is always given in dual truth, but not adequation. If I say that this paper is white, I speak in conform-

mity with the paper. But this does not mean that the whiteness of the paper consists in pure and perfect whiteness. There is conformity, but not adequation. In order for there to be adequation, it is necessary to say not just "white" but "white in such-and-such degree", specified with infinite precision. To say "white" without further commentary does not adequately express the whiteness of the paper. Conformity is not just adequation. The difference between these two aspects of judgement is well known. Although in philosophy it is commonly said that the difference exists, the problem of its origin has not been posed, and this is especially true of the articulation of these two moments.

b) Whence arises the difference between conformity and adequation? A little reflection on what I have just said will disclose that the difference does not stem from the connection between the content of the predicate and the content of the subject. On the contrary, it stems from the fact that the subject is the real thing about which one judges, and that the predicate is the realization of simple apprehension in this real thing. Now, the real thing of which one judges has already been given in a primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the difference stems from the nature of dual truth as such. The real thing, in fact, is already there to be intellectually known with regard to what it is in reality. For this the intelligence takes that retractive stepping back which is simple apprehension; these simple apprehensions {321} of every order are innumerable. Now from among them, oriented by the other things from which I start in the process of simple apprehension, I select one by a free choice. Hence there is a double origin for inadequation.

Above all, the approximation to adequation is gradual; the conformity can go on becoming itself more and more adequate. But in addition to the gradual becoming, there is a moment which it is much more important to me to emphasize in a systematic way. It is that the movement of truth, let us not forget, has a directional character. And this means only that we intellectually know by going toward the real in a determinate direction; but it also means something essentially new. In the direction toward the real, in fact, the truths conformable with the real, but not adequate to it, constitute in their own conformity not so much a *representation* of the thing as a *focus* toward adequation. This means not that reality is such as I affirm it to be, but that even if it is so, the conformity itself is like the map of a road, whose truth consists in the fact that if I follow the road completely I will have found the adequation which I sought. Conformities are ultimately justified focuses. Taking each focus of these conformities, it turns out that they constitute an intentional scheme of adequate truth. Gradual becoming and directional focus are two characteristics of the dynamic unity of dual truth.

For these two reasons, which ultimately are one, simple apprehension and therefore the affirmation of its realization are not necessarily adequate to the real even if they are conformable to it. There is no “equation”; such is the origin of the difference which we study. It is not owing to the connection between the {322} content of the predicate and the content of the subject but to the character of an intellection that steps back from what the thing, already real, is in reality. Only the difference between primordial apprehension of reality and intellection in stepping back from what it is in reality, is the origin of the difference between conformity and adequation.

c) With this we have taken a decisive step in our problem: we have struck upon the very point and mode in which conformity and adequation are articulated. If philosophy has not in the past made an issue of the origin of the difference of these two moments of truth, we should not be surprised that it has not made an issue of the articulation between them. The primordial apprehension of reality actualizes the real to us as that which we are supposed to intellectually know in an intellectual movement that steps back. A real thing is “placed”, but placed “among” other realities in order to intellectually know by stepping back what it is in reality. This intellection is therefore a movement which goes “from” other things “toward” what the real thing is in reality as terminus of intellection. As terminus of the “toward”, the real thing is the “goal” of intellectual movement. Now, in this movement the proper *intentum* of simple apprehension of reality remains, as we have seen, distended in *intention*. And in this distention the intention is not just an *intentum*, distended by stepping back, but is an intention in a peculiar “toward”. The “toward” points to the real thing already placed. In this regard the formal terminus of the “toward” is adequation. This is the radical structurally dynamic moment of dual truth, adequation as terminus of the direction of the intellection in the “toward”. But, how does this intentional movement take place? It does so step by step. And each of these steps is a terminus of a phase of the {323} intentional movement toward adequation. Each phase is therefore also intentional. But the terminus of this intention of phases isn’t the real thing “placed” by primordial apprehension, but what at each step we intellectually know of the thing in conformity with it. We go on intellectually knowing what the thing is in reality in diverse simple apprehensions, each realized in the real thing. But none is realized adequately. The fact that each of these is realized in the real thing is just what comprises conformity. The intention of affirmative movement has thus unfolded into two intentional moments: the intention directed toward the real thing placed by primordial apprehension, and the intention conformable (in each of its phases) with what the thing is. In the affirmative inten-

tion there are, then, two intentions, or rather two different intentional phases. Therefore the “conformable” intentions are but the system of phases in which the final intention of the “toward” progressively becomes more adequate. This unity of the two intentional moments is, then, formally and structurally dynamic: the conformity in the intentional phase of the final intention that is adequate to the thing, which has been placed for the affirmative intellection. Each phase of conformity is the inadequate coincidental actuality of seeming and of being real (the foundation of seeming); therefore this coincidence is but an intentional moment toward the coincidental actuality which is adequate to the real thing in its fullness, given in the primordial apprehension of reality. Here we have the precise articulation between conformity and adequation.

This articulation is, then, essentially dynamic. The conformity is in itself the unity as phases of the two phases themselves, the phase of authenticity and the phase of veridictance; and this conformity is in turn a phase toward adequation, which is formally the final terminus {324} of the intellectual movement. Each conformity is a direction toward adequation; such is the dynamic structure of dual truth *qua* truth. Heraclitus even told us (fragment 93) that the Delphic Oracle does not declare or hide, but indicates, signifies (*semainei*) what is going to happen. This is the nature of dual truth, that each conformity points toward the same adequation.

The foregoing is proper to every dual truth. To say that this paper is white is a conformity which gradually points more and more to the white which is adequate to that of this paper. All judgements, as conformity, point towards a remote adequation, off in the distance. This cannot be achieved by any intellectual movement. The adequate color is given as such-and-such a color in the impression of reality of primordial apprehension; but it is not there given to us as formally adequate. In order to apprehend it adequately we need an intellectual movement which continues to make more and more precise the real whiteness of the paper. When we move towards this goal in an intellectual movement, we continue actualizing moments of richness in conformity with what is the real whiteness of the paper. But to reach the goal adequately in this dynamic intellection is a never-ending and therefore unrealizable task. For the intellection in movement, the adequation will always be a far-off goal. Hence every truthful judgement, every dual truth, is structurally an approximation; it is the gradual approximation to the real, an approximation each of whose moments is a conformity. Every dual truth is therefore intrinsically and structurally approximate within reality, approximate to what an adequate truth should be. This approximation is a movement which slides over the real as given in primordial apprehension. {325} This is what makes it difficult to concep-

tualize that its dual actuality is formally dynamic.

What is this approximation? The approximation is always something gradual. But this does not mean that each degree of it is a type of falsity or deficiency. There are different types of approximation. In the example cited of the white paper, clearly “white” is inadequate because it only more or less approximates the real color of the paper, and this approximation consists in each degree being only a type of degree of accuracy, i.e., each degree is in itself a falsehood, a deficiency. But it is not necessary that things always be this way. Every inaccuracy is an approximation, but not every approximation is an inaccuracy. And this is essential in order to understand other types of judgements, for example those of mathematics and mathematical truth.

I am not referring to the so-called “mathematics of approximation”, but to the “mathematics of precision” as it were which yields properties which are strictly true of mathematical reality: numbers, figures, etc. Are these true judgements approximations? Clearly they are not in the sense of a degrees of inaccuracy. But there is an approximation of a different type than degree. What is it? In perceptive realities that reality is “placed” into primordial apprehension of reality as the terminus of a movement which adequately recovers it. Indeed, reality and adequate truth are not the same thing because adequate truth is only reality as terminus of an intellectual movement which achieves and recovers reality which has already been primordially apprehended. With respect to mathematical realities, these realities are something “placed” by a double act: a “definition” of *what* that reality is, and a “postulate” of its *reality*. Now, {326} mathematical intellection renders judgements of these realities thus defined and postulated which are strictly true. Are they approximations? In order to respond to this question we must agree on the terminus of that presumed approximation. That terminus is just what is defined and postulated. The intellectual movement here pronounces judgements which are strictly necessary and therefore true. But that is not the question at hand, because that strict necessity concerns only conformity. And our question is in knowing if these properties themselves, which are strictly conformable to the thing, adequately recover that to which they refer, for example a number or a figure. For this it is necessary to know what that figure or that number “is”. But the question already has a disconcerting air. What does this “is” mean here? Because apart from the fact that these “things” can be understood in different ways, and therefore “be” in a way which is not univocal (a straight line can be understood either as the shortest path or as the line which has all of its points in the same direction, etc.), the strangeness of the question lies in the fact that all of these things are at the outset

those which we have defined and postulated. And here the difficulty arises, because these “things” are not what they are through being defined and postulated in an isolated way, each independent of the others; rather, it is by each of them being what it is *within* the definition and postulate which structures the whole group to which they belong. This is essential. No mathematical “entity” is what it is except within a complete defined and postulated group, and only in reference to it does the apprehension of any one of the mathematical entities in question make sense. Each thing is but an “aspect” of this totality, an aspectual realization of what is defined and postulated. The mathematical world {327} is not a juxtaposition of mathematical entities each defined and postulated by itself; rather, each of those entities only is an entity within the complete group and as a moment of it. Thus, each figure is the figure from a space, etc.; each number belongs to a field of numbers, etc. Each mathematical “thing” receives its reality only from this aspectual character. Now, if that group had no structural properties other than those defined and postulated, every mathematical judgement would be true in the sense of being just an aspect, and therefore everything defined and postulated would be adequately apprehended in each thing. But this is not the case. Gödel’s theorem shows that the whole thus postulated and defined necessarily has properties which go beyond what was defined and postulated. This definition and these postulates in fact pose questions which are not resolvable with them alone. And therefore these solutions are just the discovery of properties which go beyond what was defined and postulated. Then the adequate intellection of each thing in this whole is left, at each step, outside of what was defined and postulated, properties which intellectual movement does not achieve. These properties are not just “more” definitions and postulates, but rather are necessary properties of the thing and confer upon its reality a distinct structure in the complete whole. As each thing is not intelligible except as an aspect of this whole, it follows that each thing is a mode of reality, which is in some way distinct, on the basis of which it could be apprehended in a fully adequate movement. In virtue of that, each necessary conformity is an inexorable approximation to an adequation which goes beyond the thing defined and postulated. There is no approximation of inaccuracy, but there is approximation of the aspects. Were mathematics no more than a {328} system of theorems and demonstrations linked together logically, the difference between conformity and adequation would be nothing but a conceptual subtlety. But mathematics isn’t that; it is the intellection of mathematical realities, endowed with their own structure. It is for this reason that, as I see it, Gödel’s theorem does not refer only to postulated “reality”, but shows that with respect to it, every mathematical truth is an aspectual approxima-

tion, because that reality has a proper translogical “structure”.

We cannot investigate this question further here. There are types of approximation which are different than the approximation of inaccuracy and approximation of the aspects. That depends on the different types of reality, which is the problem we are not going to discuss here.

In summary, every real truth without exception is, like conformity, the happening of the dynamic approximation to adequation.

Now, this does not only happen with every dual truth. The fact is that it happens with intellectualive movement as such. The intellection of the real “among” other realities is by its own structure a dynamism of approximation to real truth. That is, “the truth” as such is a gigantic intellectualive movement toward what “the real” is “in reality” in a directional focus, schematic and gradual. And not just every dual truth, but also “the” dual truth is an approximation to “the” real truth. This is the whole of work human knowledge, viz. intellectualive approximation to reality.

With this we have completed our summary analysis of dual truth. Dual truth is the quality of an affirmative intention in which what a thing is in reality is coincidentally actualized in the intellection {329} “among” others. When, in this coinciding, seeming is grounded in real being, then the affirmation is truthful. This affirmation and its truth have a formally dynamic structure: the actualization takes place in a medium, in accordance with a determined direction and a dynamic structure. Dual truth is, then, constitutively dynamic precisely because it concerns coincidental actuality. On the other hand real truth, as we saw, is intellectualive actualization of the real in and by itself. They are, then, two types of truth. But these two types are not merely juxtaposed. Various times I have alluded to their internal articulation. Now it is necessary to expand this allusion into a summary conceptualization of the intrinsic and formal unity of real truth and dual truth.

3

The Unity of Truth

In what sense do I speak of the unity of truth? Let us briefly review the basic ideas. We are not dealing with the unity of phases of dual truth but with the unity of the two modes of truth, viz. simple truth and dual truth. Both truths have first and foremost the unity which just being

true confers upon them: they are true, and hence are mere intellectualive actuality of the real. Insofar as what is actualized is real, it constitutes what we may, without further ceremony, call *reality*; insofar as this real is intellectually actualized it constitutes *truth*. These two moments of the real are not identical; but as we have seen, neither are they independent. Nor are they simply correlative; rather, they are seen to be intrinsically and formally {330} grounded in each other. Truth is always and only truth of the real; but it is not possible to think that reality is just the correlate of truth. The real, by being what it is *de suyo*, gives its truth to intellection, and is what makes truth therein. The real is then *truthful reality* (in the sense of “truthifying” or making truth), or reality “in truth”.

This intellectualive actualization of the real has in turn two moments: it is actuality of the real thing, and it is actuality of the field of reality which that thing determines. Truth is thus constitutively truth of a thing and truth within a field.

This “and” of the two moments can in turn be actualized in two modes, and therefore truth also has those two modes. One is that mode in accordance with which the real is intellectually actual in and by itself. This means that its two moments, individual and field, are actualized *unitarily*; it is a direct apprehension of the real thing, immediate and compact. The intellectualive actualization is then what I have called *real* or *simple truth*, in the sense that the real is actualized in and by itself. But there is another mode, that in accordance with which a real thing is actualized, not in and by itself, but “among” others. The thing is, to be sure, actualized as a “real” individual, but its field moment encompasses the other things. Hence this actualization of the real has two aspects. On one hand we have the thing as intellectually known, but on the other its unity with individual formality is problematic. As this unity is what the real thing is “in reality”, it follows that what is problematic in this actualization is found in what the real thing is “in reality”. I leave aside the attentive intellection for obvious reasons. {331} The intellection of the real is then dual; it is an intellectualive movement of affirmation that comes from stepping back, in which the real is actualized in coincidental actuality. This coincidental actuality is just *dual truth*.

Therefore truth is always and only intellectualive actualization of the real. The two modes of truth, simple truth and dual truth, have above all the unity which being true confers upon them, i.e., being intellectualive actualization of the real *qua* intellectualive. But this is not enough to speak of the unity of truth, because it could be treating of two types of truth, i.e., of two types of actualization. And this is not the case; there is an intrinsic unity, even a formal

one, of the two modes of truth, in virtue of which those two modes of actualization are not just “species” but in fact “modes” of actualizing. The actualization itself is intrinsically modalized. And this modalization is expressed in a second character of unity. The first was the unity which consists in the fact that both are intellectual actualization. The second is that these two actualizations are not independent. Coinciding actualization of dual truth bears intrinsically and formally in its bosom the simple truth of the real. It is necessary to stress the formal presence of real or simple truth in every dual truth. This presence is twofold: in the first place, because the real truth of that of which one judges is intrinsically present to dual truth; and in the second, because dual truth is found to be based on the medium of intellection and the medium of intellection is the real truth of the field. Affirmative intellection is in fact possible only by virtue of primordial apprehension of reality, and takes place in a medium which is also real truth. Hence every dual truth is always and only *modulation* of the simple truth of {332} the real. But this simple truth is not just a foundation which is intrinsically *present* to the dual truth, but in that duality the real acquires, so to speak, its internal unfolding, the unfolding which consists in actualizing what the real thing is in reality. Simple truth is then *inchoatively* a dual truth. But the modulation of the simple truth, and the inchoate character of the dual truth, still point to a third unity more profound than *mere actuality* and *simple dependence*. What is this unity?

The fact is that the actualization of the real *qua* actualization is constitutively open. The *openness* is the intrinsic and formal unity of the two modes of truth; moreover, it is a character of all truth, both simple and dual. Modulating and being inchoate are the expression of openness. This is the third and radical character of the unity of truth. On what is the openness grounded? In what does the openness, as a moment of actualization in itself, consist? What is the ambit of this openness? Here we have the three points to which we must briefly attend.

a) On what is the openness grounded? The openness of which we are here dealing is a mode of actuality, and as such formally affects intellection as such. If our intellections were no more than a simultaneous addition or a succession of various acts of intellectually knowing, there would be no reason to speak of openness. But this is not the case, because the formal and radical terminus of intellectual actuality is the impression of reality; i.e., the intellection in which the real is actualized is constitutively sentient. And the very impression of reality is formally open; it is, as we have already seen in Part I, the transcendental of the impression of reality. Thus the diversity of intellections can at times be the unfolding of the same impression of reality. It is in this {333} unfolding that the

real is actualized not just in and by itself, but also “among” other real things. Hence it follows that the primary intellectual apprehension of the real makes the turning toward other intellectual apprehensions necessary. And this turning is precisely the openness, or rather, the expression of the openness; every intellection is a turning, and is a turning because it is constitutively open, and is constitutively open because it is constitutively sentient. And as the intellectual actuality of the real is truth, it follows that the openness of intellection is openness of truth and to truth. Because the intellection is sentient, truth is constitutively open. Each truth implies the others and is inchoatively turned to them. The openness is the radical condition in accordance with which all the real is apprehended, either actually or inchoatively, among other realities.

b) In what does this openness consist? In the sentient actuality of the real, the real is actualized in the unity of its two moments, the individual and the field. Now, the openness of the real which is of interest to us here is found formally in its moment of being in a field. Everything real is actually or incipiently open to what is within a field. Therefore its intellectual actuality, its truth, also is so. Every actuality is either actually or incipiently open. And this diversity is apprehended intellectually in two modes: the unitary mode and the differential mode. As we already know, in the unitary mode the apprehension of reality involves the field moment in a compact unity with the individual moment, whereas in the differential mode the field moment is autonomized by an intellectual movement that unpacks it. In both cases we are dealing with the same formal structure, viz. the structure of “fieldness”, i.e., of the nature of the field. But it is necessary carefully to avoid a possible point of confusion. {334} Since intellection “in” the field of reality, as we have seen, is dynamic, it might seem that every intellection is formally dynamic. And this is completely false, because the dynamism is not proper to the structure of every intellection, but only that of intellection that steps back in a field, i.e. of the intellection of the real “among” other realities. To be sure, in every intellection there is or can be dynamism. But this does not contradict what I just said, because in the primordial apprehension of reality there can be dynamism because there is actualization, i.e. because it is already intellection. Such is the case, for example, with the effort to be attentive; while it takes place in differential intellectual movement, an actualization is produced because there is dynamism. In this case it is intellectual movement which determines the intellectual actualization of the real. That is, intellection is not formally dynamic; only dual intellection is formally dynamic. The primordial apprehension of reality is not formally dynamic because it is not formal apprehension of the real “among”

other realities. What happens is that the real, in and by itself, is incipiently open to being actualized among other realities. Therefore its intellection isn't formally dynamic, but only so consequent upon the primary actualization of the real; but it is incipiently open to being actualized in intellectual movement, in dynamism, a dynamism of re-actualization. The reason is clear: all of the real is incipiently intellectually known according to what it is in reality. And since this intellection, when it is an intellectual movement, is already formally dynamic by being so, it follows that the intellection of the real, even though not always formally dynamic, is nonetheless always incipiently open to a dynamic intellection.

Having said this, it is clear that the openness of which we are here speaking {335} formally consists in "fieldness", i.e., the nature of being in a field. Dual truth is formally and constitutively open by being actuality of the real in its moment of fieldness, in the ambit of reality. This is the third point to which we must attend.

c) The ambit of openness is the ambit of truth as a whole. In fact, every simple truth is incipiently open to a dynamic truth, and each moment of this dynamic truth is a moment of conformity which is structurally open to adequation with reality itself, open to "the" truth. But this openness to "the" truth has various aspects, because the openness of truth is but the openness of the actualization of the real, and therefore is but the openness of the field aspect of the real itself as real. There is an aspect of the real which is of cosmic character; every truth is in this aspect a truth open to all of the other cosmic truths. But there is in the real another moment, the transcendental moment, that moment which concerns the real *qua* real. Now, as we saw in Part I, this transcendental character is formally and constitutively open. The real *qua* real is not something already and necessarily concluded. It is, on the contrary, a characteristic which is not *a priori*, but really grounded in the real characteristic of the type of reality. This transcendental order is, then, constitutively open. Therefore, if we call the truth of the cosmic unity of the real 'science', and we call the truth of the transcendental unity of the real 'philosophy', it will be necessary to say that this difference of types of knowing depends essentially on the nature of the known real. Science and philosophy are open truth. Human knowing is the enormous actualization of this constitutive cosmic-transcendental openness of the real.

Naturally, not every truth is scientific or philosophical in the foregoing sense. {336} But every truth involves actuality of the real within a field. Therefore man is an animal open not only to thousands of modes of knowing, but to something more profound. In contrast to a pure animal, which is an animal of "closed" life, man is rather

the animal open to every form of reality. But as the animal of realities, man not only is an animal whose life is open, but above all the animal intellectually actualizing the openness itself of the real as real. Only on account of this is his life open. Sentient intelligence, that modest faculty of impression of reality, thus actualizes in the human animal the entire openness of the real as real. Intelligence actualizes the openness of the real. In turn—but this is not our subject—when it arises from a sentient intelligence, the real itself is open, but it is another type of reality *qua* reality.

What is this openness to the real? One might think that it is the openness to being. If that were the case, man would be the comprehendor of being. But he isn't. Man is the sentient apprehendor of the real. Truth is not the truth of being nor of the real as it is, but the truth of the real as real. Therefore, the problems posed to us include not only that of "truth and reality" but the serious problem of "truth, reality and being". After having examined what truth is, and what the truth of the real is (in its diverse forms and in its primary unity) we must pose to ourselves the third problem: truth, reality, and being.

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§3

TRUTH, REALITY, AND BEING

Every truth, we said, is intellectual actuality of the real *qua* intellectual. Now, this actuality assumes two forms: the truth of the primordial apprehension of reality and the truth of affirmation. These two forms are unitarily the two forms of openness of the intellection to a *real thing*. But philosophy up to now has not understood matters in this way. It has rather been thought that that to which intellection is firmly open is *being*. This conceptualization is determined by an analysis only of dual truth. All of intellection is thus centered in affirmation, and in addition affirmation is identified with predicative affirmation of the type, "A is B"; every other possible form of intellection would be a latent type of predication. Seeing this white color would be a latent way of affirming that this color "is" white. This predicative judgement has been the guiding thread of the accepted analysis of intellection. Nonetheless, I do not think that this conceptualization is viable. Above all, because judgement itself, not only in its predicative form but also as affirmation, does not fall back upon the "is" designated as a copulative but upon the "real". The truth of an affirmation is not primarily and formally truth of what "is" but of the "real". Moreover, the fact is that there is an intellection of reality

which is not affirmative, and which despite its undeniable originality and priority contemporary philosophy has passed over. This of course is the primordial apprehension of reality. And the primordial apprehension of reality is not a type of latent intellectual affirmation. {338} First, because this primordial apprehension isn't affirmation, and second because this apprehension does not fall back upon being. Its formal terminus is not substantive being, the so-called substantive being is not the formal terminus of primordial apprehension; its terminus is rather the real in and by itself. Therefore the truth of primordial apprehension of reality is not truth about substantive being but about substantive reality. Reality, then, is not being, and the truth about reality is not the truth about being. Nonetheless, despite the fact that being is not formally and primarily included in the intellection of the real, it has an internal articulation with the real in the structure of every intellection. Therefore if we seek to analyze the nature of truth, we must proceed step-by-step. We must first of all see that affirmation, and therefore its truth, are not affirmation and truth of being but of reality. Then we must see that primary intellection, i.e., the primordial apprehension of the real, does not apprehend substantive being but reality. Its truth is what I have called 'real truth'. But since being, despite not constituting the formal terminus of intellection can be included in some way in every intellection, we must determine the positive structure of every truth as such according to the internal articulation of its two moments of reality and being.

Thus, three questions are posed for us:

A) Affirmation as affirmation of reality. This is the problem of "truth and copulative being".

B) Primordial apprehension as intellection of reality. This is the problem "truth and substantive being".

C) Internal structure of the truth of intellection in its two moments of reality and being. This is in all its generality the problem of "truth, reality, and being".

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1

Truth and Copulative Being

Judgement, as we have seen, has three different forms: predicative, propositional, and positional.

a) Let us begin by analysis of the predicative judgement "A is B", which is the guiding thread of the entire classic conceptualization of truth in its unity with being. Upon what does this judgement rest? We have already seen that the "is" has three different functions. It signifies

the "relation" in which A and B are. That is properly what has given rise to the word 'copula'; this is copulative being. But the "is" has another more profound function, one which is prior to the foregoing; this is the function of expressing the very connection between A and B, i.e., their "connective unity". But besides this and prior to expressing this connective unity, the "is" expresses affirmation as such. And these three functions have a precise order of foundation, as we have also seen. The copula is grounded in a connection: only because A and B are in connective unity do they acquire sufficient functional autonomy to give rise to the relation of B and A. But in turn, this connective unity does not constitute predicative judgement; what constitutes predicative judgement is the affirmation of said connective unity, and therefore of the copulation. Predicative judgement consists in affirming that the unity A-B is in the terminus of the judgement. Therefore our whole problem centers on this primary function, to wit, on the "is" as affirmation. What is this affirmation?

We are not asking about the structure of the act of predicative intention but rather about what {340} is predicated itself as such, i.e., we are asking ourselves about the "is" to which the copula alludes. What does this copula fall back upon?

To be sure, it does not fall back upon some objectivity; the "is" does not consist in "objectively it is thus". Being is more than objectivity. There has been a tendency to think that the "is" of affirmation falls back upon the "being" of what is affirmed. Predicative affirmation would then fall back upon the being of A, of B, and of their connection. Only later would it be able to express the relation. Leaving aside for the moment this "relational" aspect of the copula, we may ask ourselves: Does predicative affirmation fall back upon being? Certainly not. That upon which the predicative affirmation falls back is the reality of A, of B, and of their connective unity. On the other hand, according to the generally accepted interpretation, affirmation would fall back upon the being of A, and upon the being of B. Formally, these two beings have nothing to do with each other, because being A isn't being B, nor conversely. Therefore the being to which the copula 'is' would allude would be the unity of those two beings. In this unity the being of A and the being of B would be modified by their connective unity. Thus it is understood that the being of A-B would be a rigorously copulative being. Affirmation would consist in affirming copulatively the unity of the two beings, A and B. But this is not correct. Affirmation and its "is" do not fall back directly and formally upon the being of A, of B, and of their connection, but rather upon the reality of A, of B, and of their connection. In predicative affirmation there is certainly a connection, however, it is not a connection of beings, but a

real connection or constitution; it is *B* being realized in the reality of *A*. That *A*, *B*, and their unity are presented to us as “being” does not mean that my affirmation falls back upon this “being”, upon being itself, nor is it grounded on being. But it falls back upon the real—with however much “being” one may like—but {341} only insofar as it is real. We are not dealing with a thing, the *res* as *res essente qua essente*, as *res essente qua res*. We saw this in the analysis of affirmation. That of which one affirms is always the real already apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. This real is “re-intellegized” among other real things. And the unity of this intellection is in the field moment of reality. The medium of intellection at a distance (by stepping back) is not being but reality within a field. And affirmation itself consists in affirming the realization of the simple apprehension *B* in the reality *A* already primordially apprehended. When this affirmation is predicative the intellectual movement has its own character—it is a *gathering together*. Permit me to explain. Predicative affirmation, like all affirmation, is a dual intellection; it intellectually knows a real thing among others and from others. But it is dual in a second aspect proper only to predicative affirmation, because that thing which one intellectually knows is present in what is intellectually known, but only “in connection” with it. Every judgement is affirmation of a realization of the simple apprehension in that about which one judges. And when this realization has a connective character, there are two dualities: the duality proper to affirmation as intellection at a distance, by stepping back, and the duality of the connective unity of *B* and *A*. This second duality is what is peculiar about predicative judgement. Predicative affirmation consists in affirming the unity of this duality. In virtue of it, the intellectual movement of affirming *B* in *A* (or what comes to the same, the realization of *B* in *A*) is, *qua* act, an act of connection; and it is this connective act *qua* act which I term ‘gathering together’ [Sp. *colegir*] in the etymological sense of “reuniting with” [Lat. *collegere*], and not in the usual sense of inferring or something similar. Intellectual movement through stepping back is now a movement that gathers together. In this gathering together one intellectually knows the connective real itself. The real is now {342} actualized intellectually in the collecting. The real is intellectually known in the connective structure of its actuality, it is intellectually actualized, in the movement of gathering together. If one wishes, every judgement affirms a realization, and when the reality itself is connective, this realization is intellectually known in being gathered together. This gathering together is not just another form of movement, but constitutes in movement itself a moment which is proper to intellection. What is known intellectually through gathering together is the real in its connective unity; this real is what is affirmed in the “direct mode”.

But affirmation through gathering together affirms the connective real in the copula “is”. What is this “is”? The “is” does not constitute affirmation. As affirmation, affirmation is constituted only as affirmation of the real. But the “is” nonetheless has its own meaning; it expresses the affirmed real *qua* affirmed. This expressing does not mean either the real or its truth, but what is affirmed *qua* affirmed. Affirmation, we have seen, is intellection by stepping back in intellectual movement. Therefore affirmation is a coincidental actuality between the realm of intelligence and the realm of the real. So when affirmation is connective, the coinciding is actualization in a gathering together. Then the copulation is not just gathering together or reuniting *B* and *A*, but above all reuniting or gathering together the intellection and the connective reality itself. The terms of the copulation are intelligence and what is affirmed. The copulative “is” expresses this unity of intelligence and the real through gathering together. This unity is what is affirmed “*qua* affirmed”. Then one thing is clear: as the “is” expresses the real thing affirmed *qua* affirmed, it follows that the “is” is based upon reality and not the other way around. This is the ulteriority of being with respect to reality. Now, in affirmation we intellectually know the real as distanced, {343} as given in by stepping back in the form of an impression of reality. Therefore “being” is the expression of a primary impression of reality. Affirmation does not intellectually know in a direct mode the being of the real, but rather the reality itself; but it intellectually knows in an indirect mode the being of the real. The obliquity is precisely what the idea of expression designates. Affirmation affirms reality in a direct mode and in an indirect mode the expression of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed, i.e., being. How? That is the essential question. We shall see how subsequently; but in any case we can already see clearly what I said many pages back: the dialectic of being is grounded in a dialectic of reality. And this grounding is what, in this case, the verb ‘to express’ designates. Being and its dialectic are but the expression of the real and of its connective dialectic. The element of predicative judgement is not being but reality. Therefore its truth is not the truth of being but the truth of the real.

But this is not the only problem with the conceptualization we are discussing. We are trying to see if, in fact, judgement is formally the place of being and of its truth. I have sought to make it clear that this is not the case for predicative judgement. But there is another more fundamental problem conjoined with this one, and that is that not every judgement is predicative. What happens with the other two forms of judgement, propositional judgement and positional judgement?

b) Contemporary philosophy has not occupied itself as it should have with these forms of judgement; rather it

has simply taken for granted that they are but incipient forms of intellection of what the affirmed “is”. Now, that is not true, and indeed therein one can see quite clearly the non-universality of “copulative-being” as the character of every intellective act. There are intellections, in fact, in which the copulative “is” does not intervene even in an incipient way. This is what we must now summarily discuss. {344}

What I have called ‘propositional judgement’ is what constitutes the meaning of a nominal phrase. This type of phrase lacks a verb. Classical philosophy, as we have already said, did not consider this type of proposition. At most, when any thought was given to it, people considered such propositions as incipient predicative judgements. To say, “woman, variable” would be an ellipsis for “a woman is something variable”. But this is completely untenable. No linguist would today agree that a nominal sentence carries in some elliptical sense an understood copula. The linguist thinks, and with reason, that a nominal phrase is an original and irreducible type of a-verbal sentence. There are two types of phrases: verbal and a-verbal; both are ways of affirmation essentially irreducible. In the second there is no verbal ellipsis. This is clearer when sentences with verbal ellipsis are most frequent, for example in classical Sanskrit. But together with them there are strictly nominal phrases without verbal ellipsis; for example in the *Veda* and the *Avesta* nominal phrases are rarely elliptical. And this is essential for two reasons. First, because of what I just said: a nominal phrase is in itself and by itself a non-verbal sentence. It lacks, then, copulative being. But it is not therefore incipient predication. Philosophy has traditionally reflected upon judgements which lack a subject (the so-called ‘impersonal’ judgements) or upon judgements which lack a predicate (the so-called ‘existential’ judgements), though with poor results. But it has never occurred to anyone to think that there might be judgements without a copula. Now, the nominal phrase lacks a copula, and nonetheless is a judgement in the strictest sense of the term. And this discloses to us the second reason why the theory of incipient judgement is untenable. A nominal phrase, in fact, not only lacks a copula; but just on account of that, as we have seen, {345} affirms reality with much more force than if the verb “is” were employed. To say, “Woman, variable” is to affirm the reality of variability in a way that is much stronger than saying “a woman is variable”. The nominal phrase is an explicit affirmation of reality without any copula. And this shows once again that the formal part of judgement is not the copulative affirmation of the “is”, but the affirmation of the real as reality.

This is even clearer if we consider positional judgement, which is the real intellectually known as “being”, for example “fire”, “rain”, etc. But it is not this being

which is affirmed in the direct mode; rather what is affirmed in direct mode is the real apprehended in primordial apprehension, as primary and complete realization of a simple apprehension. That of which one judges is the real in and by itself, but without previous denominative qualification. Therefore there is only a single noun. And this is even more true than may at first glance be supposed, because the copulative “is” is not limited to being absent as in the nominal phrase and the propositional judgement; rather there are facts which are much more important to our problem. Indeed, there are languages which lack the copula “is”, or if they have it, it never has the copulative function in them. But despite this affirmations about the real are made in them. They are not Indo-European languages. The theory of affirmation has been grounded exclusively upon Indo-European languages, and within that group, upon the Hellenic *logos*, Aristotle’s celebrated *logos apophantikos*. And this has led to a false generalization, to thinking that the “is” is the formally constitutive moment of all affirmation. To be sure, since we express ourselves in languages which derive from the Indo-European trunk, it is not possible for us to eliminate the verb “is” from our sentences, {346} and we necessarily have to say that this or that thing “is” real, etc. In the same way Greek philosophy itself, from Parmenides to Aristotle, had to use sentences in which one says “being *is* immobile”, etc. Here the “is” appears twice, once as that of which some predicates are affirmed, and once as the copula itself which affirms them. These two meanings have nothing to do with each other —something which clearly manifests the great limitation of the Indo-European sentence in this type of problem. Since the world’s languages have already been created, the essential point is not to confuse this historical and structural necessity of the Indo-European family with the conceptualization of affirmation itself. So leaving aside being as that which is affirmed, what is important to us here is that very act of its affirmation, the copulative “is”, is not constituted by affirmation about being. To be sure, affirmation falls back upon the real as something “being”, but “reality” is being; it is not the case that “being” is reality. It is the real given as realization of a simple apprehension, but it is not the real given as such-and-such reality, qualified and proposed for some ulterior act of another simple apprehension. It would be absurd to pretend that when I exclaim, “Fire!”, I am saying, “This is fire”. That would be just a translation of my exclamation, and a poor one to boot. The exclamatory affirmation does not fall back upon being, but upon the real. And once again, this affirmation affirms reality with much more force than its translation into a copulative sentence. It could be translated better by saying, “It is on fire”. But the affirmation of reality is clearly much weaker than in the exclamation without the “is”.

Nonetheless, both positional affirmation and propositional affirmation affirm the real in a direct mode, {347} but at one and the same time affirm, in an indirect mode, their expression as “being”. The exclamation is *in itself* the expression of the real *qua* affirmed; it involves being as an expression of the impression of reality. That is to say, in copulative judgement as well as in propositional and positional judgement, there is a properly and formally constitutive moment, to wit, reality; but there is also a congeneric moment so to speak, which is the expression of what is intellectually known as being. How is this possible? One might think that it stems from the fact that while affirmation does not consist either expressly or incipiently in a copulatively known “is”, that of which one judges, the real, consists in being a “substantive being”, as opposed to the copulative being which is only given in judgement. Truth would then be the truth of substantive being affirmed in copulative being. Now, that is impossible. We have seen that judgement does not formally consist in the copulative “is”. Let us now examine if the real of which one judges consists, *qua* judged, in substantive being.

2

Truth and Being of the Substantive

I dealt with this problem in Part I, following along the lines of the discussion I devoted to it in *On Essence*. But for greater clarity I shall repeat what has already been said.

That of which one judges is the real apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. It is the primary and radical form of intellection, anterior therefore to all possible {348} judgement, and something that falls back upon the real in and by itself. Therefore its truth is not the truth of either conformity or adequation as in a judgement; rather, it is purely and simply real truth. What we now ask ourselves is if this apprehension and its real truth fall back formally upon a thing insofar as it has being. As a real thing is substantive, the stated question is identical to asking whether the terminus of primordial apprehension and its real truth is a thing as substantive being. That was the idea of all of philosophy after Parmenides: affirmation states what the real is as substantive being. But to me, this is untenable. Intellection, primarily and radically, simply apprehends the real in and by itself as reality. The so-called ‘substantive being’ is, to be sure, in this intellection, but only as a moment grounded in the formality of reality. To think that reality is a mode other than being substantive is, as I shall explain forthwith, an

enormous *entification of reality*. To see this more clearly, let us summarize briefly what the real is which we apprehend primordially, what being is, what substantive being is, and why the intellection of reality is at one and the same time intellection of the real and of its substantive being, i.e., what being real truth is.

a) We need not directly treat of the real *qua* real; that is a metaphysical problem. We are asking about the real in and by itself, but only insofar as it is apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. In this primordial apprehension what is apprehended has the formality of reality; it is not a stimulus but rather something real, i.e., it is apprehended not as a sign for response but as something *de suyo*. This *de suyo* is not some logical necessity, so to speak, but rather means only that the moments of what is apprehended pertain to it not by virtue of the response {349} which it can elicit, but as something “of its own”. Because of language constraints, we express this by saying that what is apprehended “is” of itself what it is and how it is. But here the “is” does not designate the formal and proper character of what is apprehended, as we have already seen. What is apprehended is reality, and not being, in the strict sense of the word.

This difference between reality and being we have considered up to now only in a negative way: reality is not being. Subsequently we shall view the nature of this difference in a positive way.

Let us consider a piece of iron. We repeat once again: it has such-and-such properties. But these properties are not the being of the iron, but the iron itself, the ferric reality; not “being iron” but “ferric reality”. And the same happens if what one desires to say is that the iron exists. Reality is the *de suyo*, and therefore is beyond the difference between essence and existence in the classical sense. Essence and existence concern only the content of what is apprehended; but the *de suyo* is neither content nor formality. Regardless of the nature of the difference between essence and existence, classical essence as well as classical existence are what they are only because that essence and that existence belong *de suyo* to a thing. The “being” of iron is not the “iron”. What, negatively, does this difference mean? Let us recall that we are speaking about the reality and the being of a real thing *qua* apprehended in primordial apprehension. Now, one might think that in contrast to “being iron”, he could lay hold of another verb to express the ferric reality. It would be the verb “there being”.¹ One would say “there is” iron as opposed to “is iron”. The “there is” always and only means something which there is in my life, in my situa-

¹ [Zubiri here employs the Spanish *haber*, the infinitive form of “there is”, which does not exist in English since this verb is defective.—trans.]

tion, etc. But it does not, simply speaking, designate “reality”. {350} Reality is a formality of a thing in and by itself; there is no question of “there is” or “there is not”. The verb which, as I see it at least with respect to Spanish, serves our need is *being here-and-now* [*estar*] as opposed to *being* [*ser*]. The difference between them has been stressed many times by saying that *estar* means something circumstantial, for example “being here-and-now sick”. On the other hand, *ser* means permanent reality, as when we say of someone that he “is an invalid”. Nonetheless, I do not believe that this is the radical meaning of the verb *estar*. *Estar* designates the *physical character* of that in which is *in actu exercito*, so to speak; on the other hand, *ser* designates the “habitual” state, without any allusion to the physical character of reality. The tuberculosis patient “is” an invalid. But on the other hand, when we say that he is [*está*] coughing, he is [*está*] feverish, etc., we formally designate the character of the coughing and of the fever in a physical way: he “is” here-and-now [*está*] coughing, he “is” here-and-now [*está*] feverish, etc. It is true that very frequently the circumstantial is expressed by means of the verb *estar*; but it is just there that we are seeing in the circumstantial the formally physical character of its reality. The contraposition between *ser* and *estar* is not primarily one between the permanent and the circumstantial, but between a “mode of being”, habitual or otherwise, and the “physical character” of reality. On account of this, at times one uses the verb *estar* to designate the physical character of the habitual, for example when saying of someone that he “is [*está*] tubercular”. Now, the verb *estar* designates physical reality as opposed to the verb *ser* which has another meaning which we shall explain forthwith. In the primordial apprehension of reality, a thing “is” [*está*] physically and really apprehended in and by itself in my apprehension. Referring back to the concept of actuality which we have been explaining throughout the course of this work, let us recall that ‘actuality’ does not mean “presence” but the “being here-and-now” [*estar*] {351} present insofar as it is here-and-now [*estar*]; it is the real “being here-and-now [*estando*] present in and by itself as real. Reality is not, then, being. So what then is being?

b) When we speak of iron, we may allude not to its properties, nor to its existence, but to what the iron might “be” [*sea*]. Properly speaking, it is this “being” [*ser*] which is opposed to “being here-and-now” [*estar*]. But it immediately springs to mind that this “being” [*ser*] is not a formal moment of ferric reality, because it is the iron, it, the ferric reality itself, which “is” [*es*]. It isn’t “being iron” (we have already seen that it isn’t) but rather that the “iron is”. What is this being? Everything real is, *qua* real, respective (let us not confuse respectivity and relation). And this respectivity of the real *qua* real is what I

understand by ‘world’. This respectivity is constitutive of the real *qua* real; i.e., everything real is formally worldly. Now, a real respective thing *qua* reality is the physical reality of it and the world intrinsically and formally constituted by it. But I can consider a real thing not as constitutively and formally real (in its twin dimensions individual and worldly) but as an “actual” reality in the world. The world is “respectivity”; actuality in this respectivity of the real *qua* “is” here-and-now [*está*] in the world constitutes the actuality of the real in the world. Reality, then, is not only something which constitutes the world, but moreover is actual in the world constituted by it. Now, the actuality of the real in the world is just “being”. “Iron is” means that that which physically constitutes real iron is *ferrically actual* in the world. This being in the world as actuality of the real being here-and-now (*estar*) in respectivity (to the *world*) is what constitutes *being*. If iron were able to sense its reality, it would sense it as ferric reality, ferrically actual in the world. This and nothing more {352} is what “iron is” means. Everything else isn’t being but reality. Thus, it is one thing to describe man as a reality born of some progenitors and among other realities; and something else to describe him by saying that “he saw the light”. This last is the actuality of what was generated (reality) in the world (light). Being does not pertain to reality as a formal moment; being is not a proper and formal moment of reality. What then is the real insofar as it is? That being does not pertain formally to the reality of the real does not mean that being does not pertain to the real. And this is what we must now ask ourselves, viz. In what does this pertaining consist?

c) The real is not the subject of notes, but rather is a system constructed of constituent and constitutive notes. That is, the real is not a substantial subject, but a substantivity. Of this substantivity we say, and with reason, that it “is”. This means that being, although not identified with reality, is still completely poured into it, so to speak. And it is poured into it as substantive reality. Being is then being of substantivity. And one might term this ‘substantive being’. But that would be an incorrect denomination, because we are not dealing with the fact that being is substantive, nor the fact that substantivity is being, but rather that the substantivity of the real “is”. It is not a *substantive being*, but the *being of the substantive*. This is the most radical form of “being”, not because substantive reality is a mode of being, but because the being of the substantive is the being of what is most radical in a real thing, the being of its own substantivity. Let us not, then, confuse the being of the substantive and substantive being. If at times I speak of substantive being it should always be understood that I refer to the being of the substantive. And this brings us to essential consequences in the order of intellection.

d) Reality and being in fact are not identical, {353} but neither are they independent. When taken together, substantive reality and its being in primary intellection, i.e. in the primordial apprehension of reality, confront us with three essential characteristics.

In the first place, we meet with not only the distinction between but also with the anteriority of reality with respect to being. Reality is not the supreme mode of being, but on the contrary being is a mode of reality. For this reason there is no *esse reale*, real being, but only, as I say, *realitas in essendo*, reality in being. A real thing “is”; it is that, the real thing, which “is”, but it is not true that being is the reality of a real thing. Reality is not *ens*. And all the rest is an unacceptable entification of reality. Greek philosophy and subsequent European philosophy have always identified reality and *ens*. Both in philosophy as well as theology, real things have been considered formally as real *entia* (entities), and God Himself as the supreme reality would be subsistent being, the supreme *ens* (being or entity). But this seems to me totally unacceptable. Reality is not entity, nor is the real *ens*. *Ens* is only the real insofar as it is. But prior to being *ens*, the real is real. Only insofar as the real is encountered in the ulterior actuality of its being, only then can and should it receive the denomination of *ens*, a denomination which is posterior to its condition as real. Therefore the entification of reality is ultimately only a gigantic conceptual hypothesis. Even when treating of God, it is necessary to say that God is not the subsistent being nor the supreme *ens*, but an absolute reality in the line of reality. It is not the case that God “is”; one can only be called *ens* based on created things which are. But in and by Himself God is not *ens*. A real thing is not real because it “is”, but rather it “is” because it is real. So reality and *ens* are not identical. {354} Being is ulterior to the formality of reality.

In the second place, this ulteriority does not mean that being is something like an ontological accident of the real. That would be absurd. Everything real “is”, and “is” inexorably, because everything real is formally respective, and therefore is actual in this respectivity, i.e., “is”. Since “reality” is a physical formality of what is apprehended in sentient intellection, it follows that while the “is” and its ulteriority are not a physical moment of its formal reality, nonetheless this ulteriority of its actuality in the world as such, i.e., being, is an ulteriority which is certainly ulterior, but also physical in its way, just as physical is the actuality of the real. The real is not a mode of being, but the real is (at least is present) in the world, i.e., “is here-and-now [*está*] being”. To say that the real is here-and-now [*está*] in being means more concretely that the real is here-and-now [*está*] being. Although being is not a formal moment of the real, to be here-and-now [*estar*] being

is a physical moment of the real, but consequent upon its formal reality.

Hence being is not primarily something understood, as has been assumed since Parmenides’ time; rather, being is something sensed when a real thing is sentiently apprehended in and by itself. Being is sensed, but not directly, i.e., it is not the formal terminus of that apprehension; rather, being is co-sensed, sensed in an indirect mode as ulterior actuality. The real “is” here-and-now [*está*] being by virtue of being already real. What is apprehended in the direct mode is the being here-and-now [*estar*]; the being [*siendo*] is not apprehended except indirectly. I shall return to this subject later.

In the third place, intellection is mere actualization in the sentient intelligence, and the real in this actualization is truth, real truth. Real truth does not make the “is” intervene as a formal terminus of it. Upon intellectually knowing the real {355} in and by itself, we intellectually know that the real is being *by being real*. Real truth is the unity of the real as something which “is” here-and-now [*está*] actualized in intellection, and as something which therefore is “being” [*siendo*]. Real truth does not require intervention by being but only by the real. Only because the real “is” here-and-now [*está*] being, is the “being” [*siendo*] co-intellectively known when the real is intellectually known. If the “being” [*siendo*] is found in this intellection, it is not to constitute it *formally*, but as an *indirectly intellectually known* moment in the real. Being is in the primordial apprehension, not as formally constitutive of it, but as an ulterior moment *of* that apprehension, even though *in* it. Let us not confuse being in the apprehension with constituting it formally. Real truth is not the truth of the being of the substantive, but it inexorably if indirectly encompasses this being of the substantive. How? That is the question of the internal articulation of truth, reality, and being in the intellection.

3

Articulation of Truth, Reality, and Being

In the two previous subsections the essential aspects of this articulation have been gradually emerging, above all their negative burden, which reveals what is unacceptable about the conceptualization we have been discussing. It was a conceptualization according to which truth falls back upon being, both copulative as well as substantive, in such a way that reality would consist only in a mode of being, albeit a radical one. As this view customarily says, “being” means “being real”. It was when criticizing this

conceptualization that the essentially negative aspects of the problem appeared. {356} Now we must gather those aspects in a positive way. This will make clear the rigorous nature of the articulation which we seek.

This is an articulation in the intellection. Reality, I repeat, is *de suyo* intrinsically and formally respective *qua* real; that is, it is “worldly” in the precise sense of world as the unity of respectivity of the real as real. But its worldliness is grounded precisely and formally in reality. It is reality which, by being real, grounds the world and is worldly. Hence reality, by being worldly, has its own actuality in this world *qua* world constituted by it; it is being. Therefore, upon intellectually knowing the real, we co-intellectively know, we co-sense, the real as being. And then the problem we face is what and how this co-intellection is possible; this is precisely the internal articulation of reality and being in intellection.

We have seen that the two moments cannot be identified nor are they independent. Being is always an inexorable real “necessity” of reality; therefore it is always “ulterior” to the real as real. Co-intellection is grounded in this ulteriority, which has different aspects in intellection depending on whether one deals with the primordial intellection of reality or affirmative intellection. It is on one hand the ulteriority of what I call the “being of the substantive”, co-intellectively known in the primordial apprehension of reality. On the other hand, it is the ulteriority of being in affirmative intellection, what I call the “being of the affirmed”. The two ulteriorities are not independent, but possess an intrinsic and radical unity. The co-intellective articulation of reality and being is what integrally constitutes truth. The problem of the articulation thus breaks down into four questions:

- a) The intellection of reality in its being of the substantive. {357}
- b) The intellection of reality in its being of the affirmed.
- c) The unity of being in intellection.
- d) Reality and being in truth.

a) *The intellection of the real in its being of the substantive.* We have already seen this in part I, but it is necessary to recall it specifically. When we intellectually know the real in primordial apprehension, we co-intellectively know the moment of being, as we have seen. How and why? This is the question.

In primordial apprehension, reality is the formality of what is impressively apprehended. In this impression of reality the real is apprehended in and by itself. But this

reality impressively apprehended has in its very formality a worldly dimension. And the actuality of what is apprehended in this worldly dimension is what I have called ‘the being of the substantive’. That every primordial apprehension is worldly is clear because that apprehension apprehends formality in its two moments, individual and field. Now, the field of reality is but the worldly respectivity *qua* apprehended in impression. Hence to perceive a real thing in its field moment is to perceive it in some way in its worldly respectivity itself. Thus the actuality of something real in impressive intellection is also the actuality in the field of reality and therefore in the world. And the actuality of the real in the field and in the world is the being of the substantive. Only because the real is in and by itself within the field and in the world, only because of this does the real have actuality within the field and worldly; i.e., only because of this “is” it the real. That actuality, that being given in impression of reality, is therefore, {358} as I said, an ulterior and physical moment of the real. But that the ulteriority is physical does not mean that the terminus of the ulteriority is also something formally physical; that is another question. Indeed we are going to see shortly that ulteriority is a physical moment of the real, but that being is not physical in the same sense in which the notes of a thing are. The real is real and has in itself an “is” in physical ulteriority; but being is, formally, only just ulteriority of physical reality: it is not “something”, it is not a note. Therefore the real apprehended in impression is sending us, in impression, on to what is ulterior to it, to its being. This sending is not, then, a type of logical movement but a physically apprehended movement in reality given in impression; reality in impression is physically apprehended and impressively sends from the formality of reality to what is ulterior to it, to its worldly actuality, because the ulteriority itself is a physical moment of the impression of reality. In this way being itself is formally something “sensed”.

Thus this ulteriority has, in apprehension, a precise character to which I did not explicitly allude in the Part I, but which it is important to emphasize here. The real is not a simple otherness passively received, but is the real itself sending, by its own formality, from this individual formality to its actuality within the field and the world, to its being. This physical sending is a sending “from” what is present to us in an impression; therefore, this “from” is strictly an *ex*. The primary apprehension of the being of the substantive is therefore “ex-pression”; it is what is expressed in the “im-pression” of reality. The formal character of the ulteriority apprehended in primordial apprehension is expression. In the impression itself one apprehends in *ex* what is here-and-now present to us; {359} one apprehends what is impressively present in its physical ulteriority. It is, if one wishes, a type of physical

push of the impression from itself toward its being. The *ex* presupposes the impression, and is only apprehended in it; however, its apprehension is not a second act, but rather the same act in its dimension of indirect or indirect ulteriority. It is but the *ex* of the apprehension in impression itself. Impression and expression are two dimensions of one and the same primordial apprehension of reality: the dimension of *in* (direct) and the dimension of *ex* (indirect). These two dimensions are generated together but not as coordinated; rather, the expression is an expression only of and in the impression itself. In this expression what is expressed is the being of the substantive. Expression is a physical character of the primordial apprehension of reality. Its character of “being here and now present” is being here and now expressed physically. Being concerns real things by themselves, even if there were never any intellection of any of them; but in their intellection, the being of the real is expression. In the primordial apprehension of reality, we intellectually know reality in and by itself impressively; we intellectually know, expressively, the substantive being in it. And since ulteriority is a physical moment of the real—it “is here-and-now being” real—it follows that not only do we express reality in impression, but we inexorably have to express it. That is to say, to the primordial apprehension of reality in impression corresponds in an essential way its expression. Therefore upon intellectually knowing the real, we necessarily co-intellectively know its being, its worldly actuality.

It is unnecessary to stress that we are dealing with an intellectual expression. The expression in all of its fullness is not something which is limited only to intellectual expression of the real. But here we are dealing with expression just as intellectual expression; it is the formal structure of the physical ulteriority of {360} what is apprehended in the impression of reality. It will therefore be useful to clarify the character of this expression, in which the intellection of the being of the substantive consists.

In the first place, this expression, as already noted, is not a second act, as if grounded in the apprehension of the real and carried out “after” the act of expression that apprehension. We are not talking about that. It is not a second act but a second dimension, the *ex* dimension of the same apprehensive act. Therefore what we have in the expression is not something that was *expressed*, but something which is strictly speaking *expressed now*. The expressed nature of reality in its “being here-and-now” present is the apprehension of reality in being. Therefore the “expressed reality” as “expressed” is its being. *Expression is, then, ulterior expressed actuality.*

In the second place, this ex-expression, by virtue of being the second dimension of the unique apprehensive

act of reality, has also a simple character, i.e., the immediate dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. It is because it is immediate that it is not a type of latent affirmation (or anything like that) of some “is”. It is not latent predication but an intrinsic dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. What there is, is a dimension of this apprehension grounded on the dimension of the “in”; and just like the “ex”, the apprehension of the “ex” is indirect. Apprehension apprehends the real in a direct way, but also apprehends it in its being; therefore the being *is indirectly apprehended*. Now, this indirectness is expression. We directly apprehend the real, and in an indirect mode its worldly actuality. Precisely on account of this it is very difficult to distinguish being and reality. History amply manifests this difficulty.

In the third place, one might think that this character of expression proper to being {361} does not consist in that of which it is an expression, viz. the real, but rather something formally meant by the expression itself. Yet that is not the case. Being is neither meaning nor sense, but the expressed nature “of” reality. That something may be expressed in one of its dimensions does not mean that being expressed is “meaning something”. We are not dealing with an act of meaning something, but with an expressed actuality. Strictly speaking, it is not so much expression as an expressed character. Therefore reality is not the meaning of being, but on the contrary, being is what is expressed of reality in its being here-and-now [*estar*] present, however much “being” [*siendo*] one wishes, but being in being here-and-now present [*estar*]. Being is grounded in reality as what is expressed in what is impressed. Reality, as real, is being here-and-now present; it is thus reality which “is”, and not the case that being is reality. Therefore reality is not the radical form of being. On the contrary, what is indeed true is that the radical form of being is the being of the substantive.

Now, ratification of the real in its intellectual actuality is real truth. Therefore to real truth corresponds essentially not just the being “here-and-now present” of the real, i.e. the impressive ratification of the real as real, but also the “being” [*siendo*] here and present, i.e., the ratification of its worldly actuality. The real truth of intellection is at once truth of the real which “is here-and-now” and of the being here-and-now of the real. They are two aspects of real truth both grounded in a precise order: the truth of being [*siendo*] is indirectly of the truth of being here-and-now. Only the truth of the real *qua* real makes the truth of the real in its being of the substantive possible.

But the being of the substantive, which is the radical form of being, is not the unique form of being in the intellection. What is that other form, and why and how does it necessarily concern human intellection of the real?

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b) *The intellection of reality in its being of the affirmed.* When I intellectually know a real thing not only in and by itself as real, but also among other real things, that real thing, as we have repeatedly said, is actualized in intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. The unity of the real as individual and within a field in reality is then unpacked; in a certain way it is distended. As the unity of both moments is formally what a thing is “in reality”, it follows that in the stepping back, what the thing is in reality remains problematic. Thus the field of reality becomes the medium of intellection in which what a thing is in reality is going to be intellectually known. This intellection—as we have already seen—is an intentional decrease of distance. When we assume a distance or “step back”, we have created simple apprehensions, and in the intentional decreasing we return to the real thing from within reality, which is then newly actualized, i.e., reactualized, but now in the order of simple apprehensions. This intellection, by virtue of being an intellection installed formally in the real as real, is therefore an affirmation. The formal moment of affirmation is, then, the realization of a simple apprehension in a real thing, a realization along the lines of intellectual actuality. This is what constitutes what a real thing is in reality; i.e., the formal terminus of the affirmation is the “in reality”.

This is not all there is in affirmation, because what is affirmed in it is definitely a realization; and this realization, as the reactualization it is, concerns actualized thing itself as a real moment. But then I must consider not just what is affirmed as a moment of the real, but also what is affirmed *qua* affirmed, just because it is a distanced intellection, through stepping back. {363} There is not only the realization of a simple apprehension *qua* realization; there is also the realization itself *qua* affirmed. What is affirmed is intellectually known, but upon intellectually knowing it, what is affirmed *qua* affirmed is co-intellectually known. For greater clarity, if we take the example of predicative judgement, the affirmation “A is B” consists first of all, in direct mode, in affirming the realization of B in A; but it also consists in affirming, albeit in an indirect way, that this realization is intellectually known, i.e., that this realization “is” in the real. The affirmation co-intellectually knows that what is affirmed is something formally intellectually known *qua* affirmed. Affirmation always takes place as a unity of powers of intelligence and of what a thing is “in reality”. And this unity is on one hand affirmation of what a thing is “in reality”, but on the other affirmation of what this unity “is”. The “is” of the realization expresses the intellectual actuality in its unity. Besides the direct mode realization, affirmation intellectually knows in an indirect mode that this realization is intellectually known in the real; and this

being here-and-now is what affirmatively constitutes the “is”. The “is” is the *being of what is affirmed* of the real *qua* affirmed. This being is not, to be sure, the being of the substantive, because the being of the substantive concerns the real by being “real”, whereas the being of what is affirmed does not concern the “real”, but what the real is “in reality”. I shall return later to this point, because first it is necessary to clarify further what this being of the affirmed is.

In the first place, the being of what is affirmed expresses in an indirect mode, as I have been saying, what a thing is “in reality”. In this aspect the being of what is affirmed is expression. And it is so in the sense previously explained: the being of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed is {364} now expressed in the affirmation itself. But, in what does this being express consist? This is what must be clarified.

In the second place, there is the nature of this expression, of this “being expressed”. Only by seeing it will we have seen what the being of the affirmed is. When one intellectually knows a real thing, not in and by itself, but “among” others, it is necessary to recall that the “among” has at least three functions. It has a constitutive function (*ratio essendi*) in the thing, one which constitutes its *distinction* from others. It also has an intellectual function (*ratio cognoscendi*) which constitutes not its distinction, but the intellectual *stepping back* from others. And finally it has an actualizing function (*ratio actualitatis*), the mode of actualizing a thing “among” others when the thing is intellectually known at a distance. The first function concerns reality, the second affirmation, and the third the intellectual actuality of the real in intellection. For the problem at hand, only the second and third functions are of interest. These two functions have a precise articulation. Stepping back is an act of retraction in which we elaborate simple apprehensions. Their actualization in the real, the third function, thus has two aspects. Above all there is the most visible one, the relationship of a thing to what is simply apprehended. This is what constitutes what is affirmed, because what is affirmed is the realization of what is simply apprehended. But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to presuppose that intellection has carried out the stepping back. Then the respectivity to simple apprehension (the third function) rests upon respectivity to stepping back itself (the second function). That respectivity is not reactualization, because reactualization concerns the real with respect to simple apprehension. It is something previous, the respectivity to stepped-back intellection *qua* stepped back, {365} respectivity to the intellection of what a thing is “in reality”. If intellection were not distanced, a stepping back, i.e., sentient, there would be no opportunity to speak of what something is “in reality”; there would be nothing but “reality”.

Therefore everything real intellectually known at a distance, in stepping back, is constitutively respective *qua* intellectually known this way. And this respectivity to intellection at a distance, in stepping back (of what something is “in reality”) is what constitutes what I term the *intellective world*. It is a world by homology with the real world which is respectivity of the real *qua* real. But the intellective world is not the world of the real, but only the world of the “in reality”. Now, what is *affirmed* is what a real thing is in reality; and the “affirmed” *qua* affirmed is the actuality of the “in reality” in respectivity to the intellective world; it is a mode of being. And this actuality is what constitutes the “being of the affirmed”. Being affirmed is the actuality in the intellective world of what a thing is in reality. And since, in affirmation, this actuality goes out of (*ex*) the realization itself, it follows that the being of what is affirmed consists in being what is “expressed” of what a thing is in reality as actuality in the intellective world.

To preclude erroneous interpretations it is important to emphasize two points.

Above all, *intellective world* has nothing to do with what, classically, was termed *intelligible world*, a notion coined by Plato (*topos noetos*) and which is an essential part of the thought of Leibniz and Kant. The intelligible world is a world of strict necessities of what is conceived, and in this sense it is a world of absolutely necessary truths. It is a second world *juxtaposed to the sensible world*, and is above it as something *a priori* with respect to it. {366} But I doubt that such a world exists. Only a single world exists, the real world. And since the real is actualized in the formality of the impression of reality in a sentient intellection, it follows that the real world is at once and radically something intellectually known and sensed. But that is not all. The fact is that the intellective world is not constituted only by the objective content of simple apprehensions (be they concepts, fictional items, or percepts). This content is at most but a part of the intellective world. But what formally constitutes the intellective world is the respectivity of the “in reality”. In this respectivity, simple apprehension does not enter by reason of its content, but ultimately by its formal moment of reality, i.e., by being what the real “might be”. “Might be” does not mean that what we apprehend is reality only approximatively. It means something else. Even if a concept were formally and exhaustively realized in the real, its character of concept would always consist in being formally a “might be” of the real, because the “might be” is the direction to the real. Now, the “might be” is grounded in stepping back, as the foundation, as the principle of the intellection of what things are “in reality”. This “in reality” concerns not just simple apprehension (either as content or as “might be”), but also and above all

its actualization. And this radical respectivity of the “in reality” to stepping back is what formally constitutes the intellective world—something which has absolutely nothing to do with the intelligible world of classical philosophy.

But it is necessary to attend to a second point. The real world pertains to the real *qua* real; and this respectivity makes the real be a world. But the intellective world does not pertain to the real as such. It pertains only to the real primarily *qua* really known intellectually; {367} moreover it pertains only to the real intellectually known *qua* really intellectually known at a distance, in stepping back. And since this stepping back is a formal and exclusive moment of human intelligence, by virtue of being sentient intelligence, it follows that only with respect to a human intelligence, i.e. a sentient one, is there an intellective world. For an intelligence that intellectually knew the real in and by itself exhaustively, there would be neither affirmations nor an intellective world. This does not comprise any kind of subjectivity, because intelligence is always actualization of the real. And this actualization has two dimensions: the dimension of the “real” and the dimension of the “in reality”. That this duality is only given with respect to human intelligence does not mean that each one of its two terms is but a mere actualization of the real. The intellective world is an actualization of the real in an intelligence which intellectually knows in intellective movement, in a sentient intelligence. The intellective world is a world of the “in reality” proper to the “real” world. This duality is a duality along the lines of intellective actualization, and therefore has nothing to do with subjectivism.

In summary, the actuality of the real in the intellective world is the *being of what is affirmed*. And it is necessary to point out now in a consistent way the characteristics constitutive of the being of what is affirmed.

aa) The being of the affirmed is not, to be sure, the being of the substantive. But neither is it merely copulative being. First, because the being of what is affirmed pertains to every affirmation and not just to predicative affirmation, the only one which has copulative being. Second, because the being of what is affirmed does not concern intellection itself *qua* intellection but only what is affirmed *qua* affirmed in it. Therefore, as I see it, it deals with a particular division of being, {368} one which is different from the classical division. Classically, being was divided into substantive being and copulative being. This division is unacceptable, because substantive being does not consist, as was thought classically, in real being (substantive being is only the ulterior actuality of the real in the world), and because copulative being does not encompass all forms of affirmation. The division should be

established between these two forms of being: the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed. Both are “what is expressed”: the first is what is indirectly expressed in primordial apprehension of reality; the second is what is indirectly expressed about what the thing is in reality. And since this duality is grounded in the actualizing characteristic of a sentient intellection, the question inexorably arises of what might be the unity of these two modes of being, i.e., the question of why they are “being”.

But in order to be able to delve into this topic, we must first attend to a second characteristic unique to the being of what is affirmed, which is extremely important, and which more clearly outlines the problem of the unity of being.

bb) The being of the affirmed is the actuality of the real in the intellectual world, in the world of the “in reality”. And this being is what is expressed in an affirmation. Now, there is a serious problem involved, that of negative judgement, because affirmation and the affirmed are the opposite of negation and what is negated. Hence it might seem to follow, first, that it is not true that intellection at a distance, in stepping back, consists in being an affirmation—it could be a negation—and second, that what is expressed “isn’t” always—it could “not be”. This is the whole problem of negation and of the negative. It is not some useless subtlety, but as we are going to see, is something which affects the most essential part of some great philosophical systems. {369}

There is, in fact, a serious ambiguity in the idea of “affirmation”. To be sure, affirmation can be the opposite of negation. In this sense, it would be absurd to pretend that intellection at a distance, in stepping back, is constitutive affirmation. But this is not the radical idea of affirmation. In the radical sense, affirming consists only in intellectually knowing at a distance, by stepping back into the reality of something, what this something is in reality. In this second meaning, affirmation is not the opposite of anything; it is only distinguished from primordial apprehension of reality. The primordial apprehension of reality is compact intellection of the real in and by itself, an apprehension which bears in an expressed way the being of the substantive. On the other hand, affirmation is unpacked and bears in an expressed way the being of what is affirmed. Here we are speaking of affirmation only in the second sense. And it is essential to keep this foremost in one’s mind. Even when one predicatively affirms “A is not B”, the affirmation itself is the affirmation that that “is” so. Therefore the “is not” does not concern the affirmation itself in the second sense. It is the same to affirm something in the first sense as to affirm that this something “is”. This sameness (*tauton*) was the celebrated thesis of Parmenides, albeit in a dimension and an

aspect which are completely different from what constitutes what I call “being of the affirmed”. This is because for Parmenides, sameness refers to the sameness of both *intellection* and the “is” (something which we already saw is impossible). But Plato interprets the sameness as sameness of both *predicative affirmation* and the “is”. To simplify the terminology, I shall speak only of affirmation *simpliciter* in lieu of predicative affirmation; but understand that I refer only to predicative affirmation. Similarly, in place of the “is” one should speak of “is in reality”; but for the foregoing reason I shall speak only of the “is”. Granting this, for Parmenides {370} one could never either know or express in a statement the “not being”. Being, and only being, “is”.

But despite that, Parmenides’ own *Poem* continually uses—as it scarcely could avoid doing—negative sentences and judgements, affirmations that being “is not” this or that.

Despite this, I still think that affirmation is an intellection at a distance, in stepping back, in which we intellectually know what something “is” in reality. To affirm is always and only to affirm the “is”. But *affirming* is one thing and the character of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed another. Now, while affirming is always and only affirming the “is”, what is affirmed can consist in an “is” or in an “is not”. This “is not” is what is usually termed the negative. It is clear that if I affirm the negative I affirm that something “is” just negative. What happens is that then the opposite of negation and the negative cannot be called “affirmation”, as if the negative were the opposite of the affirmative. This is unacceptable unless one is willing to maintain indefinitely something which is a serious ambiguity. The opposite of the negative (not-being) is the positive (being) and not the affirmative. Therefore every affirmation consists in affirming the “is”, but this being affirmed can have a positive character (“is”) or a negative one (“is not”). As I see it, all the negations in Parmenides’ *Poem* are negations only in the character of the thing affirmed, but not in the affirmation itself.

Affirmation, then, has two completely different meanings in our language. On the one hand, it means the intellection of the real at a distance, in stepping back; and on the other, the positive part of certain affirmations. Confusion of the two meanings has been the root of some serious consequences in the history of philosophy. Everything we have been saying throughout this book concerns only affirmation but not this positive part. {371} Thus we have the following schema: 1. being of the substantive; 2. affirmed being which in turn can be being, (a) positive or (b) negative.

But this by itself poses serious questions. In the first place, there is the question of in what the duality “being

and not being” formally consists as a duality between the positive and the negative in what is affirmed. This is the problem of what is negated. And since what is affirmed, i.e. the “being affirmed”, consists only in the “is”, there arises the second question, viz. What is the internal structure of the being affirmed in its double dimension of being and not-being?

First question: In what, formally, does the duality “positive-negative” consist, i.e., the duality “being and not-being”, in what is affirmed. Although for greater facility of expression I may set forth examples of predicative judgement, as I have said, the problem refers to all of affirmative intellection, whether predicative or not. What do we understand by not-being?

At first glance one might think that not being consists in affirming of *A*, instead of what it is, namely *B*, something which it is not, for example *C*. When I affirm, “*A* is *C*”, I affirm something which is not. In this aspect not being consists in error, and the error itself would be “not being” by being *otherness*. This is what Plato thought: to affirm what is not is to affirm of a thing “something other” than what it is. Not being is *heteron*. The head of the Vedantists, Sankara, thought the same thing. Error would then consist in “superimposition” (*adhyasa*), i.e., in transferring to one thing a notion which only fits another. But this does not suffice, because negative judgement itself, when affirming of something that it “is not”, can be perfectly truthful; it can be true that “*A* is not *B*”. And in this case the negation is not otherness. Moreover we are not dealing with the fact that a thing is (or is not) the same as what is attributed to it, {372} or something else; rather we are dealing with the *affirmation* itself according to which a thing “is not”, independently of whether this affirmation is or is not erroneous. Not being is not otherness but a dimension of the affirmed itself *qua* affirmed; it is affirming “is not”.

Nonetheless, this is not sufficient, because affirming “is not” can mean that we deny that “*A* is *B*”. In such case the negation would be negation of an affirmation, a *negated copula*; one denies that *A* “is” *B*. But neither is this correct. Not every negation is negation of an affirmation; rather, negation or denial is always in itself negative. It is not a negated copula but a *negative copula*. Put in the most general terms, we are dealing not with a negated affirmation but a negative affirmation. What, formally, this negative, this “is not”, is—that is the question.

Let us recall what has been said many times in these pages. Affirmative intellection is intellection at a distance, in stepping back of what a thing, already known intellectually as real, is “in reality”. We are not talking about distancing ourselves from reality, or stepping back from *it*,

but keeping ourselves there. Hence every affirmative intellection is an intellection in reality. Since the negative is a mode of this intellection, it follows that the “is not” does not consist in unreality. The “is not” does not consist in either otherness or unreality. What the stepping back does is to “unfold” a real thing; it is the unfolding of “reality” and “in reality”. This unfolding therefore opens, as I said before, a type of *gap* in the real; it is the gap of the “in reality”. To be sure, this gap is just intellective; it does not concern the physical reality of a thing, only its *actualization* in stepping back. The affirmative intentionality is an intellective movement in this gap. {373} With this, our problem is now fully addressed, because affirmative intellection is first of all an intellection at a distance, in stepping back; second it is the opening of a gap, the gap of the “in reality”; and lastly it is an actualization of the real in this gap by means of an intellective movement. Therefore to ask ourselves, What is the “is not”? is to ask ourselves for a mode of actualization in movement of a real thing in the gap of the “in reality”.

In order to conceptualize this actualization, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are dealing constitutively with an actualization with respect to simple apprehensions, elaborated in the stepping back. What are these simple apprehensions? Their content, as we have already seen, can be quite varied: percept, fictional item, concept. But it is not this content which formally constitutes simple apprehension; rather, it is their intrinsic and unique dimension of reality: the “might be”. The “might be” is not the reality which is; but rather is, in reality, the distanced version of what a real thing is “in reality”. As I said, the stepping back opens a gap in reality, and this gap is the gap of the “might be” with respect to what a thing is. The gap of the “might be” is therefore the actualization of a thing in accordance with a twin possibility: the possibility of being or the possibility of not being the actualization of a determinate simple apprehension. The stepping back, and therefore the gap, is the foundation of this duplicity of actualization of the real in intellective movement. If we make use of a common though inaccurate expression, and call all simple apprehensions “ideas”, we may say that for Plato the realm of Ideas is the realm of full reality (*ontos on*, he called the *ousia* of the Idea). For Aristotle on the other hand, the realm of ideas is the realm of the abstract. I do not share either of these conceptualizations. {374} To begin with, an idea is not in and by itself reality, but neither is an abstraction. First because the idea, in this sense of simple apprehension, is not always abstract; it can have the concrete nature of a fictional item, and above all the radical concrete nature of the percept—a point over which classical philosophy has constantly stumbled. But moreover and above all, it is because the idea is neither the realm of reality nor the realm of the abstract, but the

realm of the “might be”. Every idea is formally and constitutively directed toward the reality of which it is an idea, and this direction is the “might be”. Therefore the realm of ideas, in its “might be”, constitutes a twin possibility of actualization: either the real actualizes the simple apprehension (the idea), or it does not do so. This is positive or negative actualization. They are two possibilities *generated together* precisely because they constitute the twin dimension of the “might be”, its twin structural dimension. The negative is not grounded in the positive nor the positive upon the negative; rather, both are grounded in the “might be” of simple apprehension as such.

Granting this we may ask ourselves what this actualizations is which we call negative. It has different moments which must be carefully distinguished.

aa) Let us take this piece of paper. Let us suppose it is not green. That means above all that the green, the greenness, is not actualized in the paper. But that is not sufficient for the “is not”, because we are not concerned with whether this piece of paper does or does not have greenness, but with whether this “not-having”, this not being actualized, becomes a mode of intellectual actualization. We are not dealing with the fact that the green *is not actual*, but with the *actualization of this “not”* as such.

bb) We are dealing, then, not with actual being but with the intellection of the actuality of this “not”. To understand it, {375} let us think about the fact that affirmative intellection is a stepping back, and that therefore there is above all the moment of contribution of the simple apprehensions for the intellection of what a thing is in reality. In our case, I contribute the simple apprehension of green. I see that it is not actualized in this paper. But this seeing is not a negation; it is merely the intellectual manifestation of the non-actualization. The negation is only a quality of intellectual movement. Prior to the non-actualization of the green, the intelligence carries out a type of “turning away” from the green in the thing. We are not talking about a movement of the intelligence as carrying out some act, i.e., we are not talking about a “physical” movement. We are talking about an intellectual movement *qua* intellectual, *qua* intellectually knowing actuality of what is intellectually known in movement. The turning away is an intentional turning away; it is a positive act of *turning away* or *aversive intellection*. It is what the Greeks expressed with the preposition ἄπο, *apo*, which in Latin is *ab*. Therefore the intellection in this *apo* is *apo-phasis*, negation. In it not only is the actualization manifest, but moreover the aversion itself consists in the positive intellection of the “non” of “non-actualization”. With that the mere manifestation of “non-

actualization” has become aversive intellection, i.e., “actualization of the non”. The *non-actualization* is now *negative actualization*. It is intentional actualization in *apo*. But this which is absolutely necessary is nonetheless not yet sufficient for there to be negation in the formal sense.

cc) And this is because intellectual movement is constitutively an intentional movement, i.e., intellection of an “is”. Now, given what has been said, we would at most have “not being” as such. But this is not a negation. Negation is the affirmation that this not-being “is”. That is, negation and the negative in it do not consist in {376} “not-being” but in “being not”. The negative actualization is the actualization of the not-being “*qua* affirmed”. The negativity in question is at one and the same time “non-actualization” and the actualization of the “not” and the “being not” of this actualization; and here we have the difference between the negative and negation. The “is not” is not just otherness, nor is it unreality nor mere actualization of a “no”; rather, it is the “being-not” of a thing *qua* actualized with respect to a determinate simple apprehension. Affirmation falls back in a direct mode upon the actualization of the “no” in the intellectually known real, but for this very reason expresses in an indirect mode what is affirmed *qua* affirmed, i.e. is the “being not” of the affirmed. But then, the “no” is inscribed in “being” just like “yes”. In what does this inscribing consist? That is the second question.

Question Two: The internal structure of the being of the affirmed. This “being” in which the “not” is inscribed is the being of the affirmed, not the being of the substantive. Therefore we are not talking about admitting, without further ado, the being of not-being, as Plato thought with his celebrated ‘parricide’ (*patraloia*) of Parmenides. For Plato, the Idea is full reality, *ontos on*, and therefore to admit the idea of not-being is for him to admit the being of not-being, the very reality of not-being. But the “not-being” is a “being-not” of the affirmed as such, and therefore the being of the not-being in question corresponds only to the being of the affirmed and not to being *simpliciter*. Now, “being-not” is one of the two possibilities generated together of the “might be”, together with that of “being-yes” so to speak (*kataphasis*). Hence it follows that everything we have said about negation can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to intellection which is not a turning away or aversive, i.e., which is conversive, to the positive “yes it is”. The positive is not what is affirmed as such, but what is affirmed conversively, just as the negative is what is affirmed aversively. To say that this paper {377} is white does not consist only in intellectually knowing it as having that quality, but in affirming that it is “positively” the white of my simple apprehension. The positive is what is intellectually known in the conversive

moment of the affirmed. Hence, it is the being of the affirmed itself which has the two moments of the “no” and the “yes”.

The being of the affirmed is the being of the “in reality”. This “in reality” is just the gap which the unfolding of one thing among others opens therein when it is actualized. This gap is not a gap “of” reality, but a gap “in” reality. The gap consists in the “in reality” of individual reality. Therefore when we intellectually know something in a stepping back, we already intellectually know the gap, not as something which is not real, but as something in the real. And just on account of this, intellection in the gap intellectually knows, in an indirect mode, the gap itself as actuality in the real. And this is the being of the affirmed. The being of the affirmed is the being of the gap of the “in reality”. Now, the gap as such, I repeat, is not an absence of reality but just the opposite; it is a moment of the actualized real. The gap is, then, the field of the “in reality” open to what the real “might be”. The gap is therefore the openness of the being of the affirmed in its twin dimensions, positive and negative. Gap is opening, and therefore the actuality of the real in it is openness of the being of the affirmed. It is for this reason that the being of the affirmed inexorably has the two possibilities: being-not and being-yes. The gap is the ambit of intellectual movement, and therefore is the ambit of the co-intellection of affirmed being. And the intellection of the real in this gap is therefore co-intellection of its being in its twin dimension, positive or negative. To be “in reality” is to be open to the “being yes” and to the “being not”. {378} The intellectual world is the world of the “yes and no” of what the real is in reality. It is, at bottom, the world of the problem of the real. And here we have the internal articulation of the positive and the negative in the being of the affirmed.

With the foregoing, we have covered the essentials of the being of the affirmed as contrasted with the being of the substantive.

But we are not dealing with a difference in contraposition because both are “being”. Thus, as I said a few lines above, a question inexorably springs to mind concerning the intellection of the unity of the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed.

c) *The unity of being in intellection.* In order to see this unity it will suffice for us to review systematically what has already been said in the last few pages.

Classical philosophy identified substantive being with reality itself; it would be the *esse reale*. That is what I call the *entification of reality*. On the other hand it identified what we here call ‘being of the affirmed’ with the being of predication, with the copulative “is”. That is what I call *logification of intellection*. This, as we have

already seen, is wrong. The being of the substantive is not substantive reality, but the being of real substantivity; being is “of” the real, but is not the real itself. Therefore real substantivity and the being of the substantive are not identical. On the other hand, the being of the affirmed is not formally identical with the copulative “is”, because not every affirmation is predicative. But starting from these two identifications, i.e., starting from the entification of reality and the logification of intellection, which have run throughout the course of the history of philosophy, some great philosophical systems have conceived that the unity of the two forms of being is in turn a unity of identity. This is the identity of the entification of reality and the logification {379} of intellection. It is the third and most radical identification in these systems. To the identity of the being of the substantive with reality, and the identity of the being of the affirmed with copulative being, the philosophical systems in question add the identity of these two identities, which would be the identity between the being of the substantive and the being of the copulative. That formal, complete identity would constitute the unity of “being”. Both substantive being as well as copulative being are identically beings. “Being” would then constitute the domain of the identity. And this has been a conceptualization fraught with enormous consequences, because when one conceptually identifies the being of the substantive and substantive reality on the one hand, and on the other identically conceptualizes the being of the affirmed and copulative being, the identity of both forms of being becomes decisive for the conceptualization of intellection itself and of reality. To be sure, this identity is not necessary; but we must note that it is very difficult to avoid in the milieu of the entification of reality and the logification of intellection.

Plato did not thematically conceive this identity. When he dealt with being, he considered the being of the real and copulative being *indiscriminantly*. For him it was sufficient that in both cases he was dealing with *einai*, *esse*, being. In *Plato* we are not talking about an express identification, but only with a serious lack of discrimination. And this lack of discrimination is what we may qualify with the expression utilized by *Simplicius* to expound *Parmenides*’ philosophy. For *Simplicius* the *on* is understood by *Parmenides monakhos*, in only one way. This non-discriminating, and therefore this conceptualizing as the same, with respect to “being” when one speaks of real being and copulative being, leads to the best-known concepts of *Plato*’s philosophy. His failure to discriminate between “is” and “reality” in turn led to a theory of intellection (intellection is {380} “vision” of the real, is *Idea*), and to a theory of the real itself (reality is what is “seen”, the *Idea* itself). The lack of discrimination between real being and copulative being led him to two

main thoughts which are, at one and the same time, a theory of intellection and a theory of the real centered upon two concepts: the reality of non-being, and the community (*koinonia*) of the different ideas among themselves and with intellection. This is the unitary structure of the real (the real “is” and “is not”) and of affirmation (community among predicates and a real subject). This is the philosophy stemming from a lack of discrimination between the two types of being, real being and copulative being. But as I see it, this lack of discrimination takes place in the deepest stratum of the entification of reality and the logification of intellection. And that is impossible. Being is not reality, and affirmation is not predication. Neither the real nor the affirmed being are comprised by community of notes or of genera, as Plato said.

Plato’s lack of discrimination becomes a positive identification of real being and copulative being in modern philosophy. In this identity, one can start from real being, and then the copulative being has the structure which the structure of real being imposes upon it. That was *Leibniz*’ philosophy. The real is a “single” substance (monad), whose identity consists in the *vis* of unity of union and separation of the “details” which comprise that monadic unity of the real. Predicative judgement is the intellectual form of this monadic structure of the real; it is because of this that the judgement is a constitution or copulation. The copulative “is” is the adequate intellection of what reality is in itself. Seen from the point of view of intellection, both conceptive as well as affirmative intellection is intellection of what reality is in itself. This is what is called “rationalism”. {381} But it is impossible. Affirmation is not a constitution, as even Aristotle thought and which was repeated constantly by Leibniz. But even in the case of predicative affirmation, its constitution does not consist in a bonding *activity*, but in *actuality* of realization. It is not the structure of the real which determines the predicative structure of intellection. The first is a question of actuity, the second of actuality. Once again, the radical mistake of this identification follows from the entification of reality and the logification of intellection. Rationalism consists in affirming the identification of entification and of logification, the latter grounded in the former.

This identity can be brought about by another route: real being is primarily and radically a moment of affirmed being. “Being” is the element of thinking, and the movement of thinking is at once structuring movement of the real and something “put” by thinking itself. That was Hegel’s philosophy. Being real is “a” determination of being as such, as thought being; this is idealism. Idealism consists, as I see it, in the identification of being real with the being of the affirmed, with the latter grounded in the former. In Leibniz, real being models intellection; in

Hegel, the being of the affirmed (intellectually known or thought, the expression used is immaterial) dialectically constitutes the being of the real. Dialectically, because the movement of thinking consists in starting from the “position” of being, and this position is ultimately a “judgement”. In Hegel thinking thus constitutes the logical genesis of being in all its forms. Dialectic, for Hegel, is an internal movement of intellectually knowing as such. And by virtue of being intellection of “being”, this dialectic is a dialectic of being itself. This, as we shall see forthwith, is impossible, because dialectical movement does not rest upon itself. In the first place, it does not fall back upon being but upon the real; and secondly, {382} because the real itself is not primarily known intellectually in movement nor as position in movement.

Plato, Leibniz, and Hegel represent the identity of being real and copulative being. The entification of the real and the logification of intellection are the two foundations of classical philosophy; and it is not by chance that they have led to ontologist rationalism, even to idealism. But none of this is tenable. Being has forms which are quite different but which nonetheless have the unity of that by which all are forms of “being”. It is necessary then to confront, in a positive way, the problem of this difference and its unity.

aa) *The difference between the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed.* The being of the substantive, let us repeat, is not substantive reality. The substantive “is here-and-now being”, an expression in which reality is designated in the ‘is here-and-now’, and being in the ‘being’. Thus being is not something accidental, because the real is being *de suyo*. Therefore there is no “real being” but instead “reality in being”, as I have been saying throughout the hundreds of pages of this work. On the other hand, every real thing is so among other things with respect to which this thing is what it is “in reality”. And here we have the radical difference: being as being of “reality”, and being as being of what it is “in reality”. The first is the being of the substantive, the second is affirmed being. And both are “to be here-and-now being”, either as pure and simple reality, or as being affirmed in accordance with what is one [*se es*] in reality.

This difference is then a difference in the “to be here-and-now being”. Therefore it is in the unity of the “being here-and-now” where the unity of being is constitutively found. In what is this difference grounded, and in what then does the unity of being in this foundation consist? {383}

bb) *Foundation of the difference.* The difference between the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed is, as we have just said, a difference which concerns the real but which does so in a different mode in

each case. The being of the substantive concerns the real only by virtue of being real. And even were there no intellection, there would be and is in all the real a being of the substantive. But the being “as such” of the substantive does not consist only in the “being of the substantive”, but in the “as such” of this being. And this “*as such*” is not given except in the intellection of the real. This intellection is the impression of reality. On the other hand, the being of the affirmed certainly concerns the real, but does so according to its “in reality” among other real things. Now, this “among” is here an intellectual function of what the real is in reality. And in this aspect the “among” concerns the real which is intellectually known in a movement which intellectually knows a thing among others. Hence it follows that being, both the substantive being as well as the being of the affirmed, lead back (albeit in different ways) to intellection itself, to an intellection which constitutively involves that double possibility of apprehending the real in and by itself and of apprehending the real as something which is “in reality” among other real things. This double possibility only concerns sentient intellection. The impression of reality has, in fact, the two moments of individual formality and field formality, whose unity in the formality of reality constitutes what a thing is “in reality”. Therefore, in the unity of the formality of reality in impression is where, in its foundation, the unity of the being of the substantive and of the being of the affirmed is constituted. An intellection which was not sentient, when it apprehended the real, would not have the duality of being as such of the substantive and of the being of the affirmed. And that means that {384} this difference and hence this unity are not given within the being of the substantive. This being has no differentiation whatsoever along those lines. It is a difference which is given only in the “to be here-and-now being”, between the being of the substantive “as such”, and the being of the affirmed “in reality”. It is a difference which is thus given within sentient intellection and which pertains to the real in the order of actuality. The real is situated and actualized in sentient intellection as “real”, and as what it is “in reality”. Having identified these two actualities with each other, after having identified actuality with actuity, is also what has led to rationalism and to idealism. The internal root of the identification of these two actualizations is found in the fact that being is considered as something understood. But this, as we have seen, is not the case. Being is not formally *understood* but is something formally *sensed* in the impression of reality. And this being sensed, this being in impression, is what is divided into being of the substantive as such and being affirmed.

Granting this, In what does the unity of the being of the substantive and of affirmed being consist?

cc) *Unity of being of the substantive as such and of the being of the affirmed.* The unity in question is in the fact that both are “being”. The whole problem is then referred to the unity of “reality” and of “in reality”. Clearly this unity is the very formality of reality, “of” which and only “of” which being is the being; it is the being of the real. The unity of being is therefore unity of the “of”. Now, this unity of the being “of” the intellectually known real has its own structure, which it is fitting to set forth.

The *formal character* of being has three moments. In the first place, *being is actuality*. It is not, therefore, a formal or constitutive moment of the real as real, {385} but the worldly actuality of the real. This actuality is re-actualized in sentient intellection, because the world is apprehended sentiently as field.

This actuality opens the way to a second moment: *being [noun] is ulterior actuality*. Ulteriority is the second formal moment of being [noun]. By virtue of being a worldly actuality, being [noun] presupposes the worldly respectivity of the real. This respectivity is, on the one hand, the respectivity of the real *qua* real (world); and on the other, the respectivity toward other real things which, impressively understood, comprise the intellectual world. They are not two worlds. This is only one world, the real world, but this world has its own dimensions according as one looks at the real world of what is “real” or at the real world of what is “in reality”. The ulteriority of being consists in the actuality of the real in that respectivity which constitutes the world. And being [noun] is “to be here-and-now in the world”, whether in the sense of real *simpliciter*, or of “in reality” what the real is. Now, this actuality, because it is ulterior, is not formally identical with the real, but the real is really in the world, i.e., “is being” *de suyo*.

In the order of intellection, the real is what is apprehended “directly”; and its ulteriority is apprehended, as we have seen, “indirectly”. When we impressively apprehend reality, we co-apprehend its actuality in that respectivity. When we apprehend the real in impression, we then have indirectly apprehended its very ulteriority; i.e., we have this ulteriority in the express sense. This is the third moment of being, indirectness or expression. Being is the *expression* of the impression of reality. Only because the expressed is co-intellectively known in impression can we and ought we to say that the expressed is indirectly known intellectually; indirectness is expression. {386} Both the being of the substantive and the affirmed being have that formal unity of the *ex* which is grounded in the ulteriority of actuality. The “in” and the “ex” are the two dimensions of the formality of reality apprehended in sentient intellection. The first is the direct dimension;

the second, the indirect dimension. That being is “of” reality means, then, that the “of” consists in express ulterior actuality. And here we have the *formal characteristic* of being.

But *the unity of being is not just formal*. That is, we are not dealing with the fact that there are two species of being, viz. being of the substantive “and” being of the affirmed, but rather with the fact that these two presumed species are more than species because the unity of the “and” does not have a formally additive character. The “and” is *dynamic unity*. The fact is that the two forms of being are not just coordinated, but moreover the affirmed being is grounded in the being of the substantive as such. The being of the substantive “as such” is the radical form of being. This does not mean, I repeat, that reality consists in being *esse reale*, but that the being of the substantive “as such” is the radical form of being in intellectual actuality. Nor does it mean that affirmation falls back in a formal way upon the being of the substantive: affirmation falls back formally upon reality. Only because in that actual reality the being of the substantive is indirectly expressed, do we co-express the being of the affirmed when judging about the real. To say that the radical form of being is the being “as such” of the substantive means that *inside the lines of intellectually known being*, the radical type of being is the being of the substantive “as such”. It is in this that the being of the affirmed is grounded. And as the intellection of the real among other things of the field is a movement by which we are going from one thing to another, the unity of both forms of being is a formally dynamic unity. {387}

But it is necessary to purge a false idea about this dynamic unity, namely the idea that this dynamism is dialectical. Dynamic unity is not dialectical. The dialectic, regardless of the structure assigned to it, is always and only a “step” from one intellectual position to another, not dialectic of actuality as such. When Hegel speaks to us of the dialectic of reality it is because he understands that reality is a moment of being and that being is a position of thought. But the dynamic unity of the forms of being in intellection is not the unity of “passing from one thing to another”. To be sure, in the affirmed itself there can be a “passage” from one affirmation to another. But the dynamism which leads from the being of the substantive as such to the being of the affirmed is not a “passing” in the intellection; rather it is the very constitution of the foundation of being affirmed in the *prior* structure of the being of the substantive as such. The “passing” is grounded in the being of the substantive; but this foundation is not, in turn, a passing. Reality is present in the primordial apprehension of reality, and is affirmed, in what it is in reality, in the affirmative intellection. Only there does the

notion of passing fit.

This dynamic unity which is prior to any passing, and which constitutes the unity of being of the affirmed and of the being of the substantive as such, also has different moments.

Above all, the actuality of the real in worldly respectivity acquires its own character. Without abandoning the real, and therefore without abandoning either the being of the substantive as such, intellection goes from one real thing to another; the respectivity (of the real) as such, without ceasing to be what it is, is distended, so to speak, in respectivity to other real things among which the real is actualized in intellection; this is the primordial world as the field of reality. With it the actuality of the real in respectivity has {388} also become distended; the being of the substantive as such has been distended into the being of the affirmed. Distention is not a passing, but at most the structural condition so that there where the distention is manifested there may be a passing. *Distention* is the first moment of the dynamic unity of the being of the affirmed and the being of the substantive as such.

This distention is not bilateral, because the being of the substantive as such is the radical form of intellectually known being. Whence it follows that the being of the affirmed as distention of the being of the substantive is an unfolding of this latter, but an unfolding of actuality. The actuality of the real in worldly respectivity is unfolded in its actuality among other real things. Being affirmed is thus an *ex* of the being of the substantive. The being of the substantive as such is what is ex-pressed in the impression of reality; and in the distended im-pression in affirmative intellection there is ex-pressed affirmatively its being as being “in reality”. Each of the two beings is an ex-expression of reality. But in turn the real of the primordial apprehension of reality is the determinant of affirmation; this determination is evidence, an *ex*. Evidence is formally a moment of the real actualized in intellectual movement. But since this actualization bears in an ex-pressed way being, it follows that evidence is indirectly—and only indirectly—a moment of being. Evidence is not evidence of being, but evidence of the real. And just on account of that, indeed only on account of it, evidence of the real is indirect co-evidence of being. Therefore the expression in which the being of the affirmed consists, and the expression in which the being of the substantive as such consists, have the unity of being a distention unfolding itself, whose radical dynamic character is the *ex* of being. Only by means of this prior *ex* has the *ex* proper to the being of the affirmed been able to be constituted. {389} Being is being as such of the substantive “and” being of the affirmed. I said that this “and” is not additive. Now we can explain precisely: the “and” itself is the

character of an *ex*; the being of the substantive determines in *ex* the being of the affirmed. The dynamic unity of being is, then, unity of distension and of unfolding.

But this unfolding, this *ex*, in turn has its own character. *Ex* is the distended unity of the real which is here-and-now being. And so this gerundive takes on a modal characteristic: being [noun] is an ulterior actuality and hence gerundive actuality; it is a gerundive present. This “being” which is neither process nor a moment of a process, is rather a structure of the very being of the real, what I call *temporality*. Being [noun] does not happen temporally but rather is *temporal*. Temporality pertains to the substantive being of the real, and therefore also pertains, although in an indirect way, to substantive being in its impression of reality; this is the temporality of the being of the substantive. In what does it consist? Being, as I said, is ulterior actuality of the real in worldly respectivity. And this actuality is first of all a “being already”; but it is also a “yet to be”. The “is” of the being of the substantive is thus radically the unity of an “is already” and of an “is yet to be” in the “is now”. None of these three expressions is by itself actuality; only their intrinsic unity is actuality. Only that unitary actuality constitutes the actuality of the “is”. Already, now, and yet-to-be are not three *phases* of the happening of being, but three *faces* of its own unitary actuality. Its unity is the structure of the “being” [verb]. Temporality is the dynamic unity of the formal ulteriority of being with respect to reality. Time is grounded therefore in being and not the other way around. This temporality pertains to the real by itself and by the mere fact of being, independently {390} of any intellection, because independently of intellection the real has being of the substantive. But the being of the substantive “as such” is only given in sentient intellection; and therefore only there, albeit indirectly, is temporality apprehended as such. Its distension in the *ex* is expressed in a form proper to the being of the affirmed, viz. its temporal connotation. This temporal connotation, in accordance with whether it is a now, a before, or an after, is in its affirmation the unfolding of the temporality of the real apprehended in the impression of reality. The “being” [verb] of the being [noun] of the substantive is what determines the temporal connotation of the being [verb] of affirmed being [noun]. The temporal connotation of the “is” is an unfolding of the temporal unity of the being of the substantive.

In summary, being has the formal characteristic of actuality, ulteriority, and indirectness in expression; this is the formal unity of being. And this unity is constitutively dynamic: distension, unfolding, and temporeity are the structure of the dynamic unity of being affirmed and of substantive being as such.

We have thus seen the difference between the intel-

lection of reality in its being of the substantive and in its being of the affirmed. We then examined the unity of being in sentient intellection. With this we are now able to consider the articulation of reality and being in what constitutes the truth of intellection. This is the *fourth of the questions we posed about truth, reality, and being*.

d) *Truth of intellection: reality and being in truth.*

Allow me to repeat carefully what has already been expounded. Intellective actuality of the real has, as we know, two aspects. On one hand, there is the formality of the reality of a real apprehended thing. On the other, there is the intellective actuality of this formality, but *qua* “intellective” actuality. {391} And this comprises the radical truth of a thing, its real truth. This truth is constituted in the impression of reality, and as such the real truth has the dimension of an *in*. But as the real in impression has, ulteriorly, being, the being of the substantive, it follows that intellection expressly bears being as such, and therefore the impression itself has a dimension of the “ex”, grounded in the dimension of the “in”. To real truth there pertains, then, in direct mode the “in” of the formality of the real, and in indirect mode the “ex” of the express, of its being; the being express comprises the being of the substantive as such. This being as such is express only in intellection. Therefore the being of the substantive pertains, to be sure, to a thing; but the being of the substantive “as such” pertains only to the real intellectually known *qua* actual in intellection. In virtue of this, the primordial apprehension of the real constitutes real truth, but at one and the same time constitutes the formal truth of what apprehension itself is; intellection constitutes not only the truth of the real, not only apprehends the real, but also constitutes that moment in accordance with which apprehension itself is co-apprehending that which in it “truthifies” the real. The unity of “truth” of the real (in its reality and in its being) with the “being truth” of intellection itself, is the formal structure of real truth as such. Intellection not only intellectually knows the real, but also co-intellectively knows that this intellection “is” true. And of these two moments, the second, “being” truth is the *ex* itself, and is grounded in the truth of impression. Here we have the radical structure of intellection, of the actualization of the real: intellection actualizes the real “truthfully”, and actualizes so that this intellective actualization “is” truth. The second moment is grounded in the first. This grounding is not {392} a foundation or logical inference or anything like that; rather, it is the intrinsic and formal grounding character of the very impression of reality as actualization.

Truth, to be sure, is not only truth of the “real”; it is also truth of what a real thing is “in reality”. But this “in reality” is the distention of the field moment of the real,

already apprehended in primordial apprehension; and its intellection is an affirmative movement based on what a thing is “in reality”, and bears along with it, as co-intellectively known, the being of the affirmed as such. The being of the affirmed is the real being affirmed in this intellectual movement of mine, and therefore the actuality of the being of the affirmed is at one and the same time the affirming intellection in its merely actualizing character; it is intellectually knowing that the intellection “is true”. It is an actualization of the “real” and of the fact that it is mere actualization, i.e., of the fact that the affirmation “is” true. The characteristic of the mere intellectual actualization of the real which constitutes reality is

then at one and the same time truthful intellection and intellection of the fact that the intellection itself is true. This is the unity of reality, being, and being true.

I do not deem it necessary to insist once again that here ‘truth’ does not mean anything more than the ambit of truth, because if we take truth in the sense of the truth of a determinate thing, then that ambit gives rise to two different possibilities: the possibility of truth and the possibility of error. Here we are dealing simply with the ambit of truth as mere actualization. And this ambit is not a mere “element” of intellectually knowing but is also an intellectual, “physical actuality” of the real.

CONCLUSION

Let us review the general line of argument in this study. I asked about the structure of intellectually knowing what the real is in reality, i.e., as unity of its individual and field moments. This intellection is the intellection of the real among other real things. This “among” distends the two moments, individual and field, impressively sensed in the sentient intellection of reality. And then the intellection is converted into movement, into the unfolding of the impression of reality. It is a movement which starts from the real already apprehended in primordial apprehension, in the impression of reality; a movement which begins by stepping back from the real but within the field of reality. With that, the field of reality becomes a medium of intellection of the real; it is the “mediated” intellection of the impression of reality. That stepping back is a movement of retraction, in which the intellection elaborates the complex group of simple apprehensions (percepts, fictional items, concepts) whose formal characteristic is what the thing “might be” in reality. This “might be” is the directional foundation of the contribution of the simple apprehensions, in accordance with which intellection is moved toward the individual real and in stepping back knows intellectually what that real thing is in reality. This intellection is the affirmation, the judgement; {394} it is the *logos*. To judge is to intellectually know what the real, apprehended as real in an impression of reality, is “in reality”; and this sentient intellection consists in actualizing the real of which one judges in the order of simple apprehension; that is sentient *logos*. In other words, to judge is to judge of a realization; to affirm is sentient intellection of the realization of what “might be” in what “is”. It assumes different forms (positional, propositional, predicative), and different modes (ignorance, guessing, doubt, opinion, probability, plausibility, firmness). These affirmations are determined by the real itself in the order of its actualization with respect to simple apprehensions; this determination is *evidence*. It is a radical moment of the impression of reality; it is the force of imposition, the demanding force, of the real as given in impression. This intellection has its own

essential character: truth. Truth is the actualization of the real in sentient intellection. It can be simple; then it is the truth of the real purely and simply known intellectually in and by itself. That is real truth. But this actualization can also be actualization of a real thing among others of the sensed field. Then one intellectually knows, in affirmation, a real thing based on these other things; this is dual truth, the coinciding and demanding actuality of intellection and of the real. With respect to affirmation this coincidence is “seeming”; seeming is demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. With respect to the thing, the coincidence is the “real”. Truth is coincidence of seeming and of the real, such that the seeming is grounded in the real. All of this is an intellective movement of formally sentient character, a movement of the impression of reality and in the impression of reality. Dual truth has the three forms of authenticity, speaking the truth or veridictance, and fulfillment. In all of them there is a moment of conformity with {395} the actualized real, and a moment of possible adequation, but one which is imperfect and fragmentary with respect to the real. Conformity is no more than a step toward adequation. Both moments have between them that unity which we call “approximation” to the real. Every conformity is approximation to an adequation in an impression of reality. Truth has the dynamic unity of approximated being. In this truth and in all of its forms there is above all the real itself in a direct mode; but there is in an indirect mode its being, the being of the substantive as such and the being of the affirmed. Being is formally worldly actuality, ulterior and express, of the real impressively apprehended. Being is something sensed in an impressive actuality, of dynamic character, which culminates in temporeity. Intellection is at one and the same time truth of the real and of its being, but truth of its being grounded in truth of the real. This actuality is not only actuality of the real and of its being, but is also at the same time an actuality of what is intellectually known *qua* intellectually known, and therefore an actuality of intellection itself; it is at one and the same time truth and being-truth. Intellection is not

just intellection of the real, but also co-intellection that this intellectually knowing of the real is true. And in this radical unity consists the internal articulation of reality, of being, and of truth in intellection.

This is the structure of the intellection of what something is in reality. In order to understand it, the analysis of all the moments of intellection in the order of reality was necessary. It was necessary to see step by step how every intellection consists formally in an unfolding of the impression of the reality of the real. We are not talking about coming to a kind of realism, as it was called classically, but rather of showing that all the moments of intellectual knowing are radically and formally immersed in the real, and determined by the real itself {396} as real impressively apprehended. The aspects of this determination therefore comprise the structure of intellectual knowing of the logos. The real is not a point of arrival of the logos but rather the intrinsic and formal moment given in the primordial apprehension of sentient intellection. Therefore not only is it not a point of arrival which is more or less problematic, but rather it is the precise and

radical point of *departure*, and the very structure of intellectual movement. It is not just an intentional terminus. The logos is essentially and formally a modalization of sentient intelligence.

With this we have put the finishing touches on what I proposed at the beginning of this second part of my study, viz. the examination of the field structure of intellectual knowing, i.e., the structure of the sentient logos. It is a structure determined by the real as merely actualized in sentient intellection. But as we shall see, this structure is the commencement of a progress *within* reality and directed *toward* the real *qua* moment of the world, understanding by 'world' the respective unity of the real purely and simply as real. The logos is a movement but not a progression. We are dealing with an enormous effort of intellection of what the real is, vaster at each iteration. This progression is what, as I see it, comprises reason. Reason is a progression from the field to the world. And as the field is the sensed world, reason is constitutively and formally sentient reason. What is this progression? That is the theme of Part III of this study.

