

# Sentient Intelligence





## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I publish this book on the subject of intelligence many years after having published a work on the topic of essence. This sequence is not merely chronological; rather, it has an intrinsic meaning the clarification of which is by no means superfluous. What does 'after' signify here?

For many readers, my book *On Essence* lacked a foundation because they felt that the task of knowing what reality is cannot be brought to its conclusion without a previous study of what it is possible for us to know. This is true with respect to certain concrete problems. But to affirm it in the most general way with respect to all knowing of reality as such is something quite different. This latter affirmation is an idea which, in various forms, constitutes the thesis animating almost all of philosophy from Descartes to Kant: it is the notion of "critical philosophy". The foundation of all philosophy would be "critique", the discerning of what can be known. Nonetheless, I think that this is incorrect. Certainly the investigation of reality requires us to lay hold of some conception of what knowing is. But is this necessarily prior? I do not believe so, because it is no less certain that an investigation about the possibilities of knowing cannot be brought to a conclusion, and in fact {10} never has been brought to a conclusion, without appeal to some conception of reality. The study *On Essence* contains many affirmations about the possibility of knowing. But at the same time it is certain that the study of knowing and its possibilities includes many concepts about reality. The fact is that an intrinsic priority of knowing over reality or reality over knowing is impossible. Knowing and reality, in a strictly and rigorous sense, stem from the same root; neither has priority over the other. And this is true not simply because of the *de facto* conditions of our investigations, but because of an intrinsic and formal condition of the very idea of reality and of knowing. Reality is the formal character—the formality—according to which what is apprehended is something "in its own right," something *de suyo*.<sup>1</sup> And to know is to apprehend something according

to this formality. I will return shortly to these ideas. For this reason, the presumed critical priority of knowing with respect to reality, i.e., with respect to the known, is in the final analysis nothing but a type of timid stammering in the enterprise of philosophizing. It is akin to the case of someone who wishes to open a door and spends hours studying the movement of the muscles of the hand; most likely he would never manage to open the door. Ultimately, this critical idea of the priority of knowing has never led to a knowledge of the real by itself, and when it did lead there, it was only at the expense of being unfaithful to its own critical principles. Nor could matters be otherwise, because knowing and reality stem from the same root. For this reason, the fact that I publish a study on the subject of intelligence after having published a study on the subject of essence does not mean that I am filling some unsatisfied necessity. Rather, it manifests that the study of knowing is not prior to the study of reality. The 'after' to which {11} I alluded earlier is thus not simply chronological but is the active rejection of any critique of knowledge as the preliminary ground for the study of reality.

But this is not all. I intentionally employ the expression 'to know' in a somewhat indeterminate fashion, because modern philosophy does not begin with knowing as such, but with the mode of knowing which is called 'knowledge.' Critical philosophy is thus the Critique of Knowledge, of *episteme*, or as it is usually called, 'epistemology', the science of knowledge. Now, I think that this is an exceedingly serious problem, because knowledge is not something which rests upon itself. And by that I am not referring to the determining psychological, sociological, and historical factors of knowing. To be sure, a psychology of knowledge, a sociology of knowing, and a historicity of knowing are quite essential. Nonetheless, they are not primary, because what is primary in knowledge is being a mode of intellection. Hence every epistemology presupposes an investigation of what, structurally and formally, the intelligence, the *Nous*, is; i.e., it presupposes a study of 'noology'. The vague idea of 'knowing' is not made concrete first in the sense of knowledge, but in in-

<sup>1</sup>[The Spanish *de suyo* is an extremely important technical term in Zubiri's writings. It traces to the Latin *ex se*, and denotes that the impression of reality "comes from" and "out of" the reality of the encountered other. It therefore connotes a certain independence and self-sufficiency. The English 'from itself,' a literal translation, does not capture the range of mean-

ing Zubiri intends; therefore the original Spanish expression is left throughout the text.—Trans.]

tellection as such. This does not refer to a logic or psychology of intelligence, but to the formal structure of understanding.

What then is understanding, knowing? Throughout the course of its history, philosophy has attended most carefully to the acts of intellection (conceiving, judging, etc.) as opposed to the distinct real data which the senses submit to us. Sensing is one thing, we are told, and understanding another. This manner of focusing on the problem of intelligence contains at bottom an affirmation: understanding is posterior to sensing, and this posteriority is an opposition. Such has been the initial thesis of philosophy {12} since Parmenides, and it has hovered imperturbably, with a thousand variants, over all of European philosophy.

But there is something quite vague about all of this, because we have not been told in what the understanding as such consists formally. We have only been told that the senses give to the intelligence real sensed things so that the understanding may conceptualize and judge them. But despite this we are told neither what sensing is formally nor, most importantly, what intellection or understanding is formally. I believe that understanding consists formally in apprehending the real as real, and that sensing is apprehending the real in impression. Here 'real' signifies that the characters which the apprehended thing has in the apprehension also pertain to it as its own, *de suyo*, and not just as a function of some vital response. This does not refer to a real thing in the acceptance of something beyond apprehension, but rather inasmuch as it is apprehended as something which is its own. It is what I call "formality of reality." It is because of this that the study of intellection and the study of reality have the same root. And this is decisive, because the senses give us, in human sensing, real things—albeit with all their limitations—but real things nonetheless. Consequently the apprehension of real things as sensed is a sentient apprehension; but insofar as it is an apprehension of realities, it is an intellectual apprehension. Whence human sensing and intellection are not two numerically distinct acts, each complete in its order; but rather they constitute two moments of a single act of sentient apprehension of the real: this is sentient intelligence. And this does not refer to the fact that our intellection is primarily directed to the sensible, but rather to intellection and {13} sensing in their proper formal structure. Nor does it refer to understanding the sensible and sensing the intelligible, but rather to the fact that understanding and sensing structurally constitute—if one desires to employ an expression and concept improper in this context—a single faculty, the sentient intelligence. Human sensing and intellection are not

only not opposed, but indeed constitute in their intrinsic and formal unity a single and unitary act of apprehension. This act *qua* sentient is impression; *qua* intellectual it is apprehension of reality. Therefore the unitary and unique act of sentient intellection is the impression of reality. Intellection is a mode of sensing, and sensing in man is a mode of intellection.

What is the formal nature of this act? It is what I call the mere actuality of the real. Actuality is not, as the Latins thought, something's character of being in act. To be a dog in act is to be the formal plenitude of that in which being a dog consists. For that reason I refer to this character rather as actuity. Actuality on the other hand is not the character of something in act but rather of something which is actual—two very distinct things. Viruses have had actuity for many millions of years, but only today have acquired an actuality which previously they did not possess. But actuality is not always something extrinsic to the actuity of the real, as it was in the case of the viruses; it can be something intrinsic to real things. When a man is present because it is he who makes himself present, we say that this man is actual in that in which he makes himself present. Actuality is a temporary being, but a being present through oneself, through one's own proper reality. Therefore actuality pertains to the very reality of the actual, but neither adds to it, subtracts from it, nor modifies any of its real *notae* or *notes*. So, human intellection is formally the mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. {14}

Here we have the idea, the only idea which there is in this book throughout its hundreds of pages. These pages are nothing but an explication of that one idea. This explication is not a question of conceptual reasoning, but of a analysis of the facts of intellection. To be sure, it is a complicated analysis and one which is not easy; for this reason there have been inevitable repetitions which at times may become monotonous. But it is mere analysis.

Intellection has distinct modes, that is, there are distinct modes of the mere actualization of the real. There is a primary and radical mode, the apprehension of the real actualized in and through itself: this is what I call the primordial apprehension of the real. Its study is therefore a rigorous analysis of the ideas of reality and of intellection. But there are other modes of actualization. They are the modes according to which the real is actualized not only in and through itself, but also among other things and in the world. This does not refer to some other actualization but to a development of the primordial actualization: it is therefore a *reactualization*. As the primordial intellection is sentient, it follows that these *reactualiza-*

tions are also sentient. They are two: logos and reason, sentient logos and sentient reason. Knowledge is nothing but a culmination of logos and reason. It would not be profitable to say here what logos and reason are; I will do so in the course of this study.

The study thus comprises three parts:

First Part: *Intelligence and Reality*.

Second Part: *Logos*.

Third Part: *Reason*.

Through intellection, we are unmistakably installed in reality. Logos and reason do not need to *come to* reality but rather are born *of* reality and *in* it. {15}

Today the world is undeniably engulfed by a pervasive atmosphere of sophistry. As in the time of Plato and Aristotle, we are inundated by discourse and propaganda. But the truth is that we are installed modestly, but irrefutably, in reality. Therefore it is more necessary now than ever to bring to conclusion the effort to submerge ourselves in the real in which we already are, in order to extract its reality with rigor, even though that may be only a few poor snatches of its intrinsic intelligibility.

Fuenterrabia. August, 1980. {16}



## Part I

# Intelligence and Reality





## CHAPTER I

### INTELLECTION AS ACT: APPREHENSION

In this first part of the book I propose to study what we call ‘intellective knowing.’<sup>1</sup> From the very origins of philosophy the opposition of intellection to what we term ‘sensing’ has been taken as the point of departure. Intellection and sensation would thus be two forms, for the most part opposed. . . , of what? Greek and Medieval philosophy understood intellection and sensing as acts of two essentially distinct *faculties*. The opposition of intellection and sensing would thus be the opposition of two faculties. In order to simplify the discussion I shall call ‘thing’ that which is sensed and understood. This has nothing to do with ‘thing’ in the sense of what that word means today when one speaks of “thing-ism,” wherein the thing is opposed to something which has a mode of being “not-thinglike,” so to speak, for example human life. Rather, I here employ the term ‘thing’ in its most trivial sense as merely synonymous with ‘something’. Now, Greek and Medieval philosophy considered intellection and sensing as acts of two faculties, each determined by the action of things. But whether or not this is true, it is a conception which cannot serve us as {20} a positive base precisely because it treats of faculties. A faculty is discovered in its acts. Hence it is to the very mode of intellective knowing and sensing, and not to the faculties, which we must basically attend. In other words, my study is going to fall back upon the acts of intellective knowing and sensing inasmuch as they are acts (*kath’ energeian*), and not inasmuch as they are faculties (*kata dynamin*). So these acts will not be considered as acts of a faculty, but as acts in and for themselves. Throughout this book, then, I shall refer to “intellection” itself, and not to the faculty of intellection, that is, to the intelligence. If at times I speak of ‘intelligence’, the expression does not mean a faculty but the abstract character of intellection itself. Therefore I do not refer to a metaphysics of the intelligence, but rather

of the internal structure of the act of intellective knowing. Every metaphysics of the intelligence presupposes an analysis of intellection. To be sure, at various points I have seen myself moved to metaphysical conceptualizations, which I have deemed important. But when doing so, I have taken great care to indicate that in these points I am dealing with metaphysics and not mere intellection as act. That is, I am dealing with an analysis of acts themselves. They are salient *facts*, and we ought to take them in and for themselves and not in terms of any theory, of whatever order it may be.

But here a second aberration appears. In Greek and medieval philosophy, philosophy drifted from act to faculty. But in modern philosophy, since the time of Descartes, the drift has been in the other direction. This false step is within the very act of intellection. Intellection and sensing are considered as distinct ways of becoming aware of things. So in modern philosophy, intellection and sensing are two modes of {21} such becoming aware, i.e. two *modes of consciousness*. Leaving aside sensing for the moment, we are told that intellection is consciousness, so that intellection as act is an act of consciousness. This is the idea which has run through all of modern philosophy and which culminates in the phenomenology of Husserl. Husserl’s philosophy seeks to be an analysis of consciousness and of its acts.

Nonetheless, this conception falls back upon the essence of intellection as act. When it rejects the idea of the act of a faculty, what philosophy has done is substantify the ‘becoming aware of’, thus making of intellection an act of consciousness. But this implies two ideas: (1) that consciousness is something which carries out acts; and (2) that what is formally constitutive of the act of intellection is the ‘becoming aware of.’ But, neither of these two affirmations is true because neither corresponds to the facts.

In the first place, consciousness has no substantiality whatever and, therefore, it is not something which can execute acts. Consciousness is just making awareness itself into a substance. But the only thing we have as fact

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<sup>1</sup> [‘Intellective knowing’ is used to translate Zubiri’s expression *inteligir*, a verb derived from the Latin *intelligere*; it cannot be rendered literally, but means the act of knowing in which one’s intelligence, in the most general sense, is involved. *Inteligir* is broader than the English *understanding*, though at times it has that meaning.—Trans.]

is not “the” becoming aware of or “the” consciousness, but conscious acts of quite diverse nature. Under the pretext of not appealing to a “faculty”, the character of some of our acts is substantified and then these acts are converted into acts of a type of “super-faculty,” which would be consciousness. And this is not fact, but only a grand theory.

In the second place, it is untrue that what constitutes intellection is awareness, because that is always a becoming aware “of” something which is here-and-now present<sup>2</sup> to consciousness. And this being here-and-now present is not determined by the being aware. A thing is not present because I am aware of it, but rather I am aware of it because it is already {22} present. To be sure, this concerns a being here-and-now present in the intellection, where I am aware of what is present; but the being here-and-now present of the thing is not a moment formally identical to the being aware itself, nor is it grounded there. Hence, within the act of intellection, modern philosophy has gone astray over the question of being here-and-now present, and has attended only to the realizing. But this awareness is not in and through itself an act; it is only a moment of the act of intellection. This is the great aberration of modern philosophy with respect to the analysis of intellection.

We ask ourselves then, what is the proper nature of intellectual knowing as act? Intellection is certainly a becoming aware of, but it is an awareness of something which is already present. It is in the indivisible unity of these two moments that intellection consists. Greek and medieval philosophy sought to explain the presentation of something as an actuation of the thing on the faculty of intellectual knowing. Modern philosophy ascribes intellection to awareness. Now, it is necessary to take the act of intellection in the intrinsic unity of its two moments, but only as moments of it and not as determinations of things or of consciousness. In intellection, I “am” aware of something at that moment which “is” present to me. The indivisible unity of these two moments consists, then, in “being here-and-now present”. This being here-and-now present is of “physical” character and not merely an intentional aspect of intellection. ‘Physical’ is the original and ancient expression for designating something which is not merely conceptual, but real. It is therefore opposed to what is merely intentional, that is, to what consists only in being the terminus of awareness. Aware-

ness is “awareness-of”, and this moment of the ‘of’ is precisely what constitutes intentionality. The “being here-and-now present” in which the intellectual act consists physically is a “being here-and-now present” in which {23} I am “with” the thing and “in” the thing (not “of” the thing), and in which the thing is “remaining” in my intellection. Intellection as act is not formally intentional. It is a physical “being here-and-now present”. The unity of this act of “being” as act is what constitutes *apprehension*. Intellection is not the act of a faculty or of consciousness, but rather is in itself an act of apprehension. Apprehension is not a theory but a fact: the fact that I am now aware of something which is present to me. Apprehension is, insofar as it refers to the moment of the “being here-and-now present”, an act of grasping the present, a grasping in which I am aware of what is grasped. It is an act in which what is present to me has been apprehended precisely and formally because it is present to me. Apprehension is the conscious and “presenting” act. And this ‘and’ is precisely the unitary and physical essence itself of apprehension. To understand something is to apprehend this something intellectually.

We must, then, analyze intellection as apprehension. This analysis sets out to determine the essential nature of intellection as such, in the sense of its constitutive nature, and it must fall back upon intellection as apprehension, as I have just said. But since man has many forms of intellection, the analysis which I now set myself can be carried out along quite different paths. One path consists of making a survey of the various types of intellection, trying to obtain by comparison what these types of intellection are in and through themselves. This is the path of induction, but it is not relevant to our problem because what it would give us is a *general concept* of intellection. But this not what we seek. We seek rather the constitutive nature, i.e. the essential nature of {24} intellection in and through itself. Induction would give us only a concept, but what we seek is the “physical” nature of intellection, that is the nature of the apprehensive act which constitutes intellection as such. A general concept does not give us the physical reality of intellection. And this is especially true because it would be necessary for any survey of acts of intellection to be exhaustive, and that we could never guarantee. So it is necessary to embark upon another road. The diverse types of intellection are not merely distinct “types”. As we shall see at the proper time, in them we treat of “modes” of intellectual apprehension. Hence the analysis must bring us to the primary mode of intellectual apprehension and enable us to determine the so-called ‘types of intellection’ as modalizations of this primary apprehension. What we will thus achieve is not a

<sup>2</sup> [Zubiri is here using one of the two Spanish forms of the verb “to be”, *estar*, which refers to temporary or actual being at the moment, as opposed to *ser*, which means being in a more permanent, long-term sense. The sense of *estar* in this context is “to be present here-and-now”, and that expression is used here and throughout the text as necessary to clarify the meaning.—Trans.]

*general concept* of intellection, but a determination of the constitutive nature of the diverse modes of intellectual apprehension. Now, “constitutive nature” is just the *essential physical nature* of intellection; i.e., the problem of what intellectual knowing is, is but the problem of the determination of the primary mode of intellection. That is what I intend to deal with in the first part of this book.

To begin, let us take up an idea that was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, but which I deliberately left aside at the time. Ever since its origins, philosophy has begun by setting what we call ‘intellectual knowing’ against what we call ‘sensing’. But however strange it may seem, philosophy has never addressed the question of what intellectual knowing is, in the formal sense. It has limited itself to studying diverse intellectual acts, but has not told us what intellectual knowing is. And what is particularly strange is that the same has occurred {25} with sensing. The diverse sensings have been studied according to the diverse “senses” which man possesses. But if one asks in what the formal nature of sensing consists, i.e., what sensing as such is, we find that ultimately the question has not been posed. And there follows a consequence which, to my way of thinking, is an extremely important matter. Since what intellectual knowing and sensing as such are has not been determined, it follows that their presumed opposition is left hanging. To what and in what sense can intellectual knowing and sensing be opposed if we are not told beforehand in what each formally consists?

I am not going to enter into any type of dialectical discussion of concepts, but rather limit myself to the basic facts. They are what will lead us in our treatment of the question.

Intellection, I said, is an act of apprehension. Now this act of apprehensive character pertains as well to sensing. Hence it is in apprehension as such where we must anchor both the difference between and essential nature of intellectual knowing and sensing. This does not mean achieving a general concept of apprehension, but of

analyzing the nature of sensible and intellectual apprehension in and through themselves. And this is possible because sensible apprehension and intellectual apprehension—as has been observed on many occasions—frequently have the same object. I sense color and understand what this color is, too. In this case, the two aspects are distinguished not as types, but as distinct modes of apprehension. In order, then, to determine the constitutive nature of intellectual knowing it is necessary to analyze above all the difference between intellectual knowing and sensing as a modal difference *within* the apprehension of the same object; for example, of color. {26}

To determine the constitutive structure of the act of intellectual apprehension, it is unnecessary but very useful to begin by saying what sensible apprehension is as such. This, of course, can be done in many ways. One, by analyzing the modal difference of these apprehensions in the apprehension of the same object. But in order to facilitate the work it is more useful to put sensible apprehension in and of itself before our eyes; that is, to say what sensing is. As sensible apprehension is common to man and animals, it seems that to determine intellectual apprehension starting from sensible apprehension would be to start from the animal as the foundation of human intellection. But rather than starting from the animal in this sense, we seek only to clarify human intellection by contrasting it with “pure” animal sensing.

Finally, intellection as act is an act of apprehension and this apprehension is a mode of sensible apprehension itself. Therefore we must ask ourselves:

Chapter II: What is sensible apprehension?

Chapter III: What are the modes of sensible apprehension?

Chapter IV: In what does intellectual apprehension consist formally?

Only after answering these questions can we penetrate further into the analysis of intellection itself.



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## CHAPTER II

### SENSIBLE APPREHENSION

We ask ourselves what sensible apprehension is. As I have just said, sensible apprehension is common to man and animal. Hence, when I refer to sensible apprehension in this chapter, I will be speaking indifferently of man and animal, according to which is most convenient in the particular case.

Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing. Therefore our first task must be to clarify what sensing is. Only then will we be able to ask ourselves what constitutes sensible apprehension as a moment of sensing. {28}

#### §1

#### SENSING

Sensing is, first of all, a process; it is a sentient process. As a process, sensing has three essential moments.

1. In an animal (whether human or non-human), the sentient process is aroused by something which at times is exogenic and at times endogenic. This is the *moment of arousal*. I call it thus so as not to limit myself to what is usually termed 'excitation'. Excitation is a standard concept in animal psychophysiology. It therefore has a character which is almost exclusively biochemical. Roughly speaking, it comprises that which initiates a physiological process. But here I am not referring exactly to physiological activity. Sensing as a process is not just a physiological activity, but is the process which constitutes the life—in a certain sense the entire life—of an animal. With the same excitations, the animal carries out actions which are extremely diverse. And these actions are determined not only by physiological activity, but by everything the animal apprehends sentiently; for example, its prey. And this moment of apprehension is what constitutes arousal. Arousal is everything that initiates animal action. In my courses I am accustomed to distinguish

function and action in an animal. Muscular contraction, for example, is a function. The subject, let us call it that, of the function is an anatomic-physiological structure; for example, a striated muscle fiber. But action is something whose {29} subject is not a structure, but the animal as a whole. For example, fleeing, attacking, etc., are actions. With the same functions the animal carries out the most diverse actions of its life. So, excitation is a moment of a function; arousal is a moment of an action. This does not preclude an action from initiating a functional act in some cases. But then it is clear that the excitation is only a special mode of arousal. Arousal is the prelude to an animal action process, whatever may be the mode in which it takes place.

2. This arousal rests upon the state in which the animal finds itself. The animal has at every instant a state of vital tone. Arousal modifies that vital tone, and this constitutes the second moment of the sentient process: *tonic modification*. Modification is determined by arousal. But this does not mean that modification is a second moment in the sense of a temporal succession. This would be to again confuse arousal and excitation. Arousal can depend on an endogenic factor which can be in a certain mode connatural to the animal. In such a case, it is the tonic state of the animal which, in one or another form, has chronologically preceded the arousal. This is what occurs, for example, with some instinctive acts. But even in this case, the moment of arousal is one thing, and the moment of tonic modification another.

3. The animal responds to the tonic modification thus aroused. This is the *moment of response*. Let us not confuse response with a reaction of the so-called motor impulses. The action of the impulses is always just a functional moment; but response is an actional moment. With the same motor impulses, the responses can be quite diverse. The apprehension {30} of a prey, for example, determines the attack response. This does not refer simply to a play of the motor impulses. The response can be quite varied. It can even include doing nothing. But qui-

escence is not quietude, that is, an act of the motor impulses, but a mode of response.

Consequently, sensing is a process. This sentient process is *strictly unitary*: it consists in the intrinsic and radical unity, in the indissoluble unity, of the three moments: arousal, tonic modification, and response. It would be an error to think that sensing consists only in arousal, and that the other two moments are only consequent upon sensing. On the contrary: the three moments, in their essential in indissoluble unity, are what strictly constitute sensing. As we shall see in a later chapter, this unity is of decisive importance for our problem. It constitutes what is specific about animality.

Here I do not intend to study the *course of this process*, but its *structure as a process*. This processive structure depends upon the formally constitutive moment of sensing as such. And sensing, in virtue of its very formal structure, is what in a certain fashion determines the structure of the sentient process. Let us, then, consider these two points. {31}

## §2

### THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF SENSING

The processive unity of sensing is determined by the formal structure of arousal. That which arouses the sentient process is the apprehension of the “arousing agent”. And since what this apprehension determines is a sentient process, it follows that the apprehension itself which arouses it should be called, strictly speaking, ‘sensible apprehension.’ Sensible apprehension, then, has two aspects. First, there is that of determining the sentient process in its moment of modification and response; this is sensible apprehension as arousing. In its second aspect, sensible apprehension has a formal structure of its own, and in virtue of that sets the sensing process in motion. Our problem at the moment is centered on the formal structure of sensible apprehension. In the following paragraph we shall see how this formal structure determines the processive structure of sensing.

Since what determines the sentient process is the formal structure of apprehension, it is proper to call this apprehension “sensing as such.” Hence, when I speak of sensing without further qualification I shall be referring to sensing as the formal structure of the sentient apprehension.

We may ask ourselves, then, in what the structure of sensible apprehension consists, considered precisely and formally as sentient apprehension. It consists formally in being impressive apprehension. Here we have what is formally constitutive of sensing: *impression*. Ancient as well as modern philosophy has either paid little attention {32} to the nature of this impression, or more commonly has paid attention to it but without making an analysis of its formal structure. Philosophers have typically limited themselves to describing distinct impressions. But, it is absolutely necessary to rigorously conceptualize what an impression is, that is, in what its nature as an impression consists. Only thus will we be able to speak of sensing in a creative way.

Structurally, an impression has three constitutive moments:

1. Impression is above all *affection* of the sentient by what is sensed. Colors, sounds, an animal’s internal temperature, etc., affect the sentient being. Here ‘affection’ does not refer to the usual moment of sentiment; that would be an affect. Impression is an affection, but it is not an affect. In virtue of this affective moment, we say that the sentient being “suffers” the impression. Since its origins in Greece, philosophy has for this reason characterized impressions as *pathemata*. They would thus be opposed to thoughts, which are proper to a thinking intellection without *pathos*; so thinking intellection would thus be *apathes*, impassive. Here these unmodified characterizations comprise a description (inaccurate to be sure) but not a formal determination of what impression is. It can be said that the totality of modern as well as ancient philosophy has scarcely conceptualized impression other than as affection. But this is insufficient.

2. Impression is not mere affection, it is not mere *pathos* of the sentient being; rather, this affection has, essentially and constitutively, the character of making that which “impresses” present to us. This is the *moment of otherness*. Impression is the presentation of something *other* in affection. It is otherness in affection. This “other” I have called and will continue {33} to call the *note*. Here ‘note’ does not designate any type of indicative sign as does, etymologically, the Latin noun *nota*; rather, it is a participle, that which is “noted” (*gnoto*) as opposed to that which is unnoticed—provided that we eliminate any allusion to cognition (that would be rather the *cognitum*) as well as to knowing (which is what gave rise to *notion* and *notice*). It is necessary to attend only to what is simply “noted”. This could also be called “quality”; but a note is not always of qualitative nature. If I see three points, “three” is not a quality, but it is a note.

Moreover, one must shun the thought that a note is necessarily a note “of” something; for example, that a color is a color of a thing. If I see a simple color, this color is not “of” a thing but “is” in itself the thing; the color is noted in itself. It is true that quite often I call notes ‘qualities’, but only in a wide sense. In the strict sense, a note is not a quality, but something merely noted; it is purely and simply what is present in my impression. Using different words, the Greeks and Medievals suggested this, but did not go beyond the suggestion. It is necessary to anchor reflection on otherness itself. But before doing so let us point out a third characteristic of impression, one which to my way of thinking is essential.

3. I refer to the *force of imposition* with which the note present in the affection imposes itself upon the sentient being. It is this which arouses the process of sensing. In general, it is a conjunction of notes rather than an isolated one; thus, for example, we have the saying “a cat scalded with hot water flees”. The water sensed in impression “imposes” itself upon the animal. This force of imposition can be quite varied; i.e. the same impressive otherness can impose itself in very different manners. {34} But this force of imposition has nothing to do with force in the sense of intensity of affection. A very powerful affection can have a quite small force of imposition. And, conversely, a weak affection can have a great force of imposition.

The intrinsic unity of these three moments is what constitutes impression. But ancient as well as modern philosophy has largely restricted its attention to affection. It has pointed out (though rather vaguely) what I have termed “otherness”, but without centering its attention on otherness as such. Furthermore, it has scarcely examined the force of imposition at all. These three moments are essential and, as we shall see in the following chapter, their unity is decisive. It is necessary, then, to keep our attention focussed longer on otherness and on the force of imposition. This is especially true in virtue of the fact that what renders the distinct modes of apprehension specific is precisely the distinct modes of otherness.

*Analysis of otherness.* This analysis will reveal to us first the proper structure of otherness, and second the unity of this structure.

A) Otherness is not just the abstract character of being *other*. This is because otherness does not consist in an affection making something present to us merely as “other”; for example, this sound or this green color. Rather, it makes this “other” present to us in a precise form: the other, but “other as such”.

This “other”, i.e., this note, above all has a proper *content*: such-and-such color, such-and-such hardness, such-and-such temperature, etc. That is what Greek and medieval philosophy always emphasized. But to my way of thinking, it is essentially {35} inadequate, because this content, this note, is not just effectively other, but rather is present as other. That is what I express by saying that the content is something which “is situated”<sup>1</sup> before the sentient being as something other. And this is not a mere conceptual subtlety, but is, as we shall see, an essential physical moment of otherness. According to this aspect of “other”, a note not only has a content, but also has a mode of “being situated” in the impression.

What is this mode? It is just the mode of being other: it is the aspect of independence which the content has with respect to the sentient being. The content of a note “is situated”, and insofar as it “is situated” it is independent of the sentient being in whose impression it “is situated”. Here, independence does not signify a thing “apart” from my impression (that is what the Greeks and medievals believed), but rather is the content itself present in the apprehension as something “autonomous” with respect to the sentient being. A color, a sound, have an autonomy proper to the visual and auditory affections, respectively. “Being situated” is being present as autonomous. This character of autonomy is not identical to the content, because as we shall see in the following chapter the same content can have different ways of being situated, different forms of independence, and different autonomies. To be autonomous is, then, a form of being situated. In virtue of it I shall say that the “other”, the note present in impression, has a proper form of autonomy in addition to a content. For that reason I call this moment *formality*. Formality does not refer to a metaphysical concept as in the Middle Ages, but to something completely different, to a sentient moment of descriptive character.

Both content and formality depend in large measure upon the nature of the animal. The note sensed {36} is always “other” than the animal; but what its content may be depends in each case on the animal itself, because the content depends on the system of receptors which the animal possesses. A mole does not have color impressions, for example. But, even with the same receptors, and therefore with the same content, this content can “be situated” in different forms. The “being situated” does not

<sup>1</sup>[This is a rendering of the Spanish verb *quedar*, a technical term difficult to translate in this context but which can mean “to remain”, “to be situated”, or just “to be” in the sense of place.—trans.]



depend on the receptors themselves, but rather on the mode in which the sentient being has them in its sensing. To this mode of “having them [to or in] itself”<sup>2</sup> the word ‘habitude’ should be applied. I will explain myself a bit later. Habitude is neither custom nor habit, but the mode of having-them-itself. Customs and habits are habitude precisely because they are modes of having-them-itself. But the converse is not true: not every mode of having-them-itself is a custom or habit. Now, the terminus of a receptor is the content; the terminus of a habitude is formality. Therefore, insofar as formality is determined by habitude I shall say that the form of independence, the form of autonomy as determined by the mode of having-them-itself of the sentient being, should be termed *formalization*. Formalization is the modulation of formality, i.e. the modulation of independence, the modulation of autonomy. Otherness does not just make present to us something we call a note, but a note which in one or another way “is situated”.

Philosophy has never attended to more than the content of an impression; it has always erred with respect to formality. And this is very serious, because as we shall see in the following chapter, that which renders specific the distinct modes of apprehension, i.e., the distinct modes of impression, is formality. Sensible apprehensions are distinguished essentially by the mode according to which {37} their content is present and is autonomized, i.e., is independent of the sentient being.

B) *Structural Unity of Otherness*. Content and formality are not two moments which are foreign to each other; indeed, they have an essential unity: formalization concerns content, and in turn content concerns the mode of being formalized. The two moments of content and formality have, then, an intrinsic and radical unity: the modalization of otherness.

a) Formality modulates content. An animal, in effect, apprehends notes which we could call elemental; for example, a color, a sound, an odor, a taste, etc. Certainly they are not rigorously elemental, because every note has at least a quality and an intensity. But for now we shall not discuss that; for the purposes of our question these notes are elemental. The term ‘sensation’ should be applied to the apprehension of these notes. But, precisely because these notes are autonomous, i.e., formalized, they are independent. And they are so not just with respect to the sentient being, but also with respect to other notes.

Formalization precisely constitutes the “unity” of the sensed content. Thus, these distinct notes can have an outline, a type of closure. These unities thus closed can have the character of autonomous unities; they are then autonomous constellations. Their apprehension thus is not simple sensation; it is “perception”. The elemental notes are sensed, the constellations of notes are perceived, etc. An animal not only apprehends sounds, colors, etc., but also apprehends, for example, its “prey”. The same elemental notes can comprise different perceptive constellations, i.e., diverse types of unitary content, according to the nature of the animal. Thus, {38} for example, a crab in general perceives the constellation “rock-prey”. But many times it does not perceive the prey by itself (Katz’ experience), because if the prey is suspended from a string, the crab does not perceive it until it has habituated itself to the new constellation “string-prey”. The prey, the rock, and the string do not have a formal independence in the crab by themselves. For a dog, on the other hand, there are always three separate and independent constellations: prey, rock, string. The fact is that the dog and the crab have different modes of formalization. The formalization, the autonomization of content, now consists in that the unity of independence concerns the constellation itself, and not just one or a few notes arbitrarily selected. Formalization has thus modulated the content: from the elemental it passes to be a totality which may be closed in diverse ways. As we shall see in another chapter, this is decisive.

b) But at the same time, content modulates formality itself. Formalization is, as I said, independence of autonomization. This does not mean an abstract independence, but something very concrete. Independence, stated in a crude way, means that the content is more or less “detached” from the apprehending animal. And content modulates the mode of being detached. Now, the detachment of a color is not the same that of heat. Considering luminosity, for example, its mode of being “detached” in an insect is not the same as it is in a higher order metazoan. Nor is the mode of being “detached” of a constellation of notes the same as the mode of being detached of an elemental note. Speaking somewhat coarsely, a tree or a ravine is much richer in independence for a chimpanzee than for a dog.

All of this comprises the structural unity of otherness {39} and this unity, as we see from the examples alluded to, depends on the nature of the animal. There is no doubt that a color is apprehended in a different way as independent by the retina of a chimpanzee than by that of an insect. Otherness, then, in its intrinsic unity, admits degrees which are manifested above all in the degree of for-

<sup>2</sup>[A rendering of the compound Spanish participle *haberselas* which cannot be exactly translated into English because it has several possible meanings, all conflated here.—trans.]

malization. To the greater degree of formalization corresponds the greater independence of content.

In summary, sensible impression is an impression which affects the sentient being by making present to it that which “impresses”, i.e., a note, in formality of independence with a content which is either elemental (a single note) or complex (a constellation of notes). In their otherness, these independent notes impose themselves with a variable force upon the sentient being. And thus imposed, the impression determines the sensing process: arousal, tonic modification, and response. That is what we must now consider. {40}

### §3

#### STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT PROCESS

Sensible apprehension does not only apprehend something impressively; rather, the nature of the sentient process, which apprehension determines, will vary according to the nature of what is apprehended considered as independent of the apprehendor.

A) To see this, let us begin with an essential observation: formalization does not concern just the moment of apprehension, but the entire sentient process as such, in the sense that each one of its three moments is modalized by formalization.

Above all it is clear that there is formalization in the moment of response. This is manifested in some alterations of the sentient process. Inability to coordinate movements is not the same as inability to move oneself. The capacity of coordination of movement is a formalization. A lesion of whatever nature which, in a higher animal such as man, produces changes in coordination, does not produce paralysis. Not all animals have the same

structure of motor formalization. A spectacular case is the capacity of a cat hurled into the air to recover its equilibrium while falling.

Vital tone itself acquires nuances through formalization. A general feeling of well-being or malaise acquires nuances through mere formalization: a mode of feeling spiritless or full of life, spiritless in one direction but {41} not in others, a tonality of happiness, etc.—and all of this according to qualities and in degrees or diverse forms.

Formalization, then, concerns sensing as a whole as arousal, as modification of vital tone, and as response.

B) This demonstrates that some impressions which are the same by reason of their content, through formalization open up all of the richness of the sentient process comprising the richness of the life of the animal. The amplitude of the apprehensive formalization opens up to the animal the amplitude of possible responses. This means that the radical effect of formalization considered as a process consists in autonomizing relatively among themselves each of the three moments of the sentient process: the moment of apprehension, the moment of tone, and the moment of response. This is what allows us to speak of each of these three moments by itself. But this autonomization is only relative: it never breaks the structural unity of the sensing process. In the next chapter we shall see the very important consequences of this observation. Within each of these moments thus autonomized, formalization continues to determine nuances and individually different aspects. If I have limited myself to the formalizing aspect of apprehension, it has been on account of the theme of this book.

We have thus analyzed, first, the moments of the sentient process; and second, the formal structure of sensing. Finally we have indicated the structural determination of the sentient process through formalization.

This formalization is that which renders specific the different modes of sensible apprehension. {42}

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## APPENDIX 1

### CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT FORMALIZATION

So as not to interrupt the thread of my exposition of the analysis of sensible apprehension, I have relegated to this appendix some considerations which I deem important, but which in many respects perhaps go beyond the mere analysis of sensible apprehension.

To begin, it is fitting to explicate the use of the expression ‘formalization’. Formalization can mean the cerebral structure through which we apprehend some content in accordance with its proper formality. In this sense, formalization is a psycho-biological action. But formalization can also mean the fact that a content remains in its proper formality. Then formalization is not an action but a mere “being situated”: it is the unity of content and formality. And it is to this sense I refer when speaking here of formalization. I do not refer to structures of the brain except when dealing expressly with formalization as action.

1. Given the foregoing, it is necessary to delimit this concept of formalization with respect to two current ideas, one in philosophy and the other in psychology.

In the first place, formalization should not be confused with the Kantian idea of “form of sensibility”. For Kant, sensible content is something unformed in the sense that it lacks spatio-temporal structure. The proper {44} part of the form of sensibility would consist in “informing” (in the Aristotelian sense of the word, i.e., giving form to) sensible matter, i.e. the content. This giving of form is produced by the subjective form (space and time) which sensibility imposes on the content. Now, formalization is not giving of form. Whether Kant’s idea about space and time was correct or not (that is not our present question), the essential point is that formalization is prior to all spatio-temporal giving of form. Formalization is independence, that is, however the animal deals with its impressions, they still remain in a certain formality. Only insofar as there is formality, in which there is independence, can one speak of spatio-temporal arrangement. Formalization concerns this independence, this otherness. Independence is the formality in which content “is situated” before the apprehensor. Formalization is the mode of “being situated” and not the mode of “informing” in the Aristotelian-Kantian sense. Only because it is independent can one speak about whether content has, or does not have, or should have, this informing. The Kantian form

produces “informing”; formalization, however, is not production, but just the reverse, a mere “being situated”.

On the other hand, formalization is not what one understands in psychology when speaking of form (*Gestalt*). In this psychology, form is the total configuration of what is perceived as opposed to what the elemental sensations of 19th century psychology might have been. But formalization is not *Gestalt*. In the first place, the elemental sensations themselves are something formalized: their content, the note, is apprehended as independent and, therefore, is formalized. And, in the second place, even in the case of a constellation of notes, {45} formalization does not primarily concern configuration but rather autonomization. Configuration is only the result of autonomization. Only because there is independence can there be and is there configuration. Formalization is the independence of, and what is constitutive of, the unity of content as independent, be it elemental content or a constellation.

Formalization is not, then, either information or configuration, but autonomization: it is how the content “is situated”. Formality is not produced by the sentient being (Kant), nor is it primary configuration (*Gestalt*). It is purely and simply the mode of “being situated”.

2. In another direction, formalization can have pathological alterations in apprehension. There are cases of human perception in which there is a regressive disintegration, a decaying (*Abbau*) of the perception. This disintegration consists in a dislocation or disconnection of the perception; for example, some volumes may seem to be situated behind a curtain of colors and at a certain distance from it, etc. But I believe that the sense of the independence of the reality of what is perceived is being lost all at once. I think that the degradation of perception is at once loss of the outline of perceptive content and loss of independence. The loss itself consists of a greater or lesser regression of both aspects. It is a regression of formalization. Formalization is, I repeat, at once autonomization of content and autonomization of what is perceived with respect to the animal which is apprehending.

3. Finally, I have an interest in stressing that formalization is not primarily a type of speculative concept, but to my way of thinking is a {46} moment of apprehen-

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sion anchored in a structural moment of the animal organism itself. In the immediately foregoing pages I alluded to alterations in the coordination of movements of the human animal. It is well known that the lesion which produces them is localized in the extrapyramidal paths. Among other functions, these paths have that of formalizing movement.

But this is not all. As an hypothesis I think that the brain is not primarily an organ of integration (Sherrington) nor an organ of meaning (Brickner), but that in our problem is the organ of formalization, a formalization which culminates in corticalization. It suffices for me to allude to the servo-mechanisms or to certain special cortical areas, for example to some of the frontal areas of the brain. Formalization is a structure which is rigorously anatomico-physiological.

The anatomical-physiological organization of the nervous system has a plan or scheme which has been relatively homogeneous and common since very remote philogenetic epochs. Thus, for example, this scheme is already in the brain of the salamander. To me, this scheme has two directions: one of specification, predominantly regional so to speak, and another of a finer structure, that of formalization.

But while none of this concerns our philosophical problem here, I did not wish to refrain from expounding these ideas, which I have already published elsewhere. However, I have relegated them to an appendix because as I stated earlier, what matters to me in this book is the rigorous and precise analysis of sensible apprehension as fact.



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## CHAPTER III

### MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION

As I said at the end of the last chapter, the modes of sensible apprehension are distinguished by the modes of formalization. This refers to distinct “modes” of apprehension and not simple “types.” And in order to see that it is necessary and sufficient to analyze how the same notes can be apprehended as independent in a different way. Sensible apprehensions are distinguished among themselves above all modally. These modes are essentially two. Reserving the right to explain myself immediately below, I will say that there is a mode of sentient apprehension which—for reasons I will explain later—I call sensing *mere* or *pure stimulation*. But there is another mode of apprehending sentiently which I call *sensing reality*. It is necessary to embark rigorously upon this modal analysis. {48}

#### § 1

#### APPREHENSION OF PURE STIMULI

Sensible apprehension, that is, impression, determines the nature of the sentient process. When an impression is of such character that it consists in nothing more than determining the process, then we have a first mode of sensible apprehension. As every impression has three moments (affection, otherness, force of imposition), we must ask ourselves in what the structural nature of impression consists, according to these three moments. That is, we must say: 1. What is this impression *qua* affectant? 2. What is its proper formality? and 3. What is its force of imposition?

1) Impression always has a moment of affection. Now, the impression which consists in determining, by affection, the responsive process is what we call a *stimulus*. There are two essential moments in the concept of the stimulus: first, the most obvious, is that of arousing

the response. But this is not sufficient because if it were, one would be able to apprehend this character of arousal by itself; one would be able to apprehend the stimulus by itself, in which case what is apprehended will not be a stimulus of the apprehendor. Let us consider an example. One can apprehend a toothache without feeling the pain; that is, one can apprehend a stimulus without it affecting him (i.e., the apprehendor). Being actively stimulated, being actually affected by the stimulus, is the second essential moment of stimulus. Only then is there stimulus formally and properly. Now, when this {49} stimulative affection is “merely” stimulative, that is, when it consists only in arousing, it then constitutes what I shall call ‘affection of the mere stimulus as such’. This is what I call ‘apprehending the stimulus *stimulatedly*’. Heat apprehended in a thermal affection, and apprehended only as an affection determining a response (flight, welcome, etc.), is what we humanly express by saying *heat warms*. When heat is apprehended *only* as something warming, we say that the heat has been apprehended as a mere stimulus, that is, as something which is only a thermic determinant of a response. The diverse qualities of the different stimuli are nothing but so many qualitative modalities of the mere arousing of responses in affection. This “mere” is not a simple circumscription which fixes the concept of stimulation, but rather constitutes its positive physical outline: being “only” stimulation.

2) However impression is not just affection, but also otherness. In what does the otherness of impression consist as mere stimulus? In affection which is merely stimulative the apprehended note is made present but as “other” than the affection itself; its proper formality is made present. Now, what is essential is to correctly conceptualize this formality of otherness of the stimulus as mere stimulus. That is what I shall call the *formality of pure stimulus*. In what does it consist? The note apprehended as “other” (but only insofar as its otherness consists just in arousing a determined response) constitutes what I call *sign*. The formality of pure stimulus consists

precisely in the *formality of sign-ness*.

What is a sign? A sign is not a “signal”. A signal is something whose content is apprehended by itself and {50} besides this—and therefore extrinsically to it—“signals”. Thus, for example, we have the so-called “traffic signals”. On the other hand, a sign is the note itself apprehended. Sign-ness pertains to it intrinsically and formally, not by extrinsic attribution. It is not a note in the form of a signal, but intrinsically and formally a “note-sign”. One does not apprehend heat by itself and later also as a response signal; rather, the very form of heat as apprehended is to be formally “signative heat”, or if one wishes, “thermic sign”.

This intrinsic pertaining is not “signification.” Signification in the strict sense is proper only to language. In it, the signification is added (in whatever form—this is not the time to discuss the problem) to certain sounds (not to all). But the sign is not added to anything; rather it is the note in the mode of presenting itself as that note.

What is proper to a sign is not, then, signaling or signifying. Rather, it is purely and simply “to sign”. Ever since its origin, classical philosophy has failed to distinguish these three concepts, and generally speaking has limited itself almost always to the signal, therefore making of the sign a *semeion*. As I see it, this is insufficient. I believe that sign and signing comprise a proper concept which ought to be delimited formally with respect to both signal and signification. These three concepts are not only distinct, but quite separable. Only animals have signs, and only man has significations or meanings. On the other hand, animals and men both have signals, but of distinct character. The animal has signitive signals, i.e., it can use “note-signs” as signals. This is the foundation of all possible learning, for example. When the signals are in the form of sounds they may constitute at times what (very falsely) has been called ‘animal language’. {51} The so-called “animal language” is not language, because the animal lacks meanings; it only possesses, or can possess, sonorous signitive signals. In man, the notes utilized as signals have, as I shall explain later, quite a different character: they are signaling realities. But in both cases the notes are signals due to a function extrinsically added to them: they are notes in function of being signals. Therefore we may once again ask, What is a sign?

Medieval philosophy did not distinguish among signal, meaning, and sign. It called everything “sign”, and so defined it: that the knowledge of which leads to the knowledge of something different. Whence the classical distinction between natural signs (smoke as a sign of fire) and artificial signs. But this is inadequate, and moreover

quite vague, because the question is not whether a sign leads to knowledge of something different; what is essential is in *how* it so leads. It could do so through mere signalization (such is the case with the smoke) or through meaning; and in neither of these cases would it be a sign. It will be a sign only if it leads by “signing”.

What is a sign and what is signing? In order to answer this question it is necessary first to stress the distinction between sign and signal. Something is formally a sign and not a simple signal when that to which the sign points or leads is an animal response. A sign consists in being a mode of formality of the content: the formality of determining a response. And “signing” consists in the mere signitive determination of that response. But secondly, and in addition, we are not dealing with “knowledge,” but with “sensing,” with apprehending in an impressive way; that is, sensing something as “signing”.

A sign is, then, the formality of otherness of the mere stimulus of a response. It is the mode in which what is sentiently {52} apprehended is situated as something merely arousing; this is signitivity. Formalization is, as we have seen, independence, autonomization. And that which is apprehended in a merely stimulative manner is independent of the animal but only as a sign. This independence and, therefore, formalization, is merely stimulative. The distinct sensed qualities as mere stimuli are distinct response signs. Every sign is a “sign-of”. The “of” is a response, and this “of” itself pertains formally to the manner of being situated and sensed signitively. Thus heat is a thermic response sign, light a luminous response sign, etc.

Now, to sign is to determine a response sentiently in an intrinsic and formal way. And to apprehend something in a mere signing or signitive otherness is that in which apprehension of pure stimulation consists.

3) But every impression has a third moment, the force of imposition of what is apprehended on the apprehendor. As the sign has a form of independence, a form of signitive autonomy, it follows that its merely signitive independence is what should be called, in the strict sense, an *objective sign*. ‘Objective’ here means the mere signitive otherness with respect to the apprehendor *qua* imposed upon him. Hence I say that the determination of the response always has the character of an objective imposition. The sign reposes signitively upon itself (it is formalization of a stimulus), and therefore it is imposed on the animal as an objective sign. It is from this objectivity that the sign receives its force of imposition.

The impressions of an animal are mere *objective signs* of response. Apprehending them as such is what I

call *pure sensing*. Pure sensing consists in apprehending something as a mere objective arousal of the sentient process. In pure sensing, {53} the sensible impression is, then, *impression of pure stimulus*. In it, though the note may be an *alter*, it is an *alter* whose otherness consists in pertaining in a signing way to the sentient process and, therefore, in exhausting itself there. It is unnecessary to stress that tonic changes are also signitively determined. And it is in this that the structural character of the entire life of an animal consists: life in objective signs. Naturally, this signitivity admits of grades; but that is not our immediate problem. {54}

§2

APPREHENSION OF REALITY

Besides the sensible apprehension of mere or pure stimulus, proper to animals, man possesses another mode of apprehension in his so-called “senses.” Man apprehends the sensed in a particular way, one that is exclusively his. That is to say, the same notes apprehended in a stimulative way by an animal present a formality to man quite distinct from stimulation. To be sure, we are dealing with a sensible apprehension; hence we are always dealing with an apprehension in an impression. But it is a distinct mode of impression, and the distinction is strictly modal and one which modally affects the three moments of impression. Hence, in order to rigorously conceptualize this new mode of impression, we must successively examine three points:

1. The new formality of that which is apprehended.
2. The modification of the three moments of an impression.
3. The unitary nature of this mode of apprehension.

1. *The new formality of that which is apprehended.* The content—this color, this sound, this taste, etc.—is apprehended by an animal only as a determinant of the tonic modification and of the response. Thus, the animal apprehends heat as warming, and only as warming. This is what we express by saying, “Heat warms”. Here “warms” is not an action verb, but a verb of objective per-

sonal experience: there is a warming. The formality of heat consists in {55} heat being only what I sense in the personal experience of heat. Therefore it does not refer to something merely “subjective”, but to something “objective” whose objectivity consists in determining the living experience of the animal. We shall see this later. Hence, heat thus apprehended is clearly distinct from the apprehendor; but in the distinction itself this warming heat pertains formally to the apprehendor: the distinction is in and for the sentient process. The heat “is situated” then as a moment which is “other”, but with an otherness which formally pertains to the sentient process itself. On the other hand, in the new mode of apprehension the heat is apprehended as a note whose thermic characteristics pertain to it *in its own right*.

This does not mean that the characteristics are “properties” of the heat, but that those characteristics pertain to it in its own right, and not that they are characteristics of a subject called “heat” (which is in any case not something primitively given). Rather, they are the “heat’s own”. Every property is something’s own, pertaining to it as its own; but not everything which pertains to something as its own is a property of it. To be sure, the word ‘property’ is not always taken in this strict sense of a property which emerges from the thing, as for example weight, which by emerging from something is a property of it. The word ‘property’ can also be taken in a wide sense, and then it signifies rather the pertaining as its own to something, for example the pertaining as its own of the thermic characteristics to the heat. Here when speaking about the “in its own right” I do not refer to property except in its widest sense: the pertaining to something. But with this clarification, there is no difficulty in speaking about “in its own right” as a property just as I can call every note a quality, as I said a few pages ago. ‘Note’, ‘quality’, and ‘property’ {56} can be used as synonymous terms in the wide sense, and thus I shall use them. But rigorously speaking, they designate three distinct aspects of the real, of the “in its own right”: the “note” is what is noted as its own; the quality is always and only a quality “of” the real; and ‘property’ is the note insofar as it emerges (in whatever form) from the nature of the thing.

Now, in the apprehension of reality the note is “in its own right” what it is. In pure stimulation, on the other hand, heat and all of its thermic characteristics are nothing but signs of response. This is what I expressed by saying that “heat warms”. In the apprehension of reality, on the other hand, they are characteristics which pertain to the heat itself which, without ceasing to warm (just as it warmed in the previous mode of apprehension), nonetheless now is situated in a distinct mode. It does not “re-



main” only as pertaining to the sentient process, but “is situated” by itself as heat “in its own right”. This is what we express by saying, “The heat is warming.” Here “is” does not mean “being” in an entitative sense, especially since reality does not always consist in being. The fact is that one cannot prescind from language already created, and thus it is inevitable at times to recur to the “is” in order to signify what pertains to something as its own. The same thing happened when, in Parmenides’ philosophy, “is” was spoken of meaning that “being” is one, immobile, uncreated, etc. The verb “to be” appears twice in these phrases, first as an expression of what is understood and then as the thing understood itself. The second acception is the essential one: when we say that heat “is warming” the verb “is” does nothing but indicate that what is understood, the heat, has the characteristics which pertain to it “in its own right”. (That this “in its own right” consists in being is a false and obsolete conception). Nor do we refer to heat as mere otherness pertaining signitively {57} to the sensing process, but rather to an otherness which as such only pertains to the heat by itself. The heat apprehended now does not consist formally in being a sign of response, but in being warm *de suyo*. Now, this is what constitutes reality; and thus we have the new formality: *formality of reity or reality*. I shall shortly explain this neologism ‘reity’, which I have been obliged to introduce into the description of the formality of human apprehension. Given the totally different character which the term ‘reality’ can have in ordinary language and even in philosophy, viz., reality which goes beyond any apprehension, the term ‘reity’ can help us to avoid confusion. But having made this clarification, I shall employ the two terms indiscriminately: ‘reity’ means simple reality, simple being *de suyo*. The characteristics of heat are apprehended impressively as being “its own”, i.e. of the heat itself and insofar as they are “its own”. As opposed to the pure animal sensing which apprehends the notes *stimulatively*, and only *stimulatively*, these same characteristics are apprehended in human sensing, but as characteristics of the heat *de suyo*: the heat is apprehended *really*. Signitive independence has become the independence of reality. Reality is formally the *de suyo* of what is sensed: it is the formality of reality, or if one wishes, reality as formality.

It is necessary to delimit this general concept of reality, although only initially. Above all, it is necessary to delimit it with respect to an idea of reality which consists in thinking that reality is reality “in itself” in the sense of a real thing in the world independent of my perception. Then reality would be what was understood by “reality” in the old realism, which was later called {58} “ingenuous

realism”. But here we do not refer to that. We do not refer to going beyond what is apprehended in apprehension, but rather to the mode in which what is apprehended “is situated” in the apprehension itself. It is for this reason that at times I think that this formality should be referred to as “reity” rather than “reality”. It is the *de suyo* of what is present in the apprehension, the mode of the thing presenting itself in a real and physical presentation. Reality is not here something inferred. Just as mere stimulus is the mode of what is immediately present in apprehension, i.e., of what is present only in stimulative fashion, so reality is here a formality of what is immediately present, the very mode of the note “being situated” as present. In accordance with this mode, heat, without need to go outside of it, presents itself to me as warming *de suyo*, i.e., as being warming. This is the formality of reality.

In order to stave off confusion, let us stipulate the following:

a) Primordially, reality is formality.

b) This formality belongs to the thing apprehended of itself. I repeat: the formality of reality is something in virtue of which the content is what it is prior to its apprehension. The thing is that which, by being real, is present as real. Reality is *de suyo*.

c) This formality is not formally “beyond” or “outside of” apprehension. But just as forcefully it must be said that it is not something purely immanent, to use an old and literally inadequate terminology. Formality is on one hand the mode of being situated in the apprehension, but on the other it is that of being situated “in its own right”, of being *de suyo*. This structure is precisely what forces us to speak not only of my apprehension of the real, but {59} of the reality of what is apprehended in my apprehension. It does not refer to some jump from the perceived to the real, but of reality in its dual role of being apprehended and of “being in its own right”. In due time we shall see in what the unity of these two moments consists formally.

d) This formality of reality is, then, as we shall see, what leads from apprehended reality to reality “beyond” apprehension. This “leading” is not, as I have just said, a leading from what is not real and purely immanent to what is real beyond perception, but rather is a leading from apprehended reality to a reality which is not apprehended. It is a movement within the very reality of the real.

In the second place, it is necessary to fix the *de suyo* in another direction. What is it, in fact, that we men ap-

prehend formally in sensing? We are told (by Husserl, Heidegger, and others) that what we formally apprehend in perception are, for example, walls, tables, doors, etc. Now, this is radically false. In an impressive apprehension I never intellectually apprehend a table, nor do I ever sentiently apprehend it either. What I apprehend is a constellation of notes which in my life *functions* as a table. What I apprehend is not a table but a constellation of such-and-such dimension, form, weight, color, etc., which has in my life the function or meaning of a table. Upon apprehending what we call a “table”, what is apprehended as *de suyo* or “in its own right” is not, then, the table as table. The table is not *de suyo* a table. The table is a table only insofar as the real thing thus named forms part of daily life. Things as moments or parts of my life are what I have termed “meaning-things”. But nothing is a meaning-thing *de suyo*. The real thing apprehended as something *de suyo* is not a “meaning-thing”, but what I have called {60} a “real-thing”. It is what in another order of problems I have usually expressed by saying that the real thing is that which acts on other things or on itself in virtue, formally, of the notes which it possesses *de suyo*.<sup>1</sup> And a table does not act on other things as a table, but as having weight, etc. The table is not a reality-thing, but a meaning-thing.

Therefore, formality of reity or reality is formality of the *de suyo* as a mode of being situated in the apprehension.

2. *Modification of the moments of this apprehension.* This *de suyo* is a formality, a formality of the sentient impression. And this formality shapes the three moments of the impression.

a) Above all, it shapes the moment of *affection*. In an animal, affection is mere stimulus: it senses the stimulus merely as a stimulus to itself. We say, for example, that when cold is a mere stimulus apprehended by a dog, the dog “feels cold.” The affection is a mere stimulus; it is a stimulus relative to a response of warming or something of that nature. In man, on the other hand, an affection triggers a sentient process of a different sort: a man “is cold.” His affection is not mere stimulus; but rather the man feels that he is affected in reality, that he is affected really. And this is because what affects him is not apprehended as a mere stimulus but rather as reality: it is stimulating reality. And not only is this apprehended reality not apprehended as a mere stimulus, but its reality may fail to have the character of a stimulus at all. Every stimulus is apprehended by man as reality, but not every

apprehended reality is necessarily a stimulus. For example, a bit of scenery is not necessarily a {61} stimulus, nor is an elemental sound. Affected thus by something which is “in its own right”, affection itself is real affection. A man not only senses cold, but moreover really feels himself cold. This “feeling himself”—apart from other dimensions of the problem which it involves—expresses here precisely the character of reality of the affection. This affection is impressively sensed as a real affection and not just as an affection of mere stimulus. We do not sense only affectant notes (heat, light, sound, odor, etc.) but rather we feel ourselves affected by them in reality. This is *real affection*.

b) In this real affection something “other” is present to us; this is the *otherness*. This otherness has a proper content, ultimately common to animal apprehension. But what is essentially distinct is the mode in which its formality “is situated” in the impression. We have just explained that. The content “is situated” as something “in its own right” and not as “signing”. This “in its own right” has an essential and absolutely decisive character. Heat is warming; this is not a verbal tautology. “Is warming” means that the heat and all of its thermic characteristics are sensed as “its own.” Heat is thus heat in and for itself. And precisely for this reason the heat is a note so very much “in its own right” that not even its inclusion in the sentient process pertains to it. The heat is in a way included in the sentient process, but only because it *already is* heat. Heat as something *de suyo* is, then, prior to its being present in sensing. And this does not refer to a temporal priority; it is not the priority of what is apprehended with respect to the response which it is going to elicit, for example. That priority is given in every apprehension, including that of animals. In an animal, the sign is apprehended as objective before the response which the animal is to make. The difference is on another point and is essential. {62} In animal apprehension, the sign is certainly objective, but it is so only as a sign; i.e., with respect to the animal itself. The animal never apprehends the sign as something which “is” signitive; rather, the sign is present “signing” and nothing more. It is a pure signitive fact, so to speak. And precisely by being so it can automatize itself in the apprehension: its objectivity is to sign. In the example cited, the objectivity of the heat—sign is to warm. On the other hand, the note is present to a man as real; what is present is something which is apprehended as being prior to its being present. It is not a priority with respect to a response, but a priority with respect to the apprehension itself. In the objective sign, its objectivity is not objective except with respect to the response which it determines. In contrast, the note is

<sup>1</sup>*Sobre la esencia*, p. 104.

real in itself, and herein consists being formally prior to its being present. This is not a temporal priority, but one of mere formality.

We are dealing, then, with a priority which is very elemental but at the same time decisive: heat warms because it is “already” warm. This moment of the “already” is precisely the priority of which I speak, and this moment of priority is that which I am accustomed to call the moment of *prius*. It is a *prius* not in the order of process but in the order of apprehension: it warms “being” warm. “To be warming” is not the same thing as “to warm”. The “is”, in the apprehended heat itself, is a *prius* with respect to its “warming”: it is “its” heat, the heat is “its own”. And this “its own” is just what I call *prius*. The note “is situated” as being a note in such a form that its content “is situated” reposing like reality upon itself and formally grounding its apprehension. Thus, in accordance with this character, what is sensed in impression has installed me in the very reality of what is apprehended. With this, {63} the road to reality in and of itself lies open before man. We are in what is apprehended in the formality of reality. Formalization is autonomization. And in man we are present at what I call *hyperformalization*: the autonomized note is so autonomous that it is more than a sign; it is autonomous reality. This is not autonomy of signitivity, but autonomy of reality; it is alterity of reality, it is *altera realitas*.

c) This alterity has a *force of imposition* of its own. Alterity is not just mere objectivity, nor mere objective independence as in the case of the animal. The more perfect it is, the more perfectly objective is the animal. But this is not reality. Reality is not objective independence but being *de suyo*. Thus what is apprehended is imposed upon me with a new force: not the *force of mere stimulus* but the *force of reality*. The richness of animal life is a richness of objective signs. The richness of human life is a richness of realities.

The three moments of affection, otherness, and force of imposition are three moments of an impression. And therefore this impression is always a sensible impression because in it something is apprehended impressively. Now, when what is apprehended is reality, then sensible impression is precisely and formally what I have termed *impression of reality*. The impression of the animal is *impression of mere stimulus*. But man, in impression, apprehends the very formality of reality.

Since philosophy to date has not distinguished between content and formality, I have termed the sensible qualities (or rather their content) *impressions*. But then to speak of an impression of reality might lead one to think

that another impression is added to that of red or heat, viz., the impression of {64} reality. But this is absurd. Sensible impression is exclusively contained in formality. The sensible impression of reality is a single impression with content and formality of reality. There are not two impressions, one of content and another of reality, but a single impression, that of sensed reality, i.e., reality in impression. But as the essential part of our problem is in formality, I shall more generally refer to the moment of formality as sensed as the impression of reality. I do so in order to simplify the expressions, but above all to emphasize the contrast between this conceptualization and the common notions of impression in philosophy. Strictly understood it is, then, a denomination which is technically incorrect.

3. *The Unitary Nature of this Apprehension of Reality*. The intrinsic unity of real affection, otherness of reality, and force of reality is what constitutes the unity of the apprehension of reality. This is a unity of the act of apprehending. It is not, as I shall explain later, a mere noetic—noematic unity of consciousness, but a primary and radical unity of apprehension. In this apprehension, precisely in virtue of being an apprehension, we are in what is apprehended. It is, therefore, an “actual being” [*estar*]. The apprehension is therefore an *ergon* which could perhaps be called *noergia*. Later I shall explain how the “being present” as “actual being” is the essence of “actuality”. In an apprehension what is apprehended actualizes itself to us. Actuality is opposed here, as we shall see, to “actuity”. Noema and noesis are not primitive intellectual moments. The radical moment is rather a becoming of “actuality”, a becoming which is not noetic or noematic, but noergic. This theme will reappear in Chapter V.

In this apprehension, then, we apprehend the reality of the real impressively. For this reason I call it the {65} *primordial apprehension of reality*. In it the formality of reality is apprehended *directly*, and not by way of representations or the like. It is apprehended *immediately*, not in virtue of other apprehensive acts or reasoning processes of whatever sort. It is apprehended *unitarily*; that is, the real, which can and does have a great richness and variability of content (in general), is in its content apprehended unitarily as formality of reality *pro indiviso*, so to speak. Later I shall speak of this content; for now I refer only to the formality itself of reality. It is in the unity of these three aspects (directly, immediately, and unitarily) that the fact that the formality of the real is apprehended *in and through itself* consists.

In the primordial apprehension of reality, the real is apprehended in and through itself. By virtue of being an

apprehension, in it we “are actually” in reality itself. And this apprehension is primordial because every other apprehension of reality is constitutively grounded on this primordial apprehension and involves it formally. It is the impression which primarily and constitutively installs us in the real. And this is essential. One does not have a primordial impression and *besides* it another apprehension; rather, what we have is a primordial modalized apprehension which is, at the same time, in distinct forms. The real, apprehended in and through itself, is always the primordial thing and the essential nucleus of every apprehension of reality. This is what the expression “primordial apprehension of reality” signifies.

The three moments of impression (affection, otherness, and force of imposition) have become dislocated in modern philosophy. And this dislocation falsifies {66} the nature of the impression of reality and the nature of the primordial apprehension of reality.

Considering impression only as mere affection, primordial apprehension would be merely *my representation* of the real. Now, this is not the case because impression does not consist only in being affection of the sentient being, but rather has an intrinsic moment of otherness (of content as well as of formality.) Hence, that which is usually called “representation” is nothing but the moment of affection of the impression from which the moment of otherness has been subtracted, so to speak. It is in this way that the impression of reality has been deformed into a mere impression of mine. It is necessary to return to the impression its moment of otherness.

If one eliminates from the impression of reality the moment of force of imposition of the content according to its formality, one ends up conceiving the primordial apprehension of reality to be a *judgement*, however elemental it may be, but still only a judgement. Now, this is not the case. A judgement but affirms what, in the primary force of imposition of reality, is impressively imposed upon me, and which compels me to make a judgement. It is necessary to restore to the impression its impressive

moment of force of imposition.

If in the impression of reality one takes only the moment of otherness by itself, then one will think that the primordial apprehension of reality is nothing but a *simple apprehension*. And this is because in the simple apprehension, “simple” classically means that one does not yet affirm the reality of what is apprehended, but that what is apprehended is reduced to mere otherness. In the simple apprehension we would have otherness as something which reposes upon itself without being inscribed in the affection and with the force of imposition of reality. On the contrary, it is necessary {67} to inscribe the moment of otherness within the impression of reality as affection and as force of imposition. And then it is no longer simple apprehension but is rather what I have so many times called *simple apprehension* of reality, and which I now call primordial apprehension of reality. I have replaced the former expression in order to avoid confusion with simple apprehension.

The idea that the primordial apprehension of reality is my representation, affirmation, or simple apprehension, is the result of the dislocation of the primary unity of impression. Impression, on the contrary, intrinsically and formally involves the unity of the three moments of affection, otherness, and force of imposition.

Finally, we repeat that if one takes primordial apprehension as a mere conscious act, then the primordial apprehension of reality is the immediate and direct consciousness of something, i.e., *intuition*. But this is impossible. As we saw in the first chapter, we are dealing with apprehension and not mere consciousness. Impression, as I have said, is not primarily noetic—noematic unity of consciousness, but is an act of apprehension, a noergia, an *ergon*.

This primordial apprehension is so, then, in the impression of reality. Hence, if we wish to analyze the nature of this apprehension what we must do is analyze the structure of the impression of reality. {68}

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## APPENDIX 2

## FORMALIZATION AND HYPERFORMALIZATION

I have already said that it is formalization which unlocks the richness in the life of an animal. The more formalized is its impression of a mere stimulus, the richer its internal unity of stimulus. For a crab, "color" is a sign of its prey; but this same color apprehended in richer constellations constitutes a great variety of objective signs. The chimpanzee apprehends "things" which are much more varied and rich than those apprehended by a starfish. Whence the chain of responses to a more formalized arousal can be much more varied than in the case of a less formalized animal. For this reason, the animal must "select" its responses. Nonetheless, the unity of arousal, tonicity, and response, despite its richness and variety, is in principle fixed by the structures of the animal in question within, of course, the animal's limits of viability. Moreover, all of this has rigorous phylogenetic limits, and it is just these limits which are the frontier between the human animal and all other animals.

As one progresses through the animal kingdom, from lower to higher forms, the various species sense their stimuli as "note-signs" which are increasingly {70} more independently of themselves. That is, the animal senses the stimulus as something which is more and more detached from the apprehendor. But this formalization reaches an extreme point, so to speak. At that point, the stimulus presents itself as so independent of the animal, so set off from it, that it ends up "being situated" completely detached from the animal; formalization has thus been changed into *hyper-formalization*. Man is this hyperformalized animal. "Hyper" here has a very precise meaning: it signifies, as I have just said, that independence has reached the point where it presents the stimulus as something totally detached from the human animal. Thus the animal situation of man has completely changed.

a) In the first place, it is apparent that the detachment has gone so far that the stimulus has lost its merely signitive character. The content of the stimulus is no longer formally a sign of response. It was so while it was signing: to be a sign consists in being something signitively joined to the animal. Therefore when it is detached, the stimulus is no longer formally a sign. The content no longer has mere stimulus for its proper formality; it is no longer a "note-sign". This is the fundamental character-

istic of the "hyper" of hyperformalization: the independence which extends to complete detachment, to complete distancing. Man is the animal of "distancing" or "stepping back".<sup>2</sup> His hyperformalization determines him to be actually sensing, and therefore to be in a certain way in what is sensed, but to be so as "distanced". This distancing is the essential moment of hyperformalization. Distancing is not a physical removal; that would be impossible. It is not a going away "from" things, but a distancing "among" or "in" them. "Distancing" is a mode of being among things. In virtue of it something can happen to man which could never happen to an animal: he can feel himself lost among things. In signitivity, an animal can remain lost among many {71} responses. Indeed, this "being lost" can be cultivated in order to experimentally induce a neurosis in an animal. But this "being lost" is not a being lost among *things* but rather a disorientation in *responses*; that is, it is not strictly speaking a being lost but a responsive disorder. Only man can remain without a disorder, but lost among things, lost therefore not with respect to a disorder of his responses, but in the distancing of what is sensed.

b) In the second place, the stimulus itself thus detached no longer has its unitary outline. It has ceased to have it with respect to what concerns content: it no longer has the proper unity of being "a" sign. But in addition it has ceased to have its formal unity of independence. Upon making itself so independent, so hyperformalized, the stimulus no longer has the proper unity of mere stimulus which before it had, because it no longer has the signate independence of a response. From the point of view of mere stimulus, then, the unity of the stimulus has been broken. It has become something open: the "hyper". Hyperformalization has opened the closed world of the stimuli to a formality which is not mere stimulus.

c) In the third place, this means that the stimulus, when it ceases to be apprehended as a mere stimulus, when it becomes totally independent and thus completely distanced from the apprehendor, when it ceases to be a

<sup>2</sup>['Stepping back' is the most natural English rendering of Zubiri's technical term *tomar distancia*, meaning literally "to take distance". It is discussed at length later in the book. — trans.]

sign, is present in a new and different formality: the rupture of sign-ness is the presence of something “in its own right”. This is what I have called “reity”. The new formality is no longer objective independence but reity. The stimulus itself is no longer “sign-note”, but “real-note”. This is not a gradual but an essential difference. Hyperformalization is the step from objective independence to reity. It is the “hyper” {72} of sensible impression, this impression being constituted with it in the impression of reality. The “unity of sign”, then, has been lost and the “unity of reality” substituted for it.

d) In virtue of the foregoing, the human animal no longer has its suitable responses fixed precisely because it does not have “signs”. It is a “hyper-signitive” animal. Therefore, if it is to be viable, it must apprehend stimuli not as objective signs but as realities. A hyperformalized animal is not viable without apprehension of reality. To be sure, this does not mean that the animal “necessarily” requires that apprehension. What I want to say is that the animal requires it “if” it is going to be viable. It could have not had that apprehension, but in that case the hyperformalized animal would have only been one of many biological “essays” of individuals not capable of speciation and in which the biological phylum terminated. What I mean is that a species whose sensory apparatus had the hyperformalization of human sensory apparatus, but which did not have apprehension of reality, would not be viable.

e) Thus, in order to give suitable responses, the human animal cannot limit itself (as do the rest of the animals) to biologically “selecting” these responses, but must “elect” them, or even invent them, in function of reality. In an animal, the signs point to one or many responses, and in this chain of signed responses the animal biologically selects the response which it is going to give. But man lacks these *selection signs*. Thus he must determine his response as a function of the reality of the stimulus, of what he has apprehended, and of his own real apprehension. Man intellectually elects his response. To elect is to determine a response in reality and according to reality; it

is, if one wishes, a selection which is not “signitive” but “real”. {73}

Hyperformalization is not a phenomenon of adaptive conduct, but rather a structural principle. It has to do with structures which pertain formally to the animals in question. In other words, what we are doing here is a structural analysis of reality as formalized in some cases and hyperformalized in others, not an analysis of evolutionary mechanisms. Animal structures are found to be “adapted” by their capacity of formalization. The question remains, and we shall not discuss it, of whether this adaptation is what determines the course of evolution (Lamarckism) or is a consequence of it (Darwinism).

And we do not refer here to mere concepts, but to the “physical” structure of *reality apprehension*. It is a human structure, and as such has its organic aspect. As we saw, the formalization of the animal is a structure of it which is determined anatomically and physiologically. So, too, hyperformalization is a structure of the human animal as a whole, and therefore one with an organic aspect. For example, the form of structural regression of the brain causes the ambit of hyperformalization to regress to being a mere formalization. Cajal observed that the human brain is much richer in neurons with short axons than the brain of any other animal. Could it perhaps be that a brain thus structured is precisely a hyperformalized brain?

Hyperformalization is, then, a structural character. Certainly it is the result of a process. But this process is not the process of sensing, but something completely different and prior to sensing: it is a morphogenetic process.

This process does not constitute apprehension of reality, but is what intrinsically and formally opens up {74} the ambit of this apprehension. Apprehension thus hyperformalized is precisely the impression of reality.

(Since these ideas go beyond the limits of a mere analysis of the apprehension of reality, I have grouped them in the form of an appendix.)



## CHAPTER IV

### STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION

In the previous chapter, we have seen what sensible apprehension is and what its modes are: apprehension of a mere stimulus and apprehension of reality. The first constitutes pure sensing, proper to animals. The second is what constitutes human sensing. Human sensing is essentially and formally the impression of reality. Now, it is necessary to inquire diligently about the formal structure of the apprehension of reality. This is the third of the questions which I enunciated at the end of Chapter I.

Since human sensing has as its essential nature the impression of reality, to analyze the apprehension of reality is but to analyze the impression of reality. We shall accomplish this in two steps:

1. What is the impression of reality?
2. What is the structure of the impression of reality?

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#### §1

#### THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY

The impression of reality is always and only proper to an act of apprehension. This apprehension *qua* impressive apprehension is an act of *sensing*. In fact sensing is, formally, apprehending something in impression. This we have already seen. It is the first moment of the impression of reality. But this impression is of *reality* in addition to being an impression. That is the second moment. Hence, the following are necessary:

1. Clarify each of the two moments in and of itself.
2. Analyze the unity of the two moments, i.e., the formal nature of the impression of reality.

1. *Moments of the impression of reality.* We have already carefully explained what an impression is: it is the moment of sensing. What we are missing, then, is an analysis of the other moment, the moment of sensed reality. Now, just as the first moment, the moment of impression, qualifies the apprehending act as an act of *sensing*, so also the moment of reality qualifies that same act in a special way: as apprehension of reality, this act is formally the act which we call *intellective knowing*.<sup>\*</sup> That is what we must now clarify.

Classical philosophy never set itself this question, *viz.* In what, formally, does the act of intellective knowing consist? It described some intellective acts, but did not tell us in what intellective knowing consists as such. Now, I believe that {77} intellective knowing consists formally in apprehending something as real.

In fact, apprehension of the real is in the first place an *exclusive act* of the intelligence.<sup>†</sup> The stimuli apprehended by the intelligence are not apprehended as mere stimuli, but are apprehended really. Now, mere stimulus and reality are two different formalities, and the distinction between them is not gradual, but rather essential. A complex of stimuli, however formalized they may be, is always but a response-sign. It will never be something “in its own right,” or *de suyo*; i.e., it will never be formally reality. Reality is, then, essentially distinct from sign-ness. To apprehend reality is, therefore, an act essentially exclusive to the intelligence.

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<sup>\*</sup>[English rendering of the Spanish verb *inteligir*, which corresponds to the Latin *intelligere*.—trans.]

<sup>†</sup>[‘Intelligence’ renders the Spanish *inteligencia*, which has the same root as *inteligir* (translated as ‘intellective knowing’). It is used in the broad sense of total human capability of the mind to confront and deal with reality, and should not be narrowly construed as referring to what “IQ” tests measure.—trans.]



But, in the second place, to apprehend something as real is the *elemental act* of the intelligence. Every other intellectual act is constitutively and essentially grounded upon the act of apprehension of the real as real. Every other intellectual act, such as forming ideas, conceiving, judging, etc., is a manner of apprehending reality. Thus, conceiving is conceiving how the real is going to be; judging is affirming how a thing is in reality, etc. In all intellectual acts this moment of turning to the real appears. The apprehension of reality is therefore the elemental act of the intelligence. Classical philosophy has described well or poorly (we will not pursue the matter) some of these intellectual acts; but it has gone astray on this matter of the apprehension of a thing as reality, on this elemental act.

Finally, in the third place, apprehending reality is not merely an exclusive and elemental act of the intelligence, but is its *radical act*. Man is a {78} hyperformalized animal. The autonomization in which formalization consists has become changed into hyperautonomization in man, i.e., it has been changed from *sign* into *reality*. With this, the catalog of possible suitable responses to a stimulus becomes practically indeterminate. This means that in man, his sentient structures no longer assure his suitable response. That is to say, the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and response would be broken if man were not able to apprehend stimuli in a new way. When the stimuli do not suffice for a suitable response, man suspends, so to speak, his response and, without abandoning the stimulus, but rather conserving it, apprehends it according as it is in itself, as something *de suyo*, as stimulating reality. That is, he apprehends the stimulus, but not as mere stimulus: this is the radical dawn of intellection. Intellection arises precisely and formally at the moment of transcending or going beyond mere stimulus, at the moment of apprehending something real as real when pure sensing is suspended.

Hence, the apprehension of reality is the exclusive act, the elemental act, and the radical and primary act of intellectual knowing; i.e., apprehension of reality is what formally constitutes the proper part of intellectual knowing.

Now, the impression of reality is the formality of an apprehending act which is "one". This impression *qua* impression is an act of sensing. But insofar as it is of reality, it is an act of intellectual knowing. And this signifies that sensing and intellectual knowing are precisely the two moments of something which is one and unitary; two moments of the impression of reality. And that is what we must examine now: the unity of the impression of reality. {79}

2. *Unity of the impression of reality.* Above all it is necessary to describe this unity of the impression of reality. That will give us an idea of intelligence, to wit, sentient intelligence. Then it will only be necessary to repeat what we have obtained in order to better confront the usual idea of intelligence.

A) *Formal unity of the impression of reality: sentient intellection.* Sensing is not the same thing as intellectual knowing. But is this difference an opposition? Classical philosophy has always set intellectual knowing over against sensing. Even the one time when Kant sought to unify them, it was always a "unification", but not a formal structural "unity" which was in question. The fact is that classical philosophy, just as it failed to conceptualize what intellectual knowing is in a formal sense, never conceptualized what sensing is in a formal sense either. Given this situation, the foregoing presumed opposition remained, as I said before, as part of the intellectual atmosphere. We have already seen what intellectual knowing is: it is apprehending something as real, i.e., in the formality of reality. What is sensing? Here there lurks a hidden confusion which it is necessary to dispel. Indeed, failure to realize this confusion has had grievous consequences for philosophy. Sensing, in fact, consists in apprehending something impressively. But "sensing" can denote "only sensing", where the "only" is not merely a negative conceptual precision, but a proper positive mode of sensing as impression; this is what I have called "pure sensing". Sensing apprehends something impressively. Pure sensing apprehends this something which is impressing in the formality of mere stimulation. Therefore, sensing is not formally identical to pure sensing. Pure sensing is only a mode of sensing as such. Whence the necessity to carefully distinguish these two aspects in that which we designate with the single word 'sensing': sensing as sensing and pure sensing. {80}

The failure to recognize this difference has had serious repercussions, the first and most radical of which is the opposition between intellectual knowing and sensing. But there really isn't any opposition; intellectual knowing and sensing are not opposed. Pure sensing senses what is apprehended in the formality of mere stimulation; intellectual knowing apprehends what is known in the formality of reality. If one wishes to speak of faculties, it will be necessary to say that pure sensing is the faculty of mere stimulation, and that intellectual knowing is the faculty of reality. To be sure, as we shall soon see, this expression "faculty of reality" is here absolutely incorrect, but for the time being it is useful to us. In any case, it is clear that pure sensing and intellectual knowing are only modes of sensible apprehension. For this reason, they are both in-

scribed within the ambit of sensing. To pure sensing there corresponds another mode of sensing which is (as I shall explain forthwith) intellectual sensing. And therein lies the strict opposition: pure sensing and intellectual sensing. But both are modes of sensing.

Classical philosophy confounded sensing with pure sensing, and hence thought that there is opposition between sensing and intellectual knowing. This is not true, and the proof is that there is an impression of reality. An impression of reality as impression is sensing; but, because it is of reality, it is intellectual knowing. Impression of reality is formally sensing *and* intellectual knowing. In the impression of reality sensing and intellectual knowing are but two of its moments. This is a radical and essential overcoming of the dualism between sensing and intellectual knowing. From Parmenides through Plato and Aristotle, philosophy was based on the dualism according to which a thing is something “sensed”, and which at the same time “is”. In the midst of all of the discussions about the dualism or non-dualism of things, the duality of the two acts has been left intact: the act of sensing and the act of {81} intellectual knowing. But, I believe that in man, sensing and intellectual knowing are not two acts, each complete in its order; rather, they are two moments of a single act, of one unique impression, of the impression of reality. Now it is necessary to determine this intrinsic and formal unity.

In the impression of reality we are dealing with a single complete act. To think that there are two acts would be the same as thinking that in pure sensing there are two acts, one of sensing and another of apprehending the stimulation. But there is nothing more than one act: the act of pure sensing. The moment of “purity” of sensing is nothing but this: the moment of the unique act of pure sensing. Analogously, there is but one act of reality-impression. Intellectual knowing and sensing are only two moments of a single act. To be sure, these two moments can be separated phylogenetically; but this does not mean that the separation consists in sensing and intellectual knowing. Separated from intellectual knowing, the terminus which remains to us is not “sensing”, but rather “pure sensing”. We could never have a separate sensing without its own proper formality. When it does not have the formality of reality (given that we have separated sensing from intelligence), sensing has the formality of mere stimulus. There are not two acts, then, but two moments of a single act. The sentient moment is “impression”, the intellectual moment is “of reality”. The unity of the two moments is the impression of reality. What is this unity?

It is not a synthesis, as Kant thought, because we are not dealing with a case where the acts conform to a single object. The unity in question is not an *objective synthesis*, but a *unity which is formally structural*. It is necessary to emphasize this: it is sensing which senses reality, and it is the intellectual knowing which intellectually knows the real impressively. {82}

The impression of reality in its structural unity is a fact. And this fact is, as I said, the overcoming of the classical dualism between sensing and intellectual knowing which has so imperturbably cast its shadow across the long history of philosophy. Thus, in order to overcome or go beyond this dualism, one does not have to engage in difficult reasoning processes, but to pay careful attention to the act itself of the impression of reality.

In the conception of the two acts, an act of sensing and the other of intellectual knowing, one might think that what is apprehended by sensing is given “to” the intelligence so that the latter might intellectually know it. Intellectual knowing would thus be apprehending in a new way what is given by the senses to the intelligence. Thus the primary object of the intelligence would be the sensible, and hence that intelligence would be what I term *sentient intelligence*. But this is not correct: the impression of reality is a single and unique act, the primordial act of the apprehension of reality. In what does it formally consist?

This act can be described in two ways, the two ways in which one can describe the impression of reality. In the impression of reality we can start from the impression itself. Then “in” this impression is the moment of reality. As impression is what formally constitutes sensing, and reality is what formally constitutes intellectual knowing, it follows that saying that the moment of reality is “in” the impression is the same as saying that intellection is structurally “in” the sensing; i.e., the impression of reality is *intellectual sensing*. For this reason, when we apprehend heat, for example, we are apprehending it as real heat. An animal apprehends heat only as a thermic response sign; this is pure sensing. In contrast, man senses heat as something “in its own right”, as something {83} *de suyo*: the heat is real heat. But we can describe the impression of reality starting from the moment of reality. In that case the moment of impression is structurally “in” the moment of reality. For the above example, we apprehend the real as being warm. Sensing is thus “in” the intellectual knowing. In virtue of this, that intellection is *sentient intellection*. In the impression of reality I sense real heat (intellectual sensing), I sense warm reality (sentient intellection). The impression of reality is thus intel-

lective sensing or sentient intellection. The two formulae are identical, and so I shall use them indiscriminately. But in order to better contrast my views with the usual idea of the intelligence, I prefer to speak of sentient intelligence, embracing in this denomination both intellectual sensing and sentient intellection. Hence I shall say that the impressive apprehension of reality is an act of the sentient intelligence.

The apprehension of reality is, then, an act which is structurally one and unitary. This structural unity is what the “in” expresses. Classical philosophy, on the other hand, believed that there are two acts: the act of sensing gives “to” the intelligence what it is going to work on, i.e., to know intellectually. But this is not the case. The difference between “to” and “in” is essential. That difference expresses the difference between the two concepts of the intelligence. To say that the senses give “to” the intelligence what it is going to work on is to suppose that the intelligence has as its primary and suitable object that which the senses present “to” it. If this were true, the intelligence would be what I call a *sensible intelligence*. A sensible intelligence is an intelligence “of” the sensible. On the other hand, to say that the senses sense what is sensed “in” the intelligence does not mean that the primary and suitable object of intellectual knowing is the sensible, but rather something more than that, viz. that the very mode of intellectual knowing is to sense reality. {84} Hence, it is a sensing which is intellectual *qua* sensing. In this case the *intelligence* is *sentient*. Sentient intelligence consists in intellectual knowing being only a moment of impression: the moment of the formality of its otherness. To sense something real is, formally, to be actually sensing intellectually. Intellection is not intellection “of” the sensible, but rather intellection “in” the sensing itself. It is clear, then, that sensing is intellectual knowing: it is intellectual sensing. Intellectual knowing is thus nothing but another mode of sensing (different from pure sensing). This “other mode” concerns the formality of what is sensed. The unity of intelligence and sensing is the unity of the content and formality of reality. Sentient intellection is impressive apprehension of a content in the formality of reality; it is precisely the impression of reality. The formal act of sentient intellection is, I repeat, impressive apprehension of reality. The senses do not give what is sensed “to” the intelligence, but rather are actually sensing intellectually. There is no object given “to” the intelligence, but rather an object given “in” the intelligence itself. Sensing is in itself a mode of intellectual knowing, and intellectual knowing is in itself a mode of sensing. Reality is apprehended, then, in the impression of reality. This is sentient intelligence. That which we

call ‘intellectual knowing’ and ‘sensing’, I repeat, are but two moments of the single act of sentiently apprehending the real. As it is not possible to have content without formality nor formality without content, there is but a single act, viz. intellectual sensing or sentient intellection: the sentient apprehension of the real. This act is, then, intrinsically and structurally “one”: it is, I emphasize, the impression of reality. Sentient intellection is, then, purely and simply impression of reality. In this apprehension intellectual knowing is the very mode of sensing. {85}

Classical philosophy has erred with respect to the impression of reality. It is this impression, nonetheless, which comprises the primordial intellectual knowing, and not the combinations, however selective, of what is usually called “animal intelligence”. Still less can one speak—as is commonly done today—of artificial intelligence. In both cases what is carried out, whether by the animal or some electronic apparatus, is not intelligence because what they operate on and are concerned with is just the *content* of an impression, but not its *formality of reality*. What these animals or machines have are impressions of content, but without the formality of reality. It is for this reason that they do not have intelligence.

Intellection is, then, constitutively and structurally sentient in itself *qua* intellection. Conversely, sensing in man is constitutively and structurally intellectual in itself *qua* sensing. Thus it is that sensibility is not a type of residual “hyletic” of consciousness, as Husserl says, nor a *factum brutum* as Heidegger and Sartre call it, but rather is an intrinsic and formal moment of intellection itself.

The impression of reality is a fact which it is necessary to emphasize as against the classical dualism. Sentient intellection is a fact. On the other hand, the dualism between intellectual knowing and sensing is a metaphysical conceptualization which distorts the facts.

It is only necessary to repeat what has been said above in order to confront the idea of the concipient intelligence.

## B) *Sentient intelligence and concipient intelligence*

### 1. The sentient intelligence:

- a) Has an object which is not only primary and suitable, but a normal proper object: reality. {86}
- b) This formal object is not given by the senses “to” the intelligence, but is given by the senses “in” the intelligence.
- c) The proper formal act of knowing intellection

is not conceiving or judging, but “apprehending” its object, viz. reality.

- d) What is apprehended in impression, i.e., what is apprehended sentiently, is so in the impression of reality. In virtue of this, there is but one single act: the sentient apprehension of the real as real.

2. In contrast, classical philosophy has always believed something quite different. Classically, intellectual knowing would be, as I have repeatedly said, newly apprehending what is given by the senses “to” the intelligence. The primary and suitable object of the intelligence would be, therefore, the sensible. Thus, by reason of its suitable object, this intelligence would be what I call *sensible intelligence*. We are not told in what intellectual knowing consists; the only thing we are told is that when intellectual knowing takes place, there is a conceiving and judging of what is given by the senses. In this way intellection is progressively converted into being a declaration of what a thing is, i.e., there is an identification of intellection and predicative logos. This was the great discovery of Plato in the *Sophist* which culminated in the work of Aristotle, for whom the logos itself is the *apophanesis* of what a thing is. That is what I term the *logification of the intelligence*.

Absorbing, as is justified, conception and judgement under one rubric, I shall say that this intellection, which is sensible by reason of its proper object, would by reason of its act be *concupient intelligence*.

The concipient intelligence:

- a) Is that whose primary object is the sensible. {87}
- b) This object is given by the senses “to” the intelligence.
- c) The proper act of this intellection is conceiving and judging that which is given to it. This intelligence is concipient not because it conceives and judges, but because it conceptualizes concipiently, i.e., it conceptualizes what is given by the senses “to” the intelligence.

Abandoning the concipient intelligence does not mean that the real is not conceptualized. That would be simply absurd. What it means is that the conceptualization—even though it is an inexorable intellectual function, as we shall later see—is not what is primary and radical about intellectual knowing, because intellection is primarily and radically sentient apprehension of the real as real. Conceptualizing is just an intellectual unfolding of the impression of reality; hence, we are not talking about not conceptualizing, but rather about the fact that concepts are adequate not primarily to things given by the senses “to” the intelligence, but to the modes of intellectually sensing the real given “in” the intelligence. Concepts are necessary, but they must be concepts of the sentient intelligence and not concepts of the concipient intelligence.

Here we have, then the unity of the impression of reality: sentient intellection. What is the structure of that unity? Or what comes to the same thing, what is the structure of the impression of reality? {88}

{89}

## APPENDIX 3

## SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE AS A FACULTY

The dualism between acts of sensing and acts of intellectual knowing led to conception of dualism of faculties: the faculty of sensing and the faculty of intellectual knowing. But this conceptualization, besides not being a fact, distorts the facts. If one wishes to achieve a conceptualization which does justice to the facts, I believe that it is necessary to follow a different route. I shall indicate it in the spirit of not evading the question, but I shall do no more than indicate it because our present problem is the analysis of the facts and not theoretical conceptualizations, be they metaphysical or even scientific.

This conceptualization has two essential points: what is sentient intellection as a faculty, and what is this faculty within the structures of human reality.

1. *The sentient intelligence as a faculty.* Man can sense and can know intellectually. This idea of “being able to” is what the Greek word *dynamis* expresses. But *dynamis* is something very rich, and its diverse aspects have not been outlined with conceptual rigor.

a) On one hand, since Aristotle’s time, *dynamis* has signified potency, that according to which something can receive actuations or actuate itself, and this acting is not just on something apart from the agent, but also on the agent itself (though insofar as this is distinct from its own actuation). {90}

b) On the other hand, the Latins rendered the word *dynamis* by *potentia seu facultas*, potency or faculty.

Now, to my way of thinking, this equivalence cannot be admitted. Not every potency is a faculty by the mere fact of being a potency. In order to be able to realize its acts, it is not enough for the potency to be a potency; rather, it must be “facultized” to realize them. To be sure, there are potencies which by themselves are facultized to produce their acts. Thus these potencies are also faculties. But there are cases in which this does not occur, and then the potency cannot produce its acts unless it is intrinsically and structurally “united” to another potency, unless it is “one” with it. That is to say, the potency is not now facultized by itself to produce its own acts; it is only so in its structural unity with another. In that case the two potencies structurally comprise a single faculty, and that faculty realizes one single act. Neither of the two poten-

cies acts by itself to carry out with its actuation part of the total act; i.e., the two potencies do not each produce a partial act of the total act. On the contrary, the two potencies act only in structural unity; they do not act by themselves either totally or partially, but only unitarily. The two potencies are “co-determined” as a faculty. The potencies are not concurrent, but co-determinate, and only in this and through this codetermination do they produce a single act. The real act is only in the “co” of the codetermination. In the act itself the two potencies are structurally “one”. The two potencies constitute the two *moments* of a single faculty and a single act.

Now, such is the case with sentient intellection. To be sure, there are two potencies, the potency of sensing and {91} the potency of intellectual knowing. As potencies they are essentially distinct. In as much as it is a potency, the intelligence is essentially irreducible to pure sensing, because a formality of reality will never emerge from a sign-based formality. But this intellectual potency is not by itself facultized for producing its act. Nor can it produce other than as intrinsically and formally united with the potency of sensing—the unity in virtue of which, and only in virtue of which, the intellectual potency acquires the character of a faculty. By the same token, sensing cannot be human sensing, i.e., cannot produce the act of impression of reality unless it is intrinsically and formally “one” with the intellectual potency. This unity is the sentient intelligence. On the other hand, pure sensing is already facultized: it is a “potency-faculty”. The sentient intelligence is not a potency but a faculty. It is a faculty composed not only *intrinsically* but also—and this is the essential point—*structurally* by two potencies, that of sensing and that of intellectual knowing. Hence, it is not the case that these two potencies concur in the same object (the classical idea until Kant’s time), nor that they concur partially in a total act (Kant’s objective synthesis); there is no concurrence, but rather codetermination. They are codetermined in a single act of sentient intellection, in the act of impressive or sentient apprehension, in the impression of reality. The intelligence as a faculty is sentient, and human sensing as a faculty is intellectual. Hence the unity of the impression of reality is the unity of the act of a single faculty.

This conceptualization is not a fact—that I have already noted—but it is to my way of thinking the unique conceptualization which permits us to realize the fact of the impression of reality. The impression of reality is a fact, and therefore {92} so is intellective sensing or sentient intellection. The conceptualization of a faculty structurally composed of sentient and intellective potency is, I repeat, the only scientific conceptualization of the fact of the impression of reality.

It should also suffice to note that potency and faculty do not exhaust the nature of the “being able to”. There is at least a third sense of being able to, different from potency and faculty, and that is capacity. But this is not relevant to the present question.

Here, then, we have what sentient intelligence is as a faculty. Now, this faculty is the faculty of the structures which comprise human reality. Thus it is necessary to explain (though rather summarily) in what this faculty consists when considered as a structural moment of human reality.

2) *Human reality and the faculty of sentient intelligence.* The question is very appropriate since up to now we have spoken of sentient intelligence as a habit, as a mode of having to do with things. Thus, if we wish to conceptualize the faculty of sentient intelligence with what we have termed ‘habit’, we shall be compelled to return to the idea itself of a habit.

In every living being there are, ultimately, three distinct strata which must be considered.

A) First, there is the most visible stratum: the execution of the vital acts. This is the “arousal–tonic–modification–response” structure of which we spoke some pages back. A living organism carries out these actions while finding itself “among” things, some external, others internal to itself. This “among” in which the living organism finds itself has two characteristics. First, there is that according to which the living organism finds itself placed among things: it has its fixed *locus* among them. {93} This is a characteristic essential to the living organism, though one which it shares with all other non-living realities. But the living organism has a proper modal characteristic exclusive to it: when it is thus placed among things, it is *situated* in a determinate form among them; i.e., it has its *situs* among them. The category of *situs* had no role in Aristotle’s philosophy because he considered it as a highest category of being. Nonetheless, to my way of thinking this is not true. It is an essential metaphysical category, but only of the living organism. Position and situation, taken in the widest sense and not just in the spatial sense, are two radical concepts of this stratum of

the living organism. They are not identical, but neither are they independent: a single positioning gives rise to quite diverse situations. Thus positioned and situated among things, the living organism lives by its vital processes. This stratum, nonetheless, is the most superficial.

B) The living organism never remains univocally characterized by the web of its vital processes. In the vital processes of a mole and a blind dog we shall never encounter a situation of luminous character. But the difference is essential: the mole does not visually cope visually with things “before him”, but the dog does. Therefore, beneath the vital processes there is in every living organism a primary mode of dealing with things and with itself: the habit. Habit is the foundation of the possibility of every possible vital process. In fact, through its habit, through its mode of dealing with things, these latter “are situated” for the living organism in a certain formal respect; this is the *formality*. In Aristotle’s philosophy and in all of medieval philosophy one sees this category completely shipwrecked. But to my way of thinking, this owes to the fact that Aristotle considered the *habitus* as a highest category of being, ultimately reducible to a {94} quality. Nonetheless, I think that we are dealing with a radical metaphysical category of the living organism. In contrast to both Aristotle and the medievals (for whom the *habitus* is a disposition encrusted more or less permanently in the subject), I formally conceive of what I call ‘habit’ as a “mode of dealing” with things. For this reason, it is a category exclusive to living organisms since non-living organisms do not have a mode of dealing with things. And as a category of living organisms it is radical in them.

*Situs* and *habitus* are the two supreme categories of the living organism in its life. The habits can be quite diverse in the same living organism. But there is in every living organism a radical habit upon which ultimately depends its entire life. The biography of every dog is different, but they are all canine biographies because they are inscribed in the same habit. Now, if we compare all living organisms among themselves, we shall discover three radical habits: the habit of growth to sustain itself (this is the etymological meaning of *trepho*, to favor the development of what is subject to a growth process), the habit of sensing, and the habit of sentient intellective knowing. In accordance with this, things fall into three different formalities: as trophic, as stimuli, and as realities.

“Habit—in its formal respect”: here we have the second stratum of the life of every living organism.

Now, habit has two faces. On one hand, the habit determines the type of vital process. On the other, it is

something determined by the very nature of the structures of the living organism. Whence the mode of dealing with things is always something intermediate, so to speak, between action and structures. Thus, sentient intellection is a habit which determines every human process, but is {95} at the same time determined by the human structures. Analysis of the facts moves among actions and among the habits taken in and by themselves; but these habits conduce to something which is not a fact but a terminus of a structural conceptualization. This is the third stratum of the life of every living organism.

C) Every animal has its own structures. This system of structural notes determines the habit. Now, the structures *qua* determinants of the habit to my way of thinking comprise what we call potencies and faculties.

a) In every living organism things determine its vital processes as stimuli. Every cell, whether plant or animal, is stimuable (irritable) and is stimulated (irritated). Under this aspect, every living organism, plant or animal, has what I call *susceptibility*.

b) But there are living organisms whose susceptibility has a special character, viz. the animal. Although every living organism is stimuable, the animal is the living organism which has made stimulation into an autonomous biological function. It is this autonomization of stimulation which to my way of thinking comprises *sensing*. Sensing is not a creation of animals; it is only the autonomization of a function proper to every living organism, viz. susceptibility. Sensing is a structural moment of the living animal. This structure consists in the stimuli stimulating by an impression. This impressive structure *qua* determinant of the habit of mere stimulation is the “potency-faculty” of pure sensing.

The somatic structure and, therefore, its potencies and faculties of sensing, assume diverse forms. In the first animals, it was a type of diffuse sensing which I term *sentiscence*. In the more developed animals {96} we find a systematization of the structures of stimulus-based impression. This systematization is to my way of thinking the proper formal nature of what quite appropriately we call the nervous “system”. The nervous system is the systematization of impressivity. This impressivity makes sentiscence into a strict *sensibility*. The systematization has for its part a unique character, viz. centralization, by which the nervous system is the transmitter of the stimulus. This systematization grows in complexity from the first nerve centers to the brain and within the brain to the cortex wherein formalization culminates. Susceptibility, sentiscence, and sensibility are the three different forms of the structure of stimulation.

c) All of this happens in man, but there is in him something different as well. In addition to the biological autonomization of the stimuli, he has the potency to know intellectually in a way determined by the hyperformalization of his sentient structures. This potency is not by itself a faculty. The structural unity of intelligence and sensing is determinant of the habit of sentient intellection whose formal act is the impression of reality. Now, *qua* determinant of that habit, the unitary structure “sensing-intellection” is the faculty of sentient intelligence. It is because of this that man impressively senses reality. We are dealing, then, not just with habit but with structures. It is for this reason, I repeat, that intellection is an act of sentient apprehension of the real. It is an intellection which in a certain way (although not exclusively) we could term “cerebral”. The brain is the sentient organ which by its hyperformalization determines in an exact way the need for intellection to assure man’s ability to respond suitably. {97} In addition, the brain has an even deeper function: that of keeping intellection in a state of suspense. This is what gives rise to its state of vigilance. Finally, by virtue of being sentient, the activity of the brain formally and intrinsically modulates the intellection itself, i.e., the impression of reality. In the unity of these three moments (the exacting nature of hyperformalization, vigilance, and intrinsic modulation) consists the structural sentient moment of the sentient intelligence.

Through its structures, an animal determines the habit of mere stimulation. In it there lies open a *medium*. Medium is the environment in which this habit is formalized in the animal sensing. Man through his structures determines the habit of reality. In it he is open not only to a medium but is open to a *field* and to a *world*; this is the field of the real and the world of the real. To be sure, man has a medium, and this medium *qua* humanly apprehended is the field of reality. But the field of reality is transcendently open to the world. Whence the field of reality, as we shall see, is the world *qua* intellectually sensed. This is the work of the sentient intelligence *as a faculty*.

In contrast, as a structural note, intelligence:

a) Is not a note of mere stimulation that is completely elaborated. In contrast to all such notes, the intelligence is essentially removed from all merely sign-based stimulation.

b) Nor is it a systematic note. Rather, it represents a new element, but one which is elemental though necessitated by the hyperformalized material structures and formally and intrinsically modulated by them. {98}

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§2

## STRUCTURE OF THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY

The structure of the impression of reality is but the structure of the sentient intelligence. It consists in the structure which has the otherness of the impression of reality, i.e., its formality of reality. This structure has two aspects. Above all, the otherness of reality has different modes of being impressively given. Secondly, the otherness of reality has a unique characteristic: it is a transcendental structure. The intrinsic unity of these two moments is the structure of the impression of reality.

1

### *Modal Structure of the Impression of Reality*

Sentient intellection, as I have just said, consists in apprehending things in an impression of reality. Now, this impression of reality comes to us given by distinct senses. Each of these senses is distinct, and all of them together comprise one and the same sentient intellection of reality. Whence there are two questions for us to examine:

1. In what does the diversity of the senses consist?
2. In what does their unity as modes of intellection of the real consist?

1) *The diversity of the senses.* At first glance the answer seems to be obvious. The diversity of {100} the senses consists in the diversity of the qualities which the senses offer to us: color, shape, sound, temperature, etc. In this respect the senses differ among themselves by virtue of the distinct richness of the sensed qualities. Aristotle already noted that sight is the sense which manifests to us the greatest diversity of information: *pollas deloi diaphoras*. Today, the senses are specified by a distinction in the receptive organs. They are some eleven in number: vision, hearing, smell, taste, equilibrium, contact-pressure, heat, cold, pain, kinesthesia (including muscular, tendon, and articular sense), and visceral sensibility. I prescind from the fact that the specificity of some of these receptors is in dispute; that is a psycho-physiological question.

Nonetheless, as I see it, this is not the radical difference among the senses in the case of human sensing. The organs of the human senses sense with a sensing in which what is sensed is apprehended as reality. As each sense presents reality to me in a different form, it follows that there are different modes of the impression of reality. Now, the radical difference between the senses is not in the qualities which they present to us, nor in the content of the impression, but rather in the form in which they present reality to us. On this point, philosophy has gone astray. It has simply assumed that the thing sensed is always something which is “in front” of me. But besides being quite vague, this obscures a great falsehood, because being in front of me is only one of the different ways of a real thing being present to me. Since the fact that an apprehension is of reality is what formally constitutes intellection, it follows that the modes of reality’s being present to us in the human senses are *eo ipso* diverse modes of intellection. {101} For the sake of greater clarity I shall successively examine the modes of presentation of the real in sensing as modes of intellectual sensing and as modes of sentient intellection.

A) *The modes of presentation of reality: intellectual sensing.* In what follows, I shall limit myself to a brief sketch. Sight apprehends a real thing as something which is “in front”; we say that it is “before me”. The thing itself is before me according to its proper configuration, according to its *eidos*. But this does not apply in the case of hearing. To be sure, a sound is just as immediately apprehended in the sense of hearing as a color can be in the sense of sight. But in the sound, the thing sounding is not included in the audition; rather, the sound directs us to it. This “direction” or “sending back” is what, following the etymological meaning of the word, I shall call “notice”. What is real of the sound is a mode of presentation proper to it: *notifying presentation*. In smelling, an odor is apprehended immediately as in the case of a sound or a color. But the thing is neither present as in the case of sight, nor merely made known by notification, as in the case of hearing. In smelling, reality is presented to us apprehended in a different form: as a scent. Smell is the sense of scenting. In the case of taste on the other hand, a thing is present, but as a possessed reality, “savored”. Taste is more than notice, or scent; it is reality itself present as *enjoyable*. It is reality itself which, as such-and-such reality, has a formal moment of enjoyment. In the case of touch (contact and pressure) a thing is present but without *eidos* or taste; this is the *naked presentation* of reality. But the senses also present reality to me in another form. In kinesthesia I no longer have reality present, nor any notice of it, etc. I only have reality as some-



thing “towards”. This is not a “towards” reality, but reality {102} itself as a “towards”. It is thus a mode of *directional presentation*.

I have spoken in these last lines of sensed qualities and of the thing which possesses them. Clearly, this distinction between things and qualities is not primary but derived from the organization of our perceptions. However, I have utilized it not to fix therein the difference between quality and thing, but so that the essential idea becomes clearer, *viz.* that qualities are formally real and that their mode of being present to me in impression has the enunciated modalities. They are not modalities of reference to some problematic thing, but rather modalities which are intrinsically constitutive of each of the qualities themselves in its proper and formal reality. Thus, for example, sound is a quality whose modality of reality is to be directional. Directional in relation to what? That is another question which for the moment is of no concern to us. It could be that there is no sonorous thing, but the sound would not therefore cease to be directional, whether to another sonorous quality or simply a directional in relation to empty space. In addition, I should note that each one of these qualities has a possible negative mode. Thus, for example, taste has as a counterposed quality distaste, etc. The denominations of the qualities are for this reason simply denominations which are purely *a potiori*.

But neither reality nor my sensing are exhausted in these types of sentient apprehension. Above all, we must consider heat and cold; they are the primary presentation of reality as *temperant*. There is in addition the apprehension of reality not simply as temperant but also as *affectant*: sorrow and pleasure are the primary expression of that affection. Reality is temperant and affectant. But the {103} apprehension of reality has still another moment, *viz.* reality as *position*. This is what is proper to the sense of equilibrium. According to it, I apprehend reality as something *centered*.

But I apprehend reality in still another form. When we apprehend our own reality, we have an internal or visceral sensibility which can be quite diversified, but which globally I shall call ‘coenesthesia’. Thanks to this sensing, man is in himself. That is what we call ‘intimacy’. ‘Intimacy’ means purely and simply “my reality”; it is a mode of presentation of the real. The visceral sense is in a certain way the sense of the “me” properly speaking. The other senses do not give the “me” as such unless they are encompassed by coenesthesia, as we shall immediately see.

Eidetic presence, notice, scent, taste, naked reality, towards, temperature accommodation, affection, position,

and intimacy are first line modes of presentation of the real; they are therefore modes of the impression of reality. It is not the case that “the” mode of reality’s presence is vision, and that the other modes are nothing but replacements for vision when it fails us. Indeed, exactly the opposite. To be sure, the modes are not all equivalent; but all are in and by themselves proper modes of the presentation of reality. The preponderant rank of some modes over others does not proceed from the fact that they are replacements for vision, but from the very nature of reality. There are, for example, realities which cannot have any other mode of presentation than naked reality apprehended tactilly. And in these cases it could be that reality thus sensed is of a rank much superior to any reality eidetically sensed. In all modes of presentation of reality, then, there is always an intellective sensing. {104}

Now we must expound this same unitary structure starting from intellection; all human intellection is primarily and radically *sentient intellection*.

B) *The modes of presentation of reality: sentient intellection*. In this respect, classical philosophy has erred in two fundamental directions.

In the first place, it has erred in a direction which is so to speak global, proceeding from the dualism of opposing intellective thinking and sensing. Thus we have the celebrated aphorism: *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus* (there is nothing in the intelligence which was not previously in the senses, with the exception of the intelligence itself). This is radically false, because it expresses precisely the character of *sensible intelligence*. All intellection, however, is not just sensible, but *sentient*. Intellection is in sensing as a determinant moment of the formality apprehended therein. Inasmuch as we apprehend sensed reality, the intelligence not only apprehends what is sensed, but is in the sensing itself as a structural moment of it. And this, as we shall immediately see, is true with respect to the intelligence itself. The intelligence as intellection of itself is primarily and radically sentient intellection; the intelligence is not in itself except sentiently.

In the second place, such a preponderance has been given to the presentation of the real in vision that what is not seen is declared *eo ipso* to be unintelligible. And this is absurd not only philosophically, but also scientifically. Indeed, elementary particles are realities, since they are given a splendid mathematical description in quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, they are not visualizable {105} as if they were waves or particles. Their real structure is such that they are emitted and absorbed as if they were corpuscles and they propagate as if they were waves. But

they are neither. And it is not just that in fact we do not see these particles, but that they are in themselves realities which are “non-visualizable”. And as we shall immediately see, the identification of the visible and the intelligible is philosophically false: every intellection is sentient and, therefore, every mode of apprehension of the real—even if that reality be neither visual nor visualizable—is true intellection, and what is apprehended therein has its proper intelligibility.

There are in fact different modes of intellection and of intelligibility. With respect to vision, intellection has that character of apprehension of the *eidōs* which we could call *vidence*.<sup>\*</sup> In the sense of hearing or audition, intellection has a peculiar and unique mode: to know intellectually is to auscultate (in the etymological meaning of the word); this is intellection as *auscultation*. In the sense of taste, the intellection is apprehension as *enjoyable* (whether pleasurable or not). The enjoyment is not consequent upon intellection, but is the enjoyment itself as a mode of intellection, as a mode of apprehension of reality. Let us not forget that *sapere* [to know] and *sapientia* [wisdom] are etymologically *sapor* [taste]; the Latins, indeed, translated the Greek *sophia* as *sapientia*. In the sense of touch, intellection has a special form, viz. groping or what we could perhaps better call roughly estimating. In the sense of smell we have another special mode of intellection, the *scent*. I lump together in this concept both the scent properly so-called and the trace or vestige. In the sense of kinesthesia intellection is a *dynamic tension*. It is not a tension towards reality, but reality itself as a “towards” which has us tense. It is a mode of intellectual apprehension in the “towards”. {106}

With respect to other forms of presentation of reality, intellection has modes proper to each. Man intellectually knows the real through *accommodating himself* to reality and being *affected* by it. Accommodation and affection are modes of strict apprehension of reality, of strict intellection. And when reality is presented as centered, intellection is an *orientation* in reality. Finally, there is a mode of intellection proper to the presentation of reality in visceral sensing: it is intellection as intimation of the real, as intimate penetration into the real. This does not refer to some intimation which is consequent upon the apprehension of reality, but rather the intimation itself is the mode of apprehending reality.

Thus, all of the senses *qua* intellectual and all intellections *qua* sentient are structural modes of the impres-

sion of reality. Impression of reality is not an empty concept, but something perfectly and precisely structured. Yet all of these modes are but aspects of a structural unity. Whence the question which inexorably arises: What of the unity of the senses and intellection?

2) *The unity of the senses and intellection*. Since the essential difference of the senses rests upon the modes of presentation of reality and not in the specific qualitative content of the sensed note, it follows that the unity of the senses has special characteristics.

A) Above all, the diverse senses are not merely juxtaposed with each other, but, on the contrary, overlap each other totally or partially. If we were dealing with the qualitative content of each sense, this overlap would be impossible. For example, it would be absurd to pretend to have a taste of fire or of the pole star. But we are dealing with modes of {107} presentation of the real. And these modes, and not the qualities, are what overlap. I can have a perfectly enjoyable intellection of the pole star. Although we may not apprehend the quality proper to a sense in a particular thing, nonetheless we apprehend the mode of presentation proper to this sense when we apprehend the real by other senses. To clarify this I shall discuss a few typical cases which are of special importance.

Sight gives me the reality “before” me; touch gives me the “naked” reality. The overlap of the two modes of presence is obvious: I have “before me the naked reality”. This does not mean a vision of the *eidōs* plus a touching of that same *eidōs*; that is generally absurd. Rather, it means that the real is present “before” me as “naked” reality. The “before” me is the proper mode of presentation of the real in the sense of sight, and the “naked” reality is the mode of presentation in the sense of touch. These two modes of presentation are those which overlap. All the modes can also overlap with the mode of presentation of taste. Reality, indeed, is not just something present before me, in its naked reality, but something also in principle “enjoyable” as reality and by being reality. This enjoyableness is grounded in the mode through which reality is present to me in the sense of taste. Sight and touch give us, as I said, the naked reality before me, and I add now that it is enjoyable by being reality. Sight and touch, when they overlap with hearing, present to me the reality to which this latter sense points: the sonorous thing is apprehended as something which sounds before me and in its naked reality. A similar thing occurs in the case of heat and cold: I can sense myself acclimated or adjusted to every reality *qua* reality. In another aspect, orientation and equilibrium overlap with the other modes of sentient intellection of the real. In every intellection there is an orientation, {108} and every orientation is oriented in

<sup>\*</sup>[English rendering of the Spanish *videncia*, etymologically related to the verb *ver*, to see.—trans.]

reality by being reality, even if it be merely reported. On the other hand, every intellection of the external real, overlapped by the intellection of intimacy, makes of each intellection, including external intellection, an effort to achieve intimacy with what is apprehended.

But there is a mode of presence of the real which is of the greatest importance, *viz.* the mode of apprehending reality in “towards”, the directional presence of the real. Overlapping the other senses, the “towards” determines specific modes of intellection. Thus, overlapping the eidetic presence of reality in the sense of sight, it determines therein an effort towards the “inside”. Overlapping the listening to the notice of something, the “towards” determines therein a notification *through* the notice, toward what is noticeable. Overlapping everything which is apprehended in all of its other forms, the intellection in “towards” propels us to what is real *beyond* what is apprehended.

Overlapping the visceral sensibility, the “towards” determines therein an intellection of the greatest importance. The visceral sense gives me reality as intimacy; *i.e.*, I apprehend myself as actually being in myself. But with the overlapping of the “towards”, this actually being in me propels me inside of myself to be present to myself. And this intellection of my own intimacy in its “inside” is an intellection of the “me” through the “actually being”; *viz.* it is reflection. Reflection has always been regarded in philosophy as being the primary act of the intellection (every intellection would be a reflection); reflection would also be an immediate act (every act of intellection would already be by itself a reflection); finally it would be an exclusive act of the intelligence and foreign to sensing (the senses, we are told, do not turn back upon themselves). But this triple conceptualization is strictly false. In the first place, not every act of intellection is a reflection. Every reflection presupposes a previous “being here-and-now in {109} myself”; only because I am already in myself is there reflection. But since being in myself is an act of sentient intellection, *i.e.*, of strict intellection, it follows that reflection is not a primary intellectual act. In the second place, reflection is not an immediate act; *i.e.*, intellection is not an act which is formally an entering into myself. The entering of the intellection into itself is an entering grounded on a “towards” of my own intimacy. Reflection is not an immediate act. Finally, it is not an act which is foreign to sensing, because it is an act of sentient intellection. One does not enter into himself except by sensing himself. I apprehend myself, and I turn “towards” myself, and I sense myself as a reality which turns towards itself. And these three moments unitarily comprise reflection.

All of these forms of overlapping are authentic overlapping, that is, each mode is intrinsically and formally in the rest as a structural moment of the rest of them. No mode has any prerogative, not even the visual mode. It is in the diversity of overlapped modes that the immense richness of the apprehension of reality consists. To be sure, not every real thing is apprehended according to all of its modes; but this does not mean that they do not all overlap, because those modes according to which a reality is not present to us are modes of which we are positively “deprived”. Indeed, if we were radically deprived of a sense, independently of the fact that we were deprived of the qualities which that sense can apprehend, we would not have the mode of presentation of the real proper to that sense. A man blind from birth not only does not see black and white or colors, he cannot have the presentation of the real of the other senses as something which is here-and-now {110} “before him”. He not only doesn’t see qualities, but is deprived of apprehending the real as something which is “before”. Such a man apprehends the “naked” reality of something tactically, but never apprehends it as something which is “before” him. Quite different is the situation of the blind man who at one time was able to see. In this blind man there is not an actual seeing of black and white or colors, but the act of apprehending the real from the other senses as something real “before him” still exists. Thus, a blindness to black and white or colors is not the same as a blindness to the mode of presentation of the real “before me”. Hence, in every primordial apprehension of the real there is a strict unity not of sensible qualities, but of modes of presentation of the real, although at times it may be in that special form which we term “privative”. Each of these modes taken by itself is nothing but a reduced and deficient mode of the primary impression of reality, whose plenitude is the primary unity of all eleven modes. But then, what is this unity?

B) One might think that the various senses constitute a primary diversity such that what we call “impressive apprehension of reality” would be a “synthesis”; the intelligence would thus be what synthesizes the senses. In my view, this is false because it does not correspond to the facts. The unity of these senses is already constituted by the mere fact of being senses “of reality”, by being modes of apprehension of reality. The unity of the senses is not, then, a synthesis, but a primary unity, the physical unity of being apprehensors of reality. And since apprehending reality is intelligence, it follows that the unity of the senses is in being moments of the same “sentient intellection”. Hence, the apprehension of reality is not a synthesis of senses, but on the contrary “the” senses {111} are

“analyzers” of the apprehension of reality. From the point of view of the qualities—the only one adopted up to now by philosophy—one easily arrives at the idea of a synthesis. Scholastic philosophy conceived this synthesis as a “common sense”. The distinct qualities which comprise the perceived thing in each case would be submitted to a synthesis of qualities. But this is false: that synthesis is not what is primary; rather, it is the unity of reality. And it is this primary unity of reality which constitutes the foundation of the synthesis of the qualities. The qualities are in fact qualities of a reality. Pure animal sensing also has a unity which is prior to any possible synthesis of qualities. The senses of an animal are also analyzers of its pure sensing. And in the animal, the unity prior to the senses is a unity of stimulation in which the animal’s senses are the differentiation of the stimulation. There is, then, a unity of being in stimulation prior to the diversity of the senses. In man, the unity of sensing is also given, but not in the form of a unity of being in stimulation, but a unity of reality. The unity of being in stimulation does not coexist in man with the unity of reality. Indeed, it is the replacement of the unity of being in stimulation by the unity of reality which is the constitution and origin of sentient intelligence. If the two unities were to coexist, man would have senses “and” intelligence, but he would not have sentient intelligence. Sentient intelligence is the structuralization of the diversity of the senses in the intellectual unity of reality. If man could have only the mere unity of being in stimulation, it would signify a complete regression to the state of animality.

The impression of reality, then, has its own very precise structure. To impressively apprehend the real as {112} real is to apprehend the thing as actually being “before me” and in its “naked reality”, and in its “enjoyability”, and in its “direction”, etc.

This does not mean that one successively apprehends the same real thing in these modes of presentation, because they constitute structural moments of every unitary act of apprehension of something as real. Therefore, except in cases of congenital privation of a sense, all of these moments function *pro indiviso* in the act of sentiently apprehending any reality whatsoever, independently of the one or more senses by which its qualities are apprehended. It is for this reason that, when one loses some particular sense, he does not lose the structural moment proper to that sense’s presentation of the real—except, I repeat, in the case of a congenital absence of that sense. Conversely, in the exercise of the sentient apprehension of reality, that which each sense delivers is not just the sensible quality, but also its own mode of apprehending that quality as reality. And all of these modes are just that, “modes” of

presentation of the real, which in its primary and radical unity comprises the modal moments of a single structure and, therefore, of a single act: the impression of reality.

This primary unity is sentient intelligence. And thanks to this primary unity, it is possible and indeed necessary for there to be an overlap of some modes by others. Overlap is grounded in the primary unity of the sentient intelligence. Sentient intelligence, therefore, is not some vague concept, but, as I said before, something endowed with its own structure. Thus, the diverse modes of sentient intelligence emerge from its structural unity. {113}

This means that the modes of sentient presentation of reality constitute an intrinsic and formal limitation of our intellection due to the fact that this intellection is sentient. Sentient intellection installs us in reality, but its limitations are the root of all effort, all possibilities, and the whole problematic of the subsequent intellection of reality. But I do not wish to anticipate ideas which I will develop at length further in the book. The only thing which I now wish to emphasize is that reality is apprehended as reality and is present to us as such, and that our limitations are not a type of cut-out within reality, but are in their very limitation the positive principle of the presentation and apprehension of reality.

Thus, sentient intellection is intellection of reality which is modally structured.

## 2

### *Transcendental Structure of the Impression of Reality*

Each of the modal moments of the impression of reality has its own qualitative content which is always very specific: this color, this sound, this weight, that temperature, etc. But sensing is constituted not indeed by that qualitative diversity, but by the unity of the presentation of the real; i.e., by the unity of the moment of formality, by the unity of the impression of reality. Now, from this point of view, the impression of reality is always constitutively *non-specific*, in contrast to its content. Formality is not just one {114} more quality. But this is a conceptualization that is purely negative; positively, the impression of reality is non-specific because it transcends all of those specific contents. It has, therefore, a *transcendental structure*. Transcendentality\* is the positive face of the

\*[‘Transcendentality’ is a neologism of Zubiri. It is the noun corresponding to ‘transcendental’, and must be distinguished from that used in previous philosophy, generally ‘transcendence’. For Zubiri, ‘transcendence’ refers to the *content* of reality, whereas ‘transcendentality’ refers to the *formal-*

negative non-specificity. It is the structure of the *de suyo* as such, i.e., a structure which concerns reality *qua* impressively apprehended.

Transcendentality is a central concept both in ancient and modern philosophy. But modern philosophy conceived of transcendentality (as it could scarcely otherwise do) from the standpoint of the conceiving intelligence. The sentient intelligence leads us to a different concept of transcendentality. To reach it we must first of all clarify what transcendentality is. Then we shall be able to rigorously conceptualize its constitutive moments.

1. *What is transcendentality?* Transcendentality is the structural moment by which something transcends itself.

What is this something? What is the transcendental? That which is transcendental is that which constitutes the formal *terminus* of the intelligence, to wit, reality. And this reality is present to us in impression. Hence, that which is transcendental is reality in an impression.

In what does its transcendentality itself consist? What is transcendental depends on how one conceives the “trans”. “Trans” does not here mean “being beyond” apprehension. If that were true, the impression of reality would be *impression of the transcendent*—which would mean that the sentient apprehension of the real would be, *formally*, (i.e., *qua* apprehension) apprehension of something which in and through itself were real beyond apprehension; it would be {115} to think that the moment of otherness meant that the content of the impression of reality were transcendent. Now, it may or may not be true that that content is transcendent; that would have to be investigated in each case. But it is false that, formally, the otherness of reality is transcendent. *That* would mean that in the mere act of apprehending something we are apprehending a real thing which is and continues to be real even though we do not apprehend it. And this, I repeat, is *formally* false. In apprehension we have something real “in its own right”. But that “in its own right” should mean real beyond apprehension is, in the first place, something which must be justified. And in the second place, this justification must be based precisely upon transcendentality. The possible transcending is based, then on transcendentality, and not the other way around.

‘Trans’ means something completely different here. Provisionally, it means that we are dealing with a characteristic of the formality of otherness and not with a characteristic, transcendent or no, of the content itself. It is a characteristic which is internal to what is apprehended. It

does not withdraw us from what is apprehended, but submerges us in its reality; it is the characteristic of the “in its own right”, of the *de suyo*. And it is this reality which, in a way to be made more precise forthwith, goes beyond the content, but within the formality of otherness. This intra-apprehensive “going beyond” is precisely transcendentality. The impression of reality is not *impression of what is transcendent*, but rather *transcendental impression*. Therefore “trans” does not mean being outside of or beyond apprehension itself but being “in the apprehension”, yet “going beyond” its fixed content. In other words, that which is apprehended in the impression of reality is, by being real, and inasmuch as it is reality, “more” than what is it as colored, {116} sonorous, warm, etc. What is this “more”? That is the question.

For classical philosophy this “more”, i.e., transcendentality, consists in that moment in which all things coincide. Transcendentality would be *commonness*. Although the notion of transcendentality is not Greek but medieval, that which it designates is Greek. In what do all things coincide? They coincide in being. Parmenides told us that to intellectually know something is to intellectually know that it “is” (such, at least, is my interpretation). The “is” is that in which all things coincide. And Plato called this coincidence *commonness*, *koinonia*. This commonness is *participation*. Nothing, for example, is “the” being, but everything participates in being. In turn, this participation is a progressive differentiation of a supreme *genus* which is “the” being. Things are like branches of a common *trans*, of a supreme genus, which is “the” being. Unity, participation, genus: here we have the three moments of what I believe constitutes in Plato the first sketch of what we are calling ‘transcendentality’. I leave aside the fact that these three moments are not, for Plato, the only ones to characterize being; four other equally supreme genera apply: movement, rest, sameness and otherness. Together with being they are the five supreme genera of things. They have a commonness among themselves, at least a partial one, and participation is grounded on this community. Aristotle profoundly modified this scheme but remained in the same general conceptual line. For Aristotle, being is not a genus, but a supreme trans-generic universal concept. Whence community is not participation; it is only a conceptual community of things. Transcendentality is what is proper to a concept in which what is conceived is in all things. Being is the most universal concept, {117} common to everything. Other concepts are not transcendental, except possibly generic concepts. And this line of thought was followed throughout the middle ages. Transcendentality consists in being a trans-generic concept.

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*ity of reality.* Transcendentality is a physical, not sensible, moment of things given in the impression of reality.—trans.]

In Kant, modern philosophy conceptualized that what is intelligible is the “object” of intellection. Therefore, everything known intellectually consists in “being-object”. Transcendentality as such is not the character of all things conceived in the most universal concept, but rather is the character of all things *qua* objectively proposed to the intellection. Transcendentality is thus objectual community. And this idea lived on in all idealist philosophy.

In both of the two conceptions, *viz.* the Greco-medieval and the Kantian, transcendentality is clearly a radical and formally conceptive moment. The transcendental is that in which everything conceived (object or being) coincides. And its transcendentality consists in universal community of what is conceived. This is transcendentality conceptualized by a concipient intelligence. But more radical than this latter is sentient intelligence. Therefore it is necessary to conceptualize transcendentality from the standpoint of sentient intelligence; *i.e.*, with respect to the impression of reality. In that case, transcendentality is not community or commonness, but something quite different.

Above all, the transcendental is, first of all, something proper to what constitutes the formal *terminus* of intellection. And this is not “being” but “reality”. I shall consider the idea of being at length in another chapter. In the second place, this intellection is sentient. Hence, the real is transcendental by virtue of its reality as its own formality; reality is formality. In what does the transcendentality of this formality of reality consist? {118}

Being the characteristic of a formality, “transcendentality” does not mean being transcendental “to” reality, but being transcendental “in” realities. It is the formality of reality which is transcendental in itself. And this “transcendental” should not be conceptualized as a function of that *toward* which we have transcending, but rather as a function of that *from* which we have it. It is like a drop of oil which expands out from itself. Transcendentality is something which, in this sense, extends from the formality of reality of a thing to the formality of reality of every other thing. Thus transcendentality is not *community*, but *communication*. But this communication is not causal; there is no question of the reality of one thing producing or generating the reality of another; that would be absurd. Rather, we are dealing with a communication which is merely formal. The formality of reality is constitutively and formally “ex-tension”. Hence, it does not refer to mere conceptual universality, but to real extensive communication. The trans of transcendentality is an “ex”, the “ex” of the formality of the real. In what does this “ex” consist? This is the question which we must

now consider.

2. *The Formal Nature of Transcendentality.* We shall not construct concepts of the nature of transcendentality. Reality is the formality of impression, and transcendentality is the moment of the “ex” of this formality. The analysis of the “ex” is, then, an analysis of the impression of reality. It is not a theory. There in the impression of reality do we immediately discover transcendentality as an “ex”. This analysis shows us that transcendentality has four constitutive moments. {119}

a) Reality is the formality of the *de suyo*. Now, if for any reason the content of a real thing is modified, the real thing does not therefore necessarily become another reality. It can continue to be the same real thing, although modified. What is this sameness? To be sure, it is not a simple phenomenon of perceptive constancy but a strict numerical sameness of the moment of reality. The content of the *de suyo*, *i.e.*, what is *de suyo*, has changed but has not changed the *de suyo* itself as such. The same formality of reality, with numerical sameness, “reifies” whatever comes into its content. The thing is the same although not the same. The sameness in question is not a conceptual identity; it is not mere community. It is communication, reification. This does not mean that the concept of reality is *equal* in the two distinct realities, but that there is a *numerical sameness*. Each new apprehension of reality is inscribed in the formality of reality numerically the same. This is what constitutes the first moment of transcendentality: *openness*. The formality of reality is in itself, *qua* “of reality”, something open, at least with respect to its content. The formality of reality is, then, an “ex”. By being open this formality is that by which a real thing *qua* real is “more” than its actual content. Reality is not, then, a characteristic of the *content already completed*, but is *open formality*. To say “reality” is always to leave in abeyance a phrase which by itself is begging to be completed by “reality of something”. The real *qua* real is open not in the sense that each real thing acts on all the others by virtue of its properties. We are not dealing with actuation but with openness of formality. The formality of reality {120} as such is openness itself. It is not openness of the real, but openness of reality.

Being open is why the formality of reality can be the same in different real things. It may be said that in our apprehensions, we apprehend multiple real things. This is true; but in the first place, that multiplicity refers above all to content. And, in the second place, although we are treating of other realities, these realities are not “others” *conceptually* but are *formally sensed* as others. *Conceptually*, the multiple realities would be particular cases of a single concept of reality. But *sentiently* the other realities

are not particular cases; rather, they are formally sensed as others. And, therefore, when we sense them as others, we are expressing precisely the inscription of different real things in the numerical sameness of the formality of reality. Hence we are not talking about “a second reality”, but “another reality”. Openness: here we have the first moment of the “ex” of transcendental.

b) Since reality is formally “open”, it is not reality except respectively to that to which it is open. This respectivity is not a relation, because every relation is a relation of one thing or of a form of reality to another thing or other form of reality. In contrast, respectivity is a constitutive moment of the very formality of reality as such. Reality is *de suyo* and therefore to be real is to be so respectively to that which is *de suyo*. By its openness, the formality of reality is respectively transcendental. Respectivity transcends itself. The “ex” is now *respectivity*. It is reality itself, the formality of reality, which *qua* reality is formally *respectively openness*. {121} To be real is more than to be this or that; but it is to be real only respectively to this or that. Respective openness is transcendental. This is the second moment of transcendental.

c) To what is the formality of reality open, to what is this respectivity open? Above all, it is open to the content. And thus this content has a precise character. It is not “the” content, taken abstractly, but is a content which is *de suyo*, which is “in its own right”. Therefore, the content is really “its own” [*suyo*], of the thing. The content is “its” [*su*] content. The grammatical subject of this “its” [*su*] is the formality of reality. Upon being respectively open, the formality of reality not only “reifies” the content but moreover makes it formally “its own” [*suyo*]. For this reason it may be called ‘suificating’ or ‘own-making’. Prior to being a moment of the content, the “its-own-ness” [*suidad*] is a moment of the formality of reality. That formality of reality is, then, what constitutes its-own-ness as such. As a moment of the formality of reality, the its-own-ness is a moment of the “ex”, it is transcendental. This is the third moment of transcendental.

d) But openness is not respective just to content. The fact is that real content, thus reified and suified by being real, is not only its own [*suya*] reality, but precisely by being real is, so to speak, purely and simply real in reality itself. The formality of reality is open to being a moment of the *world*; it is a formality which, upon making the thing be reality purely and simply, makes of “its” [*su*] reality a moment of reality itself; i.e., of the world.

What is the world? It is not the conjunction of real things, because this conjunction presupposes something which “conjoins” {122} these things. Now, that which

conjoins real things is not some common concept with respect to which the real things are simply special cases. That which conjoins is a physical moment of the real things themselves. And this moment is the moment of pure and simple reality of each one of them. The character of being purely and simply real is what—because it is an open character—formally constitutes that physical unity which is the world. It is the formality of reality *qua* open, *qua* transcendent, of the real thing, and what constitutes it in a moment of reality itself. It is an openness, then, which radically and formally concerns each real thing by the fact of being purely and simply real. Therefore, were there but one single real thing, it would be constitutively and formally “worldly”. Everything is *de suyo* worldly. In this respect, each real thing is more than itself: it is precisely transcendental; it has the transcendental unity of being a moment of the world. The formality of reality is thus “world-making”. This is the fourth moment of transcendental, of the “ex”.

Thus there is a transcendental structure in every real thing which is apprehended in an impression of reality. The formality of reality is *respectively openness*, and therefore is *reifying*. This respectivity has two moments: it is *own-making* and *world-making*. That is, each thing is “this” real thing; in a further sense it is “its own” reality (own-making); in a still more ulterior aspect it is pure and simple worldly reality (world-making). This does not mean a “contraction” of the idea of reality to each real thing, but just the reverse: an “expansion”, a physical “extension” of the formality of reality from each real thing. This is the transcendental structure of the “ex”: being *de suyo* is extended to being “its own” [*suyo*], and thereby is extended to being “worldly”. {123}

This is not a conceptual conception. It is an analysis of the very impression of reality. We sense the openness, we sense the respectivity, we sense the its-own-ness, we sense the worldliness. This is the complete sensing of the thing in the formality of reality. The sensing itself is then transcendental.

Thus we have transcendental conceptualized in the *sentient intelligence*:

a) The transcendental is not “being”, but “reality”.

b) Transcendental is precisely and formally respective openness to worldly its-own-ness.

c) The “trans” itself is not a conceptual characteristic of real things. It is not, I reiterate, the concept of maximum universality. What this latter concept may be is something extremely problematic and may even depend upon the language which one employs. Moreover, it is truly problematic that a concept of total universality even

exists. But be that as it may, transcendentality is not of conceptual character, but of physical character. It is a physical moment of real things *qua* sensed in the impression of reality. It is not something physical in the same way as its content, but is, nonetheless, something physical; it is the physical part of formality, i.e., the “trans-physics” as such.

## 3

*Structural Unity of the Impression of Reality*

We have examined the structure of the impression of reality in its two-fold modal and transcendental moment. As modal, the structure of the impression of reality is {124} the structure of sentient intellection. As transcendental, the structure of the impression of reality is the respective openness to worldly its-own-ness. Now, these two structural moments are not independent. Indeed, they are but moments of a single structure and they are mutually determined in constituting the unity of the impression of reality. This is what we must now clarify.

On the one hand, real notes, as I said, have a great specificity in virtue of their content. On the other, the formality of reality is formally not just non-specific, but constitutively transcendental. Now, its content, *qua* apprehended as something *de suyo*, is no longer mere content but “such-and-such” a reality. This is what I call “suchness”. Suchness is not mere content. In mere stimulation a dog apprehends the same stimuli as a man, but it does not apprehend “suchnesses”. Reality is formality and, therefore, on account of being respectively open to its content it involves this content transcendental. In this process, the content is determined as suchness; it is the suchness of the real. Suchness is a transcendental determination: it is the *such-making function*.

In contrast, content is that which constitutes the fact that the formality of reality is “reality” in all of its concreteness. The real is not only “such-and-such” a reality but also “reality” as such. The content is the determination of the reality itself. This is the *transcendental function*. It too involves content, and not just in an abstract way, but also as making of it a form and a mode of reality. Reality is not something insubstantial, but a formality which is very concretely determined. There are not only many real things, but also many forms of being real. {125} Each real thing is a form of being real; we shall see this in a later chapter. Thus it is clear that transcendentality does not conceptually repose upon itself, but depends upon the content of things. Transcendentality is not something a priori. But neither is it something a pos-

teriori. That is, it is not a type of property which things have. Transcendentality is neither a priori nor a posteriori; it is something grounded by things in the formality in which they “are situated”. It is the content of real things which determines their transcendental character; it is the mode in which things “are situated”. It is not a property but a function: the transcendental function.

The such-making function and the transcendental function are not two functions but two *moments* which are constitutive of the unity of the impression of reality. Hence the difference between suchness and transcendentality is not formally the same as the difference between content and reality, because suchness as well as reality both involve the two moments of content and formality. Content involves the moment of reality in a very precise way, *viz.* as “making-it-such”.

Green is not suchness *qua* mere content; suchness is the mode by which green consists in real green. At the same time reality involves content in a very precise way. It is not true that content is simply a particular case of reality, but rather that reality involves content in a very precise way: as transcending it. Transcendentality could not be given without that of which it is transcendental. Such-making and transcendentalization are the two inseparable aspects of the real. They constitute the structural unity of the impression of reality. {126}

To summarize, sentient intelligence intellectually knows reality in all its modes, and transcends them in their total unity. Sentient intelligence is impressive apprehension of the real. And this impression of the real is constitutively modal and transcendental. That is, it is precisely impression of “reality”.

In this chapter, we have studied the structure of the apprehension of reality. It is apprehension by the sentient intelligence. But now three important new problems come to mind:

1. In what does intellectual knowing as such consist?
2. What is the character of the reality thus known?
3. What does it mean to say that reality is in the intellection?

The three ideas of intellection, intellectually known reality, and the being of reality in intellection, are distinct and comprise the three themes which I shall study in the next three chapters: the idea of the essential nature of intellection, the idea of reality as known intellectually, and the idea of reality in intellection.



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## APPENDIX 4

## TRANSCENDENTALITY AND METAPHYSICS

It is necessary to stress a bit more what transcendentalism is. Following the thread of the impression of reality we see ourselves led to something which is not mere analysis, but to a theoretical conceptualization of reality itself. Since this conceptualization does not strictly pertain to the analysis of the impression of reality, I have grouped these considerations in an appendix. I do not do so capriciously, but rather because these considerations comprise the frontier between a philosophy of the intelligence and a philosophy of reality. And they are not a frontier which is, so to speak, geographical, but are considerations which originate from the analysis of the impression of reality and therefore mark out for us the path of a philosophy of reality.

1) To say that one treats of the physical in “trans” already permits us to glimpse that we are dealing with a characteristic which is “meta-physical”. And indeed this is the case. But since the idea of *meta* comes to us already loaded with meanings, it is necessary to here fix precisely the meaning of ‘metaphysics’.

Naturally, it does not mean what it originally meant for Andronicus of Rhodes, viz. “post-Physics” or “what comes after the Physics”. Very soon after this editor of Aristotle, ‘metaphysics’ came to signify not what is “after” physics, but what {128} is “beyond” the physical. Metaphysics is then “beyond-physics”. This is what I have just called the ‘transcendent’. Without employing the term, its greatest exponent was Plato: beyond sensible things are those things which Plato calls ‘intelligible things’, the things he termed ‘Ideas’. The Idea is “separated” from sensible things. Hence, what later was called *meta* came to mean what for Plato is “separation”, *chorismos*. Plato boldly debated how to conceptualize this separation in such a way that the intellection of the Ideas would permit intellectual knowing of sensible things. From the standpoint of the sensible things, they are a “participation” (*methexis*) in the Ideas. But from the standpoint of the Ideas, these Ideas are “present” (*parousia*) in things, and are their “paradigm” (*paradeigma*). *Methexis*, *parousia*, and *paradeigma* are the three aspects of a single structure: the conceptive structure of the separation. Aristotle seemingly rejected this Platonic conceptualization with his theory of substance. But ultimately, Aristotle nurtured

himself on his master’s conceptualization. In the first place, his “first philosophy” (later termed ‘metaphysics’) does not deal with separated Ideas, but does deal with a “separated” substance: the Theos. And, in the second place, among physical substances Aristotle (after an initial disclaimer) in fact occupied himself more with primary substance (*prote ousia*) than with secondary substance (*deutera ousia*), whose link to primary substance he never saw very clearly. And the fact is that ultimately, even after he converted the Idea into the substantial form of a thing, Aristotle always remained in an enormous dualism, the dualism between sensing and intellectual knowing which led him to a metaphysical dualism in the theory of substance. In this way the idea of the “meta-physical” as “beyond-physical” lives on.

Though with somewhat varying interpretations, medieval thinkers understood that {129} metaphysics is “trans-physics”; the term even briefly appeared at one time. But here is the great error which must be avoided. In medieval thought, “transphysical” always means something beyond the physical. And what I am here saying is just the opposite: it is not something beyond the physical, but the physical itself, though in a dimension which is formally distinct. It is not a “trans” of the physical, but is the “physical itself as trans”. For this it was necessary to overcome the dualism between intellectual knowing and sensing which in Greek and medieval philosophy always led to the dualism of reality. The *terminus* of sensing would be sensible things, changeable and multiple as the Greeks were wont to call them. Thus, for the Greeks, transcendental means what “always is”. The “trans” is, therefore, the necessary jump from one zone of reality to another. It is a necessary jump if one starts from the concipient intellection. But there is no jump if one starts from sentient intellection.

In modern philosophy, Kant always moved within this dualism between what Leibnitz called the ‘sensible world’ and the ‘intelligible world’. To be sure, Kant saw the problem of this duality and the intellectual necessity of a unitary conceptualization of what is known. For Kant, indeed, intellection is knowledge. And Kant tried to re-establish the unity, but along very precise lines, those of objectivity. The sensible and the intelligible are for Kant

the two elements (*a posteriori* and *a priori*) of a primary unity: the unity of the object. There are not two objects known, one sensible and the other intelligible, but a single sensible-intelligible object: the *phenomenon*. What is outside of this unity of the phenomenal object is the ultra-physical, *noumenon*. And that which is beyond the phenomenon is therefore transcendent; it is the metaphysical. Hence, the Kantian unity of the object is constituted in *sensible intelligence*: {130} it is the intrinsic unity of being an object of knowledge.

In one form or another, then, whether we consider the Greek and medieval or the Kantian conception, metaphysics has always been something “transphysical” in the sense of beyond the physical, in the sense of the transcendent. Only a radical critique of the duality of intellectual knowing and sensing, i.e., only a *sentient intelligence*, can lead to a unitary conception of the real. We are not dealing, I repeat, with the *unity of the object* as an object of knowledge; but of the *unity of the real* itself unitarily apprehended. That is to say, we are not dealing with a sensible intelligence, but a sentient intelligence: the impression of reality. In it, the moment of reality and its transcendental are strictly and formally physical. In this sense of “trans-physics”, and only in this sense, the transcendental of the impression of reality is a characteristic which is formally metaphysical; it is metaphysical, not as intellection of the transcendent, but as sentient apprehension of the physical transcendental of the real.

2) With regard to the concipient intelligence, it was thought that the transcendental is something which is not just beyond physical reality, but indeed is a type of canon of everything real. The transcendental would thus be *a priori*, and moreover something *conclusive*. We have already seen that the transcendental is not *a priori*. I might add now that it is not something conclusive, either; i.e., transcendental is not a group of characteristics of the real fixed once and for all for everything. On the contrary, it is a characteristic which is constitutively *open*, as I have already said. To be real *qua* real is something which depends on what the real things are and, therefore, is something open, because we do not know nor can we know whether the catalogue of types of real things (i.e., of what is reality *qua* reality) is fixed. {131} This does not refer to whether the type of real things is open, but rather to the question of what reality is as such. For example, the Greeks thought that the character of substance expressed the real as such. But personal subsistence is another type of reality as such about which the Greeks did not think.

For this reason, when it came to consider the novelty of personal reality *qua* subsistent reality, philosophy found itself compelled to remake the idea of reality *qua* reality from a viewpoint not substantial but subsistential. To be sure, in classical metaphysics—unfortunately—subsistence has been considered as a substantial mode, which to my way of thinking has corrupted the notion of subsistence. But this does not affect what we are here saying, *viz.* that the character of reality *qua* reality is something open and not fixed once and for all.

Now, transcendental not only is not *a priori*, and not only is it open, but in fact this openness is *dynamic*. To be sure, it could have been otherwise; but in fact we are dealing with a *dynamic openness*. This means not only that new types of reality can continue to appear, and with them new types of reality *qua* reality; but also to the fact that this apparition is dynamic. It is reality as reality which, from the reality of a thing, goes on opening itself to other types of reality *qua* reality. This is the *dynamic transcendental*, the transcendental dynamism of the real.

One might think that I am here alluding to evolution. In a certain respect that is true; but it is secondary, because evolution would have to discharge here not a cosmic function, i.e., “in such a way”, but would have to be a {132} characteristic of reality itself *qua* reality. Suchness, I said, has a transcendental function. Now, the transcendental function of evolution would be, as I have already indicated, dynamic transcendental. But evolution in the strict sense is a scientific question, and as such is a question merely of fact—a fact however well grounded, but by virtue of being a scientific fact, always disputable. For this reason, when I speak here of evolution I do not refer to evolution in the strict and scientific sense, i.e., to the evolution of real things, but to evolution in a more radical sense, which can even be given without scientific evolution. It is that the different modes of reality as such go on appearing not just successively but grounded transcendental and dynamically one in another. And this is not a scientific fact, but something primary and radical. It is dynamic transcendental.

For a sentient intelligence, reality is being *de suyo*. There are different ways of being *de suyo*, ways which continue to appear, grounded in things because reality is formality, it is the *de suyo*, and this is a formality grounded and constitutively open and dynamic. To be real as such is an open dynamism. Reality as such is not a concept of concipient intelligence; it is a concept of sentient intelligence.



## CHAPTER V

## THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

We have seen that the apprehension of reality is sentient intellection. We have concentrated on the question of what it is to be sentient; the answer is, to apprehend something in an impression. Later we shall examine what intellection is: briefly, it is the apprehension of something as real. The sentient intelligence is, then, impressive apprehension of the real, i.e. the impression of reality. But in this way, we have conceptualized sentient intelligence only in virtue of its intrinsic structure. Now we must ask ourselves what sentient intellection is, not in virtue of its structure, but with respect to the formal essence of its act. What is sentient intellection as such, and what is its formal nature? It is to this formal nature that I here give the name 'essence' in an unqualified way. What, then, is the essence of sentient intellection?

Upon formulating this question, we immediately sense that we have in some ways returned to Chapter I. There we were asking about the act of intellection. The reply was: it is an act of apprehension. Apprehension, I said, is the moment in which the thing intellectually known is present in {134} the intelligence. And this being sentiently present is what constitutes human apprehension of reality. Now let us take one more step: Formally, what is this being present in sentient intellection? To be sure, these questions overlap somewhat; hence, some repetition is inevitable. But it is not simply repetition, because now we have a different point of view.

We consider sentient intellection as an act of being present. What is this act? That is the question.

Let us proceed first in a *negative* fashion, i.e., let us say what this act is *not*. In this endeavor, let us ignore for the time being the sentient aspects of the act and limit ourselves to its intellectual aspects.

Above all, intellection is not an act which intellectually known things produce in the intelligence. Such an act would be an *actuation*. It is what, in a very graphic way, Leibniz called *communication of substances*. Thus,

for Plato and Aristotle the intelligence would be a *tabula rasa*, or as they said an *ekmageion*, a wax tablet on which there is nothing written. What is written is written by things, and this writing would be intellection. Such is the idea running through almost all of philosophy until Kant. But that is not intellection; it is at best the mechanism of intellection, the explanation of the production of the act of intellection. That things act upon the intelligence is quite undeniable; but it is not in the way that the Greeks and Medievals thought. Rather, it is by way of "intellective impression". But that is not the question with which we are now concerned. We are only asking about the result, so to speak, of that actuation: the formal essence of the act. The communication of substances is a theory, but not the analysis of a {135} fact. The only fact we have is the impression of reality.

Modern philosophy, as I said, has attended more to the act of intellection in itself than to its production. To be sure, it has done so with a radical limitation: it has thought that intellection is formally knowledge. But for now, we leave this point aside and concentrate on knowledge *qua* intellection. It is obvious that in intellection, the object understood is present. Now, this general idea can be understood in different ways. One could think that the being present consists in what is present being put there by the intelligence in order to be known intellectually. Being present would be "actually being put there". Of course, this does not mean that the intelligence produces what is known intellectually. Here, position in the sense of "being put" means that what is known intellectually, in order to be so, must be "put before" the intelligence. And it is the intelligence which does this "putting before" or "proposition". That was the idea of Kant. The formal essence of intellection would then consist in *positionality*. But it is also possible to think that the essence of being present is not being "put", but in being the intentional terminus of consciousness. That was the idea of Husserl. Intellection would be only a "referring myself" to what is

known intellectually, i.e., it would be something formally intentional; the object itself of intellection would be the mere correlate of this intention. Strictly speaking, for Husserl intellection is only a mode of intentionality, a mode of consciousness, one among others. Taking this idea one step further, one could think that the being present is formally neither position nor intention, but unveiling. That was the idea of Heidegger. But intellection is not formally position, intention, or unveiling, because in any of these forms what is known intellectually “is here-and-now present” in the intellection. Now, whether it be present by position, by {136} intention, or by unveiling, the being here-and-now present of what is “put there”, of what is “intended”, and of what is “unveiled” is not formally identical to its position, its intention, or its unveiling. None of these tells us in what the “being here-and-now present” consists. Position, intention, and unveiling are, in the majority of cases, ways of being here-and-now present. But they are not the being here-and-now present as such. What is put there, “is” put there, what is intended, “is” intended; what is unveiled, “is” unveiled. What is this “being here-and-now”? Being here-and-now present does not consist in being the terminus of an intellectual act, regardless of its type. Rather, “being here-and-now present” is a proper moment of the thing itself; it is the thing which is. And the formal essence of intellection consists in the essence of this being here-and-now present.

Let us correctly pose the question. Sentient intellection is impressive apprehension of something as real. Thus the proper part of the real as known intellectually is to be present in the impression of reality. Now, this being present consists formally in a being present as mere actuality in the sentient intelligence. The formal essence of sentient intellection is this mere actuality.

Such is the idea which it is now necessary to clarify in a positive way. In order to do so we shall ask:

1. What is actuality?
2. What is actuality as intellective?
3. What is actuality as sentient?
4. Synoptically, what is actuality in sentient intellection? {137}

## §1

### WHAT ACTUALITY IS

The expression ‘actuality’ and what is conceptualized by it tend to obscure an ambiguous point which it is necessary to bring out and clarify. What traditionally has

been called “actuality” (*actualitas* by the Medieval philosophers) is the character of the real as act. And they understood by act what Aristotle called *energeia*, i.e., the fullness of the reality of something. Thus, to say that something is a dog in act means that this something is the fullness of that in which being a dog consists. To be sure, for this general way of thinking, ‘act’ can mean “action” because action derives from something which is in act. To everything real, in virtue of having the fullness of that in which it consists in reality, and consequently, in virtue of its capacity to act, the expression “being real in act” was applied—a quite improper denomination. This characteristic should rather be called *actuity*: Actuity is the character of act of a real thing.

To my way of thinking, *actuality* is something quite distinct. Actuality is not the character of the *act*, but the character of the *actual*. Thus we speak of something which has much or little actuality or of what acquires and loses actuality. In these expressions we are not referring to act in the sense of Aristotle, but rather we allude to a type of physical presence of the real. Classical philosophy has not distinguished these two characteristics, viz. actuity and actuality. {138}

But as I see it, the difference is essential and of philosophic importance. Actuality is a physical moment of the real, but not in the sense of a physical note. The moment of act of a physical note is *actuity*. Its other moment is also physical, but is *actuality*. What is actuality? That is the question.

Let us proceed step-by-step.

1. Actuality has as its salient characteristic, so to speak, the being-here-and-now-present of something in something. Thus, when we say that viruses are something having much actuality, we mean that they are something which is today present to everyone. Here one can already perceive the essential difference between actuality and actuity. Something is real in act when it has the fullness of its reality. Viruses are always realities in act; nonetheless, their being present to everyone is not this actuity. Only a few years ago, the viruses did not have this here-and-now presence; they did not have actuality.

2. One might perhaps think that actuality is a mere extrinsic relation of one real thing to another; in the foregoing example, the relation of the viruses to the men who study them. But this is not necessarily always the case. There are times when the real is “making itself present”. Thus we say that a person made himself present among others or even among inanimate things (thus man has made himself present on the Moon). This “making oneself” is already not mere extrinsic relation as the actuality

of the viruses might be; it is something which carries us beyond pure presentiality. It is undeniably an intrinsic moment of a real thing; the person in question, in fact, is what makes himself present. In what does this intrinsic moment consist? It clearly consists in that his presence is something determined by the person {139} “from within himself”. Thus, being a person is indifferent for our question, because every real thing has (or can have, we will not pursue the question) the character of being present from within itself. This “from within itself” is the second moment of actuality. Then we should say that actuality is the being present of the real from within itself. Through this moment, actuality carries us beyond pure presentness. Because in this “being present here-and-now” what confers its radical character upon actuality is not its presentness, nor the being here-and-now “present”, but the “being here-and-now” of the present inasmuch as it is now present here. Let us make a comparison. A piece of wax on my table is dry. If I put it into a container of cold water, it continues to be dry; the water does not act by moistening it. But the immersion has established an actuality: dry is now *formally* the character of “not-moistened”. Dryness has not been produced (actuity), but the actuality of the dryness has. I take this example only in a descriptive sense, with no reference to any physical explanation of moistening and non-moistening. Actuality is only the presence in this “being here-and-now”. Actuality is not mere presentness, but what is present inasmuch as something “is now”.

3. But this is not sufficient. A few lines above I said that any real thing has or can have the character of being present from within itself. The fact is that a real thing can be present or not be so according to its notes. But what is inexorable is that everything real in its formality of reality (and not just by its notes) is here-and-now present from within itself. This is a constitutive character of everything real.

Thus we have: being here-and-now present from itself by being real. This is the essence of actuality. When we impressively {140} sense a real thing as real we are sensing that it is present from within itself in its proper character of reality.

Classical philosophy has been a philosophy only of act and actuity; but a philosophy of actuality is urgently needed.

4. Actuality and actuity are not identical, but this does not mean that they are independent, because actuality is a character of the “being here-and-now”. But, “to be here-and-now” is the very character of the real. The real “is” in the sense of “is here-and-now”; we shall see this in

the following chapter. In the impression of reality, the formality of reality is, as we saw, a *prius* of apprehension itself. What is apprehended is “of its own”, i.e., is *de suyo* in the apprehension but before the apprehension. It is apprehended though precisely as something anterior to the apprehension—which means, therefore, that the apprehension (as the actuality that is, as we shall forthwith see) is always and only of what is “of its own”, i.e. actuality of reality, of actuity. Hence, every actuality is always and only actuality of the real, actuality of an actuity, a “being here and now in actuality”. Whence actuality, despite being a distinct character of actuity, is nonetheless a character which is physical in its way. There is a becoming of the real itself according to its actuality which is distinct from its becoming according to its actuity. This does not mean that in this unfolding of actuality, formally considered, the thing acquires, loses, or modifies its notes; reality does not unfold as an act, but does unfold formally as actuality. It is true that things, in order to be actual, may have to act, i.e. acquire, lose, or modify notes. But such actuation is not that in which the actuality formally consists. {141} The unfolding of actuality is not formally an unfolding of actuity.

We can now discern the importance of what I just said. Among the thousand actualities which a real thing can have, there is one which is essentially important to us here: the actuality of the real in intellection. Thus we can understand at the outset the serious confusion of ancient philosophy: because having actuality *is* a physical character of the real, they thought that intellection was a physical action, a communication of substances. Those philosophers went astray on the matter of actuality. And this has been the source of all manner of difficulties. What is intellective actuality?

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§2

## ACTUALITY AS INTELLECTION

Intellection is actuality: this is what we must clarify. Intellection is formally and strictly sentient. Hence, it is fitting to analyze intellection as actuality in its two moments: the properly intellective and the sentient. Only after that will it be possible to clarify in a unified manner what sentient intellection is as actuality. In this section, then, we shall occupy ourselves with intellection as intellective actuality.

For this task it is necessary to clarify first what intellective actuality is as actuality, and second the proper

nature of intellectual actuality.

1. *Intellection as Actuality.* That what is known intellectually is present in the intellection is perfectly clear. This “in” is just “actuality”, but it does not refer to things acting on the intellection. I am as yet ignorant of whether and how they act. But that things act is something which we can only describe basing ourselves on the analysis of the actuality of those things present in the intellection. The intellection of the actuation of things is only consequent upon the intellection of the real in actuality. The proper intellectual moment comes into play by extremely complex structures and, therefore, by extremely complex actuations. But this just means that such actuation delimits and constitutes the real content of the intelligence as known intellectually. On the other hand, in the intellection itself this content is merely actualized. Actuation concerns the {143} production of the intellection; it does not concern the formal aspects of this intellection. Intellection is “being present here-and-now” in the intellection, i.e. it is actuality. And this is not a theory, but a fact. In order to manifest it I need only situate myself in the midst of any intellectual act. Here we deal with an intellection, and therefore what is known intellectually is always apprehended in the formality of the *de suyo*, as something which is “of its own”. This formality is, as I have just pointed out, a *prius* with respect to apprehension. Whence it follows that the apprehended real is real before being apprehended; i.e., the real, upon being now known intellectually, is present, is here-and-now in actuality.

Thus, in every intellection there are three structural moments that are important to our problem: actuality, presentness, and reality. It is necessary to dwell a bit on this structure in order to preclude false interpretations.

a) In the first place, actuality is not a relation or a correlation. Intellection is not a relation of the intelligent being with the things known intellectually. If “I see this wall”, that vision is not a relation of mine with the wall. On the contrary: the relation is something which is established between me and the wall which is seen; but the vision itself of the wall is not a relation, but something anterior to any relation. It is an actuality, I repeat, in the vision itself, given that it is in the vision “in” which I am here-and-now seeing the wall. And this vision as such is actualization. Actuality is more than a relation; it is the establishment of the things related. Actualization, in fact, is a type of *respectivity*. Nothing is intellectually actual except with respect to an intellection. And this actuality is respectivity, because the formality is of reality and, as we have seen, this formality is constitutively open *qua*

formality. {144} The intellectual actuality, then, is in the primary sense grounded upon the openness not of intellection, but of the formality of reality. The openness of intellection as such is grounded in the openness of its proper formal object, in the openness of reality.

Reality, I repeat, is something formally open. Intellection is not, then, a relation, but is respectivity, and it is so because it is actuality; actuality is nothing but the respectivity of something which is formally open. Every formality is a mode of actuality, a mode of “remaining” or “staying”. Hence, even in stimulation the stimulus “remains”, but only as a sign. The stimulus has that actuality of being an objective sign; it is signitive actuality. But in the formality of reality what is apprehended has the actuality of the “of its own”. It is actuality of reality and not just of signitivity. Nonetheless, there is an essential difference. In signitive actuality the sign, precisely by being a sign, pertains formally and exclusively to the response. On the other hand, in the actuality of reality this actuality has the character of a *prius*. Hence, in both cases we start from a conceptualization of what is apprehended according as it is apprehended. What happens is that in the second case what is apprehended, by being a *prius*, is the actuality of sensing by being already the actuality of reality. They are two modes of impressive otherness. They both are equally immediate, but only the second has the moment of priority of the *de suyo*, and only the *de suyo* is respective in transcendental openness. Hence, despite the equal immediateness of both types of otherness, their difference is essential.

b) In the second place, consider actuality and presentness. Intellectual actuality, like all actuality, is that moment of reality according to which the real thing is here-and-now present {145} as real from within itself. Nonetheless, intellectual actuality is not presentness; it is not a being “present” here-and-now, but a “being here-and-now” present. Presentness is something grounded on actuality. This is essential, because what I have been saying about reality could be interpreted in a completely false way. Indeed, one might think that to say that what is perceived is present as real means only that what is perceived is present as if it were real. Reality would be then mere presentness. This, basically, is the celebrated thesis of Berkeley: *esse est percipi*. Obviously, that is not what I mean. For Berkeley, to be perceived is to have an *esse* which consists in pure presentness. We leave aside the question of whether Berkeley speaks of being and not of reality; for the present discussion it does not matter. Nor does it matter that Berkeley refers to perception, because perception is a mode of sentient intellection. Now, what Berkeley said is not a fact, because while the presentness

of what is perceived is certainly one of its moments, it is a moment grounded in turn upon another moment belonging equally to it, viz., actuality. It is not the case that what is perceived “is present as if it were” real, but as “being present here-and-now”.

In perception itself, if we stay within its confines, its moment of presentness is seen to be grounded upon its primary mode of actuality. To be perceived is nothing but the moment of presentness of actuality, of the “being now in actuality”. Having confounded actuality with mere presentness, having reduced the former to the latter, is as I see it, Berkeley’s great initial error. What is present is so by being actual in perception; but only “being here-and-now actual” is it “perceived”. {146}

c) In the third place, consider actuality and reality. Actuality and reality are two intrinsic moments of every intellection, but they are not of equal rank. Although I have already explained this before, it deserves repetition here. Actuality is actuality of reality itself, and therefore is grounded upon reality when apprehended intellectually. And this is so because the formality of reality is a *prius* of the thing apprehended with respect to its apprehension; whence its actuality in intellection is grounded as that actuality in reality. Intellective apprehension is always and only actuality “of” reality. Reality is not grounded upon actuality, i.e., reality is not reality of actuality, but rather actuality is actuality of reality.

To summarize, in every intellection we have *reality* which is actual, and which in its *actuality* is here-and-now *present* to us. Such is the structure of intellection as actuality.

Now, not every actuality is intellective. Hence, we must pose the following question: In what, formally, does intellective actuality *qua* intellective consist?

2. *Intellective Actuality*. By being actuality, intellection is a being here-and-now present of the real in it by virtue of being real. Thus, this actuality is intellective formally because in it the real not only actualizes itself but does nothing other than actualize itself. This is what I call being “mere actuality”. What is it to be mere actuality?

a) Above all it refers to a character of the real in apprehension itself. Although I have already said so many times, it is useful to emphasize this again, because to say that intellection is mere actualization of the real can lead to a serious error, one that I might even term ‘fatal’. {147} It consists in interpreting that phrase in the sense that the real things of the world make themselves present to the intelligence in their very worldly reality. This idea was

expressly affirmed in Greek and Medieval philosophy, but is rigorously untenable and formally absurd. The things of the world have no reason to be present as such in the intellection. With this question we now find ourselves facing another question, viz. that of transcendental. And I have said categorically that transcendental character does not formally mean transcendent character. What I affirm in the phrase we are discussing is exactly the contrary of what is affirmed in this conception of the transcendent, a conception which I reject as a formal moment of intellection. The phrase in question does not affirm anything about real things in the world, but rather says something which concerns only the formal content of what is intellectually apprehended. It deals, then, with the formality of reality and not with transcendent reality. Thus, I say of this content that the only thing intellection “does” or “makes” is to “make it actual” in its proper formality of reality, and nothing more. I shall immediately return to this point; but for now, one more step.

b) Through this formality of reality, the apprehended content remains as something “of its own”. What is important to us here is that we are dealing with a “remaining”. To remain is not just to be the terminus of an apprehension, but to be remain with this content present and such as it presents itself. I said this from another point of view at the beginning of the book: what is apprehended has a content and also a formality, which is the mode according to which what is apprehended is here-and-now present through the mode of the apprehendor “having to deal with it”; i.e. {148} by reason of habitude. This mode is what I called ‘remaining’ or ‘staying’. In every apprehension the thing “remains” in the apprehension. And this remaining is either a “remaining” of a stimulus or a “remaining” of reality. Thus, *qua* real the content does nothing but “remain”. The content is actualized, and is only actualized: it “remains”. What the mutual actuation of the apprehendor and the apprehended might have been is something which does not affect the proper formality of the latter. With regard to what does affect this formality, the content does not act; it does nothing but “remain” in its reality. Mere actuality is, then, actuality which formally consists in a “remaining”.

c) Yet one more step. The real “remains” in the intellection. This means that its formality of reality “rests” upon itself. Here, ‘to rest’ clearly does not mean that the real is quiescent, but, even when mobile and changeable, this change is apprehended as real, and thus its reality (as formality) rests upon itself. This does nothing but describe the “remaining” from another point of view. Nevertheless, to do so is not useless, because one might think that I am referring to intellection as *action*. And that is



untrue; I refer to intellection according to its formal essence, i.e., to *actuality*. That intellection as action is “rest”, in the sense of having its end in itself, is Aristotle’s old idea of *energeia* which dominated all of the ancient and Medieval worlds, and in large measure the modern world as well, for example in Hegel. For Aristotle there are actions like intellectual knowing and loving which have their *ergon* in themselves; they are done only for the sake of doing them. Thus, intellectual knowing has no other *ergon* than intellectual knowing, and love no other *ergon* than to be now loving. For this reason these actions are {149} *energeiai*. But be that as it may, whether these actions have no other end than themselves, our problem is not the nature of the intellectual action, but the formal nature of its actuality, the formal nature of intellection itself. Thus, reality *qua* “remaining”, rests upon itself: it is reality and nothing more than reality.

To summarize, the formally proper part of intellectual actuality *qua* intellectual is to be “mere” actuality, i.e. to have as terminus the formality of reality such as it “remains resting” upon itself.

In intellection, then:

1. What is known intellectually “is here-and-now” present as real; it is something apprehended as real.

2. What is known intellectually “is just here-and-now” present; it is not something elaborated or interpreted, or anything of that nature.

3. What is known intellectually is only present “in and for itself”; hence, the real is an intrinsic and formal moment of what is present as such. It is not something beyond what is apprehended; it is its “remaining” in itself.

It is in the unity of these three moments that the fact of the intellection being mere actuality of the real as real consists.

But intellection is formally sentient. And here a great problem arises: Is it true that what is intellectually and sentiently known is *qua* impressively apprehended mere actuality?

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§3

### ACTUALITY AS IMPRESSION

Intellection is just actualization of the reality of what is known intellectually. This intellection is sentient; i.e., I intellectually know the real impressively, in an impression

of reality. And not only the formality of reality, but its sensed content as well pertains to this intellection; it is, indeed, precisely this content which has the formality of reality. Therefore this content as such is real, that is to say, just reality actualized. Apprehension of the so-called sensible qualities: color, sound, taste, etc. is therefore an apprehension of a real quality. That is, sensible qualities are real. But it is necessary to explain this assertion.

1. Sensible qualities are above all *our impressions*. And it is now that we must point out that an impression has a moment of affection of the sentient being and a moment of otherness of what is sensed. We saw this in chapter III (let us leave aside for now the third moment of force of imposition of what is sensed upon the sentient being). Those two moments cannot be separated. Impression is not only affection, but the presentation of something “other” in the affection, viz., color, sound, taste, etc. The fact that sensible qualities are our impressions means that in the impressive moment something other is present to us. This other has a content (which we also saw), for example, green, and a formality which can be of stimulation (in the case of an animal) or of reality (in the case of man). In the formality of stimulation a quality is {151} apprehended only as a sign of response. On the other hand, being the formality of reality consists in the content being “of its own” what it is; it is something *de suyo*. Reality is, then, the formality of the *de suyo*. This, then, is what happens in our apprehension of sensible qualities. They are sensible because they are apprehended in an impression; but they are real because they are something *de suyo*. The green is such-and-such a shade, intensity, etc.; it is all of this *de suyo*, it is green *de suyo*. It would be a mistake to think that the color is green because of some structures proper to my sensory receptors. Be as it may the psycho-organic structure of my sensations and perceptions, that which is present to me in them is present *de suyo*. Reality, I repeat, is the formality of the *de suyo*. Hence, the qualities are something strictly and rigorously real. That they are our impressions does not mean that they are not real, but that their reality is present impressively.

2. This reality of the *de suyo* is just actuality. The process of sensing a quality involves an extremely complex system of structures and actuations, both on the part of things and on the part of my sensory receptors. But what is formally sensed in this process is not these actuations, but rather what is present to me in them: the green itself. Sensed green is not an actuation, but an actuality. That the green is seen does not consist in my sentient process being green, but in the green which is seen being something *de suyo*. Being sensed only consists in being

here-and-now present in my vision. And this is reality in the strictest sense of the word. It is not as if the green which is sensed were present with some pretension of reality, i.e. as if it were real; rather, it is present in accordance with what it is in itself, with what it is *de suyo*. This means that not only is the {152} perception real, but so is its formal qualitative content; this green is a content which is *de suyo* green.

3. This reality, I affirm, is formality. Consequently, reality is not a special “zone” of things, so to speak. That is, we are not referring to a zone of real things which is “beyond” the zone of our impressions. Reality is not to be there “beyond” an impression, but rather, reality is just formality. In virtue of this it is necessary to distinguish not reality and our impressions, but rather what is real “in” an impression and what is real “beyond” the impression. Thus we are not contrasting realities with my impressions, but two ways of being real, or if one wishes, two zones which both possess the formality of reality. What is real “in” an impression may not be real other than in the impression, but this does not mean that it is not real there. Today we know that if all animals with sight were to disappear, real colors would also disappear; so not just some impressive affections, but realities as well, would disappear. What happens is that these realities are not real other than “in” the impression. But the real “beyond” the impression would continue unperturbed. Now, this is not some trivial verbal distinction, because what is real is always and only what it is *de suyo*. What is real “beyond” is not so by virtue of being “beyond”, but is real through being *de suyo* something “beyond”. Beyond is nothing but a mode of reality. Reality, I repeat, is the formality of the *de suyo* whether “in” an impression or “beyond” it. The impressively real and the real beyond coincide, then, in being the formality of the *de suyo*; i.e., they coincide in being real.

4. This is not mere coincidence; rather it is a *real unity* of these two modes of reality. We do not refer to these two {153} modes as being only two particular cases of the same concept, the concept of the *de suyo*. Rather, we refer to a physical unity of reality. In fact, the impression of reality actualizes the formality of reality, as we saw, in different modes, and among them is the mode “toward”. This means that it is the real itself in an impression of reality which is really bearing us toward a “beyond” the perceived. Hence, it is not a going to the reality beyond perception, but is a going from the real perceived to the real “beyond”. That leaves open the question of what the terminus of the “toward” might be. It is a terminus that is essentially problematic; it could even be an absence of reality, but further investigation is necessary.

But in any case this emptiness would be known intellectually in the moment of reality in the “toward”, which is constitutive of the impression of reality. In point of fact, we know today that sensible qualities are not real beyond one’s perception, but we must emphasize that they are real *in* the perception. This is a distinction within the real itself. And what of reality beyond the perceived might correspond to these qualities which are real in perception is something which can only be known intellectually by basing ourselves on the reality of those qualities “in” perception.

To summarize, sentient intellection, with respect to what it has of the sentient, is just actualization of reality.

For modern science and philosophy, sensible qualities are only impressions of ours, and as such are considered as merely affections of the sentient being. Thus, to say that qualities are impressions of ours would mean that they are nothing but affections of our sensing; they would be at most “my” representations, but their content would have no reality at all. But this, as we have just seen, is unacceptable. {154} The moment of affection and the moment of otherness in an impression cannot be split apart (as we have already seen). Being impressions of ours does not mean being unreal, but rather being a reality which is impressively present. The determination of what these qualities are in the world beyond what is formally sensed is precisely the task of science.

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§4

#### THE FORMAL UNITY OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

In both its intellectual and sentient aspects, sentient intellection is formally just the actuality of what is apprehended as real. It is this actuality, then, which constitutes the formal unity of the act of sentient intellection. In what does this unity of actuality consist? That is what we must now clarify.

1. Above all, the reality of what is known intellectually is actual, i.e., is here-and-now present, in sentient intellection. But not only this, since when the intellectually known thing is present (for example, when this rock is present), I not only *see the rock* but I sense that *I am now seeing* the rock. The rock not only “is seen”, but “I am now seeing” the rock. This is the unity of the rock being here-and-now present and of my vision being here-and-now present. It is a single “being here-and-now”, a

single actuality. The actuality of the intellection is the actuality of what is known intellectually. There are not two actualities, one of the rock and the other of my intellectual vision, but one single actuality. Actuality in the sentient intelligence is, then, at one and the same time, actuality of what is intellectually known and of the intellection itself. It is the same actuality. What is this sameness? That is the question.

One might think that we are dealing with two actualities, so to speak *equal*; i.e., of the character of actuality in two points of application: in the thing and in the intellection. But this is not true. We are not dealing with two equal actualities, {156} but a single *common actuality* of the intellectually known thing and the intellection. Let us explain how.

A) *Commonness* means here a numerical sameness. The actuality of what is known intellectually and of the intellection is numerically the same and identically the same. That which is actual is clearly distinct: what is known intellectually is distinct from the intellection itself. But *qua* actuality it is numerically identical. If one wishes, there are two distinct actual things in one single actuality. This numerical sameness is of the essence of intellection. We are not dealing with some theoretical construct, but making an analysis of any intellectual act. This rock being now present in one's vision is the same as now seeing the rock.

B) But I must stress that it is a commonness of *mere actuality*. We are not referring to some common action produced by the thing and my intelligence; that would be a *commonness of actuity*, a communication of substances. That commonness is above all a metaphysical construct and not a fact. Moreover, even as a construct it is very problematic and debatable. On the other hand, in the formal nature of sentient intellection we do not have a *common act*, but a *common actuality*. Thus it is *commonness of actuality*. In the very act of seeing this rock, the actuality as rock-seen is the same as the actuality of seeing the rock. It is precisely in this identity that the difference between the rock and my vision is actualized. It is an actuality which actualizes at one and the same time these two terms.

Thus we have here the complete essence of sentient intellection: in the actuality of the thing and of the intellectual knowing, the intellection and what is known intellectually are actualized—through the numerical identity of their actuality—as two distinct realities. {157}

When I say, then, that sentient intellection is just the common actualization of the real in it, I do not only refer to real things but also to the reality of my own sentient

intellection as an act of mine. My own act of sentient intellection is a real act, a reality. And this reality is actualized with the reality of the thing in the same actuality as the thing. Let us dwell a bit on this point.

a) Above all, through being a common actuality, the reality itself of my act of sentient intellection is actualized in it. When I see this “real rock” I am now “really seeing” this rock. The reality of my own act of sentient intellection is actualized in the same actuality as the rock; this is how I am here-and-now in myself.

b) This being now in myself is sentient. And it is so not only because the “me” is sensed as reality (for example, the kinesthesia, as we saw), but because the “being now” itself is sentient—the only point which is now important to us. By sensing the real, I am there as really sensing. If this were not so, what we would have is something like an idea of my intellectual act, but not “really being there” knowing myself in my reality. I am now in myself sentiently.

c) We are talking about a “being here-and-now”. Consequently, being here-and-now in myself is not the result, so to speak, of a returning upon my act; i.e., we do not refer to having an intellection of my act after having had the act of intellection of the rock. I am not here-and-now in myself because I return, but rather (if one wishes to speak of returning) I return because I am here-and-now already in myself. There is no returning upon the act, but an already being in it really. I am now in myself by being now intellectually and sentiently knowing the thing. Conversely, I can never be here-and-now in myself otherwise than by being here-and-now in the thing. Whence being here-and-now in myself has the same actuality {158} as the being here-and-now in the thing; it is the common actuality of reality. To intellectually know something sentiently is to be here-and-now intellectually knowing sentiently the proper reality of my act.

It was necessary to conceptualize it thus in order to avoid the fundamental error of thinking that being here-and-now in myself consists in returning from things upon myself. That was the conception of reflection in medieval philosophy (*reditio in seipsum*), and is what in modern philosophy is called *introspection*. It would be necessary to enter into myself, in my proper reality, and this reality would be a “return”. But this is false. In the first place, that return upon the act itself would be an infinite regress: when I return upon myself I would have to return upon my own return, and so on indefinitely. If the turning in upon myself were a “return”, I would never have succeeded in doing so. But in the second place, what is radically false is the idea that it is necessary to turn in upon

myself. It is not necessary to “enter” or “turn in”, since I am now already there in myself. And this is so by the mere fact of being here-and-now sensing the reality of some thing. I am now in myself because my being is actualized in the same actuality as the real thing. Every introspection is grounded on this prior common actuality.

For this reason, the possibility of introspection, like the possibility of extro-spection, is grounded upon the common actuality of the thing and of my sentient intellectual act. Thus there is no infinite regress. Extrospection is the entrance into the reality of a thing. Its possibility is in the sentient actualization of the reality of a thing. And the possibility of entering into myself in the same act of mine is based on the fact that this real act has numerically identical actuality as the sentient actuality of the real thing. Both “enterings” are grounded on the fact that every actuality is of reality, and the common actuality is so of the reality of the thing and {159} of my own act. Introspection therefore has the same problematic character as extrospection. It is no less problematic to be intellectually knowing the reality of my intellection than to be intellectually knowing the reality of a thing. What is not a problem, but a fact, is that sentient intellection is common actuality.

2. This commonness of actuality has its precise structure, because in the numerical identity of the actuality two realities are actualized. And these two realities *qua* actualized are not simply two. To be sure, their actuality is numerically the same; but it intrinsically involves a duality of actualized realities, and this duality has a precise structure.

In the first place, when a thing is actualized in sentient intellection, as I said, the reality of the intellection itself remains actualized. That is, the intellection remains “co-actualized” in the same actuality as the thing. When I *sense* the real rock, I repeat, *I am here-and-now sensing it*. The common actuality of what is intellectually known and of the intellection has above all this character of “co-” or “with”.

In the second place, in that common actuality the thing is now present “in” sentient intellection; but also sentient intellection is present “in” the thing. I believe it essential to thematically emphasize this point. To describe intellection as the presence of a thing in the intelligence is to make a unilateral description. The intelligence is just as present “in” the thing as the thing “in” the intelligence. Naturally this does not refer to sentient intellection *as action* somehow acting on the thing known, for example, on the sun. That would be absurd. What I maintain is that sentient intellection *as actualization* is now “in” the

same actualization as the sun. Through being common actuality, {160} then, we have a single “in”. Common actuality has the character of “with” and the character of “in”.

In the third place, this common actuality is actuality of reality. This actualization of the reality of a thing and of the sentient act as a real act is, then, actualization of the same formality of reality. Now, the formality of reality has, as we saw, the character of being a *prius*. Reality is the formality of the “in itself”, of the *de suo*, and in virtue of it what is actualized, what is real, is something *prior* to its actualization in sentient intellection; every actuality is “of” the real. In virtue of this, the common intellectual actuality is the actuality “of” the thing, and the thing is the actualizer “of” the intellection. It is the same “of”. The common actuality has, then, the character of an “of”. This moment of the “of” pertains to the intellection precisely and formally by being actuality, and only by being actuality. It is not an immediate characteristic.

These three characteristics of “with”, “in”, and “of” are but three aspects of a single common actuality; moreover, they are what formally comprises the commonness of actualization. And as aspects, each is based on the following. The “with” is the “with” of an “in”, and the “in” is an “in” being “of”. Conversely, each aspect is grounded upon the previous one. Actuality as an “of” is so precisely through being actuality “in”; and it is “in” precisely through being “with”. The unity of these three aspects is, I repeat, what formally constitutes the commonness of actualization, i.e., the formal unity of sentient intellection.

3. This unitary structure in turn reveals to us some essential aspects which it is necessary to point out explicitly. {161}

A) We are dealing with a common intellectual actuality, with sentient intellection. This common actuality is co-actuality.

Co-actuality is a character of common actuality *qua* actuality. Now, this aspect reflects, so to speak, on the intellectual character of the actuality: when a real thing is intellectually known in sentient fashion, sentient intellection itself is sentiently “co-intellectively” known—not, to be sure, like one more thing, but in that form which is expressed by the gerund “I am here-and-now sensing”. If as is commonly done (though very inappropriately) one calls intellectual knowing *scientia*, *science*, it will be necessary to say that in virtue of the common actuality of the intellection as actuality, that common intellection as “intellective” actuality will not be just science but *cum-scientia*: *con-science*, i.e., consciousness. Consciousness is intellectual co-actuality of intellection itself in its proper

intellection. This is the radical concept of consciousness. Intellection is not consciousness, but every intellection is necessarily conscious precisely and formally because the intellection is “co-actuality”; intellective but co-actual. And since intellection is sentient, i.e., since reality is intellectually known in impression, it follows that consciousness is radically and formally sentient.

But it is necessary to make two observations here.

In the first place, this consciousness is not, formally, introspection. Introspection is only a mode of consciousness: it is the consciousness of the act of turning in upon oneself, as we have already seen. But the act of turning in upon oneself is grounded upon the act of being here-and-now in oneself (kinesthetic intellection), and therefore the introspective consciousness is grounded in the direct consciousness of co-actuality. {162}

In the second place, modern philosophy has not only made intellection an act of consciousness, but has extended this idea to all human acts. But, this is false. Consciousness, as we saw in Chapter I, does not have any substantivity; acts of consciousness do not exist, only conscious acts. And among these latter, some like intellection are of course fully conscious; but are not intellective by being conscious. Rather, just the reverse is true: they are conscious by being intellective. Other acts are not necessarily conscious.

Now let us proceed to examine the area of common actuality. Common actuality is actuality in the character of the “in”. Hence, when I have sentient co-intellection, i.e., when I have sentient consciousness, I have consciousness of sentient intellection “in” the thing. In common actuality I am now sensing myself “in” the thing, and sensing that the thing is now “in” me. Because this is intellective actuality, I then have not only sentient consciousness, but moreover I am here-and-now consciously “in” the thing and “in” my own intellection. That is what we mean when we say of someone who is very perplexed about a subject or not enthused about it that he is “not into it”. Because of the common actuality in the character of the “in”, when I intellectually know in sentient fashion my being here-and-now in a thing, I have sentient consciousness of being now “in” it. This is another aspect of the distinct consciousness of the “cum”, and how it is grounded in the common actuality.

Moreover, common actuality has the character of an “of”: a thing is an actualizer “of” sentient intellection, and sentient intellection is intellection “of” the thing. This is an aspect which corresponds to the common intellective actuality *qua* actuality. Now, the character of the “of” as a moment of common intellective actuality *qua* {163} in-

tellective is then “consciousness of”, it is “taking-cognizance-of”, the thing and of my own sentient intellection. The actuality in “of” is “intellection-of”, i.e., “consciousness-of”. This “consciousness-of” is a character grounded in the common intellective actuality. Furthermore, the “consciousness-of” is grounded in the “consciousness-in”. Only being here-and-now “in” a thing am I taking cognizance “of” it. And since I am now in it sentiently, the primary and radical taking cognizance is always and essentially sentient.

In summary, consciousness is not intellection but pertains essentially to sentient intellection. Sentient intellection is common actuality, and this common actuality *qua* actuality of intellective knowing makes it consciousness. And consciousness is not primarily and radically “consciousness-of”, but rather the “consciousness-of” is grounded on the “consciousness-in”, and the “consciousness-in” is grounded on the radical “cum”, on the impressive “cum” of sentient intellection.

When modern philosophy took leave of the “consciousness-of” (*Bewusstsein-von*), it committed a double error. In the first place, it essentially identified “consciousness” and “consciousness-of”. But essentially and radically consciousness is “con-scious”; and only through “consciousness-in” is the “consciousness-of” constituted. But in addition, as I have repeatedly said, modern philosophy has committed an even more serious error: it has identified intellection and consciousness. In such case, intellection would be a “taking-cognizance-of”. And this is false since there is only “consciousness” because there is common actuality, that actuality which is the formal constitutive character of sentient intellection.

With respect to stimulation, this same thing happens in animals. The impression constituting pure sensing, {164} by reason of its moment of otherness, makes what is sensed to be sensed as a stimulus. But at one and the same time it makes the animal “co-sense” its own affection as a stimulus; i.e., it makes the sentient animal “co-sense”.

In an animal, what is present to it is so as stimulus, and in this presentation the signed presence of the animal itself *qua* responsive animal is co-present, co-sensed. Now, this stimulus-based co-sensing is what constitutes what ought to be called the animal’s *sensitive consciousness*. This is frequently spoken of, but never explained. At most we are given to understand that an animal “recognizes” what is sensed just as does a man, the difference being only that the animal “recognizes” many fewer things than does a man. But this difference, though great, is absolutely secondary. The radical difference turns upon

the fact that the animal's "recognizing" is essentially different than that of a man, even with respect to those impressions whose content might be the same for both. Human sensing is co-actualization of reality; in this "co-" of reality human consciousness is grounded. Animal sensing is signitive co-stimulation; this "co-" of sign is the sensitive consciousness of the animal. And only because this sensitive consciousness is thus essentially different from human consciousness does the animal necessarily have to "recognize" far fewer things than man. Human consciousness as well as animal consciousness is sentient; what distinguishes them is that human consciousness is of reality, while that of the animal is of stimulus. {165}

B) Common actuality is not only fundamental to consciousness, but also to something different though quite essential. Since this actuality is common, one might think that it is constituted by the integration of two things which, in the usual terminology, are subject and object. Seeing this rock would be an act in which the seeing subject and the object seen were integrated. But that is not the case. On the contrary: it is through being common actuality that sentient intellection is actuality of what is intellectually known in intellection, and of intellection in what is intellectually known. With respect to the actuality of what is intellectually known, that actuality leads to a conceptualization and a discovery much fuller than what is commonly but improperly called 'object'. Qua actuality of intellection, it is this actuality which will later lead to discovery and conceptualization of the intelligence itself, and in general to everything which, with the same impropriety, is usually termed 'subject'. Common actuality is not the result, but the root of subjectivity. The essence of subjectivity consists not in being a subject of properties, but in "being me". It does not consist in dependence upon me, but rather is the character of something which is "me", be it something like a property of mine, or something of the thing *qua* thing, something which is "me" just by being of the thing and, therefore, by depending not on me but on it. Sentient intellection is not given in subjectivity, but on the contrary sentient intellection as just actualization of the real is the very constitution of subjectivity; it is the opening to the realm of the "me". Hence the two terms 'subject' and 'object' are not "integrated" in sentient intellection, but rather it is this which in a certain way "dis-integrates" itself into subject and object. Subject and object are grounded in the common actuality of sentient intellection, and not the other way around. {166}

C) The common actuality has a special character which should be expressly pointed out. We said, in effect, that the real itself is the actualizer of sentient intellection. This means that it is the real which determines and

grounds the commonness. To be sure, without intellection there would be no actuality; but if there is to be actuality of the real, it is something determined by the real itself. Now, reality is the formality given in an impression of reality. And this impression, as we saw, is open actuality, a respective openness; it is transcendental. Hence, the real *qua* determinant of the actuality of sentient intellection determines it as something structurally open. Common actuality is thus transcendental, and its transcendentality is determined by the transcendentality of the reality of the real. *Common actuality* is formally *transcendental actuality* because such is the impression of reality, i.e., because the impression is sentient. Kant told us that the structure of the understanding conferred transcendental content (*transzendentaler Inhalt*) upon what is understood. But this is not true. In the first place, transcendentality is not a proper character of the understanding but of the sentient understanding. In the second place, an intellection is transcendental through finding itself determined by the real in a common actuality with that intellection. This actuality is, then, not only common but transcendental. The commonness of the actuality is a commonness in which sentient intellection is respectively open to the real when intellectually known in impression. And it is because of this that sentient intellection itself is transcendental. It is not transcendental as a conceptual moment, nor by being constitutive of the real as object. It is transcendental because, {167} by being common actuality, the sentient intelligence remains open to reality in the same openness in which the real itself is open *qua* reality. It is the openness of reality which determines the openness of sentient intellection. And it is because of this, I repeat, that sentient intellection itself is transcendental.

Moreover, it is because of this that sentient intellection is transcendently open to other intellections. Diverse intellections, indeed, do not constitute an edifice by some sort of mutual coupling or joining together, i.e., because one intellection is "added" to others which outline, organize, or amplify it. On the contrary: all of this takes place, and must necessarily take place, through the transcendently open nature of each intellection. Transcendentality as respective openness of sentient intellection is the radical foundation of any possible "edifice", of any possible "logic" of intellection. But this requires further explanation.

D) One might think that the openness of an intellection to others is referred to the content of the intellections. This is not the case. The openness concerns something much more radical: the very mode of the common actuality. This common actuality can adopt diverse modes; i.e., there are diverse modes of actualization. Each of them is

open to the others, and this openness of the modes of actualization as such is what formally constitutes the transcendental foundation of every logic, or rather, of all the intellections whose articulation the logic studies. We shall study this at length in other parts of the book.

Jumping ahead a bit, it is fitting even now to emphasize what I regard as an error of ancient philosophy, according to which intellection is logos. In this view, everything the intellection has would be only moments of the logos; hence, intellection {168} would be formally logos. But as I indicated a few pages back, I think that this is false. Instead of “logifying” intellection it is necessary to “intelligize” the logos. Now, to intelligize the logos is to consider it as a mode of “common” intellectual actualization. Under conditions which we shall study in other parts of the book, the primordial apprehension of the real, by being transcendently open, determines that mode of common intellectual actualization which is logos. Logos is intellection only because it is a mode of actualizing what is already intellectually known in intellection, a mode which is transcendently determined by actualization in the primordial apprehension of reality. Intellection has other modes which are not that of logos. But all these modes are just that: “modes”. And they are not modes which are simply diverse, but modes which are transcendently grounded upon each other. Hence the modes are essentially “modalizations” of an actuality which is primarily and radically transcendental. As I said, this primary and radical intellectual actuality is the primary and radical sentient intellection, what I have called since the

beginning of the book the primordial apprehension of reality. But, I repeat, this is just a preview. We shall return to this subject at some length in chapters VIII and IX, and above all in the other two parts of the work.

We have seen what the formal essence of the act of intellectual knowing is: it is just actuality of what is known intellectually in sentient intellection. It is a simple “remaining” of what is apprehended in an impression of reality, and a “remaining” of sentient intellection in what is impressively known intellectually. It is just a common and transcendental actuality in which two things are made actual: what is impressively known intellectually and sentient intellection itself. This actuality has {169} the character of consciousness and is what constitutes the realm of subjectivity. And precisely by being common actuality, sentient intellection is transcendently open to other modes of actualization, and with that to other intellections. This transcendental openness of sentient intellection is the radical and intrinsic foundation of all intellectual construction, of every logos.

This is the first of the three questions which I propounded at the end of chapter IV. It was, “In what does the character of sentient intellection as such consist?” That is what we have just examined; now we must proceed to the other two questions. First of all, What is the character of what is intellectually known in sentient fashion; i.e., what is the character of reality (the second question)? After that, we shall go on to the third question: In what does reality “in” sentient intellection consist? {170}

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## APPENDIX 5

## REALITY AND SENSIBLE QUALITIES

Given the importance of the problem of sensible qualities, it is useful to examine this question by itself even at the risk of some repetition of what has already been said. The exposition will perhaps contain boring repetitions, but I deem them necessary to clarify the idea of what I understand by the reality of sensible qualities.

The reality of sensible qualities above all seems to be in contradiction with modern science. These qualities, we are told, are nothing but our subjective impressions. Indeed, if all animals endowed with visual sense were to disappear from the universe, all colors would *eo ipso* disappear as well. The reality of things is not colored. To affirm the contrary would be, we are told, an inadmissible *ingenuous realism*. In turn, by accepting this scientific conception, philosophy has thought that these subjective impressions of ours are referred to reality only through a causal reasoning process. The real would thus be the *cause* of our subjective impressions. This was the idea expressly propounded by Kant himself, later termed critical realism. Nonetheless, I believe that neither the subjectivism of science on this point nor critical realism are acceptable.

Naturally, to reject what science says about the reality of things would be to reject something which nowadays {172} is justifiably admitted to be a definitive conquest. This cannot be stressed too much, but it does not touch the problem with which we are concerned. Indeed, one could say that science has not even addressed our problem. For what is understood by ‘reality’ when science labels our impressions and hence sensible qualities as ‘subjective’? One understands by ‘reality’ that these qualities are foreign to sensible perception and, therefore, are real independently of it. But when we affirm here that sensible qualities are not our subjective impressions, but rather are real, do we affirm something akin to the idea that these qualities are real with an independence going beyond perception, i.e., beyond sentient intellection? Clearly not; reality does not consist in things (in our case, qualities) being something beyond perception and independent of it. Hence, the radical and crucial problem is found in the concept of reality itself. What is understood by ‘reality’?

That is the question upon which depends the meaning of our affirmation of the reality of sensible qualities.

1) *Explanation of this idea.* Let us first recall two ideas which have been developed throughout this book.

In the first place, the idea of reality does not formally designate a zone or class of things, but only a formality, reity or “thingness”. It is that formality by which what is sentiently apprehended is presented to me not as the effect of something beyond what is apprehended, but as being in itself something “of its own”, something *de suyo*; for example, not only {173} “warming” but “being” warm. This formality is the physical and real character of the otherness of what is sentiently apprehended in my sentient intellection. And according to this formality, heat not only warms, but does so by being warm. That is, the formality of reality *in what is perceived itself* is something prior with respect to its effective perception. And this is not an inference but a fact. For this reason one should speak, as I said a few pages back, of reity (thingness) and reism (thing-ism), rather than of reality and realism (be it critical or ingenuous). ‘Reity’, because we are not dealing with a zone of things, but a formality; ‘reism’, because this concept of reity or reality now leaves open the possibility of many types of reality. The reality of a material thing is not identical with the reality of a person, the reality of society, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the reality of my own inner life identical to that of other realities. But on the other hand, however different these modes of reality may be, they are always reity, i.e., formality *de suyo*. And here we have the first idea which I wanted to set forth: reality is the formality of reity impressively apprehended in sentient intellection. It is not what all the “realisms”, from the ingenuous to the critical, have understood by “reality”, viz., a determinate zone of things.

In the second place, it is necessary to propound the idea that intellection is just actualization. Actualization is never formally actuation. Hence, it is not a question of what is apprehended pretending to be real or seeming to be so, but of its being already something *de suyo* and therefore real. Reality, in which what is apprehended consists *de suyo*, is impressively apprehended in its very



character of reity. Intellection is just actualization of the real in its proper and formal reity or reality. {174}

Granting this, I maintain that sensible qualities apprehended in sentient intellection are real, i.e., what is present in them is real since they are *de suyo* this or that quality; moreover, this reality of theirs does nothing but be actualized in our sentient intellection. This is the thesis which requires further explanation.

First of all, it is necessary to insist once again that reity or reality does not designate a zone of things, but is only a formality. In virtue of this, reality is to be real beyond what is perceived. When one asserts that the qualities of the physical world are not really the qualities which we perceive, one understands by 'reality' what these qualities are *outside* of perception, what they are *beyond* perception. And thus it is clear that, according to science, if all animals endowed with visual sense disappeared from the universe, the colors would also disappear; the reality of the universe is not colored. But such an affirmation clearly shows that, by 'reality', one understands something real beyond perception, a zone of things, viz. the zone of the "beyond". But, this concept is neither primary nor sufficient because the things "beyond" are real not by being "beyond" but by being in this "beyond" what they *de suyo* are. That is, what is primary is not reality as a zone, but as formality, reity.

Now, in this line of formality we say that that formality is given not only in the zone "beyond" what is perceived, but also in the zone of what *is* perceived, a zone not any the less real than the zone "beyond" what is perceived. "Reality" means not only what is real "beyond" the perceived, but also what is real "in" the perceived itself. This distinction must be emphasized. In perception, what is perceived—for example, {175} colors, sounds, etc.—are *de suyo*, just as much *de suyo* as the things beyond perception. Naturally I am here referring only to sensible qualities sensed in perception. And to be sure we are clear on this point it is essential to recur to the distinction between actualization and actuation. In order to be perceived, the things of the world act upon the sense organs, and in this actuation the physical notes of these sense organs as well as of the things themselves are modified. It suffices to note that, for example, the sense of smell takes place by means of an actuation (let us call it that) of the olfactory receptors upon the reality "beyond". In this actuation what we call the sensible qualities are produced. But, this scientific theory notwithstanding, I affirm that as actualizations, (1) the qualities are real, and (2) they are not subjective.

a) *They are real.* That is, they are *de suyo* really and

effectively what they are. But for science they are not real beyond perception. Considered from the standpoint of the presumed real things beyond perception, i.e. arguing not formally but from the scientific viewpoint, we would say that sensible qualities are the *real way* in which these things beyond perception are reality "in" it. It is not that colors seem to be real or pretend to be so; but that they are present in their own reity in perception. Continuing this line of argument from science, we should say that perceived qualities are real because the sense organ is real and likewise the actuation of real things upon it. Hence, from the viewpoint of science, what is perceived by this actuation is also real; i.e. the qualities are real in perception. The sensible qualities thus produced, according to science, in the actuation {176} of things upon the sense organs, and of the latter upon the former, are apprehended as realities *de suyo* in an act of sentient intellection which is mere actualization. That these qualities may be the result of an actuation is something totally indifferent for the purposes of intellection as such. Intellection is just actualization, though what is actualized follows an actuation. Thus it is clear that if the visual sense organ disappeared, so likewise would the actuation and hence the colors. That is, these colors are real in perception but not beyond perception.

This concept of the real "in" perception is necessary. What is apprehended does not cease to be real because it is real only in perception. Considered from the standpoint of things beyond perception, qualities are the real way in which real things are really present in perception. It is the real quality which is present as formality in perception. Actuation does not mean that qualities do not pertain really to a thing, but that they pertain to it only in this phenomenon which we call 'perception'. Therefore, to affirm that sensible qualities are real is not ingenuous realism—that would be to assert that sensible qualities are real beyond perception and outside of it. The fact of the matter is that science has feigned ignorance of the sensible qualities, and this is unacceptable. Science must explain not only what, cosmically, color, sound, odor, etc. are in perception; but also the color *qua* real perceived quality. But neither physics, chemistry, physiology, nor psychology tell us a word about what perceived sensible qualities are, nor how physico-chemical and {177} psycho-physical processes give rise to color and sound, nor what these qualities are in their formal reality. Phenomenology only describes them. This is a situation which I have often characterized as scandalous—that the question which, when all is said and done, is the foundation of all real knowledge should be thus sidestepped. This situation is a scandal to be laid at the feet of science; let us not bur-

den ourselves with it. For us it suffices to point out, without eliminating it, the fact that sensible qualities are real moments of what is perceived, but they are real only in perception.

We might note in passing that the reality of sensible qualities does not coincide with the assertion that these qualities are proper to “things”. What we call “things” is something genetically elaborated in our perceptions over the course of years; thus for a child of two, things do not have the same aspect as they do for an adult. This is the result of formalization. For the time being, we are not concerning ourselves with what these things are *qua* things, but rather what qualities are in them and not *qua* qualities of things. And it is in this sense that I say that qualities are real in perception prior to being qualities of things. Formally each sensible quality is real in itself “in” perception.

b) *These qualities are not subjective.* For science, we are told, sensible qualities are something merely subjective. The theory is that up to a certain point a “correspondence” is established, more or less bi-univocal, between these presumably subjective qualities and the things which are real beyond perception. But thus to admit without further ado that sensible qualities are subjective by virtue of not pertaining to real things beyond {178} perception is an *ingenuous subjectivism*. If it is an ingenuous realism—and it is—to make sensible qualities into properties of things outside of perception, it is an ingenuous subjectivism to declare them simply subjective. Real things are set off in some zone beyond perception, and everything else is put into the zone of the subjective. “The subjective” is the repository for everything which science does not understand about this problem. Scientism and critical realism are ingenuous subjectivism, and this is unacceptable for many reasons.

In the first place, there is no possibility whatsoever of establishing that presumed correspondence between sensible qualities and “real things” if one begins by asserting that the former are subjective qualities. Because if the entire sensory order is subjective, where and how can the intelligence take leave of the sensory and jump to reality? Rationalism in all its forms understands that this jump is given in the concept: the concept tells me what a thing is. The reality of the sun, we are told, is not what I perceive of it, but what the concepts of astronomy tell me about it. But if one takes this assertion rigorously, it is not just that the astronomical concepts do not in fact conceptualize the sun’s reality, by themselves they are incapable of doing so. And this is because concepts by themselves do not go beyond being objective concepts; they are never

by themselves real and effective concepts of reality. Reality is not the same as objectivity; it is something *toto caelo* different from all objectivity. Thus science would be purely and simply a coherent system of objective concepts, but not an apprehension of reality. In order for concepts to be concepts of reality, they must be based formally and intrinsically upon sensed reality. {179} The concepts are indispensable; but what is conceived in them is real only if the real is already given as real, i.e. if the reality is sensed. Only then does a concept acquire the scope of reality; only then can the concept of the sun tell me what the sun is. To be sure, with only perception of the sun there would be no science of astronomy; but without the solar reality being given in some way in my perception, there would likewise be no science of astronomy because what there would not be is the “sun”. And astronomy is not the science of the concepts of the sun, but a science of the sun.

Granting this, the correspondence between concepts and what is sensed would be impossible if what is sensed is subjective. There would in that case be no possible correspondence between a perception, qualified as subjective, and any reality beyond the perception, despite the fact that to achieve this goal one calls upon a great richness of concepts. If one insists that reason inquires about the existence of something real based upon the principle of causality applied to our subjective impressions, then he would have to say that this already presumes that these impressions are real; i.e., it presupposes the reality of the impression. But as reality, these impressions are not subjective either inasmuch as they involve something perceived or in their percipient aspect. Not the latter because they are not subjective acts, but subjectual acts—something quite different. And not the former because the qualities are not “subjective” realities, i.e., they are not qualities of me as subject, because that would be equivalent to affirming that my intellection is warm, sonorous, etc., which is absurd. Hence, if they are not reality of the subject, and one denies that they are real in themselves, where will the causality be grounded? Causal reasoning will bear us from the subjectively colored thing to the concept of a colored subject distinct from {180} mine, but never from a subject to a reality. Causality does not start only from subjective impressions of reality, but must be based in the perceived itself. And if what is perceived is formally subjective, then the causality collapses. There is no causality whatsoever which can lead from the purely subjective, i.e. from subjective impressions, to the real. This critical realism is, in all its forms, a pseudo-realistic conception.

But in the second place, even leaving aside this extremely serious difficulty, there is the fact that science has not posed for itself the problem of that mode of reality

which it fleetingly calls 'subjective'. We saw this a few pages back: it labels as 'subjective' everything which is relative to a subject. Thus it terms sensible qualities 'subjective' because it deems that they are necessarily relative to the sensory organs and dependent upon them. But this does not have the least thing to do with subjectivity. Subjectivity is not being a property of a subject, but simply being "mine", even though it may be mine by being of a real quality, i.e., by being this reality *de suyo*. Now, something can be *de suyo* even if fleeting, variable, and relative in a certain way, without ceasing to be real in its fleetingness, variability, and relativity. Fleetingness, variability, and relativity are characteristics of "unicity" but not of "subjectivity". This unicity is a characteristic of a reality which is *de suyo* unique. Why? Because it concerns the actuation of things upon the sense organs. It is an actuation which is respective to the organ and the state in which it is encountered, and which is variable not only from some individuals to others, but also within the same individual, even in the course of the same perception. But this organ and its interaction with things {181} are both something real. All the physiological states of an organism, however individual they may be, do not for that reason cease to be real states. And these states, when they concern the receptive organs, individualize that very thing which they apprehend. But what is apprehended itself, despite its relativity and organic individuality, does not therefore cease to be real. What happens is that this reality is "unique". The zone of the real in perception has this character of unicity. But it does not have the character of subjectivity. The impression of the reality which is proper to the qualities is just an impressive actualization that is "unique" but not "subjective" in the acceptance which this word has in science. To assert that the unique, by being fleeting and relative, is subjective, is just as false as to assert that the only thing which is real is what is beyond perception. In the final analysis, science has not posed for itself the question of what subjectivity is. In science, any call upon subjectivity does not go beyond a commodious expedient to sidestep a scientific explanation of sensible qualities as well as subjectivity itself.

But in the third place there is something still more serious, and which is the root of this idea we are presently discussing. It is that one starts from the supposition that sensing, what I call 'sentient intellection', is a relation between a subject and an object. And this is radically false. Intellection is neither relation nor correlation; it is purely and simply respective actuality. Whence all this scaffolding of subjectivity and of reality is a construction based upon something radically and formally false, and hence erroneous at each of its steps.

In conclusion, sentient intellection is just an actualization of the real as much in its formality as in its qualitative content. With this I have said what is essential {182} to this question; but for greater clarity it will be useful to insist upon it at some length, pointing out problems which go beyond the character of plain sentient intellection and concern rather the task and scope of scientific knowledge in this order of sensible qualities. That is what I shall call the articulation of the problem of qualities.

2) *Articulation of the problem of sensible qualities.* For this we shall give a precis of what has already been explained.

A) It is clear that the two things to be contrasted are not what is "objective-real" and what is "subjective-irreal". Rather, they are two zones of real things: things real "in" perception, and things real "beyond" perception. But the reality of these latter does not consist just in being beyond perception, but in being so *de suyo*, because reality is nothing but the formality of the *de suyo*. Not having conceptualized reality other than from the point of view of what things are beyond perception has been a great conquest of science, but a limited one, because such a conquest does not authorize a reduction of reality to the "beyond". There is reality "in" perception, and reality "beyond" perception. We may note in passing that the thing beyond what is immediately perceived has nothing to do with the Kantian thing-in-itself. What is real beyond perception is a reality which, from the Kantian point of view, would pertain to the phenomenon. Phenomenon is for Kant simply object. Reality beyond is not a metaphysical entity.

B) In both zones, then, one deals with reality, authentic and strict reality. Reality or reity is the boundary within which the two zones are inscribed. What is this reality which "is" divided into reality in perception and {183} reality beyond perception? The answer we have already seen and repeated time and again: it is being *de suyo* what it is, being what it is "of itself", i.e., being reity. The two zones of real things are really *de suyo*; they are equally reity. Things beyond perception are real not by virtue of being "beyond", but by being *de suyo* what they are in this beyond. Qualities are real in perception because they are *de suyo* what is present in them. Reality is neither thing nor property, nor a zone of things; rather, reality is just formality, the *de suyo*, reity.

C) The two zones of reality are, then, identical *qua* reality. In being *de suyo* the realities in perception and the realities beyond perception are identical. What is different is the content, what is *de suyo*. The content beyond

perception can be different from the content in perception. This does not mean that the content of a perception is not real, but that its reality is insufficient in the line of realities. The insufficiency of reality in perception is what distinguishes the two zones of reality, and what bears us from perceived reality to the reality beyond perception. For this reason, the zone beyond perception is always problematic.

D) These two zones, then, have an intrinsic articulation in reality itself, in the reality apprehended in sentient intellection. Reality is not apprehended sentiently in only one way, but many; and especially important for our problem is that mode which is sensing reality “toward”. Reality is apprehended by the sentient intelligence, as we saw, in all of the diverse ways of being sensed; and one of them is sensing it in a directional way. It is not, as we have already seen, a “toward” extrinsic to reality, nor a direction toward reality, {184} but is rather reality itself as direction, or if one wishes, direction as a mode of sensed reality. Hence the terminus of this direction is always something problematic in principle; it is just reality beyond perception. Now, these two different modes of presentation of reality are, as we saw, overlapping and comprise one single perception of reality. The “toward” overlapping the other sensings is now the “toward” overlapping the sensible qualities in themselves and, therefore, propelling us “toward” what is real beyond the perceived.

Since the “toward” is directional, and this direction can be quite diverse depending upon the senses in which it is articulated, it follows that the terminus of this “toward”, i.e., the “beyond” itself, can have different characteristics, as we said. It can be “another thing”, but it can also be the same thing present but toward what is within itself. We shall not pursue that problem here; I only point it out to show that the “beyond” is not necessarily another thing, and that what is immediately perceived and what is beyond the perceived are not necessarily two numerically different realities. Moreover, these different modes of the “beyond” have among themselves and with what is immediately perceived an internal articulation. It is possible, indeed, that something which is discovered as being “other” beyond the immediate ends up being the very foundation of the immediate, but exceeding it in profundity. Whence, the “beyond” is simultaneously the same thing as the immediate, i.e., its formal foundation, and nonetheless cosmically another thing which is merely immediate by reason of cosmically exceeding it. A reality which is part of the foundation of the formal reality of something, but which exceeds it precisely by being its {185} formal foundation, is not just a reality added to the first, purely and simply. It is rather the same reality in

profundity. I shall immediately return to this point.

From this internal articulation of the two zones of real things, the zone of things real “in perception” and the zone of things real “beyond perception” three important consequences follow.

a) To go to the real beyond perception is something inexorable, an intrinsic moment of the very perception of sensible qualities. Every quality, indeed, is perceived not only in and by itself as such-and-such a quality, but also in a “toward”. The reality of qualities “only” in perception is precisely what constitutes their radical insufficiency as moments of the real; they are real, but they are really insufficient. In their insufficiency, these already real qualities are pointing in and by themselves in their proper reality “toward” what is real beyond perception; this is the onset of science. What science says of this “toward”, i.e., of that beyond perception to which the sensible qualities point, can be owing to a reasoning process which may be causal. But this causal remission (1) is grounded in the “toward” itself and not *vice versa*; (2) is based upon realities, not upon the reality of my subjective impressions but upon the reality of the perceived quality which, being insufficient, points toward something which causally is discovered by science; (3) is something that can be conquered by means of a causal reasoning process and be, nonetheless, a formal moment of the foundation of that about which one reasons. Thus science is not a capricious occurrence, nor an arbitrary collection of concepts, but something inexorable whatever may be its modes. {186} The modes of the “toward” of the most primitive man just as much as our own are modes of “science”, i.e., modes of an inexorable march from perceived reality toward what is real beyond perception.

b) The point of departure and the entire *raison d’être* of the affirmation of the real beyond perception is, then, precisely the real which is perceived. Everything that science affirms of the physical world is only justified as an explication of what is perceived *qua* real “in” perception. Electromagnetic waves or photons, for example, are necessary for perceived color. However they are necessary not only as productive causes of the perceived quality, but, as I see it, they are necessary in a deeper and more radical sense: those waves and photons do not remain “outside” of the perceived quality, but are the reality of this quality “inside” of it; they are a *formal moment* of its reality in profundity. Color is not produced by the wave (as critical realism affirms), but, I believe, color “is” the wave perceived, is the perceptive visual reality “of” the wave itself. Hence, the visual perception of color “is” the electromagnetic wave “in” perception. Similarly, sound carries us beyond its sonority to elastic longitudinal waves. Again,

these waves are not only the causes of sound in perception, but ultimately are formally constitutive of sound itself in its proper sonority. The electromagnetic as well as the elastic waves exceed color and sound respectively; in this respect they are “something other” than these qualities, since their cosmic reality lacks color or sound. But because “in addition” they comprise the formal foundation of color and sound, it follows that those waves and these qualities are not {187} purely and simply two things. Because if indeed outside the realm of this perception the waves are something else, nonetheless within it (and only within it) the qualities and the waves are numerically one single thing and not two—as they would be if the waves were the cause of the qualities. Sensible qualities are real in perception; they are the perceptive reality of what cosmically exceeds them. If the sensible qualities had no reality, or if this reality were numerically distinct from that of the cosmos, then science would be a mere system of concepts but not a knowledge of the real. If one maintains that sensible qualities are produced with respect to their content by the receptors themselves, they would not stop being thereby just an actualization of that real product. But in fact this conceptualization is a pure metaphysical construct and not a fact.

One will then ask how waves, for example—that is, reality beyond perception—can give rise to a real immediately perceived quality in perception. To which I respond that this a problem for science, and that science, as I indicated, has sidestepped it. And this is the scandal of our

present-day knowledge.

The perceived real, then, is what bears us inexorably to the real beyond perception; the real beyond perception has no more justification than the real perceived.

c) This means that in directionally apprehended reality what is *de suyo* is converted into a problem for us. Not the problem that something is *de suyo*, but the problem of what the structure is of what is *de suyo*. Sensible qualities, despite being real in perception, and despite {188} inexorably leading us beyond what is perceived, can be abolished beyond the perceived precisely to be able to be an explanation of what is perceived. Elementary particles, atoms, waves, etc. not only are not perceived by themselves in fact, but are by nature not sentiently apprehendable or visualizable, as the physicists have been saying for some years now. But they are, nonetheless, necessary for what we formally do perceive. This necessity is described in contemporary physics through rigorous unified mathematical structures which overcome the visual dualism of wave and particle. According to these unified structures, elementary particles can behave as particles in their creation and absorption, and as waves in their propagation. Quantum mechanics is the unified mathematical formulation of this non-visualizable reality of the particles. And thus science is not just an explanation of what is perceived, but an explanation of the whole reality of the cosmos; that is the enormous task of the concepts, laws, and theories of science.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION

In contrast to the classical idea of intellection, we have staked out a new and different one: sentient intellection. It is just the impressive actualization of the real as real. But this entails an idea of reality which is quite different than what is understood by reality in a conceptualizing or concept-producing intellection. Up to now we have studied reality as a mode of otherness. But now we must study it in and for itself. This will involve inevitable repetitions.

Sentient intellection apprehends the real impressively. What is thus apprehended has, as we saw, a formality and a content. Neither of these moments is independent. The formality of “reality” as a proper moment of what is apprehended makes of this latter what we call a ‘real thing’. And we express this character by saying that heat not only warms, but “is” warming. In this way three terms appear here: ‘reality’, ‘the real’, and ‘being’. This is just what we now must analyze. {190}

The foregoing terms refer to three ideas apprehended in sentient intellection. They are three ideas different from the usual ones which are intellectually known in a conceptualizing intellection. For this reason I shall, in each case, indicate that contraposition, but only with the motive of outlining the ideas. Moreover, our analysis will be cursory. These three ideas are intrinsic and formal moments of what is apprehended; i.e., they are three boundary ideas. In fact, the actuality of what is intellectually known in sentient fashion is an actuality which is common to what is thus known and to the intellection itself; that we have already seen. So, these three ideas anchored in that common actuality pertain on one hand to the reality of intellection itself, and on the other to the reality of what is intellectually known. With respect to the first, these ideas are a constitutive part of intellection and, therefore, of any philosophy of the intelligence. With respect to the second, they are the constituting thing itself of reality and, therefore, part of any philosophy of reality, of

metaphysics. The boundary between the two aspects is precisely the common actuality; this actuality is the boundary between the philosophy of the intelligence and metaphysics.<sup>1</sup> Since what I am here propounding is a philosophy of the intelligence, I shall say only what is necessary for my task about these three ideas.

I shall examine, then,

1. Reality.
2. The real.
3. Being

#### REALITY

As we have been saying over and over, reality is first and foremost a formality of otherness of what is sentiently apprehended. And this moment consists in what is apprehended being situated in the apprehension as something “of its own”, something *de suyo*. Reity (thingness) or reality is the formality of the *de suyo*.

This *de suyo* is the moment in which what is apprehended is “already” what is apprehended. This “already” expresses the formal anteriority of what is apprehended with respect to its being here-and-now apprehended; it is the *prius*. In virtue of it, the formality of reality installs us

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<sup>1</sup> [Zubiri’s “philosophy of intelligence” corresponds in some respects to what, in the British tradition, is called ‘philosophy of mind’; but Zubiri goes far beyond that encompassed by the usual discussions of the philosophy of mind because he believes that his philosophy of intelligence is one of the cornerstones of philosophy, of deeper significance than the usual division into metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics.—trans.]

in what is apprehended as reality in and through itself. That is, for a sentient intelligence:

1. Reality is something sensed; it is a formality of otherness.
2. This formality is the *de suyo*.
3. It is the most radical part of a thing; it is the thing itself as *de suyo*.

What is now important to us is this radicality of the thing itself. What is reality as a moment of a thing?

The question is justified because we are not now dealing with a mode of being here-and-now present, but of pertaining to a thing in its radical “of itself”. The *de suyo* constitutes, then, the radicality of the thing itself as real and not only as otherness. And this is essential. {192}

It is essential because one might think that reality coincides with *existence*. Something would be real if it were existent, and if it did not exist, it would not be real. But the matter is not quite as simple as it seems. To be sure, what doesn’t exist isn’t real, and what exists is real. But that is not the question, because what must be asked here is if a thing is real *because* it is existent or rather if it is existent *because* it is real. The question is justified because not only is a thing not real if not existent, but neither is it real if it does not have determinate notes. Now, existence and notes concern the content of the real. To be sure, existence is not just another note of the content. But that isn’t the question, because though it may not be a note, existence is a moment which formally concerns the content of what is apprehended but is not formally a moment of its reality. For this same reason, the fact that this content is real is something “anterior” to its existence and to its notes. Only in being real does a thing have existence and notes. Permit me to explain.

We are not dealing with a temporal anteriority, nor saying that a thing may be real before being existent; that would be absurd. Nor are we referring to some order of temporal succession, but rather to an order of formal fundamentation. And then it is clear that reality is formally anterior to existence. Existence pertains to a thing *de suyo*; a real thing is *de suyo* existent, which means that in a real thing its moment of existence is grounded in its moment of reality. We said on several occasions and quite properly that a thing has *real existence*. ‘Real’ means

that it is an existence which pertains *de suyo* to the thing. Were this not so we would have not reality but a *spectre* of reality. And that is, I think, the key to interpret the metaphysics of the *Vedanta*: existence is only a moment of reality {193} and not the other way around—as if something were formally real by being existent. What formally constitutes reality is not existing, but the mode of existing, viz. existing *de suyo*. For that, it does not matter to me how one conceptualizes existence, whether like St. Thomas, for whom existence is an act of essence; or like Suarez, for whom existence is really identified with the essence. That is, it is not at all clear that there is this thing which we call ‘existence’. There are “existent things”, but it is not clear that existence is a moment which is somehow really distinct from the notes. The nature of the relation between notes and existence in content is the subject of metaphysics, but not our present problem. The only important thing here is that existence always and only concerns the content of what is apprehended in the same way that it concerns its notes, despite the fact that, as we have said, existence rigorously speaking might not be a note. What is formally apprehended as real in the sentient intelligence is what is *de suyo*, not what is “existent”. *De suyo* is a radical and formal moment of the reality of something. It is a moment common to sentient intellection and to the real thing: as a moment of intellection, it is the formality of otherness; and as a moment of the real thing, it is its own *de suyo*. Every metaphysics of reality as existent and as possessor of its own notes must inexorably ground itself in the formality of reality, in the *de suyo*. The relation of these two aspects of the common actuality is the *prius* of the *de suyo*. That is, the *de suyo* is not only the mode in which an apprehended thing is present to us, but is thereby the constitutive moment of the reality of the thing in and through itself.

This is an idea of reality grounded upon the sentient intelligence. The conceptualizing intelligence erred with respect to this moment of the {194} *de suyo*, and headed in the direction of a metaphysics of reality as existence. But reality is something intellectually sensed in things: it is “sensed” and is so “in” a thing. What is thus sensed “in” a thing is an “in” which is *prius*; hence, this intrinsic priority is the radical moment of the thing itself.

A thing *qua* determined in the formality of reality is constitutively a real thing; it is the real.

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## APPENDIX 6

## SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE FORMALITY OF REALITY

We have already explained that reality consists in the formality of the *de suyo*. It is this formality which (pardon the redundancy) formally constitutes reality. But it would be a serious error to saddle this idea with all of the conceptual elaboration subsequently brought to pass by the intellection of reality. It is not our purpose here to examine, even summarily, the content of this elaboration. The essential point is that this elaboration has not been arbitrary, but determined by the moment of the impression of the formality of reality. Thus it is necessary for us to apprehend with precision the moment or moments of the impression of reality which are in themselves determinants of that elaboration. This does not go beyond an analysis of the impression of reality; however, it carries this analysis not by way of intellection but by way of reality. It is for this reason that I here only point out the subject.

Now, the moment of the impression of reality which determines the elaborations to which I am referring is the moment of transcendentality. As we already saw in Chapter IV, transcendentality is the openness of the formality of reality as such. Reality is the *de suyo*, and this *de suyo* is open as *de suyo* as much to what a thing is in its-own-ness as to other things. This refers not {196} to a conceptual openness, but to an openness which in its own way is physical. In virtue of it, a real thing is real by being “more” than what it is by being colored, having mass, etc. This “more” is, then, a moment which intrinsically and constitutively pertains to the very structure of the *de suyo*. As I shall say forthwith, there are two serious errors about this matter which must be avoided. The first consists in thinking that the “more” is the formal mode of reality. In that case the *de suyo* would be something grounded on the “more”. But that is impossible; the “more” is always and only a moment of the *de suyo*, and hence is only a grounded moment. The other error is in the opposite direction. It consists in thinking that the “more” is some type of thing more or less imaginary which is added to reality, to the *de suyo*. This is also impossible; the “more” pertains structurally and constitutively to the *de suyo* itself. Both errors are the consequence of not having apprehended the articulation between the *de suyo* and the “more”. And this articulation is the transcendentality of the formality of reality.

Transcendentality is real; by being real, a thing is “more” than what it is by being warm or sonorous. But at the same time this “more” is a “more” of reality; it is, therefore, something which is inscribed in the *de suyo* as such. Transcendentality is the openness of the formality of reality as such; hence, it is “more” than the reality of each thing. It is thus grounded in the *de suyo* and is a moment of the *de suyo* itself but without being an extrinsic addition to it.

Let us now see more concretely what this structure means.

Reality is open formality. Hence reality is constitutively respective. In virtue of this each thing, {197} by being real, is from within itself open to other real things—whence the possible connection of some real things with others. That this connection exists is a fact, and nothing more than a fact. But what is not a fact, but an intrinsic metaphysical necessity, is that if such a connection exists it is grounded on respectivity. According to this line of transcendental openness, the moment of reality acquires a special character, what in ordinary discourse we call ‘the force of things’, which consists in the force of imposition of the real. To be sure, it is not a force in the sense of Newton’s or Leibnitz’ physical science; but rather a force *sui generis*, “forceness” or necessity. We say that something has to occur by the force of things. Here we can see clearly that this *force of reality* is grounded on what reality formally is with respect to its force of imposition, in the *de suyo*. But it is not a moment added to reality; it is a moment which expresses the respectivity of things; it is just their transcendentality. This idea of the force of things has given rise to many different conceptual elaborations. It is not important to analyze them here; rather, it will suffice to cite some examples so as to show that all of these conceptual elaborations are grounded on the transcendental moment of the force of reality. One of the most ancient (and problematic) of them is, for example, the idea of destiny, the *moira* in Greek tragedy. Together with it one could interpret the force of reality as *nature*; nature would thus be the intrinsic moment of the force of reality. But the force can be conceptualized in still another form. It can be conceptualized as *law*; that is what is proper to modern science. But in any case, whether law as nature or destiny, we have elaborations of something {198} in



which the formality of reality itself is found to be inscribed, viz. the force of reality. This force is a transcendental characteristic of the openness of reality as such. Reality is not force, but this force is always and only a transcendental moment of reality as reality, a transcendental moment of the *de suyo*.

But there is still another line of transcendental openness. It is that the formality of reality is in itself a moment which has primacy over the content of each real thing. As I said, this moment of reality is, for example, a reifying moment; it is in addition a “such-ifying” moment, a moment through which what is *de suyo* [of its own] is formally *suyo* [its own] and makes *suyo* [its own] everything which happens to the thing; it is “own-ness”. This primacy has a very precise name: *power*. Philosophy has continued to blot out of its realm the idea of power. It returns in a pointed way in Hegel, but even there just with respect to the philosophy of the objective spirit. “Power”, as I see it, is not “force”; it is mere dominance. Now, metaphysical power is the dominance of the real *qua* real. The real through being real has its own power, the power of the real. This is the dominance of the moment of reality over all of its content. Real things do not consist only in the intrinsic necessity of the structure of their content and the force with which this content is imposed upon us according to its formality; they consist as well in transcendently conveying the power of the real, the dominance of formality over content. Force and power are thus two different dimensions of the impression of reality in its character of respectivity, of transcendental openness. Here, then, we are not dealing with a mythical concept; the salient characteristic of a myth is not “power”, but that determinate conceptualization {199} of power which we might better term ‘powerfulness’ or ‘potency’. A myth consists in conceptualizing the power of the real as po-

tency, and in conceptualizing the reality of things as the seat of potencies. This idea is elaborated in turn according to various interpretations, one of which consists in interpreting potency as animity; that is animism. Animism is not the conceptualization of things as power nor even as potency, but just the opposite, viz. potency as what makes animism possible. And then we clearly see that in the same way as animism presupposes potency (without being identified with it), so potency presupposes the power of the real as a dimension of things *qua* real. Power has nothing to do with potency nor animation; power is a transcendental moment of the real as real. It is grounded in reality, in the *de suyo*. Otherwise, we should fall into an absurd mythism. But neither is it a mere addition to reality; rather, it is a moment which is transcendently constitutive of reality.

Force of reality and power of the real are the two points of the transcendental impression of reality upon which a whole gamut of subsequent conceptualizations has been based. But in themselves, those two points are formally given in the impression of reality. These three moments—*de suyo*, force, and power—pertain to every impression of reality and, therefore, to every conceptualization of reality in whatever historical period it may be found. I shall only add that to affirm that force and power are anterior to the *de suyo* is just to forget the moment of the *de suyo*. Within reality we do not deal with the preponderance which some {200} moments can have over others, but with inscribing them congenerically in the *de suyo*. Is not this precisely what, at the dawn of philosophy, Anaximander’s celebrated *arhke* expressed?

The impression of the formality of reality is the impression of the *de suyo* transcendently open as force and as power.

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§ 2

## THE REAL

Reality is the formality of the *de suyo* determined in the apprehension by a mode of formalization of content which is different from the formalization of stimulation. Formalization is, as we saw, what constitutes the mode of otherness of apprehended content; it is the autonomization of this content. Such autonomization has two moments: it is independence, or autonomy of the content with respect to the apprehendor; and it is independence of what is apprehended with respect to other apprehended things—what I have called the moment of closure, or better, the moment of the closed unity of what is apprehended. Now, when these two moments are moments of the formalization of reality, i.e., when they are moments of the *de suyo*, then autonomization as independence of content and as closed unity of notes takes on its own character, viz. the character by which the apprehended is *the real*. What the real is, then, is something which can only be conceptualized based on formalization, i.e., on the sentient intelligence; it is something which must be conceptualized as being *de suyo* independent and one. What is this being independent and one *de suyo*?

1) Apprehended notes, by being *de suyo* independent, have their own formal character: they are *constitution*, the constitution of the real. Constitution is the moment in which the notes determine the form and the mode of the real in each case. And here we have the first characteristic of the real: {202} to be constitutional. This is not a theoretical concept, but a moment of the impressive apprehension of the real. Content has the capacity to be *de suyo*. And this capacity is, therefore, the capacity for constitutionality. It is what I call sufficiency in the order of independence or of the *de suyo*; it is *constitutional sufficiency*. And the real as constitutionally sufficient is what I call substantive reality, *substantivity*. Substantivity is, formally, constitutional sufficiency, sufficiency for being *de suyo*.

This capacity in the order of constitutional sufficiency, i.e., in the order of substantivity, can be quite varied. A real color green apprehended in and by itself is something *de suyo*. Each note which is apprehended in and by itself as reality (even though provisionally) has constitutional sufficiency. Being green is a mode of constitution of the real; it is the verdeal or green form of reality. And in turn, the real green has, taken in and by itself, that constitutional sufficiency which is substantivity. It is what I call *elemental substantivity*, because it is the inde-

pendence of a single note. It is the primary and radical substantivity, because each note which is provisionally apprehended in and by itself is what gives us the impression of reality, i.e. the formality of reality.

But it is not the only case nor the most general, because what in fact happens is almost always that the apprehended content does not have a single note but many; it is a constellation of notes. In that case all of these notes have the same formality of reality, which is numerically the same and which “reifies” the total conjunction of notes. Each note by itself is no longer a reality. What is real, what is *de suyo*, is then not each note but only the {203} whole ensemble. By itself, no note has the capacity or sufficiency to constitute the real, but this capacity, this sufficiency, is proper only to the whole ensemble. Therefore only this ensemble is what has substantivity. But, this ensemble is more than a mere ensemble. In what is thus apprehended, each note has a determinate “position” in the ensemble. Hence, each note is not an element “in” an ensemble, but an element “of” an ensemble; it is a “note-of”. Every note *qua* note is then formally “of”. That is what I call the *constructed state*, in which each note is a constructed moment “of” the ensemble; it is a “note-of” the ensemble. This does not refer to some type of mysterious adhesion of the content of some notes of the substantivity to others, but to the fact that each note is real *qua* note only in the unity with other real notes as notes. Thus the ensemble itself is not just a mere ensemble but the positional and constructed unity of its notes; it is what I formally term a *system*. The formalization of what is sensed in sensing is the impressive moment of sentient intellection; in this case the formalization consists in a constellation of notes, and what is thus impressively known intellectually is a system. That is, when it has the formality of the *de suyo*, the formalization of the notes as constellations acquires the character of *substantive system*; it is the unity of the system. This system unity is constructed unity. Only the system now has constitutional sufficiency. Formalization sentiently grounds this intellectual apprehension of what we call real things not as “things” (as we shall see immediately) but as unities of systematic substantivity. This does not refer to a conceptual elaboration, but to a close analysis of the apprehension of the real. {204}

Although every note which is provisionally apprehended in and by itself (for example, extension and intellection, each in and by itself) may provisionally have constitutional sufficiency, it is quite possible that if one tries to form a system with only these two notes, it may not have constitutional sufficiency. Thus, the constitutional sufficiency of a note and a system of notes are not the

same. For greater clarity I concentrated almost exclusively on the constitutional sufficiency of systems in my book *On Essence*. In them, constitution is clearly the mode of unity of a system. The moment of sufficiency is constituted through being a closed totality. But this concept of constitution is based upon the more radical concept of constitution as determination of form and mode of reality. The substantivity of a system is not comprised by the substantivity of its notes; on the contrary, the substantivity of these notes does not go beyond being provisional for the effects of their intellectual actuality. But this same thing applies to all substantivities—all of them are merely provisional. There is only one strict systematic substantivity, that of the cosmos. Constitution, I repeat, is the determination of the mode and form of reality through notes. And this constitution can be elemental or systematic. Constitutional sufficiency is thus a substantivity which is either elemental or systematic.

2. The real, then, has a moment of reality (the *de suyo*) and another moment of autonomized content. Now, these two moments are not independent. To see this suffices to look closely at systematic substantivity. Again I repeat that we are not talking about constructing theoretical concepts, but carrying out a careful analysis of any {205} apprehension of the real whatsoever. In systematic substantivity, the unity of the system constitutes its *in*, its *intus*, its interiority. Here, ‘interiority’ does not mean something hidden, lying beneath the notes, but just the unity of their system. This unity is what makes them a *construct*, viz. being “notes-of” the system. The notes by themselves are the projection of the unity; they are its “ex”, its “extra-”, its exteriority. Every reality is thus an *in* and an *ex*, an interiority and an exteriority. It is interior because it is a system; exterior because it is a projection in its notes. As a system, every reality is internal; as a projection in its notes, every reality is external. These are not two conceptual moments, but two physical moments, described apprehensibly, of the sensed construct. The projection of the unity in its notes has two aspects. On the one hand, it is a *molding* of the unity in its notes, a molding of the interiority; in this aspect the notes are the *ex-structure* of the construct, the structure of the *in*. But on the other hand, this interiority, this *in*, is *actualized* in the notes in which it is molded. Molding and actualization are not the same. Now, the formal respects according to which the *in*, the unity of the system, is actualized in all or some groups of its structural notes is what I call *dimension*; it is the actuality of the interiority, of the *in* of the system, in the exteriority of its structure. The real is, then, *structural and dimensional substantivity*.

I appealed to systematic substantivity for greater clarity. But what was said applies equally to elemental substantivity. A note apprehended in and by itself as real has a “numerical unity” of reality. The actualization of this unity in the note is just its dimension. {206} I use the term ‘dimension’ because in each dimension the substantivity is measured. What are these dimensions?

Let us assume that we apprehend any real thing whatsoever, for example a rock, a dog, or a star. When we do so the thing is situated in the apprehension first of all as a whole, a *totum*. Upon apprehending one or several notes, I apprehend, for example, a dog. The whole actualized in each note or in any group of notes is the primary dimension of substantivity. In the second place, this whole is not a mere ensemble of notes, as I have already observed. Precisely because each note, *qua* note, is a “note-of”, the presumed ensemble of notes has a *coherence* in its own “of”. The system is actualized in each note or in any group of notes, as a coherent whole. Finally, in the third place, this coherent whole has a type of steadiness or solidity on account of which we say that it is *durable*. To endure is here “to be here-and-now being”. Substantivity has this triple dimension of totality, coherence, and durability. The real is *de suyo* total, coherent, and durable. This is not some conceptual construction, but just an analysis of any apprehension of the real. Totality, coherence, and durability are three moments of what is apprehended in its primordial apprehension.

Thus in dimensional substantivity we have the real from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence.

Classical philosophy, both ancient and modern, confronted the problem of the real with a conceptualizing intelligence. Thus it thought that the real has a very precise character. Parmenides believed that what is known intellectually is given as a *jectum* (*keimenon*); that was the origin of idea of the “atom” (Democritus). Aristotle went a step further: what is known intellectually is not the *jectum*, but {207} the *sub-jectum* (*hypo-keimenon*), substance. Its notes are “accidents”, something which supervenes on the subject and which cannot be conceived except as being inherent in it. Modern philosophy took yet another step along this line. What is known intellectually is *jectum*, not *sub-jectum* but *ob-jectum*. Its notes would be objective predicates. *Jectum*, *subjectum*, and *objectum* are, for a conceptualizing intelligence, the three characteristics of the intellectually known real.

But for a sentient intelligence, reality is not *jectum* (nor *subjectum* nor *objectum*), but what has the formality of the *de suyo*, whether it be a note or a system of notes

sensed in their reality. The real is not a “thing” but something “of its own”, thing or not. In contrast to what was thought in the conceptualizing intelligence, viz. that the real is substantiality and objectuality, in the sentient intelligence the real is substantivity. Hence, the notes are not accidents “in-herent” to some substantial subject, nor are they predicates of an object, but rather moments which are constitutionally “co-herent” in a constructed substantive system.

Thus we have what, from the standpoint of the sentient intelligence, is the real. But the problem does not end here. When I contrasted stimulus and reality, I said that heat not only warms but “is warming”. Thus we have not only *reality* as a *de suyo*, and not only *the real* given as substance *de suyo*; but moreover there appears here this subtle term “is”. That is the idea of *being* itself. The real *de suyo* is. That is what we must now elucidate. {208}

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## APPENDIX 7

## ON THE REAL AND ITS REALITY

Since they deal with concepts and problems on the frontier between the study of intelligence and the study of reality, the following considerations at times go beyond mere analysis of the act of sentient apprehension of the real.

The real has its constitutional notes. These notes, by being real, almost always comprise constellations, i.e., unities which are closed and independent of the apprehender by virtue of that formality of reality, “of itself”, *de suyo*.

As closed, systematic unities, the notes have a type of closure which is common to all men, for whom real systems all present the same aspect, viz., they are things which are relatively independent of each other by reason of their notes. That is owing to the sentient structure. If it were not so, the systematic unities would be radically different from those which we now perceive. If we were to see the colors and forms of this tree with a different type of retina, we would perceive streams of photons or electromagnetic fields, for example; and that which we call a tree would not have, as a system, the character which it has in our sensible apprehension. This is what I term the *homogenization* of systems; it is determined by the structures of formalization. It is thanks to them that we apprehend independent “things” instead of fragments of a cosmos. {210}

In the second place, these systems come demarcated with a certain coefficient of invariance. Not that the notes are completely invariant, but the system of them has nonetheless a relative invariance in virtue of which we say that we have apprehended the same thing. That is, we are not dealing with the mere *constancy* of what is perceived, i.e., the invariance of notes—a phenomenon which, as is well known, is also common to animals. But what the animal does not apprehend is that type of “real constancy” which we call *sameness*; sameness is formally the identity of reality of a system apprehended sentiently in the invariant structure of its system of notes.

Homogeneity and sameness are two characteristics of a system of notes *qua* closed. But much more important and profound are the diverse types of independence of the real as determined by the type of system of its notes, i.e., inasmuch as they are independent systems “of their own”.

In the first place, by reason of its constitution, each note or system of notes constitutes a *form of reality*. Green is the verideal form of reality. Constitution is thus the concrete form of the unity of the real; i.e., of the “of its own”.

But in the second place, there is something more. Content does not comprise only the form of reality, but also the *mode of reality*. A star, piece of iron or copper, a holm oak, a dog, a man, etc., are distinguished from each other as forms of reality only by their respective constitutions, that is, by the character of their notes, by their constitution. But there is a much more profound difference between these realities. The real is the *de suyo*. Now, in the examples cited, one sees immediately that these real things differ not only {211} by virtue of their notes, but more importantly by the way in which these notes are “theirs”, are of substantivity. That is, they differ by the mode of reality, by the mode of substantivity. Thus, despite their constitutional difference and, therefore, despite their different forms of reality, iron and copper nonetheless have the same *mode* of substantivity; it consists “just in having as its own” its notes. This “as its own” is what is then conceptualized as a “property”. In sentient intellection the “of its own” does not formally consist in being a “property”, as was thought in the conceptualizing intelligence; but on the contrary being a “property” is grounded upon the sentient apprehension of the “of its own”. With respect to animals, each has its own constitution and, therefore, its own form of reality. Nonetheless, they all have the same mode of reality which is different from mere “having as its own”. An animal has an independence and a specific control over its environment based in large measure upon sensing. In sensing, a living animal in a more or less rudimentary fashion is an *autos*, a *self*. An animal always has at least a *primordium* of *autos* which is richer as one ascends the zoological scale. It is a mode of reality different from merely having notes as its own; it is indeed a new mode of reality which we call ‘life’. Life is not “auto-motion”, as it has usually been described since the time of the Greeks; but a kind of “auto-possession”, i.e. being in reality and sensing itself as an *autos*. Here we are not dealing with the constitution as a form of reality, but with the fact that the system as such in its independence is that which constitutes the

radically formal part of an animal. And man has a mode of reality yet more profound; he is not only something which possesses itself, something *autos*, but an *autos* of a {212} different kind: viz., being not only his own substantivity, but also his own reality *qua* reality. The simple *autos* consists in pertaining to oneself by reason of the systematism of one's notes. But in man we are dealing with an *autos* in which self-pertaining is not by virtue of notes, but formally and reduplicatively by the very character of reality. Man pertains to himself as reality; he is a *person*. A person is formally and reduplicatively a real its-own-ness.

Many forms of reality can, then, have the same mode of reality. And these modes, as we have just seen, are three: mere having "as its own", self-possessing, and being a person. They are not independent; each involves the previous one. Thus only by having determinate notes can the real be an *autos*, a living being. And only by being alive and by having determinate properties such as intelligence can the human animal be a person. But this in no way keeps the mode of reality from being something different from the form of reality.

But there is still more. The real is not only something independent by virtue of its notes and their mode of being real to it; rather, each real thing is a moment of pure and simple reality; i.e., it is real in the world, it is real in a wordly fashion. Worldliness is the respective openness of the impression of reality *qua* impression of pure and simple reality. Through it we sentiently know the real as established in the world. Now, there are various *figures of establishment in reality*. Living as well as non-living things are part of the world. Their establishment in reality consists, then, in that figure which I call *integration*. Man partakes of this condition, but is not reduced to it because as a personal reality man is not only formally and reduplicatively "his own" as reality, {213} but is his own "facing" everything real. This is a type of withdrawal in the world but "facing" the world; a type of confrontation with the world. Hence he senses himself in reality as relatively independent of everything else; i.e., as relatively "absolute". He is not part of the world, but is in it yet falling back upon himself in his own reality. The establishment of man as a personal reality in the world is thus not integration but *absolutization*, so to speak. In contrast to what Hegel thought, viz. that the individual spirit is but a moment of the absolute spirit, we must affirm that through his personal reality, and inasmuch as he is personal, man is not integrated into anything, either as a physical part or as a dialectical moment. To be sure, a person is integrated into the world by some moments of his reality; for example, his body. But *qua* personal, this same body transcends all integration; the body is personal

but is so formally and precisely not as an organism or a unified system, but as principle of actuality. On the other hand, that absolute character is grounded in a transcendence, in something which, though starting from the world (as an organism), nonetheless is in it transcending it, i.e., having a relatively absolute character. But this relativity as a moment of the absolute is not integrable, or rather, is only relatively integrable. Whence the possible unity of men has a character which is completely different from that of an integration. Men can be directed to others in a way which pertains only to men, viz., in an "impersonal" way. Other realities are not impersonal, but "a-personal". Only persons can be impersonal. And therefore, {214} while the unity of other things (because they are apersonal) is integration, the unity of men is primarily "society", a unity with other men taken impersonally, i.e., taken just as others. Moreover, by maintaining themselves as persons, i.e. as realities which are relatively absolute, men have a type of unity superior to mere society; this is "personal communion" with others as persons. All of this I say by way of illustration because in itself, the subject pertains to the study of man as established in reality.

Establishment in reality is radically given in the impression of reality. Whence it follows that reality *qua* reality is not a mere concept, but is physical establishment in reality. To be sure, I have a concept of reality *qua* reality; but this concept is never primary. What is primary and radical is the *de suyo* as a moment of reality *qua* reality. And this moment is "establishment" in reality, in the *de suyo*; it is apprehended in the sentient intelligence, and precisely because of that is not primarily a concept, but something anterior to any concept. For a conceptualizing intelligence, the fact that something is purely and simply real means only that it is a particular case of reality. But for a sentient intelligence, being purely and simply reality means "being now restored" in reality. Reality *qua* reality is, then, a physical moment of the real, that moment which I have called 'establishment'. And the reality in which every real thing is established is not the objective field of the concept of reality, but the physical formality of reality apprehended in every sentient intellection. And since this formality is constitutively {215} open, as we saw, the establishment itself admits various manifestations. In other words, reality *qua* reality is a moment which is physically open to different establishments. And in fact this openness is dynamic. There has indeed been dynamic progress in the real *qua* real, because there has been progress in the establishment in reality. We do not know if this dynamic progress will always march forward; that is a problem which is outside the scope of our concerns here. But in principle, reality as such is something which continues to be open. {216}

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§ 3

## THE BEING OF THE REAL

When I contrasted reality and stimulation, I stressed that in both cases we are dealing with formality of otherness. For clarification, I presented a trivial example. As otherness of stimulation, heat is what is explained by saying “heat warms”. On the other hand, as otherness of reality, we say that “the heat is warming, is warm”. In this example, what I wished to draw attention to is the difference between the two formalities of otherness. In stimulation, heat pertains formally to the sentient process of the animal; it is its sign. It is, then, a type of signate pertaining or property. But heat as reality is something to which its thermic qualities pertain *de suyo*; it is warming. These two phrases reveal the contrast between the two modes of presentation of what is apprehended. The second (heat “is warming”) shows a mode of presentation which transcends mere presentation: to say that the heat “is warm” or is warming is a mode of presentation in which the reality that is present is a prior moment of what is presented, i.e., a moment of what is presented as real in and by itself and not as a moment of its presentation. To this reality its thermic qualities pertain *de suyo*: prior to its presentation, the heat is warm. But then we find ourselves in a situation where what is apprehended, the heat, is described not with one term but with two. Insofar as the thermic qualities pertain to it of itself, *de suyo*, we say that the heat has reality in and by itself. But {218} on the other hand we utilize a second term: we say that the heat “is” warming. And here it is not just the reality of the heat which intervenes, but also what the “is” designates, viz. the being of the heat. And this poses the problem of the difference between a warm reality and a warm being; i.e., the difference between reality and being. We have already seen in what reality consists, viz. the *de suyo*. Hence, we must now clarify in what this which we call ‘being’ consists.

The idea of being has always been fashioned with respect to the understanding, which is to say with respect to the conceptualizing intelligence. However, the conceptualizing intelligence is essentially grounded on the sentient intelligence, which turns the ideas of reality and being upside down. Reality is not something understood, but something sensed, viz. the formality of the *de suyo* as proper to what is intellectually known in and by itself, prior to its actually being impressively present. Now, prior to being understood in a real thing, *being is sentiently apprehended* in it. In what does this being consist, which is sentiently apprehended?

Being is something much more radical and complex than the empty “is” about which we are usually told.

A) In the first place, being is above all *actuality*. We have already seen that actuality is something different than *actuity*. Actual and actuality is a “being here-and-now present” not *qua* present, but *qua* being here-and-now. It is being here-and-now present “from within itself”, and not as some extrinsic denomination. It is, finally, being present from itself “by being real” and inasmuch as it is real. The radical actuality of the real consists in the unity of these three moments (being here-and-now, from within itself, inasmuch as it is real). I say ‘radical’, because the real has many actualities; but there is one which is primary and radical, viz. that which I just {219} explained. How is the real actually present from within itself by being real? Clearly, by being real and inasmuch as it is real, that wherein the real is actual is precisely in the pure and simple worldly respectivity. The real is open as reality, is open to the world. And to be here-and-now present in the world is to have actuality in it. That is the primary and radical actuality of the real. Now, the actuality of the real in the world is just its being. Being is worldly actuality. Thus the real is not only real, so to speak, not only the worldly, but the real which is present in the world and inasmuch as it is present therein. This is being. Let us now consider a couple of examples which do not formally pertain to our analysis of the primordial apprehension of reality but which illustrate what we have been saying.

An oak tree is an oak tree and nothing more; that is its reality. We see that this reality, in its form and in its mode, has its figure of establishment in the world. All of that, as I said, pertains to the reality of the oak. But the being of the oak is in another direction. Its establishment in the world “makes” (if I may be permitted the expression) the oak be purely and simply real. But this establishment of the oak in the world reflows, so to speak, upon the established oak as a whole (with its suchness, its form, and its mode) in a very precise way. It does so not by making it tree-reality (that it already was), but by making the oak which is established in the world *to be here-and-now present* in the world just by being here-and-now established in it. And this being now present is just being. Reflowing here consists in determination of actuality; it reaches all moments of the oak—its suchness, its form, and its mode of reality. The “such-and-such reality” {220} is converted into “such-and-such being”. The same thing happens with the form and mode of reality: they are converted into “being form and being mode”. This “being” is not, then, a conceptual moment, but a physical one. But it is a physical moment of actuality. It is what I have expressed in the idea of reflowing. If the oak tree

could speak it would say, “I am now established in reality as an oak.” This is what a man does when he says, “I am established as a personal reality in the world.” Through reflowing, in the case of man his personal reality is converted into an “I”. The “I” is not the reality of the person, but his being. This phrase does not only say “I am this or that”, but also “this or that is what *I am*.” Here the “I” fulfills a task strictly of emphasis: it is I who is this or that. And this occurs not because man is capable of saying so; on the contrary, he is capable of saying so because ultimately he is so. The “I” is the reflowing of the pure and simple reality in a personal reality established therein. So, while the oak clearly cannot say it, it unquestionably has an “is thus”. The “is thus” is just actuality; it constitutes the reality of the oak *qua* present in the world. And therein being formally consists. Thus, being is clearly something very rudimentary in the case of rocks, of the oak, and of dogs, for example. Where it is not rudimentary is in the case of man, whose personal reality is actual in the world as “being I”. In the other realities, being is the most rudimentary of worldly actualities; but it always pertains to a real thing.

Hence being is something independent of any intellection; even if there were no intellection there would be—and there is—being.

B) In the second place, since every actuality is “posterior” to actuality, it follows that “being” is something posterior to {221} reality. In other words, being as actuality is ulterior to the real; it is the *ulteriority of being*. This ulteriority has its own formal structure, viz. temporality. To be sure, not every ulteriority is temporal; but the ulteriority about which we are here speaking, the ulteriority of being, is so. Temporality is not a structure grounded in ulteriority, nor is ulteriority something grounded in temporality. Rather, the structure of *this* ulteriority is formally temporality. In other words, the essential character of the ulteriority of being is temporality; the real “is”. This actuality consists first of all in that a thing “already-is” in the world; and secondly, in that the thing “still-is” in the world. Hence, “being” is always “already-is-still”: this is temporality. We are not referring to three *phases* of some chronological occurrence, but three structural facets of the ulteriority of being. The intrinsic unity of these three facets is what the expression “to be here-and-now being” expresses. Etymologically it is a present participle, being here-and-now actually present in the world. Its adverbial expression is “while”. Being is always and only being “while”. I have explained this at greater length in “El concepto descriptivo del tiempo” (*Realitas* II, 7-41).

With this, two errors which I would like to explicitly state have been eliminated. One consists in thinking that ulteriority is chronological posteriority. This is false because ulteriority is not chronological posteriority, but purely formal posteriority; i.e., just temporality. And temporality does not have the structure of the three phases but rather the modal unity of three facets. The other error consists in thinking that due to its ulteriority, being is accidental to the real, something adventitious to reality. But this {222} is absurd, because being is actuality in the world, and this actuality pertains *de suyo* to the real. Ulteriority then simply means that reality is not formally being, but that, nonetheless, reality is *de suyo* ulteriorly being. Ulteriority pertains to the real *de suyo*. “Worldliness”, in fact, is a constitutive, transcendental dimension of the impression of reality, as we saw; and because of it actuality in the world is not adventitious to reality. This actuality the real has—indeed, has to have—*de suyo*; it “is” because it is “real”. If one wishes, reality is not being; but reality “really is”. That is what I express by saying that reality is not *esse reale*, but *realitas in essendo*.

Since the real is substantivity, it follows that it is substantivity which has being; being is the being of substantivity. This does not refer to what is usually called “substantive being”. There is no substantive being because being itself lacks any substantivity; only the real has substantivity. I shall immediately return to this point. Thus, there is no “substantive being”, only the “being of the substantive”; this is substantivity *in essendo*, “being” (as participle). The “being” (as participle) of reality is just the being of substantivity.

This ulteriority of being is essential; because of it reality is not a mode of being. Just the opposite: being is the ulterior actuality of the real. Being is something *grounded* on reality, in the actuality of the real; and this being grounded is just ulteriority. Let us return to the example which we have been considering for the last several pages: heat is warming. This “warming” has two meanings. First of all it means that heat has warming reality. “Warming” then means that heat is a form of reality, viz. warming reality. To warm is thus to warm {223} things. But it can also mean something different. To be here-and-now warming can mean that warming is a way of being here-and-now in the world. This does not refer to warming things, but to being here-and-now in the world warming. So, the actuality of the heat in the mundane sense of being here-and-now warming is being. Thus we are not dealing with a form of reality, but a form of being. This is the whole difference and the whole unity of reality and being: everything real inexorably “is”, but “is” by being already “real”.



Our return to the foregoing case is not a simple exemplification of what we have been expounding; it is something more. It is a return to the essential point: being is not something understood, but something sensed. This is the heart of the matter.

C) What is the sensed being? Being is ulterior actuality of the real. And since the real itself is sensed, the foregoing question is but to ask ourselves how it is that when we sense the real, we are already sensing its being. The formal end of sentient intellection is always and only reality. In virtue of this, reality is intellectually known in sentient fashion directly in and by itself, as impression of reality. Now, this reality thus apprehended in impression “is” ulteriorly. This ulteriority is, then, “co-sensed” when reality is sensed. The way of intellectually sensing ulteriority is to “co-sense” it. It is not sensed directly, but only indirectly. If one wishes, reality is sensed *modo recto*; whereas ulteriority is sensed *modo obliquo*. This obliqueness is just what I have called “co-sensing”. When I sense the real in and by itself *modo recto*, I am co-sensing *modo obliquo* its physical and real ulteriority. What is co-sensed is being. Hence, being is co-impressively sensed when reality is sensed. This does not refer to an accidental co-sensing, but to an inexorably physical and real co-sensing, {224} because it is just reality which “is” *de suyo*. Therefore, when we sense what is apprehended *de suyo* we impressively co-sense its being here-and-now “being” (participle). The impression of reality is transcendental openness to the world. Hence, it is quite inexorable that when we impressively sense the real we should be sensing that it is being in the world; this is *sensed being*. The apprehension of being pertains, then, physically but obliquely to the apprehension of the real; this is the *obliqueness of being*.

Actuality, ulteriority, and obliqueness are the three structural moments of being. Being is thus primarily and radically sensed. Such is the idea of being from the standpoint of the sentient intelligence.

Classical philosophy has addressed the problem of being from the standpoint of what I have termed the ‘conceptualizing intelligence’. To know intellectually would be to “understand”; and understanding would be intellectually knowing that something “is”. That was the thesis of Parmenides and Plato, and it has stamped European philosophy with its peculiar character. But the conceptualizing intelligence is constitutively grounded upon the sentient intelligence; whence follow essential differences in the problem which we are discussing.

a) Above all, there is a profound difference in the very mode of confronting the problem. Basing themselves on Parmenides, both Plato and Aristotle subsumed intel-

lection under *logos*; that is what several pages back I called the *logification of intellection*. But this is not all; it is furthermore the case that, for this theory, what is intellectually known consists in “being”. Whence it follows that reality is but a mode of being—to be sure, the fundamental mode, but nonetheless only a mode: the *esse reale*. That is to say, the real is formally *ens*; reality would thus be entity. This is what I call {225} the *entification of reality*. Logification of intellection and entification of the real thus converge intrinsically: the “is” of intellection would consist in an affirmative “is”, and the “is” known intellectually would be of entitative character. This convergence has in large measure etched the path of European philosophy. However, the problem does not exhibit the same character from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence. The *logos* is grounded upon sentient apprehension of the real; i.e., on sentient intellection. Therefore, instead of “logifying” intellection, what must be done is, as I said, to “intelligize” the *logos*; i.e., make the *logos* an ulterior mode of the primordial apprehension of the real. The formal *terminus* of intellectual knowing is not the “is”, but “reality”. And thus it follows that reality is not a mode of being; indeed, being is something ulterior to reality itself. In virtue of this, as I said a few pages back, there is no *esse reale*, but rather *realitas in essendo*. Reality cannot be entified, but must be given an entitative ulteriority. The ulteriority of the *logos* goes “along with” the ulteriority of being itself.

b) A precise idea of *ens* was never reached from the standpoint of the conceptualizing intelligence. (I must of necessity repeat some things already said in order to clarify this point.) It can indeed already be seen in Aristotle, who tells us that *ens* (ὄν) has many meanings. They are essentially eighteen: being true and false, being act and potency, being essentially and accidentally, being accident (nine modes of being accident) and being a subject or substance, where this subject is at the same time matter or form or composed of both. This naturally permitted Aristotle to treat the problems of first philosophy with some rigor, from his point of view. Nonetheless, it would be fruitless to inquire {226} as to what, definitively, he understands by *ens*. He would always reply with his eighteen senses, linked only by a vague and imprecise analogy, and based upon Parmenides’ idea that *ens* (ὄν) is a *keimenon*, a *jectum*. But by his logification of intellection, Aristotle conceptualized this *jectum* as a *sub-jectum* (*hypo-keimenon*)—something which did not much clarify the question. Aristotle remained trapped in this net of concepts. Given the situation, some Medieval philosophers thought that no precise and unitary concept of *ens* exists. But in general they thought that reality is existence; and then either understood existence as *act* of the

existing thing (St. Thomas) or as a *mode* of the existing thing (Duns Scotus). But in both cases the *ens* would be an existent thing which is either effectively existent or aptitudinally existent. But this is not so from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence; because as we have already seen, reality is not existence, but rather being *de suyo*. That is to say, it does not have to do with either a *de facto* act of existing, nor an aptitude for existing, but rather something prior to any act and any aptitude, viz. the *de suyo*. The real is *de suyo* existent, *de suyo* apt for existing. Reality is formality, and existence concerns only the content of the real. And thus the real is not *ens*, but is the *de suyo* as such. Only by being real does the real have an ulterior actuality in the world. This actuality is being, and the real in this actuality is *ens*. Reality is not *ens*; reality has its entity *de suyo*, but only ulteriorly. Reality is not formally entity.

Modern philosophy modified the medieval conception somewhat; this was the *objectualization* of the *ens*, of the *esse reale*. In various forms this is the basic idea of modern philosophy. {227} Originating from the *esse objectivum*, from the objective being of Henry of Ghent (14th c.), it became the central idea of Descartes' philosophy in which what is conceived, as he tells us quite literally, is not *formaliter reale*, but is *realitas objectiva* (*Meditation III* and *Primae et Secundae Responsiones*). For Kant and Fichte to be is to be an object, to be now put there as an object, so that reality is not entity, but objectuality. But this is inadmissible, because even granting that impossible identification of being and objectuality, what is proper to an object is not its "positionality", but its "actuality" in the intellection. And the same must be said for being as intentional position or as unveiling: intentional position and unveiling are only modes of actuality, modes

of *being now* put there, of *being now* intended, of *being now* unveiled.

Hence the very idea of *ens* is vitiated at its root in the conceptualizing intelligence. Reality is not *ens*, but formality of the *de suyo*. And the real is *ens* only as actuality in a world.

c) Finally, the being of which we speak is the being of the conceptualizing intelligence; it is *being which is understood*. But, primarily and radically being is not something understood, but is *sensed being*; this is the obliquity of the sentient apprehension of being. The old thesis of Parmenides canonized the opposition between intellectual knowing and sensing which has been sustained throughout all of Western philosophy. Nonetheless, this opposition, as we have seen, does not exist. To know intellectually is to apprehend the real, and this apprehension is sentient. Being is nothing but the oblique moment of what is apprehended in an impression of reality. From the standpoint of a conceptualizing intelligence, what is known intellectually *modo recto* is "being"; whence it follows that what is oblique would be the apprehension of the real. It would be what we could call {228} the *obliqueness of the real*. And as I see it, that constitutes the radical flaw of European philosophy on this point (only on this point, naturally). Being understood, taken in and by itself, is always and only the human expression of being obliquely sensed in an impression of reality.

With this we have now studied two of the three points which I set forth. The first concerned the character of sentient intelligence as such; the second was the character of what is sentiently known. Now we must address the third and final point: in what does reality "in" sentient intellection consist.



## CHAPTER VII

### REALITY IN SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH

In chapter V we saw that intellection is mere actualization of the real as real, and we have analyzed what it is to be mere actuality. It is not actuity, i.e., it is not an act, because it neither adds, subtracts, nor modifies in any way the physical notes which constitute the real. But while it is not an act, actuality is a physical moment of the real. And at this juncture the question inevitably arises as to what this moment adds to the real. Actuality, in fact, is not some empty moment, so to speak; but has its own structure determined by that in which the real is just real. What actuality adds to the real is precisely this being “in” the intellection. We saw what intellection is and what reality is in the two previous chapters. So now we must see what reality is “in” intellection, and we shall proceed in two stages:

1. What, formally, is this intellective “in”? That is, What, formally, does it mean that the real is just actualized “in” intellection? That is what I term *real truth*.

2. What are the structural moments of this “in”? They are the dimensions of real truth.

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§ 1

#### REAL TRUTH

A real thing is apprehended as real in and by itself; it is *de suyo* what it is. Since this moment of formality is a *prius* of things, it follows that reality does not consist formally nor is it necessarily exhausted in being known intellectually. Hence, on account of its intellectually knowing what a thing is, we say that intellection is true. What the mere actualization of the real adds to reality is, then, its truth.

What is understood by truth? At first glance truth seems to be a quality of a judgment. But this is not so because a judgment is only a mode of intellection. Intel-

lection is neither exclusively nor primarily judgmental. Rather, it consists formally in apprehending something as real, and this intellection also has its truth. As I just said, truth is intellection *qua* apprehending what is real and present as real. Truth adds nothing to reality in terms of notes; but does add to it its intellective actualization. Hence, the question of what truth is, is a question which concerns intellection as such, and not just the judgmental intellection.

Reality and truth are not identical. Intellection, and therefore truth, are aspects of actualization. And actuality, I repeat, adds no physical note to the real. Nonetheless, it does add the actuality of truth to it. And since not every reality is actualized nor has to be, it follows that not every reality has truth. {231}

For the same reason, reality and truth are not correlative, either; i.e., reality does not consist in being a correlate of truth. Every truth involves reality; but not every reality involves truth.

Reality grounds truth. Reality is what gives truth to intellection when it is just actualized therein. And this actualization is true because it involves reality. Reality, then, is what gives truth, and I generally refer to this “truth giving” with the expression ‘to truthify’. Reality truthifies in intellection. Thus, the “in” in which intellective actuality consists is nothing but truthifying. For this reason, not only is truth not something correlative to reality; they are not even related. It is, rather, respectivity, a moment of pure actualization, pure truthifying. Truth is purely and simply the moment of the real intellective presence of reality.

Bearing this in mind it is necessary to purge two conceptions of truth which, by dint of continual repetition, are acceded to without examination, but which in my opinion are false.

The first is the conception according to which truth

is objective consciousness. This is the conception upon which all of Kant's philosophy is erected; though in fact it goes back several centuries before him. The problem with this view is not just that it is false, but something much more serious: it is an incorrect analysis of the fact of intellection. The ideas of consciousness and object resound in this conception. Yet intellection is not an act of consciousness, but an act of apprehension; and what is intellectually known does not just have objective independence, but real independence. The conception of truth as objective consciousness is, then, flawed at its heart.

The second conception consists in an appeal to the fact of error: there are intellections which are not true. And from here one goes on {232} to say that truth and error are two qualities which function *ex aequo*, and that intellection as such is "neutral" with respect to this difference. Intellection would thus be something neutral in itself and, therefore, its proper nature would not be to *have* truth, but to be an *aspiration* for truth. Deep down, this was Descartes' conception, associated immediately with the idealistic analysis of intellection. Nonetheless it involves a string of serious errors. In the first place, the truth and error of which it speaks are the truth and error of judgment. Now, as we have repeatedly said, judgment is never the primary form of intellection; there is an anterior mode. And so it must at least be said that whether this primary mode of intellection includes truth and error is debatable. It is necessary for us to examine that question, and we shall do so immediately. But, in the second place, even with respect to judgmental intellection, the indisputable fact of erroneous judgments is in no way equivalent to putting truth and error on an equal footing. Errors of judgment are possible only because truth grounds the possibility of error. An error of judgment does not, therefore, consist in a mere "lack" of truth; but is formally and rigorously a "privation" of truth. The judgmental intellection, therefore, is not something neutral. It is not the case that judgmental intellection "can be" true "and" false, but that in fact it "has to be" of necessity *either* true *or* false because the judgmental intellection has to be true *de suyo*. Hence, truth and error cannot be put on the same footing as qualities which supervene upon an intellection which is in itself neutral. Intellection, even judgmental intellection, is something more than aspiration. Therefore, truth is neither objective consciousness {233} nor one quality of intellection that is opposed to another which is error. Truth is the moment of actualization of the real in sentient intellection as such. How exactly does this work?

I reiterate that we are dealing with the truth of sentient intellection as such, i.e., with the primary and radical

nature of the sentient actualization of the real. Thus we are not dealing with just any intellectual actualization. As we have already seen, sentient intellection in its primary and radical form is that in which what is apprehended is in and for itself, that is, what is apprehended is there directly, immediately, and unitarily apprehended. Now, in this sentient actualization what is apprehended is so *de suyo*. And this moment of formality of the *de suyo* is a moment of a thing anterior (*prius*) to its own being here-and-now apprehended—and precisely therein does its reality consist. But to be sure, this *de suyo* which is prior to the apprehension is nonetheless apprehended in its own anteriority; i.e., is present in sentient intellection. Hence, this *de suyo* as anterior to the apprehension is reality. And this *de suyo*, this reality, *qua* present in the apprehension is just truth. Truth is reality present in intellection *qua* really present therein. Thus the primary and radical truth of sentient intellection is not identified with reality; nor does it add to the real anything different from its own reality. What it does add is a kind of ratification by which what is apprehended as real is present in its apprehension; and this is just ratification of the *de suyo*, ratification of the reality proper. *Ratification* is the primary and radical form of the truth of sentient intellection; it is what I call *real truth*. {234}

*It is truth* because it is a moment which is not formally identical to reality. Reality is a formality of a thing, but truth is a quality of intellection insofar as the real is present in it. This and nothing else is the difference between reality and truth: real truth is ratification of reality.

*It is real* because it is reality itself which is in this truth; it is the real itself which truthifies. To be sure, we are dealing with reality as formality of the *de suyo*, and not with reality as beyond apprehension; it is the reality of what is apprehended just as it is apprehended in its apprehension. I shall immediately return to this idea.

Here we have the essential nature of *real truth*: the real is "in" the intellection, and this "in" is ratification. In sentient intellection truth is found in that primary form which is the impression of reality. The truth of this impressive actuality of the real in and by itself is precisely real truth.

Three observations may serve to bring this idea into sharper focus.

Above all, we are dealing only with ratification; and this is essential. Classically philosophy has gone astray on this matter and always thought that truth is constituted in the reference to a real thing with respect to what is conceived or asserted about that thing. It is because of this that I believe that the classical idea of truth is always what

I term *dual truth*. But in real truth we do not leave the real thing at all; the intelligence of this truth is not conceptualized but sentient. And in this intellection nothing is primarily conceived or judged; rather, there is simply the real actualized as real and therefore ratified in its reality. Real truth is ratification, and {235} therefore is *simple truth*. For greater clarity, and though anticipating some ideas which will appear in the other two parts of the book, I will say that truth can adopt diverse forms. In the first place, there is *simple truth*, i.e., real truth in which we do not leave the order of the real; it is truth as *ratification*. In it, not only do we not leave the order of the real, but moreover there is a positive and difficult act of not doing so; this is the very essence of the *ratification*. In the second place, there is *dual truth*, wherein we have left the real thing and gone toward its concept, toward a judgment, or toward an explanation of the thing. If we return to the thing from its concept, that is truth as *authenticity*. If we return to the thing from a judgement, that is truth as *conformity*. And if we return to the thing from some explanation of it, that is truth as *fulfillment*. As we shall see, this third form has never been considered by classical philosophy. Authenticity, conformity, and fulfillment are the three forms of dual truth. But in contrast to the case of dual truth, in real truth there are not two terms which are primarily foreign to each other, such as the real thing on one hand, and its concept on the other; or similarly its judgement on one hand and its explanation on the other. There is but a single term, the real thing in its two internal moments: its own actuality and its own ratification. It is because of this that every dual truth is grounded upon real truth. In real truth, the real is *ratifying*. In the truth of authenticity, the real is *authenticating*. In the truth of conformity, the real is *truth-stating*, i.e. the real is stating its truth. In the truth of reason, the real is *verifying*. Authenticating, truth-stating, and verifying are three forms of dually modalizing real truth, i.e., ratification. Therefore this real truth is, as we shall see at the appropriate time, the foundation of dual truth. {236}

The second observation concerns what I pointed out earlier: real truth is not the opposite of error for the simple reason that the primary intellection of the real does not admit of the possibility of error. Every primary apprehension of reality is ratifying of what is apprehended and, therefore, is always constitutively and formally real truth. There is no possibility whatsoever of error. Truth is ratification of the real in its actuality. This has nothing to do with the question of whether there is or is not an actuation of a real thing in order for it to be apprehended. If we situate ourselves in the real outside of apprehension, it is possible that this actuation deforms the thing and that

therefore what is apprehended is not the same as what the thing is outside of perception. But this does not prevent what is apprehended from being real “in” the apprehension itself, whether or not it is real outside of the apprehension. In the case of any error whatsoever, for example, that of illusion, one leaves the realm of what is apprehended and goes beyond it. Illusion is therefore a phenomenon of duality. But the mere actuality of what is apprehended “in” the apprehension itself is not dual; it is a series of notes which pertain to what is apprehended “of its own”, i.e., *de suyo*. Hence, error consists in identifying the real which is apprehended with the real beyond or outside of the apprehension; in no way does it consist in what is apprehended being unreal “in” the apprehension and yet being taken as real. In an apprehension the apprehended content is real in and by itself; when ratified as such it constitutes real truth. There is no possibility of error. The same can be said about errors owing to things such as malformations of the sensory organs themselves, e.g. Daltonism. In one type of Daltonism, the subject sees a dark grey color where a normal person sees red. But in both cases, and within each perception, the grey {237} which the afflicted person sees is no less real than the red which the normal person sees; nor is that red any more real outside of perception than the grey. Every sentient intellection in which something is seen in and by itself is always and constitutively real truth. Reality is nothing but the formality of the *de suyo*, and real truth is this *de suyo* ratified as *de suyo* in the apprehension. Error is only possible when we leave this intellection and venture out to a dual intellection which goes beyond the apprehension.

Finally, a third observation. Real truth, as I have just said, is simple truth. But it is necessary to conceptualize this simplicity in the correct manner. For Aristotle, to be simple consists in not having any multiplicity whatsoever, in being “purely simple” so to speak; thus sensible qualities as the proper formal object of each sense would be *ta hapla*. But this is not correct. What is apprehended in sentient intellection has, in general, a great variety of notes; indeed, it is a substantive system of notes. The simplicity of this apprehension does not consist, then, in the “pure simplicity” of what is apprehended; but in the fact that all of its internal variety is apprehended in and by itself in a unitary fashion. Thus we are not dealing with a simplicity of content (something which in fact is never given), but rather with the simplicity of the mode of apprehension, viz. the mode of apprehending something directly, immediately, and unitarily; i.e., *per modum unius*. To see a landscape, or to see a book *en bloc*, so to speak, without stopping to apprehend each of its notes or any combinations of them, is a simple apprehension in the

unitary sense. This unitary vision of a system, ratified in the intellection of what is thus presented, is its simple real truth. It could also be called its elemental truth. {238}

Thus we have the essential nature of real truth: ratification. And this truth has some extremely concrete dimensions.

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§ 2

## THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH

In real truth, it is reality which in and by itself is truthifying in the intelligence; i.e., it is reality which directly, immediately, and unitarily is giving its truth to the intellection. As we have seen, this reality has structurally speaking three dimensions: totality, coherence, and duration. Now, the ratification of each of these dimensions is a dimension of real truth. These dimensions are formal respects; they are the ratification of the different moments of the respectivity in which the real consists. When I discussed the dimensions of the real I explained that what was said with respect to systems of notes is applicable to each of them by itself; thus I may excuse myself here from referring to anything but systems.

A) Everything real as a system of notes has that dimension of being a systematic whole; this is the dimension of totality. When a real thing is actualized in its formal respect of totality, its reality is ratified in a very precise way, viz. as the *richness* of what is apprehended. Richness is not the totality of notes of the real, but that totality *qua* ratified in sentient intellection. It is a dimension of real truth, the dimension of totality of the real as ratified in intellection.

B) Everything real is a coherent system of notes. Formal *coherence* is a dimension of the real. But this coherence ratified in intellection constitutes {240} real truth as truth of the coherence; this is what we call the *what* of something. It is a dimension of real truth. To be “what” is the ratification of the real coherence of the system in intellection.

C) Everything real is a *durable* system in the sense of enduring. If it did not have the quality of durability, a thing would not have reality. Now, the ratification of durability in intellection constitutes the truth of this durability, viz. *stability*. ‘Stability’ means here the character of being something established. Being here-and-now established is the dimension of duration, of presenting the being of the real, ratified in intellection. Being

here-and-now established is just what constitutes the ratification of the presenting being here-and-now. The reader can observe that this idea of stability is conceptualized here in this problem in a different way than in other publications of mine.

Reality, then, has three dimensions: totality, coherence, and duration. These dimensions are ratified in real truth and constitute the three dimensions of this truth: totality is ratified in richness; coherence is ratified in “what”; and duration is ratified in stability. Richness, “what”, and stability are, then, the three dimensions of real truth. But ratification itself is not some amorphous character, so to speak; rather, in each case there is a proper mode of ratification. Totality is ratified in richness according to its own mode of ratification, viz. manifestation. Manifestation is not the same as making evident, because what is evident is certainly manifest, but it is evident because it is manifested. Manifesting is the mode of ratification of the totality in richness; a thing manifests the richness of all its notes. Reality is coherent, and is ratified in a “what” according to a proper mode of ratification, viz. {241} firmness. What we call the “what” of a thing is just that in which it consists and therefore which gives it its own firmness: it is iron, it is a dog, etc. The mode in which this coherence is ratified is, then, just firmness; the real has the firmness of being a “what”. Finally, durable reality is ratified in stability according to its own mode, viz., corroboration or steadiness. Steadiness is not apprehension of some mere fact; it is a mode of ratification, the apprehension of presenting being here-and-now.

To summarize, the three dimensions of the real (totality, coherence, duration) are ratified in the three dimensions of real truth (richness, “what”, stability) via three modes of ratification (manifestation, firmness, steadiness). The intrinsic unity of these three dimensions of ratification and its corresponding modes constitutes the radical part of real truth, the radical part of the ratification of reality in intellection.

This idea of ratification is not just a conceptual clarification, but something which touches the most essential part of sentient apprehension of the real. By being sentient, this apprehension is impressive; and every impression, as we saw in Chapter II, has three moments: affection, otherness (content and formality), and force of imposition. The sentient intelligence is essentially constituted by the impression of reality. As impressive, this intellection is sentient. Inasmuch as it senses the other as otherness “of itself”, *de suyo*, this sensing is intellective. Inasmuch as apprehended reality is ratified in the impres-

sion itself, it is real truth. Ratification is the force of imposition of the impression of reality; it is the force of reality in intellection. And since this impressive intellection is just actualization, {242} it follows that it is not we who go to real truth, but that real truth has us so to speak in its hands. We do not possess real truth; rather, real truth has possessed us by the force of reality. This possession is not just some mental state or anything of that sort; rather, it is the formal structure of our very intellection. Every form of intellection subsequent to the primary and radical intellection is determined by the real itself; the determination is thus a “dragging along”. We are possessed by real truth and dragged along by it to subsequent intellections. How? That is the problem of the subsequent modes of intellection; it will be the theme of the other two parts of the book. But before going on to them it is fitting to con-

clude this first part with a modal consideration. Permit me to explain.

What has been done up to now is analysis of the formal structure of intellection as such; this is sentient intellection. But in many passages I have pointed out that we were dealing with the primary and radical intellection. This indicates that there are intellections which are not primary and radical but which, nonetheless, are intellections; that is, they have the formal structure of intellection. This means that in our analysis we have simultaneously treated the questions of what is intellection and what is its primary mode. Now it is necessary to delineate these two formal and modal moments of intellection with greater precision. That will be the theme of the following chapter.



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## APPENDIX 8

SOME CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH

Once again I prefer to group in an appendix those concepts which go beyond the limits of pure analysis of the apprehension of reality. Here I would like to do two things: (1) by way of illustration, to share certain linguistic facts which are very well known; (2) to point out the possible dimensions of real truth in subsequent intellection.

I. As is well known, the Greeks called truth *aletheia*, discovery, patentization or revealing. But this is not the only term by which truth is designated in our modern languages. I here reproduce a page which I wrote and published on this subject in 1944:

For the sake of accuracy, it is important to point out that the *primary* meaning of the word *aletheia* is not “discovery,” or “revealing”. Although the word contains the root *\*la-dh*, “to be hidden,” with the *-dh-* suffix of state (Latin *lateo* form *\*la-t* [Benveniste]; *ai, rahu-*, the demon who eclipses the sun and the moon; perhaps the Greek *alastos*, he who does not forget his feelings, his resentments, the violent one, etc.), the word *aletheia* has its origin in the adjective *alethes*, of which it is the abstract form. In turn, *alethes* derives from *lethos, lathos*, which means “forgetfulness” (the only passage is Theocritus 23, 24).<sup>1</sup> In its primary meaning, *aletheia* connotes, then, something which is not forgotten; something which has not fallen into “complete” oblivion [Kretschmer, Debrunner]. {244} The only revealing to which *aletheia* alludes then is simply that of remembrance. Whence *aletheia* later came to mean simple revealing, the discovery of something, truth.

But the idea of truth itself has its *primary* expression in other words. Latin, Celtic, and

Germanic languages all express the idea of truth based on the root *\*uero*, whose original meaning is difficult to pin down; it is found as the second term in a Latin compound *severus* (*se[d]-verus*), “strict”, “serious”, which would lead one to suppose that *\*uero* must mean to happily *trust in*; whence *heorte*, festival. Truth is the property of something which merits confidence, security. The same semantic process appears in Semitic languages. In Hebrew, *'aman*, “to be trustworthy”; in Hiph., “to trust in,” which gave *'emunah*, “fidelity”, “steadfastness”; *'amen*, “truly, thus it is”; *'emeth*, “fidelity, truth”; in Akhadian, *ammatu*, “firm foundation”; perhaps *emtu* [Amarna], “truth”. On the other hand, Greek and IndoIranian start from the root *\*es-*, “to be”. Thus Vedic *satya-*, Awadhi *haithya-*, “that which truly, really is.” The Greek derives from the same root the adjective *etos, eteos*, from *\*s-e-to*, “that which is in reality”; *eta=alethe* [Hesych.]. Truth is the property of being real. The same root gives rise to the verb *etazo*, “to verify”, and *esto*, “substance”, *ousia*.

From the linguistic viewpoint, then, there are three inseparable dimensions articulated in the idea of truth, whose clarification should be one of the central themes of philosophy: reality (*\*es-*), security (*\*uer*), and revealing (*\*la-dh-*).

The radical unity of these three dimensions is just real truth. For this reason I have alled upon these linguistic data {245} as an illustration of a philosophical problem.”<sup>2</sup>

II. Real truth, i.e., the ratification of reality in intellection, then, has three modes: manifestation, firmness,

<sup>1</sup> [oÚkzti gšr se, kñre, qžlw l upežn poc' ōrēmenoj, |l|<sup>a</sup> bad'zw "nqa tō meu katžkrinaj, ōpV l ōgoj /ēmen |terpžwn xunōn tožsin rñsi tō fšrmakon, "nqa tō l -qoj. *Idyllia* 23, lines 21-24—trans.]

<sup>2</sup> *Natureleza, Historia, Dios*, 1st ed., p. 29, 1944 [English edition, p. 14-15—trans.].

and steadiness. As I wrote in my book *On Essence*,<sup>3</sup> every real truth essentially and indissolubly possesses these three dimensions. None of them has any preferential rank or prerogative over the other two. The three are congeneric as structural moments of the primary intellectual actualization of a real thing. Nonetheless, they are formally different; so much so that their deployment in *subsequent intellection* fundamentally modifies man's attitude toward the problem of the truth of the real.

Man, in a word, can move about intellectually according to his preference amid the "unfathomable" richness of the thing. He sees in its notes something like its richness in eruption. He is in a state of insecurity with respect to every and all things. He does not know whether he will reach any part, nor does the paucity of clarity and security which he may encounter on his path disturb him overmuch. What interests him is to stir up reality, to make manifest and to unearth its riches; to conceive them and to classify them with precision. It is a perfectly defined kind of intellection: intellection as adventure. Other times, moving cautiously and, as it were, in the twilight, as he must in order not to stumble or to become disoriented in his movements, man seeks in things securities on which to base himself intellectually with firmness. [He seeks certainties, certainties about the things that are in reality.] It is pos-

sible that, proceeding in this fashion, he may let fall by the way great riches in things; but this, however, is the price of reaching what is secure in them, their "what". He pursues the firm as "the true"; {246} the rest, no matter how rich it may be, is no more than the shade of reality and truth, the "verisimilar." It is intellection as achievement of the reasonable. On other occasions, finally, he precisely restricts the range and the figure or pattern of his intellectual movements amid reality. He seeks the clear constation [steadiness] of his own reality, the aristate [finely edged] profile of what he effectively is. In principle, nothing remains excluded from this pretension; however, even when it is necessary to carry out painful amputations, he accepts them; he prefers that everything in which he does not achieve the ideal of clarity should remain outside the range of intellection. It is intellection as science, in the widest sense of that term.<sup>4</sup>

Every subsequent true intellection has something of an adventure in reality, something of a certain firmness, and something of a science (in the wide sense), because manifestation, firmness, and steadiness are three dimensions constitutive of real truth, and hence cannot be renounced. But the predominance of some of these qualities over others in the development of intellection modifies the intellectual attitude. Because of that predominance, they constitute three types of intellectual attitude.

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<sup>3</sup> 1962, p. 131 [English edition., p. 151—trans.].

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<sup>4</sup> *On Essence*, p. 131 [English edition., p. 152, with bracketed material added—trans.].



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## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PRIMARY MODE OF INTELLECTION: PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY

If now we collect the threads of our exposition, we will readily discover that they are tied together at three points which it behoves us clearly to spell out. In the first place, we should emphasize that what we have analyzed is strict and rigorous intellection. The second is that there are different modes of intellection. But these different modes are not only different, but—and this is the third point—they are modalizations of a primary and radical mode. This fact obliges us to say what that primary and radical mode of intellection is.

It is, then, necessary to pull our discussion together around three essential points:

1. What is intellectual knowing?
2. What is the modalization of intellectual knowing?
3. What is the primary and radical mode of intellectual knowing?

All of this has already been discussed in the foregoing chapters; but I now emphasize it for the following reason. When one speaks of sentient intelligence, it is easy to leave the reader with the idea that sensing is definitely a moment of intellection, but to let him forget that this sensing is in itself intellectual, that intellection is sensing, and therefore that when we have conceptualized sentient intellection, we have already conceptualized intellectual knowing itself.

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§ 1

#### WHAT IS INTELLECTIVE KNOWING?

When we speak of intellectual knowing and intelligence we do not only think about whether sensing is a distinct moment of intellection; rather, we ordinarily think

that intellectual knowing is something more than sensing. Intellectual knowing would be something like understanding what that which is intellectually known is. And this capacity to understand would be in turn a type of mental effort; there are some people who have more of it than others, and we tend to think that this means they have a greater capacity to understand things. To be sure, there is much truth in this. But just as in other problems, there is more to the question of what intellectual knowing is than meets the eye. And I am not referring to the difference between conceptualizing intelligence and sentient intelligence, but to what is usually thought of as intelligence. Let us ask, then, what this is.

A) Let us pause for a moment and consider what we term 'understanding'. Certainly hearing a sound is not the same as understanding it. For the first, it suffices not to be deaf; the second on the other hand requires a science called 'acoustics'. But this leaves the question unanswered. What is it that the understanding understands? How and why the sound is really as it is. When the sound has been understood, what we have before our mind is the real sound itself unfolded, so to speak, in all of its structures. And thus it is clear {249} that if, upon hearing a sound, we had before our mind all of these structures, there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of what we call 'understanding'. Nonetheless, no one will deny that we have intellectually known the sound; rather, it is just the opposite. Hence, this having the real before our mind is that in which intellectual knowing consists. And this shows us the following:

*a)* That understanding consists in filling a gap in our apprehension of reality (in our example, the reality of sound).

*b)* That the essence of understanding is in intellectual knowing, and not the other way around, as if the essence of intellectual knowing were understanding.

To know something intellectually consists in having its reality before our intelligence. The effort of intellectual knowing does not primarily consist in the effort to understand, but in the effort to apprehend reality. A great intelligence is a great capacity to have the real unfolded before it, a great capacity to apprehend the real. To intellectually know something is to apprehend its reality; intellection is apprehension of reality. I indicated in chapter IV that apprehension of reality is the elemental act of intellection. That does not mean that it is some sort of rudimentary act, but rather is the basic formal structure of every intellection as such. Intellectual knowing is always and only apprehending reality. Understanding is only a special act of intellection, i.e., one act among others of apprehension of reality. The rest of the special acts of intelligence are to apprehend reality more and better; i.e., to know intellectually better.

B) Intellectual knowing, I said, is apprehending the real as real. And for this reason the word ‘real’ (and hence the word ‘reality’) has a double function in this sentence. On one hand, {250} ‘reality’ designates the proper formal object of intellectual knowing. An animal does not apprehend reality because the proper formal object of his apprehensions is not reality but stimulation. But on the other hand, ‘reality’ also designates the structural nature of the act of intellectual knowing, viz. that type of turning of the apprehension to the real. That is to say, reality is not only the formal object of intellection; intellection itself consists formally in being apprehension of the real as real.

C) Whence the unity between intelligence and reality is not a “relation” but merely “respectivity”; it is “being here-and-now” apprehensively in reality. This apprehensive being is described through its three moments:

a) We are actually, in reality, sensing what is sensed as *de suyo*, i.e., we are actually in reality sentiently. Hence, to say that I am actually sensing something real is to express that I am intellectually knowing, that I am here-and-now apprehensively in reality. From this point of view, reality could better be termed *sentible* than *sensible*.

b) This “being here-and-now” has a very precise character. It is to be here-and-now merely actualizing what is apprehended, in which we are here-and-now. “To be here-and-now” is here mere actualization.

c) In this actualization we are here-and-now installed in reality. Reality is not something to which one must go, but primarily something in which one already is here-and-now, and in which, as we shall see, we never cease to be here-and-now. When we sentiently apprehend a real thing we are already intellectually installed in real-

ity. Intellectual knowing is being here-and-now apprehensively in reality, in what things are *de suyo*.

This installation has a dual character. Upon intellectually knowing a real thing, we remain installed in it. But this installation is, in one aspect, ultimately very fleeting; {251} another real thing may immediately supervene, and upon intellectually knowing this new thing we are in *it*. According to this first characteristic, installation is being here-and-now installed in a real thing. But this does not completely exhaust the nature of installation, because as we have seen, the impression of reality in which we intellectually know each real thing is identically and numerically the same in all apprehensions. Reality reifies whatever comes to the real. The content of each real thing remains thus inscribed, so to speak, in the same impression of reality given to us by the previous real thing. That is to say, as we saw in chapter IV, the impression of reality is transcendently open. And this means that when we intellectually know a real thing, that in which we are installed is not only this real thing, but also pure and simple reality. A real thing thus has two functions: that of being *something* real, and that of being *pure and simple reality*. There is an essential linkage between these two moments. This linkage does not consist in being a juxtaposition or an adding together of the real thing and reality, because pure and simple reality is not a type of sea in which real things float around. No, reality is nothing outside of real things. Nonetheless, it is not something identical to all of them nor to their sum. Rather, it is just the moment of transcendence of each real thing. This is the linkage between the two moments of the real thing and reality: transcendence. In virtue of it, we are in pure and simple reality by being here-and-now, and only by being here-and-now, in each real thing. When we apprehend a real thing, its force of imposition is as we saw a ratification. Now, this ratification, this force of imposition, is not only the force with which this real thing is imposed upon us, but also the force with which, *in it*, pure and simple reality is transcendently imposed upon us. Ultimately, {252} to know intellectually is, I repeat, constitutively and formally to be here-and-now apprehending pure and simple reality, i.e. what things are *de suyo* as such. Therefore this installation in pure and simple reality is physical and real, because the transcendence of the impression of reality is physical and real. When we sentiently apprehend a thing as real, we are actually *with* the real thing, but we are with that thing *in* reality.

Thus, reality is not something which needs to be justified for the intelligence; rather, it is something which is not only immediately apprehended, but also—and above

all—constitutively apprehended. We are thus not dealing with conceptual constructions and chains of reasoning, but merely with an analysis of any act of intellection whatsoever.

The intrinsic and formal unity of the three moments (sensing the real, mere actualization, and installation) is what constitutes sentient intelligence. Sentible reality is apprehended in sentient intelligence, and its apprehension is just an actualization which apprehensively installs us in reality. We are installed in reality by sensing, and for this reason to sense the real is to be here-and-now intellectually knowing.

But this apprehension of the real is modalized, because the impression of reality is transcendently open. Whence apprehension itself is transcendently modalized. This is the second point that we must examine.

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§ 2

### WHAT IS MODALIZATION?

To know intellectually, I said, is just to actualize the real as real. But there are different *modes of actualization*. I am not referring to the different modes in which the senses present to us what is apprehended “of its own”. Here by ‘mode’ I understand not these different modes of sensing the real, but the different modes of actualization in sentient intellection *qua* intellection, determined by the different modes of reality itself.

Every intellection is, I repeat, just actualization of the real; but the real is respective. Now, each real thing is not only respective to intellectual knowing, but as real is *de suyo* something respective to other real things. Reality, in fact, is a transcendently “open” formality. The real has, then, different real respectivities. And all of them are anchored in the structure of each real thing. Thus when a real thing is actualized in intellection, it can be actualized in its different formal respects. And because of this the intellectual actualization itself can be affected by the diversity of formal respects of each thing. The diversity of the actualization of the real according to its different formal respects constitutes what I here call *modes of intellection*. Permit me to explain.

For the effects of our problem, let us recall that reality is transcendently open formality. This openness is primordially the openness of each real thing to its own content; but it is also and at one and the same time openness {254} to the reality of other things. Things are real

in and through themselves, but they are also given respectively to other real things by the transcendental openness in which the formality of reality consists. Now, the intellection of one real thing respective to others constitutes the intellection of what that real thing is “in reality”. What is apprehended in and by itself is always real; but how it is apprehended with respect to other real things determines the question of what that real thing is “in reality”. To apprehend what something is in reality already implies the apprehension that this something is real, and that its reality is determined with respect to other realities. If it were not for this respectivity, the apprehension of the real would not give rise to the question of what a real thing is in reality because we would already have an exhaustive apprehension of the real thing *qua* real. This “*qua* real” is just its respectivity to every other reality; but then it is this respectivity which, in a single act of apprehension of the real, will actualize reality for us in and by itself, as well as what the thing is in reality. But this does not prevent the two dimensions “reality” and “in reality” from being formally different. Let us not forget, indeed, that we are not dealing with two actualizations but with two modes of the same actualization. Including them in a single act does not imply abolishing their essential difference.

Now, the respectivity to other real things is not something univocal, because the openness of the formality of reality has, as we saw, different lines so to speak. Hence, real things are actually transcendently open in different formal respects. In each of them we intellectually know what the thing is in reality. They are different modes of intellection. And since there are two respects, {255} it follows that there are two different modes of intellection of what something is in reality. We shall see this in great detail in the two following parts of the book.

These two modes are not only different, but in their diversity intrinsically and formally involve a basic structure with respect to which each mode is not just a diversity but a *modalization*. What is this basic structure? To see it, it suffices to attend to what I just said. Intellectually knowing what a thing is *in reality* is another mode of intellectually knowing what is already so known in and by itself *as reality*. This is, then, the basic formal structure, the apprehension of something “as reality”. The “in reality” is a modalization of the “as reality”.

The foundation of this modalization is clear. The real is sensed in an impression of reality, and this impression is the unity of all of the modes by which the real is present to us in what is sensed. One of these modes is reality in the sense of “toward”. Now, the real which is transcendently open in the “toward” is what inexorably

determines the modes of intellection. A real thing as transcendently open toward another thing is just what determines the intellection of what that former thing is in reality. The “toward” in itself is only a mode of reality’s being here-and-now present. But when the “toward” is considered as a transcendently open moment, then it determines the intellection of what the real thing is in reality.

But this reveals to us that that basic structure of intellection, of the mere actualization of the reality of something, has a precise character; because in order to be able to talk about what something is “in reality”, the thing must be already apprehended “as real” in and by itself. {256} And this means that the apprehension of the real thing as something, prior to its subsequent modalization, constitutes at one and the same time a proper and primary mode of intellection. This is just what I call the *primordial apprehension of reality*. The intellection of what something is “in reality” is, then, a modalization of the intellection of what this something is “as reality”. With respect to this primordial apprehension, the other modes of intellection are not primordial but *ulterior* or *subsequent*. ‘Ulterior’ comes from a very old Latin word *uls* which means *trans*. It only survives in the positive form *ultra*, the comparative form *ulterior*, and the superlative form *ultimus*. So we are not dealing, then, with “another” intellection but with a different mode of the same intellection. This is the first intellection itself, but “ulteriorized” so to speak. I will shortly explain this more rigorously.

The primordial apprehension of reality coincides with the mere intellection of a real thing in and by itself, and therefore, with the impression of reality. It is for this reason that I have indiscriminately used the expressions for the impression of reality, “intellection of the real in and by itself”, and “primordial apprehension of reality”. But now it is fitting to distinguish them. In this primary intellection there is the “formal” aspect of being an intellection, viz. the mere impressive actualization of the real in and by itself. And there is the “modal” aspect of primordiality. Now, that about which we are now asking ourselves is intellection *qua* primordial mode of apprehension of the real. This is the third point.

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§ 3

### THE PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY

By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is appre-

hension of reality in and by itself. This intellection, as we saw in chapter III, is in a radical sense an apprehension of the real which has its own characteristics. It is fitting to repeat this in order to focus better upon our present question. Intellection is formally *direct* apprehension of the real—not via representations or images. It is an *immediate* apprehension of the real, not grounded on inferences, reasoning processes, or anything of that nature. It is a *unitary* apprehension. The unity of these three moments is what makes what is apprehended to be apprehended in and by itself. And we have also observed that this unity does not mean that what is apprehended in and by itself is something simple. Just the opposite: apprehension can have and indeed always has—except in a few cases—a great variety of notes. For example, when we apprehend a landscape, what is apprehended has an immense variety of notes. If I apprehend them unitarily and not as notes and things related to each other, then the landscape, despite its enormous variety of notes, is apprehended in and by itself, i.e., unitarily. Moreover, what is apprehended not only can have a great variety of notes, but these notes can also be *variable*. And this is essential, as we shall see. The landscape, in fact, may have flowing water, or undergo changes in lighting, etc. Though varied and variable in its notes, if the content is apprehended directly, immediately, and unitarily, {258} it is apprehended in and by itself. To be the apprehension of something in and by itself is not, then, the same as having simplicity of notes. And as we shall see below, this observation is essential.

Every intellection is mounted in one or another way on this intellection of the real in and by itself. Nonetheless, that intellection is modalized. This means that the intellection of the real in and by itself, besides being what is “formally” intellective, has its own “modal” character, a primordial modality; the apprehension of something in and by itself is, modally, the primordial apprehension of reality. What does this mean?

As I just said, every intellection is based on apprehension of the real in and by itself. But I can have this apprehension in two ways. I can take it as the basis of other intellections, e.g., as the basis for judging what is apprehended. But I can have the apprehension of something in and by itself “only” as something in and by itself. Then this moment of the “only” constitutes the modal character of the apprehension; the intellection of something “only” as real in and by itself is modalized by the “only” in the primordial apprehension of reality. This is the primary mode of intellection.

Nor is this a subtle point. It might seem so if I consider that what is apprehended is a system of notes. But if I consider the apprehension of a real note, just in and by

itself, then it is clear that the concept of primordial apprehension has a great simplicity both in the first and second cases. Let us take, for example, the color green. Apprehending it in and by itself would signify that there is an apprehension of this color as the unique real terminus of apprehension. This would be what has {259} usually been called the sensation of green. Experimental psychology debated this problem of sensation: Does pure sensation really exist in this sense? The experimental discussions have been numerous, but they do not affect our problem, because the fact that something is real in and by itself does not mean that it is separated from everything else. If I perceive a tree with all of its notes, I may direct my attention to but a single one of them, e.g., the color green. This note is given in the system with the others, but I can fix my attention on it alone. Then that note is apprehended in a primordial apprehension of reality even though it may not be in itself an elemental sensation, i.e. a terminus separated from everything else. The problem of the primordial apprehension of reality is not a problem of the psychology of sensation. The problem of the apprehension of a note just in and by itself is thus not identified with the classic problem of that note's sensation. In sensation one tries to *isolate* a note perceptively. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is no *dividing up* of anything; rather one perceptively *fixes* upon a single note even though it may be part of a system.

Hence—independently of this question—a system as complex as a landscape, if apprehended only in and by itself, is *as a primordial apprehension of reality* something as simple as the apprehension of a single note. Modality is essential to the intellection; and as modality, primordial apprehension encompasses everything from the apprehension of a single note to the apprehension of a system as enormously complicated as a landscape.

And now two questions inevitable arise: What is the constitutive act of the primordial apprehension of {260} reality? And, What is the proper intellectual nature of what is apprehended in this act?

In the first place, let us consider the *constitutive act* of the *primordial* apprehension of reality. I speak of “constitutive act” in a loose sense, because it is not an act but a mode of the act of intellection. This mode, as I have already said, is fixation or concentration; I concentrate on one or several notes, or even the whole system considered unitarily. Now, this concentration *qua* intellectual modal act, or rather as primary modality of the intellectual act, is *attention*. Attention is not just one psychological phenomenon among others; it is a modal moment of intellection, because attention is not “simple” concentration. It is

a proper intellectual mode, that mode by which I concentrate “only” on that which I apprehend in and by itself. Strictly speaking, it is not an act of attention but an *attentive intellection*. As concentration, attention has two moments. One is the moment in which I center myself on what is apprehended; this is the *moment of centering*. The other is the moment which I shall call the *moment of precision*; it is the moment in which what is not apprehended as center remains on the periphery of the apprehension. This does not mean that it is not apprehended, but that what is apprehended outside of the center is not the subject of attentive concentration. Thus it is not *excision* but simple *marginalization*. Nor are we referring to mere abstraction, because what is not centered is nonetheless actually apprehended, but in a special form, viz. it is co-apprehended, it is apprehended but “imprecisely”. ‘Imprecision’ does not mean here that it is apprehended incorrectly, confusedly, or anything of that nature. Rather, *im-precision* regains its etymological sense of not having to do with precisely what I am here-and-now doing, with what I am now {261} intellectually knowing.

And similarly, ‘precise’ does not mean the correctly and distinctly apprehended, but to be something which I am singling out without singling out everything else. The “precise” in the ordinary sense of the word, viz. what is distinct, clear, etc., is always something grounded on the “precise” as that which I am singling out. Only because I look in a precise sense at something, and not at something else, only for this reason can I see or not see with precision what this something is. Now, what is not the center of attention is imprecisely relegated to the margin or periphery. And it is then that what is the center of attention is apprehended in and by itself, and only in and by itself, i.e., it is precisely here-and-now or is precisely apprehended.

The intellection of something in this way is what I call “primordial apprehension of reality”. The primordial apprehension of reality is not what formally constitutes intellection, but is the primary modality of the intellection of the real in and by itself. This modality consists in what is apprehended being so precisely in attentive intellection.

In the second place, what in the positive sense is the nature of the actuality of what is intellectually known in this mode? Actuality is above all something which concerns the real itself; it is its proper actuality. But, as we have already said, the real has different formal respectivities. And the different modes of actualization depend upon the different modes of the actuality of the real. The modes of intellection correspond to these modes of actuality of the real in respectivity. The modes of intellection



are essentially and formally grounded on the different modes of actuality of the real; it is these modes which determine those intellections. The modes of intellectually knowing what a thing is in reality correspond to these modes of actuality. {262} Now, a mode of actualization in the attentive intellection pertains to the intellection of something real in and by itself, but “only” as real in and by itself. This mode of intellectually knowing depends upon the mode of actuality of the real, upon the “only” in which we apprehend the real in and by itself. This mode of actuality is formally “retention”; it is what the “only” expresses in a positive sense. A real thing, in and by itself, only as real in and by itself, is something whose actuality rests “only” on the real thing in and by itself. And this mode of actuality is just what I call *retention* of its own reality. Actuality in the mode of “only” is an actuality which retains its own reality and which, therefore, retains us in its apprehension. When we are actually apprehending something attentively we are retained by the real in its proper actuality. Retention is the positive and primary mode of actuality. In the primordial apprehension of reality we are, then, attentively retained by the real in its proper reality; this is the complete essence of the primordial apprehension of reality.

This retention in which we are on the part of the real admits various degrees. Retention as a modal moment of the apprehension of reality is only a line of actuality of the real. In this line different degrees can fit. The attentive intellection can make us concentrate at times on the real in a mode which is more or less “indifferent”; reality is intellectually known only in and by itself, step by step. At other times the attention more or less stays fixed upon a

thing. Both of these cases are equally degrees in the modal line of attentive intellection. There is finally a very important mode, “absorption”. {263} We are and remain-situated in a real thing as if there were nothing but this thing. The intellection is then as if completely emptied into what is apprehended, so much so that it does not even recognize that it is intellectually knowing.

Indifference, fixation, and absorption are three rigorously and formally intellectual qualities of the primordial apprehension of reality. They are not psychological states but modal qualities of intellection. For this reason they do not constitute degrees of primordial apprehension; they are only degrees of the exercise of the act of intellection, but not degrees of its formal structure, in the same way as vision, for example, has its own formal structure, always the same, independently of the fact that in the exercise of the faculty of vision there may be differences due to better or worse vision.

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In summary, to know intellectually is to apprehend something formally real; it is just impressive actuality of the real in and by itself. When we thus apprehend the real “only” as real in and by itself, then the intellectual apprehension has the modal character of attentive and retaining intellection of the real. This is the essence of the primordial apprehension of reality; it is the primary mode of intellection. The other modes are modalizations of this primary mode, subsequent modalizations of it. Its more rigorous albeit simply programmatic conceptualization is the theme of the next chapter. {264}

## CHAPTER IX THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION

It is most important to explain the relationship between the modes of intellection and the primordial apprehension of reality. And when this is done, we must pose two questions. First, the radical question: what are the ulterior<sup>1</sup> modes of actualization of the real? Second, in broad outline what are the ulterior modes of ulterior intellection *qua* intellection?

Thus we shall examine the following:

1. What ulteriority is.
2. The modes of ulterior actualization.
3. The modes of ulterior intellection.

### WHAT IS ULTERIORITY?

Ulteriority consists very concretely in intellectually knowing what that which has already been apprehended “as real” is “in reality”.

It might seem as though it is in these modes that intellection *par excellence* consists, while the primordial apprehension of reality is something quite poor. But this is not true. Though necessary, of the greatest richness, and of incalculable perspective, the ulterior modes of intellection are but succedaneous. It is only because the apprehension of something as real is insufficient that we have to intellectually know what that real thing is in reality. To be sure, the primordial apprehension of reality

essentially and inescapably involves a great determination of content. But despite this there is a certain insufficiency in that primordial apprehension. This insufficiency affects the content of the apprehension, specifically, the notes of the content. In ulterior modes of intellection, the content becomes immensely richer; but it is a content which is intellectual only by virtue of being inscribed within the moment of formality of reality of the primordial apprehension. It is not the content which constitutes the formal essence of intellection. To know intellectually is formally to apprehend reality, and to apprehend it just in its actuality of reality with all of its content. And in this respect the primordial apprehension of reality is not only much richer than the intellection of the ulterior modes, but is intellection *par excellence*, since {267} it is therein that we have actualized the real in its reality in and by itself. It is therein that all of the enrichments of the intellection of what something is in reality have to be inscribed. Hence, despite its enormous volume and richness, the intellection of the ulterior modes is unutterably poor with respect to the way in which the primordial apprehension apprehends reality. The intellection of the most poor reality intellectually known in the primordial apprehension is immensely richer as intellection than the intellection of reality in its ulterior modes. It is only as referred to the primordial apprehension of reality that the ulterior modes are what they are, viz. intellections of the real. It is because of this that these ulterior modes are just succedaneous.

On the other hand, precisely because the ulterior actuality consists in respectivity it follows that its intellection has a fuller content than that of the primordial apprehension. Of course, there is no more reality; but the reality is actualized more richly. If this were not so, the whole system—for example of the sciences—would be constitutively futile. Ulterior apprehension is the expansion of what is already apprehended as real in the primordial apprehension. And thus it is clear that what something is

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<sup>1</sup> [Readers should bear in mind that Zubiri employs the word ‘ulterior’ as a technical term, with its primary meaning that listed as first in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, “lying beyond that which is immediate or present, coming at a subsequent point or stage”—trans.]

“in reality” is an enrichment of what it is “as reality”. The unity of these moments is ulterior intellection.

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§ 2

### THE ULTERIOR MODES OF ACTUALIZATION

We have already seen that intellection formally consists just in the impressive actuality of the real as real. To reach this idea we have analyzed the intellection of a real thing in and by itself, and only in and by itself. But in general the impressive apprehension of the real apprehends the real in and by itself, to be sure, yet not “only” in and by itself, because several things are given in that apprehension at the same time; and each of them can be a terminus of intellection. There are several reasons for this. The first has to do with the nature of the attentive intellection. One’s attention can be directed more to some aspects than to others; thus what is perceived is so to speak fragmented into distinct things. What was unitarily “a landscape” in and by itself becomes a tree, a brook, a house, etc. Or it can be the case that one has an apprehension of things which are distinct not through fragmentation but because they are independent of each other. In every case, the intellectual apprehension is profoundly modified because we are not referring to the fact that these various things, each in and by itself, might be the terminus of a particular apprehension. If that were the case, we would have a multiplicity of apprehensions. We are not now referring to that but to the fact that there is a single apprehension whose terminus is formally multiple: I have different and distinct things within the same apprehension.

Thus things are apprehended distinctly, but not by virtue of being undivided. It thus happens that {269} apprehension itself as act has its own formal unity, different from the unity of each of the various apprehended things. So we can say that things apprehended as multiple in this case nonetheless constitute a particular unity. A thing is real in and by itself; but reality is formally and constitutively respective. Whence it follows that the real is not just real but is diversely respective reality. The actualization of the real is intrinsically and formally modalized *qua* actualization.

The foundation of this modalization is clear, as we have seen; it is the “towards” as transcendental openness. This openness has different directions, so to speak.

Above all there is the openness of the thing apprehended as real to other real things which are also appre-

hended. This is the openness of the “its-ownness” of each real thing, apprehended as real, to the “its-ownness” of other things, also apprehended as real. It is the openness of each thing apprehended with respect to apprehended “its-ownness” of other things. When a real thing is actualized respectively to other real things in the direction of openness, we say that the thing is found in a *field of reality*. To intellectually know what a real thing is in reality is now to intellectually know it as a moment of the field of reality, as being respective to other things of the field.

But the formality of reality is respectively open in another direction as well. By being pure and simple reality, it is transcendently open to being a moment of reality itself. It is, then, open to what we have called the *world*. Thus to intellectually know what a real thing is in reality is to intellectually know it as a moment of the world.

These are two different modes of intellection because we intellectually know different modes of ulterior actualization of the real. {270} To intellectually know what a color, which we see, is in reality is to intellectually know what it is in the field-sense with respect to other notes, e.g. sound. But to intellectually know what that color is in reality as a moment of the world is something different; it is to intellectually know it, for example, as a light wave or a photon.

Respectivity in a field and worldly respectivity are not, to be sure, two respectivities; but they are two different dimensions of the respectivity of the real as such. We shall dwell a bit on these points.

The field of reality is not an order of things which is extrinsic to their reality. On the contrary, it is an intrinsic moment of each thing, a field-sense moment of it. Even if there were but a single real thing, this thing would still be in a field, i.e., of field-nature. As we know, each real thing has a moment of content and one of formality. It is only by the second moment that things constitute a field of real things. Since things themselves in our impression of reality give us their moment of reality, it follows that the field of reality is determined by real things themselves and not just by the unity of my act of perception. This reality is in fact formally and constitutively open, as we saw. And only because each thing is intrinsically and formally open to a field, only because of this can many things be in a field. In virtue of it, there is a rigorously cyclic respectivity between a real thing and the field of reality. Each real thing grounds the field, but the field reworks, so to speak, the real things which have determined it. This is also what happens in physical nature. The charges on bodies generate the electromagnetic field, just as masses

generate the {271} gravitational field; but these fields affect the charges and masses of the bodies, so that the field itself acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the bodies. For a trivial analogy, we might say that a real thing is a source of light which spreads light everywhere, i.e. generates the field of clarity. And in this clarity, i.e., in this light, we not only see the other things but also the source of light itself. Whence the field of clarity acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the sources of light. The field moment does not withdraw us from real things, but draws us more deeply into them because it is a constitutive moment of the formality of reality *qua* transcendently open.

As a concept, the field forms an essential part of scientific knowledge. Given a certain quantity, if at each point in space this quantity has a fixed value only by virtue of its position, physicists say that this space constitutes a field. Thus Einstein was able to say that a field is nothing but the physical state of space. Space as a kind of empty recipient of every structure is a chimera; that which we might call 'empty space' is purely and simply nothing—a splendid definition.<sup>2</sup> In other sciences as well, for example biology, one speaks at times of phyletic fields.

The field of reality does not coincide with this physical field nor with the phyletic field, because both space and the phyletic directions are but moments of reality, moments of the field of reality. Thus, for example, every distance is a moment of the field of reality and not the other way around. Whatever space may turn out to be, it must always be understood from the standpoint of the field of reality, rather than the field being understood from the standpoint of space. Every real thing {272} *qua* real is constitutively open, and this openness toward other things is above all transcendently that of a field.

But the real is not open only to the "its-ownness" of each real thing; that which is really its own is, by the mere fact of being so, *reality*. In virtue of this, the real is a moment of pure and simple reality and, therefore, everything real in its immense multiplicity has a certain proper unity as worldly reality. This unity does not consist in the *unification* of real things *qua* real, but is *unity* itself as an intrinsic and constitutive moment of each real thing *qua* real. This unity of moments is what constitutes the world. Even if there were only a single real thing, it would be formally worldly.

In summary, each thing is real in and by itself, and is

reality which is in a field and in the world. These two latter moments are, then, two dimensions of transcendentality. But they are not independent. Each thing is purely and simply real, i.e. worldly, because "its-ownness" is what constitutes it as real. And because this respective reality is above all in a field, it follows that worldly transcendence affects the field itself. Conversely, a field is nothing but the world *qua* sensed moment of "its-ownness". And since this "its-ownness" is sensed in the manner of a field, it follows that the field is the world *qua* sensed; it is the field which is constitutively open to the world. The world is the sensed transcendentality of the field.

And this is not just some conceptual subtlety. The thrust of this distinction can be seen most clearly in human reality. For purposes of clarity, {273} when one speaks of realities, one always thinks of a real thing as something distinct from oneself. But this is essentially false; real things are not just the rest of the real things, but also include me as a reality. Now, my reality (i.e. every human reality) has actualization in a field. This is what ultimately constitutes what we term the 'personality' of each individual. Personality is a mode of actuality of my own reality in the field of all other realities and of my own reality. And for this reason, personality is inexorably subject to the inevitable vicissitudes of the field of reality. So on account of my personality I am never the same. My own personal life is of a character defined by a field. But what I am as reality is not exhausted in what I am in contradistinction to all other things and my reality among them; rather, my reality in a field, my personality, also includes other things as moments of my personal life. Thus, meaning-things, which are not pure and simple reality, are nonetheless constructed moments of each thing with my personal life. Every meaning-thing is a constructed moment of the field-sense actuality in which my personality consists. But my reality also has a worldly actuality. I am a person, i.e. I have personhood, and as pure and simple reality, my reality is not personality; it is something more elemental and radical, viz. personhood. As a worldly moment, I am a person, i.e. personhood, and as a field-sense moment, I am personality. And thus we can see what is of a field-nature, i.e. the personality, is the personhood actualized in a field. Personality is the field-sense qualification of personhood. For this reason I am always the same (personhood) although never the same thing (personality). {274}

Actuality in a field and worldly actuality are, then, different modalities of the respective actualization of the real. And each of these actualizations determines a proper mode of intellection.

<sup>2</sup> [Zubiri's meaning here is obscure; even empty space is teeming with virtual particles which pass in and out of existence in accordance with the Uncertainty Principle,  $\Delta t \cdot \Delta E \geq \hbar$  —trans.]

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§ 3

## THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION

Intellection is always just the actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. This intellection is precisely the primordial apprehension of the real in and by itself. But the real as sensed is ulteriorly actualized as in a field and as in the world. Thus it is that what is intellectually known as real can be ulteriorly known intellectually according as it is “in reality”. This “in reality” has the two dimensions of being in a field and being in the world.

To intellectually know what something real is in reality is above all to intellectually know the already apprehended real as real, according as it is what it is in a field with respect to other things. This intellection is no longer primordial. I intellectually know what a real thing is in reality as “its-ownness”; I intellectually know what the real thing is in function of other realities. And this intellection is what constitutes the *logos*. *Logos* is the intellection of what the real is in its reality in a field. So I intellectually know a real thing from the standpoint of other real things; I intellectually know it therefore in the field-sense. Hence the *logos* is an enrichment of the content of the primordial apprehension; the enrichment which “proceeds from”, and is “grounded in” the other things of the field “toward” which what the *logos* intellectually knows is open in the field sense. The openness of a field is the foundation of the *logos* and of the enrichment of the content of primordial apprehension. Here ‘*logos*’ means not only a proposition or a judgment, primarily because simple apprehension as judicatory apprehension pertains so essentially to it, {276} and the *logos* itself consists in its constitutive unity. Simple apprehension is not just something to which a judgment is added; rather, it is nothing by itself and is what it is only in its intrinsic unity with judgment. Conversely, no judgment can be a judgment if what is affirmed is not firmly part of what is simply apprehended. This is the *logos*. What is the intrinsic nature of this unity? We shall see it subsequently: it is a dynamic unity. Why? Because every intellection is sentient. The ulterior intellection which the *logos* is, is a modalization of sentient intellection. And this modalization is grounded upon the dynamism of the *logos*. The *logos* is formally *sentient logos*, and for this reason, and only for this reason, it is a dynamic *logos*.

But there is another reason not to confuse *logos* with judgment. *Logos* does not always rest upon itself *qua* judgment, but can rest upon other *logoi*. Thus it pertains to the *logos* not just to be a judgmental intellection, *logis-*

*mos*, but also to be an intellection grounded on other *logoi*, i.e. *sylogismos*, what is usually termed ‘reasoning’. *Logos* is not only judgment; it can also be *co-legere* or inference in a field. This inferring has been called ‘reasoning’. But the word is incorrect; it might seem to indicate that reason consists formally in reasoning, in mounting one *logos* upon one or more others. But this is doubly false, because in the first place reasoning does not by itself constitute an intellection of the real; indeed it does not go beyond being a mode of the *logos* itself as mere intellection. And in the second place, reason, as I am about to discuss, does not aim at the *logos* but at the real itself; and this is not a constituent of reasoning. {277}

And here once again the greatest amplitude, the greatest enrichment proper to ulterior intellection reappears. The real in and by itself is reality apprehended in a primordial apprehension; and conversely, reality as real is not actualized as real except in primordial apprehension. But not everything excluded from this primordial apprehension is also excluded from its intellection in the *logos*. Thus, what we call a table is not something actualized in the primordial apprehension of reality, because the real as such is not the table as table, but as a “thing” with properties; and it is only a table in a constructed function with the reality of my life. I do not apprehend tables, but I have a *logos* of tables, and in general of every meaning-thing. This is the enrichment of the reality of my life as constructed with the real. *Logos* does not amplify reality, but constitutes an undeniable enrichment of its content.

*Logos*, then, is a dynamic intellection in a field of what something is in reality. But there is another mode of intellection, the intellection of the real as a moment of the world. Now, the world is the transcendental part of the field, because the field is nothing but the world as sensed. Hence, intellection of the real as in the world is formally based on intellection of the real as in a field, i.e. on the *logos*. It is for this reason that the former intellection is not a simple mode of the *logos*, viz. it is an intellection of the world. And this intellection is what formally and rigorously constitutes what we call *reason*. It is not an argument nor the result of arguments or other chains of reasoning, but a progression from reality in a field to worldly reality. This progression cannot be reduced to the *logos*. To be sure, it is dynamic; but not every dynamism is a progression. The *logos* does not progress toward anything, but is already in a field and moves in the real already {278} apprehended in the field. On the other hand, the dynamism of reason consists in being here-and-now in progress. It is not a dynamism within a field but a dynamism which leads from the field to the world. Reason is not argument but transcendental progress toward the

world, toward pure and simple reality. Since the “toward” is a sensed moment of the real, it follows that not only is the logos sentient, but reason itself is too; it is *sentient reason*. In virtue of this the expression “toward” reality can lead to a mistake, that of confounding “towards” other things with “towards” the world. Both reason and logos are grounded upon the “towards” of the transcendental openness of the real as such. The “towards” is therefore a “towards” within the real. Thus we are not referring to a dynamism or progression “toward” reality; on the contrary, we have a dynamism and a progress which is already within reality itself. Reason does not have to “achieve” reality because it is born and progresses in it.

In other words, the field-nature moment and the worldly moment are modes of actualization which are determined intrinsically and formally by the real itself. And as every intellection is actualization of the real, it follows that the real known intellectually and respectively to another real thing has two moments of actuality. The first is the moment of reality in and by itself; it is the primary and radical actuality, what rather vaguely and imprecisely I have called ‘the individual moment of reality’. But the real in respectivity does not have a new actuality; rather, what it acquires is the actuality of its own reality respectively to other things. So we are not dealing with another actualization but a re-actualization of what the real is in and by itself. The intellection of the real in this aspect is, then, constitutively “re-actuality”. This “re” is what {279} formally expresses the fact that we are dealing with an ulterior intellection. Ulterior intellection is a re-

actualization in which the actuality of a thing is intellectually known as actualized with respect to another reality.

Since primordial apprehension is sentient and takes place in impression, ulterior intellection is impressive ulteriority; hence logos is sentient and reason is sentient. Ulteriority is grounded in the very structure of the impression of reality. The intellection of a real thing as respectively open, as re-actualized, is what I call ‘intellectually knowing what the real is “in reality”.’ What is primordially apprehended is always real; but if we ask what it is in reality, this “in reality” consists in an actual determination of the real thing with respect to other real things. If this were not so, the apprehension of the real would not give rise to the question of what this real thing is in reality. All that is possible only because intellection is sentient. Hence, neither logos nor reason has to get to reality; on the contrary, reality is actualized in sentient intellection. It is because of this, and only because of it, that logos and reason arise, and that both of these intellections take place already within reality. It is, I repeat, why logos is sentient and reason likewise is sentient.

How this ulterior modalization occurs, and what the structure of its link to primordial apprehension of reality is, will be the respective themes of the other two parts of the book. They are the themes of the dynamic sentient logos, and the progress of the sentient reason.

But before embarking on that task, it will not be out of place to return to the point of departure of this first part in order to see better the unity of our analysis. {280}



## CHAPTER X

### SENTIENT INTELLECTION AND HUMAN STRUCTURES

This study has been an analysis of intellection as apprehension of the real and of its primary mode, the primordial apprehension of reality. To facilitate the task, I have contrasted the analysis of intellectual apprehension with apprehension which is just sensible, with pure sensing.

Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing. And sensing is a process having three essential moments: arousal, tonic modification, and response. Now, arousal as a moment of sensing takes place in impression. An impression thus has two quite different aspects. One is the aspect in which the impression is an arousing function. But there is another aspect which is prior and more radical, viz. what the impression is in its own formal structure. Arousal and impression must not be confused: arousal is a function of an impression, and is grounded on the latter's formal structure. Arousal is of a process character; impression of a structural character. They are, thus, two different problems.

I began by studying the formal structure of impression. An impression is an apprehensive act; hence {282} it is necessary to speak of impressive apprehension. Sensing is apprehending impressively, and this apprehension is what formally constitutes sensing. An impression has three essential moments: affection of the sentient being, presentation of what is sensed, i.e., otherness (in its dual moment of content and formality), and the force with which the sensed is imposed upon the sentient being. This sensing has two different natures which depend upon the formality of otherness. Otherness as stimulation is what constitutes the pure sensing proper to animals. Stimulation consists in that formality by which what is sensed is formally just a sign of tonic modification and of response. But otherness can be of a different nature, if the formality of what is sensed consists in what is sensed being something *de suyo*, something “of its own”; this is the formality of reity or reality. Now, to apprehend reality is the formally proper role of intellection; hence, impressive

apprehension of reality, impression of reality, is formally sentient intellection.

This sentient intellection constitutes the proper and formal structure of intellectual knowing. It is what we have studied throughout the course of this first part of the book. By way of complement to it—and only as complement—let us now direct our attention to the other aspect of intellection, viz. sentient intellection as a determinant moment of the human process. I have already said something about this subject in Chapter IV. It leads us to two questions: the determination of the other two moments of tonic modification and response, and the moment of the unity of the process of sentient intellection *qua* process.

A) Above all there is the determination of the other two specifically human structures. Intellection {283} determines the affects or tonic modifications. I speak of “affects” in order to distinguish them from the affections proper to every impression. The modification of the animal affects by the impression of reality is what constitutes *feeling* or *sentiment*. Feeling is an affect of the real; it is not something merely “subjective”, as is usually claimed. Every feeling presents reality *qua* tonically modifying as reality. Feeling is in itself a mode of turning toward reality. In turn, response is a determination in reality; it is volition. When the sentient tendencies describe reality to us as determinable, determining, and determined, then the response is *will*. Feeling is the sentient affect of the real; volition is a determining tendency in the real. Thus, just as intellection is formally sentient intellection, so also feeling is an affecting feeling and volition is a tending will. The essential part of sensing in its three moments of arousal, tonic modification, and response is formally structured in intellectual apprehension, in feeling, and in volition. Only because there is sentient apprehension of the real, i.e., only because there is impression of reality, is there feeling and volition. Intellection is thus the determinant of the specifically human structures.



To be sure, we are dealing with intellection in its function of sentiently installing us in the real. We are not dealing with what is usually called *intellectualism*. Intellectualism is not given other than in the conceptualizing intelligence; it consists, in fact, in assigning to concepts the radical and primary function. But here we are not talking about a concept being the determinant of the other structures; that would be totally false. Here we are talking about sentient intelligence; and what this intelligence makes {284} is not concepts but the apprehension of what is sensed as real. It is not, then, an intellectualism; it is, rather, something different *toto caelo*, what I might call an *intellectionism*. We are dealing with intellection as sentient apprehension of the real; and without this intellection there would not be, nor could there be, feeling or volition.

B) Now, the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and effective response is the intrinsic and formal unity of the structure of sensing as sensing. Sensing is not something which only concerns arousal; rather it is the intrinsic and indivisible unity of the three moments of arousal, tonic modification, and effective response. This unity of sensing is primary and radical; hence, the formal structure of sentient intellection, when it determines the openness of a formality distinct from the merely sentient, does not break the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and response of animal sensing. Not only does it not break it, but indeed it enters into play precisely by the structure of hyperformalization, which is a structural moment that is properly sentient. Whence it follows that the unity of what is intellectually known as real is a unity which does not eliminate sentient unity, nor is superimposed upon it (as has been said from the standpoint of the conceptualizing intelligence throughout the course of philosophy), but is a unity which absorbs and formally contains the structure of animal sensing. Directed to reality, man is thus the *animal of realities*; his intellection is sentient, his feeling is affecting, his volition is tending.

When it determines these specifically human structures, intellection inexorably determines the proper character of life in its unfolding. Human life is life in “reality”; hence, it is something determined by intellection {285} itself. If we employ the word ‘thinking’, not in a rigorous and strict sense (that we shall do in other parts of the book), but in its everyday sense, we shall have to say that it is intellection, the sentient apprehension of the real, which determines the thinking character which life has. It would be false to say that it is life which forces us to think; it is not life which forces us to think, but intellection which forces us to live as thinking.

But this processive function of intellection as life is something which does not intervene in any way whatsoever in the structural nature or in the formal nature of sentient intellection as such. The conceptualization of the act of sentient intellection is the only thing which is involved in the response to the question “What is intellectual knowing?”. I have explained this structure in the previous chapters; and it is fitting to emphasize that what is expressed in them is not a theoretical construct, but a simple analysis—to be sure prolix and complicated—but just a simple analysis of the act of sentient intellection, i.e., of the impression of reality.

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With this we have responded to the question of what intellectual knowing is; it is just impressive actuality of the real, just actuality of the real in the sentient intelligence. The primary mode of this intellection is the primordial apprehension of reality. Now we come face to face with the problem of the ulterior modes of intellection; that will be the object of the following two parts of the book. The second will treat of the *sentient logos*, and the third of *sentient reason*.