

PART THREE

INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this book we have analyzed what intellectual knowing is. Intellectual knowing is just the actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. Reality is a formality of what is impressively apprehended, i.e., is a formality given in the impression of reality. What we intellectually know in it is thus that what is apprehended is *real*.

The impression of reality is transcendently open. Reality is open in itself *qua* reality. And in virtue of this everything real is so respectively.

Reality is impressively open above all to the reality proper to each thing. Each real thing is *its own reality*. When we apprehend something real just insofar as it is its own reality, this intellectual apprehension is the *primordial apprehension* of the real. In order not to encumber the expression I shall simply call “its own reality” by the term ‘real’; this has all been analyzed in Part I of the book.

The real is, moreover, impressively open to the reality of other real things sensed in the same impression of reality; each real thing is sensed with respect to other real things that are also sensed, or at least are capable of being sensed. The sentient intellection of some real things sensed among {12} others so sensed is the *logos*. It is an intellection of what the real, apprehended as real in primordial apprehension, is *in reality*. It is not the same thing to intellectually know that something is real as to intellectually know what this real thing is in reality. We have analyzed the structure of this intellection in Part II of the book.

However, the impression of reality is transcendently open not only to each real thing, and not only to other real things sensed in the same impression, but to any other reality whatsoever, whether sensed or not. In the impression of reality, in fact, we apprehend not only that this color is real, that this color is its own reality (Part I). And not only what this color is in reality with respect, for

example, to other colors or other qualities, to wit, red (Part II). But we also apprehend that this red color is real with respect to pure and simple reality itself, for example that it is a photon or an electromagnetic wave. The impression of reality is thus an impression of pure and simple reality itself. That is to say, we apprehend in impression not only that a thing is *real*, and not only that this real thing is *in reality*, but also that this thing is purely and simply real *in reality itself*. It is not the same thing to intellectually know what something is in reality as to intellectually know what something is in reality *itself*.^{*} So much so, indeed, that as we shall see, what something is in reality *itself* may not resemble at all what it is in reality in impression. Here we have the third mode of intellection: the intellection of what a thing is in reality itself. That will be the subject of Part III. This intellection goes beyond logos. It is reason.

Reason is founded in primordial apprehension and in all the affirmative intellections which the logos has intellectually known in sentient fashion. That might cause one to think that {13} reason is a combination of affirmations, a reasoning process. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Reason is not a reasoning process. The difference between logos and reason is, in fact, an essential one. To be sure, both are movements starting from a real thing. But in the logos, this movement is from one real thing to another, whereas in reason, we are dealing with a movement from a real thing toward pure and simple reality itself. The two movements, then, are essentially distinct. I shall term this movement of reason a *progression* [*marcha*]. It is a progression from a real thing to pure and simple reality itself. Every progression is movement, but not every movement is a progression.

^{*} [Roughly speaking, Zubiri is drawing a distinction between the truth about something and the whole truth about it. For the former, we say, “In reality, the situation is...”; Zubiri uses *en la realidad* to express the *whole* truth about something, in-depth knowledge of it. There is no corresponding English idiomatic expression, so “in reality itself” is used.-trans.]

This progression is not a process, but a structural moment of intellectual knowing. It is not a type of “putting into action”, nor is it progress toward an intellection of the real as such. No one, so to speak, “starts” to intellectually know reality by means of reason. We are, rather, dealing with a structural moment. To be sure, it is not a structural moment of intellectual knowing as such; i.e., it is not a structural moment of intellection considered formally. Neither primordial apprehension nor logos are the progression in question, despite being intellections. But this does not mean that the progression is a type of summation of these previous structures, as if they were “uses” (arbitrary or necessary) of intellection; rather, it is just a modalization of intellection, a modalization of determinate structural character in the intelligence by the impression of reality. This modal determination is based structurally upon the two modalities of pure primordial apprehension and of logos. Only granting that we have impressively known intellectually that something is real (primordial apprehension), and what this real thing is in reality

{14} (logos), only granting these two intellectual moments is that moment of intellectual progression into reality determined, that progression which is reason. Intellectual knowing, by virtue of its structural nature, must of necessity progress, or rather, is already progressing since it is already reason through the very structure of the impression of reality given in primordial apprehension and in logos.

This is just what we must now study. The structural moment poses two groups of problems. In the first place, there are the problems concerning the nature of the progression of reason as such. In the second place, there are the problems concerning the formal structure of this new mode of intellection: that it is *knowing*. We shall examine these problems in two sections:

Section 1: The progression of intellectual knowing.

Section 2: The formal structure of this intellection through reason: the formal structure of knowing.

SECTION I

THE PROGRESSION OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING

As we have just indicated, the progression of intellectual knowing is not a *process* but a structural *progression* founded upon the other structural moments of intellectual knowing. But this does not go beyond being a vague indication, and moreover a negative one; it does not say what the progression is, only what it is not. We must delve into this problem of the progression in a positive way. Clearly, it is an intellectual progression, i.e., this progression is a moment of intellectual knowing itself. In progression one intellectually knows by progressing and one progresses by intellectually knowing. It is not, then, just a “progression of intellectual knowing”, but a “mode of intellection”; it is what I call ‘intellectual progression’.

As intellectual, it is a mode of actualizing the real. And this is decisive.

It is thus necessary to examine three problems: What is the intellectual progression of intellectual knowing *qua* progress? What is the progression of intellectual knowing *qua* intellectual? And, What is the formal object of this intellectual progression? That is to say, we have:

Chapter 2. What is Progression?

Chapter 3. Progression as Intellection

Chapter 4. The Formal Object of Intellectual Progression {16}

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS PROGRESSION?

Since we are dealing with a structural moment of intellectual knowing, it is necessary to return to the root of the question even at the risk of repeating some ideas already studied. Intellection sentiently apprehends things in their formality of reality. And this formality, impressively sensed, is intrinsically and constitutively *open* as reality. Each real thing consists not merely in “being here”, circumscribed and limited to its own notes; rather, *qua* reality, it consists formally and precisely in a positive openness to something which is not, formally, the thing itself. This openness—let it be said in passing—does not consist in what, with regard to another order of problems, I am accustomed to call ‘open essence’ as opposed to ‘closed essence’. The difference there touches upon the structure of what is real, whereas in our problem the openness concerns the very character of reality. In this sense, the closed essences themselves are, as reality, open essences.

In virtue of this, the formality of reality has, besides its individual moment, a moment of openness toward something beyond the reality considered individually. That is to say, a thing, by being real, exceeds or goes beyond itself in a certain way. {18} This moment of *going beyond* or *excedence* is grounded in the openness of the formality of reality. Every thing, by virtue of being real, is what it is; and considered according to its own *reality*, is in some way being more than itself.

Now, just on account of this character of excedence, the reality of each real thing is formally respective *qua* reality. The *respectivity* of reality is founded upon excedence. Everything real *qua* real is constitutively respective in its own, formal character of reality. Openness grounds excedence, and excedence grounds respectivity. Here I shall use the terms ‘excedence’ and ‘respectivity’ indiscriminately, and I shall also speak of respective excedence and of excedent respectivity.

Although what I am going to say of this respective excedence also concerns each real thing in its reality, nonetheless as it affects our present problem I shall refer

primarily to other aspects of apprehension.

The first is the field aspect. Reality is open in itself and from itself towards other real things sensed or sensible in the same impression of reality. That is, openness determines, in respective excedence, a field of reality. The field is not a type of ocean in which things are submerged; nor is it primarily something which encompasses all real things. Rather, it is something which each real thing, through its own reality, opens up from itself. Only through this openness is the field something excedent and respective. Only because “there is” a field can this field “encompass” sensed things. But this field that there is, or rather that there is this field, is owing to the openness of each real thing *from its own reality*. Indeed, even were there no more than a single thing, this thing would yet open the field. It is fitting to repeat this idea, already studied {19} in Part II, to bring the problem of Part III into focus.

But the formality of reality is also open insofar as it is the formality of reality pure and simple. This aspect, in which each real thing opens up the arena of pure and simple reality, is what constitutes the *world*. The world is not the conjunction of all real things (that would be the *cosmos*), nor is it what the word means when we say that everyone lives in his own world; rather, it is the mere character of reality pure and simple. I repeat what we just said about the field: were there but one single thing, there would still be a world. What happens is that with there being perhaps many—one would have to investigate—the world is the unity of all real things in their character of pure and simple reality.

Real things intellectually known in primordial apprehension and in field intellection are not just such-and-such real things. Upon intellectually knowing them, I do not intellectually know only that they are such-and-such; rather, upon knowing that, I also intellectually know, at one and the same time, that they are mere realities, that they are pure and simple reality. Now, reality as reality is

constitutively open, is transcendently open. In virtue of this openness, reality is a formality in accordance with which nothing is real except as open to other realities and even to the reality of itself. That is, every reality is constitutively respective *qua* reality.

Thus all real things have, *qua* purely and simply real, a unity of respectivity. And this unity of respectivity of the real *qua* real is what constitutes the world. Reality is not a transcendental *concept*, nor is it a concept realized transcendently in each real thing; rather, it is a *real and physical moment*, i.e., transcendentality is {20} just the openness of the real *qua* real. And *qua* unity of respectivity, reality is the world.

Let us not, then, confuse world and cosmos. There may be many *cosmoi* in the world, but there is only one single world. World is the transcendental function of the field and of the whole cosmos.

Field and world are not, then, identical; but neither are they independent. Upon knowing intellectually and sentiently this real thing, I intellectually know, sentiently, at one and the same time, that this thing is a moment of the pure and simply real. In the field we already know the world intellectually. Conversely, pure and simple reality, the world, is as I just said, the transcendental function of the field. And in this respect—and only in this one—can one say that the field is the world as sensed. Therefore strictly speaking one should say that in an impressive way the world is also sensed *qua* world. But its impression of reality is the same as that of this real thing sensed in and by itself or sensed within a field. Nonetheless the two are not identical because the field is always limited to the things that are in it. If the group of things in the field is augmented or diminished, the field expands or contracts. On the other hand the world is, always and essentially, open. Whence it is not susceptible to expansion or contraction, but to distinct realizations of respectivity, i.e., to distinct transcendental richness. This transcendental richness is what we shall call “world making” or “mundification”. The *field* dilates or contracts, the *world* mundifies. The world is open not only because we do not know what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all because no thing, however precise and detailed its constitution, is reality “itself” as such.

Now, in this respect, intellectually knowing a real thing is {21} intellectually knowing it open to ... what we do not intellectually know, and perhaps shall never know, what might be in reality itself. Therefore intellection of a thing *qua* worldly is not just a mere movement among things, but a *progression* toward the unknown and perhaps even toward meaninglessness or nothingness.

Our present question is to conceptualize what this progress is.

a) Above all, I repeat, it is a progression “from” the real, i.e., from an effective intellection. This intellection is not necessarily just the primordial apprehension of something; but it is always an intellection in which we have already intellectually known—or at least have sought to intellectually know—what that real thing is in reality. The point of departure is the entire primordial apprehension of the real, and of what this real is in reality with all the affirmations which constitute this intellection. The progression is then always progression from the great intellectual richness of the real.

b) The real opens reality from itself in the impression of reality; it is the openness of the moment of reality. With that, this moment of reality is made autonomous in a dimension other than that of individuality. And being made autonomous has two aspects. One is the aspect of this reality by which real things constitute a field; it is the constitutive moment in which the logos moves. In this movement of the logos, the moment of reality has a very precise function: it is the *medium* of intellection. But the moment of reality is autonomous in another respect. The impression of reality apprehends not only real things, but also that each real thing is pure and simple reality; it is openness not only to the field but to the world. A real thing is apprehended not according to what it is “in reality” but according to what it is “in reality itself”. One goes from real things and their field to the world: {22} this is the progression we are speaking of. In this openness, reality has been made autonomous: not only is it the *medium*, but it is also something intellectually known by itself. Reality, then, has another function which is very precise: it is the *measure* of what, in the world, the reality is which is going to be intellectually known. In fact, as one’s point of departure is real things and what these things are in reality, one progresses from these intellections while gathering in them another intellection, more or less explicit, of what *real* being is. To be sure, it is a being-*real* which concerns the things included in the field and therefore encompassed by it. But this being-*real* goes beyond those real things *qua* “real”. Hence it follows that in the previous intellection of these things, we have already intellectually known in some form what it is to be real. And then reality is no longer just the medium of intellection but is the measure of what is going to be intellectually known as purely and simply real in openness. As this openness of the real *qua* real is the world, it follows that ultimately the field itself has been provisionally converted into the measure of what is going to be intellectually known in the open world, into the measure of what

is going to be intellectually known in the open world, viz. what a thing is in reality itself. To progress in this open world is to move ourselves into a “formal” intellection, rather than a “provisional” one, of what it is to be real. As the world is formally a world open from reality, real things intellectually known in the field seek to determine a progression of what things are in reality.

c) Thus progression is the movement which leads not from some real things to others, but from the field of all real things toward the world of pure and simple reality. The terminus of this “toward” in its new function has a complex character, as we shall see shortly. On one hand, it is {23} a “toward” other real things outside the field; and thus progression on one hand will be an effort to expand the field of reality. But on the other hand, when we intellectually know, in the field of reality, what real things are encompassed by it, we have intellectually known—perhaps without realizing it—what it is to be purely and simply real. Then progression is a progression in a world which is open not only to other real things as signs, but also to other possible forms and modes of reality *qua* reality. And this is very important as well as decisive.

In summary, progression is not just a movement. Nonetheless movement and progress have an intrinsic unity: this unity is formally in the “toward” of the impression of reality.

This difference between movement and progression has a very precise character. The intellectual movement

of the logos is a movement quite well defined: it is *movement of retraction and affirmative reversion* within the things of the field. But progression is another type of movement. It is not movement within the field of reality but movement toward the real beyond any field at all. Therefore progress is a *search for reality*. It is *intellectus quaerens*. And because of this, though every progression is a movement, not every movement is progression, because not every intellectual movement is a search for reality. To be sure, no movement is haphazard and chaotic. The movement of retraction and affirmation is grounded upon the actualization of what something already real is in reality among other things of the field, and is necessarily determined by said actualization. In progression, movement is grounded and determined *in measured fashion* by the previous intellection of pure and simple reality. One “affirms” what is, in the reality of the world, something already actualized in an apprehension that is primordial and in the field. One seeks reality {24} within reality itself, beyond real sensed things, according to a measure of reality. It is a radical search in a world open in itself. Progression is being opened to the unfathomable richness and problematic nature of reality, not only in its own notes but also in its forms and modes of reality.

Here, then, we have what progress is: the search for reality. But this progression is intellectual. And then we may ask ourselves not only what intellectual progression is in itself, but what is the properly intellectual part of this progression.

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CHAPTER III

PROGRESSION *QUA* INTELLECTION

What is intellectual knowing as search? Here we have the key question. Intellectual knowing as search is not being in search of an intellection, but a search in which one intellectually knows while searching and by the search itself. This brings up a multitude of problems, because searching is clearly an activity of intellectual knowing which should be considered from two points of view. Above all it is an *activity*, but not just any activity; it is an activity of *intellectual knowing*. As I see it, this activity of intellectual knowing *qua* activity is what should be termed *thinking*. But one ought to consider as well the activity of intellectual knowing in the structure of its intellection. This act of intellection has its own intrinsic structure and constitutes a mode of intellection determined by the activity of thinking. Thus intellectual knowing not only has the character of activity, but is also a mode of intellection as such. The activity determines intellection as such, and intellection in turn determines the activity. As a mode of intellection, thinking activity is no longer mere thinking but something different; it is *reason*. Reason is the intellectual character of thinking. Thinking and reason are not the same, but {26} neither are they independent. Rather, they are two aspects of a single act of intellectual knowing as search. The activity of intellectual knowing *qua* determined by a mode of intellection has, we may say, *intellectual character*. But *qua* act which proceeds from an activity *qua* activity, this I shall term *the activity of intellectual knowing*. That is what I expressed a few lines back when I said that reason is the intellectual character of the activity of intellectual knowing, i.e., of thinking.

In this manner we have before us two groups of problems which we must confront:

§1. The activity of intellectual knowing as search, as activity: thinking.

§2. The intellectual character of thinking activity: reason.

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§1

ACTIVITY OF INTELLECTUAL KNOWING *QUA* ACTIVITY: THINKING

Seeking, I said, is an activity of intellectual knowing. And in order to understand it one must begin by conceptualizing what activity is. Only then can we say in what, properly, the thinking character of this activity consists. These are the two points with which we must occupy ourselves.

1

What is Activity?

I am referring now to the concept of activity in general. To reach the goal it is necessary to refer to notions about which we have been speaking since the beginning of the book.

Activity is a mode of action. But not every action is the action of an activity. Why? Action is always something carried out, and only that, regardless of the connection between the action and the one doing it; this itself is a problem with which we have no reason to become involved here. The carrying out of an act can take on at least two different forms, because action has, *qua* action carried out, two different aspects. On one hand it is, purely and simply, an action carried out which has “its” corresponding act. And then we say that the doer is simply in action; this is “being here-and-now in action”. Thus in the actions of seeing, hearing, walking, eating, intellectually knowing, etc., the corresponding “act” is produced in a formal way. By the fact of producing {28} this action, the doer (animal or man) is acting in the sense of being in action. But something different can happen. It can happen that the doer is in action, but not in any action which yet has its full act or formal content; rather, the doer is in a type of continuing action and continues an action which unfolds in different stages. Then we say not

only that “he is here-and-now in action”, but that “he is here-and-now in activity”. Permit me to explain. Activity is not the carrying out of an action, it is not being in action, but being in the process of carrying out actions; *activity is taking action*, it is to be here-and-now in the process of action. Activity is not simply an action but an action which, I repeat, consists in being here-and-now taking action in a way more or less continual and continued. Taking action here does not refer to what is carried out—as if taking action meant that the corresponding act is being sustained, etc. Taking action does not refer to what is carried out, but only to the doer of the action. Someone can be acting in a dragged-out manner in a single action. This is not activity. Activity certain has something of action, but such action does not even its act without something more, something which leads to the act, because activity consists in being here-and-now in action. Activity which has something of action is, nonetheless, not by itself action with its act. This taking action, which is at one and the same time more than action from a certain point of view, and less than action from another (since by itself it does not have its complete act), this strange taking action, I say, is precisely activity. In activity one is involved in that action which is not only producing actions but producing them by taking action. All activity involves action (since it leads to actions), although not every action is carried out by a doer in activity. {29}

It is necessary to forcefully reject the idea that the superior form of taking action is activity. On the contrary, activity is only a modality of action, and ultimately is the successor of a full action. The fullness consists, in fact, of *having* its “act”. And activity is activity in the order of *achieving* this act. Thus, to be living or to be in movement is not activity, but simply action, because in them the doer is only in action. But on the other hand, looking from side to side or being in physical agitation are activities. Thus, being in action and being in activity are not the same. Activity is thus taking action; it is something on the order of that action which is the only thing which the “act” has, act in the double sense of being “the act” and of being its full, formal content. It is this which I term ‘act’ in the strict sense; and therefore I call this character ‘actuity’. Actuity is not the same thing as actuality. I call ‘actuality’ the character of act, whereas actuity consists, as I see it, in the real being present in itself *qua* real. To know intellectually is not formally actuity but actualization.

Now, searching is the activity of intellectual knowing. It is what we term ‘thinking activity’. Let us then ask ourselves, In what does the thinking character of this activity consist?

2

What Is “thinking” activity?

Activity is not pure and simple action, but is taking action in relation to a formal content of its own. And here this content is intellectual knowing. The activity of intellectual knowing is what we formally term *thinking*. {30}

Thinking, to be sure, is not just about what things are from a point of view which is, so to speak, theoretical. One does not think only about the reality of what we call “things”; rather, one also thinks for example about what one must do, about what one is going to say, etc. This is true. But even in this order, that about which one thinks is *what it might be* that he is going to realize, *what might that be* that he is really going to say. In thinking there is always a moment of reality and therefore a formal moment of intellectual knowing. Conversely, this intellectual knowing is an intellectual knowing in activity, not simple actualization of the real. In order to have simple actualization it is not necessary to have thinking, because the actualization is already, without further ado, intellection. But one thinks just in order to have actualization. This intellectual knowing, which by virtue of being so is already actualization, but *actualization in progression*, in the form of taking, this intellectual knowing, I say, is just the activity which we call *thinking*. In thinking one goes on intellectually knowing, one goes on actualizing the real, but in a thinking manner.

The character of thinking activity is determined by the real which is open in itself *qua* real. Only because the real is open is it possible and necessary to intellectually know it openly, i.e., in thinking activity. In virtue of this, thinking activity has some moments proper to it which it is essential to point out and conceptualize rigorously.

a) Above all, thinking is an intellectual knowing which is open through the real itself, i.e., it is the search for something beyond what I already intellectually know. Thinking is always *thinking beyond*. If this were not so, there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of thinking. But it is necessary to stress that this beyond is a beyond in relation to the very character of reality. We are not dealing only with the search for other things—that animals do as well—but with searching for *real* things. {31} What the animal does not do is to investigate, so to speak, the reality of the real. But we investigate not just to find real things, but also to find in these same real things, already known intellectually before thinking, what they are in reality. And this is a form of the “beyond”. Thinking is above all “thinking toward” the “real which

lies beyond". Now, three directions for the "toward" spring into view, determined by the progress toward the beyond. The beyond is, in the first place, what is outside the field of reality. Thinking is above all to go on intellectually knowing, according to this direction, what is outside the things we apprehend. Thinking is, in this direction, an activity "toward the outside". In the second place, one could be talking about going to the real as a simple noticing, and go from it toward that which is noted in the real; the beyond is now a "toward what is noted". In the third place, it can go from what is already apprehended as real toward what that real is from the inside as reality; it is a progression from the *eidōs* toward the *Idea*, as Plato would say. Beyond is here a "toward the inside". The "inside" itself is a mode of the "beyond" along the lines of reality. This is not in any sense a complete catalog of the primary forms of beyond, if for no other reason than that we do not always know toward which "beyond" the real may point and direct us. I have only sought to emphasize certain particular lines of special immediate importance.

b) Thinking, we said, intellectually knows, in activity, the real "beyond". Therefore, in virtue of intellectually knowing in openness, thinking is an inchoate intellection. This is the *inchoative character* of intellectual knowing as thinking. It is not something merely conceptive, but something which concerns the progress of intellectual knowing in a very important way. Every case of intellectual knowing through thinking, by virtue of being inchoate, opens a path. I shall return to this point and discuss it at length later. For now it {32} suffices to emphasize that there are paths which in fact deviate from the reality of things. And this is because there are paths which do not seem to differ among themselves except very subtly, almost infinitesimally; it would be enough to just lean a bit to one side or the other to go onto one or the other of the paths. And this is just what thinking does. Nonetheless, these diverse paths, which inchoatively are so close, and which therefore can seem equivalent, may lead to quite disparate intellections when extended, intellections which may be absolutely incompatible. That initially slight oscillation can lead to realities and modes of reality which are essentially diverse. And the fact is that thinking is constitutively inchoate. A thought is never just a point at which one arrives, but also intrinsically and constitutively a new point of departure. What is intellectually known through thinking manner is something intellectually known, but inchoatively open beyond itself.

c) Thinking is not only open beyond what is intellectually known and in an inchoate form, but is an *intellective knowing activated* by reality *qua* open. How does

this happen? Intellectual knowing is just actualizing the real. Therefore the real intellectually known is something which is given as reality; it is a *datum*. What is this *datum*? The datum is above all a "datum of" reality. This does not mean that the datum is something which some reality beyond the given vouchsafes to us; rather, it means that the datum is the reality itself as given. To be a "datum of" reality is to be the "given reality" *qua* reality. Rationalism in all its forms (and on this point Kant accepted Leibniz' ideas) always conceived that to be given is to be "given for" some problem, and therefore a datum given for thinking. This is Cohen's idea: what is given (*das Gegebene*) is the subject matter (*das Aufgegebene*). {33} Intellection would be formally a thinking, and as such just a task. But this is impossible. To be sure, what we intellectually know of the real is a datum for a problem which is posed to us for thinking. But this is not the essential point of the question, either with respect to the idea of the "given" or the idea of the "datum for". Above all, this is because in order to be a "datum for", the given has to start by being a "datum of" reality. The real is, then, a "datum of" reality and a "datum for" thinking. What is this "and", i.e., what is the intrinsic unity of these two forms of datum? It is not a unity which is merely additive; nor is it that the datum is a "datum of" and *also* a "datum for". Rather, it is a "datum for" precisely and formally because it is a "datum of". Why? Because the datum of reality gives us reality in its intrinsic and formal open character *qua* real. Therefore it follows that the "datum of" is *eo ipso* a "datum for" what is beyond the given. And then it is clear that rationalism not only has not taken account of the "datum of", but moreover has a false idea of the "datum for", because it believes that the reference to thinking is that for which the datum is given, and which constitutes it as a "datum for". Now, this is wrong. The "datum for" is a moment of the actuality of the real in its openness "beyond". There is therefore a double error in rationalism: in the first place, it stumbles over the "datum of"; and in the second, in having interpreted the "datum for" as a datum for a problem, whereas in fact the "datum for" is first and foremost a form of actualizing the field in its openness beyond and not the form of intellectually knowing the real. Because the "datum for" is a moment of field reality "beyond", and only because of this, can it be a {34} datum for a problem. The openness of reality *qua* merely actualized in intellectual knowing is the intrinsic and radical unity of the two forms of datum, datum-of and datum-for. Ordinary language expresses this intrinsic unity of being a datum with an expression which is not only fortunate but which, taken rigorously, manifests the unitary structure of the two forms of datum: *things give us pause to think*. The real is

not only *given* in intellection, but it *gives* us pause to think. This “giving” is, then, the radical unity of the two forms of datum in the real.* And this giving us pause to think is just intellectually knowing in thinking activity. Thinking activity is not only open to the beyond in inchoate form, but is constituted as such an activity by the real itself which was previously known intellectually. From this point of view, thinking activity has some quite essential aspects which it is necessary to stress.

c.1) Above all, regardless of what it is that things may give us pause to think, being an activity is not what is formally constitutive of intellection. In and by itself, intellectual knowing is not activity. To be sure, intellectual knowing can be found in activity, but it “isn’t” activity, and moreover the activity is subsequent to the intellectual knowing. The primary intellection of the real in its double aspect of being “real” and of being “in reality” is not activity. Affirming is not activity but just movement; and not every movement is movement in activity. Affirming is not activity but movement. Movement will only be activity when the primary intellection, in virtue of what is already intellectually known as real, is *activated by what is intellectually known itself*. And it will be so precisely because what is intellectually known is open reality *qua* reality. To be in the action or process of intellectually knowing by means of sight is not to be in activity, but it can turn into activity. {35} Thinking, then, is not something primary but is consequent upon the primary intellection. What is primary, and indeed chronologically primary, is the intellection.

c.2) In virtue of this, thinking activity is not only not primary but does not even arise from itself. It has been commonly said (as in Leibniz and Kant) that thinking is a spontaneous activity, in contrast to sensibility, which can be merely receptive; thinking in that case would be spontaneity. But this is false for two reasons.

Above all, it is false because true human sensibility is not just receptive and not just a receiving of affections, but is the physical presentation of what is impressing as real, i.e., otherness, intellectual sensibility. But that is not what is important to me now, which is rather to insist on the fact that thinking is not an activity which spontaneously arises out of itself. And it does not do so because the intelligence is constituted in activity only as a result of the datum of open reality. It is things which give us pause to think, and therefore it is they which not only put us

into activity, but also determine the active character itself of intellectual knowing. We are intellectually active because things activate us to be so. This does not mean that that activity does not have in and by itself a specific character (as we shall see below), which might easily lead to the error of believing that thinking is a spontaneous activity. But the truth is that it is not spontaneous; rather, primary intellection, and therefore the real itself, are what makes us, in a certain way, to be spontaneous. To give us pause to think is, in fact, something given by real things; but what the real things give us is just “to think”. In the first respect, thinking is not spontaneous; but it can seem to be so in a certain way, albeit erroneously, by virtue of the second respect. Without {36} things there would be no thinking; but with those things already intellectually known there is a specific activity, “to think”. Thought, one might say, proceeds from real things by the “having to think” which these things “give” us pause to think about. This is the radical point which has led to the error of spontaneity.

c.3) Thinking activity is an intellectual knowing activated by the things which give us pause to think. And this, as I already indicated, is an intrinsic necessity of our intellection in a field, because the openness of their reality is that by which things give us pause to think. Nonetheless, this is inadequate. It is necessary to add that this openness is not simply the openness of respectivity in the world; rather, it is this same openness *qua* apprehended in the field manner. If this were not true, there would not be thinking activity. Simple respectivity in the world is the open character of reality itself. If intellectual knowing were not sentient, this openness would be intellectually known, as is usually said, by an intuitive intelligence, as just a note of reality. In this case intellectual knowing would not be of the thinking type. But the openness is given to us sentiently, i.e., within a field. Thus its intellection is “trans-field”, “beyond”, i.e., is a progression. And this progression is thus thinking activity. The possibility and necessity of thinking activity are then intrinsically and formally determined by sentient intellection.

In summary, thinking activity is not just a particular case of the activity of a living man; i.e., we are not saying that human reality is activity, and that therefore everything human—including thinking—involves an activity. This is false in two ways. First, not every action of a living man is the {37} result of an activity; as we have seen, action and activity are not the same. Activity is taking action, something different than doing an action. The life of a living man is *de suyo* action, that action in which the living being realizes and fulfills himself while being in possession of himself. But this action is not therefore ac-

* [This is the closest translation of the Spanish idiomatic expression *dan que pensar*; Zubiri is emphasizing the commonality of the word *gives, da*, in the two cases.—trans.]

tivity. It will be so only when the action is activated. Now, this can take place in many different ways, and that is the second reason why the conception of thinking activity as just a particular case of a presumed general activity is false. With regard to what concerns the intelligence, the activator of the activity is the real itself *qua* real; the real is the what arouses the taking of action, by virtue of being actuality in sentient intellection, and therefore open. And this taking, this activity, is thinking. As I said earlier, in Part I, it is not that life forces me to intellectually know, but rather that intelligence, by virtue of being sentient intellection, forces me to live thinking. Whence thinking activity forms part of the intellection of reality, not just intrinsically but also formally. As intellection is actualization of reality, it follows that thinking is a mode of actualization of reality. One does not think “about” reality but “in” reality, i.e., as already inside it and based upon what, positively, has already been intellectually known of it. Thinking is an intellectual knowing which not only intellectually knows the real, but does so searching based on a previous intellection of reality and progressing in and from it. Thinking, as the activity of intellectual knowing that it is, *formally* involves that which activates it, viz. reality. And it is not just that reality activates the intelligence in that form of activity which comprises thinking; but that intellectually knowing reality *qua* activating is an intrinsic and formal moment of thinking activity itself. {38} In virtue of this, thinking already possesses in itself, actually and physically, the reality in which and in accordance with which one thinks. This is what we are going to see.

{39}

§2

THINKING ACTIVITY *QUA* INTELLECTIVE: REASON*

Thinking activity, thinking, has intellectual character. I have already said that I call the internal structure of thinking intellection its ‘intellectual character’. Through thinking, thinking activity acquires an intellectual character which is determined in its intellection. Now, by virtue of its formally intellectual character, thinking con-

stitutes reason. Reason is the intellectual character of thinking, and in this sense is the thinking intellection of the real. Thinking and reason are but two aspects of a single activity, but as aspects they are formally distinct: one thinks in accordance with reason, and one intellectually knows in thinking reason. The two aspects are not mutually opposed, as if we were dealing with the fact that some subjective mental activity (such as thinking) managed to reach the real (e.g. by reason) from which it was previously excluded. This is not the case. To be sure, I have a thinking activity which is merely psychical by which I can, for example, turn over my thoughts. But turning over thoughts is not thinking. Thinking is always (and only) thinking in the real and indeed already inside the real. One thinks and one knows intellectually while thinking in accordance with reason. It is this thinking intellection of the real, then, which should be called ‘reason’.

The real as previously known intellectually propels us, then, to know intellectually in another way, viz. to know intellectually while thinking. But that real from which we start is not just a point of departure which we leave behind; rather, it is the *positive support* for our progression in its search. Thinking intellection, in its {40} intellectual character, is reason; it is essentially and constitutively a progression based upon an intrinsic support. It is a support in which we have already intellectually known the real. And in its intellectual progress, reason must go on by newly actualizing the real in a cautious manner, i.e., by going over its steps again and again. And it is precisely on account of this that the activity is called ‘thinking’ or *pensare* [in Latin], a word closely related etymologically to ‘weighing’ or *pesare*. Thinking has the intellectual character of a repeated weighing of the real “in” reality itself in order to go “toward” the real which is inside of that reality. Thinking is weighing intellectually. One weighs reality; one weighs it over and over. And this intellectual weighing of reality is just reasoning, explanation. Thus we speak of “weighty reasons”. The reality which reason must achieve is not, then, *naked reality*—that was already done in primordial apprehension and also in the subsequent field affirmations. The reality which reason must achieve is *reality weighed over and over*. What then is that previous installation in the real? In order to answer this question, we must confront three serious issues:

1. What is reason?
2. The scope of reason.
3. Reason and reality.

* [Readers should bear in mind that the Spanish word for reason, *razón*, like its Latin root *ratio*, has a broader meaning than just the reasoning process; it also encompasses what we in English would call ‘explanation’. This should be borne in mind throughout the remainder of the book.—trans.]

I

WHAT IS REASON?

We have just answered the question: it is the thinking intellection of the real. But this is just a generality. To make it precise, it is necessary to clarify that intellection in two of its essential aspects. This intellection, in fact, is *mine* above all. Of that there is not the slightest doubt. Reason is {41} above all my reason. But on the other hand, it is undeniably a reason about *real things themselves*. Therefore if we wish to clarify what reason is, we see ourselves constrained to examine successively what is reason as my intellection, and what is reason as the reason or explanation of things; only in this manner will we understand, in a unitary way, just what reason is.

1

Reason as Mine

Naturally, “mine” does not here refer to something subjective. Nor does it mean that reason is just a simple activity of mine, that activity which we call ‘thinking’, because thinking is formally the activity of *intellective knowing*, whereas reason (including my reason) is an *intellective character* of intellection itself. It is the formal character of an intellection brought about in thinking intellection. This means, then, that we are referring only to a mode of intellection, and therefore to something which concerns intellection itself as such. To speak of my reason means only that reason is something which modally concerns intellection.

Reason as a mode of intellection has three essential moments: it is in-depth intellection; it is intellection as measuring; and it is intellection as or while searching.

First moment. Thinking intellection is an intellection of something “beyond” the field of reality. I have already pointed out that “beyond” does not formally designate only other things which are “outside” of the field. “Beyond” is also that or those aspects of things within the field, but aspects which are not themselves formally in it. What, specifically, is this “beyond”? That is the essential point. One does not think about the {42} “beyond” in some capricious way, because it is not the case that one intellectually knows things or aspects which are outside of the field “besides” having intellectually known field things. It is not, then, that there is an intellection *on this side* of the field and “besides” that another “beyond” the field. On the contrary, one thinks about the reality beyond precisely and formally because the things which are in the

field are *the very same things* which “give us pause to think”. And this giving us pause to think is, on one hand, a being led to intellectually know what is “beyond”, but on the other consists in being led to the beyond by the inexorable force of the intellection of what is on this side, so to speak. And it is in this that the “giving us pause to think” consists. To give pause to think is a *sensed* intellective necessity, by virtue of which the things in the field direct us to what is beyond. The beyond is above all the “toward” itself as a moment of the impression of reality. But this “toward” is not just an additional moment. The “toward” is, in fact, a mode of sensed reality *qua* reality. Whence it follows that the real not only directs us to something other, but does so by virtue of being already real in that “toward” which it directs us. That is, the “toward”, as a mode of reality acquires, as we saw in Part II, the character of a “through” or “by”. Therefore the “beyond” is not something which is just other, but is other “through” being “on this side” what it is. It is not a “deduction” but the very impression of reality in the “toward” as a moment of what is on this side. And this character is the “through” as sensed physically. What is not in the field is intellectually known in order to be able to better know intellectually what is in it. And the “beyond” consists in a positive way in this: in being something to which that “on this side” precisely and formally leads us in order to be able to better know intellectually the “on this side” itself. Thus we have here just the opposite of a simple additional item. And in virtue of that, intellectually knowing the beyond is intellectually knowing what, {43} ultimately, is on this side. That which gives us pause to think is what, ultimately, is intellectually known in the field. This “ultimately” can be the interior of each thing, but it can also be other things external to the field. Nonetheless, in both cases what is intellectually known beyond is always intellectually known precisely and formally as that without which the content of what is “on this side” would not be the reality that it is. This is intellective knowing in the “through”. And it is in this “through” that the “in-depth” consists. To go to the beyond is to get to the bottom of real things, to understand them “in depth”. And this “in depth” or ultimate nature, intellectually known, is just my explanation of them. Only by intellectually knowing this ultimate nature will I intellectually know the real things of the field. In-depth is thus not a type of indiscernible profundity, but only the intellection of what, ultimately, real things are. Thus, an electromagnetic wave or a photon is what, ultimately, color is. Their intellection is thus intellection in profundity.

Now, reason or explanation is above all the *intellection of the real in depth*. Only as an explanation of color

is there intellection of electromagnetic waves or photons. The color which gives us pause to think is what leads us to the electromagnetic wave or to the photon. If it were not for this giving us pause to think, there would be no intellection of a beyond whatsoever; there would be at most a succession of intellections “on this side”. And I am not referring only to the type of “beyond” discussed above, because the beyond is not just a theoretical concept, as are the wave and the photon. The beyond can also be what forges a novel; we would not create the novel if the real did not give us pause to think. The same could be said of poetry: the poet poetizes because things give him pause to think. And that which he thus thinks of them is his poetry. That what is intellectually known in this manner is a reality which is theoretically conceptualized, a reality in fictional form, or a poetic reality, does not change the essence of intellection as reason. {44} A metaphor is one type of reasoning about things, among others. What is intellectually known of the beyond is purely and simply the intellection of what things “on this side”, in being intellectually known, give us pause to think. Therefore the intellection of the beyond is reason or explanation; it is intellection of the real in depth. But reason, explanation, has still other essential constitutive moments.

Second moment. Reason, as I said, is intellection of the real in depth; but this reason is brought to fulfillment in the reality “on this side” which has already been intellectually known. This reality previously known is not a simple “medium” of intellection, but something different. It is the “measure” of intellection. The fact is that every reality is a reality which is constitutively measured *qua* real. What does this mean?

Everything real is constitutively respective *qua* real. This respectivity is the world. World is the unity of respectivity of the real as real. Everything real is, then, the world precisely and formally by being real, i.e., by its formality of reality. In virtue of this, that worldly respectivity turns back upon each real thing, so to speak, in a very precise way: each thing is presented to us as a form and a mode of reality determined according to formality in respectivity. This determination is just the measure. Thus reality is not just the constitutive formality of the “in itself”, of the *de suyo*; but rather the measure in accordance with which each real thing is real, is “in its own right”, *de suyo*. Measure is not the unity of relation of real things; on the contrary, measure is, in each thing, consequent upon its respectivity as *sich*. Only because reality as reality is respective, and only because of this, is its formality a measure of its own reality. The real is reality but measured in its reality by its own formality of reality. So, rea-

son is not just {45} intellection of the real in depth, but rather *measuring intellection of the real in depth*.

This requires somewhat more detailed analysis. Every measuring is based upon a measurement standard or “metric” with which one measures. What is this metric? What is the intellectual measure of the real according to this metric? To answer these questions, it is necessary to recall that thinking intellection, my reason, is an intellection which is based upon what we have previously known intellectually in the field. Only by returning to this point of previous intellection will we be able to investigate the questions A) What is the metric? And B) What is the intellectual measure of the real in depth?

A) My thinking intellection, my reason, does not intellectually know reality as a medium but as something already known intellectually, in a positive way, in a prior field intellection. This is an essential difference. If one wishes, reason intellectually knows reality itself not as light (that would be reality as a medium) but as a source of light (i.e., reality as measure). And this is a peculiar intellection, because in it one intellectually knows reality by itself, to be sure, but not as some additional thing. Rather, one knows it as something which I shall term “reality ground”; reality is the grounding of thinking intellection *qua* grounding. That is what I term a *principle*. The intellection of formality is reality as a source of light, as a measure; this is the intellection of reality as a principle. Under this aspect reason is *intellection as a measuring principle of reality in depth*. We shall continue to take a firmer grasp of the concept of reason as a mode of intellection. To clarify it, let us state first of all what it is to be a principle; and secondly, investigate what the principle of thinking intellection or reason is; and thirdly, clarify in a rigorous way the nature of this intellection as principle. {46}

a) What is it to be a principal, and how is the principle given to us? Reality as a principle is clearly reality as ground; and as such, the ground is a “by” or a “through”. Now, to be a ground is always and only to be the ground of something else, of the field; it is, I repeat, a “by”. This other thing, *qua* grounded, is something to which the so-called ground is open; it is a “by” as open. And conversely, the ground then has the formal and intrinsic moment of openness. It is on account of this that it grounds; ground is above all foundation.* But that is not all, be-

* [The Spanish word *fundar* is here translated as “to ground”, in accordance with normal English usage; however, this makes it impossible to track all derivatives of the word in Spanish, since some of them must be translated differently into English, such as *fundación*, “foundation”, which does not derive from “to ground”.—trans.]

cause being a ground is a very precise and determinate mode of grounding; a grounding principle is only one mode of ground-ability. Now, what grounds does so when it grants to what is grounded its own character of reality: *a) from* itself (i.e., from what is grounding), and *b) when* upon granting it the grounded reality is realizing itself precisely and formally *by and in* the reality of the thing doing the grounding. The ground passes fundamentally into the grounded. That which is grounding has not only grounded the real but is doing so intrinsically and formally. That which is grounded is then real in a fundamental way. It is in this that being *principle* formally consists, as I see it. A principle is not just a beginning, nor is it the mere “from where” (the *horthen*) as Aristotle thought; rather, it is that which is doing the grounding making itself real from itself, in and by itself, in the real *qua* real. The principle is so only inasmuch as it is intrinsically “being a principle”, i.e., making itself real as a principle.

How is the principle of intellection given to us? When that which is the ground is the very character of reality, i.e., when the ground is in-depth reality, then its intellection is, as I already indicated, {47} very peculiar. Reality is no longer naked formality of reality; that naked formality we have intellectually known in every intellection since the primordial apprehension of reality. Reality is not now naked *reality* but *reality qua grounding*. How is this reality *qua* grounding given? To be sure, it is not reality “itself” as if it were an “object” (let me be permitted to use this word for the sake of clarity). A principle is not some “hidden” thing in what has the principle. If that were the case one would intellectually know this “object” and would “later” add to it a relation, which would therefore be something extrinsic to the object, viz. the relation of grounding another object. But such is not the case, because if one considers just reality “itself”, its being grounded is an intrinsic moment, not an added one. Reality “itself”, in fact, is here actualized, is here present to us, not like “the” realities, i.e., like an *object-reality*, but is actualized and present to us in itself and formally as *ground-reality*, or if one wishes, as the real ground. This is an essential difference. The ground is reality, but reality whose character of reality consists only in really grounding. In the object, the real is “put”, but as “against” (*ob*): opposite or contraposed to the apprehendor himself and to his apprehension. Here, however, the reality is not “put”, but *is here and now* “grounding”. Reality is not now actualized either as *naked reality* or as *object-reality*, but precisely as grounding. Reality is actualized now as real, but the mode of its actuality is as “grounding”, not as “being here-and-now present”, either in itself

or against, “ob” something other. Therefore I call it *ground-reality*. This is not, I repeat, a relation added to its character of real, but its intrinsic and formal mode of being real. In the object, the real is actualized in {48} the form of being “against” (*ob*)—as we shall see forthwith—, whereas here reality is actualized in its own way, that of really grounding. It is, if one wishes, a presenting of the real not as something which “just is there”, but as “being there as grounding”. This is the reality apprehended precisely as a principle, i.e., *principle-reality*. Its mode of actualization is to be actualized in the form of a “by”, as grounding.

b) Granting this, is reality the fundamental principle of thinking intellection? Definitely it is. Reality, in fact, is apprehended as reality constitutively open *qua* reality. If reality were not open there would be no thinking intellection because there would be no “beyond”. Reality itself would be only real things. But since reality itself is open, it is reality itself, previously known intellectually in sentient fashion, which thrusts us from itself “toward” the beyond in an intellectual search; i.e., reality is grounding. But it is grounding which creates a foundation precisely because it is reality already actualized in a previous intellection; and it is in this reality that, formally, the real thing is being newly actualized. Through openness, then, reality is grounding and foundation of thinking intellection; it is its *principle*. Reality *qua* open is what gives us pause to think, and this giving is what constitutes reality as the principle of thinking intellection. The “datum-of” is the principle of the “datum-for”. This principle is therefore reality. But that must be clarified.

In the first place, we are dealing with reality not as *naked reality* but as *ground-reality*. In the second place, reality itself, which comprises this ground-reality, is not the moment of individual reality (*qua* individual) of each thing. We have already seen in Parts I and II {49} that naked reality is the formality of reality. Formality is the mode of otherness of the *de suyo*, which has nothing to do with what Scholasticism called a “formal” object or Duns Scotus called ‘formality’. Formality is here the mode of otherness of mere stimulus. This *de suyo*—let us reiterate even at the risk of being repetitive—does not mean only the fact of existence. Rather, it means that both essence and existence, as in classical philosophy, pertain *de suyo* to the thing. Reality is not formally synonymous with either essence or existence, although nothing is real without being existent and having essence. This formality of reality has two moments. Above all, it has a moment which, for lack of a better word, I call ‘individual’; this is the formality of reality of *each real determinate thing*. But when various real things are apprehended, we intel-

lectively know that each of them determines that moment of reality, in accordance with which we say that each thing is in the *field of reality*. This is the field moment of the formality of reality. The formality of reality is thus not only individual formality but the ambit or scope of reality. It is a transcendental scope which encompasses all sensed or sensible things.

This field, *qua* physically real, is a *medium* in the intellection, a medium of intellection. The field of reality as medium is that in which something is intellectually known. This happens, for example, in the case of every affirmation. But it can happen that the reality is what leads to what is grounding, to the reality beyond, to the world of reality itself. Then reality is not a medium but *ground-reality*; this is the measuring principle of reality in the beyond. The field reality thus intellectually known is now more than a medium of intellection; it does not stop {50} being a medium for the intellection of the beyond, but it is more than a medium because it leads to the measuring principle. It is unnecessary to repeat that this ground-reality is not an object-reality. This reality is that in accordance with which I intellectually know, in a thinking manner, the measure: in this consists its being a principle. Now, it is on account of this that reality as intellectually known as fundament reality is the principle of reason.

This principle is not a judgement. The conversion of the principle into a fundamental judgement is one of the most seriously flawed reincarnations in the history of philosophy. Aristotle called the intellectually known thing the principle of *noein*; thus, he tell us, the principle of trigonometry is the triangle. But shortly thereafter this principle is transformed into a primary judgement, in large measure by Aristotle himself, who made the judgement called the ‘principle of contradiction’ the principle or the *arkhe* of his metaphysics. And thus we find it in modern philosophy, above all in Leibniz and Kant, who take for ‘principles’ one or several primary judgements. They are primary because they announce something upon which every subsequent intellection is founded. In place of the triangle we now have a fundamental judgement. With this, the function of the principle becomes that of a primary rule or norm of every intellection. This is what has sent philosophy along the paths of mere logic. But it is unacceptable. A principle is reality itself previously known intellectually in field actuality, but now intellectually known as the ground-reality of every subsequent intellection. It is necessary to return to the original meaning of ‘principle’: it is not a judgement but a prior intellection of reality itself. Naturally—and I shall return to this shortly—we are not concerned with this prior in-

tellection *qua* intellection, but with what is intellectually known or actualized in it, to wit, reality itself. {51} What Kant claims is false, viz. that reason is reason or explanation not of things but only of my knowledge of them.

This principle which is not judgement, I assert, is reality in its field moment: the *de suyo* of things within the field is what, in them, gives us pause to think. Thus the reality which reason intellectually knows is not *naked reality*, i.e., not reality such as it is intellectually known merely as formality of what is apprehended in sentient intellection, but is this same sentient formality in its field or ambient moment, apprehended in itself as *ground-reality*.

Therefore, though the content of the reality beyond is grounded upon the content of the reality on this side (perhaps as distinct from it), with respect to what concerns the character of reality, this character is physically identical on this side and in the beyond. Consequently the character of the reality of the beyond is not founded *in re* (as a Scholastic would say) in the thing on this side, but is *physically the same thing* as that *res* on this side. The world of reality is the same as that of field reality *qua* reality. It is not the sameness of an objective concept but the physical and numerical identity of the scope or ambient of the real. The only thing founded *in re* is perhaps its own content, but not its character as reality. The possible ground *in re* does not concern reality itself, only its content.

Field reality is reality “itself” in the field, reality itself in its structure on this side; reality “itself” of the world is that same reality in its structure beyond. The two structures are not independent. Their dependence is manifested in their same character. Field respectivity is the same as respectivity in the world, but, in a certain way, it is so *qua* sensed. And by virtue of this sameness field reality *qua* reality propels us to worldly reality. {52} Then reality in the world is formally the ground of field reality; it is ground-reality. We shall see this in greater detail below. These structures are always extremely concrete; therefore they consist not only in an empty respectivity, but also in a content, however problematic it may be, which intrinsically pertains to the respectivity itself.

c) Let us clarify this idea a bit more. The ground-reality is that in accordance with which the thinking intellection measures; it is just what constitutes the being of a “principle”. In this respect, *reason is intellection as a principle*. To be sure, the principle which constitutes reason as a principle is what we can call the *ultimate principle*. Permit me to explain. Every thinking intellection is based upon something, and this something is by itself a

principle of intellection. Thus, returning to the example of Aristotle, the triangle is the principle of trigonometric intellection. But this does not mean that in its turn, the triangle cannot be something whose own intellection is based upon the intellection of, for example, perpendiculars and angles. Then these latter are the principles of intellection of the triangle. This means that a principle can have its being as a principle only provisionally. But what is it that constitutes the being of the principle of reason itself *qua* reason? We are not dealing only with trigonometric or some other type of reason, but rather with reason *qua* reason. Now, the principle of all the limited principles of reason is “reality”, reality in its physical and identical character. And in this sense, I say that *reality is the ultimate principle*, ultimate in the sense that its intellection is what constitutes the principle of reason as such. This is the ultimate nature of being a principle. It does not refer to an ultimate nature which is recurrent in the sense of a causal series or to anything of that nature. What then is reality itself as the principle of reason? {53}

To be sure, the principle is not “being” nor therefore “entity”, because reality is something in principle prior to being and all entity. And this is not some triviality, as if we were dealing only with a change of words. Being, as I see it, is always and only actuality of the real in its respectivity *qua* real, i.e., actuality of the real in the world. On the other hand, reality is formality of the real as real, i.e., the real as something *de suo*. Reality and being are not the same. The proof is in the fact that being has its own modes, which are not formally modes of reality; an example, as I see it, is temporality. Moreover, being is founded upon reality and has its explanation there. There is no *esse reale* but only *realitas in essendo*. The principle of reason as such is, then, not being but reality. Therefore it is strictly false to think that being is the ultimate instance of things—that rather is “reality”. I shall return to this problem at greater length.

This principle is not an objective, analogical, or univocal concept. And this is because we are not dealing with the case of reason finding itself compelled to intellectually know the real as something which the objective concept of reality makes effective, a concept which would be found to be at variance with the diverse categories of things or predicated univocally of them. Reality is not an objective concept, but the intellectual actuality of a physical moment of the real, of its own formality of field reality. The field moment of reality is physically real. Insofar as it pertains to the field, it is a sensed moment; but *qua* real it is already an intellectually known moment. Reason is not thrust upon real things by the concept of reality; rather, physical apprehension of reality itself makes one

intellectually know, physically, “the” reality in reason. And this is the principle of reason. Therefore reality as {54} principle is in reason not only *objectively*, but *really*. It is not something which needs to be achieved by reason, as if we were dealing with some passing from a concept of reality to the real part of things; rather, the fact is that reality as physical field is that which intrinsically and formally pertains to the intellection of the real in reason. This intellection, this reason, is already physically in that field. Whence a principle is not that concept into which all others are resolved; rather it is already physical reality itself in its field moment. This reality as grounding principle of reason can also be called ‘reason’, but not by virtue of being a mode of intellection, only in virtue of being a real principle of this mode of intellection. In place of an objective concept we have, then, the physical reality of what pertains to the field. Reality *qua* field reality is, in a certain way, the explanation or reason of reason itself. Therefore this intellection, I repeat, does not consist in intellectually knowing how something realizes the objective concept of reality, but rather in intellectually knowing how the physically real field is, *qua* reality, something determinate in each real physical thing; it is the intellection of the real itself measured by physical reality in its own nature as a field. Each real thing, as real, is a mode and form of reality as in the world, i.e., it is real as a formal individual moment in the field of reality. Therefore to intellectually know something as real in the field sense is not to intellectually know it “under” the objective concept of reality, but to intellectually know something “within” the physical ambit of reality, within the field moment *qua* formality of reality. Reality is thus a principle not only of the intellection of everything real in the most profound sense, but the principle of reason itself; it is the reality of what pertains to the field, not as such but as being the principle measuring of the real. In this respect—which is {55} certainly the most radical—reason is intellection precisely as the principle of the real. Hence the usual concept of reason, to wit, “faculty of principles”, is for me false because the plural “principles” has no meaning unless one understands by ‘principle’ something like “fundamental judgement”. And this, as we saw, is wrong. A principle is not a fundamental judgement, and therefore there is only a single principle: reality. And because of this, reason is not the *faculty of principles* but in-depth *intellection of the real through principles*.

The real, I said, is constitutively measured *qua* real. And it is because of this that reality has the character of principle, viz. that of being its own measure. The real is that which is measured in the field sense in its own formality of reality.

With what is this measuring brought about? With a canon. The intellection of the real in reason is not only via principles but also constitutively canonic, i.e., possessing a canon.

B) *Canonic character of intellection via principles.*

We have intellectually known the principle, we have obtained it, in a prior field intellection of the real as real. This might seem poor, because the reality which we have intellectually known in the field manner is itself apparently poor and provisional. This is a question to which I shall immediately return. But it is in light of what we have learned about the principle that we are going to measure the real in the most profound sense, both in respect of its content as well as its mode of reality.

Consider some examples to clarify what I just said. In the most elemental field of reality we have intellectually apprehended that the material things in it are what we term ‘bodies’. In the progression beyond the field it has been thought for many centuries that the things “beyond” are also bodies—of another class, {56} to be sure, but still bodies. It required the commotion generated by quantum physics to introduce in a difficult but undeniably successful way the idea that the real beyond is not always a body. Elementary particles, in fact, are not corpuscles (neither are they waves in the classical sense, be we leave aside this aspect of them) but another class of material things. Borne along by the field intellection of things, we were disposed to intellectually know the things beyond the field as bodies, different perhaps, but when all was said and done, still bodies. The measure of the real was undertaken with a determinate metric: “body”. Now, the progress toward reality has opened up to us other real material things which are not bodies.

But this is not all. In the process of intellection of real things within the field there has been decanted into intellection not just the intellection that the real things are bodies, but also and above all the intellection that to be real is to be a “thing”, in the sense that this word has when one speaks, for example, of “thingness”. That was the measure of reality: progression beyond the field was brought about by thinking that the measuring reality is a “thing”. An intellection much more difficult than that of quantum physics was needed in order to understand that the real can be real and still not be a thing. Such, for example, is the case of person. Then not only was the field of the real broadened, but that which we might term ‘the modes of reality’ was also broadened. Being a thing is only one of those modes; being a person is another. Thus not only has the catalog of real things been changed, i.e., not only has a reality beyond the field been discovered, but the character of reality itself as a measure has changed,

because a person is something different from a stone or a tree not just by virtue of his {57} properties, but by his mode of reality; the mode of reality of a person is different from the mode of reality of a stone or a tree: the measure of reality is not that of being a thing.

I have adduced these examples because they clearly show that progression is a search not just for new *things* but also for *new forms and new modes of reality*. Upon intellectually knowing the real in the field sense, we have not just intellectually known this or that thing, but also just what it is that we call ‘real’. These two dimensions are not independent. Their intrinsic unity is that with which the real is measured in thinking activity. The intellectual part of this activity consists first and foremost of thinking in accordance with an intellectual measure. That reality which is already known intellectually is not a medium but a measure, both with respect to what concerns what is real and what concerns that which we call form and mode of reality. Now, that which is measuring is always reality in the profound sense. But the measurement is always brought about by some particular metric. Reality as the measuring principle is what I term *canon of reality*. Here I take the word ‘canon’ in its etymological sense. The Greek word *kanon* is formed from another Greek word *kanna* which is of Semitic origin (Akhadian *qana*, Hebrew *qaneh*) meaning a cane, which served among other things as a standard of measure. Reason, the *intellectus quaerens*, bears this canon in its intellection, and with it measures the reality which it seeks, at one and the same time as real thing and as mode of reality.

This canon is not a system of norms for measuring the intellection of the real. The concept of canon entered philosophy with Epicurus and was revived by Kant. For all of this philosophy, the canon was a group of norms (logical or of some other order). The canon would thus be a system of judgements which regulate {58} the intellectual measurement of the real. But this, as I see it, is unacceptable, because it makes affirmative predication the very essence of intellection. And that is wrong. A canon is not a system of normative judgements but is, as the etymology of the word expresses precisely, a “metric”; it is not a judgement nor a system of judgements which regulate affirmative measurement. This “metric” is just what was previously known intellectually as real in its form and in its mode of reality. The thinking intellection goes off in search of the real beyond what was previously intellectually known, based upon the canon of reality already known. It is essential to reiterate the main point: a canon is not the canonic of Epicurus and Kant, but what the word meant when spoken in Greece, for example the canon of Polycletus.

This canon, in my opinion, has very precise characteristics which it is necessary to point out.

Above all, the canon is always concrete; it has the character of *concreteness* in an essential way. We have intellectually known the canon previously upon intellectually knowing the real in the field of reality. And already in that case, as I have said, we have intellectually known not just what each real thing is among others, but also—perhaps without realizing it—what it is to be real. Now to be sure, I intellectually know, in real things of the field, what *in them* is their being real. That is, this is an intellection which is essentially concrete. And this is just the canon of reality. We are not, then, dealing with the fact that in the field we have intellectually known in what being real consists in the abstract and in all of its generality; rather, we are dealing with the concrete mode in which what we intellectually know in the field is real. The canon of reality is what, through reality, we have intellectually known within the field. And this is an essential character of the canon. But it has still others.

In the second place, in fact, the canon does not have {59} a definite form of being a canon. On the contrary, there are many *different modes* of being a canon; there are different modes of measuring. When speaking of a canon, we tend to think that it consists formally in being conceptualized reality, perhaps concrete and limited, but always conceptualized. But this is not the case. The canon can be conceptualized reality, but it is not necessary for it to be so. It can be, in fact, an emotional measure, for example, or a metaphorical measure, etc. The metaphor is not only so in its content, but above all concerns its own mode—metaphorical—of measuring the real. The canon is not formally any of these natures; it is canon *qua* measure, regardless of the mode of measuring.

But this is not all. In the third place, the canon is essentially an *open* canon. Inasmuch as we continue to intellectually know more real things, the canon measuring reality continues to change as well. And this happens in two ways. The canon continues to change above all because what constitutes the field measure of reality has been changing. For example, what the canon is after having intellectually known “persons” is not the same as it was when we intellectually knew only “things”. The measuring reality, in its concrete condition and within a determinate mode of measure, continues to expand or contract, but always goes on changing. But there is another sense to this variation, because the canon does not only consist in being a concrete metric of measurement; rather, things, when they are measured, turn out to be of greater or lesser reality with respect to reality itself as

principle. Whence the canon itself remains open not just on account of real things, but also by virtue of the character of reality. {60}

In summary, the measure of the real in the intellection of reason has an open character which is rooted in principles and canonic. It is rooted in principles because it deals with reality as a principle; it is canonic because it deals with reality as a canon. The two aspects are inseparable: the principle is such for a canon, and the canon is always a canon according to a principle. Their intrinsic unity is a measuring moment of reason. In order to simplify, I shall call it a ‘canonic principle’. Reason has a first moment, that of being intellection in depth. It has a second moment, that of being the canonic intellection of this depth. But it has in addition a third moment, since reason is formally and constitutively reason, by virtue of being intellection in its quest mode.

Third moment. Reason progresses in measured fashion towards an in-depth intellection. Therefore it has this moment of being a quest for that which is going to be intellectually known. This moment of quest can lead to a mistake which it is necessary to root out. I have already hinted at it before. The fact is that we are not dealing with the quest for an intellection which we still do not possess; we are rather dealing with a proper mode of intellection, viz. the quest itself, quest or search as a mode of intellection. Reason is formally *intellectus quaerens*, i.e., inquiring intellection. It is inquiring itself as a mode of intellection. Reason is only a mode of intellection; it is not intellection pure and simple. Reason is formally and structurally a quest or search, because reason is intellection of the real insofar as the real gives us pause to think. Now, to intellectually know what gives us pause to think and is giving us pause to think, is the very essence of the search. Reason, then, is formally and structurally a “search”. Thus to reason there pertains essentially not just the moment of depth and the moment of measuring, but also {61} its inquiring character. On this point philosophers have usually gone astray. What is this formal mode of intellectually knowing in the inquiring sense? I shall begin responding to this question by pointing out some essential aspects of the intellectual search.

A) Above all, reason is *dynamic*. The matter is clear: reason is progression, and while not all movement is progression, nonetheless all progression is movement. Therefore reason has a formally dynamic structure. And it is essential to emphasize this. Reason is not just a system which is articulated in the nature of a principle and a canon, as for example in the demonstration of a theorem. This type of demonstrative system is, as we shall see, the

result of reason, but not what formally comprises reason. Reason is a progression; and the principle and canon of reason are the principle and canon of searching, of the search for reality in depth. If reality were totally and completely apprehended in primordial apprehension, there would be no need to speak of reason. Intellection is not inquiring reason because reality is intrinsically articulated in a fundamental form, but because this fundamental articulation, precisely by virtue of finding itself only in depth, must be an articulation which is sought after. It is not enough for us to move within the field of reality; rather, we must progress in depth beyond the field. The difference between what is on this side of the field and its ultimate nature is the difference which makes the dynamic moment a progression of reason. It is this progression which has a canonic principle.

B) This canonic principle is not proper to just any progression, but only to one which is formally intellective; it is an inquiring progress, and the canonic principle is the principle of inquiry. The canonic principle is {62} formally a canonic principle of intellective search. Therefore this principle is not the canonic representation of the real. The canon does not measure the real in such a way that anything falling outside the scope of what the canon presents is declared non-real. The canon does not measure the real as representation, but on the contrary as a “direction” of search. Therefore it can happen, and in fact does happen—perhaps most of the time, as in the examples previously cited—that the real actually encountered is not like real things intellectually known in the field sense and presented in the canon. Nonetheless, the canon does not cease to function as a canon, since it is precisely by being directed by that representation that the thinking intellection is able to find diverse realities in it. The canon is directional. Only by going to seek bodies is it that reason has been able to intellectually know something “material” which is not “corpuscular”. Reason is the *directionality* of a progression. To be sure, there would be no direction without representation; without intellection of bodies there would be no direction for searching beyond the field. But this representation does not consist in being the norm or measure of what, in fact, is real; but rather in being the direction of an in-depth search. All searching has a precise direction determined by a previous representation. To search is to go while opening for oneself a path in the light of the direction which has been marked out for us by what has already been presented. Reason is not a quiescent system of articulated strata, but a system of inquiry; it is directional reason. Reason is above all the direction of an in-depth search.

C) Reason as search is not just directional; by virtue

of being so it is constitutively provisional. This is the *provisionality* of reason. Reason is always subject to possible canonic “readjustments” or “renovations”, which by virtue of being so {63} are rational readjustments or renovations. Such readjustment clearly concerns the content of what is presented in the canon, regardless of the nature of this presentation, which may not necessarily be a visual image. But when all is said and done, the essential part of the matter is that the readjustment not only remakes the content of what is presented as real, but also the very direction of all subsequent search, of all subsequent reason; hence it is that the direction of reason is always provisional. Provisional does not mean that it is false; that is another question with which we shall deal later. Rather, it means that even if true, it is a truth which by its very nature will be not necessarily derogated, but superceded. The nature of this superceding depends upon the individual case. But it will always be the case that what is superceded, precisely because of its nature, is formally provisional.

Dynamic, directional, and provisional is how reason is formally inquiring. This inquiring character, as I have already said, is a moment of the proper mode of the intellection of reason.

Now, intellection is actualization of the real. Therefore if reason is inquiring, this inquiring is determined by the mode of actualization of the real. What is this mode by which it affects the inquiry? That is the question upon which it is necessary to focus after having analyzed some characteristics of inquiry.

We have already seen that reason is intellection thrust “toward” what is beyond the field, i.e., in depth. This thrusting does not happen in a negative way; i.e., we are not dealing with a case of the field expelling us to some realm outside the field. On the contrary, the field thrusts us from the field, to be sure, but within and not outside of the real itself *qua* real. That is, {64} the thrusting “toward” is a positive actualization of the reality beyond the field aspect of reality. The essential point of the question is this positive actualization. The field throws the intelligence in front of a real, but outside-the-field, reality. And this thrusting before itself, actualizing that toward which we are thrust, is just what the word *problem* (from the Greek, *pro-ballo*, to throw something “in front of”) means in its etymological sense. In a problem there is already an actualization, i.e., there is an intellection of reality; but this actualization is at the same time still not fully actual. This being-now-actual in a certain way without being so, or rather without being so fully, is the nature of the problematic. The problematic is not primarily the character of my progression, but is primarily

the character of the actualization of the real. The real gives one pause to think. And this giving is precisely the problematic, something given by the real. Reality in the “toward” hurls me to a peculiar actuality of the real, to a problematic actuality. And this actuality of the real as a mode of actualization is what formally constitutes a problem. It is on account of this that problems are not created, but discovered or found. Only because the real is problematically actualized, and only because of this, intellection is—and must be—inquiring by intrinsic necessity. Inquiring is the mode of intellectually knowing problematic reality *qua* problematic. And this is inexorable. It is quite possible that, hurled by the real as problematic, we might retreat and not continue the intellection. There are millions of problems to which everyone can give a wide berth. But what is necessary is that we either stop before the problem or we give it a wide berth. And this *necessity* is just *inquiring*. Giving it a wide berth is a form of inquiring. The problematic determines an inquiring intellection as such. This {65} inquiring can have the negative aspect of giving something a wide berth, or the positive aspect of our taking up the problematic. This taking up can in turn have different modalities. Inquiry can be taken up and *resolve* the problem. But this is not the general case, because there are perhaps radical problems which the strict intellection of reason cannot resolve. Then “taking up” means only *treating* the problem. The “treatment” of the problematic is already an incipient solution. But this solution can be something toward which the incipient treatment only directs us in a convergent manner; it is a convergence which most of the time would be only “asymptotic”. In every case what is formally essential to inquiring reason is to be a “treatment” of the problem.

In summary, reason is a mode of intellection which has three proper moments. It is above all an intellection in depth. In the second place, it is a measuring intellection, i.e., an intellection of the real precisely as principle and canonic. Finally, it is an intellection with an inquiring character. The intrinsic unity of these three moments constitutes reason as a mode of intellection. If we wish to reduce it to a formula, we might say that *reason is intellection in which in-depth reality is actualized in a problematic way, and which therefore compels us to inquire through principles and a canon about the real in-depth*. Let us not take this expression as a definition in the usual sense of the word, but as a descriptive expression of what reason is, and it is something *toto caelo* different from what is usually understood by ‘reason’. It would not be superfluous to pin down further the nature of this difference.

D) Philosophy has customarily limited itself to a conceptualization of intelligence as affirmation: to know intellectually would be to affirm something of something—what many pages ago I termed {66} the *logification of intellection*. This idea runs parallel to another according to which reality and entity are identified, viz. the *entification of reality*. Both identifications are unacceptable; but what is now important to us, to clarify the problem of reason, is to concentrate on the logification of intellection. This logification has led to some concepts of reason which are vitiated at their very root. As we have already seen, according to these concepts, one understands by ‘reason’ the “faculty of principles”, i.e., the faculty of fundamental judgements. And this is false because a principle is not a judgement based on principle, but mere sentient actualization of reality as ground-reality. A principle has to be understood not in a concipient intellection but in a sentient intellection. Judgement is only one mode among others of this actualization, and therefore is something derived from it. In virtue of this, a principle is “reality” itself. And therefore reason is not the faculty of principles but intellection as principle. And that logification of intellection, I repeat, is what has led to certain concepts of reason which are, as I see it, unacceptable. Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can reduce these concepts to three.

Above all, there is the concept that reason is *logical rigor*. This concept, in a definitive way, has led to understanding reason as a *reasoning process*. Thus the process of reasoning would be the supreme form of logical rigor. This logical rigor caused reason to be conceived as something absolute. The idea, in various forms, has been circulating since Parmenides, Plato, and even Aristotle, and in modern philosophy culminates in Leibniz. The rigor of the reasoning process would be founded upon various kinds of rigorous evidence from the so-called principles of reason, i.e., in primary conceptual evidence, which for Leibniz were reduced to identities. Reason would be the organ of absolute conceptual evidence. {67} Hence, over and above sensibility, the absolute conceptualization of reason would float. Reason would be the canonic principle of the real, because a canonic principle would be a judgement of absolute conceptual evidence. If we go beyond what is apprehended sentiently, it would of necessity be by means of rigorous logic. Now, all of this is unacceptable not only as an idea, but even as a description of the fact of intellection, because to know intellectually is not to conceive and judge, but to sentiently apprehend the real as real; it is not “logical” but “sentient” intellection. And what carries us beyond the sentient apprehension of the real is not logical necessity, but the sentient actualiza-

tion of the real in the “toward”; it is the real “toward”, and not some logical necessity. The principle of reason is not concepts and primary judgements, but reality physically apprehended in the “toward”. Reason is not the organ of absolute evidence, but the organ of the progression of intellection in depth of the real already intellectually known sentiently.

According to a second concept, reason is not logical rigor but *dialectical necessity*; the logos logifies reason in the form of dialectic. This is Hegel’s idea. For Hegel, logical rigor consists but in seeing the real in the mirror or *speculum* of reason “itself”. Reality does not go beyond the “mirrored” or “specular” image of reason. Hence reason is *speculative reason*. The principles of reason are not a type of absolute conceptual evidence, but the unfolding of the speculative structure of reason. Reason is the unfolding of concepts. And the principle of this unfolding is not evidence but the intrinsic inconsistency of the concept. Reason cannot stop at a concept without seeing it dissolve into its opposite; then the original concept is recuped by incorporating into it this opposite, synthesizing a new concept from both, and so on *ad infinitum*. {68} The only consistent thing is then reason in its movement. Reason is movement, this movement is dialectical, and it consists in the turning of reason in upon itself; such would be the principle of reason under this concept. Reason would be speculative conceptual dialectic, in itself the very concept of the concept, i.e., Idea in the Hegelian sense.

But this is impossible. Reason is not movement within a concept; nor is it movement “in itself”; rather, it is a progression “toward the other”, intellection of the beyond. Reason is not a movement of concepts but a search within reality. Reason is inquiring, reason progresses. And this progression is not, to be sure, the result of some evidence, as Leibniz maintained; but neither is it the internal mobility of concepts. Reality is not the mirrored or specular image of reason. It is not the case that concepts are in themselves inconsistent; rather, it is reality itself which is intellectually actualized in problematic form. What moves reason is not the inconsistency of concepts, but the problematicism of reality. And it is on account of this that intellection, whether inconsistent or not, is still of an inquiring nature. Inquiring is the intellection of the problematic as such. The progression of inquiring is, then, nothing but the progressive actualization of the real.

According to a third concept, reason is neither rigor of absolute evidence nor dialectical necessity. Reason

would simply be *organization of experience*. This was Kant’s idea. The primary judgements of reason are not judgements about reality, but judgements about my intellection of experience. Regardless of how one interprets Kant’s philosophy (psychological, logical, or transcendental organization), reason must be the organization of these intellections. Such organization would have a precise {69} character, viz. totalization. The content of reason would not be the totality of the real but the logical totality of my intellections. Kant called these totalities (world, soul, God) *Ideas*. Reason is not the organ of absolute evidence nor the dialectic of the internal inconsistency of thinking; rather, it is purely and simply logical totalization. But this is unacceptable. And it is so for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is clear that reason is based upon what I have termed ‘prior intellection’. But these intellections upon which reason is based and to which I here refer are not intellections *qua* intellections, but the reality intellectually known in them. And since this intellection is sentient, it follows that reason is not the reason of intellections, but the reason of reality intellectually known in sentient fashion. In the second place, with regard to this sensed reality, reason does not organize its totalization, but its measure as open and in-depth. The presumed organization of experience is not the construction of a logically closed totality, because reality is in itself open *qua* reality. Reason is not organization but simply measuring as the principle and canon of the character of reality in depth.

The logification of intellection has led to three ideas of reason: organ of absolute evidence of being, organ of speculative dialectic, and organ of the total organization of experience. These conceptions are unacceptable at their root, because intellectual knowing is not judging but sentiently actualizing the real. Whence it is that reason does not rest upon itself, but is always just a mode of intellection. Reasoning, speculating, and organizing are three ways—among the many possible—of intellectually progressing in depth toward the beyond. And this progression is by its own formal nature grounded {70} upon a previous intellection, a sentient intellection.

With this we have examined with some care what reason is as a mode of intellection, i.e., what is *my* reason. But this is not enough to conceptualize what reason is, because the fact that the reason is *mine* is just an aspect of reason. In an essential way, reason has another aspect: reason is reason or explanation *of things*. What is this reason or explanation of things? That is what we must now examine.

Reason as Reason or Explanation of Things

On this point I will be much briefer, because the subject really belongs to the intellection of reality, to metaphysics; and here we are only dealing with intelligence. It is only with respect to intelligence that one can speak formally of reason, because reason is always a mode of intellection. But if this is true, what sense is there in speaking of the reason or explanation of things? We must address two questions: A) Reason as something about things, and B) the meaning of this reason or explanation.

A) *Reason or explanation is about things.* Let us return to the point of departure for this investigation. Intellection of the outside-the-field real is an intellection in progression toward reality itself as such, because reality as reality is formally open. This progression is an intellectual activity. *Qua* activity, the progression constitutes thinking. *Qua* intellectual, this activity is reason. Thinking is the activity of the intelligence, i.e., the activity determined by the actuality of reality *qua* open. It is, then, an activated activity; it is, in fact, {71} real things which give us pause to think. Reason is the intellectual aspect of this thinking activity. That is, reason intellectually knows in things that by which they give us pause to think. In this intellection, real things do not just give us pause to think; they give something more: *they give reason or explanation.* It is of minor importance that sometimes, perhaps most of the time, they *deprive us* of reason or explanation. But we encompass both directions of giving and depriving in that which *a potiori* we call “*giving a reason or explanation*”. In intellectual progression, real things begin by giving us pause to think, and end up by giving a reason or explanation. These are two different senses of “to give”. But their unity is the “giving” as such. And it is in this giving that the reason or explanation of things consists. To be sure, reason is only a mode of intellection. But as this mode is determined by real things themselves, it follows that *qua* determined by things, reason or explanation is about them. Reason, then, is given by them both in its initial moment as well as in its terminal moment. In virtue of this, a given reason or explanation *qua* given pertains to them; it is the reason or explanation of things themselves. The “of” does not mean that my reason is about things only in the sense that by being a mode of intellection it falls back upon them. This characteristic applies to all intellection and not just to reason. Nor are we dealing with an “of” which is genitive in the sense of propriety or pertinence, whose subject would be intellection itself. We are dealing with the fact

that reason pertains to things themselves. The “of” is a genitive of propriety or pertinence but whose subject is real things themselves. It is they which “give”; and since what they give is “reason” or explanation, it pertains to things. Otherwise they would not give it. Reason or explanation is something given. This is essential; reason is not something which one “has”, but something which is “given” to us. Reason is intellection measuring reality. Now, things give us the measure of their reality; it is just in this that {72} reason or explanation consists. And this “given” is at one and the same time my reason and the explanation of things. It is at one and the same time the open character of the reality of the real. In this openness, the real gives us pause to think and gives reason or explanation, because only the open can “give”, and only in the open can one search and find. To be sure, the question here arises as to what this finding is. But we shall speak of that later. Reason or explanation, in summary, is something belonging to things.

B) But, in what form is reality something which gives? Reality is the *de suyo* of things. And this *de suyo* sets limits for the “giving”. To give reasons or explanation is then a moment of the *de suyo*; reality as canonic principle of the in-depth inquiring intellection is a *de suyo*. But this is not sufficient for the question at hand. Reality, in fact, is something which *de suyo* “gives”, and it gives because it is open. Now this openness of the real has different forms.

Above all, the real is open *qua* reality, and it is therefore constitutively and formally respective. But reality is also open to real things *qua* grounding them. And we have previously explained what grounding is. Here openness is not just openness but an openness qualified as *the ground itself*, grounding openness.

But there is a third form of openness. Reality can be open not only by being respective, and not only by being grounded, but also by being *intellective actuality*. The intellectually known real is, as real, something *de suyo*, open therefore to being in intellectual actuality. This intellectual actuality can be at times just the primordial actuality of the real as real; this is primordial apprehension. But it can happen that intellectual openness has the character of a principle, i.e., is an actuality in thinking intellection. {73} Now, I repeat, the intellectual openness of the real as a principle is just reasons or explanation. And this openness is the basis for saying that reason or explanation is of things. Reality is not open to being reason or explanation by virtue of being naked reality, nor by merely being actualized in intellection; rather, it is open to being reason or explanation by being intellectually actualized in

form as a principle, and therefore ultimately by being actualized in sentient intellection. It is important to elaborate on this point, not just repeating it in different words, by discussing it from the point of view of the explanation of things.

a) In the first place, there is the very idea of the reason or explanation of things. Philosophy has distinguished reason or explanation as *explanation of being* from reason considered as the reason associated with *knowing*. But this distinction does not touch upon what, as I see it, comprises the fundamental aspect of reason. Reason is always reason or explanation of real things. Therefore in order to be able to speak of reason associated with knowing, it is necessary that a real thing be already present in its own character of reality. Now, that which is present is not naked reality but *actualized* reality. Between *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* there is, as I see it, the *ratio actualitatis*. And it is from this that reason is formally extracted, i.e., reason is extracted from actuality. Naked reality is but a “what”; it is that in which the real consists. This “what” can be actualized in different ways. When it is actualized in thinking intellection, the “what”—that in which a thing consists—has actuality in a problematic mode; it is a “what” which problematically retains its full actuality, its full “what”, that full “what” toward which the real thing itself *qua* real has directed us. This full “what” is, then, its what “for”, its “because”.* Reality actualized in the field manner, as reality, directs us as reality to {74} that which must be its full actuality, to its “what-for” or “why”, as direction. The “toward” itself is reality in the form of “for”. The “for” is the very openness of the “toward”. Reason is always intellection of a “what”, and therefore is intellection of a “what-for” or “why”. Later I shall explain the structure of this which we call “what-for”. It is not so easy to conceptualize.

The “what-for” or “why” is not a question which I formulate more or less arbitrarily about the actualized real; rather the question at hand is inexorably determined by the mode in accordance with which a real thing is actualized. This mode of actuality of the real is reason or explanation. As a question, the “what-for” or “why” is the intellection of a mode of actuality of the real; it is the concrete positive aspect of the problematic. To be problematic is to be a “what” in the “what-for” or “why”.

b) But this is not all, because that problematic actuality

is *eo ipso* intellectually known by searching. And this means that the actuality in “what-for” or “why” is actuality which, by being a search, turns out to be ordered to being found. The actuality of the real in “what-for” or “why” is always and only something found.

The “what-for” or “why” is not just something toward which I am thrust in my inquiring; rather, as a mode of actuality in the “toward”, it is something formally encountered in a search. This moment of the “being encountered” is a moment of actuality having positive character. This positive moment of the “what-for” *qua* encountered is what, precisely and formally, constitutes the “giving”. That things give us reason or explanation means that their actuality is actuality found in them themselves, because we are not dealing with the case of finding by chance, by stumbling upon it, but with the formal character of something sought, i.e. of something found in a search. This positive character is therefore {75} formally constituent of the reason or explanation of things; it is just their “giving”. We shall see shortly with greater precision in what this giving and this finding consists. But we can already say that they are moments of actuality.

c) But since it is actuality in that mode of “what-for”, there arises the question of what is the character of the “what-for” *qua* encountered.

Above all, the actuality in question is not an actuality of the real in the world, i.e., the actuality to which we now refer is not being. The “what-for” is not a “why is it” something or other. To be sure, it is impossible to refrain from expressing ourselves in the language which has already been created and therefore it is impossible to refrain from saying that the “what-for” or “why” is always just a “why something is”. But this is an ambiguous mode of expression. It could mean that the real “is thus in *its reality*”. And this is something which is extremely precise. But it might also mean that the real “is” thus in reality. And this is false as an idea of reason. Reason *qua* reason or explanation is not reason or explanation of being. Reason or explanation is always so of reality. Reason deals with reality and not being. Reason as principle of things is not “reason or explanation of being” but on the contrary “reason or explanation of *this* being”. Being is something which requires a principle and this principle is reality; reality is the reason or explanation of being. Reason is not the unfolding of being, as Hegel conjectured, but intellection of reality as a principle actualized in a thinking manner as reality.

The actuality in “what-for” or “why” is not, then, actuality as being in the world, but intellectual actuality of reality. It is not just actuality of the real—that is proper to

* [The Spanish word for ‘what’ is *qué*, and the word for ‘for’ is *por*. The phrase *por qué* means ‘for what?’ or ‘why?’, but the compound *porque* means ‘because’. This and the following text makes use of the Spanish word structure, which cannot be exactly reproduced in English.—trans.]

all intellection. We are, rather, dealing with an actuality in its mode of “what-for” or “why”. And insofar as something is actualized as real in “what-for”, we say that its reality is a *ground*. The actuality of the real in “what-for” is the grounding. {76} Reason or explanation is of things because it is their grounding actuality. *Qua* searched for, actuality is found in “what-for” or “why”, and as such, this actuality is the ground.

Reason is, then, reason or explanation of a thing *qua* actuality in the “what-for”, found as a ground.

We have thus seen what reason is as a mode of my intellection and as explanation of things. But both aspects of reason have an essential unity. It is necessary to attend to this unitary aspect of reason.

3

The Unity of Reason

All reality known intellectually by thinking, i.e., all reality intellectually known in reason, is reality whose actuality is grounded on and by reality itself as principle and canon. The essence of reason is to be thinking actuality of the real. It is by being *thinking* actuality that reason is “mine”. By being thinking *actuality* it is essentially, like all actuality, actuality of the real, i.e., “of things”. The unity of reason as mine and as explanation of things is, then, in the fact that reason is thinking actuality of the real. Let us clarify the nature of this unity.

In Leibniz this unity is a unity which we might say is one of indiscrimination. For Leibniz, reason is always reason or explanation of being. And this explanation of being is indiscriminately explanation of what a thing is and that it is intellectually known. This unity is what the celebrated principle of sufficient reason expresses: everything which is has a reason why it *is* rather (*potius quam*) than *is not*. It is ultimately more than {77} indiscrimination; it is an identity. Whence every logical reason or explanation always has some metaphysical ramifications. Now, this is quite impossible. Ultimately, the principle of sufficient reason is insufficient. First, because it concerns a reason or explanation of being; but reason is not reason or explanation “of” being, but reason or explanation of “this” being. And Leibniz did not see the explanation of this being: reality itself. Secondly, it is inadequate because the presumed identity between reason or explanation of being and reason or explanation of things is quite capable of being rejected, not just as a theory but by the mere analysis of the facts of intellection. It virtue of this, logical explanation is not, purely and simply, real and

metaphysical explanation. The reason of intellection is one thing, and the reason or explanation of real things quite another.

It was necessary to establish, then, some “discrimination” where Leibniz has not discriminated. And etymologically, ‘discrimination’ means “critique”. Hence the necessity for a critique of reason alone. That of course was Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. The reason to which Kant refers is reason as Leibniz’ indiscriminate reason. Therefore the title of Kant’s book *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* should be translated not as *Critique of Pure Reason* but *Critique of Reason Only*. It is the critique of the purely logical ground of metaphysics, the critique of Leibniz’ logico-real unity. Kant’s critique as discrimination is perfectly justified; intellectual reason is not the same as reason or explanation of reality. But does this mean that we are dealing with two reasons, split apart and separated as reason? That was Kant’s thesis. In contrast to the unity of reason, Kant set forth the simple duality of two reasons, incommunicado as reasons. But this, in turn, is impossible, because it is to pose the problem of reason along the lines of naked reality. Now, that is wrong. The reality upon which reason touches is not naked reality but *actualized* reality. And if it is indeed true that {78} reason as a mode of intellection is not the reason of naked reality (on this point, as I said, Kant is justified), still, when dealing with actualized reality, the question changes its aspect. Actualized reality does not cease to be real because it is actualized, even though its ambit of reality is immensely smaller than the ambit of naked reality, i.e., than the world. And as it is actualized in my intellection, it follows that the two reasons are not identical, as Leibniz claimed; but neither are they radically separated, as Kant claimed. The unity of reason is unity as intellectual actuality of the real. And it is this which is the subject of the celebrated principle of sufficient reason. As I see it one should express the principle as: *every reality, intellectually known in reason, is a reality whose actuality is grounded in and by reality itself*. Actuality is, ultimately, actuality in sentient intellection, and reason is what the actualization of the real in sentient intellection gives us in the form of “by”. It is sentient reason. Conversely, as this unity is a unity which is only radical, the two reasons, though not split, still follow separate paths. The real can be intellectually known as real, but this intellection will never be a mere logical unfolding of an intellection. We shall see this in the next chapter.

In summary, reason is the actuality of the real in a thinking search. As what is actualized is formally real, it follows that the real thus actualized is formally in actuality of reason. In this sense one ought to say that every-

thing real is rational. But it is necessary to understand this statement correctly.

In the first place, we are dealing with the fact that the *actualized real* is inexorably found in the ambit of reason. ‘Rational’ {79} means, first of all, to be in the ambit of reason. In this sense everything real actualized in intelligence is finally but ultimately incorporated into the ambit of reason. What happens is that not everything real “has” a reason or explanation: it could be based upon itself without being actualized.

In the second place, ‘rational’ does not mean that the actualized real has the internal structure of something conceptual. ‘Rational’ is not synonymous with ‘conceptual’; that was Hegel’s mistake. For Hegel, everything real is rational, and for him ‘rational’ means that everything has the structure of speculative reason, i.e., the structure of a concept. But that is chimerical, because ‘rational’ does not mean ‘conceptual’ but rather to be intellectually known in thinking actuality. And this intellection is not necessarily the logical intellection of the concept. Reason can actualize the real in a thinking manner in forms which are not conceptive. Moreover, it can actualize the real as being superior to every rational intellection.

In the third place, the rational is not just *what is actualized* in thinking intellection, but is rational because what is thus actualized enters *by itself* into the ambit of reason. Here ‘by itself’ means that we are not dealing only with an arbitrary operation of human intellection, but rather that the real is actualized as real in the form of “what-for” or “why”, i.e., it is already, *by itself*, actualized in the ambit of reason. We are not dealing with the question of whether reality in its own internal structure, i.e., as naked reality, can be intellectually known by reason. And this is because we are not dealing with *the nakedly real* but with *the actualized real*. Moreover, within the realm of the actualized real itself, its content can be completely opaque to rational intellection. It is one thing for the real to be actualized in a “what-for” or “why”, another for its content to be able to assume different forms in what is actualized. And it does assume them. One is the {80} form of transparency; the real in reason can be *transparent* to reason. But it can also happen that the real is not transparent but *opaque*. Opacity and transparency are two modes in accordance with which the actualized is intellectually known as a “for-what” or “why”. Now, ‘rational’ here means only that the actualized real is by itself, i.e., by its very mode of actualization, the terminus of rational intellection. It does not mean that by being the terminus of rational intellection, that which is intellectually known

necessarily has a character which is transparent to reason. Reason can intellectually know the real as opaque. In this sense the real, though rational in the sense of being by itself ensconced in the ambit of reason, can still have in its own structure moments which are not transparently knowable intellectually by reason. That is, the real can be, by itself, opaque. This is what, in common parlance, is termed *irrational*. The irrational is a characteristic of the real as intellectually known by reason itself. The irrational is not what “is not rational” but in a positive sense, what “is non-rational”. Irrationality is a positive characteristic of what is intellectually known in reason. In this sense, the irrational is *eo ipso* rational. The real, in itself, as naked reality, is neither rational nor irrational; it is purely and simply real. It is only one or the other when it falls into the ambit of reason, i.e., when it is reality actualized in thinking. Now, as the real *qua* actualized falls in the ambit of reason *for* itself, it follows that the real is real in a “what-for” or “why”. And only then can the answer to this question, the “for” or “because”, be irrational. Irrationality is reason giving the actualized real in reason; or rather, it is one of the modes which things have of giving reason or explanation of themselves. It is a type of reason or explanation given by things. The real is immersed by itself in reason, both by being about things {81} as well as by being one of my modes of intellection. And in this sense, and only in this one, everything real is rational.

I proposed to do a study of reason. And I have centered my reflections upon three questions: What is reason? What is the scope of reason? And in what, concretely, does the unity of reason and reality consist? We have already seen what reason is (both as a mode of my intellection and as a mode of reason or explanation of things, and in their essential unity, i.e., as actuality of the real in thinking intellection). Reason is, in all its dimensions, a mode of intellection. But not every intellection is, of itself, reason. Therefore it is necessary to inquire about the origin of this mode of intellection. That is what I have termed the ‘rise of reason’.

II

THE RISE OF REASON

As was inevitable, when examining what reason is we spoke at length about the rise of reason, covering the essential points. But it is fitting to recall in a systematic way all the things said on this topic, while at the same time covering certain points in more detail.

Reason does not rest upon itself, but *has an origin*. Here I understand by ‘origin’ or ‘rise’ that structural moment of reason by which it is, *qua* reason, something originated. We are not dealing with the genetic origin of reason, either in an individual or the species; rather, we are concerned only with the radically structural origin of it. Where does reason have its structural origin and what is its mode of origination? This is the question. In order to deal with it, let us proceed, as in so many other questions, step-by-step. {82}

1) Above all, reason is an activity, but an activity which does not arise out of itself. Modern philosophy has always conceptualized reason as an activity which arises out of itself, i.e., spontaneously. But this is impossible. Reason, in fact, is the intellectual moment of thinking activity. Now, thinking is not a spontaneous activity. Thinking is certainly activity, but *activity activated* by real things. It is they which give us pause to think. Therefore reason, by virtue of being an intellectual moment of an activated activity, is reason founded upon something given. And by this I am not referring to the fact that reason intellectually knows what is given as an object about which to think; i.e., I am not dealing with the fact that reason is an intellection which has an object that it did not “put” there. Rather, I am referring to the fact that reason, as a mode of intellection, is a mode determined by things and therefore is a mode of intellection imposed by them. Things not only give us that about which we think, but also the very rational mode of intellectually knowing them; they impose it, because upon giving us pause to think, they *eo ipso* determine this mode of intellectual knowing which is reason. Reason, then, is not a spontaneous activity but an intellectual mode given by things. It has its rise, its origination, above all in real things inasmuch as their reality is what gives us to think, and what determines intellection in the form of reason. But that is not all. The origination has a root which is still deeper.

2) What is it that gives us to think? Real things, in their reality, give us pause to think. To do this, these real things have to be already present to us as real. Now, the mere intellectual actuality of the real as real is intellection. Things give us to think because previously they were already intellectually known as real. Therefore reason {83} as a mode of intellection of what things give us pause to think is a mode of previous intellection of the real. In virtue of this, reason formally arises precisely from this previous intellection. Reason has its origin in things, but in things previously intellectually known as real. This is a deeper moment of the origin of reason. On account of it reason is not, as we shall see, a mode of intellection supe-

rior to naked intellection; rather, reason is reason by virtue of being founded upon intellection and being a mode of it. Reason, by being intellection of what things give us pause to think in mere intellection, is an intellectual progression determined by the inadequacy of this mere intellection. Only insofar as mere intellection does not intellectually know things adequately, only in this respect do things give us pause to think. And this thinking intellectually knows the reason of this “giving”. Reason is always subordinate to primary intellection. But its origination has a yet deeper root.

3) What is it in the naked intellectual apprehension of real things which gives us to think? To think is to intellectually know reality beyond the field, in depth. Therefore it is because real things are intellectually known in the field manner as real that they give us to think. Reason, by being a mode of intellection in depth, is formally *reason of the field*, i.e., reason determined in the field sense to be reason. The origin of reason does not lie only in the fact that the real previously known intellectually gives us pause to think; it has an origin which in a certain respect is still deeper: the field-nature of the previous intellection of the real. The field is a physical moment of the real, the sensed moment of the world, of the respectivity of the real *qua* real. Therefore the field is *eo ipso* a physical moment of the {84} intellectually known real in its primordial apprehension, in its naked intellection. The field is not just a concept but is, I repeat, a physical moment of the real; and it is so precisely because respectivity within the world is a moment of reality itself as reality. That physical sense does not consist in being a “thing”—the field is not a thing which is intellectually known—but that in which and through which one intellectually knows one thing among others. Finally, this physical moment is not a “relation” but “respectivity”, formally constitutive of the real *qua* real. In this “fieldness”, the real is apprehended in a “toward”, within the field and beyond the field. And this intellection of the real in the field manner “toward” what is beyond is what constitutes reason as intellection in search of something. Reason is reason that is originally field reason. Reason has its origin not just by being something given by real things and not just by being a mode of some previous intellection; rather, it has an origin because it consists in being field intellection in search of something. But its origin has a yet deeper root.

4) The field, in effect, is the sensed world as world, the sensed respectivity in the “toward”. Now, to sense something as real is just sentient intellection. Sentient intellection is the intellection of which field reason is a mode. Sentient does not mean (as we have already seen) that its own object, primary and adequate, is sensible. If it

were no more than that, the unity of intellection and sensing would be merely objective, and in such a case intellection would be “sensible”. We are concerned with something much more significant, that intellection properly so-called is “sentient”. We are not concerned then with *sensible intellection*, but with *sentient intellection*. So, the intellection of the real within a field in {85} the “toward” as depth is reason; and as this intellection is sentient, it follows that reason is formally *sentient reason*. Reason senses reality in the “toward”, reality itself giving us pause to think. Its progression is a progression within a “toward” sensed, a sentient progression in the nature of the field real. Only because intellection is sentient, only because of that is it necessary to know intellectually, in the field manner, in reason; that is, reason is sentient. Reason has its origin not only by being something given by things, not only by being a mode of previous understanding, not only by being reason or explanation of what is in the field, but it has its origin primarily and radically by being a mode of sentient intellection, that is by being sentient reason. But it is necessary to clarify more the character of this origin, asking ourselves in what the formally sentient moment of reason consists.

5) The question cannot be justified further, because to say that reason is “sentient” seems to mean that what reason intellectually knows is something like the qualities sensed in a sensible perception. And that would be absurd. We are not dealing with anything like it at all. Reason is a mode of sentient intellection; therefore it is to sentient intellection itself that we must direct our attention in order to understand the idea in question. In what, formally, does the fact that intellection is sentient consist? What is the formally intellectual part of sensing? To be sure, it is not in the nature of the sensed quality, i.e., not in the content of sensing; but rather in the type of its formality of otherness, in the formality of reality. The formally intellectual part of human sensing is not in its content but in being an *impression of reality*. Intellection is one with sensing precisely and formally in the moment of otherness, in the moment of formality of sensing. The formal unity of sentient intellection is found in that the formal part (not just of the {86} *intellectively known* but of *intellective knowing itself*) is identically and physically the formal moment or formality itself of sensing, of impression. Therefore intellectual knowing is sentient intellectual knowing, and human sensing is intellectual sensing. This unity is the impression of reality, which by being of reality is intellectual and by being impression is sensed. The content of sensing is sensed reality only by being the content of an impression of reality. Now, reason is the mode of sentient intellection. And sensing the re-

turn to the world is how every impression of reality is transcendently open. This openness, as we have already seen, is dynamic in two ways. First, in the form of dynamism toward other sensed things (the field), and second in the form of a search (the world). Every impression of reality is *qua* formality an open impression, not only in the dynamism of distance but also in the dynamism of searching. To see the color green as something *de suyo* is to be inchoatively seeing it toward other colors, and toward other realities. To apprehend something sentiently *de suyo* is a first step toward the world, a first primordial sketch of the search for the real in reality. As such, human sensing is already a primordial type of reason, and every form of reason is radically and primordially a mode of sensing reality. It is sentient reason.

Therefore reason as a search for the world in the field is not a question of concepts, nor even one of being, but a question of the impression of reality not *qua* impression of such-and-such a reality, but *qua* impression of mere reality, of pure and simple reality. Reason is a search for the world, an inquiring impression of reality. And now it is clear that the sentient part of reason does not refer to its own content, but to the impressive {87} character of that reality which reason intellectually knows in a particular way by progressing impressively in it; it is an impression of reality in progression. A transfinite number, an abstract concept, are not sensed qualities. But they are intellectually known as something real, and as such are constituted in the impression of reality as such. That reason is sentient means, then, that reason *qua* intellection is an intellectual modulation of the very impression of reality. Intellection is mere actuality of the real in sentient intelligence; it is formally the impression of reality. And reason as a mode of intellectual actuality is a mode of the impression of reality. Which mode?

In *primordial apprehension* or naked sentient intellection, sentient intelligence senses reality in itself and by itself in an impression as the *formality* of what is sensed. In the field intellection of the real which culminates in *affirmation*, the intelligence has the impression of reality of one thing among others, and the sensed formality then acquires the character of a field as the *medium* of intellection. But in *reason*, the intelligence has the impression of reality, of formality, as a *measure* of the real beyond the field in depth. Therefore strictly speaking reason not only moves “in” reality, but rationally “senses” the reality in which it moves, and senses rationally that it is moving therein. Reason does not search for reality but *really* searches for and dives into reality, precisely because it senses this reality and its own motion therein. The reality constitutive of reason is just reality in impression.

Therefore reason is not primarily something merely logical, but rather it intellectually knows reality with that *coercive force* proper to the reality in which it is, i.e., with the force of *sensing reality*. In its inquiring, reason *senses reality inquiringly*. {88} In the primordial impression of reality, intelligence senses reality as naked formality; in affirmation, intelligence senses the impression of reality as a medium of intellection of the real; in reason, the intelligence senses the impression of reality as a measure or ground of the reality beyond the field. They are three modes or forms of the impression of reality.

Now, the impression of reality has a physical unity in accordance with which it is the impression of reality formally, medially, and by measuring. These are not three “uses” of the impression of reality, but three intrinsically necessary “modes” by virtue of being modes of a single sentient intellection—by virtue of being, that is, three “dimensions” of the actualization of the real in sentient intellection. These three modes are not constituted owing to the impression of reality, but “in” the impression of reality; they are that in which the very impression of reality unitarily consists. They are not derived *from* the impression of reality, but are the three dimensions *constitutive of* the primordial impression of reality. Conversely, these three dimensions of intellection (primordial apprehension, affirmation, reason) are distinguished only in being modes of sentient intellection. Of these three dimensions, the first, to wit, the impression of naked formality, can be given without the other two, but the converse is not true. And this is because the second, affirmation, is something essentially founded upon the primordial impression of reality, and in turn reason essentially involves affirmative intellection. The unity of the impression of reality in these latter two dimensions is, ultimately, the “toward” of the naked impression of the formality of reality.

So when we say that reason is not only sensible but sentient, we are not talking about some sensualistic reduction of {89} affirmation and of reason, because “sensualism” means that the *contents* of judgement and reason are formally reduced to the contents of sensible impressions. And this is simply absurd. The fact is that in sensible impressions, philosophy has seen nothing but their content, and it has gone astray on the matter of their formal *sensed moment of reality*; i.e., it has not seen the impression of reality. Now, to reduce the contents of affirmation and of reason to those sensible impressions is absurd. But the formal moment of reality, the impression of reality, remains. And then to reduce the moment of reality of an affirmation and of reason to reality sensed in impression, to the impression of reality, is not sensualism.

The moment of reality proper to affirmation and to reason is physically and numerically identical to the moment of reality impressively apprehended in primordial apprehension. We are not, then, dealing with a *conceptual identity* of that which we call ‘reality’ in the three modes of intellection, but with a moment which is *formally physical and numerically the same* in the three modes. The physical and formal unity of the moment of reality as impression is not therefore sensualism. It is, rather, *sensism*. And that is something quite different; it is one and the same impression of reality which in its physical and numerical sameness opens up the dimensions of affirmed reality and of reality in reason. Reason is sentient in this radical mode—and only there—, that of being a mode of the impression of reality.

The radical rise of reason is in the physically “unique” impression of reality. Reason is something which has an origin precisely and formally by virtue of being sentient. In virtue of this, I repeat, reason, like affirmation, is but a mode of intellection of primordial apprehension. Reason is not {90} something which by itself sits *on top of* everything sensed. On the contrary, reason itself is sentient, and rational intellection is a determinate mode of intellection of sentient intellection itself. Reason progresses in order to fill up insofar as possible the inadequacies of naked intellection. This progression, then, does not have *supremacy* over naked sentient intellection or primordial apprehension; it has, only in some respects, *a certain superiority* over it. This is superiority is only partial and within the narrow confines of reason. The progress of reason has a certain free and creative character with respect to the content of intellection. But it is, I repeat, a creation within very narrow confines. Nothing of what is intellectually known in reason is real without a ground—a ground which is necessary in principle—of what is intellectually known in primordial apprehension. But by virtue of being a ground, that which is intellectually known in reason is something real within that physical reality, something primary and unlikely to be lost of the impression of reality. Only primordial apprehension has radical supremacy in human intellection. The difference between naked intellection and reason is then given—and can only be given—in an intelligence which is sentient. It is what I call the ‘unprescriptive parsimony of reason’. And this is its power.

In virtue of that, the origin of reason, its radical origin, is in its sentient character. Reason is an act which modally concerns the impression of reality.

But this does not yet exhaust the problem of reason. The impression of reality, in fact, is but a moment, the moment of otherness of what is apprehended, the moment

in accordance with which what is apprehended is, *de suyo*, what is present in apprehension. It is because of this that the real thus actualized is not only real but indeed has its own real content. The impression of *reality* is not a secondary {91} impression, but the formal moment of a single, unique impression *of the real*, of the impressive actuality of the real. Now, reason as a modulation of the impression of reality has thereby its own intellectually known contents, and does not leave them outside that impression. Reason is formally sentient by virtue of being a mode of the impression of reality; and on account of that, just like said impression, reason intellectually knows the proper contents of the real. Together with its impression of reality, these contents comprise a mode which is proper not only to the impression of *reality*, but also *eo ipso* a mode proper to intellectually knowing *the real*. Hence, having shown that reason modally concerns the impression of reality not only does not exhaust the problem of reason, but is the very point at which one poses the problem of what the rational intellection of the real consists. This is the problem of “reason and reality”, the last of the three great problems which we posed to ourselves after having examined what reason is and what its origin is.

III

REASON AND REALITY

1

The “Problem” of Reason

We have seen that reason is a mode of sentient intellection, and that therefore it is intrinsically and formally sentient reason. This reason, like all sentient intellection, is {92} constitutively a mere actualization of the real. Therefore reason is not something which has to “achieve” reality; rather, it is something which is already constituted as reason within reality. We have examined how reality functions, so to speak, in its three dimensions of formality, mediality, and measure. Now it remains only to clarify that structure from another essential direction, something which we have sketched out in the last few pages. Reality, in fact, is not only actualized in intellection, but moreover by virtue of being so has possessed us. We are possessed by reality. What is this possession? The reader should excuse the monotonous repetition of ideas, but it is convenient to summarize what has been said.

Possession is not exclusive to intellection as such; it

belongs to all intellection to be sure, but it does so because intellection is sentient. It is, then, to sensing that we must turn out attention, but very briefly so as to recap what has been said in Part I. Sensing is sensing impressions of things, or rather, impressively apprehending things. An impression has three moments which are not independent, but which are distinct from one another within their primary and indestructible unity. An impression is above all *affection of the sentient*. But in this affection there is an essential second moment: presentation of something else in and through the affection itself; this is the *moment of otherness*. But impression has still a third essential moment: the force, so to speak, with which the *other* of otherness is imposed on the sentient. This *force of imposition* is just being possessed by what is sensed. The unity of the three moments—affection, otherness, and force of imposition—is what comprises the intrinsic and formal unity of what we call *impression*. {93}

Impressions are quite varied. But this diversity has a very precise characteristic with regard to our problem. The other which is present in affection has above all a *content* of its own: color, sound, heat, taste, etc.; but it also has (as I have already said) its own *formality*. This is the mode by which those kinds of content are present to us, i.e., the mode by which they are “other”. This formality is above all the *formality of stimulation*, the mode by which the other is formally other by triggering a response. The other is then merely a “sign”. But the other can be present as other not in relation to possible responses, but in relation to what is present *de suyo*; this is the *formality of reality*. What is present then is not a “sign” but “reality”. In these two types of impression, the other is imposed upon the sentient according to two different types of force of imposition. In the sign, the impression is imposed with the *force of stimulation*. In the formality of reality, it is with the *force of reality*. In the first case we have *impression of a stimulus*; in the second, *impression of the real*. Now, to apprehend something as real is what formally constitutes intellection. Therefore impression of the real is formally impression of a *sentient intelligence*.

Let us leave aside, for the moment, the content of this impression of the real, and attend only to the formality of otherness, which is what I have called *impression of reality*. If we call the act of intellectually knowing *noein*, as has been done since the time of the Greeks, it will be necessary to say that even since then this *noein* has been inadequately conceptualized. To be sure, the act, the *noesis*, has been distinguished from that which is present in us, the *noema*. But nothing more; philosophy has gone astray on the matter of the impressive character of the *noein*, i.e., {94} on its formal unity with the *aisthesis*,

with sensing. The Greeks, then, and with them all of European philosophy, failed to realize that intelligence is sentient. And this has repercussions with regard to the very concept of *noesis* and *noema*. The *noesis* is not just—as has been said—an act whose terminus is merely intentional; rather, it is in itself a physical act of apprehension, i.e., an act whose intentionality is but a moment, the directional moment of the relational or apprehensive aspect of what is intellectually known in impression. On the other hand, the *noema* is not just something which is *present* to the intentionality of the *noesis*, but something which is *imposed* with its own force, the force of reality, upon the apprehendor.

In virtue of this, the *noein* is an *ergon* and therefore its formal structure is *Noergia*. ‘Noergia’ means at one and the same time that the *noesis* is relational, that it is impressively apprehending, and that the *noema* has the force of imposition proper to reality. This is the force of impression of reality.

Sentient intellection is possessed by the force of reality; i.e., the real is impressed upon us in three different ways. In the first place there is the force with which the real, as formality of what is apprehended in and by itself, is imposed as real. This is the primordial form of the impression of reality. Reality primordially sensed is not impressed upon us by any type of irrefutable evidence, but by something more than evidence: by the *irrefragable force of being reality*, by the primordial force of reality. The possible evidence—it is not, though, strictly speaking evidence—is but the expression of this primordial force. However in the second place, it can happen that the real is not sensed in and by itself, but only among other realities, i.e., at a distance. Then the impression of reality {95} adopts the form of an affirmation, and what is affirmed is but the reality apprehended in the impression of reality at a distance. What is apprehended is then imposed with its own force, which is demand or exigence, the *exigent force of the real*. Its noetic expression is evidence. Evidence is not constituted by the mere presence of the evident, but by the force of reality, by its exigent force. But the real, in the third place, can be sentiently apprehended in depth. This is the impression of reality in depth. Then reality is impressed upon us with its own force, the *coercive force of reality* in depth. Its noetic moment is just reason. Reason, affirmation, and primordial apprehension are but noergic modes of a single identical noergic impression of reality. Reason is modalization of affirmation, and affirmation is modalization of primordial apprehension. In turn, the otherness of the real in impression is imposed upon us with its own force, first in the irrefragable force of immediate formality, which is then turned into exigent

evidence and later into the coercive form of reality. Affirmation and reason are but modulations of the impression of reality. They are noergic modes.

Reason, then, moves by its own force, by the force with which the real itself is impressed upon us as if it were a voice. This force is not some impulse in a vacuum. Just the opposite: it is a force which moves us but which constrains us to keep within the real. It is, then, a *coercive force*. What is proper to reason or explanation is not evidence nor empirical or logical rigor; rather, it is above all the force of the impression of reality in accordance with which reality in depth is imposed coercively in sentient intellection. The rigor of a reasoning process does not go beyond {96} the noetic expression of the force of reality, of the force with which reality is being impressed upon us, that reality in which we already are by impression. Therefore the problem of reason does not consist in investigating if it is possible for reason to reach reality, but just the opposite: how we are supposed to keep ourselves in the reality in which we already are. So we are not speaking about arriving at the state of being in reality, but about not leaving it.

This movement of reason is not just movement. Movement is dynamism, and moreover affirmation as such is dynamic. Reason is a movement, but different than affirmative movement; it is a movement of searching, a progression. It is a progression which arises from and is animated by the reality-ground, by reality in depth.

The progression itself is thus a movement in which one does not seek to reach reality but to intellectually know the real content of the voice of reality, i.e., the real. It is a search for what the real is in reality. The reality of the real is not univocally determined; this is indeed just the problematic of the real in the face of reason. In virtue of it, the progression is a movement within *reality itself* in order to describe what the real is in worldly reality just through the coercive force of reality. This force consists in constraining us so that the real which reason seeks is intellectually known as a content which does not draw us out of reality. What does this mean? We are not talking about maintaining ourselves in reality “itself” in some general way, i.e., formally consubstantial with reason. Even when what reason intellectually “knows” turns out not to be true, still, this not-truth is so within reality and through it. In this regard, the coercive force is a force which is formally constitutive of reason. Therefore when I am speaking about maintaining ourselves in reality I do not refer {97} only to something like a pretension of reason, i.e., to the fact that reason consists in pretending to move itself intentionally in reality. Rather, I refer to something much more important, to wit, that reason, ef-

fectively and not just presumptively, is already moving itself in reality. And this is *absolutely necessary*, with a physical necessity of the intellectually known itself, not of rational intellection *qua* intellection. What happens is that this *is not enough*. Without that formal and consubstantial immersion of reason in reality, there would be no rational intellection at all. But the problem lies in what reason can mean in its concrete form, because the voice of reality is a voice which cries out in concrete terms, i.e., it is the voice with which these real determinate things within the field constrain one to seek *their* reality in depth. Therefore they are a search and a coercive force which are both essentially concrete. One seeks the structure in depth of these concrete field realities, i.e., one tries to maintain himself in the in-depth reality of some very determinate things. And then it is quite possible that the immersion in reality, despite being consubstantial with reason, nonetheless draws us out of what *these* concrete things are in depth, and leaves us floating in a reality, physically real, but devoid of intellectual content. It is not just a question of simply moving ourselves effectively in reality, but of not remaining suspended in it with respect to what concerns the determinate things in the field, whose in-depth intellection is sought.

It is to this concrete progression that we must now attend. The progression has a *point of departure*, viz. determinate realities within the field. In this progression reason has opened to *its own ambit*, one which is both distinct from {98} the previous field and in-depth. Finally, in this ambit the intellection of reason in its *own character* takes place. Let us examine these three aspects of the progression of reason.

2

The Support for the Progression of Reason

First, let us consider the *point of departure* of reason. Reason is not an intellection which only comes *after* other pre-rational intellections. Reason is an intellection *determined* by the intellection of real field things. If this were not so, there would be no possibility of a human reason. The determinant of rational intellection is *previous intellection* of what is in the field. What is this previous intellection? To be sure, it is not intellection *qua* intellectual act. Classical philosophy has seen reason above all from the point of view of an intellection composed of prior intellectual acts. The typical rational intellection would therefore be reasoning: the composition of the *logoi*, the *syn-logismos* or *syllogism*. But as I see it, this is not al-

ways true, and furthermore is never what is essential. The idea that the essence of reason is the reasoning process is unacceptable. The essential part of reason is not to be the *combination of previous acts* of intellection. The essential part of previous intellection is not *intellection* as an act, but *what is intellectually known in the act* or in previous acts. Reason, in fact, is not a *composite* intellection but a *new mode* of intellection determined by what was previous intellectually known. It is in-depth inquiring intellection. This new mode of intellection is not necessarily a composition of intellections. Each intellection is merely actuality of something real; but since {99} everything real is respective *qua* real, it follows that every intellection of the real is inquiringly referred, in depth, to other possible intellections. Reason consists in this formal referring process. Reason is not a composition of intellections; rather, there is composition of intellections because there is reason. That is, the process of reasoning not only isn't reason, but moreover reason is the very possibility of all reason processes. This reason is the new mode of intellection. It is in this modal aspect, and only in this, that I say that reason starts from what was intellectually known in a previous intellection. What is this which was previously intellectually known?

The previously known is everything apprehended in the field manner. It is above all *the real* intellectually known in primordial apprehension. But it is also each thing which we have intellectually known at a distance in the field upon knowing what that thing is *in reality*. This intellection has two moments: the moment of simple apprehension and the moment of affirmation. I shall lump both moments together in the word 'ideas', in order to simplify the expression. That which has been previously known intellectually is, then, the field of the real and all the ideas and affirmations of what that real is in reality. These previous intellections do not have the character of "premises", first because rational intellection is not just theoretic, and second because reason is not formally ratiocination. Reason, when carrying out a reasoning process, is only a type—and not the most important type—of reason or explanation. But third and above all, they do not have the character of "premises" because the intellectual set of the real, and of the ideas and affirmations about what the real is in reality, does not now function like a set of judgements, but like a set of intellections. Intellection is not formally judgement; just the opposite: judgement is what it is only by being affirmative *intellection*. Now, affirmation does not {100} function here like judgement, but like intellection, i.e., like intellectual actualization of the real and of what this real is in reality. Affirmation itself is for our problem only a form of intellection.

Whether or not it is affirmative, the intellection of what this real thing is in reality is an intellection. And it is as intellection that affirmations and ideas now intervene. Up to now, “real” and “in reality” have been but two moments of the field intellection of real things. Here this previous intellection has a new function, one which is modal. It does not intervene by virtue of its own intellectual structure (primordial apprehension, ideas, affirmations), but in a *new mode*. This new mode consists in being the intellectual *support* of the real in depth. Together with the real and what it is in reality, we have here reality in depth, what the real is in reality. Correlatively, the intellection of the real in primordial apprehension and in affirmation is now the voice of reality in depth. This new function is, then, the function of being the voice of reality. That which was previously intellectually known then has the modal function of being that in which this voice resounds. In what was intellectually known in the field resounds the voice of what the real is in depth. This resounding has two aspects. On one hand, it is the sound itself, i.e., the notes of what the field reality, as reality and in reality, is in depth. And this is not some vague metaphor, because to be *resonant* is in this sense to “notify” reality in depth. And notification is a mode of intellection. But on the other hand, the resonance has a second aspect. Things not only notify, but are also that in which what is notified resounds. They are not just *resonances* of the real in depth, but also the {101} *resonators* themselves. And *qua* resonators, these real things take on that new modal function which is to be principle and canon. Principle and canon are neither premises nor rules of reasoning. They are the field reality as resonator of what reality is in depth. This is the full force—and also the limitation—of rational intellection, of the intellection of the voice of reality in depth. This reality in depth is actualized in intellection in its own way, in the form of the ambit of resonance.

3

The Ambit of Rational Intellection

Ambit is always, in one form or another, an open ambit with respect to the things in it. But the ambit of rational intellection is open in a very special way. Let us see how.

Every field intellection is an open intellection: What a real thing is in reality is not fully actualized even in intellection or primordial apprehension, because this apprehension apprehends the real in and by itself; whereas to intellectually know what this something is in reality is to intellectually know it “among” other real things. Hence,

when we intellectually know this something as real, what it is in reality is left open precisely and formally because the “among” of its reality is left open. This intellection culminates in affirmation. Every affirmation, then, takes place in an open ambit. And its openness is just the openness of the “among”: only because something real is apprehended “among” other real things, only on account of this is this intellection open. This openness, then, {102} has a precise structure. It is an openness which is given only in the intellection of each thing, but with respect to other things actually apprehended already in the field in primordial apprehension. This “among” actualizes reality for us in the “toward”. And just on account of that, the intellection of what this real thing is in reality is a movement which goes from the real toward other realities, and from them to the first reality. This is affirmative movement.

But in rational intellection the openness is different. Let us recall once again what was said earlier. To be sure, the entire field reality (i.e., real being and what these real things are in reality) sends us beyond the field. But it is beyond the whole field, not from one thing in the field to something else in it. Therefore intellection is not a movement from one real thing to another, but a progression from every field reality toward an in-depth beyond. Thus intellection is a special mode of movement, viz. a search in reality. And as such, it does not know if it is going to find something in this in-depth beyond. This is the openness not of the intellection of a thing with respect to others within a field, but the openness of all the field reality to a world, i.e., to reality. The openness of the world is not an “among” but the “respectivity” of the real *qua* real. Whence it is that the openness of the ambit of rational intellection is in a certain way absolute. And precisely for this reason its intellection is not simple movement but searching. Affirmative movement is movement in a field, but the searching, the rational movement, is a movement in the world, in reality. It is in this that the in-depth or profound nature of the real formally consists.

This openness, precisely on account of being openness in the world, is above all openness to other real things, but it is or can be {103} openness to other functions and modes of reality as well. This openness is absolute, because no matter how much we find, the searching never exhausts the openness of the world. And this is the essential point. In contrast to Leibniz and Kant, we must say that reason is neither total nor totalizing; rather, it is constitutively open. And this is not on account of the internal limits to reason but the very character of the real as impressively sensed. Reality is open *qua* reality, be-

cause its openness is but its constitutive respectivity. The task of reason is indefinite not only in the sense that it will never exhaust what concretely is proposed to it to intellectually know, but above all because what is intellectually known, viz. the real *qua* real, is formally and constitutively open, and therefore never closed and exhausted. In this open ambit, in this world, is where the intellectual search of reason takes place; it is searching in reality. What is the character proper to this inquiring intellection?

4

The Character Proper to Intellectual Search

We are dealing then with a search in a formally open world. But this does not mean that either the openness of the world or the search itself is not defined, because *we are thrust into* the search for real field things, and upon them *we support ourselves* in our search. Reason opens the ambit of intellection but only based upon real things. And this openness with support is what constitutes the character proper to intellectual search. In what does this support consist? And what is it that is thus intellectually known? {104} These are the two points which we must summarily analyze. The questions overlap partially, and hence some repetition is inevitable. But despite that, it is necessary to examine the questions separately.

A) In what does support consist? One might think that it consists in the ground; then to say that reason is supported in what was previously intellectually known would mean that what is intellectually known in reason is something which has its ground in what was previously intellectually known in the field. If this were so, that which is intellectually known by reason would be only something which *de suyo* does not have reality; it would only be real insofar as it is grounded in some reality intellectually known in the field manner. To use a medieval formula, this is the classical idea that what is intellectually known in reason is by itself only objectivity—*ens rationis*—; only insofar as it has a *fundamentum in re* can it be said that what is rationally intellectually known is real. Now, said this way, and including all of its ramifications, this is not correct as I see it, because it is a conceptualization in which fundament and support are identified, and that identification is wrong. Every rational intellection has, in fact, two moments. One, that which is intellectually known; another, the character in accordance with which the intellectually known is intellectually known as real. And these two moments are not formally distinct; rather, they have essentially different characters.

The moment of reality, as we have already seen, is

consubstantial with reason. Therefore reason cannot set itself the task of *reaching* reality, because it is already *in* reality. And this means, above all, that what is intellectually known by reason is not, in this respect, *ens rationis* but *realitas ipsa*. The reality in which reason moves is not based upon the reality of the field, but rather the reality itself of the field, in its physical numerical identity, is that in which reason moves. {105} To be sure, as I have already explained at length, the reality in which reason moves is *ground-reality*. And its function in rational intellection is “to be grounding”. But grounding what? Why, just its content. The content of what is intellectually known rationally is based upon the content of what is intellectually known in the field manner. We shall see this forthwith. We earlier asked ourselves what a base or a support is. Support is always something formally “other” and also “prior” inasmuch as it conduces to the intellection of something different, but something called forth by the prior. The content of what is rationally intellectually known is based upon “the” reality in which reason moves consubstantially, i.e., without formal support. This character of support which the content has is therefore inscribed within the previous character of reality (when this character has as its function that of grounding). The character of reality is identical to the formality of the impression of reality. And therefore reason, even when it intellectually knows what is most inaccessible to the senses, is always and only sentient reason because it intellectually knows its contents within the moment of reality of an impression. The mode in which reality is grounding consists in being referred to the content of real field things as support of the content of what reason is going to intellectually know.

What is this which reason intellectually knows?

B) That which is intellectually known in reason thus has its own content, which is formally and identically inscribed in the character of reality of the field. This character or formality is just the open ambit of reality *qua* reality, an ambit already apprehended in the field manner. On the other hand, the content of what is going to be intellectually known in this ambit is what is based only upon the content of the field intellection. That content is not necessarily identical with nor is it {106} necessarily distinct from what is intellectually known in the field manner. What is different and new is the mode of intellection. Thus, for example, in ancient physics intellectually known elementary particles were corpuscles, i.e. something whose nature is identical to what bodies intellectually known in the field manner are. But the fact that the corpuscle of field intellection was a support and also a moment of intellection in-depth—this constituted a new

mode of intellection. That which was intellectually known—the body—was the same, but it was different in its intellectual function, i.e., the mode of intellection. The mode of rational intellection is just the mode by which reality itself is grounding the real. The mode of intellectually knowing a body is given. If one intellectually knows that what is in the world is a body, the *content* “body” is identical to the field content. But the fact that this content is a *ground* of the field, that is something new. What is new is that the field body, despite being a support of what is intellectually known rationally, might not be a ground of what is intellectually known. The particles (i.e. what is rationally intellectually known) are not bodies, but it is upon the body in the field that I have based myself precisely in order to intellectually know something which is not a body. Therefore in rational intellection reality itself is an open ambit in itself, i.e., an ambit which is open in the worldly sense, and moreover an ambit which leaves its mode of grounding free, so to speak, in openness, and therefore also leaves free the content of the grounded *qua* grounded. And this is what, ultimately, confers upon what is intellectually known in reason one of its own characters. Which one? Let us explain step by step.

a) Let us repeat: above all it is reality itself which imposes rational intellection upon us. This is the coercive force with which the impression of reality in depth is imposed upon us. All real things, we said, give us pause to think. {107} And this ‘give’ is the coercive force with which the intellectually real in depth is imposed upon us. Since the intellectual moment of thinking is reason, it then follows that this mode of intellectual knowing, reason, is something imposed by reality itself. Reality makes us intellectually know in reason.

b) But this which the real imposes upon us in depth—let us speak about it now from the opposite standpoint—is reality as mere ambit. And this being “mere ambit” has two faces. On one hand it has the most immediate face: forcing us to intellectually know the field real within the ambit as principle and canonic measure for grounding it. Under this aspect, what reality determines in intellection consists in reality adopting a rational form. That is, reality makes us *to be in reason*. The new mode of intellection is to be in reason. But to be merely an ambit also has another face. And this is that upon being in reality as mere ambit, its content as such remains indeterminate. Reality is imposed upon us with the force of having to endow it with some content. Now, it can happen that this content as real is given by real things which have been previously known intellectually; but the fact that this is a ground of the real in depth is something

radically new, as we have said. On the other hand it can happen that the content is like that of field things. If being in reason is something imposed by reality, its rational content is never so; what the “grounding” structure of the real is, is not imposed. Whence it follows that the unity of the two faces of the imposition of reality is the necessary imposition of something which is what is not-necessary. This paradoxical unity is just *freedom*. The essence of reason is freedom. Reality forces us to be free. This does not mean that I can intellectually know just as I please, but that the determinant response of my intellection to the imposition of {108} the real in depth is to be necessarily free. I might not wish to intellectually determine the real in depth. That would be a negative act of reason, but still a negative act which is only possible through the free character of determining. The determination itself is not free, since it lacked nothing more, but its determining itself is free. Reality in depth is imposed upon us not in order to *leave* us in freedom, but to *force us* to be rightly free.

This does not happen in the same way in the case of reason and affirmation. Intellection of one real thing among others, the field intellection, intellectually knows—and I say it predicatively for greater clarity—that A is B. And this intellection, as we saw, is a movement in freedom. But the freedom is mediated by ideas (B) in order to apprehend the real thing (A). Affirmation is the realization of these free ideas (B) in the thing (A). In somewhat vague terms, we may say that B discharges a *representative function*: affirmation intellectually knows in a thing the realization of what is represented, an intellection which takes place in the medium of reality. On the other hand, the question changes when we are dealing with rational intellection, because then we are not talking about a field of reality but about in-depth reality itself, i.e., about the world. Intellection then falls back not upon the *representative content* of B but upon its grounding character. B now has a *formally grounding function*. Therefore the realization of B in A is now that of grounding A in B, whether realizing it or not. In virtue of this, the realization in depth is free in the sense that it freely creates the idea of the grounding character of B. Reason is not representation. In in-depth reality one deals with a realization but in the sense of grounding, and therefore something radically free. {109}

This unity (in freedom) of “the” open reality *qua* fundamenting and of fundamented content, is a unity of radical indetermination which confers upon the rational its own character, viz. that of *being creation*.

Rational creation does not mean arbitrary intellec-

tion; just the opposite: it is always a creation based upon and directed by that which is intellectually known in the field manner, in a progression from the field real toward in-depth reality, toward what a thing is in reality. Therefore it is a creation within very strict limits. It is a creation which has a principle and a canon, and in turn principle and canon are but principle and canon of rational creation. Things of the field are apprehended as they are; in-depth reality is found through principle and canon. And I am not limiting myself to apprehending what is given to me; rather, I am compelled to forge reasons, i.e., the ground of what is given and affirmed, regardless of what it is. Reason is creative intellection through principle and canon. This does not mean that reason does not contain truth and error; that is another question. I here affirm that something intellectually known in creative intellection is that in accordance with which or with respect to which reason contains truth or error. And this intellection, I repeat once again, is not necessarily a “representative” creation, but it is always a creation, let us say functional, i.e., of the fundamental and grounding character, of reality. I shall refer to this fundamental and grounding character, intellectually known concretely, as ‘content’ in this book, and not representation as such.

What is this creating? In what does creation by reason consist? What are its modes? Let us review summarily what was said about these three points in Part II of the book.

c) As the grounding character of content is not {110} univocally imposed by reality, one might think that what creative intellection does is to forge a “reason” or explanation in thought and attribute reality to it. Creation would then fall back formally upon the character of reality. As I see it this is not correct. Reality is physically consubstantial with reason. We are not dealing with an intentional consubstantiality but a physical one, and it is also formal and strict. To know intellectually and rationally is not to *pretend* that the content of this or that intellection is real, because reality is not a pretense of reality and still less a free pretense about it. The reality which reason intellectually knows is physically one and identical with the reality intellectually known in every intellection preceding the rational intellection. Reason does not have a pretense of reality but rather *is already in reality itself*. What reason pretends is that this reality has this or that determinate content, and therefore that this content, freely chosen, is a ground. We could call it *grounding content*. What is created is then not reality but the grounding content of in depth reality. In virtue of this, reason is not creation of reality but just the opposite: creation of the grounding content in reality.

In affirmation, a real thing *A* is *actualized* in the field *B*, and in turn the field *B* is realized in the real thing *A*. Realization and actualization are two unitary aspects of the intellection of something in a field. Of these aspects, realization is founded upon actualization. Now, when intellection of the real in depth takes place, it has these same characteristics, but most probably in a much more complicated form since we are no longer dealing with the field but with the world. Rational intellection has two moments, viz. the moment of intellection of reality itself {111} as grounding principle, and the moment of intellectual knowing of a real determinate content as grounded upon that ground.

The first is the intellection of in-depth physical reality as grounding principle. This physical reality is actualized in intellection and in its ideas; and its mode of being actualized, I repeat, is “to be grounding”. In turn the content of previous intellections (ideas) takes on the character of the content of the real in the world. This is the realization of the content of the idea. The unity of these two moments is just creation. The in-depth reality is actualized in what was previously intellectually known, and in this actualization reality acquires its free content; this latter has been realized.

Hence the importance of reason: it is physical reality itself, in its grounding free content, which is in play. We have already found ourselves in a similar situation when we were studying field intellection. Field intellection is an intellection of the real as realization of something irreal. For just this reason the irreal inexorably has its “own” properties about which it is possible to debate. As I see it, this can only happen because the “created” is always and only the character of a content of physical reality itself. Physical reality actualized in a free system of ideas and previous affirmations can and does have more properties than those determined by the logical content of said ideas and said affirmations. And this is inexorable. Creation, then, radically and primarily concerns reason itself as intellection of the ground of something in depth.

But then we see clearly that this intellection {112} has, as I said a bit earlier, a second moment: the attribution of this “reason” or “explanation” freely created to a real thing. And this attribution is free. I can freely intellectually know that in-depth cosmic reality is the classical Hamiltonian ground, or the quantum field ground. And granting this, I intellectually know freely as well that a real field thing has in fact one or the other of those two grounding structures. This is the second moment of rational intellection, viz. that from the various grounds which I have freely created, I freely choose one as the

ground of what I am trying to intellectually know in the field. The creation of grounding reason is the actualization of in-depth physical reality in what has been previously intellectually known. And this creation is prolonged in an intellectual knowing of a concrete real thing with one or another ground: it is an actualization of the thing in one or another of them. This actualization constitutes the root of realization, the realization of the ground in in-depth reality, and the realization of this ground in the real thing which I want to intellectually know. Reason or explanation, then, is first an intellection of the real ground, and second an intellection of the fact that this ground is of a real thing which one is trying to ground, a ground realized in it. And these two moments taken unitarily in the reality of this thing in the world constitute the free creation of reason. And here we have the essence of reason as a free creation. In what, more concretely, does the *rational* character of this creation consist? That is the second question.

d) The free creation of content, whatever its nature, is supposed to have *its own unity*. It is not by chance that the creation is conceptual. One can intellectually know that that content has the “unity”—only apprehended poetically—of the metaphorical. It is not by chance that the content has a {113} type of unity which was fixed in advance. The rational part of this creation consists in being a creation in and of “grounding unity”, of whatever type. When it is realized, this unity created by me takes on the character of a real in-depth structure: the system of centauric notes becomes a centaur, etc. And this structural unity is just grounding reason. The rational part of the creation is, then, precisely in the structure.

There is a type of structural unity that discharges a decisive function, viz. the structural unity which consists in being a “construct” system, i.e., a system in which none of its notes has its own reality as a note other than being intrinsically and formally “of” the others.* Being a construct system is the very essence of the real *qua* real. Whence its radical function. And it is on account of this that we are going to concentrate our reflection upon this structural unity. That system of notes should have, intellectually, its own coherent unity. And this unity can be established in many ways. The structural intellectual unity of the notes can consist, for example, in being a definition. But it is not necessary that it be so. It can also be a system of axioms and postulates. This system of axioms and postulates is not just a system of definitions.

* [Zubiri is drawing an analogy with a grammatical feature of the Semitic languages to which he frequently makes reference, the “construct state” that describes a type of unity similar to that discussed here.—trans.]

What is unique about this intellectual unity *qua* structural is being a “construct” unity. As intellectual creation the unity is above all just coherent intellectual unity. And this unity, I repeat, is not necessarily an intellection through definition. And it is not in the first place because definition is not the exclusive way of constructing intellectual unities. Second, and especially, because definition is always a predicative logos. Now, predication is not the primary and constitutive form of the logos; before it there is a propositional logos which is the nominal logos. I leave aside for {114} now the fact that there is a form of logos prior to the propositional logos, viz. the positional logos. Now, the coherent intellectual unity of the in-depth real is the intellectual unity in a nominally constructed logos, i.e., in a nominal logos which affirms the notes in a construct state. When the logos falls back upon notes which presumably are ultimate and irreducible, we have the radical logos of in-depth reality. This unity is freely created.

The actualization of in-depth physical reality in this unity confers upon it the character of being the content of that in-depth reality. And in turn the coherent intellectual unity has been realized in the in-depth reality. In virtue of this, the coherent intellectual unity has acquired the character of primary coherent unity of the real: it is essence. Essence is the structural principle of the substantivity of the real. I have explained my views on these subjects at length in my book *Sobre la esencia*†. Essence is what reason has sought in this case. And in this search reason has freely created the essence, in the sense explained above. This is not the essence of reality itself, but reality itself in essence. Therefore the fact that the real has essence is an imposition of in-depth reality itself. But whether this essence has this or that content, however true my in-depth intellection is, will always be an open question. Every note, by being real, points to others in its physical reality, so that rational intellection of essence is constitutively open both insofar as my intellection never terminates, and insofar as the intellectually known itself, i.e., each note, in principle points to another. And we shall never know the amplitude of this pointing. What, in fact, does this amplitude mean?

Every real thing is a construct system of notes which {115} constitute it, and which I therefore call ‘constituent’. But among these notes there are some which are not grounded upon others of the system itself. And these notes are then more than constituent; they are constitutive, and what they constitute is the essence of the real thing.

† English translation, *On Essence*, by A. R. Caponigri, Catholic University of America Press, 1983.

Their unity is, in fact, *primary* coherent unity. Now, amplitude is the difference between the constituent notes and the constitutive notes in the order of grounding of the in-depth real. And this is quite complex, because essence is what constitutes, as reality, the real thing of which it is the essence. And here is where the complexity of the problem begins.

The pointing, in fact, is grounded above all in the constitutive respectivity of the real *qua* real, i.e., is grounded in the fact that the real is constitutively in the world. This respectivity is what makes each thing not only real but constitutively a determinate form and mode of reality. In virtue of this, the reality of each essential note points to that which in the real thing in question is the radical and ultimate determinant of that mode of reality. Then ‘amplitude’ means the major or minor difference between some real notes and the ultimate and radical determinant in them of the mode of being in question. For example, the mode of being a person is radically different from the mode of being of any other apersonal reality. And this amplitude is opened up within the richness of these constitutive notes. However ultimate they may be, the cells or cellular components of a human organism are not what determine that this organism have a ultimate mode of being personal.

But this is a relatively exceptional amplitude, because all other real things, and even people themselves, before being modes of reality, are moments in such-or-such respectivity; they are forms of reality. Each thing is {116} respective not only to the world, to reality as such, but also to what other real things are in their physical suchness. This respectivity is no longer world but cosmos. And this cosmic respectivity determines a pointing not to modes of reality but to other real things, and to other forms of reality, to their structural notes. Then ‘amplitude’ does not mean the difference between some constituent notes and others which are ultimately determinant of the mode of reality; rather, it means the difference between some constituent notes and others which ultimately determine the cosmic respectivity of the thing and of its form of reality. Here the notes do not determine the mode of being of the real, but its formal inclusion in the cosmos.

Now, in both senses, the amplitude of the notes makes intellection of essence something constitutively open. This is not the place to investigate that question, because it isn’t the subject of the present book. I shall therefore limit myself to a summary indication of it.

Essence determines each real thing with respect to not only other real things but also to other forms and modes of reality. Each thing is “its own” reality. And this

“its own” has two aspects. For one, it is a pointing to other forms and modes of reality; but for the other, it is the openness of that real thing towards its own reality. Only by virtue of the first aspect is respectivity pointing; by virtue of the second, it is constituting. Respectivity as pointing is grounded upon constituting respectivity. Constitutive notes, i.e. essence, make each thing “its own” reality, but within a prior unity which cannot be lost, viz. the cosmos. What is cosmos? One might think, following Aristotle, that cosmos is just an ordering, a *taxis* of things, the real. But one might also think that it is only the cosmos itself which has its own unity. Then {117} things would be parts or fragments of the cosmos, and therefore would not have an essence; only the cosmos as such would have it. Things would be only fragmentary essential moments of the cosmos. The unity of the cosmos would not be *taxonomic* but of a different character. In the case of the *taxis* the course of the cosmos would be a system of interactions of things. But if the structure of the cosmos is not taxonomic, then the course of the cosmos must be simply the variation of moments of a primary unity, something like the unity of the course of a melody. The moments of a melody are not found in interaction with other moments of it, and yet there is a melodic course which has a perfectly determinate structure. In this case the unity of the cosmos would not be taxonomic but melodic, following deterministic and statistical laws. The breakup of the cosmos into things which are really distinct does not, then, go beyond being a provisional breakup. And therefore the essence of each presumed thing is affected with a provisionality *par excellence*, with a radical openness.

What we have here, then, is how the intellection of that real in-depth moment is a constitutively open intellection in a creative sense. It is drawn from the sentient character of reason. Sentient reason must create what it is going to intellectually know by structural grounding and endow the real with this unity in order to convert it into primary coherent unity, i.e., into essence. And this, which culminates in the rational intellection of the essence of the real, completely characterizes all rational intellections: they endow reality with a freely created structural content by actualization of that reason in what is created.

How is this endowing brought about, i.e., how is the creative intellection of the real brought about? This is the third and last of the points which we must examine. {118}

e) Modes of rational creation. In its primary structure, as we said, reason is in-depth intellection of the previously intellectually known field reality. It is clear that, starting from what we might call ‘primary rational intel-

lections', reason follows its line of progress in-depth beyond the field. We shall see this below. But what is important to us here about this moment is the constitutive origin of reason, and this origin is found in what was previously intellectually known. In the previously known, reason has not only its point of departure but its intrinsic support. This support is ultimately the principle and canon of intellection with which reason measures in-depth reality. Reason is sentient. Its sentient part assures that what I intellectually know is reality; but the fact that this reality is the ambit of in-depthness or profundity is what opens up and constitutes the creative freedom of reason. This freedom concerns the content of in-depth reality. Insofar as I rationally know this content intellectually, reason is not of representative character but of grounding character; the content is created in order to endow reality with its concrete grounding character, because only from this latter does the content most proper to in-depth reality turn out to be "other" or even "opposite". I have here given the name 'representation' to everything previously intellectually known, not in the sense of being just simple apprehensions as opposed to affirmations, but in the sense that all these simple apprehensions and all these affirmations are what "re-present" real and true reality. This representation serves as principle and canon of rational intellection, i.e., of the intellection of the grounded character of content. But then it is clear, as I have already said, that although the grounding function is not formally the same as the representative function, {119} it is not completely independent of it. And this is because the fact that what has been previously known intellectually, the representative, can be the principle and canon of the ground indicates that this ground must have some support in that which is representative. The representative is the necessary base and support for reason, even though it may not be even close to adequate with respect to its grounding character.

Now, starting from this representation of what is effectively real in the field, rational creation tries to freely endow in-depth reality with its own grounding content. The mode of endowing is the mode of being supported in what was previously intellectually known for the free creation of the content of in-depth reality, i.e., it is the mode in which what was previously intellectually known gives reason or explanation of the real. What are these modes? As I see it, the endowing results in three principle modes.

First mode. In-depth reality can be endowed with a content in what I shall call *free experience*. In what does this free experience consist, and in what does the mode of endowing the in-depth reality in it with its own content

consist?

First and most important, What is this free experience? Let us say what experience "is" here, what it "falls back" upon, "how" it does so, and in what this singular experience "consists".

What does "experience" mean here? Leaving aside for later the strict and rigorous concept of what experience is, it will suffice for now to appeal to the normal and common meaning of what is generally understood by experience. 'To experience' sometimes means in a tentative way to test or assay. In our case, this testing "falls back" upon the content which I have apprehended. And this is possible just because reality as ambit leaves {120} the content indeterminate, and therefore is the ambit of free creation. "How" experience falls back testing what was previously intellectually known is by testing in the form of freedom. Finally, what is freely tested regarding the previously intellectually known content "consists" in a modification of it; we test or seek to modify its content freely, not to be sure along the lines of its physical reality, but along the lines of its intellectual physical actuality. Thus, for example, one takes the intellection of something which in the field sense is a "body", and freely modifies many of its characteristics, stripping it of its color, reducing its size, changing its form, etc. With this modification the body becomes a "corpuscle". The effort of free modification of the actuality of already apprehended content is wherein free experience formally consists. Free experience, then, moves in the actuality of physical reality itself. And the freedom of this movement concerns its content, a free movement based upon the principle and canon of what has been previously intellectually known.

It is useful to position this concept of free experience with respect to other philosophical systems, above all with respect to the idea of the experience of the fictitious. John Stuart Mill thought that together with what is commonly called 'sensible experience' or 'perceptive experience' there is an experience of imagination, i.e., an experience which is commonly called 'image' as opposed to perception. Mill tells us that this image is not reality. The idea has been coopted by Husserl in what he calls 'fantastic experience', which falls back upon the content of every perception when its character of reality has been neutralized. Now, what I call 'free experience' does not coincide even remotely with either of these two conceptions. In the first place, that upon which the free {121} experience relies is formally reality. And this reality is the physical reality of what has been previously intellectually known. Therefore this experience does not rely upon nor remake the image in the sense of imaginary reality; nor does it

rely upon the fantastic *qua* neutralized in its reality. Just the opposite: free experience involves the moment of physical reality; it is not *freedom from reality*, but *reality in freedom*. And in the second place, this experience does not rely only upon the fictitious, but also upon perceptions and concepts, all of which formally comprise the intellectual content of simple apprehensions. However experience does not rely only upon these simple apprehensions, but also upon all the affirmations of what has been intellectually known in the field manner.

Together with this conception of free experience as experience of a free jump from the empirical *to the fictitious*, the idea of freedom as the liberty to jump from the empirical *to the ideal* has often run its course in philosophy. In this view, freedom would consist in creating “ideal” objects. But that is impossible, because that upon which freedom relies here is not an “object” but “reality”. And whatever may be the presumed “ideation”, its formal principle and its outcome are always physical reality. Hence the so-called ‘ideal creation’ is not the creation of ideal reality, but creation of reality in an idea.

Free experience is neither experience of free fiction nor experience of free ideation. Free experience is a free modification of the content of what has been previously intellectually known, but a modification conducted in the ambit of physical reality itself.

Actualized in this free experience, i.e., in this modified representation, in-depth reality therein takes on {122} its content. How? What is the mode by which free experience endows in-depth reality with a content? The mode by which the content of free experience gives reason or explanation of the real consists in this content being a *formal image or model* of in-depth reality. It is understood that with this “model-like” content, in-depth reality gives reason or explanation of the real, and in many cases this is naturally true. But in many others we are witness to the historical unfolding of the collapse of this tendency to construct “models”. In physics it was thought for centuries that in order to give an explanation of reality, it was necessary to rationally construct “models”, for example Faraday’s lines of force, the mechanical model of the aether, the astronomical model of the atom, etc. In organic chemistry there is the celebrated model invented by Kekulé to explain organic molecules: the bonds between atoms, e.g. in the case of benzene hexagonal single and double bonds (Kekulé’s hexagon), etc. At one time it was thought by many that human embryology began from something like an invisible homunculus. Let us similarly recall the effort to take people as a model of in-depth reality; that was the “personification” of natural realities. In

turn, men as well as all things were taken as vital souls, i.e., living things were taken as a model of in-depth reality. The list could be extended indefinitely. The effort was always to endow in-depth reality with a content that was the actualization in it of a model or formal image.

Here we have the first mode of endowing in-depth reality with its own content, viz. free experience. To be sure, the total or partial collapse of those models and above all the {123} rational profundization in them, led to other modes of explaining the real, to other modes of basing oneself upon what has been previously known intellectually, modes different than taking it as an image or model acquired in free experience. These other modes are, as I have already said, primarily two.

Second mode. That which has been previously known intellectually has not only its own notes but in addition these notes have among themselves a more or less precise structural unity. Here I take the word ‘structural’ in its widest sense, viz. the mode of systematization of the notes. This structure is something which has degrees of depth, from the simple unity of a mere group of notes to the primary coherent unity of essence, passing through all intermediate degrees. Here, then, ‘structure’ means the formal unity of notes. Now, in order to give explanation of the real I cannot rely upon the notes of field things themselves, but only upon their formal structure, in their mode of systematization. The mode of endowing in-depth reality with formal structure is what I call *hypothesis*. What is an hypothesis? What is the mode of endowing in-depth reality with content in this hypothesis?

‘Hypothesis’ is an expression which comes from the Greek *hypotithemi*, to collect, to establish something below something else. This “establishing below” has two aspects. One is the aspect of what is thus established; the other, the aspect of the act of establishing it. In English we call the first aspect what is “supposed” about something, the other, ‘supposition’. These two are not the same. Supposition is an act of mine, the supposed a moment of the real. Things supposed about this or that actualization, situation, or creation are not suppositions. The supposed is not primarily supposed by virtue of being the terminus of a supposition; on the contrary, the supposition is so {124} because that which is supposed in it is something supposed. The supposed is always primary. The Greeks called the supposed *hypothema*, and the supposition *hypothesis*. In English and other modern languages, only the second survives. Therefore the word ‘hypothesis’ is somewhat ambiguous: it commonly leads to believing that an hypothesis is a supposition, but it can also be the supposed itself. In our problem, the supposed, that which

is “established below”, is the formal structure of something. I therefore call it the ‘basic structure’. Hypothesis is the basic structure as something supposed of the real. The mode of the notes of the real being “systematized” is just basic structure, as opposed to a mere “diversity” of notes. This is the primary and radical aspect of hypothesis. Hypothesis (in English or Spanish) is not, then, mere supposition. If by ‘supposition’ one understands every conceptualization to be admitted more or less provisionally, then everything rational would be an hypothesis. But hypothesis is first of all the supposed of something, its radical structure. It is a moment of reality, what is established as the base of something, its basic structure.

Now, in what was previously intellectually known, I can freely attend to its basic structure and to its notes. In this last sense of notes, modification is free experience. But the hypothesis does not formally consist in free experience; rather it consists in being endowed with basic structure. Thus I intellectually knew what is supposed about the real in question independently of its notes. And then I could rely upon them in order to endow the in-depth real with basic structure. And I can call this endowing ‘hypothesis’, but now in the sense of supposition: it is the supposition that the supposed of the in-depth real consists in this or that thing supposed or basic structure. This endowing does not consist in supposing that my supposition is real, but in supposing that the real in which I am already here and now present, prior to all {125} supposition, has one determinate basic structure and not another. Repeating once again the formula, I shall say that we are not dealing with a supposition or hypothesis of reality, but of reality in supposition or hypothesis. We are not dealing with hypothetical reality but with the hypothetical structure of the real in which I already really am. And in this lies all of the weight of the hypothesis, viz. in being what is supposed of the basic structure.

What is this matter of endowing the in-depth real with basic structure? What we are doing is to consider that the basic structure of the in-depth real is of the same nature as the basic structure of these or those field things. This is very different, as we shall see forthwith, from considering some field things as models of in-depth reality. Here we are not trying to model. We are trying to do something quite different, to *homologize* or make *equivalent*. The mode of endowing content to in-depth reality does not consist in endowing it with some model-notes, according to which the in-depth reality grounds something by being this or that model; rather, it consists in in-depth reality structuring the thing in question. To ground is here to structure. The structures of the in-depth real and of the field real are assumed to be homologous. This

homology does not mean generalization. Generalization is an extension. And dealing with basic structures, there is to be sure a generalization, but one which is the consequence of a homology. Only because the structures are homologous can they be generalized. Therefore the equations of electrical potential are not a generalization of mechanical or thermal potential, but rather express a basic homologous structure, and only in this sense can one speak of generalization.

Let us take some more examples of homologies. A {126} social entity does not seem at all like an organism if we consider its notes; but since the beginning of the century it has been thought innumerable times in sociology that the basic structure of society, i.e., the mode of its “elements” being systematized is the same as the mode of systematization of the organs of a higher animal; this was the idea behind sociological organicism. Hence the idea of social “organization”. This is the homology between the basic structure of in-depth reality of society and the field reality of living beings. It was also thought that the basic structure of the social is homologous not to that of living beings but to that of solid bodies; this was the idea of the in-depth reality of the social as “solidarity”. Society is neither a dog (or other higher animal) nor a solid body; but it has been thought that the basic structure of in-depth social reality is homologous to the basic structure of a dog or of a solid body. Homology has intervened also in the physical sciences. Thus it is (or was) thought that elementary particles in some respects have structures homologous to that of bodies which rotate around an axis. But in elementary particles we are dealing only with homologous basic structures, because in these particles there is no rotation. Nonetheless, quantized angular momentum (without rotation) is attributed to these particles; this is ‘spin’. It is precisely because we are not dealing with modeling but with what I here term ‘homologizing’ that, in my view, it has been said for decades that elementary particles are not “visualizable”. This does not mean the triviality that they are not “visible”, but that they do not have notes which are the same as those of field bodies. This is clear in the case of spin, which represents purely and simply the homology of two structures, the {127} rotational structure of field bodies and the rotational structure without rotation of the elementary particles. Descriptively, light does not at all seem like electricity or magnetism; but it is known that the basic structures of light are identical to those of electromagnetism as expressed in Maxwell’s equations; this is the electromagnetic theory of light.

In summary, I can endow in-depth reality not with the notes of field things considered as models, but with a

basic structure (hypothesis) which is homologous to that of something in the field.

Still, this does not exhaust the modes of endowing in-depth reality with content.

Third mode. Rational creation relies upon field reality in order to endow in-depth reality with its own structure, as we have seen. This field reality, by virtue of being an ambit, is something different from its content. And that requires the field ambit to be a field of freedom for the intelligence. This freedom can refer to the notes which constitute field things, i.e., the freedom to be able to change them within their own lines. Freedom can also refer not to the notes themselves but to their mode of systematization, their basic structure, in order to take it independently of the notes themselves. There is yet one further and more radical step of freedom. It consists in the ambit being the field of freedom in order to completely construct its content by constructing notes and basic structure at the same time. Then rational intellection can endow in-depth reality with this content which is freely constructed.

What is this construction? In what does the mode of endowing in-depth reality with grounding content by relying upon free construction consist? {128}

That this is *free construction* we have already seen some pages back when speaking about the creational character of reason. Free construction is the maximum degree of creative freedom, and therefore it would serve no purpose to repeat the details of what has already been said; it will suffice to review some ideas. I freely construct on the basis of percepts, fictional items, concepts, and above all of affirmations. That which is thus constructed, is constructed *in reality*, in physical reality itself; this is field reality *qua* physical reality and identical to the formality of reality apprehended as impression of reality in primordial apprehension. It is this reality which is actualized in my free constructions. ‘Free’ does not here mean that the act of realizing is free as an act, but that the realization itself is what, *qua* realization, is free. Here freedom does not concern only the constructing act, but also the formal nature of what is constructed itself. Freedom in this context is not only freedom to modify notes or to homologize structures; it is *freedom* or *liberation* from everything to do with the field in order to construct the content of in-depth reality. This free realization is not production, but a realization along the lines of actuality. Realization independent of the field and of production is free construction. That from which one is free is not being real, since reality is primarily and ineluctably given in every intellection since primordial apprehension itself

(and therefore in the field, in field reality). What is free is the realization of a content as content of the real. The real, then, is not a thing like the things immediately sensed, but neither is it just something mental; it is rather a *free thing*. Upon being *de suyo* a free thing consists in reality, in being freely this or that. The construction, then, is not freedom of reality, but reality in freedom. {129}

In this free action, I am to be sure relying upon the content of the field real as previously intellectually known. But it is a reliance which has a radically free character: I rely upon the content of field things only in order to make the break of liberation from that content. Although my free construction adopts models or basic structures taken from the field, nonetheless the free construction is not formally constituted by what it adopts; if it does adopt it, it does so freely.

The free construction can be brought about in different ways. It should not be thought that to be rational is synonymous with “theoretical” construction, so to speak. Any free creation whatsoever, a novel for example, is free construction. I do not call it ‘fiction’ because in every free construction, however fictitious it is, percepts, concepts, and affirmations come into play as well as fictional items. Any novel is riddled with concepts and affirmations. But I can also bring about a free theoretical construction. This construction is not a novel, but the difference—about which I shall speak forthwith—concerns the construction itself. Every free construction, whether theoretical or not, is *qua* construction of the same nature; it consists in constructing, in reality, a content with full freedom regarding the whole content of the field.

Granting this, How is the reality of this free content endowed? The mode in which the freely constructed intellectually endows reality with its own content does not consist in modeling or in homologies; it is instead a radical *postulation*. In-depth reality is actualized in what has been freely constructed by postulation. This I have already explained in Part II. It is not truth which is postulated but real content. And this is so whether dealing with theoretical or {130} non-theoretical construction. It is not postulation of reality but reality in postulation. One postulates what belongs to something [*suyo*] but not the *de suyo* itself. Postulation is the mode by which in-depth reality is endowed with a freely constructed content. Reality is actualized in my free construction, which latter is thus converted into the content of the real; a content however free one may wish, but always the content of the real.

That which is freely constructed and realized by postulation can remain on its own; it is creation by creation. This is proper, for example, to a novel. But that

which is freely constructed can be realized in the “ground-reality” as grounding the content of a field thing. Then that which is freely constructed is “grounded” content; it is theoretical postulation.

It is not difficult to adduce examples of postulation which are especially important and decisive. Above all, there is the rational intellection of the spatial reality of the perceptive field in its in-depth reality; this is geometry. All geometry consists in a free system of postulates (including the so-called axioms). In geometry one freely postulates that the in-depth reality of the space field has fixed, precise characteristics; this is the geometric space. The field space, i.e., perceptive space, is the pre-geometric space. Now, one postulates that this field space has, in its in-depth reality, fixed intrinsic characteristics which are quite precise. The existence of geometries with different freely selected postulates shows that the possibility of different contents applies to the in-depth reality of space, to geometric space. This diversity is more than meets the eye, because in my view, it discloses two things. First, {131} it shows that we are always dealing with “space”, i.e., that we are always trying to give rational foundation to that which is the perceptive spatial field. This latter is not absolute space—that would be absurd—but neither is it a geometric space. Therefore I call it ‘pre-geometric space’. It is a space which does not possess strictly conceived characteristics, because when conceiving them it is necessary that this pre-geometric space become a geometric space. Geometric space is therefore an in-depth foundation of pre-geometric space. The diversity of postulates discloses that, above all, both spaces are in fact space, but that the pre-geometric space is different than the geometric space. In particular, it shows us in this way that Euclidean space is not, as has so often be claimed, “intuitive”, i.e., it shows us that Euclidean space is a free creation of geometric space. Second, the mutual independence of the diverse postulates shows the dissociation of structural aspects of geometric space. It shows us that, as the systems of postulates are distinct, essentially different and even separate aspects may apply to geometric space. These include conjunction, direction, and distance. This revelation occurs based on the simple fact that the systems of postulates are mutually independent. Topology, affinity, and measure reveal, both in their total independence as well as their possible conditional unity in some cases, that the intrinsic rational intelligibility of the in-depth reality of space comes about in a free construction. This is also revealed by the independence of postulatable structures within each of those geometries. The geometries are postulation; the intellection of in-depth reality of space is therefore free creation. {132}

In physics, at the beginning of the modern age, there were two great free creative efforts to intellectually know rationally the in-depth reality of the universe. One consisted in the idea that the universe is a great organism whose diverse elements comprise systems by sympathy and antipathy. But this never had much success. The one which triumphed was the other conception. It was the free creation which postulates for cosmic reality a mathematical structure. That was Galileo’s idea in his *New Science*: the great book of the universe, he tells us, is written in geometric language, i.e., mathematics. For centuries this mathematicism took the form of mechanism, a free creation according to which universal mathematics is the mathematics of deterministic movement. But for the last century, physics has ceased to be mechanistic. The mathematical structure of the universe subsists independently of its earlier mechanistic form, which was too limiting. *Mathematicism* is not mechanism. And all of this is, without any doubt, a free creation for rationally intellectually knowing the foundation of all the cosmos. Its fertility is quite apparent. Nonetheless, the fabulous success of the idea of a mathematical universe cannot hide its character of free creation, of free postulation, which precisely by being free leaves some unsuspected aspects of nature in the dark.

Let us summarize what has been said. We were asking ourselves about the modes of free rational creation. We saw that there are three in particular. They rely upon three aspects of the field: the experience of notes, structure, and constructing. In these three aspects the creation which is of free character unfolds: free experience, free systematization, and free construction. By free experience in-depth reality is endowed {133} with a model-like content. By free systematization in-depth reality is endowed with a basic structure. By free construction in-depth reality is endowed with a completely created content. The mode of endowing in-depth reality with a consistent content by modifying certain field notes is what I call “modelizing”; the mode of endowing in-depth reality with a content of basic structure which relies upon the field is “homologizing”; and the mode of endowing in-depth reality with a completely constructed content is “postulating”. These three are the three modes of rational creation. They are but modes of moving ourselves intellectually in a primary, identical, and ineluctable formality of reality. And as this formality is intrinsically and formally given in the impression of reality, it follows that the three modes of rational creation are three creative modes of sentient reason.

With that we have finished the second step of our investigation in this chapter. We set out to analyze the

structure of the progression of intellection. For it we began by studying intellectual activity *qua* activity; this is thinking. We then asked about thinking activity *qua* intellectual: this is reason. And within reason we have seen, in the first place, what reason is; second, what is its ori-

gin; and finally the unity of reason and reality. Now it remains for us to study the fourth essential point of our investigation: What is the formal object of rational activity?

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CHAPTER IV

THE FORMAL OBJECT OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY

Let us summarily retrace the line of argument thus far in this third part of our investigation, in order to be able to better focus upon its subsequent development.

We have seen that reason is the intellectual moment of thinking activity. In other words, reason is not a *simple activity* of intellectual knowing but an *intellectual activity*. We have, moreover, seen what this means. Activity is not simply action, but rather being in action along the lines of that mode which consists in taking action. This activity, *qua* activity of intellectual knowing, is what constitutes thinking. Thinking is the mode of action of intellectual knowing determined by real things already intellectually known in a prior intellection; it is, then, an activated activity. And that which activates us in these already intellectually known things is the constitutively open character of reality itself. *Qua* activity, thinking activity is being in action, it is intellectually knowing that to which the things previously intellectually known are open. It is what we call “giving pause to think”. The real is giving us to think because it is really open and because thinking is constitutively open to {136} reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically and formally involves the moment of reality, not just intentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what we call its *intellectual character*. The properly intellectual moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellectual and structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previously intellectually known. This support is the reality of what is intellectually known through the field in its character of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection determined by the real itself.

This mode of intellection is inquiring intellection, a searching. Reason relies upon what has been previously intellectually known for this search. It is a search which goes beyond what is intellectually known in the field of the real, a “beyond” in all its aspects and dimensions; it is what I call ‘profundity’ or ‘reality in-depth’. In the intel-

lection of in-depth reality, reality is not a “medium” of intellection, but a “measure” of field reality. The things of the field, then, are not at the back of reason. Just the opposite: they constitute the canonic principle by which intellection measures in principle the reality of the field itself.

This measurement has the formal characteristic of ground. In-depth reality is “ground-reality” or if one wishes, “fundamental reality”. Reason is thus intellection of the real in depth through a principle. This principle is not a system of truths or of rules, but reality itself in its physical character of reality. And as reality is constitutively open, it follows that reason itself is open *qua* reason. In this openness reason is going to intellectually know in-depth reality in a form which is dimensional, directional, and {137} provisional. The moment of the real which sends us to this intellection is, as I have already said, reality in its characteristic of “toward”. With this, in-depth reality becomes physically present but intrinsically indeterminate; it is indeed then a problem, not of being or entity but of reality.

Here is my explanation; it is an intellection of mine. But *qua* determined by things, reason or explanation is a moment of them; it is reason of things. It is they which give or take away reason. Indeed, in the line of actuality, it is the in-depth reality of things *qua* problematically actualized. And this actuality is that which constitutes the unity of reason as my reason and as reason or explanation of things.

Thus reason is a structural moment of the intelligence as determined by the nature of the intellection of the real itself. In it reason has its structural origin. And as intellection is formally sentient, it follows that reason itself is sentient. It is the reality of things, in fact, which sentiently apprehended gives us pause to think.

This reality is, I repeat, the physical and explicit reality of things already known intellectually. Therefore the problem of reason is not a problem of seeking reality, be-

cause reason is already in reality and it is in this being in reason in which the very principle of reason consists. And this is not just the principle, but also the foundation, of all of reason's intellectual progress: reality is coercively imposed upon reason. What is a problem is the intellection of reality in its own fundamental content. This is what must be measured. And in order to deal with this problem reason actualizes reality itself in its previous intellections, a mode of {138} actualization which consists in considering them as foundation of the real. But as my previous intellections are mine, it follows that rational intellection *qua* rational is a free creation. In this free creation the real takes on, in my previous intellections, its fundamental content. And in turn, this content is realized. That realization can assume different forms. It can be the realization of a content achieved through free experience, through basic structure or hypothesis, or in free construction; i.e., it can be modalization, homology, or postulation, the three forms of fundamentality.

Granting this, the structure of reason leaves a very precise question open to our analysis. That which is intellectually known is in-depth reality in its fundamental content. This intellection is, as I said, a free creation which does not unfold from the field but relies upon the field in order to determine that content in a search. In virtue of this, a question arises: With respect to this in-depth reality, what is its content *qua* searched for? That is, What is the formal object of intellectual activity, the formal object of reason? Here we have the key question, a question which is much more complex than it might seem at first glance. A little reflection will reveal that this question unfolds in three groups of problems:

1. What is the character of the formal object of reason?
2. What is the formal unity of this object with the real which has determined it?
3. What, formally, is the determinant function of the real in reason?

These are the three points which we must quickly examine.

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§1

THE FORMAL CHARACTER OF THE OBJECT OF REASON

Reason is an intellection determined in one of the directions of the "toward" of the real, viz. the in-depth "to-

ward". This "toward" is, I repeat once again, a mode of reality itself, reality in its mode of "toward". And when this "toward" is so in-depth, then the intellection is reason. The formal character of reason is then the formal character of the terminus of this "toward".

To be sure, by virtue of being a mode of reality, the "toward" itself has a terminus in reality itself, since we never left it. But this does not mean that the "toward" terminates in some real *thing*. The terminus *qua* terminus is a terminus in reality, and therefore pertains to it, even though not real by itself. What is this pertaining? It is not pertaining to reality as a determinate content. Strictly speaking, the terminus could be vacuous, i.e., the "toward" might be toward nothing. Nonetheless, it will always "really" be a nothing; it is therefore in reality like an echo, so to speak. The pertaining to reality does not, then, mean that its content is determinate, but merely that it is a "terminus", something toward which one goes. This terminus is a terminus in reality, but not a determinate content of it. Being in reality without being formally a real content is just what comprises being something which is possible. The terminus of the "toward" is something formally possible. Here we have the formal character of the object {140} of reason, viz. possibility. That in which reason moves is the real, always and only as possible. What, to be more precise, does this possibility mean?

Taken from the negative side, the possible is that which lacks something in order to be fully real. But this not being real is limited to reality itself. And that limiting constitutes the positive aspect of the possible. Now, there are different modes in accordance with which the "not" is limited to reality. Here two are of special interest to us.

The first came to our attention when we dealt with the intellection of what something real is in reality among other things. The first thing that intellection does in these circumstances is not to abandon reality but to take within it a distance from the real. This is a movement of "stepping back" within reality. Such intellection by stepping back constitutes simple apprehension. Its formal character, the formal character of the terminus of simple apprehension, is physical reality itself in its mode of "might be". The real in the field is actualized in my understanding after stepping back as a real that "might be". "Might be" does not consist in being either a condition or even a possibility in the strict sense. Percepts, fictional items, and concepts are not formally possible because they are already the real in stepping back from content. This is what I shall call the 'unreal'. We have already seen what it is. 'Unreal' does not mean not having to do with reality, but having to do with it by freeing its content. From

the standpoint of reality, the unreal is really unreal; it is reality itself actualized in simple apprehension. From the standpoint of content itself, the unreal is what is realized in reality in the mode of “might be”. In what, precisely, does this mode consist? A content is unreal in the “might be” mode when the unreal content is intellectually known as a property or note of the real. This paper might be red considering the unreal content of the red as if it were {141} a chromatic note of the paper. But the unreal can be of a different character, because I can realize in reality the unreal not as a note but as a ground. Then it is no longer what reality “might be”, but something different, what reality “could be”. This is the possibility of the real. The terminus of the “toward” is for now only a possible terminus. As such it is in reality like a “could be” of reality itself. It is a real possibility. *The “might be” is reality in retraction. The “could be” is reality in being grounded.* The difference between the “might be” and “could be” is not a difference between two modes of possible being, but between two modes of realization. The “might be” is not intrinsic possibility; it is a mode of something being realized as a mode. As a mode, the “might be” is the *unreal mode* (understanding ‘unreal’ here as reality in stepping back from content, and not what is understood grammatically by ‘unreal mode’). In contrast the “could be” is a *mode of making possible*, a mode not of being a note, but of being a ground. The difference between the unreal mode and the mode of making possible is not a difference between two possibilities, but the difference between unreality realized as a note (unreal mode) and unreality realized as a ground (possibilitation). The unreal realized as ground is the truly possible part of reason, the “could be”. To preclude confusion between possibility and making possible I shall at times refer to cases of the latter as “the possibilities”, in plural.

My previous intellections are a basis, and upon this basis the intelligence actualizes what field reality could be in its in-depth reality. This is the formal character of the object of reason.

Reason is the intellectual moment of thinking. Therefore it is necessary to say that intellectual activity, i.e., thinking, {142} always thinks about the real, but only about the possibilities of the real. One always and only thinks about possibilities. If I think about a stroll I am going to take, or in the trip upon which I am going to embark, or in what, in reality, is this thing which we call ‘light’, that about which I am formally thinking is the stroll I am going to take, or in the trip upon which I am going to embark, or upon the real possibilities for this which we call ‘light’ to be produced. The formal object of intellectual activity is what the real could really be.

How is this “could be” inscribed in the real, i.e., how are possibilities intellectually known as possibilitating in the real?

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§2

THE UNITY OF POSSIBILITIES AS DETERMINANT OF THE INTELLECTION OF THE REAL

Naturally, we are only dealing with the order of intellection. We are not concerned with how the possibility is making possible reality in and by itself, but with how the intellection of possibilities is determining the intellection of the real in-depth. Now, this unity which is determinant of the possibilities in the intellection of the real has three essential aspects.

A) In the “toward” I do not just go “beyond”, so to speak, but rather the “toward” is a “toward” already internally qualified by that which throws me beyond. That which thus throws me is the intellection of field reality. And this reality determines the “toward” itself as a “toward” based on something intellectually known previously. And it does so in a twofold sense. First, field reality has its own content, and it is its notes which, upon throwing us “toward”, qualify the mode of going toward in-depth reality. The “toward”, in fact, as a mode of reality, recovers all other modes, and these in turn recover the “toward”. Whence it follows not only that each of the modes of field reality throws us “toward” the beyond, but also that this same “toward” is internally characterized by those other modes. Not only that, but there is in this qualification a second aspect which is the “ground”, and that is that field reality not only throws us “toward” but also comprises the canonical principle {144} of intellection in this throwing. These two aspects are but that: aspects of the internal qualification of the “toward”. Now, its formal terminus is what in-depth reality could be, i.e., this formal terminus is possibility. And as the throwing “toward” is intrinsically characterized, it follows that the possibility itself in question is already in some way intrinsically characterized. And this is not some empty possibility, but a possibility which is really characterized *qua* possibility. Here ‘really’ means not only that this possibility pertains to reality, but that the reality itself characterizes by making possible that possibility. In other words, making possible is *inchoate possibility*. The “toward” is inchoate. And with inchoation we have the first respect in which making possible determines the intellection of in-depth reality. Reason does not move in the in-

finitude of possibles but in a chain of possibilities as yet inchoate; i.e., it goes on pointing out intrinsically and terminally toward what the possibility is going to make possible.

B) This “toward” has multiple routes precisely because it is recovering, as I just said, all of the content of the field things. As this content is multiple, so are the inchoate routes. That is, field intellection never goes “toward” a single possibility, but “toward” multiple possibilities. Each one of them is inchoate by nature. Hence it follows not only that reason moves in the realm of possibility, but that it moves among multiple possibilities. Reason must take them together; it has to take each “with” (*cum*) the rest. Therefore, the terminus of the “toward”, more than a mere possibility, is co-possibility. And this intellection of the possible as “with” (*cum*) is just what constitutes *co-legere*, “take with”, “take together”, to deduce or infer. The multiplicity of possibilities {145} “toward” which we are sent determines that mode of intellection which is *colegere*, “taken together” or inferred. In its etymological sense, *colegere* is very close to the verb ‘to collect’. And here we have the second aspect in accordance with which possibility determines the intellection of the real in-depth: taking together or inferring. The word does not mean ‘to deduce’ in this context, but the determining of the mode of realizable possibilities, perhaps inchoatively. Deduction is but one mode of inferring among others. Inferring designates but a mode of intellection, viz. that of intellectually knowing one or more possibilities when co-intellectually knowing the rest. It is the *cum* as a mode of intellection. Reason intellectually knows in-depth reality in a mode which is constitutively inferential. It infers diverse inchoate possibilities, diverse things that are inchoate. And by this inferential *cum*, the diverse possibilities can be intellectually known as more than merely inchoate; they can be intellectually known as a real ground for making possible. What does this mean?

C) The *cum* of mere inferring has, as I pointed out, a meaning quite close to that of collecting. But it is much more than just collecting. The fact is that one of the many diverse possibilities is possibility of the real, and therefore these possibilities are open because reality itself is constitutively open. Hence the *cum* of the different possibilities constitutes an ambit in which each possibility, by being open to others, can incorporate them. Then the *cum* shows us its true nature, viz. mutual “implication”, or plication”. And on account of this implication, the possibilities are not only multiple; they constitute a system. Now, the determination of in-depth reality as realization of a system of possibilities mutually implied or complicated is precisely *explication*. This is the third

aspect of the intellectual determination {146} of in-depth reality. To intellectually know in-depth reality in a rational manner is to intellectually know it in explication. Conversely, to explicate is to intellectually know in-depth reality as a realization of a system of possibilities.

In summary, rational intellection moves among real possibilities, which intellectually determine the in-depth reality in a way which is inchoative, inferential, and explicative. But we must go one more step, and that is to investigate how the real itself leads to possibility.

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§3

DETERMINANT FUNCTION OF THE REAL IN REASON

Reality previously intellectually known in the field throws us toward in-depth reality. Of this throwing we have studied the terminus toward which we are thrown and the mode in which we are thrown. Now, we ask ourselves for the point of departure of the throwing. We are going to be thrown by field reality. This throwing “toward” possibility takes place, as we have seen, in a “toward” which is internally characterized. This characterization is the inchoate nature of possibility as the intellection of in-depth reality, of the intellection of what the reality could be. But then it is *eo ipso* a possibility which is inchoatively present as such in the field intellection itself. This field intellection is sentient, as is reason itself. Therefore, that possibility is *actually* present—albeit inchoatively—in the sentient intelligence. Now, this *sentient* being here-and-now present of the possibility *qua* possibility, i.e., the *sentient* presence of what in-depth reality “is capable of being” *qua* “could be”, is formally what constitutes *suggestion*. The real ambit of co-possibility is the ambit of suggestion, the ambit of suggestions which are co-suggested. The intelligence then has to opt for one of the different suggestions, and begin its intellection progression. The “toward” of the throwing is, then, a concrete suggestion. I shall forthwith explain this at greater length. Suggestion is not a psychical phenomenon or anything of that nature; rather it is a {148} structural moment of reason itself *qua* reason. In field intellection not only are things present which are intellectually known, but also in them the suggestion is present of what they could be in-depth.

I said that reason can opt for one among many sug-

gestions. But it can also opt for none of them. Then reason invents new possibilities. But this invention, inasmuch as it is a rupture of the lines of suggestion, would not have been possible other than by suggestion itself. If one wishes—and speaking a bit paradoxically—among the possible suggestions there is that of not attending to any of them. Field intellection gives us the canonical principle of the intellection of in-depth reality, and the suggestion in which it can be intellectually known. But what reason intellectually knows can be opposite to its canonical principle and to every positive suggestion.

In virtue of this, a canonical principle and a system of suggestions is the concrete structural figure of that search *qua* search which is rational intellection.

This concrete figure is essential to reason. Reason is not a mode of intellection specified only by its formal terminus in the abstract. The rational mode of intellection has, on the contrary, a precise modal structure, viz. its concreteness. The concreteness is not individuation, so to speak, of a general structure; rather, it is a moment which intrinsically and formally touches the very structure of reason. To be sure, it is not essential to reason to have *this* or *that* concrete figure; but it is structurally essential to reason *to have concreteness*. Reason is not something which “makes itself concrete”, but something which “is concrete” in and by itself. And I am not referring to reason as movement about one real note from each human reality; in {149} this sense reason does not make an exception for any of their notes. Everything real is in this sense individual in and by itself. I am referring to reason not as a structural note, but to its own mode of intellectually knowing the real. This structural concreteness has a formal root in the two moments which constitute the search. One is the moment of being a principle: the canonical principle is not “the” field reality in abstract, but what the field intellection in all of its concretion (reality and canonical principle) has extracted in its being thrown. Another is the thrust into concreteness of the direction of intellectual search, viz. the suggestion. Canonical principle and suggestion are, in their intrinsic concreteness, structural moments of rational intellection. What is this concreteness?

This structural concreteness has a precise formal character: it is what constitutes the *forma mentis*. Reason has a strict and rigorous structural figure in its very mode of intellectual knowing. What is this *forma mentis*? Let us explain the expression.

In the first place, we are dealing with “mind” or *mens*. What is this *mens*? Mind is not formally identical to intelligence. Etymologically it proceeds from an Indo-

European root *men-* which meant, among other things, impetus, ardor, passion, etc.; that is, it expressed animated movement. But as I see it, this is not all, because it is not a movement, as for example the movement of passion; as simple movement this passion is not just something mental pure and simple. The movement itself is mental only if it bears as its weight some type of intellection of the trajectory and the terminus of that movement. That is, the movement which *mens* signifies is always movement inasmuch as it has an intrinsic intellectual weight. The force of the *mens* {150} has as its own formal character the intellectual weight; it is the force by which movement itself is intellectually understood and determined. Conversely, intellection is *mens* only when it is intellectual motion. Now, this movement is just the throwing. Therefore *mens* is intelligence in throwing. To be sure, it is a throwing as the very mode of intellection. We are not dealing with what moves us to intellectually know, but with the intellectual movement itself. And as the intellectual movement in throwing is just reason, it follows that there is an internal implication between reason and *mens*. Thus “mind” expresses the concrete character of reason.

In the second place, this *mens* has a form or figure, viz. *forma mentis*. In what does it consist? It does not consist only in the trajectory determined by intellection and its principle, i.e., it does not consist in the form of movement of intellection. It is something more. It *is* that form but distilled to its essence, so to speak, in the intellection *qua* “thrustable”. The form in question is not just the figure of an act, but the figure of a mode of our being involved with the intelligible. Being involved is what “habitual mode of behavior” means in this context. The figure which we seek is but the habitual mode of behavior of intellection in its thrust. It is essential for reason to have a figure or form as the intellectual habitual mode of behavior of being thrust.

In the third place, this habitual mode of behavior is supposed to be formally determined by the “toward” itself. Intellection, in fact, can have many habitual modes of behavior or modes of being involved with things. Here two types are of interest to us. Some habitual modes of behavior or modes of being involved, for example, can be due to individual as well as social differences. They are determined by the mode of being of man, and constitute the figure or form of the thrust by being the figure or form {151} of the man thrown. Hence it follows that the habitual mode of behavior remains qualified, it has qualities, but these qualities have an origin extrinsic to what reason formally is; they have their origin, for example, in being Greek or in being Semitic. But there are other types of thrust, whose difference is founded upon the intrinsic na-

ture of the “toward” itself *qua* “toward”. Reason then is also qualified, but its qualities have their origin in the intrinsic nature of reason itself; for example, the difference in throwing “toward” the real in a poetic manner as opposed to the scientific manner. These are not modes which the intellection “has”, but modes of what the intellection “is”. The two types of habitude qualities (let us call them ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’) are not identical. Within a single intrinsic mode of the “toward”, for example within the poetic “toward”, many modes of creating what we call ‘poetry’ fit; the primitive Sumerians understood something different by ‘poetry’ than did the poets of classical Greece. And similarly within the intrinsic “toward” proper to science, there are diverse modes; that which a primitive Sumerian or Akkadian understood by explanation of the world, that which a Greek understood by it, and that which we understand by it, are completely different things. Now, the *forma mentis* is constituted by the intrinsic and formal mode of the confronting or thrusting toward the real, by the mode of the “toward” *qua* “toward”, and not by the modalities which this sending or searching can have as an extrinsic function of the modalities of that which one seeks. This is the difference, to use an example, between a poetic figure or explanation of the real, and a theoretical figure or explanation of the real (this does not go beyond being one example among many). {152} It is a difference of a different order than that which exists between the modes of creating science, and between the modes of creating poetry, according to anthropological characteristics. The *forma mentis* consists in this case in the difference between doing science and doing poetry.

These three aspects, viz. being intellective action, being habitual mode of behavior of motion, and being intrinsic and formal habitual mode of behavior of this motion, constitute together what I understand by *forma mentis*, the concrete figure which intellection adopts in its formal mode of being thrown to the real, in the mode of sending as such.

Now, this concept has a very precise name, *mentality*. It is not primarily a psychological, social, or ethnic concept, but a structural one. I am referring, to be sure, to what mentality is formally. Mentality is the intrinsic and formal aspect of the habitual mode of behavior of throwing toward real things; for example, the theoretic mentality. So I am not referring to the qualities which mentality can have, and in fact does have by virtue of determinate external factors of psychological, social, etc. origin. And it is important to emphasize this because usually one uses ‘mentality’ in reference to theoretic mentality as well as to the “Semitic mentality” or the “feudal mentality”. And as

I see it, this is not correct. The Semitic and the feudal are certainly things which qualify or characterize mentality, but they confer a determinate quality upon something which is already a mentality, i.e. the mentality as a mode of our being intellectually involved with things. To be Semitic is not a mentality but a quality which qualifies something which is already a mentality, for example, upon “doing science”, etc. But the fact that it is scientific does not “qualify” the mentality already given; rather it is the moment which intrinsically {153} and formally “constitutes” it. But that everyday concept lacks a third aspect, the most radical part of the *forma mentis*, the aspect formally constitutive of the habitual mode of behavior of going to the real. The so-called ‘Semitic mentality’ is Semitic by virtue of being the mentality proper to “the” Semite; but it is not a mentality which is “in itself” Semitic—something which formally makes no sense, even though we all use the expression. The modes of conceiving things which a Semite has are not formally Semitic conceptive moments. Being Semitic certainly affects one’s concepts and confers upon them qualities of their own; but these are not formally their qualities, because these qualities do not depend upon the structure of the conceiving itself, but rather upon the mode of being of the Semite. It is on account of this that the so-called mentality of the Semite is not Semitic *qua* mentality; it is only the mentality of the Semite. On the other hand, the theoretic mentality is theoretic “in itself” *qua* mentality; it is not a mentality “of” a scientist but a mode of intellection of the real, a mode intrinsic to reason. The difference between scientific and poetic intellection is significant; they constitute two mentalities, the scientific and the poetic. These two are strict mentalities. The Semite or the Greek, on the other hand, qualify these two mentalities with qualities of extraintellective origin; their origin is in the mode of being of the Semite and the Greek. It is for this reason that they do not constitute mentalities properly so-called. That is the strict and formal concept of mentality. But this does not mean that the everyday expressions ‘Semitic mentality’, ‘Greek mentality’, etc., should not continue to be used. The only important thing is to dispel the error of the concept of mentality latent in these expressions. It is not the same to speak of mentality when referring to Semitic mentality as to speak of it in connection with scientific mentality. The first is proper {154} to a sociology of knowledge; the second pertains to a philosophy of the intelligence.

And it is of this mentality, strictly understood, that I say it is structurally essential to reason; it is reason’s intrinsic and formal concretion. Reason is concrete, and its concretion *qua* reason is mentality. There is not, nor can

there be, reason without mentality; whatever there could be without mentality could not be reason. The same occurs in the field intellection of the real. To see this piece of paper and affirm that it is green is not a question of mentality. The mentality appears only when one goes in depth beyond the field in order to know what the foundation of greenness is. Only intellection in-depth has the concreteness of mentality. To the concrete determination of the formal terminus of in-depth intellection, i.e., to the concrete determination of the formal reason or explanation of what is intellectually known, there corresponds the concrete determination of reason *qua* intelligent throwing, i.e., mentality.

As mentality is the concretion of the sending as such, its intrinsic and radical roots are the canonic principle and suggestion. Neither these moments nor for that matter the mentality itself, are limited to the dominion of the theoretic. I have been saying this all along. Suggestion, for example, suggests not only what the theoretic nature of the intellectually known is in depth, but above all recounts the very lines of intellection. It can suggest the creation of concepts; but it can also suggest metaphoric, poetic, or any other type of depth. And similar things should be said of the canonic principle. The unity—at times ineffable—of metaphor has as principle the qualities already apprehended in field intellection; but their roles as principles can be quite varied. This line of intellection {155} is just the line of the “toward” as such. The differences are not only in that from which we are thrown and in that to which we are thrown, but also in the very type of trajectory which we are going to follow, i.e., in the lines of the “toward” of intellection. Mentality

should be understood in the light of this vast range, which encompasses not only the content, but also the very lines of intellection. Different are the mentalities of the scientist, the poet, the politician, the theologian, the philosopher, etc. And this, I repeat, is true not just by virtue of the “content” of their reason but above all by the “line”, by the habitual mode of behavior in which reason progresses, thrust out in its search. Mentality is just the formal concrete habitual mode of behavior of rational search; it is the concreteness of the “toward” as such.

* * *

In summary, we have already examined in this section what progression is (Chapter I): progression is search. We saw next what its intellectual structure is (Chapter II). Progression is a thinking activity, whose intellectual moment comprises reason, i.e., the intellection by principles of what the real is in depth. The formal object of this intellectual activity is possibility, i.e., what in-depth reality could be. This possibility determines the intellection of in-depth reality in an inchoative form, one which is collective and explicative. And that is possible precisely because field reality, previously intellectually known, gives us a canonic principle and a system of suggestions. It is the ultimate root of the structural concreteness of reason, of its constitutive mentality.

Granting this, rational intelligence intellectually knows {156} in-depth reality. What is the structure of this intellection? Here we have the question which we must examine in Section 2.

SECTION 2

STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL INTELLECTION: KNOWING

The inquiring intellection, reason, is a special mode of intellection. Intellection, as we already know, is the apprehension of something real as just actualized as real in that apprehension. The inquiring intellection is a mode of intellection of the real actualized in a special way. This mode of intellection is what we call *knowledge* [*conocimiento*].¹ The structure of intellectual progression, i.e., the structure of rational intellection, is knowing [*conocer*]. Not every intellection is knowledge in this sense. Moreover, it is not at all obvious that the highest form of our intellection is this kind of knowledge. The identification of intellection and this sense of knowing might seem obvious to modern philosophers; it was accepted without discussion by Kant. But as we shall see, that identification is untenable. The difference between intellection and knowledge in this sense is a serious problem, one over which Kant himself stumbled. Therefore Kant's *Critique* suffers from a radical inadequacy. Prior to a critique of knowing, Kant should have elaborated a critique, or at

least a philosophy of intellection as such. Hence in the final analysis Kant's *Critique* is inadequate. Kant understands intellection {158} as knowing in the sense of "being familiar with". In the final analysis, however, he does nothing but pull together an identification which had been in circulation for many centuries. But Kant also believed—again, without calling it into question—that at bottom knowledge in the sense we are discussing is synonymous with science. This double equation (intellection = knowledge; and knowledge = science) determines the progression of thought in the *Critique*. But this double equation is incorrect. Intellection is not knowledge, nor is the structure of knowledge science. Therefore, in order to conceptualize the nature of rational intellection rigorously, we must pose two questions to ourselves:

- I. What is knowledge [*conocer*]?
- II. What is the formal structure of knowing [*conocer*]?

¹ [Zubiri is drawing a distinction here between *inteligir*, 'intellective knowing', and *conocer*, 'knowing' in the more usual sense.—Trans.]

CHAPTER V

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

In the foregoing pages we have discussed what rational intellection is. Now, knowledge [*conocimiento*] is what formally constitutes rational intellection. In order to conceptualize knowledge it is worthwhile to briefly recount what has already been said in order to frame the question adequately.

Above all it is necessary to eliminate a false but very current idea, that knowledge is substituting concepts of reality for sensible representations. According to this theory, sensible impressions are mere empty representations of reality, and the intellection of reality is only in knowledge, above all in scientific knowledge. But that is not true, because sensible impressions are not *representations* but *presentations*. That which is representation is scientific knowledge; but representation not in the sense of substitution of impressions by other intellections (*vorstellen*), but in the sense of re-explaining that which is already present (*darstellen*). In this sense (and only in this one) is knowledge re-presentation, i.e., rational re-actualization.

With this mistake eliminated, let us continue with the problem.

Rational intellection is intellection above all. As {160} such, it is the apprehension of something as real, an apprehension in which the real itself is just actualized. This intellection has two moments. Everything real, in fact, has an individual and a field moment. Upon apprehending something as real one apprehends its reality in accordance with both moments but in a different mode. If one attends more to the individual moment, then intellection is apprehension of the thing as real. But if one attends to what the real thing is in a field, it is then apprehended as actualized in the field manner, among other things similarly actualized. And then apprehension does not intellectually know only that a thing is real, but also what this real thing is in reality. These are the two moments of intellection, viz. intellectually knowing something as real, and intellectually knowing it as being, in the

field sense, something “in reality”. They are the two moments of pure and simple intellection.

But it can happen that a real thing, together with the field which it determines, thrusts us beyond this field reality toward reality “itself” as reality beyond the field, i.e., to the world. This beyond is not the beyond of one thing toward others—that would be an intra-field beyond. We are dealing with a “beyond” of a real thing and of its whole field toward reality itself as reality; i.e., we are dealing with a beyond which is beyond the field and toward the world. This beyond is not a beyond the “subject” (so to speak), because in this sense in field intellection we are already installed beyond what that interpretation would take for the subject in field intellection, and we continue being so in every intellection. This “beyond”, the whole field, can be so in different directions: toward the inside of things, toward other extra-field things, etc. But we are always dealing with going toward the world as the ground of what a real field thing is. Thus we are not considering a thing with respect to others of the field, but {161} rather we are considering each thing as a mode of grounded reality. *Qua* ground, I have called extra-field reality ‘reality in depth’. Now, intellection of the real in depth is certainly intellection, but not just intellection; rather, it is a special mode of intellection, the “grounding” mode. Reality is not actualized in this intellection as something more than is there; rather, it is actualized in a mode which consists formally in being actually grounding. ‘The ground’—as I have already said—is here taken in its widest sense. It is not identical with ‘cause’. To be a ground is not necessarily to be a cause; a cause is only a mode of grounding. There are others, for example, physical law, i.e., the mode by which the real happens based on reality, and is being so taken. The ground is all that which determines from itself, but in and by itself, that which is grounded, so that this latter is the realization of the ground or foundation in what is grounded. Being grounded makes of in-depth reality the principle of this mode of intellection. It is the principle which measures

not what something is in reality with respect to other things which are sensed in the field manner, but measures its ground or foundation in reality. The intellection of the real in-depth is intellection as principle and measure; it is rational intellection. Now, the intellection of something in its in-depth reality, i.e., rational intellection, is what formally constitutes knowledge [*conocimiento*].

Knowledge is intellection in reason. To know what a thing is, is to intellectually know its in-depth reality, to intellectually know how it is actualized in its own ground or foundation, how it is constituted “in reality”, as a measuring principle. To know green does not only consist in seeing it, or in intellectually knowing that it is in reality one determinate color among {162} others. Rather, it is intellectually knowing the ground or foundation of greenness in reality; intellectually knowing, for example, that it is an electromagnetic wave or a photon of some determinate frequency. Only having intellectually known it thus do we really know what the real green is; we have intellection of the greenness, but in reason. The reason or explanation of green is its real ground or foundation.

Whence arises the radical difference between knowledge and intellection. Knowledge is intellection by virtue of being apprehension of the real as real. But it is only a special mode of intellection because not every intellection is knowledge. To intellectually know without intellectually knowing the reason or explanation—this is not knowledge. Intellection is always an actualization of the real, but there is only knowledge when this actualization is a ground. That is intellection in reason.

This might make one think that mere intellection is inferior to knowledge, so that it would be necessary to inscribe intellection within knowledge; intellection would then be, formally, a rudimentary knowledge. But, the truth is just the opposite: it is necessary to inscribe knowledge within intellection. And with this, intellection does not formally consist in rudimentary knowledge; rather, knowledge receives all of its richness and its value from being an intellection. Knowledge is only a sketch of subsequent intellection. And there are several reasons for this.

In the first place, intellection is not knowledge; it is intellection which, through its sentient deficiency, determines knowledge. Intellection is an actualization of the real. But if the real, for example this color green, were exhaustively actualized in my intellection, there would be no opportunity of speak of knowledge. Full intellection of the real, i.e., its full {163} actualization, would make knowledge radically unnecessary. We would then have intellection without knowledge. On the other hand, the

converse is impossible: one cannot have knowledge without intellection, without actualization of the real. There is only knowledge when the insufficiency of intellection requires it. This insufficiency stems from the sentient moment of intellection. Without sentient intellection there is not nor can there be knowledge.

In the second place, intellection and knowledge are different but not independent. In what sense? We have already indicated it: intellection is what determines knowledge. Sentient intellection calls forth knowledge. In order to make up for the insufficiency of intellection, intellection needs to determine not another intellection, but another mode of the same intellection; i.e., what is determined is an expansion of intellection. Knowing is an expansion of intellection. It is intellection, i.e., actualization of the real as real, but an intellection which actualizes rather what that thing already actualized as real is really; it is actualization as search. And herein consists what an expansion is, viz. An inquiring actualization of what is already actual. Therefore, knowledge is not only different from mere intellection; it is an expansion of that intellection. But there is more.

In the third place, in fact, knowledge is not only expansion of intellection and therefore something based upon it; in addition, knowledge consists, in principle, in bearing us to a greater intellection, to a greater actualization of what is known. Intellection is actualization of the real, and therefore knowing is but a leading to actualization. Knowledge is not just an expanded actualization but an expansion which leads to a new actualization of the previously actual. Knowledge does not {164} rest upon itself but upon the intellection of what preceded it and upon the intellection to which it leads us. The final terminus of all knowledge is an actualizing of the very reality previously intellectually known, an actualizing of it in its in-depth reality. If it were not for this, knowledge would be but a mental game. Hence all knowledge is the transition from one intellection to another intellection. It is an intellection in progress. Knowledge is intellection seeking itself.

As *anchored* in intellection, as *expansion* of intellection, and as *transition* to a new intellection, knowledge is an intellectual mode which is formally inscribed in mere intellection. To intellectually know is not a rudiment of knowing. Intellection is not formally a rudimentary knowledge; rather, it is knowledge that is the sketch of an inquiring intellection *qua* intellection. To know [*conocer*] is not a primary intellectual phenomenon, as if the essence of intellectual knowing [*inteligir*] were to know [*conocer*]. On the contrary, the essence of knowing

[*conocer*] is intellectual knowing. Knowing is not the *status possidens* of intellection; only intellection itself is that. Therefore every theory of knowledge must be grounded upon some previous conceptualization of intellection, and not the other way around, as if to intellectually know were to know [*conocer*]. Some think that to know [*conocer*] is better than to intellectually know. But this is not correct. That which is intellectually known in knowing [*conocer*] is certainly more than what is just known in mere intellection; it has a richer content. But to know [*conocer*] is not just elaborating an intellectually known content; rather, to know [*conocer*] is intellectually knowing that this content is real, i.e., actualizing this content in the real. Only at this price do we have knowledge. And this reality is given to the knowledge by mere intellection, and it is to that that all knowledge leads in order to be knowledge. All knowledge is {165} always and only an elaboration of an intellection. And this elaboration is just reason or explanation. Knowledge is, then, intellection in reason, i.e., intellection of the real in its in-depth reality.

On this point it is necessary to contrast this concept of knowledge with others which I deem incorrect because they do not have an adequate concept of what it is to be a fundament.

By ‘knowledge’, Kant understands every objectively grounded judgement. And we have already seen that this is unacceptable because to intellectually know in the affirmative sense is not by itself knowing. At the very least the ground is necessary. For Kant, this ground is determining the objectivity of affirmation (and it does not matter that this objectivity, for Kant, has transcendental ideality). But this is not what formally constitutes the fundament in knowledge. The ground is “ground-reality”, and not determining the objectivity of a judgement. Kant has cast the problem of knowledge along the lines of judgement and judging. And this is wrong, for at least two reasons. First, identifying knowledge with judgement is an extreme logification of reason. To know is not formally to judge. And second, the ground in question is not the determining objective of the judgement but the ground-reality. Knowledge naturally involves judgements, but not every judgement is knowledge. It is only knowledge when the judgement is a judgement of in-depth reality. Field judgement is not knowledge.

The Greeks employed the inchoate verb *gignoskein*, to know, with many meanings. That which is important to us here is the one which encompasses strict and rigorous knowledge, and which in the Greeks culminates in what they called *episteme*, strict knowledge, a word which

is almost (and only almost) synonymous with ‘science’. {166}

Plato, in the *Thaetetus*, criticizes the last of the three definitions of strict knowledge (*episteme*) which the interlocutor proposes: true opinion with logos. Here ‘logos’ means reason. Reason, then, would be that which, in this definition, formally constitutes the specific part of knowledge. Plato criticizes this definition, but he understands by ‘reason’ what in all likelihood his interlocutor understands, viz. the elements of which something is composed. After his criticism, Plato left open and without express solution what logos is in a more radical sense. Understandably Plato himself said that this dialogue is of the *peirastikos* type, i.e., an attempt or effort, as we would say today. The fact is that ultimately Plato, in his critique, wishes to point out another meaning of the logos, with which he will be occupied in the *Sophist*: the logos which enuntiates not the “elemental” being but the “intelligible” being. That is to say, the logos which Plato asks of knowledge is the intellection of intelligible being, of the Idea. The rest will be only “true opinion”. Now, it is not this which we have discovered as reason in our analysis. Reason is not judgement of “intelligible being” but of “in-depth reality”. Above all, there are not two beings, the being of the sensible and the being of the intelligible, but a single being, the being of the real. Moreover, we are not dealing with being but with reality, and not with intelligible reality but with in-depth reality. Therefore, whatever the meaning of that “true opinion” to which Plato alludes, such true opinion cannot be counterposed to truth *simpliciter*, to the truth of the intelligible, because there is no dualism of sensing and intellectually knowing; rather, there is only the formal and structural unity of sensing and of intellectually knowing in sentient intellection. Whence it follows that reason itself is sentient; and that to which it bears us sentiently is in-depth reality. {167}

This in-depth reality, this reality ground, is not what Aristotle thought either, viz., the cause. At the beginning of his *Physics*, Aristotle tells us that we believe we know something (*gignoskein*) when we know its cause. Knowing would thus be specified and constituted by the apprehension of causality. But this concept is, as I see it, too restrictive. Every cause is a ground, but not every ground is necessarily a cause. And I do not refer to knowledge such as mathematics, whose grounds are not causes in the strict sense, but rather principles. I refer to something deeper; I think that regardless of what a principle may be, it is necessary to conceive of it from the standpoint of the ground, and not the other way around. I explained this above. Causes and principles do found; but on this account are not grounds. To ground is a very precise mode

of founding.* To ground is certainly to be a principle, but to be a principle is not just to be that “from which” (*hothen*) something comes, but that which *from itself and by itself is realized* in what is founded. Then and only then is a principle a ground. To know is not to know causes, nor to know principles which found, but to know grounds, to know “fundamentally”. But Aristotle thought about strict knowledge, about *episteme*, about science. And for him, the object of science is what always is as it is, without being able to be in any other way. Now, this concept is even more restrictive than that of causal knowledge. And neither *episteme* nor causal knowledge are knowing formally, because not every ground is causality. To know a friend in depth is not a question of either causality or of scientific necessity. To know a friend well is not to have a detailed account of his life, nor to know the motives of his actions and reactions, but to intellectually know these motives as a manifestation {168} within his form and mode of reality, of an in-depth reality.

Let us add, finally, that ‘in depth’ is not synonymous with the ultimate. Everything ultimate naturally has depth, but not everything with depth is ultimate. There are degrees of “in depth”, even an infinite number of them; indeed, it has an unfathomable depth. To know something in depth is not to know it in its ultimate reality. Moreover, intellection in depth is a fact; but the access to the ultimate is constitutively a problem which is always open, even to infinity. It is because of this that intellection in depth is not synonymous with absolute intellection. Ground-reality is not absolute reality. That was Hegel’s great mistake. The progression toward what is in depth is not the unfolding of an absolute knowledge. In depth-ness is always an open dimension, and therefore reason is not absolute knowing but open intellection in depth. Thus, just as the field of the real is constitutively open, in the same way the in depth “toward” to which the field sends us is a “toward” which is also constitutively open. Therefore Hegel started from a false premise, thinking that the real (he said “the Idea”) is the closure of the ab-

solute, so that each reality would be but a moment of this ultimate closure. But that is unacceptable, because reality is “constitutively” (and not just in fact) open. Moreover intellection itself, as mere actualization of the real, is also constitutively open. One cannot assume, along with Hegel, that each level of consciousness is just a progressive manifestation (phenomenon) of the absolute as spirit, i.e., an unfolding toward absolute knowledge. The progression of the intellect is not, nor can it be, a “phenomenology of the spirit”.

In summary, that which specifies intellection, making of it knowledge, is in-depth reality. And this {169} in-depth reality does not consist in either objective ground (Kant), or in intelligible entity (Plato), or in causality, still less in necessary causality (Aristotle), or in the absolute (Hegel). In-depthness is the mere “beyond” as “ground-reality” in all the multiple modes and forms which this beyond can assume. Causality or the principles of a deductive form of knowledge are not thereby excluded, nor are the possible steps toward an absolute reality. What is excluded is the idea that something of sort formally constitutes the in-depth reality in which reason is installed by the movement of intellection as thrown from from the field to the beyond.

Let us summarize what has been said so many times. Reason is (1) inquiring intellection of reality; (2) intellection in depth, of worldly reality, i.e., intellection of reality “itself”; (3) intellection which is formally measuring as principle and canon of the reality of the real, in accordance with sensed suggestions. The three formulae are identical; they expound the three moments whose intrinsic and formal unity is the very essence of reason. To know is to intellectually know the real in accordance with these three moments, i.e., knowledge is intellection in reason. This reason is a modalization of sentient intellection, and is therefore sentient reason. Knowing is, then, the work of sentient reason. What is the formal structure of this knowledge? {170}

* [Zubiri is here drawing a distinction between “to found”, *fundar*, and “to ground”, *fundamentar*. “To found” means “to establish”, whereas “to ground” means to be the ultimate foundation of, the principle support of, the in-depth explanation of something.—trans.]

CHAPTER VI

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

Knowledge is intellection in reason. Since the meaning of this formula has already been explained, we see immediately that knowledge not only is not identical to intellection, it is not identical to science either. Science is but one mode of knowledge among others. Therefore, when we ask about the formal structure of knowing, we ask for something much more radical than if we were to ask what science is. We are asking, what is the formal structure of rational intellection of reality “itself”?

How does one know? This is the question which we must now address, viz., the formal structure of knowing.

In the first place, what one wishes to know is something already intellectually known in the field manner. And what we wish to intellectually know is its in-depth reality. Therefore, based upon canonic principles, we situate, so to speak, the field real upon the base of in-depth reality. This “upon the base” is what I shall call the ‘moment of *objectuality*’. What an object is is not in-depth reality but a field thing. A thing is converted from field reality into an object. In-depth reality is not an object but a ground. But this is {172} inadequate, because in the second place, based upon canonic principles, suggested by the field, we must fix the mode of possible access to the in-depth part of the field real. In depth reality is a ground, but not in a vacuum; rather, it is a very concrete ground in each case. Therefore it is essential to fix the mode in which we may have access to this ground, which is going to be the ground of the determinate field thing. This manner is just the way of access, i.e., the *method*. But this too is inadequate, because in the third place, it is necessary that, having advanced by this path, we try to find the ground for which we are searching. This is the moment of *rational truth*. Objectuality, method, and true encounter: these are the three moments whose unity constitutes the formal structure of knowing.

This structure is not identical to a scientific structure, because it is not necessary that the unity of the three moments of knowing have “scientific” character. Objectuality is not necessarily identical to what a scientist understands by object, viz. a fact. A scientific fact is not the same as objectuality; rather, being a scientific fact is but a mode of objectuality. In the second place, the method is a way of access. It is not something identical to the scientific method. The scientific method is “a” way of access to in-depth reality, but not every way of access is a scientific method. Finally, a true encounter is not the same thing as scientific confirmation, for at least two reasons. First, it is not because it is necessary to understand this presumed scientific confirmation with respect to the true encounter, and not the other way around. And in the second place, it is not because there is no implication that we will in fact actually *reach* this true encounter; it may perhaps not always be possible. Science is not, as Kant thought, a *Faktum*, but an {173} effort, not just with respect to its content, but above all with respect to the very possibilities of its existence—something completely different from the conditions of possibility of a science already achieved, such as the science about which Kant spoke. Science in accordance with the three constitutive moments of rational intellection is essentially a problematic knowledge, viz. a knowledge which seeks to take on the form of experimental facts, of a precise method of experimentation, or of the grounding of verifiable truths. This tripartite intention is characteristic of science. And it is on account of this that science is, *qua* knowledge, a problematic knowledge. And this problem of science is inscribed in the formal structure of knowing as such. This structure has then three moments: objectuality, method, and true encounter. But as stated, they do not go beyond being vague expressions. In what, precisely, do they consist?

{174}

§1

OBJECTUALITY

As I have already indicated, the intellection of a real field thing in its in-depth reality situates that thing upon this in-depth reality as its base.

This in-depth reality is not what is by itself known in the intellection. We are sent “towards” it, and installed in it by field reality itself as reality; in-depth reality, as such, is not what is known. What is known is the real field thing. In order to avoid monotonous repetition of the adjective ‘field’, I shall speak of a real thing or simply of a thing. The in-depth reality is not something intellectually known as if it were some great thing; rather, the mode of this in-depth reality being actualized is, as we have seen, “to be grounding”; it is *ground-reality*. Therefore in-depth reality is the real ambit of grounding. Now, the first thing that we do in order to know a real thing already given to us is to situate it upon that ambit as base. That which is “in-depth” is, in this case, a “base”. And before this base, the real thing, which was among others in a field, *leaps out at us* as grounded in its in-depth reality. The thing therefore suffers a type of transformation, from being in the field to being upon the base, to being grounded. In this new condition, the real thing *qua* jumping out at us is what we call ‘object’. The real thing has been transformed into a real object. This is the first moment of rational intellection, viz. objectuality. It is necessary to {175} conceptualize with great care what this objectuality is and in what the transformation of the real thing into real object consists.

I

WHAT IS OBJECTUALITY?

To be sure, objectuality is not objectivity. Objectivity is something which concerns an affirmation. But objectuality concerns not an affirmation but the very mode of actualization of a thing. Objectuality is “a” mode of actualization of a thing. An object is not, then, objectivity. But neither is it a mere actualized real thing. Object is not identical to real thing. Not every real thing intellectually known as real is by that alone the object of a possible knowledge. A real thing is an object only when it is actualized “upon the base” of grounded reality. A thing intellectually known in accordance with grounded reality is in reality in the field, and is certainly a real thing, but it

is not formally an object. It becomes so only when it is actualized upon the base of grounded reality. Being an object is neither objectivity nor a real thing, but rather has its own structure. And then we may ask ourselves in what this actualization consists, and in what being an object formally consists.

The expression ‘object’ has, like almost all important expressions, different meanings which it is necessary to carefully distinguish.

In the first place, being an object does not consist in being something which we are going to intellectually know. That an object is synonymous with what we are going to intellectually know echoes the classical idea of the {176} formal and material object. And this is wrong. This classical conceptualization nourishes itself ultimately upon the identity of the real thing and of an object, adding perhaps that the real thing is going to be the terminus of an intellection. And this is not the case, because being an object is not, formally, just being the terminus of an intellection. One must add, at the least, in what mode the thing is the terminus of intellection.

Then one might be able to think, in the second place, that an object is that which we propose to ourselves to intellectually know. An object would then be “proposed” reality; it would be “pro-positum”. This has a very wide meaning which would take us outside of intellection. Restricting ourselves to intellectual pro-posing, object would be what is proposed as something to be intellectually known. It would be the real thing actualized in the form of *pro*, whose etymological sense is “in front of”. As a mode of actualization, object would consist in being present, in being a *positum*. But put in front of me, i.e. in the form of *pro*, the real thing would be before me, i.e., a *pro-positum*. But this is not the case. Above all, because this concept does not conform to the object of rational intellection. There are also, as we have seen, propositional judgements, and in addition predicative judgements, in which a thing is proposed for subsequent determination. Thus, when we affirm that *A* is *B*, the *A* is proposed to be affirmed as *B*. But it is not for that reason that it is formally an “object”. To be sure, every rational intellection involves, or at least can involve, affirmations. But then it is clear that to intellectually know *A* in its in-depth reality is not the same as to intellectually know *A* as subject of predication of a field note *B*. The *A* on the other hand is actualized in rational intellection not as a *pro*, but in a different way. Every object is *pro-positum*, but not every *pro-positum* is an object. Therefore it is necessary to go one step further. {177}

In rational intellection a thing is not actualized

among others in the field, but rather is actualized *over* the base of in-depth reality. There are, then, two moments: being placed-*before* and being *over* a base (the base of the world). In these conditions a real thing is certainly placed, is a *positum*, but is not so in the form of *pro*.

When a real thing is projected over the base of in-depth reality, is as if jutting out from this base. Thus the thing acquires something like its *own bulk*, which we have to intellectually know not as something complete in itself, but as something whose bulk we must keep in order to intellectually know it in-depth. When it so juts out, the thing presents itself as a *positum*, but as a *positum* whose outline, so to speak, must be overcome in order to go to its base. This actualization is not actualization in *pro*, but actualization in *ob*. The thing is no longer something *pro-posed*, but something *op-posed*; it is an *ob-positum*. And this is to be an object, viz., to be actualized as *ob*. To be able to be proposed, the object starts by being *op-posed*. Here ‘opposed’ does not refer to some obstacle; ‘object’ is not ‘objection’. The opposed is not like a mountain which separates and divides; rather, it is like the depth of a port which must be maintained in order to be able to go in the other direction to the beyond. The *ob* consists in a jutting such that by its own nature, it is sending us to something beyond, to in-depth reality. It is an *ob* formally sending us “toward”. *Ob* is not a simple being in front of, a being in front as raised, a being opposed between its actualization in a previous intellection and the actuality of grounding, but rather a being raised by sending us formally to this actualization. The ground, which is in-depth reality, must keep the presumed {178} sufficiency of the bulk of the thing. In-depth reality is grounding in the form of keeping something which is opposed and is sending; it is actualization in *ob*.

But this does not yet suffice, because even if the *ob* is correctly understood, one can still misunderstand what it is to be an object. An object can, in fact, have two meanings. One is that which proceeds from the *ob* itself; this we have already explained. Another meaning is that which proceeds from the second part of the expression [*-ject*]. An object would be that which is actualized as *ob*, but as something which is (under) lying; it would be a *jectum*. Here the accent is not on the *ob* but on the *jectum*. The object would be something which “is here”; it is a *keimenon*, something lying, as Parmenides said; a *hypo-keimenon*, a sub- or under-lying, as Aristotle said. The *ob-jectum* would be the correlate of a *sub-jectum*. The difference would be between the *ob* and the *sub*, but the reality itself would in both cases be a *jectum*, something lying. This conception of object has run throughout the history of philosophy since Parmenides. It has, for exam-

ple, its supreme expression in Kant, who conceptualized the object only in terms of natural science. Now, this is impossible. To be sure, there are—or at least it is not excluded that there can be—objects lying about. But there are many realities which are actualized in the form of *ob* and which are not “lying”, which are not a *jectum*. For example, persons as such, life, society, and history are not something *jectum*. Their mode of reality is different than being “lying” reality. They have or can have intellectual actuality in *ob*, but they are not *jectum*. In this sense, then, object would be what we today call ‘thing’. But the actuality in *ob* is not necessarily actuality of a *jectum*. Therefore, while the word ‘object’ may be linguistically inevitable, it is fitting that a new word be employed {179} to preclude confusion of the two meanings of ‘object’. This word must express the actuality in *ob*, but not as a *jectum*. For this it will be necessary to express simple reality, simple real being, without *jectum* though possibly using the verb ‘to be’. In Latin the verb *esse* has as participle *sens*, which does not survive except in compounds such as *prae-sens*, the present, *ab-sens*, the absent, etc. Now, it remains to create a word along similar lines, something like *ob-sens*, the *obsent*. Neither in Latin, the Romance languages, nor in English does such a word exist. German has the word *Gegenstand*, which means the same as our word ‘object’. *Gegen* expresses the *ob*, and *stand* expresses the *sens*, object along the lines of opposition. This would be perfect if German did not understand *stehen* as a mere being here, i.e., as a *jectum*. Thus the Kantian tradition has identified *Gegenstand* with *ob-jectum*. It would have been better to say *Gegenseiend*, because reality can be *ob* and not be a *jectum*. Object would thus be not the *ob-jectum* but the *ob-sent*. And to lie would be only one mode among others of *esse*. This is not the time to emphasize the difference between being and reality; however very soon we shall see the importance of this distinction. Here we are only trying to pin down the notion of object a bit more. For this I have gone to the expression *ob-sent*, not in order to continue using it but only to clarify the ideas we have been discussing. I shall continue, then, using the word *object* but only in the sense of *obsent*.

In summary, being an object formally involves the real thing (whether “lying” or not) being actualized in the form of *ob*. This *ob* has two essential characteristics which it is necessary to carefully point out.

A) In the first place, *ob* is a *categorial characteristic*. What does this mean? ‘Category’ does not designate a “class” of things. We are dealing not with a class of things but with “modes” (or forms, {180} which here comes to the same thing) of an intellectually known thing.

In every intellection one declares the mode in accordance with which the thing is present. To declare in Greek is expressed by *kategoréo*, and the declaration is called *kategoria*. Category is, then, as I see it, the mode of a thing's being present *qua* declared in intellection.

Now, to be an object, i.e., objectuality, is above all a category of actualization; it is the mode by which reality is actualized as "ob", regardless of its real content. It is the essentially categorial characteristic of the *ob*. This we have already seen in Part I.

But to be present as "ob" has still a second essential characteristic.

B) In the second place, "ob" has a *characteristic of positivity*. What does this mean? In intellection the real is present as real regardless of its form of actualization. I can describe this being present as the formal constitutive moment of the intelligible real; it is the actualization of the real. But I can describe the being present as a moment proper to intellection itself. And then I shall say that what is present is actualized in a form such that, by virtue of being mere actualization, its relationship to the intellectual act itself is to be "merely" actualized. The real in intellection is actualized and is nothing more than actualized. What is present determines its intellectual actualization based on itself, and it is based on itself as it is actualized, and only actualized, in its mere presenting itself. Now, to be "only actualized" in its being present is what comprises being a *positum*. It is the characteristic of positivity. *Positum* is what is present insofar as its actualization is, with respect to the presented itself, only a being actualized in its presenting itself. That is, being a *positum* has three moments: being here-and-now present, being only here-and-now present, and being only here-and-now present in and {181} through its presenting itself. Through the first moment, the *positum* is something apprehended. By the second moment, the *positum* is opposed, if I may be permitted the expression, to what may be its interpretation or intellectual elaboration, for example, to the theoretical, to the speculative, etc. Through its third moment, the *positum* is a simple observable thing in the intellection. We are not trying to go beyond what is present to a thing which is manifested in what is present, but to take what is present in and by itself in its mere presenting itself. It is necessary to take these three moments in their formal and intrinsic purity. In order to comprehend this, it will be useful to position this concept of positivity face to face with two other kindred ideas.

Above all, the fact that the actualized does nothing but be here-and-now present might cause one to think that this being here-and-now present is, *qua* being, just "being

here". This is false. It would be once again to identify just being present with a *jectum*. The 'being' to which we refer does not concern the presented but the presentation. What is present can be what is most opposed to the "being here", what is most opposed to a *jectum*. The most radical course of a person's life, or a reality which consisted only in happening, do not for that reason cease to be present, and only present, in an intellection. Positivity does not mean "staticness"—if I may be permitted the expression.

But it is not just that being present does not mean being a *jectum*—something which, when all is said and done, is easy to comprehend; rather, there is another more subtle dimension in the concept of positivity. One might think, in fact, that being present, being only present, and being so as presenting itself, is the same as saying that what is actualized thus is just what we call a *fact*. Positivity would be a characteristic identical to "facticity". But this is absolutely wrong.

To see that, let us ask what a fact is. {182} Certainly the fact is a *positum*. But the converse is not true; not every *positum* is a fact. And the proof is that, in order to certify that something is a fact, one usually calls it a "positive fact", which indicates that the positivity cannot be understood based upon the facticity, but rather that the facticity, i.e., being a fact, must be understood based upon the positivity. Insofar as it is a *positum*, the fact is something which is present, which only is present, and which is so in the presenting itself. Although the word affects only the third moment of the *positum*, for greater clarity we shall call the *positum* an observable. Therefore *positum* is a characteristic of the real actualized as observable. But not everything intellectually observable is necessarily a fact. In order to be so it must fulfill a necessary condition, viz., that the *positum*, besides being observable, must by virtue of its own nature be *observable by anyone*. And it must be so "by virtue of its own nature". This requires special attention. "Observable by anyone" does not mean that there are various people who have observed it. Even if there were only one person who had done so, this observable would be a fact if what is observed has the nature of being observable by anyone. Thus, it could be that an historical fact might have had but one witness. If an authentic document reaches us to the effect that this fact has occurred, and if what is thus witnessed is by its nature observable by anyone who could have understood it, then what is witnessed by this single observer is a fact, *in casu*, an historical fact. On the other hand, if what is observed is something which, by virtue of its nature, is not observable by more than one person, then what is observed is certainly something real, it is a *positum*, but this real thing, despite being real, is not properly speaking a fact.

This is the case with some moments of my intimate personal life. It is not just that I observe them, but that {183} no one other than I *can* observe them. Thus these realities are not, properly speaking, facts. It was just this, as I see it, that was the true reason why Wundt's nascent experimental psychology did not admit the purely introspective as a fact. I leave aside the fact that expression, on the part of the person, can be considered as a fact; that is a different question, which Wundt's successors resolved affirmatively. Conversely, there can be positive realities which are perfectly observed by many persons, and yet these positive realities cannot be called 'facts' if, by virtue of their own nature, they are not observable by everyone. Thus, for example, we have the apparitions of Christ before the fifty, according to St. Paul's testimony. Even though Christ may have been seen by the fifty, and even though their testimony be true, these apparitions thus observed would not therefore be a fact, because the presumed reality could not be observed by all other persons who happened to be there, but only by those select fifty. It would be *positum*, but not a fact. These apparition of Christ, in fact, *by virtue of their nature*, could not have been observed by just anyone, but only by those graced with them. 'Fact', then, is not synonymous with present reality; rather, the real *positum*, I affirm, is only a fact if by its own nature it can be observed by anyone. Every fact, then, must be *positum*, but not every *positum* is a fact.

To be sure, from the very first pages of this book I have repeatedly stated that I wish to attend to the facts, for example the fact that we sentiently apprehend the real. But this does not contradict what I just said, because what is a fact is sentient apprehension; what is apprehended in its real and *positum* character is not necessarily {184} a fact. The color green sensed is a fact; this does not mean that, without further ado, the color green is a fact. In order to be so it is necessary to add that what is apprehended can be apprehended by anyone. And in this case that is so. The green apprehended is real; it is a *positum*, but if one says no more it is not a fact; it is only a fact if one says that by its nature it can be apprehended by anyone.

Moreover, not every fact is necessarily what we call a *scientific fact*. This is a problem which unleashed a spirited discussion at the beginning of this century. A fact is only a type of "posited" reality; the scientific fact is, in turn, only a type of fact. In order for a fact to be a scientific fact, what is observable by anyone has to be, in a certain way, "fixed". A scientific fact, I believe, is a fixed fact. Fixation is always and only the characteristic of a fact not just by virtue of being observable by anyone, but as a fact observed in a special form, viz. as referred to a

system of previous concepts. These concepts can be either from natural science, historical documents, etc. Without this fixation, we would have a mere fact, to which the name *brute fact* was given at the beginning of the century, as opposed to *scientific fact*, which as I see it is the conceptualized and fixed fact. If we take a bobbin, copper wire, an electrical cell, and an iron bar, we shall see that under certain conditions the bar oscillates and its oscillation can be measured on a suitable scale. In this case the scientific fact is the electrical impedance of the bobbin and wire. But that is not the brute fact. The brute fact would be, for example, the observation of the oscillations of the iron bar. Within an historical tradition it is quite possible that the *traditum* may perfectly well be a fact, yet there is no documentary fixation. It would not then {185} be a scientific fact. This is the sum total of the difference that there is between what we might call a living tradition and a tradition with documentary continuity. Strictly speaking, the scientific fact is the clarification of reality apprehended as a function of previous concepts. But we shall not now delve into this problem as it would distract us from the matter we have been discussing.

To summarize, *positum* is the actualization of something in its being present, in its being just present, and in being so in its being present itself. It is not a characteristic of apprehended reality either as *jectum*, or *fact*, or as *scientific fact*.

Now, the "ob" has a characteristic which is not just categorial but also of a *positum*. To be "ob", objectuality, is positivity. That something is an object, in the sense of objectuality, is not something which is determined by me, but is something determined by the real itself in its being present. I have indeed said that the "ob" is constituted when a real thing is projected upon the base of reality. But this projection does not have its roots in me, but in the very mode of reality's being presented, i.e., in its "toward". It is not I who projects a real field thing upon the base of reality, but rather it is that reality itself which, when sentiently apprehended, has the moment of a "toward" the in-depth. The real is projected from itself into its own being presented; *it is projected*, I must stress, and it is not I who projects it. Therefore "ob" is a *positum*. Once again, the matter in question is not that objectuality is a fact, and still less a scientific fact, but that in its real character is the reality itself which sends us to the in-depth, regardless of the nature of its content.

But it is necessary to avoid another mistake. I have said, in fact, that rational intellection intellectually knows the real as {186} the object of a search, i.e., we are dealing with an inquiring intellection. And searching is not

searching for a *positum* but a *quaesitum*. This is true; nonetheless, let us think a bit longer about it. What is searched for in rational intellection is the ground of a real field thing. For this reason it comes to that positive projection which we call “ob”. But neither in-depth reality as such, i.e., the ambit of grounding, nor the real as real object are the sought-after goals. What is sought after is the ground of the real object in in-depth reality. The “ob” and the “for” are just *positum*. What is sought is the fundament of the “real-ob” in the “for”.

Summarizing, the field real acquires the characteris-

tic of a real object in rational intellection. Its objectuality consists in what I called being *ob-sent*. And this objectuality has two essential characteristics: categorial character, viz. the “ob” is a category of actualization; and positive character, viz. the “ob” is a *positum* for the real itself. The categories of actualization are something *positum*, and every *positum* is so above all categoriality. In the “ob” the unity of both characteristics is formally given.

But this is leading us to the second point, which is, in what precisely does the transformation of a real thing into a real object consist?

APPENDIX

THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORIES

‘Category’ does designate a “class” of things, as is usually assumed. The list of categories is not the supreme classification of things. We are not dealing with “classes” of things, but with “modes” of the intellectually known thing. Recalling what has been said already, let us repeat that in every intellection one states the mode in accordance with which a thing is actually present. In Greek, ‘to state’ in this sense is *kategorēo*, and therefore what is stated is called a *category*.

The problem of the categories goes back to Aristotle, who was in turn inspired by Plato. For Plato and Aristotle, to intellectually know is to declare or affirm that what is intellectually known “is”. That is Parmenides’ old thesis. Intellection is logos of being, *logos ousias*. In the logos one states the modes in accordance with which what is intellectually known “is”, i.e., one states the modes of being. How? The logos is a complexion or weaving (*symploke*) of the thing about which one is affirming (the *on*), and of what one is affirming or predicating of it. The characteristics of being, stated in this predicative weaving, are the categories. For Aristotle, then, the categories are the supreme modes of entity as such. (I need not stress that here I take the word ‘mode’ in its most general meaning and not as something different from a form of reality). Thus, strictly speaking, it would be false to say that “green” is a quality. Green is a note just like sonorous, heavy, warm, etc. But the manner in which green determines this paper consists in making of it a “which”. Quality is not the green itself, but the way in which the green determines the being of this paper. {188} As this determination is declared in predication, i.e. in the predicate, it follows that the predication, this mode of being which we predicate as a quality of the modes of being, is stated in the predication itself. Now, the different types of statements of the modes of being in predicates are just the categories. A quality is not a note but a category. To be sure, they are but supreme genera of what can be predicated of being. They are not *predicates*, in the sense of notes, nor are they *predicable*, nor would they be what the

medieval philosophers called *predicamenta*. And this was decisive: the categories, we are told, are founded upon the structure of the logos; they constitute its formal (logical) structure and are the base of all our grammar (noun, adjective, preposition, etc.). This conception has run throughout European philosophy (Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc.).

If one studies it carefully, however, this concept starts from two presuppositions: that intellection is affirmation, is *logos*; and that what is intellectually known is *being*. That is what I termed “logification of intellection”, and “entification of reality”. To intellectually know is to affirm, and what is intellectually known is entity. The unitary convergence of these two presuppositions has in large measure determined, as I said, the character of European philosophy.

But these two presuppositions are, in my view, untenable.

A) It is thought that what is intellectually known is “being”. But that is not the case; what is intellectually known is not being but “reality”. We have already seen that before; being is an *actuality* of the real (in the world), an *ulterior* actuality (to reality itself), an *ulterior* but *oblique* actuality. Being is *ulterior* and *oblique* actuality of the real as reality. It is necessary to repeat these ideas at this time.

B) The logos, affirmation, is but a mode of intellection, {189} not to be sure the only or most radical one. Indeed, the predicative logos itself is not the only type of logos; first there is the positional logos and the propositional logos. Only then is there a predicative logos. Classical philosophy has logified intellection, so that the theory of intellection has been converted into Logic. But that leaves out the essence of the logos, which consists just in being a mode of intellection, i.e., a mode of actualization. One cannot “logify” intellection, but on the contrary must “intelligize” the logos. All of this has been previously explained.

Hence the categories are neither predicates, nor predicables, nor *predicamenta* of being, but the modes of a real thing as merely actualized in intellection *qua* modes stated about it. The categories are primarily and radically modes of a real thing stated about its mere actualization, in its mere intellection; they are not modes of real things *qua* affirmed in some logos. They are categories neither of entity nor predication; rather they are categories of reality which is merely actualized in intellection. This is a concept of category which differs from the classical one.

But the real actualized in intellection has two aspects. One is the aspect given to the actualized real *qua* real; the other is the aspect given to the actualized real *qua* actualized. Hence, what is stated in intellection is on one hand the modes of reality, and on the other the very modes of actualization. By the first aspect, the categories will be modes of reality actualized *qua* reality. By the second aspect, the categories would be modes of reality actualized *qua* actualized. In contrast to classical philosophy, it is necessary to introduce two systems of categories: {190} categories of reality and categories of actualization. These two systems of categories, naturally, are not independent but have an intrinsic and radical unity. Let us quickly examine the following three points: 1. Categories of reality; 2. Categories of actualization; 3. The intrinsic and radical unity of the categories.

1. *Categories of Reality.* Following the thread of the logos, Aristotle views the categories as manners of determination of the subject; ultimately this is therefore a vision which goes from outside to inside. The essence of what is not a subject would be in fact to inhere, or as Aristotle says, to be an accident. The same happens with Kant and even Hegel. The only difference lies in the fact that for Aristotle the logos does nothing but *declare* an already determined subject, whereas for Kant and Hegel (albeit in a different form, we prescind from the matter), what the logos does is to *constitute* the subject affirmatively. But always one deals with a vision from outside to inside. Now, the real is not a *subject* but a *system*. It is a *construct system*: each note, by virtue of being a “note of”, involves the system as a whole of which it is a note, and therefore consists in the actuality of the system in said note. The essence of a note is not “to inhere” but to “cohere”. In virtue of this, the system is a *unity* which is actually *present in each note*, making of it a “note of”. This is the essential point.

Now, this unity of the system is an “in”. The real is an *intus*. The notes are only that in which the system is projected from itself, from the *intus*. The *intus* thus also has a moment of “ex”; it is just the “from itself”. Whence

it follows that the real is not only *intus* but also an *ektos*, an *extra*. This is a vision from inside to out. And then what has traditionally been called ‘categories’ is not the way in which a subject is determined {191} by the notes predicated of it, but the formal respects by which the “in” is projected onto an “ex”. And it is this formal respect which I call *dimension*. The categories are not the pronouncement of the characteristics of being in the logos, but the pronouncement of the real in intellection. I call them ‘dimensions’ because in each one is, in a certain way, the system in a proper formal respect, i.e., its reality *qua* reality is measured. These dimensions are not only numerically different (as happens, for instance, in geometry), but also qualitatively different. Moreover, they mutually imply each other. This is an essential observation. By being formal respects of actualization, these dimensions are inscribed, so to speak, in a formal, primary respect, the respect by which things are *de suyo* in apprehension. The dimensions are thus inscribed in that primary formality which is “reality”.

But this actualization of the real takes place in intellection.

II. *The categories of actualization.* There reality has *modes of actualization* which are not identified with the characteristics of reality, i.e., with its dimensions. Therefore one ought to speak of categories of actualization or of intellection. The name matters little; the essential point is not to confuse these categories with those other categories which are the dimensions of reality. Now, *qua* intellectual actualization the categories are neither predicates nor predicables nor *predicamenta*; they are simply modes of actualization of the real declaimed in intellection.

What are these categories of actualization? They are, as we have been seeing, five, because there are five modes {192} by which reality is actualized in intellection.

A) Intellection is, above all, nothing but the mere actualization of the real in the intelligence. It is the radical category of actualization, the category of the “in”.

B) There is another mode of being present, of the real being actualized intellectually. It is not the case that the real ceases to be actualized “in”, but that it is reactualized in affirmative intellection. Something already intellectually known as real is in addition intellectually known as real based on other things; this is affirmation. It is therefore a reduplicative actualization. The *A* already actualized as real becomes intellectually known as being really *B*. This is the category of the “re”, of “reduplication.” This category is, in a certain way, general

because there are different forms and modes of “re”.

a) A real thing is intellectually known based upon others “among” which it is. The real thing is then actualized in the intellection of these other things. We have already seen this: the “among” has, among other aspects, an aspect proper to a thing actualized as such. It is a “re” but “among”. This is the category of “among”.

b) One intellectually knows in this “among” that the thing is actualized, but as a function of other things. In this functionality, the real thing is actualized in that mode which we call “by”. “By” is the functionality of the real *qua* real. It is a “re” but “by”. This is the category of the “by”.

c) Finally there is another mode of actualizing what is intellectually known as “among” and as “by”, and which consists in the thing being present “among” and “by”, but now not with respect to other things, but as the projection of the real only as a moment of the world. This projection actualizes the real in the form of “ob”. The “ob” is a category.

“In”, “re”, and in turn “re” as “among”, as “by”, {193} and as “ob”, gives us the five categories, the five modes of intellectual actualization of the real *qua* intellectually known.

Since these categories are modes of presentation, they apply both to the field as well as to the world, although in different forms. But the “among” in the field is not identical to the “among” in the world, nor is the “by” in the field identical to the “by” in the world. But that is another question.

Each one of these categories comprises different categorial modifications. Thus, actualization as “in” comprises all the modes by which what is sensed is present to us. We already saw, in Part I, that the essential difference of the senses is not in the qualities which are sensed, but in the very mode by which the sensed qualities are present to us as real. Similarly, the “re”, as a mode of “among”, comprises different forms: the modes of intentionality of the “re”, etc. Finally “by” and “ob” can assume different forms. These five categories of actualization are not independent of the categories of reality; they constitute the categorial unity of the intellection of the real.

III. *Unity of the categories of reality and of actualization.* This unity has two aspects.

A) Above all, both the categories of reality as well as the categories of actualization constitute a “system”, the *system of the categories*. This is obvious with respect to

the categories of reality. The categories of reality constitute a system. But it is less obvious that the categories of actualization also constitute a system. Hence it must be clearly stressed. Every “re” actualization is essentially based upon an “in” actualization; otherwise it would not be re-actualization. Only as “in” can something be actualized among others. In turn, this unity of the “in” and of the “re” is what {194} points to reality as a “by”. Finally, by just projecting the “in” and the “re” upon in-depth reality, the real is actualized as “ob”. Here the systematic character of the categories of actualization is apparent.

B) But taken together, the categories of actualization and the categories of reality reveal an intrinsic and radical unity, the unity of actualization. We are not dealing with actuality, but with actualization. This unity, by virtue of being of actuality, is determined by reality because every actuality is always and only actuality of reality. The modes of actualization, then, are determined intellectually by the real itself. To be sure, intelligence has its own nature. But we have already seen that this nature is actualized in and by the actuality of a real thing, intellectually actualized. Therefore this actuality is certainly common to the real thing and to the intellection itself, but this commonality is modally determined by the real itself; in virtue of this, the actualization is not only a *common actuality* for the real and for intellection, but in addition this commonality has an intrinsic and formal character; it is a commonality in which the real itself grounds it. It consists in being a commonality determined by the real of which it is the actuality. Intellection is certainly an actuality; but *qua* intellection it is just actuality “of” the real. And therefore the actuality common to a real thing and its intellection is determined by the mode in which the “of” is present to the intelligence. And as the real *qua* real is transcendental, it follows that the *common actuality* of intellection and of what is intellectually known is a commonality of *transcendental* nature. Kant said that the very structure of the understanding confers transcendental content (*transzendental Inhalt*) to what is understood. {195} That is not true. Transcendentality is not a characteristic of the understanding but of intellection as determined by the real itself in common actuality by the real. This actuality is, then, not only common but transcendental. It is, if one wishes, common transcendental actuality. That is to say, the actuality is something common in which intellection is respectively open to the intellectually known real. And it is for this reason that intellection itself is transcendental. This commonality of actuality is not transcendental as a conceptual moment, but neither is it transcendental because it constitutes the real as object. It is transcendental, above all, because by being common,

the intellection is open to reality in the same openness by which the real is open to its actuality in intellection. Therefore there is transcendental commonality. In virtue of this, transcendental as respective openness of the reality of the real is determinant by virtue of the respective openness of intellection as such. And it is for this reason that intellection itself is transcendental. Intellection is transcendently open to other intellections. The diverse intellections do not constitute an “edifice” by virtue of being lumped together, i.e., because to one intellection others are “added” which outline, organize, or amplify it; but on the contrary all of this takes place, and does so necessarily, by virtue of the transcendently open nature of each intellection. Transcendental as respective openness of intellection is the radical foundation of every “logic” of intellection.

The categories of reality and of actualization have, then, an intrinsic unity with respect to two characteristics: systematic unity, and unity of transcendental commonality.

IV. *Special consideration of the category of the “ob”.* The “ob” has a formally categorial characteristic. To be object {196} is a categorial mode of actuality. Let us prolong our reflection on this idea of object which is essential for the problem of knowing.

Above all it is necessary to avoid the mistake of confusing object and objectuality. The categorial aspect of actualization is the being actualized “as object”; it is not the character by which what is present as object can constitute one or several objects. Object and objectuality are not the same.

Kant’s celebrated categories are modes of being of objects, the diverse moments which constitute that which we call “an object”. Therefore they are, like Aristotle’s categories, categories of content, very different than the categories of actuality. Since Kant was, like Aristotle, oriented toward the predicative logos, he takes up the idea of categories as modes of unity of predicate with subject. Kant’s novelty is in affirming that this unity is not an affirmative unity consequent upon the object, but on the contrary the unity of predicate and subject is what makes the intelligible have its own unity in virtue of which it is an object. The object is constituted as this or that object by a function identical to that by which affirmation itself is constituted, which is then the ground of objectual unity. And it is in this that, for Kant, the categories consist: they are modes in which the diversity of intuition is unified as objects of intellection. The categories would thus be transcendental modes of representation. But this is untenable for a variety of reasons. In the first place, intellectual knowing, and especially rational intellectual knowing, is

not representing. The radical function of reason is not to be representative but to be grounding. To be sure, this intellection will involve representations, or at least can involve them in most cases; but the formal function {197} of reason is not to *represent* but to *present*. The categories are not modes of representing but modes of presenting. And in the second place, it is clear that Kant’s idea of what is represented would figure in the different categories of the “re”. And this is not sufficient to constitute the “ob”.

Kant has posed for himself the problem of the constitution of objects, but he stumbled over the problem of objectuality as such, over the “being-ob”. And the fact is that by ‘object’ Kant understands the content of objects. It doesn’t matter for this problem that such content is merely formal; one is always dealing with a content. Now, objectuality is not a content but a mode of actualization of a content. One is not dealing with “an object” but with “objectuality”.

And on this point, Kant is in agreement with Aristotle; he takes the problem of the categories along the lines of the categories of the content of reality. They have a different meaning for categories of reality, but they agree upon some characteristics which for both of them constitute the system of categories of reality, viz. Being *a priori*, closed, and universal. For Aristotle and Kant—above all Kant—the categories of reality constitute the *a priori* warp and weft of what is categorized. This is not the place to discuss that important problem in detail. But from here on I want to let it be settled that the categories of content are not an *a priori* system, but the modes of what has usually been called the ‘transcendental function of suchness’, of the real considered as suchness. Hence they depend upon the real and are not *a priori* conditions of the real. In the second place, the categories of reality are not closed systems, because the transcendental function is in itself an essentially open function. The real can be constituting not just other real things, {198} i.e., not only a diversity of suchness, but can also go on constituting other modes of reality *qua* reality. For this reason the transcendental order is an order which is open dynamically. And finally, in the third place, the system of content categories is not universal. Aristotle determined his categories as modes of substance, but above all along the lines of sensible substance. Kant molded his categories upon the things which constitute the object of Newton’s physics. And this is manifestly unilateral, both in the case of Aristotle and that of Kant. One cannot extend the content categories of physical things, whether substances or sensible objects, to all other types of reality. Therefore the universality of the content categories is not achieved by changing the concept

of reality, for example by saying that the reality of things, which are here, form the order of some cosmic movement. The fact is that in any case whatsoever, and regardless of how rich our chain of concepts is, the system of the con-

tent categories is not, as I see it, universal. Each type of knowledge has its own content categories. It is impossible to reduce the categories of the historical and the personal to the natural, etc.

II

TRANSFORMATION OF A FIELD THING INTO
A REAL OBJECT

In view of the foregoing, this point will be dealt with briefly. The object, i.e. the objectual reality, is not an interpretation or anything of the sort; it is the terminus of apprehension. {199} A real thing is a *positum*, but upon the base of in-depth reality; therefore the real thing acquires a character of “ob”. That transformation is, then, of categorial order, of categories of actualization. We are not trying to elaborate a representation but to actualize another mode of presentation. For this reason, I repeat, the transformation of a real thing into a real object is categorial. The real field thing, actualized now as real “in” primordial apprehension, and “re”-actualized in the field manner “among” others and “by” others in the form of affirmation, is now projected upon the base of in-depth reality, upon an ambit actualized in turn as “by”, i.e., upon an ambit with the nature of a ground. The “field” of the real thing is open to a “world” in which it is grounded. Then and only then does the real field thing acquire the character of real object. *The “ob” is but the actualization of a field thing as a world thing.* Only in this actualization is there an “object”, i.e., in the rational intellection, in knowledge. That which is intellectually known in primordial apprehension, and that which is intellectually known affirmatively, are not, formally, objects. Only what is intellectually known rationally is an object. This openness of field to world is an openness which leads not to what a field thing already intellectually known “toward” others of the field is, but rather to whatever that intellectually known field thing now is “toward” grounding reality itself.

In virtue of this, the transformation of a real thing into objectual reality has precise characteristics:

a) It is a transformation not in the mode of representing the real, but in its mode of being present. Objectuality is the terminus of a transformation only of categorial actuality. {200}

b) It is a transformation along the lines of the “toward”; the field “toward” is transformed into a “toward” the in-depth.

c) This transformation is determined by the real itself, because the “toward” is a mode of reality. The field real in its “toward” is what presents to us that real in its “toward” the in-depth.

What is the character of this transformation? The

transformation concerns, at one and the same time, intellection and the real thing. With respect to *intellection*, the transformation does not consist in a change in the act of intellection *qua* act. It is a transformation which determines, in intellection, something which is less than an act but more than mere capacity. This modalization is just what constitutes *actuity*. An object is not the terminus of a representation but the terminus of anintellective attitude. The transformation consists, then, intellectually, in the change of act into attitude. The “ob” is intellectually constituted as a terminus of an attitude.

This transference also concerns the *real*. The “ob” refers. The “ob” is a mode of actuality, and therefore, like every actuality, it is always just actuality of the real. The categorial “ob” presents us not “an” object, but a *res objecta*, a *res* in “ob”. In virtue of this, that which is actualized in this new attitude, i.e. what is going to be intellectually known rationally, is not the *res objecta* as *objecta*, but the *res objecta* as *res*. The “ob” only has the character of referring, and it refers to the reality of which it is actuality. In the intellective attitude the real itself is actualized in “ob”; but it is always an actualization of the real. The transformation, then, falls back upon the actualization in an attitude. Knowledge, I repeat, is not a representation of things, but an actualization of them in that new attitude of the “toward”. {201}

In this attitude, the real is objectually projected onto the in-depth base, i.e., it is actualized as worldly reality. This projection, and therefore the knowledge itself, can be of quite varied nature. That I said before. Knowledge is not just science, nor is it principally science. There are other modes of knowledge, for example poetic knowledge, religious knowledge, etc., just as there are also other known realities which are not things, for example one’s own or someone else’s personal reality. Now, knowledge is not principally theoretic; it is not because it is not radically theoretic. The radical aspect of knowledge is in the attitude of the “toward” determined by the real itself, an attitude in which the real is actualized in an “ob”. The rest is but modalizations of this radical structure.

Here then is what objectuality is, and what the attitude which determines the transformation of the real thing into real object is.

This objectuality is only a categorial correlate of an attitude, in which the real is actualized in an “ob” by projecting it—and only projecting it—upon the world as an ambit of grounding. This real was previously actualized as “in” and “re”. Therefore its projection upon the ambit of grounding leaves open the intellection of the ground of that objectual reality as a moment of the world. That is to

say, knowledge is always intrinsically and formally an open problem. It is not sufficient that the field real is actualized for us as object. It is actualized for us as object precisely in order for us to intellectually search for its in-

depth nature. For that it is necessary that this nature be accessible to intellection. How? That is the second point of the formal structure of knowing: after the constitution of objectuality, the access to the ground of the real.

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§2

THE METHOD

It is by projecting the field real onto the base of in-depth reality, onto the world, that we seek the rational intellection of field things, i.e., their knowledge. Knowledge is search. Let me reiterate that we are not dealing with the search for some intellection, but rather with an intellection which *qua* intellection is inquiring, which is inquiring itself as a mode of intellection. Since to be an intellection is to be a mere actualization of the real, it follows that the search is an actualization brought to completion in that mode of actualizing which is inquiry. Even though I have said all this before, I repeat it here because it is something essential for the subject which we are about to examine.

Where does one search for that actualization? We have already seen where: in the world. World is the respectivity of the real *qua* real. And it is in this sense that it is something beyond the field. The field is respectivity, but it is just sensed respectivity, the sensed world. To go beyond the field is to go from “field” to “world”. This world is not, formally, something sought, but something given. The world is given not as something which is there “facing” me; rather, it is given in that mode of reality which is the “toward”. It is for this reason that the world is formally something “beyond” the field. In the world thus actualized is where one seeks that which we wish to rationally know intellectually, that which we wish to know.

What is it that one seeks in the world? One seeks the real considered with respect to the world. Worldly reality is {203} actualized precisely as a “to be grounding”. The world is thus the ambit of grounding. And it is just on account of this that the world, that which is beyond the field, is in-depth reality. In-depthness does not consist in any kind of mysterious root, but in being the “for” of the field itself *qua* worldly. Therefore that which one seeks in this progression from the field toward the worldly is the ground of the field. Ground, as I have already said many times, is not necessarily a cause, but the mode in which that which is grounding grounds, from itself, the grounded and formally passes into what is grounded. Cause is only a mode of ground. The ground is therefore, ultimately, the world in a real thing. What one seeks is, then, this ground. *One does not seek the world, but the ground of the real in the world, transforming the field reality into objectual reality.* Neither does one seek an object. World and object are not what is problematic. What is problematic is always just objectual reality *qua*

reality in the world. This problematic business is what one seeks, viz. the ground of this determinate field thing.

In virtue of this a question arises: *How* does one seek that which is sought, that is, the ground of the world? This “how” is strictly and formally an intellective mode. Now, the “how” of the search for the fundament in the world is what constitutes *method*. A method is how one forges a way, a way toward the ground. A method is therefore the *way* of knowing as such. The necessity and nature of the method is not just a type of human necessity. It is that, but this necessity is founded upon an essential moment of reality, upon the constitutive openness of the real, merely in its respectivity. As ambit of respectivity, the world is open; {204} therefore, as a moment of respectivity of each real thing, reality is open in each thing. And the “how” of the search for the ground is set in this very openness; it is that which transforms the intellective movement into a progression among the real. Method is a way. Neither the world nor the real object is a problem, as I said; the problem is the way from the real object to its ground.

Thus it is necessary to ask ourselves: what, precisely, is a method? And what is its intrinsic and formal structure? These are the two points which we must examine.

Here we ask ourselves in what method consists. We are not interested in what a particular method is; that we shall see later. What we are now interested in is what comprises a method as a moment of rational intellection, i.e., what comprises the methodic moment of reason.

I

WHAT IS METHOD?

‘Method’ is not synonymous with what is usually called the ‘scientific method’. To be scientific is but a possible modalization of what it is to be a method. Method is something more radical; it is the way of access. The concept of “way” or “path”, *hodos*, was probably introduced into philosophy by Parmenides. But for method, just being a way or a path is not sufficient. It is necessary that the path be “among and through” the forms of reality. The path must be a path which is *meta* [after]. Only then will we have that which constitutes the method. Method is a problem because it is not univocally determined. And not being so is precisely why there is a *meta*, i.e., a forging of a way. {205}

What is this method *qua* intellective? That is the essential question. The matter is not resolved just by saying

that method is a way of access. It is necessary to clarify the intellectual character of the method itself.

For this let us recall, once more, that it is a forging of a way, that is how intelligence opens in order to go from a real field thing to its worldly ground. The path is traced between two points: the real field thing and its worldly ground. Clearly one is dealing with the real thing and with its real ground, real but intellectually known, actualized, in intellection. Therefore the method is the way of access from one actualization of the real to another. As we said, knowledge is intellection seeking itself. And what is sought is a new intellectual actualization of the same real field thing. It is quite possible that the content of the ground may be something which in some way is numerically distinct from the field thing; but it is always just intellectually known as a ground of the field thing. Therefore we are dealing, strictly speaking, with a new actualization of the field thing; it is actualized not as in a field but as in the world. That it is actualized as worldly is not the same as that it is actualized as being here-and-now in the world. This last would be “being” in the traditional sense. Here we are dealing just with reality *qua* respective in that respectivity which constitutes the world. And since all actualization is so of reality, it follows that ultimately what is done is to intellectually know the real more profoundly or more in-depth. That is, method is a way into reality. The moment of reality is decisive. To be sure, we are dealing with actualized reality, but actualized as reality. Method is a forging of a way into reality itself towards a more profound reality. Here, ‘intellection’ is taken in its most radical sense, its primary sense, as the mere {206} actualization of the real. Therefore, we are not dealing with any special actualization, as for example that of judgement, but of mere actualization regardless of its mode. Mere actualization does not exclude any special actualization, but neither can it be identified with any. Method is the way from an actualization of the real (the field actualization) to another actualization of it, actualization in the world; and it formally consists in going from one to the other by actualizing the real from its first actualization towards the second. And this process is inquiring intellection *qua* intellection; it is a going by intellectual knowing. Anticipating an idea which I shall expound forthwith, I will say that knowledge starts from an actualization of the real in primordial sentient apprehension, and terminates in an actualization in a physical trial or test, i.e., a sentient trial or test of reality. The road which runs from the first to the second is just that of inquiring reason, and *qua* road, it is method. Method, I repeat, is an inquiring actualization of reality.

Despite the inconvenience, it was essential to repeat

this because the idea of method lends itself to serious confusion. Generally one understands by ‘method’ the path which leads from one truth to another, understanding by ‘truth’ a true judgement; therefore the method would be a reasoning process which goes from one true judgement to another. But to me this is untenable for three reasons.

a) In the first place, method is not the way from one truth to another but from an intellectually known, actualized reality to another actualization of it. Method is not the way of truth, but the way of reality. To be sure, we are dealing with actualized reality; but it is always reality. Therefore method as path is a path not in the truth of knowledge, but in reality. {207}

b) In the second place, the intellection which comes into play here is not a judgement. To be sure, actualized reality is a truth. But it is not the truth of a judgement. The intellection in which method consists is the intellection of the real as *real truth*, not as logical truth. In method there are judgements, clearly; but it is not judgement but real truth which determines the methodic character of intellection.

c) In the third place, the way, the method itself, does not consist in being a reasoning process. It is not the access of a true judgement to another true judgement, because what is sought is not another judgement but another actualization. The identification of method with reasoning—which has run throughout the last centuries in all works on logic—is in my view untenable. People have fallen into this trap on account of what at various times in this study I have called the “logification of intellection”. But it is impossible. To be sure, method is a way, and moreover is a way which must be followed; it is something to be pondered or reflected upon. But it is so in the etymological sense; it is a “pondering” and not a logical “discourse”. Logical discourse, the discourse of reasoning, is but a type of “pondering”. Moreover, reasoning as such is not method. Reason has its own laws, just as does the structure of judgement. But these structural laws are not method. Method, to be sure, must conform with the structural laws of logical intellection. But this conformity neither is nor can be a method which leads to knowledge, i.e., to a new actualization of the real. The laws of logic, logic as a whole, is the *organon* of knowledge, but it is not a *method*. And in order to understand this, it suffices to cite two cases in which normal logic is accustomed to identify method and reasoning, viz. deduction and induction. {208}

Deduction, we are told, is the method of some sciences, for example, mathematics. But in my view, this is

untenable, and not just because there is a special type of reasoning called “mathematical induction”,¹ but because deduction concerns the logical structure of *mathematical thinking*, but not the *actualization of the mathematical real*. For this, rigorous deductions are not enough; rather, it is necessary “to make” the deduction by operating, transforming, constructing, etc., “within mathematical reality”. Only this is mathematical method; logical deduction is not. Therefore deduction by itself is not method but logical structure, and furthermore is not the method of the mathematical. There is no deductive method; there are only deductive structures of judgements, in the present case, of mathematical judgements. Mathematical reasoning, deduction, is a logical structure, but not a mathematical method.

The other instance where there typically is confusion of method and reasoning is the reverse of the previous one. It consists in making induction into an inductive reasoning process. And this is impossible, not just in principle but also in fact. Never has construction of an inductive reasoning process been carried out. To do so, the first requirement is to devise what is usually called the ‘principle of induction’. And this, in fact, has never been done satisfactorily, not even by invoking probability theory to exclude random experimental errors. Therefore in fact no inductive reasoning process exists. On the other hand, induction exists as a strict and rigorous method. One starts from the real as actualized in facts and goes by repetition (in accordance with the Law of Large Numbers) from the experimental results to a general statement. This statement pronounces {209} the actualization of the ground. I leave aside whether the statement is or is not true. We shall consider that problem later. The only thing I wish to stress here is that the inductive method is a method, but not a reasoning process.

In mathematics we have a deductive type of reasoning which by itself is not a method; in induction we have a method which by itself is not a reasoning process.

This does not mean that in rational intellection there are no reasoning processes. There are and there must be necessarily, just as there are judgements. To pretend that the opposite is true would be, rather than an impossibility, something just stupid. But neither judgements nor reasoning processes are what formally constitute method. A reasoning process is a logical structure which method has to respect. But that is a question of logic. And logic by itself is never, nor does it pretend to be, the font of truth.

On the other hand, method is essentially—or at least pretends to be so—the font of truth, given that it moves in reality. Therefore a philosophy of intelligence is not a logical tract. Only logic is occupied with reasoning. The philosophy of intelligence is not, but is instead essentially occupied with method.

Method as a way is an intrinsic and formal moment of rational intellection. As such, it is always and only a way into reality, whether given reality or postulated reality.

With this we have clarified in some fashion our first point, viz. to be method is to be inquiring actualization *qua* inquiring; it is actualization as a way, a way of the ground of the field real. It is an intellective progression into reality, not a logical progression into truth. What is the structure of this method? That is the second point which I set forth.

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II

STRUCTURE OF THE METHOD

We will not discuss a particular method but rather study the structure of the methodic moment of rational intellection. This methodic moment is comprised of three essential steps.

1

System of Reference

Above all, in order for there to be knowledge it is not enough that there be a real object which one is going to know and someone to intellectually know it. No knowledge would be possible with just this. It is absolutely necessary that the intellection be brought to fruition by intellectually knowing the real object as a function of other real things which were previously intellectually known in the field, i.e., by referring that object to these real things. It is absolutely essential to understand this because it is a point which is usually passed over. No knowledge exists if one is not intellectually knowing through a system of reference. And with this we have the first step of all method: the establishment of a *system of reference*. It is necessary not just in fact, but as being something formally constitutive of method.

We already encountered something similar when we studied field intellection. To intellectually know what a

¹ [Mathematical induction is, in fact, a strictly deductive method of reasoning.—trans.]

real thing is in reality is something which cannot be done except by intellectually knowing the real thing “from” other things of the field. But the field “from” is not {211} identical to what I have here called ‘system of reference’. In both cases one deals with a “toward”, to be sure. And herein consists the similarity of the two “froms”. But their respective characters are radically different. In field intellection the “toward” is a “toward” between the things of the field, and therefore we intellectually know what one of those real things is in reality from or with respect to others in the field. In field intellection one intellectually knows what something “is in reality”; therefore it is ultimately an intellection of verification or substantiation. The “from” is a chain of substantiations of what the real thing “could be”. And if there is construction, it is always a construction of what would be substantiatable. On the other hand, in rational intellection one does not intellectually know what something “is in reality”, but that “by which something is really in reality itself, in the world”. Thus the things from which one intellectually knows this “by” are not a chain of substantiatable “could be’s” but just a system of reference from which one goes to what “could be”. The double meaning of the “toward” thus establishes a double mode of intellection: the intellection of what something is in field reality and the intellection of that by which something is real in the world, of what something is in universal reality itself. The first we intellectually know “from” a chain of substantiatable things; the second “from a mere system of reference”.

What is this system of reference? And What is its character?

Above all, the first question must be answered. We saw that rational intellection is based upon what was previously intellectually known, and this support is just the canonic principle of intellection. Now, this canonic principle is what constitutes the system of reference.

Naturally, this canonic principle is not, by itself, univocally determined. But it always has to {212} have something, and something determined by the field. And this is now the essential point. The principle can be and is quite varied; that we shall see forthwith. But its being a principle has a precise formal character, that of being determined in accordance with the field. Therefore it is ultimately the field itself, in its field totality, that constitutes the system of reference for intellection of the world. Now, the field is a principle by virtue of its moment of reality. The field reality is the system of reference for worldly reality insofar as that field reality is reality. And this is obvious, because field and world are not two strata numerically independent—the field, as I said, is the sensed world. Now the field, what is sensed of the world, is the

system of reference for the active intellection of the world. Therefore all the “naivete” of reason always reduces to the same thing: to thinking that the world is formally identical to what is sensed of it, to the field. The field would then be the formal structure of the world. And it is on this that naivete depends. The field is not by itself the structure of the world, but merely a system of reference. And it is so because the field is real. What happens is that it is only real in the field sense. And it is on account of its moment of reality that this field reality constitutes a principle of rational intellection. This field, as a system of reference, then has a moment upon which I wish to again insist. We are not dealing, in fact, with the field real giving us just an “idea” of what reality is. It does give us that, to be sure; but that is secondary (because it is derivative) for our problem. Nor are we dealing only with a “concept” of reality, because the field as a system of reference is not formally a concept of reality; rather it is the field “reality” itself in its own {213} physical nature of reality. It is the physical reality of the field which, *qua* physical, constitutes the system of reference for the intellection of that same reality, intellectually known in the worldly sense. That intellection is therefore an activity which intellectually moves in reality itself.

Granting this, what is the character of this system of reference? To be sure, it does not have representative character. It certainly involves a system of representations, because field things are already “present” and it is based upon them that we seek to present the ground. In this respect, and only in this one, they are a “representation” of this ground. But its formal function *qua* system of reference is not representative, because these representations do not present the ground by being representation; rather, they present it only “by” grounding the sensed thing, even if to do so they destroy all the content of the representation. The representation thus has a double function: representative and directional. Only this latter makes it a system of representation. The system of reference supplies representations, but the reference itself is not in the nature of a representative. This directional function has a very precise nature. It is what I previously called ‘grounding function’. The grounding function, the function of the “by”, has directional character, and moreover has nothing but directional character. The representations in fact can lead to a “by” which revokes the representation or even leaves all possible representative content in suspense. *Knowing is never representing.*

What is this directionality? And what is its cognitive status?

a) Rational intellection is, as we saw, an {214} ac-

tivity, activated by the real, but nonetheless activity. Therefore the “toward” of rational intellection is an active “toward”, which actively goes toward the in-depth. The system of reference consists only in the tracing out of the concrete direction of the “toward” of activity. Before I called what has been previously intellectually known ‘support’; now we see that support consists in being directional reference. Directionality is concreteness of the worldly “toward” of activity.

And this is essential. Knowledge is, above all, precision and exactitude, but it is a directional line. We are not dealing formally with precision and exactitude along the lines of concepts and expressions. It is quite possible that with concepts and expressions which are not univocally realized representatively, we still mark out a very precise direction. In such a case, those concepts and expressions are only partial indications of the in-depth reality, but according to a direction which is very precise in itself. That happens, for example, in quantum physics. The concepts of particle and wave are but partial representations of some aspect of the in-depth real. Their function lies in the fact that this partiality is inscribed in a precise direction *which goes beyond it*. Not just “complementarity”, as Bohr thought, it is “superceding”. The same could be said of other types of knowledge, for example the knowledge of personal realities and of living realities in general. The concepts and expressions of which we make use are but aspects within a direction which is very precisely determined not just toward what we seek to intellectually know, but includes the direction of what we already intellectually know.

b) Whence the cognitive state, so to speak, of rational intellection. Knowledge is not a system of {215} concepts, propositions, and expressions. That would be an absurd type of conceptualism, or rather logicism, which is ultimately just formal. Moreover it would be field intellection but not knowledge. Knowledge is not just what we know and what we say, but also, and in the first place, what we want to say. Language itself is not, for the effects of intellection, something merely representative. And I am not referring to the fact that language has another dimension than that by which it is the expression of what is intellectually known. This is obvious, and a triviality. What I am now saying is that precisely as expression of rational intellection, and within this intellection, language has, besides a possible representative function, a function which differs from the merely representative. Therefore the cognitive status of the system of reference is not to serve as an explicit intellection, but something different. Anticipating some ideas that will be expounded below, I will say that in rational intellection and

its expression, we are not trying to *make explicit* the realization of representations, but to *experience* a direction, to know if the direction taken is or is not of suitable precision. What the system of reference determines is not a making something explicit, but an experience. If that were not true, knowledge would never have its most valued characteristic: to be a discoverer, a creator.

Hence the error which, as I see it, most radically vitiates logical positivism.

In the first place, knowledge, i.e., rational intellection, is not a system of logically determined propositions. That would be at most—and not always—the structure of field intellection, but in no way the structure of rational intellection. Rational intellection, knowledge, is not formally field intellection but {216} worldly intellection. Positivism is only a conceptualization—and an incomplete one—of field intellection, but it is blind to worldly intellection, whose essential structural character is directionality. Knowledge is an intellection directed to the world from a system of reference. The formal structure of knowledge does not reduce to the formal structure of the *logoi*, but involves the essential moment of a directional reference. Statements with univocal meaning are not enough. Let us leave aside, for now, what logical positivism understands by ‘verifiable’.

In the second place, this direction is the direction of a progression. Inquiry pertains to the essence of knowledge. We are not dealing with a progression toward knowledge but with the fact that knowledge itself is intellectual progression; the progression is just its own mode of intellection. Positivism limits itself to the logical statements of this intellection. But those statements are only its logical expression; they do not constitute the formal structure of the knowledge which is intellectual progression.

In the third place, this progression is creative. Logical positivism is blind to this third, creative dimension of knowledge, because creating is not stating new propositions but discovering new directions of intellectual progression. It is for this reason that the cognitive status of rational intellection is not to be a “univocal” manifestation but a “fertile” direction toward the worldly real. This fertility is not a consequence of rational intellection but a formally structural moment of it.

To be sure, I believe that today philosophy, perhaps more than ever, must have conceptual precision and formal rigor. Modern philosophy is in this regard the source of a great deal of confusion which gives rise to erroneous {217} interpretations. I have strongly emphasized this:

the reconquest of exactitude and precision in concepts and expressions is necessary. But this does not in any sense mean that such analysis, which is the function of logic, is the structure of knowledge, because the world does not have a logical structure but rather a real respectivity. And only because of this is knowledge what it is: the progression toward the system of reality.

The inquiring activity of rational thinking makes its second essential step within this system or reality.

2

Formal Terminus of the Methodical Activity

What is the formal terminus of this methodical activity? We have already seen the answer: it is what a field thing “could be” in the world. The formal terminus of cognitive activity is the ground of the real as possibility. For the effects of rational intellection, the ambit of grounding, the world, is in the first place the ambit of the possibilities of the ground. The world is certainly reality, the respectivity itself of the real as real. But this reality, for the effects of knowledge, is only the ambit of intellection of the ground. And as intellection is actualization, it follows that the actuality of the world in intellection is actualization of all the possibilities of the ground. But this requires further clarification.

Consider the matter of possibilities. They are real possibilities, i.e., possibilities which are comprised as such in the intellection of the real world (not a redundancy). What are these real possibilities? Above all, they are {218} possibilities in the sense that they are that which the real perhaps “could be” in the worldly sense. That we have already seen. We are not dealing with a mere “might be” but with a “could be”, i.e., with a positive mode of the making possible of the real. The real is not just what it is, but is something modally real constituted from its own ground, based on its own, intrinsic, and formally real possibilities. As possibilities, they are in themselves something unreal; but the unreal, realized as a ground of reality, is the very possibility of the real, what intrinsically and formally is making it possible. The real is something essentially possibilitated. It is not that possibility is prior to reality, but that the mode of reality of the worldly is to be possibilitated real; possibility is only a mode of reality. Why? Because of its own insertion into the world. In this sense, possibility is not prior to the real, but a modal moment of its worldly respectivity. It is because of this that I speak of possibilitation rather than possibility.

But this possibilitation also has another essential aspect. Every intellective actualization is so of reality, but at the same time is intellective. Now, with respect to a rational intellection, the intellection itself is activity. Hence it follows that the possibility of the “could be” is at one and the same time the possibility of the “could be” of the real thing and the “could be” of the intellection. This intellection is an inquiring activity. Therefore, in this second aspect, the possibilities take on the character of what we call the ‘possibilities of my activity’, something completely different from my potencies and faculties. The system of reference, I said, is the concrete outline of the “toward”. Activity provisionally appropriates to itself some possibilities as possibilities of what a thing could be; and upon doing so, accepts a {219} concrete outline of its inquiring progression as a moment of its own activity. In the course of history, man not only has discovered what things are and could be in the worldly sense; but also the possibilities based upon which my intellection can take on a new form of rational intellection. We have intellective possibilities which the Greeks did not have. It is not just that they did not know many of the things we know, but that they were not able to know them as we can and in fact do know them. The two moments are different. With some intellections we intellectually know different possible grounds of a real thing. Conversely, there are possible grounds which cannot be intellectually known other than by illumination of new possibilities of intellection. The possible, as a formal moment of rational intellection, of knowledge, is at one and the same time what a thing could be (what its own ground is), and what my possibility of knowing is, not in the sense of being the terminus of an activity, but in the sense of being possibilities which this action formally has in itself as action. Possible is unitarily “the possible” and “the possibilities”.

How is this possible actualized? The unity of the two aspects is actualized in that structural moment of intellective activity which is the sketch or outline. Rational intellection intellectually knows what is possible (in its two aspects), referred to the system of reference. And this reference is what constitutes the *sketch*. To put it more radically, ‘sketch’ is the conversion of the field into a system of reference for the intellection of the possibility of the ground. The sensed possibility, *qua* sensed, is, as we saw, suggestion. The sensed possibility as system of reference is sketch. Naturally, every sketch is founded upon a suggestion. Nonetheless, suggestion and sketch are not identical. {220} Sentient intellection as such suggests. But sketch is suggested only if sentient intellection is in a state of activity. It is the moment of activity which distinguishes sketch from suggestion. Only a sentient intelli-

gence knows by sketch; the sketch is only for knowledge. Conversely, a sentient intelligence can only know by sketching. In our problem, sketching is an act which is purely and formally intellective, and this activity is a mode of intellection; it is intellection activated by the real itself. Consequently, we are not here dealing with a human activity “applied” to intellection, or anything like it. Activity is intellection activated by the real, and the sketch, as an act of this activity, is something formally intellective—indeed, it is the very intellection of the possible ground. The ground is only knowable to us by sketching, because the sketch is the concrete form of illumination of possibilities (real ones and of intellection). An activity that sketches is the only place where one can actualize reality as a possibility both real and of intellection. Sketching is a form of intellective knowing.

How does one sketch the actuality of the real in its possibility? The possibilities are not sketched other than by confronting the field real in intellective activity, i.e., intellectually knowing the field as real worldly object. The confronting is what on the one hand converts the real into something that can be grounded, i.e., it is what constitutes the real upon the base of its possibility. But there is something more. Possibility thus illuminated has its own content. This content *qua* possibility is always something constructed; it is *construction*. (I am not speaking of construction in the sense of group theory). The sketch of possibilities is always just a constructed sketch. No intellective possibility {221} as such is purely and simply given. It may be received if entrusted to us; that is the problem of history as transmission. But that is another question. What is here important to us is that what is entrusted is a construction. It could likewise be that the construction consists only in accepting as possibility the real which is encountered. But even in this case, clearly what is encountered is converted into a possibility, i.e., is something constructed; immediate construction if one wishes, but still construction. In this construction, each of its moments is a possibility. Therefore the construction is properly construction of a system of possibilities. The system of reference is for the construction of a system of possibilities. Each possibility is only making possible within a system together with the rest. We already saw this when dealing with possibility as formal terminus of rational intellection. The possibilities are not added together but rather “co-possibilitate”. And this “co-” is the system. Therefore every alteration of a possibility implies in principle, if not the alteration, then the reconsideration of the all the rest. The crisis of a possibility puts the entire system in crisis.

This system of possibilities is not univocally deter-

mined. Therefore its constitution is a *free construction*. All of its intrinsic limitations follow from this, limitations with respect to its capacity to lead to the sought-after ground. That capacity is “fecundity”. The system of possibilities, by virtue of being freely constructed, is of limited fecundity. But it has still another limitation: it is a system selected from among others. In virtue of this, the system is of limited “amplitude”. When the ground for a system of possibilities is known, this knowledge is limited in fecundity and amplitude. Hence its constitutive openness. {222} All knowledge, by virtue of being an intellection with a system of possibilities freely constructed from a system of reference, is an open knowledge, not just in fact and because of human, social, and historical limitations. Rather, it is open *qua* knowledge through intrinsic necessity, to wit, by being intellection as sketch. And this is a moment which is formally constitutive of rational intellection as such.

The second step of the method is the sketch of this system of possibilities from a system selected as the reference. But the method as a way seeks to lead to an end, viz. intellection of the ground of the real. This is the third step of method, the final step. The first is the establishment of a system of reference; the second is the sketching of possibilities; and the third is the intellection of the possibilitating ground of the real.

3

Method As Experience

How does one intellectually know the possibilitating ground of the real as worldly reality? When one intellectually knows this ground, the knowledge has reached its terminus. This is the problem of the access to what one seeks to know. Method is nothing if it does not lead to a real and effective access. Now, with the proviso that I shall explain myself further below, let me say that access is, formally, *experience*. Knowing begins with a system of reference from which one sketches a system of possibilities which permit one to experience what a thing is as worldly reality. To clarify this we need to conceptualize what experience is, what {223} one finds in experience (i.e., the experienced), and what is the mode of finding it. That is, we seek the concept of experience, the object of experience, and mode of experience.

A) *What is experience?* Experience is not a univocal concept. When we speak of experience, generally we think in terms of what is called ‘sensible experience’.

And this is extremely ambiguous, because the expression has different meanings, all completely acceptable for a language, but not identical in conceptualization either to “sensible” or to “experience”, as we shall see. What do we understand by ‘sensible’? And above all, What do we understand by ‘experience’?

A first meaning for ‘experience’, and one which is very general, is perception, *aísthesis*, i.e., sensing, and hence the sensed qualities. In this sense experience is opposed to what would be intellectual apprehension. The so-called ‘sensualism’ thus philosophically understands that experience is perception (external or internal, it matters little). To have an experience of something would be to perceive it. But this is absolutely unacceptable. If I may be permitted the expression, to experience is not to sense. And this is true in a very radical sense. In the first place, sensing does not only sense qualities but also that these qualities are real. We have not only an impression of green (strictly speaking it is impossible to only have the impression of green), but also the impression of green as real. Sensualism has seriously gone astray with respect to this matter. What is sensed in experience is not only a quality but also its formality of reality. Therefore human sensing is intellectual, since apprehending something as real is the formally constitutive part of intellection. Moreover, in the second place, not even understanding sensing as intellectual sensing is it acceptable to identify {224} experiencing and sensing. To be sure, without sensing there is no experience; but to sense is not formally to experience. In sensing, what is sensed is something fundamentally given. Now, what is experienced is not something given but something achieved—achieved certainly by sensing, but still achieved. The sensible is just the experiencible, but is not formally experienced. The moment of achievement is essential to experience. What does this moment mean?

One might think that experience consists in the experience of “one thing”, and not simply of some quality. It might be that this thing is a quality, but be that as it may, it might be the terminus of an experience only insofar as that quality is considered as a thing. Now, anything real, considered as a thing, even in the most stable of cases, is something variable and fleeting. Experience would not be just sensing, but that habitude of sensing something as fixed and stable. Sensing senses quality (I add, real quality), but experience might be a mode of sensing something “itself”. This is the concept of experience which Aristotle crafted and which he called *empeiría*. Aristotle thought that the constitutive moment of experience is the *mnéme*, retention; thus the reiteration of perception, the retained perception, would be experience.

But this is inadequate. Experience is not necessarily that which Aristotle called *empeiría*, because what is perceived and retained is not only the quality but, as I keep repeating, the formality of reality. Aristotle definitively separated the sensible and the intelligible, and therefore never conceptualized that intellectual sensing whose formal moment I have called ‘impression of reality’. Experience is not just empirical sameness. The *empeiría* is only {225} a mode of experience. And the proof is the fact that we speak of people who have much or little experience of a thing or situation. The sameness in question is hence not a mere empirical retention of qualities nor of a real quality; rather, what is retained must be just a real thing intellectually known (retentively if one wishes) as real, not in each of its perceptive phases, but as real in the worldly sense. The experiential moment is not, then, empirical retentiveness, but something different. What? That is the third concept of experience.

When we speak of not having experience or of having much or little experience of something, we are not referring to the diversity of perceptive acts of a thing, even if perceived as real; rather, we refer to that mode of apprehending it (including perceptively) which consists in intellectually knowing it in depth. The achievement which constitutes experience is an achievement of reaching this depth, not the moment of retentive sameness. By reaching this depth, the thing is actualized as worldly reality. Therefore, in order to know what experience is, we must say what reaching this depth is as a mode of intellectual actualization.

So we are dealing with an actualization, but not as mere actualization. That would be just sentient intellection, not experience. Something more than naked reality is needed; it is the real which actualizes what “really” is. Therefore, we actualize its reality as referred to other things which open an ambit within which the thing takes on its possible respect to these other things. And in order to intellectually know what we seek to intellectually know, the indicated things are those which outline, in intellection, the characteristics of that real thing. As such, this outline is thus something unreal in itself. Now, this unreal thing has to be {226} intellectually known as inserted in the real thing; only thus will it be the outline of it. And this insertion can have two different modalities.

a) The unreal can be inserted into the real by being actualized in the real as a realization. This is the realization of the unreal in the real. Intellection then consists in intellectually knowing what the real thing is in reality. To realize is to intellectually know the reality of the “could be”. It is in this realization that being a *manifestation* consists. It is the intellection of the real in the field sense.

b) But the unreal can be inserted and actualized in the real in a different way, by testing if it is inserted. This is not manifestation, i.e., it is not mere realization, but *testing*. We then intellectually know by testing what the real thing is in depth. What is this testing? It is not, formally, just an assay or experiment. It is something else.

In the first place, it is testing *of reality*. This reality is not naked reality nor a realization, but the reality of the thing as a moment of the world. Reality here is not of the field but of the world. It is not the realization of a “might be” but of a “could be”. Because of this, as we shall see, such realization is *testing*. Testing rests upon the “beyond”. It is something essentially different from a manifestation. What is in reality is manifested; what could be is tested.

In the second place, this is a *physical testing*. We are not dealing with a thought experiment, or anything of that nature. We are dealing with a “physical” testing. It is something not thought but carried out. It is “to do” the testing. And this exercise has an essential character. It is something carried out, but the carrying out itself is a mode of intellection of the real in its worldly character. *Qua* exercised, it is something physical, and *qua* intellectual it is intellection in a process of forging a way by carrying out the testing. This forging {227} of a way is that intellectual moment which we call *discernment*. Physical testing is, then, a discerning exercise.

In the third place, physically and of reality, testing is just that: testing. The real thing has been converted into a real object, has been actualized in an “ob”. That is, it is something like an obstacle raised up along the road toward the world. Method consists in traversing that road and going through the “ob”. And this is testing, viz. Going through the “ob” in order to open onto the world itself, upon the worldly reality of the real object. The “ob” is like a gate which must be cleared, and once cleared, situates us in the proper worldly orientation. Going through in Greek is denoted by *peirao*, and in Latin *perior* (which exists only in compounds). Whence derives the Spanish word *puerto*.² This going through the gate, in which testing consists, is therefore *ex-perior*, or “experience”. As that which is gone through is the “ob” of something in the field, i.e. the “ob” of something originally sensed, it follows that the testing itself as such is radically a *sentient discerning exercise*. Only a sentient reason can do this testing.

This moment of experience gathers together the two

moments which we have described previously: the moment of resting upon the in-depth real, and the moment of being something physical. In virtue of this I shall say that experience is *physical testing of reality*. Experience is not just sensing the real but sensing the real toward the in-depth. Experience is not just *empeiria*, nor is it a mere retentive fixing of sameness, but an outlining and physical fixing of in-depth reality. Experience as testing is the insertion of an outline or sketch into in-depth reality.

Here we have the essence of the methodic encounter with real: experience. It is paradoxical result. We started, {228} in fact, from the field which is the sensed world, sensed respectivity. And now we end up with a physical testing of reality, i.e., with an act of sentient reason. What is sensed, is it world or field? The question constitutes the paradox to which I earlier alluded. Now, as it deals with a discerning intellection, the question cannot be thus formulated. The field is not the formal structure of the world; that would be “naivete”. In rational intellection the world takes on the character of grounding the formal structure of the field. And this is just the opposite of naivete. The field is the world as sensed. Now, what we have achieved thus far is the sensed as world. In this initial progression we have gone from the field to the world. In the final direction we have come back from the world to the field once again. For this we have taken the round-about route via the unreal as sketch. This is the essence of experience: to intellectually know what is sensed as a moment of the world through the sketched “could be”.

What is it that we formally experience in experience?

B) *What is experienced as such*. Experience is based upon a real thing in accordance with its “could be”, and what is experienced is then what I have provisionally called ‘insertion’ or ‘realization’ of the “could be”, i.e., of something unreal, in the field real. This insertion has a precise cognitive character, because we are not dealing only with experience as a testing activity of mine, but above all—and in the first place—with the fact that in this insertion the real is actualized. Now, what is actualized of the real is just the “could be” as its ground. And the “could be” as ground of the real is only a form of what we call ‘for’ or ‘by’. And this ‘for’ in the form of “what for” is the formal object of knowledge. We already said that {229} this formal terminus is the “could be”. But to state it now with greater precision, the formal object of knowledge is the “could be” inserted or realized in the real, i.e., the “could be” as inserted into a “for”. This is what, rigorously, constitutes the terminus of experience; it is the experienced as such. In order to rigorously conceptualize

² [Spanish for ‘gate’.— trans.]

it, we must clarify two points: what the “for” is in itself, and how the “for” is experienced. I already expounded all this at the beginning of Part II of the book; let us review some of those ideas.

a) *What is the “for”?* To properly conceptualize it, let us recall once again that rational intellection is referentially grounded in the real as intellectually known in the field manner. And the field real is what sends us beyond itself. This sending is what, together certainly with correctness, but with greater rigor, we call “giving us pause to think”. We have already seen that the real not only is “given” as real in sentient intellection, but that this “given from” the real is given to us together with the “given for” thinking; the intrinsic unity of these two “givings” is just the “giving us pause to think”. The real, by being real, is what gives us pause to think. And it gives us pause to think, as we said, because reality is intrinsically open, i.e., it gives us pause to think, it sends us because it is open. Therefore it is necessary, above all, to conceptualize in what that moment of openness of the real consists, understood in the field manner, in accordance with which the real is inexorably giving us to think. What is it in the real, intellectually known in the field manner, which formally gives us to think?

When the real is apprehended sentiently in a field, it is among other real things of this field. And in this apprehension we apprehend what each of them is from others. To be “in reality”, we said, is the {230} intrinsic and formal unity of the individual moment and of the field moment of the formality of the real. Now, this unity constitutes what I have called *functionality of the real*. Its expression is the “for”. Fieldness is not some summation of field things, but the fact that the field itself is formally functional rather than additive. A thing is certainly real in and by itself, but it is “in reality” what it is only as a function of others. Naturally I am not thereby referring to the notes which the real has, but to its reality. The real, by virtue of being field reality, is only real as a function of the other field things. Here the term ‘functionality’ is taken in its widest sense, and therefore with no allusion to the many diverse types of functionality which may emerge.

Every real thing actualizes its reality in the field manner as a function of other real things. Nothing is actualized in the field manner in a way which is so to speak monolithic; it is actualized only together with other things, after them, outside of them, on the periphery of the field, etc. And all of these determinations constitute so many modes of functionality. That the thing is in a field is, then, a radical characteristic of its functionality. Con-

versely, functionality is formally a mode of inclusion in fieldness. Now, it is not a functionality which is primarily concerned with the content of the notes of the real, but their proper actualization as real. It is the functionality of the field real *qua* real. Functionality is fieldness itself as a determining moment of the individual part of each reality. “Among” is the expression of fieldness. This fieldness, by virtue of its exceeding, *encompasses* various real things; but prior to this and for it the field *includes* each one of them, {231} so that one has an aspect of constitutive functionality. For determining a field, the real determining thing itself, upon determining the field, is included in it. Functionality is then fieldness itself not as encompassing but as including.

Therefore functionality does not consist in one thing depending upon others, but is rather the structure of the whole field precisely and formally because it is a structural moment of each of the things in it. In virtue of this, functionality does not consist in *A* depending upon *B*; rather, what is functional is the field unity of *A* and *B* as reality. The field reality itself is with respect to *A* reality of functional character.

This functional field actualization is given in the unity of all the modes of sensed reality. But said functionality is only intellectually known in and by itself in that field moment which is the “toward”. Functionality by itself is actualized as a “toward”, i.e., is actualized in each thing in its “toward” reality. Field things are functional in the “toward”. The actualization of this functional aspect is what I call “for”.

b) *This “for” is strictly experiential.* To see this it suffices to recall some points from what has already been said.

aa) Human sensing is an intellectual sensing, and therefore what we men sense are all sensible qualities, but in their formality of reality. Sensing, for the purposes of a philosophy of intelligence, is above all *impression of reality*. Reality, then, is not something conceived or inferred, etc., but something impressively given in strict formality; it is the *de suyo*, the given. And it is given “physically”. Every subsequent intellection which is physically given moves physically in this physical reality. {232}

bb) Now, when this reality is actualized in the field manner, the real presents that moment which is functionality. Functionality, I repeat, does not consist in a real thing referencing another; it is rather an intrinsic moment of the impression of reality. Functionality, in fact, is the inclusion of the real in its field, impressively determined. And this field is “its own” [*suyo*], i.e., it belongs to the

real *de suyo* in its own formality. Functionality is thus a field moment given in the impression of reality. This *datum* is given just as a formal moment of it. We are not, then, dealing with an inference or anything of the sort (as I already pointed out); rather, it is an immediate *datum* and one formally given in the very impression of reality.

cc) To this impression of reality there corresponds that mode of presence of the real which is the “toward”. The “toward” is not a relation but a mode of presenting the real as real. The impression of reality is an impression of reality in all its modes, therefore including the mode of the “toward”. Hence intellection of something in the “toward” is not a judgement, be it analytical (Leibniz) or synthetic (Hume, Kant), because the “toward” is not a conceptual moment but a sensed “toward”. It is a structural moment of the very impression of reality. Now, the “for” is the formal structure of fieldness and corresponds to the field (as I have already said), not by reason of the content of things which it encompasses, but precisely on account of the formality of reality, viz. the structure of the field of reality *qua* reality. Whence the “for” points not only toward other field things, but toward reality itself *qua* reality, i.e., it points to the world. Its pointing to the world is thus something given in the impression of reality in its mode of “toward”. {233}

To preclude a possible erroneous interpretation I should add a few words. I said that the “toward” is above all a mode of the intra-field real, but that at the same time it is a mode of the whole field *qua* field. One might think that this second mode consists in every impression pointing to something which produces it. But this is quite far from what I have been saying, because that presumed pointing is not a pointing toward something which produces the impression, but is rather the *formal moment of otherness* which is intrinsically constituent of the impression itself as such. And it is this otherness which is intrinsically and formally an intra-field otherness and a worldly otherness. The world is not sensed as the cause of my impressions, but as worldliness of the impressive otherness of the real as real.

dd) Now, the functionality in the “toward”, as I said, is precisely and formally the “for”. The “for” as such is something formally sensed. It is not, as I said immediately and quickly returned to, a judgement, but something prior to any judgement. Moreover, every judgement about the real in the “toward” is only possible by being inscribed in the “toward” itself.

This apprehension of the “for” is not a reasoning process, be it formal or transcendental. It is merely analysis of sentient intellection itself. In virtue of that, we said,

the “for” is experientially accessible because it is formally the impressive way of the “toward”.

ee) What happens is that sensing by itself is not experience. What is sensed is by its own nature experiential. In what does the experiential of the “for”, already sensed, consist? The “for” is sensed; in other words, it is not only accessible but is already physically accepted in intellection. But this “for” has a complex structure. {234} That the “for” is formally sensed does not mean that its diverse structural moments are sensed equally. The “for”, in fact, is a determination of that which is real in the field manner. The field real is a sensed “what” which sends us beyond the field, i.e., beyond its own field “what”, toward a worldly “what”. There are, then, two “what”s: the “what” of the real field thing, and the worldly “what” in itself. The first “what” is sensed in the field manner; but the second “what” is not sensed, so to speak, but is a “what” created in a free construction, a “what”, therefore, which is sought in what “could be”. These two “what”s have an intrinsic unity: the unity of the “for”. The second “what” is that by which the first is what it is, i.e., is its “what for?” The expression “what for?” has an internal ambiguity. It is on the one hand something toward which we are sent by the field “what”; it is on the other that by which the field “what” is what it is. It is owing to this second aspect alone that the “what for?” should apply. Hence the “for” is something inexorably given in its “toward” form. On the other hand it is a “for” which inexorably moves in worldly reality. Born of reality *qua* field, the rational “what for?” is determined, with respect to “for”, by the coercive force of in-depth reality. Reality coercively imposes that there be a “for”, whose worldly or in-depth terminus, the worldly “what”, is freely intellectually known. The actualization of this force of imposition in freedom is just what I have called so many times the ‘insertion of the unreal, of the “could be”, into the real. The “for” bears us from field reality to worldly reality, and makes us revert toward field reality in a free “what”; this is just “experience”. The “what” is sensed, but not {235} by virtue of this is the “what” itself experiential; the worldly “what” is not sensed; but as it points us coercively toward the sensed, it is experienced. This pointing is the testing of the worldly “what for?” in the field “what”. The testing consists in trying to make of the world something formally sensed, i.e., in intellectually knowing the world as sensed. The necessity of a “what for” or “why” is something sensed: it is the “for”. But the “what” is in that “what for” something created. The coercive reversion from in-depth reality toward field reality is experience, testing.

Hence it is that the “what for?” is strictly experien-

tiable. The worldly “what” arises from the sensed “for”, and is inscribed in that sense along the lines of the “for”. What is not given is what this “what for?” is. That there should be a “what for?” is by no means a logical necessity; rather, it is something real, given sentiently. And in this given “for”, the free creation of rational intellection in the form of experience, of physical testing of reality, comes into play. It is, as I said, the experience of the insertion of the worldly “what” into the “for”. Testing is to test how the world fits into the field. It is testing of field reality from the standpoint of in-depth or worldly reality.

This experience of the “what for” has, then, a complex structure in virtue of the distinction between its two moments: the moment of the “what” and the moment of the “for”. Therefore, when one affirms that the object of knowledge is the “what for”, one states something not univocal but ambiguous. This has given rise to philosophical conceptualizations which as I see it are inadequate, if not completely false. That is what I now wish to explain summarily.

B) *The experienced “what for?” as object of knowledge.* To know something, we said, is to have an intellection of {236} what something is for, i.e., why it is what it is and how it is. What is this “what for?” We answered the question some pages back. But if we return to formulate the question again, it is because philosophy has conceptualized the “what for?”, the object of knowledge, in a way which as I see it is incorrect, and which has had profound repercussions. In order to clarify what I think on this subject, it will suffice to recall quickly what has been explained here in order to contrast it with these other conceptualizations.

For Aristotle, the “what for?” or why of something is its cause. To know something, he tells us, is to know its cause or causes. The “what for?” is, then, formally causality. Cause is all that which exercises a productive or originating influence of the so-called ‘effect’, not only efficient but also material, formal, and final; or viewed from the standpoint of the effect, it is a characteristic in accordance with which the effect is something really produced by its cause. Causality is, then, originating production. This causal order is, for Aristotle, something given in our sensorial apprehensions. The object of knowledge would then consist in going back from given causes to higher causes via a reasoning process.

With Hume, modern philosophy initiated a thoroughgoing critique of this conception. Causality, Hume tells us, is never given to us; neither is the influence by which the pulling of the rope produces the ringing of the bell. Causality is not given; only mere succession of

events. Therefore any attempt to achieve strict knowledge moves in a vacuum. That, as Kant would say, is skepticism. Kant accepts this critique, but contrasts it with the *Faktum* of science, which lives on causes. And as causality is not given, it follows that for Kant, causality is only our mode of constituting an object as the terminus of universal and necessary judgements. {237} Causality is not something given, but something produced by the understanding in the order of knowing, in order for us to know. Causality is not a mode of producing things, but a mode of judging objectively about them. This is the dawn of all transcendental idealism.

But as I see it, this entire discussion rests upon two fundamental ideas, to wit, that the “what for” or “why” is causality, and that causality is not given in our sentient apprehensions. Now, both of these ideas are ultimately false.

Above all, the “what for” or “why” is not causality; it is functionality. And functionality, as we have already seen, is not dependence of one thing upon another, but the very structure of the field of reality. The “what for” is not an originating or productive influence; it is only the mode by which something is really what it is. At most, causality would be a mode of functionality; that is not our problem. But it is not the only mode, nor even the primary one, because functionality is not causal dependence. If I say that in a gas, the product of the volume and pressure equals the temperature multiplied by a constant, this does not mean that volume, pressure, and temperature are linked as causes. What, in this case, would the causes be? The question does not make sense. The only thing affirmed here is the functionality of the three terms. And this functionality includes the three at once. We are not dealing with a case of one term dependent upon another, but functionality as field structure. And physical laws are primarily laws of functionality. In the example cited, we have Gay-Lussac’s law. Science does not have causes as its object but functional “what for”s or “why”s. The “what for?” or “why?” is not, then, necessarily causality. {238} It is formally worldly functionality, i.e., the functionality of the real *qua* real. As I see it, in this problem it is necessary to replace the notion of cause by the more general notion of functionality of the real *qua* real.

This is all the more so given that the Aristotelian notion of cause is somewhat restricted. Permit me to explain. Aristotle understood by ‘cause’ that which produces a distinct entity. When he wishes to explain the causality of a cause he introduces the now classic distinction of the four causes: efficient, final, material, and formal. Now if, from this point of view, we consider as an example the counsel which one person gives another, it is not clear into

which of these four types of cause this case falls. It seems clear to us that a shove, however modest, falls under efficient causality. But on the other hand, if we try to apply the idea of the four causes to an act of advising a friend, we are struck by grave doubts about the possible type of causality of the advice. This points up the fact that Aristotle's celebrated theory of causality is strictly formed around "natural" realities. Aristotle's causality is a theory of *natural causality*. As I see it, one must rigorously introduce a theory of *personal causality*, next to Aristotle's natural causality. I emphasized this point most recently in my course given at the Gregorian University in 1973. Personal causality is of a very different kind than natural causality. Thus the two type of causality are not univocal but at best analogous. In virtue of this it is necessary to introduce a theory of causality which is both natural and personal, within a broader conception, that of the functionality of the real *qua* real. Because of this I pointed out in {239} Part II that one cannot metaphysically refute occasionalism, but I left aside the question of human actions. The fact of the matter is that the personal type of causality, even though very in-depth, does not enter into natural causality. The distinction between agent, actor, and author of human actions does not figure in the Aristotelian theory of causality. To be the author of an action is not just to produce it, and no more. It is more, much, much more than some occasionalist functionality. But it is not, on account of this, a strict cause in the Aristotelian sense; it is, strictly speaking, something quite above all Aristotelian causality.

Moreover, is it true that the "what for" or "why" is not given in this sensible apprehension? This is the second of the two fundamental ideas which it is necessary to examine in this problem. Since Aristotle, philosophy has understood that sensing, as a mode of apprehension of things, is comprised of impressions in which what is apprehended is only the so-called 'sensible qualities'. Now, as I see it, this is not correct. The senses sense qualities, but they sense them as real, and therefore as functional in the impression of reality.

Granting this, the conceptions of Hume and Kant turn out to be false from the start.

Hume thinks that the "what for" or "why" is causality, and that causality is never given in sensible apprehension. But this is quite ambiguous, because sensible apprehension is not just apprehension of quality but apprehension of a mode of reality, of formality, i.e., it is an act of sentient intellection. And one of the modes given in impression is the mode of reality as "toward". Now, in this mode we are given, as we have seen, functionality. In

virtue of this, the functionality of the field real is given in intellectual sensing. The "succession" to which Hume appeals is not {240} the succession of two impressions, but an impression of successive reality. Therefore the succession is already a mode of functionality. Now, functionality in its worldly "toward" is just the "for". The "for" is then something given. What is never given, and which must be sought—almost invariably with little success—is the "what" of that by which the field and its contents is as it is. But the "for" as such is given in human sensing, in the impression of reality. All of Hume's critique, I repeat, is based upon the idea of sensing as mere apprehension of qualities. And this is wrong: sensing is "also" impression of reality. In virtue of this, there is no sensing "and" intelligence, but only sentient intelligence. Therefore Hume's critique is radically false, as false as Aristotle's conception of the matter. Aristotelian causality is not given; neither is any originating influence. But what is given, and formally so, is the functionality of the real *qua* real. To summarize: (1) The object of knowledge is not causes but "what for"s or "why"s; (2) They are "what for"s insofar as they are "for"; and (3) this "for" does not concern knowledge but sensed reality *qua* actualized in sentient intellection.

This same idea comprises the introduction to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Causality, he tells us, is not given in any sensorial impression; in virtue of this, it is above all a synthesis of impressions. But it is a synthesis whose function is to make objective knowledge possible, i.e., the universal and necessary judgement, and in this sense causality constitutes an *a priori* of knowing. It is, as Kant says, a synthetic *a priori* judgement. Now, this is untenable for the same reason as Hume's critique: at bottom there is the absence of the idea of sentient intelligence. What is sensed is never a mere sensible quality, but the sensible quality {241} in its reality in impression; and to this impression of reality there pertains, intrinsically and formally, its functionality. One of those modes of impression of reality is the "toward". The "toward" is a sensed mode. This mode is not, therefore, a synthesis, but rather pertains to the very structure of the formality of reality in impression. It is a moment of sensing itself, in each quality. In virtue of it functionality is a sensed moment and one given in each impression. Each real sensed quality is sensed in and by itself as something functional. Sensed functionality is not synthesis but the structural respectivity of each quality by virtue of being real. Hence functionality is not something which primarily concerns objective judgement; rather, it pertains to sensing itself, to the impression of reality. As such, it is not something *a priori* of the logical apprehension of objects, but a mo-

ment given in the sentient impression of reality. Causality is not the formal object of knowledge, only functionality is so. And as such, it is not a synthetic *a priori* judgement, because it is not a judgement at all (rather it is the sensed “toward”); nor is it synthetic (the “toward” is not synthesis but a mode of reality); nor is it *a priori* (but something “given” in the impression of reality). It is the functionality of the real, *qua* real, given in the impression of reality.

In summary, the object of knowledge is the “what for” or “why” experienced as “for”, i.e., worldly functionality. And this “for” is something given sentiently in the impression of reality *qua* “for”. What is sought is the “what” of the “for”. And this is just the problem of science. Science does not comprise a system of judgements but is the experience of the worldly “what” as such.

We have then examined what experience is, and what is the {242} corresponding experienced object. Let us now investigate the third question which I enuntiated: the modes of experience.

C) *Modes of experience*. We have seen that experience is not mere sensing, either as sensible perception or as *empeiria*; rather, it is that same sensing but insofar as in it the testing of the freely constructed “could be” is brought about. It is ultimately the testing of a “could be” in a “for”. And this experience, thus conceived, is what may have different modes; they are modes of testing. We are not now trying to determine what these modes are, but to conceptualize in what this modalization as such consists.

Now, experience is the terminal moment of method. Method, as we saw, has three phases: establishment of a system of reference, sketching of possibilities, and experience. This experience has different modes, i.e., there are different modes of physical testing of reality. And as testing is always a function of the system of reference and of the possibilities of the “could be” which we are sketching out, it follows that the modes of experience, as modes of testing, comprise the diversity of methods as such. Therefore I shall treat of the *modes of experience* as *modalizations* of method, i.e., as modalizations of the way of access from field reality *qua* reality to in-depth reality.

The first moment of the method is the establishment of the system of reference. This system of reference is the field of reality. And this field, as we have already seen, is not just a field of real perceived qualities, but of perceived realities in all of their fullness, whether or not they are elemental qualities. These realities are of different categorial natures as much for what concerns the categories of reality {243} as for what concerns the categories of their

intellective actualization. Field intellection not only intellectually knows reality actualized “in” sentient intellection, but also the “re”-actualization in the form of a judgement. For its part, the actualized real in these two forms has its own categories of reality. As I said, the categories of thing, person, life, societal living, historical unfolding, etc., are not the same. The categorial nature of the field of reality is quite rich. It is not constituted by a unique category but by a great categorial diversity within its actualization as well as its reality. And in accordance with each category, things are present in all of their great variety.

Reality, actualized categorially according to an “in” and according to a “re-”, is projected upon the base of the worldly ground, and then acquires the character of an “ob”. The “ob” is not separation but rather a pointing to the ground. And as the categories of reality of field things are quite varied, it follows that the formal character of the “ob” is equally quite varied. The objectuality of a thing is not the same as the objectuality of a person, of a life, etc. There are many modes of being an object because there are many modes of actualization of the real in an “ob”. Hence, wherever one looks, the field of reality is multi-form. And as this field is just the system of reference of what is actualized in the “ob”, it follows that by its own nature the system of reference is not univocal but constitutively plural. The system of reference is determined ultimately by the nature of the “ob”, by the mode in which the field real is object. And this mode is what makes of field reality a canonical principle. The determination of a canonic principle is constitutively modal. Hence the {244} establishment of the system of reference is inexorably modalized. Each type of reality and of actualization constitutes a possible mode of referential system. In its very root, then, method is formally modalized. And these different modalities constitute an ambit of free choice. Depending on whether one adopts one or another reference system, the road embarked upon, the *meta* of the *methodos*, will always be a “way”, an opening of a path, but of a different “mode”. And this is essential. It is not the same to have “things” as a system of reference as to have “persons”, or other types of field reality. The knowledge of the whole field as a worldly moment will be completely different in the two cases. Ultimately, each type of knowledge, as we have already said, has its own categories and its own ways. This diversity of modes of actualization, I say, is the terminus of free choice. Only by a free choice do some field things take on the character of canonic principle. The modalization of objectuality grounds, by free choice, the modalization of the canonic principle constituting the system of reference.

But modalization also affects the other two moments of method, the sketching of possibilities, and the physical testing of reality.

The second moment of method, in fact, is the sketching of possibilities. A sketch is, as we have already seen, the conversion of the field of the real into a system of reference in order to intellectually know sentiently and actively the “could be” of the ground of the field. Clearly, every sketch is based upon sentient intellection of possibility, i.e., is based upon a suggestion. But a suggestion is a sketch only when it is the suggestion of activity of sentient intellection. And this activity of sketching is the free construction of real possibilities, {245} of the “could be”. Only as a system of possibilities sketched out based upon a system of reference can we intellectually know the field real as a moment of the world. Now, the system of reference is just that: a system of reference. The sketch constructed upon this reference, by being a free construction, can therefore have quite different modal characteristics. Above all it can be a sketch of possibilities *in conformity* with what is already determined in field intellection by its own representative content. For example, it may be a system of bodies linked by the laws of Newtonian mechanics, or a system of vital forces, or a system of personal agents, etc. But it is not necessary that this always be the character of the sketch. I can, in fact, sketch a system of possibilities not in conformity with field reality but in fact contrary to it, e.g. a system of particles which are mechanically indeterminate, or a system of persons that is “fatally” determined. Then the sketch has not the character of conformity, but a character of *contrariety* with respect to the system of reference. Between the two modes one finds the extremely rich gamut of sketches which are not contrary to field reality, but merely *diverse* with respect to it. This diversity in turn can have the character of *mere difference* within the plane of possibilities offered in the system of reference, as for example when it was initially thought that in wave mechanics one was dealing with a classical wave equation. But the diversity can also have the character of *going beyond* the possibilities of the system of reference, for example when Einstein defined his law by means of the proportionality of Ricci’s tensor and of mass-energy, which went beyond the difference between classical gravity and inertia. Ultimately, this is what takes place in {246} quantum mechanics, whose equations go beyond the difference between wave and particle. Whether one deals with conformity, contrariety, or diversity (differential or a going beyond), the sketch has thereby acquired an essentially modal character. The modalization of objectualization inexorably implies this modalization of the sketch of possibilities. Each mode of

objectualization opens different modalities of sketching. And as the objectualization is in itself something modal, it follows that the method acquires, in its second phase, a modalization of second degree, so to speak.

Hence it follows that the third moment of method, the physical testing of reality, i.e., the experience of the “for”, is essentially modal. It is a modalization of third degree. We are not dealing with different ways of making experiences within the categorial, but the different modes of experiential intellection of the real in its sketch. These modes depend upon the two modalities which we have examined: the modalization of objectuality (the different modes of the “ob”) and the modalization of the sketch itself (the different modes of the “could be”).

The physical testing of reality, i.e., experience, is very different in the modal sense. There are sketches of possibilities which in a certain way come to mind. And at that point, the physical testing of reality has a quite precise modal character. Every method is the “way” [*via*] from the field in “ob” toward what, in the worldly sense, “could be”. Now, when we say that this “could be” comes to mind, it is something which we encounter when we objectualize the field in “ob”; this is the *ob-vivus*. Many of the great rational intellections have been accomplished with this modal character of being obvious. Thus, it was obvious that field reality was worldly and obeyed Newton’s laws. {247} ‘Obvious’ means something that jumps out at us. Therefore it does not lose its character of obviousness. It was so obvious that atoms were regulated by Newtonian mechanics that no one was able to think otherwise about it. It would only have appeared as something ‘obvious’ had someone cast doubt upon it. And until the third decade of this century, no one did. Only at that moment did it seem that this fact was obvious, but nothing more than obvious.

Obviousness is a mode of experientiation. But there are other quite different modalities. All of them have the common characteristic of not being obvious. The “ob” does not always simply lead us to the terminus of the path [*via*]; rather, it generally only opens to us a difficult road toward it. The “ob” is presented as something successively more difficult to pass; it is not the *obvious* but the *difficult*. The difficult is not obvious, it is just viable. And precisely in order to probe this viability, we resort to an experience, a physical testing of a rich and complex reality. The *viability* is, with respect to the obviousness, the second great modal difference of experience.

This experience of the viable can assume different modes in turn:

a) Above all, the field real can be physically tested in

a way which consists in forcing it to show its in-depth nature to the one experiencing. The physical testing of reality then consists in what we call an *experiment*. Not every experience is an experiment, but experiment is always the first mode (first in my exposition) of experience. What is an experiment? An experiment rests in principle upon the whole of the field real. This field reality comprises not only “things” (in the inanimate sense), but also living beings (regardless of their real nature), and even men. I can experiment with {248} everything in the field, i.e., I can force everything in the field to show me its reality. The experiment has three essential moments. It is in the first place a provocation of reality. In the second, it is a provocation from a sketch of possibilities. And finally, it is a sketched out provocation, but as a mode of intellection. However natural this third moment seems, it is necessary to stress it because the first two moments might lead one to think that an experiment consists in a manipulation of reality. This manipulation exists, but experiment does not consist in that. The experiment consists in intellectually knowing, in a manipulative way, the real. This intellection is not added to the manipulation; rather, the manipulation itself is a mode of intellection. Hence the concepts elaborated in this intellection are, as I have already said, formally experimental concepts or formally conceptual experiments. Therefore experimentation does not formally consist in a manipulation, but in a mode of intellectually knowing the real in a manipulative way. It is intellection in manipulation, not intellection of what is manipulated. Hence the discontinuity between observation and experimentation, which is so often stressed, disappears. To be sure, I cannot manipulate the stars, but I can study them experientially from a sketch of intellection possibilities. And in this formally intellectual sense, every observation is an experiment. The observation is not a passive registering of events. Therefore—and in this merely intellectual sense—what is experimented upon in an experiment is something “made intelligible”. It is a thing “made” or *factum* in a double sense: in the participial sense (of being something which is the terminus of a making or doing) and in the nominal sense (of being a fact as actuation of the real). The formal object of this element is therefore a “fact”. {249} There is *no* experimental fact which is disconnected from the intervention of the experimenter; every experiment is a provocation of the real. What happens is that this intervention can assume different modal characteristics in turn. It can be an intervention which forces reality to show itself such as it is with complete independence from our intervention: this is the “fact” of classical physics. But it can happen that the very intervention of the experimenter pertains to the content of the fact. In such case the fact is real, there is no

doubt of it, but it is not totally independent of the experiment itself; this is the case, for example, with the experiments of quantum mechanics. We are not dealing with intervention of a *knowing* subject (*qua* knowing) into known reality, as Heisenberg thought, but with an intervention of the experimental “manipulation” in the content of what is experimented; it is a manipulating intervention. The fact is actualized in sentient intellection although it may not be independent of the manipulation. In any case, the experiment is an experience of reality as fact in the sense already explained. And these facts can be not just physical but also biological or human; I can experiment with men or with living beings.

b) There is another mode of experience which consists, not in making a thing show us its own nature by some provocation of ours, but in the attempt to be present, so to speak, at the vision of the real achieved *based on its own interiority*. To be sure, the merely material reality of an atom or molecule is not viable in this form; but it is something possible and real when dealing with living realities and above all human realities. This being present is grounded upon an installation of the one experiencing in {250} the experiential; it is what I call *compenetration*. Life in general, and above all human life, is subject to the physical testing of reality, not just as an experimental fact, but as reality in compenetration. Naturally we are not dealing with some physical penetration, but of being compenetrated with what makes one experience. It is what is expressed upon saying, for example, that someone sees through the eyes of another. It is a type of *perikhoresis*, not of reality but of the modes of actuating, and of conducting oneself. It is a difficult operation; one always runs the risk of projecting the nature of the one experiencing upon what is experienced. But be that as it may, this is an authentic mode of rational intellection, an authentic mode of physical testing of reality. Compenetration is a rigorous mode of experience. To be sure it is not experiment; but without excluding experiment, compenetration actualizes, in a worldly way, the real in the intellection of the one experiencing. There is no better knowledge of a person than that which is achieved by being compenetrated with him. And this extends to all of the dimensions of human life. Moreover, it extends to merely animal life and up to a certain point, to vegetable life as well. When all is said and done, we describe the life of an animal by realizing with some difficulty the experience of compenetrating with it given the limits of its biological constitution. I said that this extends to all dimensions of human life. Thus, for example, leaving aside the problem of its truth, there is, as a mode of physical testing of reality, a strict historical experience. For an

Israelite of the first century before Christ, everything which happened to his people was but a series of episodes of an historical experience of Yahweh's alliance with Israel, to the point that, as is well known, it was the unique way which led Israel to the idea of Yahweh as creator of the world. {251} This is the Pentateuch. Compenetration here adopts the form of a great historical experience. In it, to be sure, one does not experience Yahweh in Himself, but one knows what Yahweh is in His people by being compenetrated with Him. Israel is not only the people in whose history the prodigious actions of Yahweh have taken place, but a people whose whole history, even in the commonest happenings and day-to-day events, formally consists in being the historical experience of Yahweh. The same can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of sociological knowledge.

c) There is still another type of physical testing of reality. There are, in fact, postulated realities. These realities have not been postulated by some simple occurrence, but by the suggestion of field reality. Mathematical reality is not a part or moment of field reality; it has nothing to do with this latter by virtue of its content. But this new reality, *qua* reality, would not be postulated if reason did not already move in field reality *qua* reality. It is this physical reality *qua* reality which constitutes that about which the content is postulated. Therefore what is postulated is not postulated about truth, but about the content of reality in postulation. Here, field reality *qua* reality is a system of reference by which reality itself has a content independent of its field content. And this independence is just a referential mode, the mode of my referring to field reality "independently". This independence compels us to sketch a free system of postulates or axioms (I need not now discuss the difference between them). These postulates are then the postulated determination of the content of reality, a reality numerically identical with field reality *qua* reality. They constitute, by postulation, the {252} sketch of the content of the new reality. We are not talking about truths which I state freely, but of real characteristics which I sketch freely. Postulation is a mode of realization of content, not a mode of affirmation. In virtue of this, when I logically deduce necessary consequences (including necessary and sufficient consequences) from these postulates, the conclusion has two essentially different moments. To be sure, they are inseparable up to a certain point (I shall forthwith tell what that point is), but they are never formally identical. The first moment is the only one which is generally designated clearly because it is of greater apparent relief; this is the moment by which the affirmation is a necessary conclusion from the axioms, from what has been postulated. But it is not the

only moment; there is another. And it is essential to point out that other moment forcefully. When I say, in the conclusion of an argument, that *A* is *B*, I do not simply pronounce the truth of my affirmation, but a real property of the mathematical object. If one wishes to speak of "seeing", I see in the conclusion not only that I have to necessarily affirm that *A* is *B*, but that I see that *A* "is really" *B* with necessity. This moment is not simply a moment of truthful intellection, but of apprehensive intellection of mathematical reality as such. What happens is that I see this reality as something which necessarily must be seen as such. It is the physical necessity which leads me to see reality in its logical necessity; but the logical necessity in and by itself is not reality. If an intelligence were to intellectually know, in an exhaustive way, the law of gravitation, it would not be limited to seeing in the movement of a body something which must occur thus in truth; besides this necessity, and just on account of it, it would see the real movement of the body. And this same thing happens with {253} mathematical reality. I do not just succeed in deductively determining what is understood as *A* must be *B*, but also in seeing that *the very reality* of *A* is necessarily being *B*. If this were not the case, mathematics would be a pure logic of truths. And that is impossible because mathematics is a science of reality. So much so, indeed, that Gödel demonstrated (as I have often remarked) that what is postulated has properties which are not deducible from the postulates nor can they be logically refuted by them. The fact is, as I see it, that they are real properties of mathematical reality, and their apprehension independent of the postulates is a point in which the apprehension of reality does not coincide with logical intellection. In every mathematical method there is, then, a double moment: the moment of necessary truth of an affirmation, and the moment of apprehension of reality. One's necessarily affirming that reality is thus is not opposed to the fact that the moment of reality is formally distinct from the logical necessity of my affirmation. To be sure, they are two moments of a single, unique act; but as moments they are different. And in them the moment of logical necessity is not primary because the postulates in turn do not consist in logical affirmations but in postulations of the content of reality. It is reality, then, which has the first and last word in all mathematical intellection.

These two moments, the moment of truth and the moment of apprehension of reality, nonetheless have an intrinsic unity. It is what I call *testing-together* [*comprobar*] or *verifying*. As I see it, verification does not consist in verifying if my affirmation is verified; that does not need to be verified in mathematics. What is verified is not the truth of my affirmation but the very presence of

reality {254} apprehended through a way of logical deduction. It is the testing or verifying of reality through the “together” of truth. Truth is not verified, but rather reality in its truth; we apprehend “reality in truth”. This might make it seem that the method has consisted of a reasoning process. But this is not true because all reasoning processes depend upon something prior to the reasoning itself, upon the postulation of the content of reality. Method is a path into postulated reality, an oriented path in accordance with logical rigor. But if this demonstrative rigor, by being impossible, did not lead us to apprehend the reality of *A* as “being” *B*, we would not have mathematics. The unity of the two moments of the intellection of postulated reality is, then, what we call ‘verification’. The physical testing [*probación*] of reality is now verification [*comprobación*]. Here we have the essence of what, paradoxically, but very exactly, should be called the ‘experience of the mathematical’. The mathematical is the terminus of a physical testing of reality, of experience.

To be sure, there are postulated realities which are not mathematical; they constitute the ambit of the reality of fiction. But I need not insist upon them because however they are seen, they have the two moments of internal coherence of the feigned, and of apprehension of its reality in fiction. They are, in this sense, the terminus of verification, in explicit form.

Every postulated reality has, then, a mode of experience its own, verification.

d) But there is still another mode of experience, the mode which concerns the nature of my experiencing my own reality. It is the experience of myself.

Above all, What does ‘experience of myself’ mean here? To be sure, we are not dealing with the mere apprehension of my reality; that happens, as we have already seen, due to sentient intellection {255} of a general sense of corporeal existence. Nor are we dealing with a mere affirmation of what I am or am not in reality, i.e., with a mere judgement of field intellection. To say that what I really am in the field of my violent reactions, perhaps being a timid person, is not a rational intellection of what I am as wordly reality. We are dealing, then, not with a mere apprehension of my reality, nor with a judgement of what I am in reality, but with an intellection of what my reality is as a form of reality, i.e., with a rational intellection, with knowledge. This form of reality has the two moments of being a mode of reality proper *qua* reality; it is the moment through which I intellectually know that I am a person. But there is a second moment which constitutes not so much a mode of reality as a modulation, a mode of that mode of reality; it is what I call ‘personality’,

as opposed to merely being a person, which I call ‘personality’. Thus, for example, I can say that a person is a good or bad person, because he really has this or that set of qualities which modalize his personality. To intellectually know this it does not suffice to point out that now he acted well, or that now he does not give in to temptations. It is necessary to transcend the order of actions and even temptations, in order to go to the mode by which he is, ultimately, this person.

This is something which I need to investigate. As St. Augustine said, *quaestio mihi factus sum*, I have become a question for myself. For this knowledge I need a method, a way that in the reality in which I already am, I am led to my own formal in-depth reality in a physical probing of my own reality. We are dealing with a way by which I achieve, in myself, the discernment of some {256} modalities of reality as opposed to others. This is achieved in the physical probing of my own reality, in an experience of myself. As the probing that it is, this experience consists in an insertion, into my own reality, of a sketch of possibilities (perhaps of something unreal) of what I am. The experience of myself is a knowledge of myself.

The idea that experience of myself as a mode of reality consists simply in a type of report or examination of myself is chimerical. By intrinsic necessity, every examination of myself is oriented and inscribed in a system of reference. When one speaks of a confession of himself, the concept of confession is not necessarily univocal. What St. Augustine understood by confession is not the same as what Rousseau understood by it. For St. Augustine, to confess to oneself is to know, to have an experience of what I am in my in-depth reality with respect to a very precise system of reference, viz. the reference to what God has realized in me and I in God. On the other hand for Rousseau, confession is the knowledge of what I am “naturally”; the system of reference is now nature. God and nature are here two systems of reference among many others, without which there could never be any confession.

This system of reference leads to a sketch of what I ultimately am. For example, it might be the sketch of a certain vocation: Do I or do I not have that vocation?

For this I need to probe the insertion of this sketch (in the foregoing example, of this vocation) into my own reality. Ultimately there is no more than a single physical probing of this insertion, viz. trying to conduct myself by intimately appropriating what has been sketched. That insertion can be positive or {257} negative. The insertion is then an attempt at appropriating to myself something

along the lines of the sketch of possibilities which I have wrought. *Self-appropriating* is the radical mode of experience of oneself, the radical physical probing of my own reality. To know oneself is to probe oneself in self-appropriation. There is no abstract “know thyself”; I can only know myself along the lines of this or that sketch of my own possibilities. Only the sketch of what I “might be” inserted into me as self-appropriation, only this constitutes the form of knowing oneself. Clearly, it is a appropriation in the order of actualization of my own reality. This discernment of oneself is a difficult operation; it is discernment in probing and self-appropriation.

In summary, then, there are four fundamental modes of experience: experimentation, compenetration, verification, and appropriation. They are not methods like the physical, psychological, sociological, historical, and other

“methods”; rather, they are modes of methodic intellection, i.e. modes by which we intellectually know, by means of a way, the real, regardless of what the “methods” may be in the usual sense of the word. Every “method” can imply various of these “modes”. The unity of the modes is not, then, the unity of “a” method, but something more radical and fundamental, viz. the unity of experience. In virtue of it we say that men have much or little experience, i.e., that they have realized, to a different degree, the physical probing of what reality ultimately is.

With this we have examined the two primary moments of the structure of knowing: objectualization and method. It is now necessary to tackle the more important theme relating to our problem: the truth of our knowledge of the depths of the real.

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§3

RATIONAL TRUTH

Rational intellection, i.e., knowledge, is a search going beyond the field to its ground, that is, toward what “could be” as worldly reality. In this search the field takes on the character of object, and the search itself is a way, an opening of a way to discovering the ground, a method which is based upon the field reality as a system of reference with respect to which the intelligence sketches a system of possibilities that ultimately one tries to subject to a physical probing of reality in that intellective moment which constitutes experience. In this experience, rational intellection finds that reality coincides or does not coincide with the sketch of possibilities. This *encounter* is the truth of rational intellection; the opposite is error. In what follows, unless the contrary is indicated, I shall only speak of truth; error can only be understood with respect to truth. And truth as *encounter* is the essential part of rational intellection. What is this truth, i.e., what is the truth of reason? We need to determine, then, the essence of the encounter. And that will lead us to discover the major characteristic of the intrinsic structure of knowing. The problem of the truth of reason thus unfolds in three successive steps:

1. What is the truth of reason as encounter?
2. What is its formal essence?
3. What is its intrinsic structural moment?

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I

THE TRUTH OF REASON

Let us take a few steps back, to the beginning of our investigation. Intellection, I said, is the mere actualization of the real in intelligence. This reality can be considered under two aspects. I can consider reality as a formality proper to a thing itself; this is the problem of reality. But I can also consider reality *qua* actualized in intellection. Then the actualized real is just truth. Truth is, then, the real itself *qua* actualized in intellection. It is the real itself which confers its truth upon intellection. I have

called this giving of truth *truth-making*. And this truth-making has, as we have seen, different modalities. Above all, reality (unless otherwise indicated, I shall employ ‘reality’ and ‘real’ as equivalent in our problem) can be actualized in and by itself in its naked reality. The real makes truth in accordance with its own otherness of reality. Throughout this study, I have called that mode of actualization *real truth*. It is the radical, primary, and essential form of truth as such, the mere *being actually* present of the real in intellection.

But there are other forms of truth-making. The real, in fact, is not actualized only in and by itself; it is actualized as real but with respect to other real things. The real, then, makes truth, but it gives truth not only to the intellection of the real itself but to that intellection in which one intellectually knows the real thing among other things of field reality. Real truth is a simple truth, not in the sense of uncomplicated or elemental, but in the sense that {260} there is simply “one” reality, however complicated it may be, yet one which is intellectually known in and by itself *indivisibly*. The other form of truth-making constitutes *dual truth*, because there is the real thing and some other respect in which the real thing is intellectually known. The intellective actualization of the real thing is now dual. In it the two moments of the intellection of the real should coincide unitarily in the unity of actualization of the thing. The real thing makes truth, but in coincidental form. All dual truth is essentially a *coincidental truth*, a coincidence between real truth of a thing and the intellection of this thing “from others”.

This coincidental truth can in turn have three essential characteristics. In the first place, it can be a coincidence of the real and of a simple apprehension. Then we say that the real is authentically this or that; for example, that it is authentic wine, because there is a coincidence between the liquid which I am really apprehending and the simple apprehension of the wine. The real makes truth here in that form of giving dual truth which is *authentication*.

But in the second place, it can deal with a coincidence between the real and the mode in which the real must be understood with respect to the field, i.e., a coincidence between the field real and its affirmative intellection. The real now makes truth like something which dictates or pronounces its truth. Its truthifying is *veridical*. Intellection is then a conformity more or less adequate of what is affirmed and the field real.

But there is still a third form of coincidental truth not usually distinguished from the previous ones. In it, the field real is formally actualized not in an *act* (either

apprehensive or affirmative, but in an *activity* of worldly searching. The coincidence is then an {261} *encounter* or *finding* in the field real of that which is sought in the world, to wit, of its ground. Coincidental truth is now truth in finding. The real is actualized and makes truth in the form of a finding. To be sure, this truth contains authenticity and veridictance, just as veridictance contains authenticity. But this intellection in finding is not just authenticity or veridictance; rather, it formally consists in being authenticity and veridical *in finding*. And this finding is an irreducible mode of truth because it is not a moment extrinsic to intellection; rather, it pertains to it intrinsically and formally. All truth of affirmation in fact has an intrinsically and formally dynamic character, as we saw. But the third type of truth which we are studying is not simple dynamism; rather, this dynamism has its own character, that of dynamism of inquiry, or in progression. The inquiry, and therefore the finding, then pertain intrinsically and formally to truth in encounter. St. Augustine tells us (*De Trin.*, IX,1): “Let us seek like those who have not yet found, and we shall find like those who have yet to seek, because when a man has finished something, he has but begun.” Now, this expresses not only a limitation which in fact human knowledge possesses. It also expresses something much more serious, viz. the formal character of knowing proper to it. The limitation of knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is something derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of rational intellection, from knowing as such, since it is inquiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is formally inquiring, only because of this must one always seek more and, finding what was sought, have it become the principle of the next search. {262} Knowledge is limited by being knowledge. An exhaustive knowledge of the real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of the real without necessity of knowledge. Knowledge is only intellection in search. Not having recognized the intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as inquiry is what led to straying with respect to this third form of truth, and to subsuming all truth under the truth of affirmation. That is not the case; inquiry is a mode of intellection, the mode of rational intellection; and truth is not only conformity but also encounter. It is not the same thing to affirm something about what is in the field as to encounter what this which is in the field is in the worldly sense. It is not the same to intellectually know what something is “in reality” as to know what something is in reality “itself”. The difference is that between conformity and encounter. And as what is encountered is or is not what is sought, it follows that the real now has a mode of making truth which is its own, its own mode of actualization; this is *verification*. Verification is the proper and

exclusive form of the truth of rational intellection.

Authentication, the veridical, and verification: these are the three forms of dual truth, of coincidental truth. The truth of reason, and only it, is verification.

He we have the first step of our investigation, that of determining in what the truth of reason, the truth of encounter, consists: the truth of reason is verification. But this leads to a second step, i.e., to asking ourselves in more detail what the formal essence of encounter is, what the formal essence of verification is. As this encounter takes place in experience, the formal essence of verification is but the problem of the truth of experience.

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II

THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IN ENCOUNTER

The truth of reason consists, then, in the real making truth in the form of verification. The truth of reason is encounter, but not a haphazard type of encounter such as a collision with reality or a stumbling upon it. Rather, it is the encounter with something which is sought. This search is not some flailing about in a vacuum, so to speak, but the search for something which has already been intellectually mapped out. The encounter as such is verification. In order to determine that in what, essentially, truth in encounter consists, we must pose three questions: What is verification? What is the formal structure of verification? And In what does the order of rational truth consist?

1st Question. What is verification? Verification is clearly encountering or finding something which one is already seeking. To understand what verification is, let us proceed, as in so many other problems, step by step.

Above all, let us recall what it is which is sought, and that is the ground of the field real as a moment of the world, i.e., of the respectivity of the real *qua* real. This fundament is intellectually known in a *sketch of possibilities* of what the real “could be” in the worldly sense. What one seeks is then, formally what has been sketched out as real.

This encounter takes place in the real by submitting it to a physical testing of reality, to experience. As what is sought is something sketched, it is clear that the encounter consists not in being a mere manifestation, but in being the *fulfillment* of what was sketched out. Encounter is fulfillment of a sketch. We are not dealing with some

mere conformity, {264} more or less adequate, with the real; rather, we are dealing with the intellection of the real as realization of a sketch. This is the fulfillment of what “could be” in what “really is”. Fulfillment is the mode proper to inquiring intellection.

Fulfillment is the mode in which the real makes truth in intellection, viz. fulfilling what has been sketched out. And it is because of this that the fulfillment has *verification* for its own essence. Verification is a “making true”, *verum facere*. And this requires a special reflection.

In the first place, what is this *facere*, this making or doing? The *facere* is not, here, a *poiesis*, nor is it a *praxis*, or an *agere*, because what the *facere* designates here is not an actuation but an actualization. We are dealing, in fact, with a *facere* proper to a ground. Now, a ground, as we saw, is what grounds the real with respect to itself, passing formally into what is grounded. We are not dealing with a temporal passing, but one of a merely actual nature. It therefore consists in constituting the real thing itself, in actuality, i.e., it is the intrinsic and formal constitution of the actuality of the thing itself. It is a formally grounding passing. It is here a moment of intellectual *actuality* of the real. Intellectively knowing itself is now activity, and ultimately, intellectual activity is the actuality of the moment constitutive of the real *qua* actualized from the depths of itself.

In the second place, what is made in this making is the *verum* in fulfillment. What is made is the intellectual actuality of the fulfillment itself. It is not, I repeat, a making in the sense of producing or anything like that; rather, it is a *making of actuality*. And this actuality has its own character—let us say so once again—, that of being actuality in fulfillment. If this were not so, we would have simple {265} conformity. And conformity is not, formally, something sought after, but fulfillment *is* so by virtue of its essence. The real not only “is” actualized, but is actualized as something “grounding”.

In the third place, this *facere* of the *verum* not only concerns what is intellectually known, but also the intellection itself *qua* rational. The *verum facere*, verification, is a “co-happening” in actuality, a “co-happening” of the constitution of the grounded real and of intellection as the ground. And this “co-” is just the modality of coincidence in rational intellection. Coincidentiality is now “co-happening” or “co-constitution”. Intellection itself is then grounded *qua* intellection, which is not only in conformity with the real but also is a conformity grounded *qua* intellection. Rational intellection has grounded truth.

In the fourth place, it is a coincidence determined by the real itself. Coincidence is a mode of actuality, and as such is actuality of the real. The intellectual aspect is, then, grounded upon the real formality of a thing itself. And this unity of actuality, grounded upon the real, is what constitutes the fact that things give us *ratio* or explanation. The form in which the real makes truth is that *facere* which consists in giving *ratio* or explanation. Fulfillment, verification, consists formally in giving *ratio*. Whence knowledge consists in being the intellection of things insofar as they give us *ratio*. That formula appeared early in this study of reason; but now we see in what, radically, this giving of *ratio* consists. Knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, is not a system of propositions, but an intellectual activity in which the real makes truth in its ground; it consists in things giving us *ratio* or explanation. And {266} science itself as a system is the more or less necessary system of the “giving *ratio*” of the things which it investigates. In experience, the real is giving us (or taking away from us, which comes to the same thing) *ratio*. Experience has as an intrinsic and formal moment, that of making truth; and verification is but the giving of *ratio*, i.e., is the intellectual constitution of the ground as such.

How does the real verify the *ratio*? A difficult problem. This is the second question which we have posed with respect to verification, viz. the structure of verification.

2nd Question: The formal structure of verification. Verification has a complex character. To analyze it, let us recall what has already been explained.

Above all, verification always has the *character of necessity*. It is necessary that the real be or not be grounded in something which “could be”. Necessity is a character of verification because it constitutes the character of its own emergence. Then one might be tempted to think that this necessity is independent of experience, because experience only shows us facts. But this, as we have already seen, is false. Experience is inscribed in the impression of reality. And the impression of reality has as a structural moment that of the “toward”. Intellectual knowing as “toward” is, then, an intellectual necessity, the necessity in accordance with which the real *is itself* bearing us from the field to the world. It is a datum of the real itself *qua* real. The necessity of grounding, then, takes place in the necessity of the intellectually known real; it is not just a fact. And this surely leaves open the question of whether this necessity leads to a final positive terminus; this we shall see soon see. But neither is that necessity a merely logical one. We are not dealing with the stating of

{267} some proposition, for example, the principle of causality or of sufficient reason, and trying to make clear that these propositions are evident and hence “must be applied” to the field real. This is, as I see it, untenable, above all because no one has ever been able to state those presumed principles with a univocal formula. So it is not surprising that no one adduces rigorous proofs that they are evident. Hence we are not dealing with application of these principles to field reality. The necessity of going to what is in the world is not a piece of evidence but is given in the intellection of the field real as real. And this functionality, projected upon that to which it impels us in the “toward”, is the very actuality of the “for”; it is a datum and not a necessary judgement. It is a moment of a sentient reason.

But verification does not just have that moment of radical necessity. Verification, by virtue of its nature, must be something possible in principle; this is its *character of possibility*. This has at times seemed clear. Nonetheless, it is not something clear even with regard to those conceptions for which grounding is a logical necessity, because the fact that it may be necessary to go toward a ground does not mean that, without further ado, it must but possible to find it in either a positive or negative sense. It is necessary, then, to determine the precise point in which the said principle takes place in the real. And that is the question. As I see it, this point is none other than one in which the field real has thrust us from the field to the world; it is just the real and physical identity of the moment of reality in the field and in the world. In virtue of this, if I intellectually know field reality, not as sensed in the field manner, but according to the formality of reality of a field thing, then I am already in the moment of reality which constitutes the {268} world itself. The necessity with which the field real thrusts us “toward” the world is just what makes it possible to find the world in what is sensed; this is the possibility of verification. To verify is to bring the world to the field. And this is possible thanks to the fact that the moment of reality is numerically and physically identical in the field and in the world. What makes the progression from the field to the world is, then, what makes possible the return from the world to the field. And in this consists verification. The world is not necessarily a zone of real things beyond the zone of the real things of the field; rather, it is only the fullness of the formality of reality *qua* respectivity. Hence, verification not only has a moment of initial necessity, but also an intrinsic and formal character of possibility.

As necessary and possible, in what does verification consist in itself, i.e., in the intellection of the worldly in the field? The “for” is an open ambit. How is it filled?

This is the third character, or rather, the third group of characters of verification.

Above all, one must make an essential distinction. We have already seen it, but now it is necessary to set it down because it is here that it acquires its full meaning. The “for” is a “what for” or “why”. And the “what for” or “why” has two moments. One is the moment of the “for” itself. And this is a datum of the impression of reality. The other is the moment of the “what”: that which we force to be the worldly “what” of the field. The first moment does not require verification; only the second does so. How is it verified, how does one find, in the experience of the world, the worldly “what” which we have sketched out? This is the question exactly.

Let us say at the outset that the question which we have just formulated does not have, nor can it have, a univocal answer. {269} Verification is a dynamic moment of rational intellection. Hence it is not a quality which the sketch *has* or *does not have*, but the quality of a progression which *takes* us to a verification. Verification is an essentially dynamic quality; it is always and only *to go verifying*. And this “to go verifying” is what constitutes experience. It is not the manifestation of a fact. The *dynamic character* is, together with necessity and possibility, the third great characteristic of verification.

This characteristic has many of its own modes.

In the first place, what is sketched has to be sufficient for grounding what in the field. This is the *moment of sufficiency*. It is what, from a merely logical point of view, was encapsulated in the idea of sufficient reason—something impossible, as we have seen.

This sufficiency has in turn complex characteristics.

a) Verification consists in what was sketched out having at least confirmable *consequences* in the field. The sketched-out “what” is not verified in and by itself, but only in its consequences. Immediate verification, if it exists, is quite exceptional. If the consequences are not verified in the field, the sketched-out “what” would not be true. On the other hand, if the qualities of the field are the same as those of what is sketched out, we may say that what is sketched out has verification. I shall forthwith pose a matter for reflection with respect this.

b) There are times when what is sketched out is not something whose consequences are strictly necessary in the field. It might happen that there is at least a *concordance* between the sketch and the field reality. This is a verification, but of another order than that of the consequences.

c) It might happen that in the process of going to verify, the “could {270} be” can show different aspects, each of which taken by itself is not sufficient in any of the two senses explained; but if there are many different aspects, the unity of all of them is nonetheless convergent with respect to the outcome. Then there is a verification by *convergence*. Although it may seem strange, almost all of our rational intellections, even those most solidly established, have this character of verification by convergence; the more the convergence, the better the verification. This is an essential form of verification. The convergence is not a type of substitute for verification; it is verification in convergence.

Consequence, concordance, and convergence are the three modalities of what I have called ‘sufficiency’. Without sufficiency there is no verification.

But in the second place, verification has another line which is not simply identified with that of sufficiency. The world, in fact, is the respectivity of the real *qua* real. On the other hand, the field is just what is sensed of the world. Hence reality *qua* worldly is something much richer than field reality; the world strictly *exceeds* with respect to the field, and does not just exceed the field with respect to the real things sensed in it. Now, exceeding is a possible line of verification; it is the *moment of exceeding* of verification, because the sketch of the worldly “what”, in virtue of being worldly, exceeds what is of the field. This means that, in principle, the sketch contains more properties of the real in the field itself than those which are strictly sensed in its mere field intellection. Hence the sketch contains “new” properties of the real. In general, only a rational intellection which leads to the discovery of {271} new verifiable properties has strict scientific value. Thus the electromagnetic theory of light led to the discovery of new properties of light; the relativistic and ondulatory theory of the electron led to the discovery of the first form of antimatter, the positron, etc. Rational intellection does not ground what is of the field except by exceeding it. This is the line of exceeding proper to rational verification.

To be sure, neither the line of sufficiency nor the line of excedence is absolute verification, but only a progression toward a verification off in the distance. No moment of it, by itself, has absolute value; it is rather a provisional verification. Here ‘provisional’ does not mean that it is going to be rejected or absorbed, because neither rejection nor absorption are formal characteristics of the verifying progression. The strictly formal character of verification does not consist in being opposed to error. The formal character which is of interest to us here is quite precise: it

is *adequacy*. Provisionality consists in but partial inadequacy. The possible rejection or superceding or diversification in verification is formally inscribed in the compass of adequation. It is a characteristic which is intrinsically and necessarily inherent in verification, both with respect to sufficiency and with respect to exceeding. Verification is a “going verifying”. It is not a quality which something has or does not have; but a quality which consists in becoming more adequate to the real. It is the dialectic of adequation. Adequation as limit of dynamism has appeared already in the problem of the truth of judgement. However here we are not dealing with mere dynamism, but with that special dynamism which consists in progression. And then the dynamic intellection takes on, in the progression constituting reason or explanation, its own characteristic: verification in *scrutiny*. This should not seem strange to us. {272} Human reason is sentient reason. It senses that its progression takes place in reality. And here is the *terra firme* of that intellectual progression. But it senses the different states of this progression just like so many other scrutinies. And scrutiny, as we have already seen, is a mode of intellection of the real: the scrutiny of reality gives us reality itself *qua* “scrutinized-reality”; i.e., reality in the mode of the scrutinizable. Sentient reason is, ultimately, reason which moves in scrutiny, and what it scrutinizes is, formally, the adequacy of verification. The dialectic of adequation is progressive scrutiny of verification.

Having reached this point (sufficiency, excedence, scrutiny), it is necessary to focus our reflection upon these three aspects of verification thus understood.

a) In the first place, the verification of reason has two aspects which must be very carefully distinguished. This is the point to which I alluded previously, and about which I said some reflection is needed. Because, what is it that is verified? What was sketched out is what is verified, something which bears us from the world to the field; it is precisely in this that verification consists. This verification is experience, something quite different, as we said, from sensible perception as from experiment. But then the fact that what has been sketched discharges two functions comes to our attention. On the one hand, reason leads to an affirmation about the field real, an affirmation which can be verified both along the diverse lines of sufficiency as well as along the line of exceeding. Thus, I can verify that the wave “reason” or “explanation” of light leads to interference, which is to be sure verified in experience; and I can verify that the gravitational “reason” or “explanation” of masses leads to certain movements of the stars, something also verified observationally. {273} But what is it which is verified? What is verified is the reality

of the interference and the reality of the movements recorded in celestial mechanics. But the question does not end here, because these same phenomena may be grounded upon principles different than those of the wave theory of light, or the gravitational laws of Newton. And this is, in fact, the case. The photonic theory of light also gives a complete explanation of interference, and the relativistic theory of gravitation likewise gives a complete explanation of celestial movements. Thus it follows that it is one thing to verify, in experience, the fulfillment of what has been sketched, and something quite different to verify that the explanation or reason adduced is the unique and true one. One thing is the verification of what has been predicted or explained, something else the verification of the explanation itself. Now, this latter is not verifiable. One can verify the truth of what is explained or predicted, but one cannot verify the explanation itself which is advanced. If it were possible to verify both in a single experiment, we would have some type of critical experiment, an *experimentum crucis*. But such experiments practically do not exist. One can demonstrate that quantum mechanics does not contain nor admit hidden parameters, but one cannot demonstrate that only quantum mechanics can give a physical explanation of elementary particles. It is one thing to verify the truth to which reason leads, and something else to verify the explanation itself which leads to these truths. And this latter is not verifiable. There are only two possible exceptions to what I have just said. The first is that the explanation chosen is such that by its own nature it is the only possible one; then the verification of the truth of the explanation would be, at one and the same time, the verification of the explanation of the truth. There is another exception, in a certain way more attainable. It is the case in which the sketch to be verified consists only in the affirmation of the reality of {274} something unknown. That is what happens when reason sketches out, for example, the existence of a nerve cell. The verification (microscopic image) of the reality of this cell verifies the two directions of the explanation. But in general verifying the sketches of reason does not mean verifying the explanation of their truth.

b) In the second place, the immense majority of rational intellections are not absolutely verifiable even in first of the two senses which I just described. Precisely because it is progressive, verification always admits of degrees. In what situation do these gradual verifications arise, i.e., what is the physical testing of reality in the immense majority of cases, not to say in nearly all of our rational intellections? To understand this, it is necessary to point out a very precise character of verification. Veri-

fication, as I said, is not necessarily adequate, but adding now that verification is never totally excluded because verification is not a quality which something has or does not have; rather, there is only the ongoing process of verification. Hence the inadequacy does not entail complete abolition of verification. What has been sketched out, precisely because it is more or less adequate, can be more or less verified. This is expressed in a very precise distinction. Adequate verification is verification which in a certain way is *total*. There is no doubt that then the inquiring intellection encounters the real as the complete fulfillment of what has been sketched out; the real then is, with respect to what has been sketched out, something strictly *rational*. The way or path which has led us to the real is just the way of the rational. Experience is here experience of the real as rational. But when verification is inadequate, the sketch is not complete. Experience is {275} only the fulfillment of some aspects or moments of what has been sketched out. It is not that what has been sketched out has parts, but that the totality of what has been sketched is more or less firm in the physical testing of the real. And in this sense, what has been sketched is not composed of *parts*, but of *partialities*. Of them, some are fulfilled and others not. This partiality is a mode of verification; it is not full verification, but just partial. And this partiality shows that what has been sketched is not the “way” or *via* of the real, but is something in some way “viable”. Now, rational intellection of the viable, the inadequate fulfillment of what has been sketched in the physical testing of reality, is just what constitutes the *reasonable*. The reasonable is a mode of the rational; it is not the strict rational, but the viable rational. The reasonable is strictly and formally the viable. There are verifications which are more or less viable than others, more or less reasonable than others. The intellectual progression in *worldly reality*, which in its dynamic phases scrutinizes the real, is in general a progression or experience of the reasonable. Insofar as something is being verified reasonably, it tends constitutively to the strict rational. In the limit of this constitution the explanation or reason of truth and the truth of reason or explanation would coincide. When there is but approximation to this limit these two are only reasonably coincident.

c) Finally, it is necessary to emphasize an essential possibility: that not every sketch is verifiable. To be sure, the progression of reason always takes place in physical reality, whether field reality or worldly reality. But what has been sketched out in this progression may not be verifiable. The “what” of the “what for?” is then like an empty space. What is unverifiable shows reality as empty. The unverifiable has two essentially different aspects. A

sketch can be {276} unverifiable in the sense that in the physical testing of reality the real expressly excludes what has been sketched. Then the unverifiable has the sense of *refutable*. We are not dealing with a logical refutation, but with a *negative experience*. But there is a second degree of irrefutability, so to speak, and that is what is neither refutable nor irrefutable; this is a *suspended experience*. What, then, more precisely, is unverifiability? To be sure, negative experience fully enters into the line of verification; it is a strict verification of non-truth. Negative experience is a crucial experience of falsehood. And it is because of this, rigorously speaking that there are no strict negative experiences. The problem thus centers around suspended experience: What is its unverifiability? One might think that it is a suspension originating in the absence of verification. But this is not the case. It is necessary that there be not absence but impossibility of verification. Mere absence would give us the sketch as unverified, but not as unverifiable. The unverifiable is what, by its own nature, is taken away from verification, i.e., from a physical testing of reality. For this the experience of the unverifiability itself is necessary; that is, we need the verification of unverifiability, because the experience in question is not the suspension of experience but a suspended experience. Now, the sketch which we are trying to deal with is not a simple occurrence; it is a sketch articulated in a suggestion. The sketch is born from mere suggestion; it is not identified with mere suggestion but is always positively or negatively articulated in a suggestion. Hence the suspended experience of a sketch means a reduction of the sketch to what has suggested it, a reduction of the sketch to suggestion. But then it is clear that the suspended experience cannot consist in {277} not sketching what has been suggested, but in taking the suggestion itself as the source of a new sketch. Then the unverifiable does not close us off from intellection; rather, what it does is to open up for us other possible types of verification, a new intellection, a progression of a new type. This is the most radical form of the *dialectic of reason*: the dialectic of verification as such.

Verification is dialectic not only by virtue of its moment of progressive adequacy, but also and more radically by its intrinsic characteristic: it is a progression from the verifiable and the unverifiable toward new sketches. This is the dialectic “suggestion-sketch”. Rational intellection is a process of sketching in and from a suggestion, and returning from the sketch to the suggestion for new sketches. It is *dialectic of sentient reason*. It is not a psychological process but an intrinsic and formal moment of rational intellection as such. Indeed it is the very mode of intellectual knowing, intellectual knowing in the dialecti-

cal progression of “suggestion-sketch”.

With this, we have summarily analyzed the formal structure of verification. Verification has the character of necessity, of possibility, and of dynamism. In itself, verification has a moment of sufficiency (consequence, concordance, convergence) and a moment of exceeding. In both moments it is a verifying process which is more or less adequate, recognizing that verifying the truth of reason or explanation is not the same as reason or explanation of truth, and that verification can adopt the form of the strictly rational or of the reasonable, or even of the unverifiable, as a dialectical moment of intellection. Rational intellection has the dialectical structure of sentient reason. Naturally, in this distinction, what has already been verified constitutes an essential moment, that of *progress*. {278}

Let us return to the point of departure for this analysis. Verification is the mode by which the real makes truth in the thinking intellection. The truth of this intellection is rational truth. This truth is the truth of the field real as worldly reality; rational truth is truth which is formally worldly. Hence, rational truth not only is truthful but also constitutes the truth of a world; it is—please excuse the expression—an order. Here ‘order’ is not ordering but a zone or region. What is the order of rational truth? Here we have the third of the three questions which we posed to ourselves in the study of the essence of truth in encounter. The first was, what is verification? The second was, what is the formal structure of verification? Now we pose the third question: in what does the order of rational truth consist?

3rd Question: The “order” of rational truth. Rational truths constitute an order, the order of reason, because reason is the intellection which, in its progression, intellectually knows the field real as a moment of the world. Now, the world is the real as such, and therefore its unity is essentially and formally respective; the world is the respectivity of the real as real. Therefore, every rational truth, by virtue of being worldly, is formally respective. This is the order of reason. If we wish to conceptualize with some rigor what this order is, we must confront at least two serious problems: in the first place, what is the characteristic of this order as “rational”? And in the second, in what does this order as “order” consist?

1. *The characteristic of truth qua “rational”.* The truth of rational intellection *qua* rational is distinguished, as we have seen, from the truth of field intellection. {279} The latter concerns real things in the field of reality, whereas rational truth concerns the very world of the real.

And it is necessary to carefully pin down the character of this difference, especially since its mere mention can suggest the difference—classical since Leibniz’ time—between truths of fact and truths of reason.

For Leibniz, a truth of reason is formally and constitutively necessary; it cannot be other than it is, and it is impossible to think the opposite of it. Therefore the truth of reason would be eternal truth. On the other hand, a truth of fact is a truth about something which can be otherwise; its opposite is possible. Therefore it is contingent truth.

But this conception is, as I see it, untenable, even leaving aside the fact that an eternal truth requires an eternal intelligence, which the human intelligence certainly is not. But I repeat, even leaving aside this point, the radical difference is not that between fact and necessity, but between reality in a field and reality in the world, which is something quite different. For Leibniz, truth is always a question of being objective, i.e., of objective concepts; and its being is intellectually known in that form of affirmation which is identity. Truth is always mediated or immediate identity of concepts. Now, this is wrong. Truth is not a question of objective concepts but of reality. And reality is always something primarily and radically given, something merely actualized in intellection. Hence Leibniz’ distinction between truths of fact and truths of reason, between necessary truths and contingent truths, is false.

In the first place, let us consider the so-called ‘truths of fact’. Above all, Leibniz (and on this point, all philosophical tradition {280} before him) fails to distinguish the two types of truth in what he vaguely calls ‘truth of fact’. And this is because there are truths of fact such as, for example, the truth that this book occupies such-and-such space on my table; but there are also truths of fact which concern the structure of cosmic reality, for example, the truth of gravitation. The first are *factual truths*; the second are what I call *factual truths*. The cosmos is not a fact but rather a theater, the fact of facts, that in which every fact exists. Certainly it is not something absolutely necessary, but neither is it something properly contingent. Moreover, without delving further into the subject, what is decisive is that both the factic as well as the factual are, for the effects of my intellection, something intellectually known sentiently in the field of reality. The essential point is not that they are contingent (that would be a problem of reality), but that their intellection is of the field. Now, field reality, regardless of how much it may be of the field, and of how much it is sensed, is “reality”. Therefore the so-called ‘truth of fact’ is the truth of field

“reality”. Thus reality is intellectually sensed, and what is sensed is so in the formality of reality. We are not, then, dealing with truths of *fact* but truths of *field reality*. In what is of the field, reality is given. It is not a question of concepts but of reality. Reality, even if of fact, is not synonymous with contingency; rather, it is the formality of what is apprehended. In virtue of this, reality is not a “mere” fact, but a constitutively necessary formality. In turn, the most necessary truth of the world is in some mode and some form the truth of something sensed in the field manner. Therefore what is sensed does not therefore cease to be intellectually known in necessity.

In the second place, are the presumed truths of reason {281} eternal truths in Leibniz’ sense? Clearly not. Leibniz cites as truths of reason the supreme logical principles (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle), and mathematical truths. But are these truths grounded in nothing other than our mind? No, they are not. They are grounded intrinsically in “given” reality. Mathematical truths are certainly necessary, but their necessity depends upon postulates, and hence upon reality given in and by postulates. Ultimately mathematical truths are anchored in something given. And therefore they could perfectly well be another way. The postulates are, in fact, freely chosen. It would suffice for me to change the postulates, and mathematical truth would be different.

The same thing happens with the supreme logical principles. These principles, in fact, are structural principles of affirmation. And what logic does is to intellectually know affirmation as such. But here a serious error comes up not just in Leibniz but in almost all of philosophy, culminating in Hegel. Indeed, How do I intellectually know the principles of every affirmation? It is usually said, for example, that the principle of non-contradiction regulates the very intellection of every affirmation; that is, that it is the principle not only of affirmation *qua* something affirmed, but also of intellection itself as an act of affirmation. And this is, as I see it, incorrect. When I intellectually know affirmations as such-and-such affirmations, these affirmations are the thing intellectually known; and these things certainly have a character of non-contradictory necessity, i.e., they have non-contradiction as their structural character. But the question does not end here, because these affirmations, with all their structures including non-contradiction, must be intellectually known by me in a distinct act; otherwise we would have *logos*, {282} but not logic. Logic is founded in the intellection of the *logos* as something intellectually known. Now, it is easy to think that this intellection of an affirmation is in turn an affirmative intel-

lection. If this were true, there would be an infinite regress: the principle of non-contradiction of intellectually known affirmations would also be the structural principle of their intellection, and so on *ad infinitum*. And here, as I see it, is the mistake. The intellection of my affirmation is not, in turn, an affirmative intellection; rather, it is a primordial apprehension, therefore anterior to all affirmation. In more general terms, intellective access to the logos is not in turn a logical access. Hence, for the effects of intellection, the necessity of the principles of affirmation is not in the concepts but in the intellectual reality of my affirmations. This reality is, then, something given and not something conceived. Logical truths are not necessities of concepts but characteristics of given reality. If one cannot think the opposite of them, it is not because their truth is eternal, but because intellectually known reality itself as reality, i.e., affirmation *qua* affirmed, is what cannot be any other way.

Granting this, the essence of the so-called “truth of reason” is not to be the truth “of reason” but “rational” truth, which is something different. And it is rational truth because it concerns the world of reality (including therein affirmative intellections as acts). Every rational truth is a truth of reality, because it is a truth of worldly reality. And I am including in worldly reality the cosmic itself. To be sure, the world and the cosmos are not identical. The world is the respective unity of the real *qua* real; the cosmos is the particular respectivity of the worldly real. But for the effects of intellection; cosmos and {283} world coincide; they are that “toward” which field reality directs us. In this “beyond” world and cosmos coincide. Because of this I have here spoken simply of “worldly reality”. One might say that the cosmos as such is not necessary. But that is just what I am saying, that rational truth does not consist in being truth of reason but in being worldly and cosmic truth of the field real. The worldly is not just the cosmos, but the cosmic is formally worldly; it is a particular kind of world. And the field real as a simply worldly moment or as a cosmic moment (i.e., as something factual) is always the terminus of rational truth. Necessity and contingency are not characteristics of truth, but of reality.

Therefore it is not the case that two types of truth exist, viz. truths of reason and truths of fact. Every truth is always just a “truth of reality”. What happens is that this reality is either reality sensed as of the field, or worldly and cosmic reality. But in both cases we are dealing with one and the same reality *qua* reality. Field reality impels us from itself, in its mode of “toward”, to the worldly; and the worldly is intellectually known in the field real as the finding and fulfilling of a sketch. And

this finding is rational truth. It has nothing to do with the idea that the order of rational truths is an order of absolute necessity. My sketch is always a freely constructed sketch. When I seek its verification, it might be that we find it to be unverifiable, and not always because the sketch was false, but because it is not necessarily true that everything real is rationally verifiable. The real might rest upon itself. And then the real enters into the zone of reason but in order not to constitute itself as real there in reason. But this does not invalidate what {284} we have said, because the field real is what leads us to the worldly. And that is good enough. We are not dealing with the case that *all* of the real *qua* real is necessarily of rational structure; it suffices that *something* real, to wit, the field real, has this structure. To think that everything real necessarily has its “explanation” not only is an hypothesis, but moreover a falsehood. Thinking about what Leibniz thought about, to wit, the reality of God, what must be said is that God is above all reason and explanation; to affirm, as is usually done, that God is the explanation of Himself constitutes an empty logification of divine reality. God is absolute reality; but even in the worldly sense, it is not certain that every reality has a rational explanation. A free act does not; rather, freedom is what puts reason or explanation into what is going to happen. But freedom itself is beyond explanation. It is, if one wishes, the explanation of the unexplainable. The truth of rational intellection then essentially overcomes the duality of fact and reason.

One might say that metaphysical truths are necessary. We shall not here seek to define what the metaphysical is; it suffices to indicate that the metaphysical is the order of the real *qua* real, i.e., the order of the transcendental. Now, the transcendental is not something conclusive and *a priori*; it is something *given in impression* (the impression of reality), and it is something *open*, and *dynamically* open. Metaphysical truths are only stages of the intellective progression toward the truth of reality.

In summary, then, the duality of truths of fact and truths of reason does not exist, only the duality of field truths and worldly or rational truths. Both are true not of concepts but of reality, i.e., of a formality actualized in {285} intellection. Rational truth is simply worldly truth.

But these rational truths constitute an “order”. It is not, to be sure, the order of absolute necessity of conceptive essences, in Leibniz’ sense; but it is a strict order. In what does it consist?

2. *The order of rational truths qua “order”.* Rational truths, I say, constitute an order. That I indicated earlier. Rational truth, in fact, is the truth of the real as a

form of reality. Each thing is not just real, but constitutes “a” form of being real, i.e., one form among others because reality is constitutively respective, and this respectivity is the world. Therefore a real thing as a moment of the world is “a form” of reality, it is “its” form of reality. It does not matter, in this problem, that the respectivity in question is cosmic in addition to worldly. The cosmic, as we have already said, is the suchness of the world, a particular kind of world, the suchness or particularity of worldly respectivity; therefore, ultimately, what is decisive is the respectivity itself of the world. In virtue of this, all worldly reality, when it is multiple, sends us back, in its own character of reality, to other forms of reality, because no form is self-contained, but only respectively to another. And therefore all truth about a worldly reality, i.e., all rational truth, sends us back *qua* truth to other rational truths. Therefore rational truths constitute an order, the order of the rational. This order has two essential characteristics.

In the first place, the rational is not just the explanation or reason of what is of the field. Explanation is primarily and radically explanation of field reality. Without this, and without being for this, {286} there would be neither reason nor explanation, nor rational truth. This has never been emphasized enough. The rational is constituted as the terminus of a progression in which, impelled by the field real, we go in search “toward” the world, i.e., toward the form of reality which has that field thing as a moment of the world, in reality. Reason or explanation, then, is primarily and radically reason or explanation of what is of the field. It has a precise origin; it does not rest upon itself, and this origin is, as we have seen, in what is of the field. But this means that the rational has two faces: one, which opens onto the field thing of which it is the explanation. But since this reason or explanation is worldly respectivity, it follows that reason has a second face: that which opens onto other forms of reality, i.e., other explanations. By being the reason or explanation of a field thing, reason is, in a certain way, going beyond itself. Therefore the order of reason has a characteristic of *exceeding* with respect to the field of which it is the reason or explanation.

This characteristic appeared before when we dealt with verification, and still earlier, when we dealt with the field of the real. Therefore in order to pin down our ideas, let us once again quickly review what exceeding is. To exceed does not mean that that to which it is applied is a *contraction* of what is exceeding, but that, on the contrary, exceeding is an *expansion* of the characteristic of reality. It is an expansive constitution, and not a contractive one, of the character of reality. This expansion has two fun-

damental moments. Above all, it is an expansion of the character of reality of each real thing as primordially apprehended; it is a character which befits everything real thus apprehended. It is the exceeding by which each real thing determines a field, the field of the real. This is the *field exceeding*. But there is a second moment, that by which the whole field of the real leads us toward the world; the field real is {287} now intellectually known as a form of reality in the world. This is *worldly exceeding*. In turn, this worldly expansion, this expansion of the field in the world, has two aspects. One is that aspect by which intellection as a form of reality, i.e., rational intellection, upon being the explanation of a field thing, discovers (or can discover) in the field real more properties than those which, in the field manner, we have so far intellectually known. It is an exceeding with respect to properties. But the worldly exceeding has, together with the first aspect, a second one: the expansion of each explanation to other explanations. And this second aspect of worldly expansion is what is now of interest to us. Through the first aspect, worldly exceeding is an exceeding of explanation with respect to the field; this exceeding is therefore entirely contained in the respect which reason or explanation shows to what is of the field. But the exceeding of which we now speak is an exceeding within the rational itself, within the world of reality. It is impossible to discover the explanation of a real thing by itself, because if it is an explanation it is so of more than that one thing; it is an explanation within the worldly unity of other explanations. By virtue of its own essence, explanation of the real is exceeding in the worldly sense.

And here a second essential characteristic of the order of rational truth shines through, because the aforementioned exceeding is not simply a numerical addition to reason or explanation, but an exceeding which is constitutive of and essential to all reason. It is not that “one” explanation leads us to “others”, but that each explanation is so only “in and by” that which leads us to others. That is to say, explanation by its exceeding constitutes not an additive order but a formal and constitutive one; it is a *system*. Explanation is formally and constitutively systematic. Rational truths as such constitute a system. This means, {288} first of all, that every explanation is sketched based on others. In field intellection we see that each thing is intellectually known based on others. Now, in rational intellection, each explanation is intellectually known based on others. Conversely, every explanation leads, in and by itself, to others, and is only an explanation in unity with them. Therefore every rational intellection leads intrinsically and formally to its own superceding in others. And then, this makes something decisive

clear to us. Explanation, as we saw, is an intellectual sketch of what a real thing “could” be as a form or moment of the world. Each explanation is a “could”; if I may be permitted a risky expression (which I previously purged to preclude confusion) I can say that each explanation is a “possible”. Now, the systematic unity of explanations is then a unity of “co-possibles”. The whole world of the rationally intellectually known is the unique and true explanation of field reality. The sketch, we say, is drawn based on a system of reference. This system of reference is the field of the real. Now, what is sketched, the adequate explanation of the field real, is the unity of the world. The field is the system of the sensed real, and the world is the system of the real as a form of reality. The “could be” is the ground of the real. Therefore the system of the world is just the ground of the unity of what is of the field.

And here it is necessary to avoid four errors which may readily come to mind.

The first concerns the “could be”. The “could be” is something possible. But I have just indicated that this latter is a risky expression because it is ambiguous. The order of possibles can be understood as the order of the essences which eternally rest upon each other. Reality would then be a derivative of these possibles; that was Leibniz’ idea. But it is wrong. The possibility of the “could be” is not the essence of {289} the real, anterior to the real itself, but the field reality itself which, as physically real, is a “reality”, but “toward” the world. Be the world as it may, it is always just a structure of reality given in the field manner. Therefore the rational is not the possible, but the real in its intrinsic and physical emergence from itself; hence it is a moment *within* the real itself. It is not a question of whether the possible is real, but the real itself as realization of its form of reality. This is not something anterior to the real, but an intrinsic constitutive moment of it. The possible is the real’s intrinsic nature of being possible. Ultimately, the possible is a moment reduced from the real itself. Only the real is a ground of the possible. Having inverted these terms is the first mistake which I have sought to avoid.

The second mistake concerns that moment of unity of the rational through which every explanation is an explanation based upon others. It is here that the systemic character of the rational is most readily apparent. But this “based upon”, and therefore the system itself, isn’t that “based upon” which from time immemorial has been called the “reasoning process”. The system of the rational is not, formally, a reasoning process. Leibniz said that pure reason is the “linking of truths”, the linking of rea-

soning processes. And Wolf expresses the same thing when he says that “the” reason is the faculty of perceiving the nexus of universal truths. Universality here expresses the character of a reasoning process. But as I see it, we are not concerned with that. The system is the unity of respectivity of the world. Therefore, the fact that every explanation is understood based upon others does not mean that it is deduced from them. It means rather that every explanation refers to others, regardless of what the mode of referral may be. The referral itself is the systematic character of the world, and not the other way around. The reasoning process is founded upon {290} the respective character of the world, the respective character of reality rationally known intellectually. Only because the world is systematic unity, and only because of this, can there be, *in some cases*, a reasoning process. The essential unity of the world is not, then, reasoning; it is the real unity of respectivity.

And this brings us to the third mistake. As each rational truth intrinsically and formally refers to another, one might think that the order of rational truth is the totality of rational truths. That was Kant’s idea: reason, for Kant, is the organization of experience, but in and by itself it is the logical totality of the truths of the understanding, what he called ‘Idea’. The object of reason, for Kant, is not things but the truths which I have understood about things. But this is untenable. Reasoning is based upon truths already known, and this is possible thanks to the fact that truths have a unity which is conferred upon them by being truths of the world. The unity of the world, as I just said, is the foundation of reasoning. And this unity is not, therefore, the *total system* of truths but the *principial unity* of respectivity. The order of rational truths does not have the character of totality but of respectivity. And respectivity is not necessarily totality; a constitutively open respectivity cannot be totality. The unity of respectivity is the intrinsic and formal principle of all rational order. This order is not, then, totality even as Idea.

This puts us face to face with a final mistake, the fourth, which it is essential to dispel. One might think, in fact, that the order of rational truth is the unity of true reality as such. Then the order of rational truth would not be “totality” as Kant thought, but the order of a primary unity of the real as such; it would be {291} the order of the “ab-solute”. And this order would be but the development or unfolding of the absolute. The absolute would then be reality unfolding or developing itself, i.e., the reality which not only is in itself, but is in itself and for itself; the absolute would be spirit. That was Hegel’s idea. But such is not the case. Even leaving aside the subject of

the identity of reason and reality in Hegel—that is not our topic at the moment—it is necessary to point out that the unity of the rational order is not the unity of the absolute. A real thing, intellectually known rationally, is a thing as a form of reality. Now, it is certain that the transcendental order is an order which is open dynamically. But this does not mean either that the constitution of each real thing in the world is a movement, or that the transcendental dynamism is an unfolding. ‘Movement’ is not synonymous with unfolding; there is only unfolding or development when the movement consists in actualizing something which, previously, was virtually in what is moved. But in the constitution of forms of reality, we are not dealing with *something* which is being configured, but with the fact that *each thing* is being configured as a form of reality. It is not that the absolute is configured or configures itself, but that what is configured is each real thing. Thus there is no unfolding. And furthermore, there is no unity of the absolute. The different forms of reality have no other unity than that of respectivity. Therefore the order of the rational is not the order of the absolute but the order of the world. Reality *qua* reality is not the same thing as absolute reality. Each real thing is not a moment of a great thing, of the absolute, but only a moment respective to other realities. The order of the rational is neither a Kantian totality nor a Hegelian absolute; it is simply a world.

With this we have completed our second step to {292} conceptualizing truth as an encounter or finding. The first step was analyzing what truth is as an encounter; this was “verification”. The second has been to determine the formal essence of this mode of truth. That we have done by confronting three questions: What is verification? What is the formal structure of verification? And In what does the order of reason or explanation consist? We must now take a third and final step: determining what we might call the intrinsic character of truth as an encounter, i.e., the intrinsic character of rational truth, of the truth of knowledge.

III

THE INTRINSIC CHARACTER OF RATIONAL TRUTH

It is first of all necessary to pin down the meaning of the question we wish to answer. We have seen that rational truth is *verification*. It is a mode of truth-making with a special character, a mode by which the real, already

apprehended as real, gives its truth to the thinking activity; i.e., it is a mode by which the real gives us reason or explanation. We have seen what the formal essence of verification is. Verification is the truth-making of the real in an inquiring intellection, i.e., it is in a sketch. To verify is to find the real; it is a fulfillment of how we have sketched what the real could be. In this finding and in this fulfillment the real is made actual (*facere*) in intellection (*verum*). And in this consists “verification”. And it is in this truth-making that rational truth consists. Now, that verification in a sketch intrinsically involves two aspects: finding and fulfillment. Up to now we have been made to see the character of rational truth {293} as a truth which has those two moments: finding and fulfillment. But those two moments are different, and each imposes its own stamp upon truth. Hence their unity is what constitutes the intrinsic nature of rational truth. What, ultimately, is this intrinsic character of rational truth, i.e., the intrinsic unity of finding and fulfillment? This is the question now facing us.

To answer this question it is above all necessary to focus on each one of the two moments of verification, that of finding and that of fulfilling. Let us repeat, then, what has already been said but in a more systematic way. Only then will we be able to confront the question of the internal unity of these two moments, i.e., the intrinsic character of rational truth.

To do this with some degree of clarity, it is necessary to repeat certain ideas expounded earlier at greater length.

1. *Verification as finding*. Truth consists, formally, in the mere actualization of the real in intellection; and this actualization is truth. The actualized real, then, makes truth. We have seen that there are two essential forms of truth: real or simple truth, also referred to as elemental truth, and dual truth, that which consists in the coincidence of the aspects of dual actualization. There is dual truth when those two moments coincide; it is what I have repeatedly called ‘coincidental truth’. And this coincidental truth in turn assumes three forms: authentication, veridictance, and verification. Now, we are not dealing with a simple classification of truths, but with a unitary structure, i.e., each form of truth presupposes the previous one and is founded upon it. Every coincidental truth of authentication is grounded upon real truth, and involves {294} in an authentication sense real truth itself. Every truth of veridictance is founded upon the truth of authentication, and involves in a veridictance sense the truth of authentication, and therefore real truth. Every truth of verification is founded upon the truth of veridictance and formally contains this truth in a veridictant way; hence it

involves veridictance in a verifying way, as well as authentication and real truth. I shall later return to this subject at length. But it was necessary to sketch it here with regard to rational truth, since every rational truth is founded upon a truth of veridictance, i.e., formally contains one or several affirmations, and with them, a real truth. Now, here is where one finds the irreducible novelty of rational truth with respect to the truth of veridictance. Since rational truth formally involves affirmations, one might think that rational truth consisted in that fact that when my affirmations about the real meet the real, they conform to it. Rational truth would thus be simple truth of veridictance. This is the idea behind all of classical philosophy. But rational truth is not that. To be sure, rational truth formally involves affirmations, but does not consist in “being” in conformity with the real. Certainly without that conformity, there would not be rational truth. But rational truth is not mere conformity. Rational truth is the “finding” of conformity; but the finding in itself is not *conformity* but something which involves conformity, albeit in a new way, viz. *confirmation*. The rational truth of affirmation does not consist in conformity of what is affirmed *with* the real, but in the confirmation of what is affirmed *by* the real. Every rational truth is sought, and is the inquiry for something which has been sketched out. And the finding is not simple conformity with the affirmation sketched with the real, but the “confirmation” of the sketch by {295} the real. If there were no sketch, there would be no finding, nor for that matter rational intellection. It is on account of this that finding is something different than simple agreement or simple conformity.

But let us understand this correctly. The word ‘confirmation’ can have two meanings. It can mean a type of ratification of a true affirmation: one already has a secure truth, and seeks to ratify this truth by another route. Confirmation would then be ratification of a truth already affirmed as true. But finding is not confirmation in this sense, for a very simple reason: prior to the finding, what is affirmed is not affirmed as true, but as a simple sketch of truth. Then ‘confirmation’ means something more radical than ratification; it means giving the character of *secure* truth to what has been sketched as true. What has been sketched out is secure “with” the found real. This is the “with” of confirmation. It is not ratification of a truth but the very constitution of truth. Confirmation is finding insofar as it gives security. Finding is not a chance stumbling upon what is sought, but rather *constitutive confirmation*, constitution of the security of what has been sketched in and by the real. *It is not ratifying confirmation.*

Now, the real is actualized in confirmation. Simple “af-firmation” becomes “con-firmation”. Here we have rational truth as finding. *Veridictance “is manifested” in conformity; verification “confirms” in finding.* Reason not only affirms but confirms in finding. Reason is not formally reason because it affirms, but rather affirmation is formally rational because it constitutes the truth of an encounter or finding in constitutive confirmation. The sketch is the affirmation of what “could be”. Rational intellection is the confirmation of the “could {296} be” in and by what it is. The finding is a moment of *inquiring intellection* of what the real “could be” in the world. And because of this it is intellection of a real thing in its ground; it is *grounding intellection*. This ground is what constitutes in-depth reality, where in depth formally consists in establishment in the world. Rational intellection is in-depth intellection of the real actualized in its ground. All of these formulae are identical. And their intrinsic formal identity is just the essence of rational intellection as finding in constitutive confirmation.

This is verification as finding.

It is not easy to choose an adequate designation for this finding which is constitutive of rational truth. Nevertheless, it is necessary or at least extremely convenient to have one, for greater clarity in what I am now going to expound. For it, let us consider that every confirmation involves affirmations. And the affirmations have always been considered as proper to the logos. Then one might be able to call rational truth ‘truth of a logos’, i.e., logical truth. This is extremely risky because it might easily lead one to maintain the idea that the rational part of truth is the subject of logic; rational truth would then be a truth which is logically founded. And that would be a serious error, one which I have repeatedly pointed out in the course of this book. The fact is that the expression ‘logical truth’ has two meanings. It can mean that the truth of the logos is logical in the sense that the essence of the logos consists in predicative affirmation. Now in this sense, to say that rational truth is logical truth is a great falsehood. It is what, since the very beginning of the book, I have called *logification of intelligence*. Rather, one must {297} follow the opposite path, viz. seeing in the logos the mode of intellectual actualization of the real. The logos must be understood with respect to intellection; this is the *intelligization of the logos*. In such case, ‘logical truth’ means truth of the real actualized in the logos. Then, clearly, rational truth is logical truth because verification is a mode of truth-making in a twofold way which involves the logos. Naked reality is not actualized in intellection as logos. Rational truth, on the other hand, is not actualized formally as logos, but involves logos. Now,

it is in this sense, and only in this precise and exclusive sense—I insist upon these adjectives—that I say that by being dual actualization in confirmation, rational truth is logical truth in the sense of truth of a reality which in one of its aspects makes truth in logos. This is not the best expression, but lacking a better one I shall employ it in the final pages of this chapter to designate not “the” rational intellection but only an aspect of it, that aspect by which rational intellection involves affirmations, i.e., involves logos. This is truth as finding.

But here is where the second moment of verification appears. Truth is finding of something which is sought through sketching. Then verification is not just confirmative finding but fulfillment of what has been sketched. And this is the essential point.

2. *Verification as fulfillment.* Fulfillment of what? Of what has been sketched out. But, what is it, formally, that has been sketched out? In what does the fulfillment consist, and what is then the character of truth as fulfillment?

a) *What the sketched out is formally.* Although we have already dealt with this question, let us here recall the ideas that are essential for the subject at hand. Rational intellection is {298} actuality of the real not in an *act* of intellection but in intellectual *activity*. It is intellectual activity “toward” the grounding real, in a “toward” determined by the real itself apprehended as real already, and which is what we now seek to understand in its ground. It is in this moment of the “toward” that one intellectually knows the real in thinking actuality; and therefore reality is intellectually known then as reality. But the real itself, intellectually known as worldly reality, is formally given by that mode of the real that is the unreal. The unreal is then entirely inscribed within reality. This inscribing has two moments, or if one wishes, two aspects. On one hand we say that reality is actualized in an intellection, though not in an intellection which is necessarily empty, but in one which concretely consists in what, without reservation, I have called (as we commonly say), “my ideas”. Through this actualization of reality in “my ideas”, their content is intellectually realized as mere content of the idea in reality. These two moments taken together constitute the *unreal*. In themselves, the ideas are “a-real”. They are realized through the actualization of reality in them. Therefore the unreal, by reason of the ideas, is a free creation of mine; and in virtue of that, I say that creating does not consist in giving reality to my ideas but in giving my ideas to reality. The unreal is inscribed, then, entirely within reality by those two moments of actualization and realization. For the purposes of our problem, this

inscribing can have two modes. One consists in the fact that the unreal is what the real “could be”. It is, as we saw, an intellection of the real in drawing back. The “could be” is inscribed in reality in a very precise way, in the *unreal mode* (not in the grammatical sense but in the sense which I just explained). But the unreal can be inscribed in the real in another form, viz. the unreal as {299} reality of what the real “could be”. This “could be” is not a mere abstract possibility, but something different and much more positive: it is intellection in *potential mode* (I repeat the same thing here I said with respect to the unreal mode). The “could be” is not, in itself, “possible”, but “possibilant”, making possible. Therefore this “could be” is not intellectually known in a movement of drawing back, but in a sketching out of a progression toward the ground of the real. What is formally sketched out is, then, the possibilitation of the real *qua* possibilitant. And this possibilitant or making possible is an internal system of fundamental moments, i.e. their intellection is a “construction” of possibilitation. To facilitate this expression, let us here employ the word ‘possibilities’, in plural, as opposed to what is merely “possible”.

Let us now ask ourselves what it is that these possibilities possibilitate. The sketch, as I said, is above all a construction of what the real “could be” in its in-depth reality. Therefore the possibilities possibilitate, above all, the real in its worldly reality. The actualization of the world in intellectual activity is actualization of possibilities of a ground. It is not that these possibilities come before the real, but that they are the very ground by which the real is a moment of the world.

But these possibilities are not limited to being possibilities of the real, because this system of possibilities is freely sketched out, freely constructed. In virtue of this, the sketching activity is *appropriation* of the possibilities in a free option. This is the essence of the sketch as intellection. With it, the possibilities are not only what possibilitates the real, but also what possibilitates, at one and the same time, the real and my thinking intellection of the real. In this aspect they are my possibilities; what possibilitates the real {300} is constituted in possibility from my thinking. Upon being appropriated by me, the possibilities which possibilitate the real in the world possibilitate at one and the same time my rational intellection. Neither primordial apprehension of reality, authentication, nor veridictance are the terminus of appropriation. Verification, on the other hand, is formally the terminus of appropriation. One appropriates, I repeat, the possibilities of the real in intellection. Now, just on account of this, rational intellection is not just sketching; it is fulfillment of what is appropriated.

b) *What is fulfillment?* My rational intellection is, then, first and foremost actualization of the real in accordance with my sketched out possibilities. And this actualization is just the essence of fulfillment. Neither authentication nor veridictance are, formally, fulfillment. But verification is formally fulfillment, because we are not dealing with the fact that what is fulfilled may be the outcome of an intellection which is sought. This search, *qua* search of an intellectual act, can be common to every intellection whatsoever regardless of its formal nature. But verification, as I have already said, is not the search of intellection, but intellection which is formally inquiring, intellection in the process of searching. Inquiry pertains to the formal content of the intellection itself. And this is exclusive to rational intellection. Neither authentication nor veridictance are intellection in inquiry. Neither of these two intellections consists in appropriation of sketched out possibilities. But verification does. The fulfillment of what has been appropriated is not a characteristic either of act or of activity, but the actuality of what has been intellectually known in that activity *qua* possibility of its own actualization. Intellection is actualization of the real in intelligence. And when the intellection is rational, then the real is actualized in {301} the form of a fulfillment of a sketch. This fulfillment itself consists in realizing the possibilities sketched out and appropriated. Therefore this actualization is what, with complete semantic and etymological rigor, should be called *fulfilled actualization*.

Now, intellectual actuality is strictly common to what is intellectually known and to intellection itself. That we have already seen. Insofar as it is actuality of the real intellectually known in the fulfilled way, it comprises the very essence of rational truth. Therefore rational truth *qua* truth is the fulfillment in the real of what has been appropriately sketched out by intellection itself. This is the essential difference between conformity and confirmation. The fulfillment, and only the fulfillment, is confirmation. And conversely, confirmation is fulfilled actuality. And because of this rational truth *qua* fulfillment has its own intrinsic character.

c) *Character of truth as fulfillment.* We have seen that as finding, rational truth has a logical character in a very precise sense, which I have already explained, in the sense of actualization in a logos. In this respect rational truth is logical truth. Now, as fulfillment, rational truth has a different character, inseparable from the former but different from it. In fact, rational truth as fulfillment is the realization of possibilities. And every actualization of possibilant possibilities, whether intellectual or not, has a very precise character. On one hand, it is realized actualization

by a potency (let us call it that) of things, and by a potency of mine, the intellectual potency. In this sense that realization is a fact. But on the other hand, when the sketch of a possibilant possibility mediates between a simple potency and actualization, the realization is more than a fact, it is a *happening*. {302} The realization is at one and the same time fact and happening; but being a happening is not formally the same as being a fact. While every happening is a fact, not every fact is a happening. The fact is actuation; the happening is actualization. The fact is *actuation* of “potencies”; the happening is realized *actualization* of possibilities. As it is in the realization of possibilities that the essence of the historical consists, it follows that the character of rational truth *qua* happening is what formally constitutes the very essence of the historical part of this truth.

Now, rational intellection, by being fulfillment, is formally historical, since fulfillment is realization of possibilities. Rational truth has this character of historicity. Historicity is an intrinsic character of rational intellection, of rational truth. But as we had to clarify in what the character of rational truth consists as finding, to avoid serious errors, so we must now clarify the fact that rational truth is historical.

That rational truth is historical does not mean in any way whatsoever that rational truth pertains to history. That is to say, it does not mean that rational truth has history. Clearly it does so, and to affirm that is a trivality. But “to be” history is not to be “historical”. Neither does it mean that rational truth, besides having history, is historically conditioned. It is obvious that this is so, as we see in science, for example. Not in just any epoch can the same experiments be sketched out, etc. But here we are not dealing with that; we are not dealing with the fact that rational truth has history nor with the fact that it is historically conditioned; rather, we are dealing with the fact that rational truth is formally historical in itself inasmuch as it is truth. That means, first of all, that its {303} historicity is an intrinsic and formal character of rational truth *qua* truth.

But even with all this, it is necessary to clarify concepts still more. On the one hand, one must shun thinking that rational truth *qua* truth is true of something historical. This, as is obvious, is radically false, because the real *qua* real does not have to be historical. Some galaxies, a star, or a mathematical object are not historical realities *qua* realities. Therefore when the real is historical, rational truth is doubly historical: it is historical because the real in this case is something historical; moreover, it is historical by virtue of being a rational actualization. Only

this latter is what is proper to rational truth *qua* truth. That rational truth is historical does not, then, consist in its being true of something historical. But neither does it consist in being a truth which, *qua* truth, depends upon intellectual knowing itself *qua* act of mine. And this is so for two reasons. In the first place, intellection is not necessarily historical, and even if it were, this historicity of my act does not pertain to the formal content of the rational truth. In the second place, the historicity of intellection does not consist in the vital unity of intellectual action and of all the vital structures, regardless of the mode in which this vital unity and its concretion may be understood. However much one stresses this vital aspect of the historicity of the intellectual act, it is still an extrinsic aspect to the truth of what is intellectually known as true, since it is an historicity of intellectual actions *qua* actions. All of this pertains to the order of activity. The historicity with which we are now dealing is on the other hand a formal characteristic of rational truth *qua* truth, and pertains to the order of actuality. And it does not consist in thinking that what is {304} actualized is always historical reality, nor in thinking that the very mode of intellectual action is historical. That rational truth is historical *qua* truth consists in the actualization of the real in intellection being *fulfilled* actualization. Historicity is here a mode of actuality. It is not a mode of activity.

But this is not all, because in turn this formal and intrinsic historicity does not consist in being merely a dynamic characteristic. To be sure, every truth of veridictance is, as we saw, a dynamism of conformity toward adequation. But rational truth is not just a movement of a phase of conformity of truth to another phase; rather, it is the fulfillment, in each of these phases, of its progression. Intellectual progression is a sketch of possibilitant possibilities; its actualization is fulfilled intellectual actuality. And it is in this that rational truth formally consists. It is an actualization of possibilities, an actualization of the “could be”. And the historicity of rational truth does not, therefore, consist in *movement*, either temporary or temporal, of an actuality; rather, it consists in a *mode of constitution* of the actuality of the real, in being actuality made possible, a fulfilled actuality. In this respect rational truth is formally and intrinsically historical truth.

Therefore: (1) Historicity here is a mode of actualization, not a mode of action or actuity; (2) this mode is fulfillment, not dynamic conformity. That is the meaning of the expression, “historicity is actualization, fulfilled actuality; rational truth is fulfilled truth”.

In summary, rational truth has on the one hand a

character of finding; it is logical truth. On the other, it has a character of fulfillment; it is fulfilled truth, {305} historical truth. What is the unity of these two characteristics? That is the last question which I posed.

3. *The unity of rational truth.* This unity is essential. To see that, we must recall once more that the truth of rational intellection is a truth of inquiring intellection. But this, while necessary, is not sufficient; we must pin down the intrinsically unitary nature of rational truth in this intellection. Only by occupying ourselves with these two questions will the unity of rational truth be clarified.

A) *Rational truth, truth of an inquiring intellection.* Rational truth is, as we have seen, logical and historical. But this “and” can give rise to a fatal error, because one might think that rational truth is at once logical and historical. In such case, the “and” would be a copulative “and”. This is not completely wrong, but it is not correct, either, because rational truth is not at once logical and historical; rather, it is *indivisibly*, i.e., at once logical truth and historical truth. Logicity and historicity are two aspects which are not just indivisible, but mutually co-determining of the unity of rational truth. The “and” then means intrinsic indivisible unity.

a) To see what this means, let us recall the outcome of our previous analysis. As truth of inquiring intellection, rational truth is *truth as sketched out*. And the truth of a sketch is verification, i.e., consists in the real truth-making, in the real giving of truth, in a sketching intellection. This verification is finding and fulfillment, not along the lines of a copulative “and”, but in a radical way in each of those two moments. The real as sketched out is found in fulfilling, and is fulfilled by finding. Finding is confirmation, and fulfillment is {306} making possible. Therefore something is confirmed by making possible and is made possible by confirming. The real makes truth in a possibilitant confirmation and in confirming possibilitation. The unity of rational truth consists in the identity of both of these formulae. Each of the two (historicity and logicity) intrinsically and formally involves the other *indivisibly*. That is, rational truth is historically logical (fulfilling), and is logically historical (finding). Such is the intrinsic and formal unity of rational truth. The logical portion of rational truth consists in historical fulfillment; and the historical portion of rational truth consists in logical finding. This is the radical and formal identity of the logical and the historical in every rational intellection. It is an identity which shines through in the sketching character of rational intellection as such, i.e., in inquiring intellection as such. Sketching is the manner of intellectual knowing in the inquiring sense. The unity of the logical

and of the historical in rational truth shines through, I repeat, in the inquiring character of this intellection. Each form and mode of reality has its own rational truth. ‘Rational’ does not mean something proper to conceptualization or to some theory, but is purely and simply the found real as confirming its intrinsic possibilitation.

b) But, In what, positively, does this unity which thus “shines through” consist? We have already answered: in being actuality. Verification is a mode of actualization, i.e., a mode of truth-making. The unity of the logical and of the historical in rational intellection is found, then, in the moment of actuality. What actuality are we talking about? The actuality of the truth-making of the real in thinking activity. Now, this is the formal definition of reason. The identity of the logical and the historical which shines through in the sketch is {307} the very essence of reason. The logical and the historical are “one” *indivisibly* because they are indivisible moments of that mode of intellection which is reason. It is reason itself which, intrinsically and formally is logico-historical or historico-logical. Now, reason is sentient intelligence activated by the real itself. In sentient intellection one senses reality in the field manner in its diverse modes; therefore one senses, in the field manner, the real in that mode which is the “toward”. And this “toward” has an “intra-field” aspect, through which the intellection takes on a dynamic character. But this “toward” also has a “trans-field” aspect; this is the “toward” of the whole field of reality toward reality *simpliciter*, i.e., toward the world. The field is the sensed world. There are not two independent “toward’s”. The worldly “toward” is the actuality of the field real, but as “pro-blem”. Worldly reality is the problem of field reality. The actuality of the world has the concrete form of “pro-blem”. A problem is not a “question” but a mode of actualization; it is the actuality of the real as hurled into the intellection (from the Greek *ballo*, to hurl). And this hurling has a very precise structure: it is the trans-field “toward” of intra-field reality. A problem is just the mode of actualization of the reality of the world. It is not that worldly reality itself is a problem, but the mode in which this reality is given to us as real in actuality.

In virtue of this, intellection takes on the character of progression. This “toward” is what I have called “giving one pause to think”. Therefore inquiring intellection is sentient intellection in action. That is, reason is a modulation of sentient intellection and therefore is constitutively *sentient reason*. By virtue of being so, reason is inquiring and sketching. And in virtue of this, it is a logico-historical reason {308} (or historico-logical) because it is intellectual actuality of reality in the form of a

problem. The unity of the logical and the historical in rational truth is then but the very unity of sentient reason. Only a sentient reason intellectually knows worldly reality as a problem, because reality as a problem is but reality sensed in a worldly “toward”. And it is because of this that there is and must be inquiry and hence sketching. In virtue of that, rational intellection is intrinsically logical and historical, precisely and formally because it is intellection of sentient reason, i.e. because it is the actuality of worldly reality as a problem. The unity, I repeat, of the logical and the historical in rational truth—and only there—is but the unity of sentient reason. And this unity consists in being sentient intellection activated by the real. This intellection is measuring. Reason is the intellection of measure of the reality of things. And therefore sentient reason is a measuring intellection of the reality of what is of the field in the world. And in this intrinsic and formal unity of sentient intellection, activated in measuring intellection, consists intellection as sketching; and therefore in it consists the intrinsic and formal unity of the logical and of the historical in rational truth. Rational truth is historical and logical, because it is the actuality of the real as a problem, a problem which activates sentient intelligence, making of it sentient reason.

We asked ourselves what the actuality of the real in rational intellection is. It is the thinking actuality of the real; it is *actuality* in sentient reason, i.e., it is formally actuality of the real as “pro-blem”. It is in this moment of thinking actuality of the real in sentient reason, in the actuality of the real as “pro-blem”, {309} that the unity of rational truth consists. The identity of the logical and the historical consists in the actuality of reality as a problem. An intellection of the real as problem is essentially and constitutively an inquiring sketch of the measure of the real in the world of reality and is therefore logico-historical.

c) But it is necessary to go one step further. Reason is an activity of sentient intellection activated by the real itself intellectually known in that intellection. And the actuality of the real in this intellectual activity is just reason, as I have said. Therefore, as I said, the actuality of the real in reason, i.e., the actuality of reality as a problem, is a modulation of the actuality of the real in sentient intelligence. And as the proper part of sentient intellection is to give us an impression of reality, it follows that the actuality of the real in sentient reason is but a modulation of the impression of reality. What is this modulation?

In sentient intellection of primordial apprehension, we formally apprehend the real, and we impressively have

the real itself as real. Therefore as this intellection is activated by the sensed real in a “toward”, the thinking intellectual activity, reason, is already in the real. The real is not something which must be achieved by reason; reason already moves, formally and radically, in reality. Therefore I say once again, reason does not consist in going *to* reality, but in going *from* field reality *toward* worldly reality, in going toward field reality in depth. And this “in depth” consists in ground-reality. Reason is identically in-depth intellection and grounded intellection. This grounded “in depth” is apprehended in the form of a “toward” from sensed reality itself in sentient intellection. Therefore sentient intellection, as we already saw when dealing with the origin {310} of reason, gives us the moment of reality in impression in three modes. The primary and radical mode is reality as mere otherness of what is sensed as something *de suyo*. It is reality as *formality*. But this reality has, intrinsically and formally, the moment of the field “toward”. Thanks to it, reality is the medium in which dynamically we intellectually know what is of the field. It is the impression of reality not as simple formality, but as *mediality*. But the “toward” sends us toward what is trans-field, toward the worldly. And in this other aspect, reality is not just a medium of intellection but the in-depth ground which mediates the simple reality of the real. This is the impression of reality not as formality and mediality, but as *measure*. That modulation is just reason. In this intellection, things already apprehended as real give us the measure of their reality. Such is the very essence of reason, viz. to intellectually know the measure of the reality of real things. Reality given in impression of reality is formality, mediality, and measure. These are not, as I already said, three *uses* of the impression of reality, but three *modes* of a single impression of reality. Reason is a modulation of the impression of reality, and therefore it moves, radically, in reality and is determined by it not just by the demand for evidence (that would be proper only to mediality), but by what I have called the *coercive force* of the real.

And here is the radical and formal unity of the logical and the historical in rational truth: it is, I repeat, the actuality of the real as “pro-blem”. This unity is what constitutes sentient reason. In fact, reason consists in measuring the reality of things; in it real things give us the measure of their reality. But reason measures reality in accordance with {311} canonic principles which are sensed in the field manner. As canonic and measuring, the principle is logical. In and of itself, the canonic principle is not just intellectually known, but also sensed. Only a sentient reason is, formally, a measuring of the real. And because of this, measurement itself takes place

sentiently in fulfillment of something found, also sentiently. The sensed measure is therefore a sketched measure, and hence is intrinsically logico-historical. Reason is formally sentient; it is sentient intellection of the measure of the reality of things. And it is on account of this that its truth is logico-historical and is verification of measure. The sentient *facere* of verification makes *verum* something formally logico-historical. Because of this, that unity is but the precipitate of a sentient reason. Sentient reason is the measuring modulation of the impression of reality. And by being so, it is at once logical and historical, because it is at once inquiring intellection of the measure of reality in an impression of reality. The activation of sentient intelligence by the real, in fact, is an inquiring activity of the measure of the reality of things. Therefore the truth of this intellection, i.e., verification, is formally logico-historical. Sentient reason is a measuring (i.e., logico-historical) modulation of sentient intellection.

What is the nature of this rational intellection *qua* intellection?

B) *The nature of rational intellection.* Truth, as I have been constantly repeating, is the truth-making of the real in intellection. This truth-making takes place in diverse ways, as we have seen. These diverse ways constitute so many modes of sentient intellection. Each of them is a modulation of the previous one, because each mode of {312} truth is a modulation of the impression of reality. When the real makes truth in a measuring sketch of reality, i.e., in sentient reason, we have that modulation of the impression of reality which is the measure. The mode of making the real true by this modulation is verification. Verification is *truth as sketched*. And the intellection of the real as verification is what constitutes reason. But that is a conception of rational truth along the lines of the intellectually known real. Now, just as the mode of making the real true in sentient reason is a modulation of the impression of reality, so also this mode of making the real true modulates intellection itself *qua* intellection. Intellection, in fact, is mere actuality of the real. Therefore the modulation of actuality is *eo ipso* modulation of sentient intellection. What is this modulation of intellection *qua* intellection? Here we have our last question in this problem.

Now, intellection of the real as sketched, in verification, is just what constitutes *knowledge*. To know is to intellectually know what something is in reality as a moment of the world. It is the mode of intellection of the measure of reality of a real thing; it is to intellectually know what something is in reality. Knowledge is that modulation of sentient intellection which intellectually

knows the measure of the reality of what is sensed, and is the intellection which consists in intellectually knowing rationally. Now, as rational truth is intrinsically and formally logico-historical, it follows that every knowledge as such is intrinsically and formally logico-historical.

It is so in the strict sense which we explained when dealing with rational truth. Therefore to affirm that all knowledge is logico-historical intellection is not in any sense whatsoever that which is usually called *historicism*. Historicism consists {313} in conceptualizing knowledge and its truth as a more or less relative moment, as a truth more or less relative to history understood as movement. Therefore it consists in affirming that the truth of knowledge is relative to a moment of history. And this is unacceptable, because the historicity of knowledge is not a movement but an intrinsic and formal characteristic of intellection itself *qua* logically true. That we have already explained. Knowledge is truth as sketched and is therefore *intellection fulfilled in finding*. Hence, if indeed it is true that knowledge “has” a history, it does so only because knowledge “is” formally true in fulfillment. Therefore the unity of the logical and the historical in rational intellection is what formally constitutes knowledge.

a) This brings us to stress the very idea of knowledge. Up to now we have arrived at three ideas of knowledge; and these three I have employed indiscriminately. But to finish the discussion, it is now fitting to examine the radical unity of these three ideas. We said that knowledge is in-depth inquiring intellection; it is intellection of the ground, and it is intellection in reason. Now, these three ideas are identical; each just makes the previous one explicit. Knowledge is in in-depth inquiring intellection. This means that activity by the real itself—apprehension in sentient intellection—goes from the field real to the worldly real. And herein consists profundity: it is the worldly base of the sensed real. This base is formally reality, since the world is reality *simpliciter*. But it is not something which “is there”; rather, the mode of being there is to ground: reality *qua* worldly {314} is “ground-reality”. The base is nothing but grounding reality. Knowledge as in-depth intellection is grounding intellection. Therefore to say that knowledge is grounding intellection is but to make explicit the formula by which knowledge is in-depth intellection. In-depthness is just the nature of the grounding. And what is this grounding? It consists in the sensed real as a moment of the world, as a moment of reality *simpliciter*. And then ground-reality is just the measure of the reality of the real. And this measure is just what we call ‘reason’. Therefore knowledge is intellection in reason, in measure. And this just

makes explicit the character of the ground and hence of profundity. The three formulae, then, are not three expressions of a fundamental identity; each, in fact, just makes the previous one explicit. Hence we can always use the third as a summary of the first two: knowledge is *intellection in reason*. And the identity of these three formulae is precisely knowledge, inquiring intellection.

b) I say “intellection ‘in’ reason”, and not “intellection ‘with’ reason” because reason is but a mode of intellection, i.e., a mode of mere actuality of the real in sentient intellection. Reason is not something added to intellection (that is what the “with” would express), but a modulation of intellection (just what the “in” expresses). Hence the essence of knowledge is found in the modulation of making the real true. Consequently, knowledge is not a judgement or a system of judgements, but formally a mode of actuality of the real in intellection. The idea of knowledge must be conceptualized as a mode of truthifying, as a mode of actuality, of that mode of actuality of the real which is the “pro-blem”. {315} I repeat, a problem is not an intellectual question but a mode of actuality of the real. Only because reality is actualized as a problem, only because of that can there be and must there be questions. It would be a serious error to conceptualize reason in the mode of logos, and above all in the mode of predicative logos. That would be a logification of knowledge. On the contrary, the logos itself (in all of its forms, including the predicative), is but a mode of the intellective actuality of the real. Therefore one must conceptualize knowledge as a mode of truth-making, to wit, a truth-making of the real in the actuality of a “pro-blem”, and not as a judgement or system of judgements, which has been the great error of all of modern philosophy, above all Kant.

c) To know is then a mode of actuality of the real, a mode of truth-making. Therefore it is, as I said, a modulation of sentient intellection. Hence all that knowledge has of intellection, and therefore of truth, it owes to being a modulation of a previous intellection, ultimately to being a modulation of the primordial apprehension of reality. From this latter it receives all of its possibility and all of its scope as truth. Primordial apprehension is not a rudimentary knowledge; rather, knowledge is intellection subsequent to primordial apprehension. Knowledge is born from an insufficient intellection and terminates in an ulterior intellection. Thus, from the point of view of the content of what is intellectually known, the content of knowledge can be at times—though not always—richer than the primary intellection, and richer than the primordial apprehension. But the entire scope of knowledge, what makes knowledge be knowledge, is the moment of reality of what is known. Now, this moment is not produced by

knowledge itself, but is given to it {316} in and by primordial apprehension, by primary sentient intellection. It then follows that knowledge is not only grounded in intellection, but is also subordinated to it. Knowledge is, then, as I just said, merely *subsequent* to the intellection of primordial apprehension. An intellection, a complete primordial apprehension, will never give rise to knowledge, nor will it require any knowledge whatsoever. Knowledge as a mode of intellection, i.e., of mere actuality of the real, is essentially inferior to primary intellection, to the primordial apprehension of the real. Knowledge is, as I said, a modulation of this intellection. And this intellection is, as I have just reiterated, mere actuality of the real; and therefore knowledge is a modulation in a problem of the actuality of the real. And this actuality thus modulated is unitarily, intrinsically, and formally, logico-historical actuality. Hence it follows that far from being the supreme form of intellection, knowledge is (by being rational actuality of the real, of a logico-historical nature) an intellection which is inferior to the mere intellection of primordial apprehension.

Knowledge is, I repeat, the successor to primordial apprehension, and this character of successor consists precisely and formally in being a logico-historical actualization of reality actualized as a problem.

* * *

Here, then, we have the intrinsic character of rational truth. Rational truth is an intrinsic and formal thinking actuality of the real as a problem. It is then a

truth of logico-historical nature. This actualization is reason. Reason consists in the intellection of the sentient measure of {317} the reality of real things. And this mode of intellection is what constitutes knowledge. It is because of this that rational truth is logico-historical truth. And as such it is a modulation subsequent to an intellection; hence the unity of truth. The primary form of truth is real truth. When it is distended in the field, reality is actualized in a dual fashion. This dual actuality is actualization in the form of authentication and veridictance. Authentication and veridictance are real truth itself actualized in the field manner, i.e., distended. Finally, as the duality is also trans-field, real truth itself is actualized in the form of verification. Each form of truth formally includes the previous ones, and therefore always formally includes real truth.

Intellection begins in primordial apprehension, and founded therein is activated in cognizant reason, whose rational truth formally consists in reversion to that primordial apprehension, from which indeed it never left. Reason is sentient reason; it is a modulation of constitutively sentient intellection. From this it is born, therein it moves, and therein it concludes.

In the same case it is, as we saw, logos by virtue of being sentient. This already manifests how much inquiring reason, like the field intellection of the logos and the primordial apprehension of reality, despite their essential intrinsic differences, still constitute a profound unity, the unity of sentient intellection. In this way, the analysis of the modulation of intellection puts before our eyes the profound unity of that intellection. From it we started. Therefore at the end of our analysis it would be good to return to the unity of intellection as the general conclusion of the entire study. {318}

GENERAL CONCLUSION

THE UNITY OF INTELLECTION

Throughout the course of this study we have examined what sentient intellection is and what its modulations are, viz. primordial apprehension of a real thing, intellection of a real thing among others in a field (field intellection, logos), intellection of each thing already apprehended in the field but actualized now as a moment of the reality of the world (reason). In the first modal form, a real thing is actualized for us in and by itself as real; in the second, we move toward an actualization in logos, where the now-real thing is in reality; in the third modalization what the real thing is in reality is actualized for us as a moment of the world, i.e., we intellectually know the measure of the reality of that thing *qua* real. Reality in and by itself, what it is in reality, and the measure of its reality: here we have the three modes of sentient intellection of each thing.

In these three modes, each one of the last two is based upon the previous one and formally includes it without being identified with it. This means that intellection has a peculiar unity; and it will be necessary, then, to say in what this unity formally consists. {320} But that is not enough, because this unity confers upon intellection a unitary quality, so to speak. We do not have intellection on one hand and diverse modalities on the other; rather, in every case, we have intellection as a whole, because its diverse modalizations are imposed by the real itself from its primordial apprehension. What does this unity mean? We must, then, examine two questions: the unity of intellection as a problem, and the intrinsic structure of this unity of intellection. Those are the themes of the two chapters comprising this General Conclusion.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF INTELLECTION

It is necessary to pin down, with some rigor, what the unity of intellection is in itself.

It is not some *unity of stratification*. Primordial apprehension, logos, and reason are not three strata of intellection, even if one adds that each is based upon the previous one. Nor are we dealing with the fact that we apprehend something as real and then advance to a higher level, that of what sensed things are in reality, and then finally we ascend to pure and simple worldly reality. Primordial apprehension, field intellection, and rational intellection are not three levels or strata which comprise some type of geology of intellection. Such a conception is nourished upon the idea that each intellection, i.e. the primordial apprehension, the field intellection, and the rational intellection each has its own complete unity, independently of the unity of the other two modes of intellection. Hence intellection would move in each of these planes without having anything to do with the other two. The most that could be said is that each stratum rests upon the previous one, in a way which is ultimately extrinsic; each plane would have its own {322} exclusive structure. Strictly speaking, we would then be dealing with three unities; the unity of intellection would then be purely additive. But this is incorrect; each one of those things we called 'strata' not only presupposes the previous one as support, but includes its intrinsically. Primordial apprehension is formally present and included in the logos, and both intellections are formally present and included in reason. They are not three unities but a single unity. And the fact is that we are not dealing with three *planes* of intellection but three *modalities* of a single intellection. They are three modes and not three planes. To be sure, each mode has its own irreducible structure. It would be false to attribute to primordial apprehension the structure of the logos or of reason. But by being modalities of a the same intellectual function, they confer a precise structure upon this unity. What is it?

One might think that because there are three distinct modalities, they would at least be successive modalities.

We would then be dealing with three *successive modes* of intellection. As modes they would be modes of something like an underlying subject, of the intelligence. First we would apprehend something as real. Later, conserving this apprehension, we would intellectually know what this real thing is in reality, and finally, conserving the real and what it is in reality, we would intellectually know it as a moment of the world. But this is not correct, because field intellection does not come *after* primordial apprehension but is *determined* by it. And this determination has two aspects. On one hand, there is the moment by which primordial apprehension determines the logos. However, primordial apprehension is not just *prior* to the logos but is logos *inchoatively*, albeit only inchoatively. We are not dealing with mere anteriority but with inchoateness. But there is another aspect. What is determined, logos, then involves {323} primordial apprehension as something in which this latter *unfolds*. So there is not just anteriority but inchoation and unfolding. The same must be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of reason: logos, and therefore primordial apprehension, determine rational intellection, which is then inchoatively determined by these two intellections as an unfolding of them. The modes are not merely successive but have a more radical unity.

One might think, finally, that these three modes, thus mutually implicated, at least comprise a *lineal* unity. That is, we would be dealing only with a trajectory of that which we could vaguely call 'intellective knowing'. But the fact that there is a trajectory is not the same as this trajectory constituting the formal essence of the three modes of intellection. Each mode not only unfolds the previous one and is inchoatively in the following one, but is *formally* included in the following one as well. This formal character I have been stating monotonously, but without emphasizing it. Now we must occupy ourselves with it, because if matters are this way, then it is clear that in virtue of this inclusion, the prior mode is in some way qualified by the following one. Each mode has its own intrinsic structure, but by virtue of being formally in-

cluded in the following one, it is thereby affected by it. So we are not dealing with just any type of trajectory of intellectual knowing, but with a growing, a *maturation*. There is a trajectory of intellectual knowing, but it is grounded upon something more refined, in a maturation. The trajectory is only a derived and secondary aspect of maturation itself. The unity of the three modes is the unity of a maturation.

This is a structural unity. Maturity enriches, but that is because it is necessary to mature. For what? To be fully {324} what it already is. This need for maturity is thus an insufficiency. In what way? Not, to be sure, with regard to reality *simpliciter*—that has been grasped since primordial apprehension, since the first mode. But the real thus apprehended is doubly insufficient; it does not actualize to us what a thing is in reality or what it is in reality itself. Without primordial apprehension, there would be no intellection whatsoever. Each mode receives from primordial apprehension its essential scope. Logos and reason do no more than fill the insufficiency of primordial apprehension; but thanks to this apprehension—and to it alone—they move in reality. Modal maturation is not formally constitutive of intellectual knowing, but its

inexorable growth is determined by the formal structure of the first mode, of primordial apprehension of sentient intelligence. Sentient intellection, in its mode of primordial apprehension, intellectually knows, in impression, reality as formality of a thing in and of itself. This impression has different moments. In its moment of “toward”, it actualizes the respectivity of each real thing to other sensible things and to worldly reality. This respectivity is constitutively essential to the impression of reality. Therefore, although it is not formally constitutive of intellection, it is nonetheless something structurally determinant of the other two modes. This structure is then something which enriches the impression of reality, but does so not *qua* reality but in its respective terminus. But then it does not go beyond the impression of reality; rather, it determines that impression as logos and as reason. Logos and reason are incremental fulfillment of something that cannot be lost and is present as a font, the impression of formality of reality. This is the radical unity of the three modes of intellection. But that is not enough, because we may ask, in what does {325} the formal unity of this impression of reality, in its modal determinations, in its maturation, consist? Here is the question which we must treat as the conclusion of this entire study. {326}

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CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITY OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

Sentient intellection is, formally, a mere actualization of the real in accordance with what the real is *de suyo*. This formal structure determines the actualization of what the real thing is in reality, and of what it is in reality itself. These two actualizations modalize the formal part of intellection. In this modalization, the act of intellection and also intellectual knowing itself are modalized, as well as the intellectual state in which we are. What is the nature of the modalized act? What is the nature of modalized intellectual knowing itself? What is the intellectual state in which we find ourselves, in this modalized fashion? We must then expound three essential questions:

§1. The unity of the *act* of intellection.

§2. The unity of *intellectual knowing* itself.

§3. The *state* in which we find ourselves intellectually.

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§1

THE MODAL UNITY OF THE ACT

The formal structure of intellectual knowing, I must reiterate, consists in mere actualization of a real thing as real in sentient intellection. But ulteriorly, this same thing gives rise to two intellections: the intellection of what the apprehended is *in reality* (logos), and the intellection of what that which is in reality, is *in reality itself* (reason). So as not to make the expression unduly complicated, I shall forthwith designate both intellections with a single expression: the intellection of what a thing “really” is. ‘Really’ here encompasses both “in reality” and “in reality itself”. Therefore we shall deal with both intellections as if they were a single one as distinct from primordial apprehension. These two intellections, the

primordial apprehension of reality and the intellection of what really is, have the unity of being actualization of the same real thing. But they are not merely two actualizations; rather, the second is a re-actualization of the first. And this is the decisive point. Actualization determines the re-actualization, but then this latter re-actualizes, and in turn determines the first actualization. The primordial intellection of the real is then on one hand determinant of the reactualization. But in turn this re-actualization determines in some way the first actualization. This is the very essence of the “re-”. It is a “re-” in which one expresses the formal structure of the unity of the two intellections. What is this structure? {329}

To be sure, we are not dealing with an effort to do a representation of a real thing, because intellectual knowing is not representing but reactualizing. Intellectual knowing is always presenting, i.e., having what is intellectually known present. Intellection is making something “to be here-and-now *present*” insofar as it “is here-and-now”. Therefore the second intellection, by being reactualization, determines another mode of presentation. Of what? Of the same real thing. This is re-actualization. How? In every reactualization we return from the second actualization to the first. And in this reversion consists the unity of the “re-”. How?

Reactualization is “re-turning”. That is, with the second intellection in hand we return to the first. Given the photon, we return to the color green. And in this re-turning, the second intellection involves the first. We intellectually know the color green from the photon, re-turning to this real color green from what it really is. Therefore the first intellection is as if encapsulated or enclosed in the second. The apprehension of the green is *comprehended* by virtue of the photon. Comprehending is not merely apprehending, but encompassing something. Here, ‘to comprehend’ has the etymological sense of *comprehendere*. Comprehension is what is going to constitute the mode of a real thing being newly present. It is a peripheral circumscription, so to speak, of the primordial

apprehension of the real. This comprehension of a real thing incorporates what it really is; the photon is incorporated into the color green. And this incorporation has a precise name, viz. *comprehension*: we have *comprehended* and not just *apprehended* the real green. Here the word ‘comprehension’ does not have its etymological meaning but rather its ordinary one, that of understanding something. The “com-prehension” of a real thing, {330} from the intellection of what it really is, makes us understand or comprehend what that real thing is. The “re-” of reactualization and its dependence on the real already actualized in primordial apprehension is what “comprehension” is. The unitary act of this intellection is then comprehension.

What, to be more precise, is this comprehension? It is fitting to address this question with some rigor.

To do this, it is convenient to conceptualize comprehension in this sense vis-à-vis other senses. To be sure, it is not what medieval philosophy called a *comprehensive science*, viz. the intellection of all that is intelligible in an intellectually known thing, because what we usually call ‘comprehending’ is not this total comprehension. And the fact is that we are but dealing with a mode of intellection according to which something *really* is.

Nor are we dealing with a logical moment of the so-called *comprehension* of notes as opposed to the *extension* of their possible subjects.

Nor does ‘to comprehend’ here mean what, in Dilthey’s philosophy, has been called *Verstehen* of a personal experience as opposed to the *explication* of it and of its content. For Dilthey, comprehension falls back upon personal experience and upon what is experienced in it. For him, personal experiences, be they explained as they may, are not thereby comprehended. Only will they be so when we have interpreted their meaning. To comprehend is, for Dilthey, *to interpret the meaning*, and conversely a meaning is interpretation of personal experience. With the law of gravity we do not comprehend the mortal fall of a man, i.e., whether it is suicide, accident, homicide, etc. Things are explained, experiences are comprehended and interpreted.

But this not adequate.

To comprehend is not to interpret; rather, to interpret is only a mode of comprehending. Moreover, as a mode of {331} comprehending it does not encompass all real things, but just some, the personal experiences of which Dilthey speaks. Now, even considering personal experiences, comprehending is not interpreting their meaning. The formal terminus of comprehension of a personal ex-

perience is not a meaning. In the idea of personal experience there is a possible ambiguity. The experience is reality. And what is comprehended is not the meaning of that reality but the reality of that meaning. The meaning is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience. What is comprehended is not the personal experience of reality but the reality of the personal experience. Meaning is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience. What is comprehended, I repeat, is not the personal experience but the reality of the personal experience *qua* reality; it is, if one wishes, the personal experiential reality, the fact that this reality has, and must have, a meaning. Then the ultimate difference, assumed by Dilthey, between explication and comprehension disappears. The problem of comprehension as such remains intact only with the problem of interpretation. Moreover, it is not just personal experiences—personal realities—which are comprehended; the same applies to all realities. Every reality intellectually known in primordial apprehension can be, and in principle must be, re-intellectually known in comprehension.

This limiting of comprehending, of *Verstehen*, to meaning can take on different characteristics, as seems to have happened in Heidegger. I say “seems to have happened” because the matter is not clear with respect to him. On the one hand, for Heidegger, *Verstehen* is interpreting. Despite all of the changes in it that one may wish to consider, it is the same idea that one finds in Dilthey, and in Rickert as well. On the other hand, *Verstehen* is at other times employed by Heidegger as a simple translation of *intelligere*, as for example in the beginning of his great work.* Now, this is untenable. *Intellectus* is not comprehension but intellection. And {332} apart from any historical and translation problem, ‘to comprehend’ is not synonymous with ‘to intellectually know’; comprehending is only a mode of intellectual knowing. There are millions of things which I intellectually apprehend, i.e., which I apprehend as real, but which I do not comprehend. In such cases there is intellection without comprehension.

Comprehension, then, is not comprehensive science or notional comprehension, nor interpretation of meaning. It is a special mode of intellectual knowing. And then we must ask ourselves what comprehending is.

We have already given the answer: in comprehension one turns to apprehending something already apprehended as real, in light of which we have apprehended what it really is. There are, then, three intellectual actualizations of the same reality. In the first place, there is

* [*Being and Time*—trans.]

the intellectual actualization of a thing as real, viz. the primordial apprehension of reality. In the second place, there is the intellectual actualization of what a real thing is really, viz. modal intellection in logos and reason. Finally, in the third place, there is the intellectual actualization of the same real thing (which was already apprehended in primordial apprehension), but modally incorporating into it what has been actualized in the intellection (logos and reason) of what it really is. This third actualization is comprehension. Comprehending is apprehending the real based on what it really is; it is intellectually knowing how the structure of a thing is determined based on what it really is. It is just the act of intellection as unitary and modal.

The question therefore consists in our saying precisely what the formal object of comprehension is. This question turns into two others: what is it that comprehension incorporates, and in what does the incorporation consist?

1. What does comprehension incorporate into {333} primordial apprehension of the real? When a real thing is apprehended in primordial apprehension as real, it is intellectually actualized in the formality of reality, both in its individual moment as well as in its field and worldly moments. The individual moment radically determines the field and worldly moments; without individual real things, there would be neither field nor reality nor world. But in turn, what is of the field and what is of the world, once determined, determine the individual. In virtue of this, the individual, field, and worldly moments comprise a unity which is not additive but rather is a *structural unity* of determination. In order to intellectually know this unity one may follow two different paths. In the first path what is individual determines what is of the field and what is of the world. The individual is not lost, but absorbed into the field and worldly moments, as a determinant of them. As we have seen, this intellection of the individual as determinant of the field and of the world is what constitutes the intellection of what, really, the individual real thing is. To intellectually know what something is really is to intellectually know what the individual real thing is in the field of reality and in the world.

But this is not the only possible path for intellection. I can also intellectually know the individual thing as determined in turn by that field and world moment which the individual thing itself has already determined. Then the structural unity takes on a different intellectual character. Upon intellectually knowing what the individual really is, the structural unity is intellectually known in the real, but only “materially”: we have intellectually known in what the real consists as *structured*. But upon intellec-

tively knowing the individual, not just as determinant but as determinant and determined, what we have intellectually known is not just the structured, but the very *nature of the structuring* of {334} the real. This is structural unity considered “formally”. What is really determined is the real structure of a thing. Then we see the radical unity of the “really” and the “real”; it is the formal structural unity of the real and really. We see a real thing based on what it really is. Now, this intellection is just comprehension. The formal terminus of comprehension is not what is structured, but the nature of the structuring itself. It is structure as formal (not just material) molding of the *in*. The nature of structure is the *ex* determined by the *in*. To comprehend is to intellectually know the nature of the structure of the real by which a thing really is. Naturally, the boundaries between intellectually knowing what something really is and comprehending what that something is, are often almost imperceptible. Therefore it is at times quite difficult to differentiate the two modes of intellection. Nonetheless these two modes are different. Their difference is not just a *de facto* difference in my intellection, but a *constitutive* difference of human intellectual knowing. To see that, let us take the simplest example, one which will most clearly reveal the difference in question, viz. intellectually knowing that this piece of paper is green. I intellectually know, in primordial apprehension, this piece of paper with all of its notes, including greenness. But if I affirm that “this piece of paper is green”, I not only have intellectually known the piece of paper with its note, but have intellectually known this piece of paper “among” other colors, from which only one was realized in the green piece of paper. That affirmation is therefore an intellection of what the paper, chromatically, is in reality. But I can also consider this piece of paper by saying, for example, “what green really is, is the color of this piece of paper”. This turn of phrase points up not just the mere realization of the green of this piece of paper, but the very nature of the structuring by which this piece of paper is green. That goes beyond {335} having intellectually known what the piece of paper is chromatically; it is to have comprehended the greenness of the paper. Every affirmation is the intellection of a realization; and when I intellectually know this realization as the nature of its structuring, then the structural unity is formally intellectually known—this is comprehension exactly. The trivality of the case shows that the difference between these modes of intellection is not a mere fact, but stems from the very nature of intellectual knowing, viz. from its double moment of “real” and “really”. This trivality likewise shows that the difference between intellectually knowing what something is really and comprehending what this thing is can be almost impercepti-

ble. I shall return to this point forthwith. Because of this imperceptibility, the point has generally remained unnoticed. But that this difference is only “almost” imperceptible expresses the fact that it is nonetheless a real difference.

In summary, the formal terminus of comprehension is the nature of structuring. To comprehend is to intellectually know the nature of the structuring of the real as real, to intellectually know in the real as its own internal moment, the manner in which what really is determines the structural notes of a thing. The nature of structure is internal determination. The structural unity of what is comprehended is therefore the formal unity of “real” and “really”. The intellection of this formal unity is what is incorporated into the real based on intellection of what this piece of paper is in reality. To comprehend is to “see” how what something really is, is determining, or has determined, the structure of that real thing. But, in what does this incorporation itself consist? That is the second question we must address.

2. In what does incorporation consist? Incorporation is not, to be sure, some “addition”, because what the real really is, is intellectually determined by the real itself; therefore we are not dealing with an addition to the real {336} of something from outside. Nor is this a mere “application”. We are not trying to intellectually know what something really is and then apply that intellection to the concrete real which I have in my intellection. It is not a case of application but intrinsic determination of the notes according to what they really are. To intellectually know it I must intellectually know, in a thing, how its notes are *issuing forth*, so to speak, from what a thing really is. This is just what I have called ‘the nature of structuring’. The nature of structuring does not consist merely in possessing a structure, but in intellectually knowing this structure, possessed intrinsically, as a mode of reality. And here is the difficulty. Clearly, intellection of the nature of the structuring of the real stems from intellection of the real. And as intellection is actualization, it follows that that from which it stems, and that where the nature of the structuring is intellectually known, is just that actualization. To incorporate, then, means first of all to form a body, to constitute in a certain way the corporeity of the actualization of the real. But this is not enough, because in the second place, what corporalizes this actualization is just the nature of the structuring. And in order to reach intellectual knowledge of it, we have had to go to the field and worldly moments of the real, distancing ourselves in a certain way from its strictly individual moment. It is in this distancing that we intellectually know what the real really is. Now I turn from this distancing to the individ-

ual thing. This turning is the return in which I intellectually know what the thing was in its structuring nature, i.e., I intellectually know how what it really was constitutes the very nature of the structure of the real. But then it is clear that the return consists not in a mere “returning” to the real, but in intellectually recovering, from what a thing really is, its structure and its notes. And therein consists the corporeity of actualization; it is {337} recovery of the fullness of the real. This fullness consists just in nature of the structuring. Therefore the incorporation is neither addition nor application but *recovery*. In distancing from the real, I have intellectually known its structure; in the return, I have recovered what was left at a distance, viz. its nature as structuring. To comprehend a thing is to recover its notes and its nature as structuring from what it really is. It is to intellectually know how the photon determines these green notes.

Comprehension consists in this. Its formal object is the nature of structuring, and the mode of actualization of this nature is recovery. With this we have intellectually known something more than before. It is not, strictly speaking, “more”, but rather “better”—better actualization. And this is what was lacking in the primordial apprehension of reality, viz. comprehension. If we call primordial apprehension ‘intuition’—though very inappropriately, as we saw—it will be necessary to say that intuition *simpliciter* is not comprehension. Bergson always believed that intuition was comprehension. That was, in my view, one of his two serious methodological errors. Intuition is something which must be recovered for there to be comprehension. Comprehension is not intuition, but recovery of what was intuited based on what really is. The richness of intuition, an undeniable moment of it, tends to hide its poverty of comprehension.

Intellection is apprehension of the real, and therefore every intellection, even comprehensive intellection, is a maturation of primordial apprehension. And what matures in this maturation is ultimately comprehension itself. Therefore full intellection is *comprehensive apprehension*.

This is the unitary structure of modal intellection as act; it is the actualization which goes *from* the “impression of reality”, *by means of* the intellection of what “really” is, to the {338} intellection *of* the recovery of the real based on what really is.

This comprehension is not just a fact; it is a *necessity*. And it is so because the real is always intellectually known in sentient intelligence. Comprehending is, in man, comprehending sentiently, i.e., impressively. And this is what is manifested in some of the characteristics of comprehension, about which a few words are appropriate.

1. That comprehension is intrinsically and constitutively *limited*. Comprehension, as I said, is not the comprehensive science of all that is intelligible, as Medieval philosophy thought. We only comprehend something about something. And this is true in various senses.

Comprehension is limited insofar as it can only take place in *definite directions*, because what something really is, is also directionally definite. Comprehending something as interiority, as manifesting, or as actuation of something, are all different. What comprehension is in one direction may not be, and in general is not, comprehension in another. Even limited to one direction, comprehension is gradual. One can comprehend more or less, better or worse. There is, then, a limitation not only by reason of direction but also by reason of *amplitude*.

2. Moreover, there are differences by reason of the *level* to which one takes the intellection. Comprehending a real thing such as a dog at the biochemical level is not the same as comprehending it at the phylogenetic level, or at other levels. Comprehending man at the phylogenetic level is different than comprehending him socially, and so forth.

3. But above all, it is necessary to stress that there are different types of comprehension. One of them is {339} causal explanation, or explanation by means of laws. Against Dilthey it must be said that explanation itself is a mode of comprehension. Another mode is interpretation, which is not limited to meaning but includes the reality of the personal experience, etc. But the most important thing is that there are types of comprehension different from causal explanation and interpretation. As I see the matter, it is essential that we introduce a type of what we might call ‘personal causality’. The classical idea of causality (the four causes) is essentially molded upon natural things; it is a natural causality. But nature is just one mode of reality; there are also personal realities. And a metaphysical conceptualization of personal causality is necessary. The causality between persons *qua* persons cannot be fitted into the four classical causes. Nonetheless, it is strict causality. As I see it, causality is the functionality of the real *qua* real. And personal functionality is not the same as “meaning”. Persons find themselves functionally linked as personal realities, and this linking does not consist in “meaning”. I cannot here delve into this great problem of causality; suffice it to state the problem briefly so that we are able to see that comprehension can assume different types.

All of these differences of limitation, level, type, etc. are not just differences of fact, but are radically constitutive; they have their roots in the formally sentient charac-

ter of our intellection. The necessity of comprehending the real is determined by sentient intellection. Comprehending is always and only recovery, in intellection, of a real thing’s nature of structuring as sensed reality.

Here we have the unity of modal intellection as act: it is the act of comprehension. And after having examined the {340} unity of this act as a modal act, we must ask ourselves what intelligence modalized as a function of intellectual knowing is, and what intellectual knowing as modally constituted is.

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§2

THE MODAL UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING

This is the problem which concerns not the act of intellection but intellectual knowing itself as such. To employ a common expression, we could say that we are dealing with the modal unity of the intellectual faculty. *Comprehension* is the proper act of this modalized intelligence. Now, intelligence thus modalized is what should be called *understanding*. The act proper to understanding is just comprehending, i.e., understanding what something really is. As I see it, intellectual knowing and understanding are not the same. I call the capacity of apprehending something as real ‘intellectual knowing’. There are thousands of things that we intellectually know, i.e., which we apprehend as real but do not understand what they really are. Understanding is intellectually knowing something real such as it really is. In Spanish and in some other languages (but not all) we have the two words ‘intellectual knowing’ [*inteligencia*] and ‘understanding’ [*entendimiento*]. In contrast, Latin itself has only a single word, *intellectus*, to designate intellectual knowing and understanding. Understanding is, then, the intellectual knowing which understands what something, already apprehended as real, really is; i.e., what a thing is in reality (logos) and in reality itself (reason), the real thing understood in both the field manner and considered in the worldly sense. This understanding is not, then, the same as intelligence. *A posteriori* we may designate logos and reason with the single word ‘reason’, given that field, and therefore the logos, are the world as sensed, i.e., sentient reason. Then in order to conceptualize {342} what understanding is, it will be necessary to trace it out with respect to it what reason is and what intellectual knowing is.

I. *Understanding and reason*. By primordial apprehension, I apprehend a thing in its formality of reality.

And this formality, by being respective, brings us to understand the thing as a moment of the field and of the world. We thus intellectually know what the thing is really, and this intellection is reason. If I now intellectually know that same real thing *based on* what it really is, i.e., based on reason, I shall have a much richer intellection of the thing; I shall have understood it. Therefore understanding is the modal outcome of reason. For classical philosophy and for Kant, reason is the supreme form of intellection, because reason, in their view, must be the faculty of principles—assuming that a principle is a fundamental judgement—and that therefore reason would be a synthesis of judgements of the understanding. On that basis, reason would be something grounded in the understanding. But such is not the case; understanding something is only to intellectually know it based on what it really is, based on reason. Understanding is then the *outcome* of reason and not a principle of it. Understanding is the supreme form of intellection, but only along modal lines, because a principle is not a fundamental judgement but reality itself. This reality is not the patrimony of reason, but comes to it from the primordial apprehension of naked reality. Therefore understanding is the outcome of reason but only along modal lines. This brings us to the question of staking out the boundaries of understanding *vis-à-vis* not just reason but also naked intellection.

II. *Understanding and intelligence.* We understand what something really is, i.e., understanding presupposes intelligence, because the apprehension of something as real is just intelligence. The real thus apprehended, by being {343} respective, really leads to other real things both of the field and of the world. What is apprehended itself has a *content*, but also has the *formality* of reality, of the *de suyo*. This formality is thus apprehended in sentient intelligence. But its content is insufficient. Whence the necessity to go to what the thing really is. We do not go to reality, but to what the real really is. The root of this new intellection is, then, the insufficiency of the content. But with respect to the formality of reality, primordial apprehension, naked intelligence has an essential and ineluctable prerogative. From the point of view of its content, the intelligence is partially grounded in what the understanding may have investigated. But from the point of view of reality, understanding is grounded in the intelligence. Without naked intelligence there would be no understanding. Neither would there be reason. For traditional philosophy as well as for Kant, understanding is the faculty of judging. But this is not the case. Understanding is the faculty of comprehending. For Hegel, on the other hand, reason would be the principle of all intellection, not just along modal lines, but also in the direction

of naked intellection. This is a conception which ignores the problem of the modal unity of the intelligence in which the primordial apprehension of reality situates us.

In this way, ultimately, intellection has two sources. One, which is primary and supreme, is naked sentient intelligence; the other is modalized intelligence, understanding. They are not two faculties, but rather understanding is the supreme modalization of intelligence. The unity of the two dimensions is the respectivity of the real. Understanding is but sentient intelligence modalized in the field direction (*logos*) and in the worldly direction (*reason*).

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§3

THE UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING AS AN INTELLECTIVE STATE

Every act of intellection leaves us in an intellectual state, i.e., in a state of intelligence itself. Which state? That is the difficulty. To address it, we must examine three points: What is a state? What is being in an intellectual state? And What are the diverse intellectual types of this state?

I. *What is a state?* A state is always a mode of being and “staying” determined by something. It is necessary to return the idea of a state; as a difficulty, it has been absent from philosophy now for many centuries. Precisely on account of this it is necessary to conceptualize carefully what we understand by ‘state’ in this problem. For psychology, a state is a quiescent mode in which the human subject stays by virtue of an affection of things or the other moments of his psyche itself or other persons. A state is how he “is”. This is the concept of a *psychological state*. Here we are not dealing with that concept of state, for two reasons. Above all, we are not dealing with it because what is in a state, in the problem of concern here, is not a human subject but intelligence *qua* intelligence; this idea can only be extended to man as a whole insofar as he can be in turn determined by intelligence. In this respect, the state to which I am referring is more restricted than the psychological state. But that is not enough, since we are not just dealing with a mere restriction of it. And that is because—here we have the second of {345} the two reasons to which I just alluded—we are not dealing with intelligence as a structural note of human reality, but with intelligence in accordance with its formal structure, i.e., intelligence *qua* intellectually knowing. And in this respect the state to which we are referring is not more re-

stricted than the psychological state, but is a state which has nothing to do with it; it is merely an intellectual state, the state of intellection itself considered formally. What is this intellectual state *qua* state? It is just a being or “staying” in what is intellectually known. It is not being or staying psychologically affected as a subject, but a being situated in what is intellectually known, a being situated which in Spanish we express by saying, for example, “We agree that ...”.^{*} It is not a quiescent state but rather an acquiescent one, so to speak.

In what does this being or standing in what is intellectually known consist? That is the question of what the intellectual state is, not just *qua* state but *qua* intellectual.

II. *What is an intellectual state?* What an intellectual state is depends upon what is intellectually known. Now, what is intellectually known as such is reality. Therefore an intellectual state is a staying or being situated in accordance with the real insofar as the real is, with whatever desired degree of elementality and provisionality one wishes, the “law of the real”. This staying or being situated is at one and the same time of the real and of intellection. These are not two different “staying’s” or “being situated’s”, but a single one in which the real and the intelligence are together. By being a staying or situation of the real, this staying or being situated is intellectual. By being of intellection, it is a state. They are not two stayings or situations, but a single “being situated together”. And this unity is clear: the real is situated in intellection and intellection itself is grasped in the real. This is what I call *retentivity*. The real retains, and in this retention {346} the real is constituted *qua* retinent, its intellectual actuality as a retained state.

This retentivity has precise characteristics. 1) It is retention *by* the real. We are not dealing with the question of what, for example, retention by a stimulus sensed as a stimulus is. Rather, we are concerned with retention by the real as real. 2) It is retention *in* the real, not a retention in this or that thing, according to its importance, for example; rather it is a retention in the real *qua* real. We stand in reality. 3) It is retention by the real and in the real, but only in the actualized sense. We are not dealing with a retention along the lines of actuality, only actuality. And for this reason the retention is formally intellectual, since mere actualization of the real *qua* real in intelligence is just intellection.

Intellectual activity is, then, an intellectual *retained staying* by the real and in the real as such.

Granting this, let us ask ourselves in what form we are retained in intellection. Staying intellectually retained by the real and in the real as such is just what, strictly speaking, we call *knowing* [*saber*]. Knowing is staying intellectually retained in what is intellectually known. Every apprehension has its own force of imposition, and this imposition in the intellectual state is knowing. Let us fix some of its characteristics.

Knowing is not an intellection *simpliciter*. That would be a very vague notion. Knowing is not an *act* but a *state*, a staying retained in the sensed explained above. This must be stressed. And precisely for this reason, its most exact linguistic expression is the perfect tense, the *per-fectum*, something intellectually known in a terminal way. In Latin *novi*, in Greek *oida*, and in Vedic[†] *veda*: these terms do not simply mean “I know”, but {347} strictly speaking something more like “I have it known”, “I already know it”, etc. They are present perfect expressions, or perfect expressions in the sense of present. Thus, among the epithets of Agni in the Rig Veda is that of being *jata-vedas* (456,7 and 13); Agni is he who knows all that has been born (from the verb *jan-*). For the Veda, things are not “entities” but “engendered things”, “products”, or “born things”, *bhuta-*, *jata-*. Differentiated in the various Indo-European languages there appears the root *gen-*, to be born, to engender, which gave rise to the Vedic *jan-*, the Greek *egnon*, and the Latin *novi*. Now, he who has known the “engendered things” is he who has *veda*. Knowing comes designated in the perfect. As an infinitive, Latin expresses knowing with the verb *scire*. I believe that its primary meaning is perhaps “to cut”, and I think that it is found in the verb *scire* as knowing in a definitive or cutting way, i.e., as designation of a conclusive state, of conclusivity. The idea of conclusivity is perhaps the meaning of *scire*, viz. finding oneself in a conclusive state (by cutting).

This state as expressed in *oida* and *veda* is designated by a single root *veid-* which directly means ‘vision’. Knowing would thus be a state of having already seen something. But this is a great limitation; knowing is a state of intellection, and intellection is not just vision. Even in the case of vision, we do not refer to vision as an act of the eyes but to intellectual vision. Only because of this has the root associated with seeing been able to mean knowing. It is a vision which is not optical, but to my way of thinking, a vision of sentient intellection. And as I

^{*} [In the original Spanish, the verb *quedar* can mean ‘to be’, ‘to stand’, ‘to be situated’; it is here translated as the latter. The expression Zubiri refers to in Spanish is *quedamos en que...*, which is an idiomatic one that translates into English as “We agree that ...”.—trans.]

[†] [I.e., Sanskrit. -- trans.]

have expounded at length, I believe that all of the senses are moments of a single sentient intellection. Therefore it is not strange that the state of knowing comes designated in Latin, and above all in the Romance languages, with a root connected to {348} the root word for pleasure, *sapere*. Knowing [*saber*] is more tasting [*sabor*] than seeing. Whence the word *sapientia*, wisdom [*sabiduría*]. With various roots we thus have, in Latin, a single idea, the idea of an intellectual state expressed in a gradual progression from *scire*, knowing, through *scientia*, science, to *sapientia*, wisdom. German expresses this same progression with a single root taken from the visual: *Wissen* (knowing), *Wissenschaft* (science), *Weisheit* (wisdom). Just as the root of *scire* can mean, as I see it, conclusivity, I think that *scire* is what most closely approximates that conclusive intellectual state which consists in standing intellectually retained in the real by the real as such. Knowing is, then, a state and not an act. It is a state, a standing, and an intellectual state: a standing, retained in the actualized real. It admits of various types.

III. *Diverse types of knowing.* We are dealing with states, and so it is not a question of enumerating the different forms of knowing, but of qualitatively differentiating some modes of intellection.

1) Above all, there is naked intellection, the primordial apprehension of reality. It is a sentient intellection, and for that very reason it leaves us in a certain state. Its content is more or less rich, but with respect to what concerns the formality of reality its richness is maximal. In this intellection we stay, first of all, not in this or that thing. That in which we formally and moreover ineluctably stay is in naked reality. By simple intellection, that in which we stay is in reality. This is a radical and primordial knowing: the intelligence is retained in reality by reality itself. This is the impression of reality. All other intellections and everything in them which is actualized in them to us is owing to the fact that we are in reality. {349}

2) Granting that, the real thus apprehended gives rise to the intellection of what that real is really, viz. logos and reason. The intellection of a real thing, based on what it really is, is the second type of knowing. It is staying in having intellectually known what a thing really is. Knowing is then not a staying in reality, but a staying in what the real really is. This is the second type of knowing, viz. knowing not as being in reality but knowing as being in the respectivity of the real. In turn, this second type of knowing is diversified in accordance with what each thing really is. And here the differences can become enormous.

Thus, in Greece, the first form of intellection of respectivity was *discerning*. This was, ultimately, the direct idea of Parmenides. Knowing is not taking one thing for another. In the final instance error would be confusing what a thing is with something which it is not, with something else. As recognized by Plato this idea was philosophically elaborated by him in a distinct and richer form. Knowing is not determined only by discernment but as a distinct and richer form of respectivity, the *definition*. Now knowing is not only not confusing one thing with another but is in turn *defining*. Finally Aristotle received this conceptualization and elaborated it further: knowing is not only discerning and defining, but also—and above all—*demonstrating*, in the etymological sense of “showing from where”, showing the internal necessity of the fact that things must be as they are. In Aristotle, this demonstrating has different moments: rigorous reasoning, the intellection of principles upon which one is based, and the sensible impression of that to which they are applied. What happens is that these three moments do not have the same root. The first two are ascribed to *nous*, to intellectual knowing, but the {350} third to sensing. This is the radical dualism of intellectual knowing and sensing. Hence these three moments have run as dissociated throughout the course of the history of philosophy, precisely because they are found radically dislocated in the contraposition of intellectual knowing and sensing. Now, it is, on the contrary, necessary to conceptualize their radical unity, viz. sentient intellection. It is from there that the three moments of discerning, defining, and demonstrating ought to be differentiated. For this reason those three acts are clearly diverse, but they are only three intellectual modalities anchored in a single formal structure of sentient intellectual knowing. Clearly they are not anchored directly in it in the same way. Sentient intellectual knowing thus determines two types of intellection and therefore of knowing: the intellection and knowing that something is real, and the intellection and knowing of what this real thing is really. Only sentient intellection determines the duality between real and really. Now, discerning, defining, and demonstrating are not, for the purposes of our problem, three sufficiently distinct intellections, but only the three modes of intellectual knowing of what something really is.

3) But there is yet a third type of knowing, that in which we stay comprehensively in reality. It is a type of intimate penetration into a real thing from which we know that it really is. The state of knowing is now the state in which we stay retained in the real by the real itself as intellectually known in comprehension. It is properly the state in which we stand by virtue of the understanding.

Thus we have the three great types of knowing: being in reality, being in what the real is really, and being comprehensively in reality.

Let us repeat once again: the object of knowing is not objectivity or being; the object of knowing is reality. The {351} intelligence is not the faculty of the objective nor the faculty of being; it is the faculty of reality. This reality is not something distinct from what impresses the senses. Reality is a formality of the otherness of what is sensed; it is the *de suyo*. As the formality that it is, it is something impressively sensed; it is impression of reality. As the faculty of reality is the intelligence, it follows that the impression of reality is the act of an intelligence which apprehends the real in impression; it is a sentient intelligence. Human intelligence is sentient intelligence. It is not a conceiving intelligence or anything of that sort. To be sure, our intelligence conceives and judges; but that is not its formal act. Its formal act consists in sensing reality. Conversely, human sensing is not a sensing like that of animals. An animal senses what is sensed in a formality which is merely a stimulus. Man, though he senses the same thing as the animal, nonetheless senses it in the

formality of reality, as something *de suyo*. This is an intellectual sensing. Sentient intelligence is not a sensible intelligence, i.e., an intelligence directed to what the senses offer to it; rather, it is an intelligence which is structurally one with sensing. Human intelligence senses reality. It is not an intelligence which begins by conceiving and judging what is sensed. Philosophy has counterposed sensing and intellectual knowing, concentrating solely upon the content of certain acts. But it has gone astray with respect to formality. And here is where intellectual knowing and sensing not only are not opposed, but despite their essential irreducibility, constitute a single structure, one which, from wherever one looks, should be called 'sentient intelligence' or 'intellectual sensing'. Thanks to it, man stands unmistakably in and by reality; he stands in it, knowing it. Knowing what? Something, very little, of what is real. But, nonetheless, he is retained {352} constitutively in reality. How? This is the great human problem: knowing how to be in the midst of reality.

The analysis of this structure has been the theme of this prolix study of sentient intelligence.

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