SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE

Xavier Zubiri

translated with notes and introduction by

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Translator’s Introduction

Zubiri’s Rethinking of Philosophy

The creation of a new philosophical system is a staggeringly difficult task, fraught with myriad dangers, pitfalls, and problems. Only one of supreme genius can undertake this enterprise with any expectation of success, and then only when old ways of thought have shown themselves inadequate to cope with the march of human knowledge. It is fortunate that these conditions have been fulfilled in our day and in the person of Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983). No one can say now if this or any future philosophical system will be the definitive one; but Zubiri’s effort is surely the grandest, most boldly and most radically conceived effort to integrate the Western (and to a considerable extent, Eastern) philosophical tradition, the explosive growth of scientific knowledge, and the rich artistic, literary, and cultural traditions of European and world civilization.

Of course the history of philosophy is littered with corpses of failed systems. Many are the philosophers who, contemplating this situation, saw in it nothing but an inconvenient fact arising from some fault in the assumptions, reasoning, or scope of their predecessors’ work. Each expected to put paid to this situation once and for all with his own new and improved philosophy, only to see it fall to the same fate. Zubiri is determined to avoid such a fate, and to accomplish that goal, he needs to do three things:

- **Determine what went wrong with all past philosophies**, not individually but in common. To do this he must penetrate to a much deeper level than any of these philosophies, and determine the unspoken and unrecognized assumptions that lie there.

- **Develop a new way of doing philosophy** not subject to the vicissitudes of history and changes in the scientific worldview. This will require a totally new conception of reality as something open at multiple levels, rather than closed, fixed, and exhaustible, and a corresponding new theory of intelligence, knowledge, and truth.

- **Demonstrate that there is genuine progress in philosophy** by creating a new synthesis which is not a drop-in replacement for and rejection of all the old erroneous systems, but rather something which absorbs their key insights and refines and/or corrects them in a dynamic, rather than a static synthesis such as that of Kant. This synthesis must be equally capable of absorbing developments in science and mathematics.

It is important to understand at the outset just how radical Zubiri’s rethinking of philosophy had to be in order to achieve his goal. Though in constant dialogue with the history of philosophy, and recognizing that this history must be the starting point for his (or any effort), Zubiri

- rejects the traditional view of reality as a zone of things, whether “out there” beyond perception, within the mind, in the realm of ideas, or anywhere else, replacing it with a more fundamental and general notion, that of formality, which refers to the nature of what is present to the intelligence;

- rejects the traditional four-part division of philosophy into metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics as the primary basis for its organization, instead recognizing that no such strict division has ever been achieved or is even possible, and that a new approach to human intellection is necessary;

- rejects the traditional notion of God as a reality object, instead conceiving of Him as a reality fundament or ground;

- rejects the traditional idea of reality as “closed” and static, as implied in most conceptions of essence, in favor of a new view of reality and essence as “open”;

- rejects the traditional notion of a person as another type of “thing,” arguing that personhood is a separate, distinct kind of reality.

- rejects the agreement of thought and things as the fundamental notion of truth; rather this dual truth is founded on a more fundamental truth, real truth, the impressive actuality of the real in sentient intellection.

- rejects the traditional notion of sensible intelligence founded on opposition between sensing and intelligence, replacing it with a fully integrated conception, sentient intelligence.

The first major work of his grand synthesis was Sobre la esencia (1963; English edition On Essence, 1980). It dealt primarily with the object of knowing. The present work deals primarily with

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the process of knowing, which is founded upon an analysis of intelligence. These two subjects—object and process of knowing—should not be identified with “metaphysics” and “epistemology”, respectively, for two reasons: (1) the latter two topics are theoretical and of more restricted scope than the problems Zubiri addresses; and (2) Zubiri explicitly rejects the modern notion that the problems of object of knowing and process of knowing can be or indeed ever have been rigorously separated, as the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics in post-Kantian thought generally suggests.¹ The two are completely intertwined, and any comprehensive philosophy must address and encompass both together in its vision. At the outset, this requires not an epistemology, but rather an analysis of intelligence—something which must logically precede any type of rigorous epistemology or Kantian critique. As Robert Caponigri, translator of *Sobre la esencia* put it,

The theory of “sentient intelligence” must be distinguished from the “epistemological question” or the theory of knowledge. The theory of intelligence is logically antecedent to the epistemological question and every epistemological theory eventually reveals that it presupposes a theory of the intelligence in its account of what and how man can know.²

Only when this foundation has been laid can work on a comprehensive epistemology be completed and securely grounded. Zubiri frequently criticizes previous philosophers for confusing epistemology and the theory of intelligence, and consequently advocating erroneous and often absurd theories. He also believes that understanding this distinction is the key to unraveling some of the paradoxes and puzzles from the history of philosophy, many of which turn out to be pseudo-problems, such as Hume’s famous analysis of causality. Finally, this analysis of intelligence undergirds Zubiri’s analysis of truth and the stages of intellective knowledge.

Together, *On Essence* and *Sentient Intelligence* establish the basis for Zubiri’s new philosophical synthesis. Yet Zubiri was aware that much more needs to be done to establish a new, comprehensive philosophical foundation for West-ern civilization; the task is, indeed, ongoing, but one which is absolutely necessary to give meaning to the whole enterprise of civilization. At the time of his death in 1983, Zubiri was at work on several books which are based on *Sentient Intelligence* and *On Essence*, but which delve deeper into certain key topics. These books, and numerous earlier studies, are being edited and published posthumously by the Fundación Xavier Zubiri in Madrid, headed by Professor Diego Gracia of the Royal Spanish Academy and the University of Madrid.

The purpose of this introduction is not to summarize the contents of *Sentient Intelligence*, but to orient the English-speaking reader with respect to Zubiri’s intellectual heritage, his point of departure, his goals, the organization of the work, the main currents of thought in it, and the innovations which Zubiri brings to the subject. This is not to suggest that his work can be pigeonholed in any academic sense. Zubiri was deeply and passionately committed to the intellectual quest for truth; and the seriousness and dispassionateness with which he viewed this quest is manifest on every page of his writing—the same seriousness which is so evident in Aristotle and the major philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition: Averroës, Avicenna, St. Thomas, and Suarez. To further this goal, Zubiri always seeks as Olympian a perspective as possible, encompassing all relevant knowledge when discussing any subject. The result, in terms of scope, profundity, and originality, speaks for itself.

**Life and Times**

Xavier Zubiri y Apalategui was born in San Sebastián, on December 4, 1898. After preparatory studies in Guipúzcoa he attended the University of Madrid where some of his mentors were Angel Amor Ruibal, García Morente, Juan Zaragüeta, José Ortega y Gasset, Julio Rey-Pastor, and Julio Palacios. He also included periods of residence at the University of Louvain, then under Cardinal Mercier, and the Gregorian University at Rome, the successor of the Collegio Romano. At the Gregorian, in 1920, he received the doctorate in theology. In 1921 he received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Madrid. He refers to the period 1921-1928, when he worked extensively on phenomenology, as the “phenomenological-objectivist” epoch.

In 1926 he won the competition for the chair of history of philosophy at the University of Ma-

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¹ See Author’s Preface, p. 3.
Between 1928 and 1931 he included trips throughout Europe to study under the masters of various disciplines: classical philology with Werner Jaeger; philosophy with Husserl and Heidegger; theoretical physics with De Broglie and Schrödinger; biology with von Geluchten, Spemann, and Goldschmidt; mathematics with Rey-Pastor, La Vallée-Poussin, and Zermelo. As a result of these extended study trips, and his continual rethinking of philosophical problems, he embarked upon a second epoch, what he terms the “ontological” epoch (1931-1944), in which philosophical problems were radicalized, and he developed the concept of relegation, which became a cornerstone of his theological writings. Zubiri’s Madrid University lectures, *Metaphysics of Aristotle* (1931-1932) and *Pre-Socratics* (1933-1934), acquired special resonance. During the course of the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939), he was in Paris teaching courses at the Institut Catholique and studying oriental languages with Deimel, Benveniste, Labat, Dhorme, and others at the Sorbonne. In 1939 he married Carmen Castro who had been one of his students, and was the daughter of the Spanish writer Américo Castro. From 1940 to 1942 he occupied the chair of history of philosophy at the University of Barcelona.

In 1943 Zubiri left the university to strike out on his own program of research and teaching in Madrid. This also marks the beginning of his final, mature period, the “metaphysical” epoch, whose main theme is reality. He created his own model, the cursos (seminars), and through them he continued to present and involve others with his philosophical insights. His seminars were well attended, and he gathered a group of devoted followers with backgrounds in many disciplines who worked with him on the development of his thought. This group met weekly with Zubiri to discuss philosophical matters and review his texts as they were being written. The first major book of his mature period, *On Essence*, was published in 1963. It represents a complete rethinking of the concept of essence in light of the entire history of philosophy and the development of science during the 20th century. His principal systematic work, *Sentient Intelligence*, appeared in three volumes in the early 1980s. In this work, Zubiri builds upon the entire history of philosophy and science to create a new philosophical vision which incorporates key elements and insights from virtually all major thinkers, but which also shows how each of their systems went astray. The scope, depth, clarity, and profundity of Zubiri’s philosophy suggest that it is both the culmination of 2500 years of intensive intellectual struggle and the solid basis on which knowledge can build in the future. Zubiri died on September 21, 1983, in the midst of editing a new book for publication.

**Key Elements in Zubiri’s Thought**

Zubiri’s philosophical thought integrates twelve major elements:

- The panorama of the entire Western philosophical tradition from the Presocratics through Heidegger, Logical Positivism, and to some extent, the 20th century English schools of thought. Like Aristotle, Zubiri is constantly in dialogue with his predecessors.
- Aristotle and the tradition of classical philosophy (though subject to relentless critical analysis and rethinking). The gravity of Aristotle, as well as his encyclopedic vision and his understanding of the position of philosophy in the context of human knowledge, are particularly important in Zubiri’s thought.
- Insights from the work of the Phenomenologists in the 20th century. Though ultimately superseding them, Zubiri believes that there is a kernel of truth in their analysis of human experience which is essential to formulating a philosophy which takes account both of our undeniable perception of the world as real (see below), our understanding of it through science, and the limitations of our intelligence.
- The overwhelming force of our direct perception of reality. For Zubiri, this is the salient characteristic of human intelligence and must be the starting point for any firmly grounded theory of the intelligence, any epistemology, and ultimately any philosophy. Though not specifically discussed by Zubiri, the tradition of the great Spanish mystics and the characteristics of their knowledge, in some ways akin to direct experience of the world, must have been in the back of his mind.\footnote{In another work, *El hombre y Dios* (1973-75, published posthumously in Madrid by Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1984), Zubiri emphasizes this aspect of his thought,}
• Scientific knowledge, and especially the insight science has given us into the structure of the natural world and our ability to know that world. Zubiri evinces a particularly keen interest in quantum mechanics and the revolution in physics which occurred in the early decades of this century. His interest extends to all the sciences, and he believes that the cracking of the genetic code has provided insights into the biological realm which are in some ways analogous to those achieved in physics.

• Modern logic and mathematics, especially Gödel’s theorem, and the new insights about mathematical truths and mathematical realities these developments have yielded.

• Nonscientific knowledge, specifically, the need to establish a foundation for it in a comprehensive philosophical system, and recognize its great and continuing contribution to the totality of knowledge. In what sense is a novel, a poem, or a painting about reality? Why do we say that an artist has “perceived essential truths”? Why does an artist create his works rather than just discourse about his subject?

• The relation of God to the physical world and to science and scientific knowledge, especially physics; dealt with at length in earlier works.¹

• Insights from Eastern philosophical/religious traditions, especially the Vedanta. Zubiri regards this as particularly important for understanding how philosophy began and why it emerged as different in the Western tradition.

• The fundamentally different reality of the person, as compared to ordinary physical realities.

• Results and insights from philology, especially Indo-European philology. Zubiri believes that those who first created our language and our words had a freshness and clarity of vision with respect to certain basic human experiences that later generations could not replicate.²

• The Christian theological tradition, with equal emphasis on Eastern (Greek) and Western Fathers and theologians. Zubiri wrote extensively on this subject and related topics, including a book published posthumously.³

### Poles of Zubiri’s Thought

Roughly speaking, the two poles of Zubiri’s thought are (1) that which is most radical in Aristotle, his conception of essence as the tōt ὄν ἐναι, what makes a thing be what it is; and (2) the phenomenological concept of reality. His own radical innovation was to weave these two into a unified whole via the new concept of sentient intellection. But Zubiri radically rethink both Aristotle’s and the phenomenologists’ legacies; so his concept of essence, his concept of reality, and his concept of intelligence differ in many respects from the originals.

(1) Zubiri points out that Aristotle begins by conceiving of essence as that which makes a thing what it is, in the most radical sense. Later, however, Aristotle links his metaphysics with his epistemology by claiming that essence is the physical correlate of the definition (of a thing). Knowledge is then of essences via definition in terms of genus and species; the most famous example is of course “man is a rational animal”. Zubiri comments:

> When the essence is taken as the real correlate of the definition, the least that must be said is that it is a question of a very indirect way of arriving at things. For…instead of going directly to reality and asking what in it may be its essence, one takes the roundabout way of passing through the definition.⁴

For Zubiri, this is not merely a roundabout way, but something worse:

> …it is a roundabout way which rests on an enormously problematic presupposition, namely, that the essential element of every


² Zubiri studied Indo-European philology (nowadays usually termed “historical linguistics”) with Benveniste, one of the early pioneers. He was of course unaware of the work done in the late 1980s by Ruhlen, Shevoroshkin, Greenberg and others linking together major language families (Indo-European, Afro-Asiatic, Finno-Ugric, etc.) into superfamilies such as Nostratic or Eurasiatic; but this would have come as no surprise to him, especially in view of his own etymological work on philosophical terms in the Semitic and Indo-European languages.

³ El hombre y Dios; [Man and God], op. cit.

thing is necessarily definable; and this is more than problematical.¹

In fact, Zubiri believes, the essence in general cannot be defined in genus-species form, and may not be expressible in ordinary language at all. He believes that essences—in the radical sense of determining what a thing is, and thus how it will behave, what its characteristics are, and so forth—can be determined only with great difficulty; and much of science is dedicated to this task. Specifically, Zubiri believes that it is necessary to go back to Aristotle’s original idea of essence as the fundamental determinant of a thing’s nature, what makes it to be what it is, and expand on this concept in the light of modern science.

But this critique indicates that there is a deep realist strain to Zubiri’s thought, a belief that we can, in some ultimate sense, grasp reality. The problem arises in connection with our belief that what we perceive is also real—a belief upon which we act in living out our lives. This compels Zubiri to make an extremely important distinction with respect to reality: between reality in apprehension (which he terms ‘reity’), and reality of what things are beyond sensing (true reality, realidad verdadera). Zubiri believes that the failure of past philosophers to distinguish these, and consequently, their failure to recognize that they refer to different stages of intellection, is at the root of many grave errors and paradoxes. This leads directly to the second pole of Zubiri’s thought: Phenomenology.

(2) Zubiri takes three critical ideas from phenomenology (Husserl, Ortega y Gasset, and Heidegger). First is a certain way or ‘idea’ of philosophy. In particular, he accepts that phenomenology has opened a new path and deepened our understanding of things by recognizing that it is necessary to position philosophy at a new and more radical level than that of classical realism or of modern idealism (primarily Hegel).²

Secondly, he accepts that philosophy must start with its own territory, that of “mere immediate description of the act of thinking”. But for him, the radical philosophical problem is not that proclaimed by the phenomenologists: not Husserl’s “phenomenological consciousness”, not Heidegger’s “comprehension of being”, not Ortega’s “life”, but rather the “apprehension of reality”. He believes that philosophy must start from the fundamental fact of experience, that we are installed in reality, however modestly, and that our most basic experiences, what we perceive of the world (colors, sounds, people, etc.) are real. Without this basis—and despite the fact that knowledge built upon it can at times be in error—there would be no other knowledge either, including science. However, at the most fundamental level, that of direct apprehension of reality, there is no possibility of error; only knowledge built upon this foundation, involving as it does logos and reason, can be in error. Zubiri points out that it makes sense to speak of error only because we can—and do—achieve truth.³

But because the world discovered to us by science is quite different from our ordinary experience (electromagnetic waves and photons instead of colors, quarks and other strange particles instead of solid matter, and so forth), a critical problem arises which thrusts Zubiri towards a radical rethinking of the notion of reality. This is one of the main themes of Sentient Intelligence.

The third idea—perhaps ‘inspiration’ is a better term—which Zubiri draws from phenomenology has to do with his radically changed concept of reality. For Zubiri, reality is a formality, not a zone of things, as in classical philosophy:

In the first place, the idea of reality does not formally designate a zone or class of things, but only a formality, reity or “thingness”. It is that formality by which what is sentiently apprehended is presented to me not as the effect of something beyond what is apprehended, but as being in itself something “in its own right”, something de suyo; for example, not only “warming” but “being” warm. This formality is the physical and real character of the otherness of what is sentiently apprehended in my sentient intellection.

This conception of reality is, so to speak, a radical “paradigm shift”, because it means that there are multiple types of reality and that many of the old problems associated with reality are in fact pseudo-problems. Zubiri notes that

The reality of a material thing is not identical

¹Ibid.
²Diego Gracia, Voluntad de Verdad, Barcelona: Labor Universitaria, 1986, p. 89.
³Part I, chapter VII, p. 83ff.
⁴p. 63.
with the reality of a person, the reality of society, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the reality of my own inner life identical to that of other realities. But on the other hand, however different these modes of reality may be, they are always reity, i.e., formality de suyo.

Much of the work is devoted to analyzing the process of intelligence, and explaining how its three stages (primordial apprehension, logos, and reason) unfold and yield knowledge, including scientific knowledge.

**Sentient Intellection not Sensible Intellection**

Zubiri seeks to reestablish radically the basis for human knowledge as the principal step in his restructuring of philosophy. This task goes far beyond any type of Kantian critique—something which Zubiri believes can only come after we have analyzed what human knowledge is, and how we apprehend. For Zubiri, perception of reality begins with the sensing process, but he rejects the paradigm of classical philosophy, which starts from opposition between sensing and intelligence. According to this paradigm, the senses deliver confused content to the intelligence, which then figures out or reconstructs reality. The Scholastics said, nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus. This is sensible intelligence, and according to Zubiri, the entire paradigm is radically false.

Zubiri’s point of departure for his rethinking of this problem is the immediacy and sense of direct contact with reality that we experience in our perception of the world; the things we perceive: colors, sounds, sights, are real in some extremely fundamental sense that cannot be overridden by subsequent reasoning or analysis. That is, there is associated with perception an overwhelming impression of its veracity, a type of “guarantee” which accompanies it, that says to us, “What you apprehend is reality, not a cinema, not a dream.” Implied here are two separate aspects of perception: first, what the apprehension is of, e.g. a tree or a piece of green paper, and second, its self-guaranteeing characteristic of reality. This link to reality must be the cornerstone of any theory of the intelligence:

By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is apprehension of reality in and by itself. This intellection...is in a radical sense an apprehension of the real which has its own characteristics....Intellection is formally direct apprehension of the real—not via representations nor images. It is an immediate apprehension of the real, not founded in inferences, reasoning processes, or anything of that nature. It is a unitary apprehension. The unity of these three moments is what makes what is apprehended to be apprehended in and by itself.¹

Thus what we have is a fully integrated process with no distinction between sensing and apprehension which Zubiri terms sensible apprehension of reality. The fundamental nature of human intellection can be stated quite simply: “actualization of the real in sentient intellection.”² There are three moments of this actualization:

- **affection** of the sentient being by what is sensed (the noetic).
- **otherness** which is presentation of something other, a “note”, nota (from Latin nosco, related to Greek gignosco, “to know”, and noein, “to think”; hence the noematic)
- **force of imposition** of the note upon the sentient being (the noergic).

Otherness consists of two moments, only the first of which has received any attention heretofore: content (what the apprehension is of) and formality (how it is delivered to us). Formality may be either formality of stimulation, in the case of animals, or formality of reality, in the case of man.

The union of content and formality of reality gives rise to the process of knowing which unfolds logically if not chronologically in three modes or phases:

- Primordial apprehension of reality (or basic, direct installation in reality, giving us pure and simple reality)
- Logos (explanation of what something is vis à vis other things, or what the real of primordial apprehension is in reality)
- Reason (or ratio, methodological explanation of what things are and why they are, as in done in science, for example)

¹p. 94.
²p. 4, 84, 100, 243.
This process, shown schematically in Figure 1, is mediated by what Zubiri calls the ‘field’ of reality. The reality field concept is loosely based on the field concept from physics, such as the gravitational field, where a body exists “by itself”, so to speak; but also by virtue of its existence, creates a field around itself through which it interacts with other bodies. Thus in the field of reality, a thing has an individual moment and a field moment. The individual moment Zubiri refers to as the thing existing “by itself” or “of itself”; de suyo is the technical term he employs. The “field moment” is called as such and implies that things cannot be fully understood in isolation. This is in stark contrast to the notion of essence in classical philosophy.

Roughly speaking, primordial apprehension installs us in reality and delivers things to us in their individual and field moments; logos deals with things in the field, how they relate to each other; and reason tells us what they are in the sense of methodological explanation. A simple example may serve to illustrate the basic ideas. A piece of green paper is perceived. It is apprehended as something real in primordial apprehension; both the paper and the greenness are apprehended as real, in accordance with our normal beliefs about what we apprehend. (This point about the reality of
the color green is extremely important, because Zubiri believes that the implicit denial of the reality of, say, colors, and the systematic ignoring of them by modern science is a great scandal.)

As yet, however, we may not know how to name the color, for example, or what the material is, or what to call its shape. That task is the function of the logos, which relates what has been apprehended to other things known and named from previous experience; for example, other colors or shades of colors associated with greenness. Likewise, with respect to the material in which the green inheres, we would associate it with paper, wood, or other things known from previous experience. In turn, reason via science explains the green as electromagnetic energy of a certain wavelength, or photons of a certain energy in accordance with Einstein’s relation. That is, the color green is the photons as sensed; there are not two realities. The characteristics of the three phases may be explained as follows:

- Primordial apprehension of reality is the basic, direct installation in reality, giving us pure and simple reality. This is what one gets first, and is the basis on which all subsequent understanding is based. Perhaps it can most easily understood if one thinks of a baby, which has only this apprehension: the baby perceives the real world around it, but as a congeries of sounds, colors, etc., which are real, but as yet undifferentiated into chairs, walls, spoken words, etc. It is richest with respect to the real, poorest with respect to specific determination (ulterior modes augment determination, but diminish richness). In it, reality is not exhausted with respect to its content, but given in an unspecific ambient transcending the content. This transcendence is strictly sensed, not inferred, even for the baby. Primordial apprehension is the basis for the ulterior or logically subsequent modes.

- Logos (explanation of what something is vis à vis other things, or as Zubiri expresses it, what the real of primordial apprehension is in reality). This is the second step: differentiate things, give them names, and understand them in relation to each other. As a baby gets older, this is what he does: he learns to make out things in his environment, and he learns what their names are, eventually learning to speak and communicate with others verbally. This stage involves a “stepping back” from direct contact with reality in primordial apprehension in order to organize it. The logos is what enables us to know what a thing, apprehended as real in sentient intellelction, is in reality (a technical term, meaning what something is in relation to one’s other knowledge). It utilizes the notion of the “field of reality”. The reality field is a concept loosely based on field concept of physics: a body exists “by itself” but by virtue of its existence, creates field around itself through which it interacts with other bodies.

- Reason (or ratio, methodological explanation of what things are and why they are, as is done in science, for example). This is the highest level of understanding; it encompasses all of our ways of understanding our environment. One naturally thinks of science, of course; but long before science as we know it existed, people sought explanations of things. And they found them in myths, legends, plays, poetry, art, and music—which are indeed examples of reason in the most general sense: they all seek to tell us something about reality. Later, of course, came philosophy and science; but no single way of access to reality, in this sense, is exhaustive: all have a role. Reason, for Zubiri, does not consist in going to reality, but in going from field reality toward worldly reality, toward field reality in depth. If one likes, the field is the system of the sensed real, and the world, the object of reason, is the system of the real as a form of reality. That is, the whole world of the rationally intellectually known is the unique and true explanation of field reality.

In Zubiri’s word’s, reason is “measuring intellelction of the real in depth”.1 There are two moments of reason to be distinguished (1) intellelction in depth, e.g., electromagnetic theory is intellelction in depth of color;2 (2) its character as measuring, in the most general sense, akin to the notion of measure in advanced mathematics (functional analysis). For example, prior to the twentieth century, material things were assimilated to the notion of “body”; that was the measure of all material things. But with the development of quantum mechanics, a new conception of material things was forced upon science, one which is different from the traditional notion of “body”. The canon of real

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1 p. 257.
2 p. 256-257.
things was thus enlarged, so that the measure of something is no longer necessarily that of “body”. (Zubiri himself will go on to enlarge it further, pointing out that personhood is another type of reality distinct from “body” or other material things). Measuring, in this sense, and the corresponding canon of reality, are both dynamic and are a key element in Zubiri’s quest to avoid the problems and failures of past philosophies based on static and unchanging conceptions of reality.

**Reality**

Given Zubiri’s radically new approach to philosophy, and his analysis of intelligence as sentient, it is not surprising that his concept of reality is quite different from that of previous philosophy as well. As mentioned above, he rejects the idea of reality as a “zone of things”, usually conceived as “out there” beyond the mind, and replaces it with a more general notion, that of formality. “Reality is formality”, he says over and over, and by this he means that reality is the de suyo, the “in its own right”; it is not the content of some impression. Anything which is “in its own right” is real. This de suyo, the formality of reality, is how the content is delivered to us. Our brains—Zubiri refers to them as organs of formalization—are wired to perceive reality, to perceive directly the “in its own right” character. It does not emerge as the result of some reasoning process working on the content; it is delivered together with the content in primordial apprehension.

This includes reality in apprehension, as well as reality beyond apprehension. But always, the character of reality is the same: de suyo. It is therefore something physical as opposed to something conceptual. And this is true whether one is speaking of things perceived at the level of prymordial apprehension, such as colors, or things perceived in ulterior modes of apprehension such as reason, where examples might be historical realities such as the Ottoman Empire, or mathematical objects such as circles and lines: both are real in the same sense, though they differ in other respects (mathematical objects are real by postulation, whereas historical entities are not). Moreover, reality is independent of the subject, not a subjective projection, but something imposed upon the subject, something which is here-and-now before the subject. Logos and reason do not have to go to reality or create it; they are born in it and remain in it.

When a thing is known sentiently, at the same time it is known to be a reality. The impression of reality puts us in contact with reality, but not with all reality. Rather, it leaves us open to all reality. This is openness to the world. All things have a unity with respect to each other which is what constitutes the world. Zubiri believes that reality is fundamentally open, and therefore not capturable in any human formula. This openness is intimately related to transcendentalism:

...reality as reality is constitutively open, is transcendentially open. By virtue of this openness, reality is a formality in accordance with which nothing is real except as open to other realities and even to the reality of itself. That is, every reality is constitutively respective qua reality.¹

Reality must not be considered as some transcendental concept, or even as a concept which is somehow realized in all real things:

…rather, it is a real and physical moment, i.e., transcendentality is just the openness of the real qua real....The world is open not only because we do not know what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all because no thing, however precise and detailed its constitution, is reality itself as such.²

Sentient intellection is transcendental impression, in which the trans does not draw us out of what is apprehended, toward some other reality (as Plato thought), but submerges us in reality itself. The impression of reality transcends all its content. This is the object of philosophy, whereas the world as such-and-such is the object of science.

For Zubiri, the fundamental or constitutive openness of reality means that the search for it is a never-ending quest; he believes that the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century has been an example of how our concept of reality has broadened. In particular, it has been broadened to include the concept of person as a fundamentally different kind of reality:

That was the measure of reality: progress beyond the field was brought about by thinking that reality as measuring is “thing”. An intellecution much more difficult than that of

¹ p. 248.
² Ibid.
quantum physics was needed in order to understand that the real can be real and still not be a thing. Such, for example, is the case of person. Then not only was the field of real things broadened, but that which we might term ‘the modes of reality’ were also broadened. Being a thing is only one of those modes; being a person is another.¹

Now of course, not everything which we perceive in impression has reality beyond impression; but the fact that something is real only in impression does not mean that it isn’t real. It is, because it is de suyo. And what is real in impression forms the basis for all subsequent knowing, including science. Still, we are quite interested in what is real beyond impression, which may be something else, or the same thing understood in a deeper manner. For example, electromagnetic theory tells us that colors are the result of photons of a particular energy affecting us. But, according to Zubiri—and this is extremely important—there are not two realities (the photons and the colors), but the colors are the photons as perceived. Reason is the effort to know what things are “in reality” which are known in primordial apprehension.

Truth

Truth, like reality, is much different in Zubiri’s approach. The traditional view has always been that truth is some sort of agreement of thought and things. Zubiri rejects this view because it is incomplete and not sufficiently radical for two reasons: (a) “things” as understood in this definition are the product of ulterior modes of intellection, and (b) “thought” is not univocal, being different in the three modes. The notion of truth as agreement of two things, dual truth, is a derivative notion, which must be grounded upon something more fundamental. For Zubiri, the priority of reality is always paramount, and hence the primary meaning of truth, real truth, is impressive actuality of the real in sentient intellection. It is a quality of actualization, not agreement of two disparate things, which as the ground of truth would pose insuperable verification problems. All other truth is ultimately based on this real truth, this actualization. As such, real truth is imposed on us, not conquered; dual truth, a derivative form of truth, we conquer through our own efforts. Real truth must be sought in primordial apprehension:

…the real is “in” the intellection, and this “in” is ratification. In sentient intellection truth is found in that primary form which is the impression of reality. The truth of this impressive actuality of the real in and by itself is precisely real truth….Classical philosophy has gone astray on this matter and always thought that truth is constituted in the reference to a real thing with respect to what is conceived or asserted about that thing.²

Now truth and reality are not identical in Zubiri’s philosophy, because there are many realities which are not actualized in sentient intellection, nor do they have any reason to be so. Thus not every reality is true in this sense. Though it does not add any notes, actualization does add truth to the real. Hence truth and reality are different; nor are they mere correlates, because reality is not simply the correlate of truth but its foundation on account of the fact that “all actualization is actualization of reality.”³

Knowledge and Understanding

Zubiri believes that one of the principal errors of past philosophers was their excessively static view of knowledge—a conquer it “once and for all” approach. Typical of this mentality are the repeated attempts to devise a definitive list of “categories”, such as those of Aristotle and Kant, and Kant’s integration of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry into the fabric of his philosophy. Rather, knowledge as a human enterprise is both dynamic and limited. It is limited because the canon of reality, like reality itself, can never be completely fathomed. It is limited because as human beings we are limited and must constantly search for knowledge. The phrase “exhaustive knowledge” is an oxymoron:

The limitation of knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is something derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of rational intellection, from knowing as such, since it is inquiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is formally inquiring, only because of this must one always seek more and, find-

¹ p. 261.
² p. 84.
³ p. 193.
ing what was sought, have it become the principle of the next search. Knowledge is limited by being knowledge. *An exhaustive knowledge of the real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of the real without necessity of knowledge.* Knowledge is only intellection in search. Not having recognized the intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as inquiry is what led to...subsuming all truth under the truth of affirmation.1 [Italics added]

Understanding is also a richer and more complex process than heretofore assumed. Indeed, oversimplification of the process of understanding has led to major philosophical errors in the past. Understanding requires *both* apprehension of something as real, *and* knowing what that thing is with respect to other things (logos stage) and what it is in reality itself (reason stage). Traditionally only the latter is considered. Zubiri comments:

Understanding is, then, the intellective knowing which understands what something, already apprehended as real, really is; i.e., what a thing is in reality (logos) and in reality itself (reason), the real thing understood in both the field manner and considered in the worldly sense.2

Understanding, then, requires sentient intellection and cannot exist, even for subjects such a mathematics, without it. This insight reveals clearly Zubiri’s radical departure from all previous thought.

**Zubiri and Science**

The scientific and the metaphysical are closely connected, because both are forms of knowledge emerging from the reason or third mode of human intellection. Articulating the relationship between them has been a difficult problem for at least three centuries of Western philosophy. For Zubiri, the relationship is as follows: reality unfolds in events observed by the sciences, which indeed allow us to observe aspects of it which would otherwise remain hidden. But this unfolding of reality is no different from its unfolding through personal experience, poetry, music, or religious experience. All human knowing is of the real, because reality is the formality under which man apprehends anything. In man’s quest for understanding, the utilization of scientific concepts, amplified and interpreted, only supposes that the sciences are an appropriate way of access to reality. Philosophy, in turn, reflects on the data offered by the sciences as “data of reality”. But philosophy is not looking to duplicate the efforts of science. Both philosophy and science examine the “world”, that to which the field of reality directs us. But science is concerned with what Zubiri terms the “talitative” order, the “such-and-suchness” of the world, how such-and-such thing behaves; whereas philosophy is concerned with the respective unity of the real *qua* real, with its transcendental character, what makes it real.3

**Human Reality**

For centuries it was believed that what is real “beyond” impression comprises “material bodies”, envisaged as made up of some sort of billiard-ball type particles. The development of quantum mechanics forced a change in this picture, though not without considerable controversy. A much more difficult effort was required to recognize that something can be real and yet not be a thing, viz. the human person. The human person is a fundamentally different *kind* of reality, one whose essence is open, as opposed to the closed essences of animals and other living things. An open essence is defined not by the notes that it naturally has, but by its system of possibilities; and hence it makes itself, so to speak, with the possibilities. “Its-ownness” is what makes an essence to be open. This open essence of man is the ground of his freedom, in turn the ground of his moral nature. Zubiri terms the set of notes defining the essence of what it means to be a person *personality*, and *personality* the realization of these notes by means of actions. A person, for Zubiri, is a *relative absolute*: “relative” because his actions are not entirely unconstrained, but are what make him the kind of person that he is; “absolute” because he enjoys the ability to make himself, i.e., he has freedom and is not an automaton, fully deterministic.

As a consequence, man’s role in the universe is different; and between persons (and only between them) there is a strict causality, which in turn im-

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1 pp. 261-262.
2 p. 363.
3 pp. 48-49, 197, 219.
plies a moral obligation. This causality is not a simple application of classical notions of causality to persons, but something irreducible to the causality of classical metaphysics, and still less reducible to the concept of a scientific law. This is what Zubiri refers to as *personal causality*: “And however repugnant it may be to natural science, there is...a causality between persons which is not given in the realm of nature.”

**God and Theology**

The person is, in his very constitution, turned toward a reality which is more than he is, and on which he is based. This reality is that from which emerge the resources he needs to make his personality, and which supplies him with the force necessary to carry out this process of realizing himself. This turning of a person to reality is *relegation*. It is a turning toward some ground not found among things immediately given, something which must be sought beyond what is given. The theist calls this ground ‘God’. With respect to religions, nearly all offer a vision or explanation of this ground, and therefore there is some truth in all. But Christianity is unique because of the penetration of the relegated person and the personal reality of God.

**Concluding remarks**

Zubiri’s philosophy is a boldly conceived and superbly executed rethinking and recasting of the great philosophical questions, unique in many extremely significant respects. It represents a new conception of philosophy as well as a new way of viewing and absorbing the history of philosophy. At the same time, it presents satisfying answers to the great philosophical questions, and reveals how many of the problems of the past were in fact pseudo-problems arising from deep-seated misunderstandings, especially of the nature of human intellecction as sentient.

**Acknowledgement**

Special thanks is owed to Professor Gary Gurtler of Boston College, who graciously read the entire translation and suggested innumerable changes in terminology, phraseology, and sense of passages. But for his skills and great labor, this translation would be much poorer. Of course, no two readers of Zubiri or any philosopher will agree on all points, and so the translator is responsible for any errors that remain in the text.

**A Note on Terminology**

Translation of a major philosophical work such as this inevitably requires many difficult decisions on terminology. Zubiri’s philosophical method and approach leads him to use existing words in new ways, and to devise many neologisms. Great effort was made to find the most natural way of rendering these in English, but for reference, listed here are the principal technical terms for which something other than a fairly literal translation has been employed, or for which there are possible misunderstandings. More extensive treatment of Zubiri’s terminology than it is possible to include in a book such as this may be found in the glossary section of the Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America’s Website, whose address is: www.zubiri.org/general/glossary.htm.

*De suyo.* Zubiri’s most famous technical term, and one which is therefore left untranslated. Its literal meaning is “in its own right”.

*En propio.* Meaning depends somewhat on context, but generally translated as “of its own” and on occasion as “in its own right”.

*Fundentar.* The word and its derivatives, such as *fundamento* and *fundar*, are closely related to the English “to found”. However, English does not have the infinitive “to fundament”; rather, English (like German) uses “to ground” for this purpose. However, some of the Spanish forms such as *fundar*, “to found”, do exist in English. This complicates the translation problem. Here the most natural English rendering is made in each case, but the reader should be aware that “to ground” and “to found” and their derivative forms are essentially synonymous and have been used interchangeably.

*Inteligir.* Translated as ‘to know intellecctively’ or ‘intellective knowing’. This translation is based on Zubiri’s own use of the terms *intelección* and *intellección sentiente* to refer to the action of *inteligir*. The Spanish word *inteligir* is not in common usage and does not appear in the dictionary of the Real Academia (1992 edition). It derives from the Latin *intelligere*, and is related to the English ‘intelligence’. *Inteligir* in its various forms is a technical term in this book, which Zubiri uses to refer to all three of the modes of human intelli-
gence: primordial apprehension, logos, and reason. His usage, therefore, is broader than what is normally referred to by ‘intelligence’ and this should be borne in mind when reading the book. Note that English has no verb ‘to intelligence’, and a further problem is that ‘intelligence’ in modern-day English tends to be associated with “intelligence quotient”. There is a temptation to translate inteligir as ‘to understand’; however, a very important reason militates against this translation: Zubiri himself does not use the Spanish verb entender, ‘to understand’, to do the work of inteligir, though he could have done so. He reserves this word for its normal use, and indeed he carefully distinguishes intellectual knowing and understanding in the General Conclusion of the book, where he points out that Latin has only one word, intellectus, to do the job of both, which has led to a great deal of confusion.

“La” realidad. Translated as “reality itself”, as distinguished from simple “reality”. It usually occurs as en “la” realidad, “in reality itself”, contrasted with en realidad, “in reality”. These terms refer to two different levels of knowing reality.

Talitativo. Literally, the term means “such-ness” or “such-making”, and with the idea of the English “such-and-such”. These expressions, rather than the literal “talitative”, are used here.

Transcendentalidad. A neologism which is not synonymous with ‘transcendental’. It does not mean “commonness”, or that in which all things coincide, as in Medieval philosophy. This notion implicitly grounded transcendence in content. Rather, transcendentality refers to formality of otherness, not content, and describes the open respectivity of things in the world.

Veridictar. This is a term with an obvious literal meaning, “to speak truth”. Though it does not exist in English, the form “veridicance”, meaning “speaking the truth”, was created to avoid unnatural complex phraseology.

Verificar. Literally, “to truthify”. The term is rendered here as “to make truth”.

Schematic Outline of Sentient Intelligence

As an aid to reading and navigating this extensive and difficult work, the schematic outline on the following pages is offered. Readers may also find the index, which begins on page 369, to be helpful as well. In the translated text, page numbers from the original Spanish edition are given in curly braces, e.g., {221}. Note that Inteligencia Sentiente was originally issued in three separate volumes, so these curly brace page numbers start over at the beginning of each of the three parts.

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1 p. 363.

2 Refer to the discussion on pp. 43-46.
Sentient Intelligence
I publish this book on the subject of intelligence many years after having published a work on the topic of essence. This sequence is not merely chronological; rather, it has an intrinsic meaning the clarification of which is by no means superfluous. What does ‘after’ signify here?

For many readers, my book On Essence lacked a foundation because they felt that the task of knowing what reality is cannot be brought to its conclusion without a previous study of what it is possible for us to know. This is true with respect to certain concrete problems. But to affirm it in the most general way with respect to all knowing of reality as such is something quite different. This latter affirmation is an idea which, in various forms, constitutes the thesis animating almost all of philosophy from Descartes to Kant: it is the notion of “critical philosophy”. The foundation of all philosophy would be “critique”, the discerning of what can be known. Nonetheless, I think that this is incorrect. Certainly the investigation of reality requires us to lay hold of some conception of what knowing is. But is this necessarily prior? I do not believe so, because it is no less certain that an investigation about the possibilities of knowing cannot be brought to a conclusion, and in fact never has been brought to a conclusion, without appeal to some conception of reality. The study On Essence contains many affirmations about the possibility of knowing. But at the same time it is certain that the study of knowing and its possibilities includes many concepts about reality. The fact is that an intrinsic priority of knowing over reality or reality over knowing is impossible. Knowing and reality, in a strictly and rigorous sense, stem from the same root; neither has priority over the other. And this is true not simply because of the de facto conditions of our investigations, but because of an intrinsic and formal condition of the very idea of reality and of knowing. Reality is the formal character—the formality—according to which what is apprehended is something “in its own right,” something de suyo.1 And to know is to apprehend something according to this formality. I will return shortly to these ideas. For this reason, the presumed critical priority of knowing with respect to reality, i.e., with respect to the known, is in the final analysis nothing but a type of timid stammering in the enterprise of philosophizing. It is akin to the case of someone who wishes to open a door and spends hours studying the movement of the muscles of the hand; most likely he would never manage to open the door. Ultimately, this critical idea of the priority of knowing has never led to a knowledge of the real by itself, and when it did lead there, it was only at the expense of being unfaithful to its own critical principles. Nor could matters be otherwise, because knowing and reality stem from the same root. For this reason, the fact that I publish a study on the subject of intelligence after having published a study on the subject of essence does not mean that I am filling some unsatisfied necessity. Rather, it manifests that the study of knowing is not prior to the study of reality. The ‘after’ to which {11} I alluded earlier is thus not simply chronological but is the active rejection of any critique of knowledge as the preliminary ground for the study of reality.

But this is not all. I intentionally employ the expression ‘to know’ in a somewhat indeterminate fashion, because modern philosophy does not begin with knowing as such, but with the mode of knowing which is called ‘knowledge.’ Critical philosophy is thus the Critique of Knowledge, of episteme, or as it is usually called, ‘epistemology’, the science of knowledge. Now, I think that this is an exceedingly serious problem, because knowledge is not something which rests upon itself. And by that I am not referring to the determining psychological, sociological, and historical factors of knowing. To be sure, a psychology of knowledge, a sociology of knowing, and a historicity of knowing are quite essential. Nonetheless, they are not primary, because what is primary in knowledge is being a mode of intellection. Hence every epistemology presupposes an investigation of what, structurally and formally, the intelligence, the Nous, is; i.e., it presupposes a study of ‘noology’. The vague idea of ‘knowing’ is not made concrete first in the sense of knowledge, but in in-

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1[The Spanish de suyo is an extremely important technical term in Zubiri’s writings. It traces to the Latin ex se, and denotes that the impression of reality “comes from” and “out of” the reality of the encountered other. It therefore connotes a certain independence and self-sufficiency. The English ‘from itself,’ a literal translation, does not capture the range of meaning Zubiri intends; therefore the original Spanish expression is left throughout the text.—Trans.]
intellection as such. This does not refer to a logic or psychology of intelligence, but to the formal structure of understanding.

What then is understanding, knowing? Throughout the course of its history, philosophy has attended most carefully to the acts of intellection (conceiving, judging, etc.) as opposed to the distinct real data which the senses submit to us. Sensing is one thing, we are told, and understanding another. This manner of focusing on the problem of intelligence contains at bottom an affirmation: understanding is posterior to sensing, and this posteriority is an opposition. Such has been the initial thesis of philosophy since Parmenides, and it has hovered imperturbably, with a thousand variants, over all of European philosophy.

But there is something quite vague about all of this, because we have not been told in what the understanding as such consists formally. We have only been told that the senses give to the intelligence real sensed things so that the understanding may conceptualize and judge them. But despite this we are told neither what sensing is formally nor, most importantly, what intellection or understanding is formally. I believe that understanding consists formally in apprehending the real as real, and that sensing is apprehending the real in impression. Here ‘real’ signifies that the characters which the apprehended thing has in the apprehension also pertain to it as its own, de suyo, and not just as a function of some vital response. This does not refer to a real thing in the acceptance of something beyond apprehension, but rather inasmuch as it is apprehended as something which is its own. It is what I call “formality of reality.” It is because of this that the study of intellection and the study of reality have the same root. And this is decisive, because the senses give us, in human sensing, real things—albeit with all their limitations—but real things nonetheless. Consequently the apprehension of real things as sensed is a sentient apprehension; but insofar as it is an apprehension of realities, it is an intellective apprehension. Whence human sensing and intellection are not two numerically distinct acts, each complete in its order; but rather they constitute two moments of a single act of sentient apprehension of the real: this is sentient intelligence. And this does not refer to the fact that our intellection is primarily directed to the sensible, but rather to intellection and sensing in their proper formal structure. Nor does it refer to understanding the sensible and sensing the intelligible, but rather to the fact that understanding and sensing structurally constitute—if one desires to employ an expression and concept improper in this context—a single faculty, the sentient intelligence. Human sensing and intellection are not only not opposed, but indeed constitute in their intrinsic and formal unity a single and unitary act of apprehension. This act qua sentient is impression; qua intellective it is apprehension of reality. Therefore the unitary and unique act of sentient intellection is the impression of reality. Intellection is a mode of sensing, and sensing in man is a mode of intellection.

What is the formal nature of this act? It is what I call the mere actuality of the real. Actuality is not, as the Latins thought, something’s character of being in act. To be a dog in act is to be the formal plenitude of that in which being a dog consists. For that reason I refer to this character rather as actuity. Actuality on the other hand is not the character of something in act but rather of something which is actual—two very distinct things. Viruses have had actuity for many millions of years, but only today have acquired an actuality which previously they did not possess. But actuality is not always something extrinsic to the actuity of the real, as it was in the case of the viruses; it can be something intrinsic to real things. When a man is present because it is he who makes himself present, we say that this man is actual in that in which he makes himself present. Actuality is a temporary being, but a being present through oneself, through one’s own proper reality. Therefore actuality pertains to the very reality of the actual, but neither adds to it, subtracts from it, nor modifies any of its real notae or notes. So, human intellection is formally the mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence.

Here we have the idea, the only idea which there is in this book throughout its hundreds of pages. These pages are nothing but an explication of that one idea. This explication is not a question of conceptual reasoning, but of a analysis of the facts of intellection. To be sure, it is a complicated analysis and one which is not easy; for this reason there have been inevitable repetitions which at times may become monotonous. But it is mere analysis.

Intellection has distinct modes, that is, there are distinct modes of the mere actualization of the real. There is a primary and radical mode, the apprehension of the real actualized in and through itself: this is what I call the primordial apprehension of the real. Its study is therefore a rigorous analysis of the ideas of reality and of intellection. But there are other modes of actualization. They are the modes according to which the real is actualized not only in and through itself, but also among other things and in the world. This does not refer to some other actualization but to a development of the primordial actualization: it is therefore a reactualization. As the primordial intellection is sentient, it follows that these reactualiza-
tions are also sentient. They are two: logos and reason, sentient logos and sentient reason. Knowledge is nothing but a culmination of logos and reason. It would not be profitable to say here what logos and reason are; I will do so in the course of this study.

The study thus comprises three parts:

First Part: *Intelligence and Reality.*
Second Part: *Logos.*
Third Part: *Reason.*

Through intellection, we are unmistakably installed in reality. Logos and reason do not need to come to reality but rather are born of reality and in it. {15}

Today the world is undeniably engulfed by a pervasive atmosphere of sophistry. As in the time of Plato and Aristotle, we are inundated by discourse and propaganda. But the truth is that we are installed modestly, but irrefutably, in reality. Therefore it is more necessary now than ever to bring to conclusion the effort to submerge ourselves in the real in which we already are, in order to extract its reality with rigor, even though that may be only a few poor snatches of its intrinsic intelligibility.

Fuenterrabia. August, 1980. {16}
Part I

Intelligence and Reality
CHAPTER I

INTELLECTIVE KNOWING AS ACT: APPREHENSION

In this first part of the book I propose to study what we call 'intellective knowing.' From the very origins of philosophy the opposition of intellection to what we term 'sensing' has been taken as the point of departure. Intellection and sensation would thus be two forms, for the most part opposed. . . , of what? Greek and Medieval philosophy understood intellection and sensing as acts of two essentially distinct faculties. The opposition of intellection and sensing would thus be the opposition of two faculties. In order to simplify the discussion I shall call 'thing' that which is sensed and understood. This has nothing to do with 'thing' in the sense of what that word means today when one speaks of "thing-ism," wherein the thing is opposed to something which has a mode of being "not-thinglike," so to speak, for example human life. Rather, I here employ the term 'thing' in its most trivial sense as merely synonymous with 'something'.

Now, Greek and Medieval philosophy considered intellection and sensing as acts of two faculties, each determined by the action of things. But whether or not this is true, it is a conception which cannot serve us as a positive base precisely because it treats of faculties. A faculty is discovered in its acts. Hence it is to the very mode of intellective knowing and sensing, and not to the faculties, which we must basically attend. In other words, my study is going to fall back upon the acts of intellective knowing and sensing, not to the faculties, which we must basically attend. In other words, my study is going to fall back upon the acts of intellective knowing and sensing inasmuch as they are acts (kath' energeian), and not inasmuch as they are faculties (kata dynamin). So these acts will not be considered as acts of a faculty, but as acts in and for themselves. Throughout this book, then, I shall refer to "intellection" itself, and not to the faculty of intellection, that is, to the intelligence. If at times I speak of 'intelligence', the expression does not mean a faculty but the abstract character of intellection itself. Therefore I do not refer to a metaphysics of the intelligence, but rather of the internal structure of the act of intellective knowing. Every metaphysics of the intelligence presupposes an analysis of intellection. To be sure, at various points I have seen myself moved to metaphysical conceptualizations, which I have deemed important. But when doing so, I have taken great care to indicate that in these points I am dealing with metaphysics and not mere intellection as act. That is, I am dealing with an analysis of acts themselves. They are salient facts, and we ought to take them in and for themselves and not in terms of any theory, of whatever order it may be.

But here a second aberration appears. In Greek and medieval philosophy, philosophy drifted from act to faculty. But in modern philosophy, since the time of Descartes, the drift has been in the other direction. This false step is within the very act of intellection. Intellection and sensing are considered as distinct ways of becoming aware of things. So in modern philosophy, intellection and sensing are two modes of such becoming aware, i.e. two modes of consciousness. Leaving aside sensing for the moment, we are told that intellection is consciousness, so that intellection as act is an act of consciousness. This is the idea which has run through all of modern philosophy and which culminates in the phenomenology of Husserl. Husserl’s philosophy seeks to be an analysis of consciousness and of its acts.

Nonetheless, this conception falls back upon the essence of intellection as act. When it rejects the idea of the act of a faculty, what philosophy has done is substantify the ‘becoming aware of’, thus making of intellection an act of consciousness. But this implies two ideas: (1) that consciousness is something which carries out acts; and (2) that what is formally constitutive of the act of intellection is the ‘becoming aware of.’ But, neither of these two affirmations is true because neither corresponds to the facts.

In the first place, consciousness has no substantiality whatever and, therefore, it is not something which can execute acts. Consciousness is just making awareness itself into a substance. But the only thing we have as fact

[1 ‘Intellective knowing’ is used to translate Zubiri’s expression inteligir, a verb derived from the Latin intelligere; it cannot be rendered literally, but means the act of knowing in which one’s intelligence, in the most general sense, is involved. Intelligir is broader than the English understanding, though at times it has that meaning.—Trans.]
is not “the” becoming aware of or “the” consciousness, but conscious acts of quite diverse nature. Under the pretext of not appealing to a “faculty”, the character of some of our acts is substantified and then these acts are converted into acts of a type of “super-faculty,” which would be consciousness. And this is not fact, but only a grand theory.

In the second place, it is untrue that what constitutes intellection is awareness, because that is always a becoming aware “of” something which is here-and-now present to consciousness. And this being here-and-now present is not determined by the being aware. A thing is not present because I am aware of it, but rather I am aware of it because it is already [22] present. To be sure, this concerns a being here-and-now present in the intellection, where I am aware of what is present; but the being here-and-now present of the thing is not a moment formally identical to the being aware itself, nor is it grounded there. Hence, within the act of intellection, modern philosophy has gone astray over the question of being here-and-now present, and has attended only to the realizing. But this awareness is not in and through itself an act; it is only a moment of the act of intellection. This is the great aberration of modern philosophy with respect to the analysis of intellection.

We ask ourselves then, what is the proper nature of intellection knowing as act? Intellection is certainly a becoming aware of, but it is an awareness of something which is already present. It is in the indivisible unity of these two moments that intellection consists. Greek and medieval philosophy sought to explain the presentation of something as an actuation of the thing on the faculty of intellection. Modern philosophy ascribes intellection to awareness. Now, it is necessary to take the act of intellection in the intrinsic unity of its two moments, but only as moments of it and not as determinations of things or of consciousness. In intellection, I “am” aware of something at that moment which “is” present to me. The indivisible unity of these two moments consists, then, in “being here-and-now present”. This being here-and-now present is of “physical” character and not merely an intentional aspect of intellection. “Physical” is the original and ancient expression for designating something which is not merely conceptual, but real. It is therefore opposed to what is merely intentional, that is, to what consists only in being the terminus of awareness. Awareness is “awareness-of”, and this moment of the ‘of’ is precisely what constitutes intentionality. The “being here-and-now present” in which the intellective act consists physically is a “being here-and-now present” in which [23] I am “with” the thing and “in” the thing (not “of” the thing), and in which the thing is “remaining” in my intellection. Intellection as act is not formally intentional. It is a physical “being here-and-now present”. The unity of this act of “being” as act is what constitutes apprehension. Intellection is not the act of a faculty or of consciousness, but rather is in itself an act of apprehension. Apprehension is not a theory but a fact: the fact that I am now aware of something which is present to me. Apprehension is, insofar as it refers to the moment of the “being here-and-now present”, an act of grasping the present, a grasping in which I am aware of what is grasped. It is an act in which what is present to me has been apprehended precisely and formally because it is present to me. Apprehension is the conscious and “presenting” act. And this ‘and’ is precisely the unitary and physical essence itself of apprehension. To understand something is to apprehend this something intellectively.

We must, then, analyze intellection as apprehension. This analysis sets out to determine the essential nature of intellection as such, in the sense of its constitutive nature, and it must fall back upon intellection as apprehension, as I have just said. But since man has many forms of intellection, the analysis which I now set myself can be carried out along quite different paths. One path consists of making a survey of the various types of intellection, trying to obtain by comparison what these types of intellection are in and through themselves. This is the path of induction, but it is not relevant to our problem because what it would give us is a general concept of intellection. But this not what we seek. We seek rather the constitutive nature, i.e. the essential nature of [24] intellection in and through itself. Induction would give us only a concept, but what we seek is the “physical” nature of intellection, that is the nature of the apprehensive act which constitutes intellection as such. A general concept does not give us the physical reality of intellection. And this is especially true because it would be necessary for any survey of acts of intellection to be exhaustive, and that we could never guarantee. So it is necessary to embark upon another road. The diverse types of intellection are not merely distinct “types”. As we shall see at the proper time, in them we treat of “modes” of intellection apprehension. Hence the analysis must bring us to the primary mode of intellection apprehension and enable us to determine the so-called ‘types of intellection’ as modalizations of this primary apprehension. What we will thus achieve is not a

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2 [Zubiri is here using one of the two Spanish forms of the verb “to be”, estar, which refers to temporary or actual being at the moment, as opposed to ser, which means being in a more permanent, long-term sense. The sense of estar in this context is “to be present here-and-now”, and that expression is used here and throughout the text as necessary to clarify the meaning.—Trans.]
general concept of intellection, but a determination of the constitutive nature of the diverse modes of intellective apprehension. Now, “constitutive nature” is just the essential physical nature of intellection; i.e., the problem of what intellective knowing is, is but the problem of the determination of the primary mode of intellection. That is what I intend to deal with in the first part of this book.

To begin, let us take up an idea that was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, but which I deliberately left aside at the time. Ever since its origins, philosophy has begun by setting what we call ‘intellective knowing’ against what we call ‘sensing’. But however strange it may seem, philosophy has never addressed the question of what intellective knowing is, in the formal sense. It has limited itself to studying diverse intellective acts, but has not told us what intellective knowing is. And what is particularly strange is that the same has occurred with sensing. The diverse sensings have been studied according to the diverse “senses” which man possesses. But if one asks in what the formal nature of sensing consists, i.e., what sensing as such is, we find that ultimately the question has not been posed. And there follows a consequence which, to my way of thinking, is an extremely important matter. Since what intellective knowing and sensing as such are has not been determined, it follows that their presumed opposition is left hanging. To what and in what sense can intellective knowing and sensing be opposed if we are not told beforehand in what each formally consists?

I am not going to enter into any type of dialectical discussion of concepts, but rather limit myself to the basic facts. They are what will lead us in our treatment of the question.

Intellection, I said, is an act of apprehension. Now this act of apprehensive character pertains as well to sensing. Hence it is in apprehension as such where we must anchor both the difference between and essential nature of intellective knowing and sensing. This does not mean achieving a general concept of apprehension, but of analyzing the nature of sensible and intellective apprehension in and through themselves. And this is possible because sensible apprehension and intellective apprehension—as has been observed on many occasions—frequently have the same object. I sense color and understand what this color is, too. In this case, the two aspects are distinguished not as types, but as distinct modes of apprehension. In order, then, to determine the constitutive nature of intellective knowing it is necessary to analyze above all the difference between intellective knowing and sensing as a modal difference within the apprehension of the same object; for example, of color. [26]

To determine the constitutive structure of the act of intellective apprehension, it is unnecessary but very useful to begin by saying what sensible apprehension is as such. This, of course, can be done in many ways. One, by analyzing the modal difference of these apprehensions in the apprehension of the same object. But in order to facilitate the work it is more useful to put sensible apprehension in and of itself before our eyes; that is, to say what sensing is. As sensible apprehension is common to man and animals, it seems that to determine intellective apprehension starting from sensible apprehension would be to start from the animal as the foundation of human intellection. But rather than starting from the animal in this sense, we seek only to clarify human intellection by contrasting it with “pure” animal sensing.

Finally, intellection as act is an act of apprehension and this apprehension is a mode of sensible apprehension itself. Therefore we must ask ourselves:

Chapter II: What is sensible apprehension?
Chapter III: What are the modes of sensible apprehension?
Chapter IV: In what does intellective apprehension consist formally?

Only after answering these questions can we penetrate further into the analysis of intellection itself.
We ask ourselves what sensible apprehension is. As I have just said, sensible apprehension is common to man and animal. Hence, when I refer to sensible apprehension in this chapter, I will be speaking indifferently of man and animal, according to which is most convenient in the particular case.

Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing. Therefore our first task must be to clarify what sensing is. Only then will we be able to ask ourselves what constitutes sensible apprehension as a moment of sensing.

§1
SENSING

Sensing is, first of all, a process; it is a sentient process. As a process, sensing has three essential moments.

1. In an animal (whether human or non-human), the sentient process is aroused by something which at times is exogenic and at times endogenic. This is the moment of arousal. I call it thus so as not to limit myself to what is usually termed ‘excitation’. Excitation is a standard concept in animal psychophysiology. It therefore has a character which is almost exclusively biochemical. Roughly speaking, it comprises that which initiates a physiological process. But here I am not referring exactly to physiological activity. Sensing as a process is not just a physiological activity, but is the process which constitutes the life—in a certain sense the entire life—of an animal. With the same excitations, the animal carries out actions which are extremely diverse. And these actions are determined not only by physiological activity, but by everything the animal apprehends sentiently; for example, its prey. And this moment of apprehension is what constitutes arousal. Arousal is everything that initiates animal action. In my courses I am accustomed to distinguish function and action in an animal. Muscular contraction, for example, is a function. The subject, let us call it that, of the function is an anatomic-physiological structure; for example, a striated muscle fiber. But action is something whose subject is not a structure, but the animal as a whole. For example, fleeing, attacking, etc., are actions. With the same functions the animal carries out the most diverse actions of its life. So, excitation is a moment of a function; arousal is a moment of an action. This does not preclude an action from initiating a functional act in some cases. But then it is clear that the excitation is only a special mode of arousal. Arousal is the prelude to an animal action process, whatever may be the mode in which it takes place.

2. This arousal rests upon the state in which the animal finds itself. The animal has at every instant a state of vital tone. Arousal modifies that vital tone, and this constitutes the second moment of the sentient process: tonic modification. Modification is determined by arousal. But this does not mean that modification is a second moment in the sense of a temporal succession. This would be to again confuse arousal and excitation. Arousal can depend on an endogenic factor which can be in a certain mode connatural to the animal. In such a case, it is the tonic state of the animal which, in one or another form, has chronologically proceeded the arousal. This is what occurs, for example, with some instinctive acts. But even in this case, the moment of arousal is one thing, and the moment of tonic modification another.

3. The animal responds to the tonic modification thus aroused. This is the moment of response. Let us not confuse response with a reaction of the so-called motor impulses. The action of the impulses is always just a functional moment; but response is an actional moment. With the same motor impulses, the responses can be quite diverse. The apprehension of a prey, for example, determines the attack response. This does not refer simply to a play of the motor impulses. The response can be quite varied. It can even include doing nothing. But qui-
escence is not quietude, that is, an act of the motor impulses, but a mode of response.

Consequently, sensing is a process. This sentient process is strictly unitary: it consists in the intrinsic and radical unity, in the indissoluble unity, of the three moments: arousal, tonic modification, and response. It would be an error to think that sensing consists only in arousal, and that the other two moments are only consequent upon sensing. On the contrary: the three moments, in their essential in indissoluble unity, are what strictly constitute sensing. As we shall see in a later chapter, this unity is of decisive importance for our problem. It constitutes what is specific about animality.

Here I do not intend to study the course of this process, but its structure as a process. This processive structure depends upon the formally constitutive moment of sensing as such. And sensing, in virtue of its very formal structure, is what in a certain fashion determines the structure of the sentient process. Let us, then, consider these two points. {31}

§2

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF SENSING

The processive unity of sensing is determined by the formal structure of arousal. That which arouses the sentient process is the apprehension of the “arousing agent”. And since what this apprehension determines is a sentient process, it follows that the apprehension itself which arouses it should be called, strictly speaking, ‘sensible apprehension.’ Sensible apprehension, then, has two aspects. First, there is that of determining the sentient process in its moment of modification and response; this is sensible apprehension as arousing. In its second aspect, sensible apprehension has a formal structure of its own, and in virtue of that sets the sensing process in motion. Our problem at the moment is centered on the formal structure of sensible apprehension. In the following paragraph we shall see how this formal structure determines the processive structure of sensing.

Since what determines the sentient process is the formal structure of apprehension, it is proper to call this apprehension “sensing as such.” Hence, when I speak of sensing without further qualification I shall be referring to sensing as the formal structure of the sentient apprehension.

We may ask ourselves, then, in what the structure of sensible apprehension consists, considered precisely and formally as sentient apprehension. It consists formally in being impressive apprehension. Here we have what is formally constitutive of sensing: impression. Ancient as well as modern philosophy has either paid little attention \{32\} to the nature of this impression, or more commonly has paid attention to it but without making an analysis of its formal structure. Philosophers have typically limited themselves to describing distinct impressions. But, it is absolutely necessary to rigorously conceptualize what an impression is, that is, in what its nature as an impression consists. Only thus will we be able to speak of sensing in a creative way.

Structurally, an impression has three constitutive moments:

1. Impression is above all affection of the sentient by what is sensed. Colors, sounds, an animal’s internal temperature, etc., affect the sentient being. Here ‘affection’ does not refer to the usual moment of sentiment; that would be an affect. Impression is an affection, but it is not an affect. In virtue of this affective moment, we say that the sentient being “suffers” the impression. Since its origins in Greece, philosophy has for this reason characterized impressions as pathemata. They would thus be opposed to thoughts, which are proper to a thinking intelligence without pathos; so thinking intelligence would thus be apathes, impassive. Here these unmodified characterizations comprise a description (inaccurate to be sure) but not a formal determination of what impression is. It can be said that the totality of modern as well as ancient philosophy has scarcely conceptualized impression other than as affection. But this is insufficient.

2. Impression is not mere affection, it is not mere pathos of the sentient being; rather, this affection has, essentially and constitutively, the character of making that which “impresses” present to us. This is the moment of otherness. Impression is the presentation of something other in affection. It is otherness in affection. This “other” I have called and will continue \{33\} to call the note. Here ‘note’ does not designate any type of indicative sign as does, etymologically, the Latin noun nota; rather, it is a participle, that which is “noted” (gnoto) as opposed to that which is unnoticed—provided that we eliminate any allusion to cognition (that would be rather the cognitum) as well as to knowing (which is what gave rise to notion and notice). It is necessary to attend only to what is simply “noted”. This could also be called “quality”; but a note is not always of qualitative nature. If I see three points, “three” is not a quality, but it is a note.
Moreover, one must shun the thought that a note is necessarily a note “of” something; for example, that a color is a color of a thing. If I see a simple color, this color is not “of” a thing but “is” in itself the thing; the color is noted in itself. It is true that quite often I call notes ‘qualities’, but only in a wide sense. In the strict sense, a note is not a quality, but something merely noted; it is purely and simply what is present in my impression. Using different words, the Greeks and Medievals suggested this, but did not go beyond the suggestion. It is necessary to anchor reflection on otherness itself. But before doing so let us point out a third characteristic of impression, one which to my way of thinking is essential.

3. I refer to the force of imposition with which the note present in the affection imposes itself upon the sentient being. It is this which arouses the process of sensing. In general, it is a conjunction of notes rather than an isolated one; thus, for example, we have the saying “a cat scalded with hot water flees”. The water sensed in impression “imposes” itself upon the animal. This force of imposition can be quite varied; i.e. the same impressive otherness can impose itself in very different manners. But this force of imposition has nothing to do with force in the sense of intensity of affection. A very powerful affection can have a quite small force of imposition. And, conversely, a weak affection can have a great force of imposition.

The intrinsic unity of these three moments is what constitutes impression. But ancient as well as modern philosophy has largely restricted its attention to affection. It has pointed out (though rather vaguely) what I have termed “otherness”, but without centering its attention on otherness as such. Furthermore, it has scarcely examined the force of imposition at all. These three moments are essential and, as we shall see in the following chapter, their unity is decisive. It is necessary, then, to keep our attention focussed longer on otherness and on the force of imposition. This is especially true in virtue of the fact that what renders the distinct modes of apprehension specific is precisely the distinct modes of otherness.

Analysis of otherness. This analysis will reveal to us first the proper structure of otherness, and second the unity of this structure.

A) Otherness is not just the abstract character of being other. This is because otherness does not consist in an affection making something present to us merely as “other”; for example, this sound or this green color. Rather, it makes this “other” present to us in a precise form: the other, but “other as such”.

This “other”, i.e., this note, above all has a proper content: such-and-such color, such-and-such hardness, such-and-such temperature, etc. That is what Greek and medieval philosophy always emphasized. But to my way of thinking, it is essentially inadequate, because this content, this note, is not just effectively other, but rather is present as other. That is what I express by saying that the content is something which “is situated” before the sentient being as something other. And this is not a mere conceptual subtlety, but is, as we shall see, an essential physical moment of otherness. According to this aspect of “other”, a note not only has a content, but also has a mode of “being situated” in the impression.

What is this mode? It is just the mode of being other: it is the aspect of independence which the content has with respect to the sentient being. The content of a note “is situated”, and insofar as it “is situated” it is independent of the sentient being in whose impression it “is situated”. Here, independence does not signify a thing “apart” from my impression (that is what the Greeks and medievals believed), but rather is the content itself present in the apprehension as something “autonomous” with respect to the sentient being. A color, a sound, have an autonomy proper to the visual and auditory affections, respectively. “Being situated” is being present as autonomous. This character of autonomy is not identical to the content, because as we shall see in the following chapter the same content can have different ways of being situated, different forms of independence, and different autonomies. To be autonomous is, then, a form of being situated. In virtue of it I shall say that the “other”, the note present in impression, has a proper form of autonomy in addition to a content. For that reason I call this moment formality. Formality does not refer to a metaphysical concept as in the Middle Ages, but to something completely different, to a sentient moment of descriptive character.

Both content and formality depend in large measure upon the nature of the animal. The note sensed is always “other” than the animal; but what its content may be depends in each case on the animal itself, because the content depends on the system of receptors which the animal possesses. A mole does not have color impressions, for example. But, even with the same receptors, and therefore with the same content, this content can “be situated” in different forms. The “being situated” does not

[This is a rendering of the Spanish verb quedarse, a technical term difficult to translate in this context but which can mean “to remain”, “to be situated”, or just “to be” in the sense of place.—trans.]
depend on the receptors themselves, but rather on the mode in which the sentient being has them in its sensing. To this mode of “having them [to or in] itself” the word ‘habitude’ should be applied. I will explain myself a bit later. Habitude is neither custom nor habit, but the mode of having-them-itself. Customs and habits are habitude precisely because they are modes of having-them-itself. But the converse is not true: not every mode of having-them-itself.

Formalization is the modulation of formality. i.e. the modulation of independence, the modulation of autonomy. Otherness does not just make present to us something we call a note, but a note which in one or another way “is situated”.

Philosophy has never attended to more than the content of an impression; it has always erred with respect to formality. And this is very serious, because as we shall see in the following chapter, that which renders specific the distinct modes of apprehension, i.e., the distinct modes of impression, is formality. Sensible apprehensions are distinguished essentially by the mode according to which their content is present and is autonomized, i.e., is independent of the sentient being.

B) Structural Unity of Otherness. Content and formality are not two moments which are foreign to each other; indeed, they have an essential unity: formalization concerns content, and in turn content concerns the mode of being formalized. The two moments of content and formality have, then, an intrinsic and radical unity: the modalization of otherness.

a) Formalization modulates content. An animal, in effect, apprehends notes which we could call elemental; for example, a color, a sound, an odor, a taste, etc. Certainly they are not rigorously elemental, because every note has at least a quality and an intensity. But for now we shall not discuss that; for the purposes of our question these notes are elemental. The term ‘sensation’ should be applied to the apprehension of these notes. But, precisely because these notes are autonomous, i.e., formalized, they are independent. And they are so not just with respect to the sentient being, but also with respect to other notes.

Formalization precisely constitutes the “unity” of the sensed content. Thus, these distinct notes can have an outline, a type of closure. These unities thus closed can have the character of autonomous unities; they are then autonomous constellations. Their apprehension thus is not simple sensation; it is “perception”. The elemental notes are sensed, the constellations of notes are perceived, etc. An animal not only apprehends sounds, colors, etc., but also apprehends, for example, its “prey”. The same elemental notes can comprise different perceptive constellations, i.e., diverse types of unitary content, according to the nature of the animal. Thus, for example, a crab in general perceives the constellation “rock-prey”. But many times it does not perceive the prey by itself (Katz’ experience), because if the prey is suspended from a string, the crab does not perceive it until it has habituated itself to the new constellation “string-prey”. The prey, the rock, and the string do not have a formal independence in the crab by themselves. For a dog, on the other hand, there are always three separate and independent constellations: prey, rock, string. The fact is that the dog and the crab have different modes of formalization. The formalization, the autonomization of content, now consists in that the unity of independence concerns the constellation itself, and not just one or a few notes arbitrarily selected. Formalization has thus modulated the content: from the elemental it passes to be a totality which may be closed in diverse ways. As we shall see in another chapter, this is decisive.

b) But at the same time, content modulates formality itself. Formalization is, as I said, independence of autonomization. This does not mean an abstract independence, but something very concrete. Independence, stated in a crude way, means that the content is more or less “detached” from the apprehending animal. And content modulates the mode of being detached. Now, the detachment of a color is not the same that of heat. Considering luminosity, for example, its mode of being “detached” in an insect is not the same as it is in a higher order metazoan. Nor is the mode of being “detached” of a constellation of notes the same as the mode of being detached of an elemental note. Speaking somewhat coarsely, a tree or a ravine is much richer in independence for a chimpanzee than for a dog.

All of this comprises the structural unity of otherness and this unity, as we see from the examples alluded to, depends on the nature of the animal. There is no doubt that a color is apprehended in a different way as independent by the retina of a chimpanzee than by that of an insect. Otherness, then, in its intrinsic unity, admits degrees which are manifested above all in the degree of for-
malization. To the greater degree of formalization corresponds the greater independence of content.

In summary, sensible impression is an impression which affects the sentient being by making present to it that which “impresses”, i.e., a note, in formality of independence with a content which is either elemental (a single note) or complex (a constellation of notes). In their otherness, these independent notes impose themselves with a variable force upon the sentient being. And thus imposed, the impression determines the sensing process: arousal, tonic modification, and response. That is what we must now consider. [40]

§3

STRUCTURE OF THE SENSIENT PROCESS

Sensible apprehension does not only apprehend something impressively; rather, the nature of the sentient process, which apprehension determines, will vary according to the nature of what is apprehended considered as independent of the apprehendor.

A) To see this, let us begin with an essential observation: formalization does not concern just the moment of apprehension, but the entire sentient process as such, in the sense that each one of its three moments is modalized by formalization.

Above all it is clear that there is formalization in the moment of response. This is manifested in some alterations of the sentient process. Inability to coordinate movements is not the same as inability to move oneself. The capacity of coordination of movement is a formalization. A lesion of whatever nature which, in a higher animal such as man, produces changes in coordination, does not produce paralysis. Not all animals have the same structure of motor formalization. A spectacular case is the capacity of a cat hurled into the air to recover its equilibrium while falling.

Vital tone itself acquires nuances through formalization. A general feeling of well-being or malaise acquires nuances through mere formalization: a mode of feeling spiritless or full of life, spiritless in one direction but not in others, a tonality of happiness, etc.—and all of this according to qualities and in degrees or diverse forms.

Formalization, then, concerns sensing as a whole as arousal, as modification of vital tone, and as response.

B) This demonstrates that some impressions which are the same by reason of their content, through formalization open up all of the richness of the sentient process comprising the richness of the life of the animal. The amplitude of the apprehensive formalization opens up to the animal the amplitude of possible responses. This means that the radical effect of formalization considered as a process consists in autonomizing relatively among themselves each of the three moments of the sentient process: the moment of apprehension, the moment of tone, and the moment of response. This is what allows us to speak of each of these three moments by itself. But this autonomization is only relative: it never breaks the structural unity of the sensing process. In the next chapter we shall see the very important consequences of this observation. Within each of these moments thus autonomized, formalization continues to determine nuances and individually different aspects. If I have limited myself to the formalizing aspect of apprehension, it has been on account of the theme of this book.

We have thus analyzed, first, the moments of the sentient process; and second, the formal structure of sensing. Finally we have indicated the structural determination of the sentient process through formalization.

This formalization is that which renders specific the different modes of sensible apprehension. [42]
APPENDIX 1

CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT FORMALIZATION

So as not to interrupt the thread of my exposition of the analysis of sensible apprehension, I have relegated to this appendix some considerations which I deem important, but which in many respects perhaps go beyond the mere analysis of sensible apprehension.

To begin, it is fitting to explicate the use of the expression ‘formalization’. Formalization can mean the cerebral structure through which we apprehend some content in accordance with its proper formality. In this sense, formalization is a psycho-biological action. But formalization can also mean the fact that a content remains in its proper formality. Then formalization is not an action but a mere “being situated”; it is the unity of content and formality. And it is to this sense I refer when speaking here of formalization. I do not refer to structures of the brain except when dealing expressly with formalization as action.

1. Given the foregoing, it is necessary to delimit this concept of formalization with respect to two current ideas, one in philosophy and the other in psychology.

In the first place, formalization should not be confused with the Kantian idea of “form of sensibility”. For Kant, sensible content is something unformed in the sense that it lacks spatio-temporal structure. The proper part of the form of sensibility would consist in “informing” (in the Aristotelian sense of the word, i.e., giving form to) sensible matter, i.e. the content. This giving of form is produced by the subjective form (space and time) which sensibility imposes on the content. Now, formalization is not giving of form. Whether Kant’s idea about space and time was correct or not (that is not our present question), the essential point is that formalization is prior to all spatio-temporal giving of form. Formalization is independence, that is, however the animal deals with its impressions, they still remain in a certain formality. Only insofar as there is formality, in which there is independence, can one speak of spatio-temporal arrangement. Formalization concerns this independence, this otherness. Independence is the formality in which content “is situated” before the apprehensor. Formalization is the mode of “being situated” and not the mode of “informing” in the Aristotelian-Kantian sense. Only because it is independent can one speak about whether content has, or does not have, or should have, this informing. The Kantian form produces “informing”; formalization, however, is not production, but just the reverse, a mere “being situated”.

On the other hand, formalization is not what one understands in psychology when speaking of form (Gestalt). In this psychology, form is the total configuration of what is perceived as opposed to what the elemental sensations of 19th century psychology might have been. But formalization is not Gestalt. In the first place, the elemental sensations themselves are something formalized: their content, the note, is apprehended as independent and, therefore, is formalized. And, in the second place, even in the case of a constellation of notes, formalization does not primarily concern configuration but rather autonomization. Configuration is only the result of autonomization. Only because there is independence can there be and is there configuration. Formalization is the independence of, and what is constitutive of, the unity of content as independent, be it elemental content or a constellation.

Formalization is not, then, either information or configuration, but autonomization: it is how the content “is situated”. Formality is not produced by the sentient being (Kant), nor is it primary configuration (Gestalt). It is purely and simply the mode of “being situated”.

2. In another direction, formalization can have pathological alterations in apprehension. There are cases of human perception in which there is a regressive disintegration, a decaying (Abbau) of the perception. This disintegration consists in a dislocation or disconnection of the perception; for example, some volumes may seem to be situated behind a curtain of colors and at a certain distance from it, etc. But I believe that the sense of the independence of the reality of what is perceived is being lost all at once. I think that the degradation of perception is at once loss of the outline of perceptive content and loss of independence. The loss itself consists of a greater or lesser regression of both aspects. It is a regression of formalization. Formalization is, I repeat, at once autonomization of content and autonomization of what is perceived with respect to the animal which is apprehending.

3. Finally, I have an interest in stressing that formalization is not primarily a type of speculative concept, but to my way of thinking is a moment of apprehen-
sion anchored in a structural moment of the animal organism itself. In the immediately foregoing pages I alluded to alterations in the coordination of movements of the human animal. It is well known that the lesion which produces them is localized in the extrapiramidal paths. Among other functions, these paths have that of formalizing movement.

But this is not all. As an hypothesis I think that the brain is not primarily an organ of integration (Sherrington) nor an organ of meaning (Brickner), but that in our problem is the organ of formalization, a formalization which culminates in corticalization. It suffices for me to allude to the servo-mechanisms or to certain special cortical areas, for example to some of the frontal areas of the brain. Formalization is a structure which is rigorously anatomico-physiological.

The anatomical-physiological organization of the nervous system has a plan or scheme which has been relatively homogeneous and common since very remote philogenetic epochs. Thus, for example, this scheme is already in the brain of the salamander. To me, this scheme has two directions: one of specification, predominantly regional so to speak, and another of a finer structure, that of formalization.

But while none of this concerns our philosophical problem here, I did not wish to refrain from expounding these ideas, which I have already published elsewhere. However, I have relegated them to an appendix because as I stated earlier, what matters to me in this book is the rigorous and precise analysis of sensible apprehension as fact.
CHAPTER III

MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION

As I said at the end of the last chapter, the modes of sensible apprehension are distinguished by the modes of formalization. This refers to distinct “modes” of apprehension and not simple “types.” And in order to see that it is necessary and sufficient to analyze how the same notes can be apprehended as independent in a different way. Sensible apprehensions are distinguished among themselves above all modally. These modes are essentially two. Reserving the right to explain myself immediately below, I will say that there is a mode of sentient apprehension which—for reasons I will explain later—I call sensing mere or pure stimulation. But there is another mode of apprehending sentiently which I call sensing reality. It is necessary to embark rigorously upon this modal analysis.

§ 1

APPREHENSION OF PURE STIMULI

Sensible apprehension, that is, impression, determines the nature of the sentient process. When an impression is of such character that it consists in nothing more than determining the process, then we have a first mode of sensible apprehension. As every impression has three moments (affection, otherness, force of imposition), we must ask ourselves in what the structural nature of impression consists, according to these three moments. That is, we must say: 1. What is this impression qua affectant? 2. What is its proper formality? and 3. What is its force of imposition?

1) Impression always has a moment of affection. Now, the impression which consists in determining, by affection, the responsive process is what we call a stimulus. There are two essential moments in the concept of the stimulus: first, the most obvious, is that of arousing the response. But this is not sufficient because if it were, one would be able to apprehend this character of arousal by itself; one would be able to apprehend the stimulus by itself, in which case what is apprehended will not be a stimulus of the apprehendor. Let us consider an example. One can apprehend a toothache without feeling the pain; that is, one can apprehend a stimulus without it affecting him (i.e., the apprehendor). Being actively stimulated, being actually affected by the stimulus, is the second essential moment of stimulus. Only then is there stimulus formally and properly. Now, when this stimulative affection is “merely” stimulative, that is, when it consists only in arousing, it then constitutes what I shall call ‘affection of the mere stimulus as such’. This is what I call ‘apprehending the stimulus stimulatedly’. Heat apprehended in a thermal affection, and apprehended only as an affection determining a response (flight, welcome, etc.), is what we humanly express by saying heat warms. When heat is apprehended only as something warming, we say that the heat has been apprehended as a mere stimulus, that is, as something which is only a thermic determinant of a response. The diverse qualities of the different stimuli are nothing but so many qualitative modalities of the mere arousing of responses in affection. This “mere” is not a simple circumscription which fixes the concept of stimulation, but rather constitutes its positive physical outline: being “only” stimulation.

2) However impression is not just affection, but also otherness. In what does the otherness of impression consist as mere stimulus? In affection which is merely stimulative the apprehended note is made present but as “other” than the affection itself; its proper formality is made present. Now, what is essential is to correctly conceptualize this formality of otherness of the stimulus as mere stimulus. That is what I shall call the formality of pure stimulus. In what does it consist? The note apprehended as “other” (but only insofar as its otherness consists just in arousing a determined response) constitutes what I call sign. The formality of pure stimulus consists
What is a sign? A sign is not a “signal”. A signal is something whose content is apprehended by itself and [50] besides this—and therefore extrinsically to it—“signals”. Thus, for example, we have the so-called “traffic signals”. On the other hand, a sign is the note itself apprehended. Sign-ness pertains to it intrinsically and formally, not by extrinsic attribution. It is not a note in the form of a signal, but intrinsically and formally a “note-sign”. One does not apprehend heat by itself and later also as a response signal; rather, the very form of heat as apprehended is to be formally “signative heat”, or if one wishes, “thermic sign”.

This intrinsic pertaining is not “signification.” Signification in the strict sense is proper only to language. In it, the signification is added (in whatever form—this is not the time to discuss the problem) to certain sounds (not to all). But the sign is not added to anything; rather it is the note in the mode of presenting itself as that note.

What is proper to a sign is not, then, signaling or signifying. Rather, it is purely and simply “to sign”. Ever since its origin, classical philosophy has failed to distinguish these three concepts, and generally speaking has limited itself almost always to the signal, therefore making of the sign a semeion. As I see it, this is insufficient. I believe that sign and signing comprise a proper concept which ought to be delimited formally with respect to both signal and signification. These three concepts are not only distinct, but quite separable. Only animals have signs, and only man has significations or meanings. On the other hand, animals and men both have signals, but of distinct character. The animal has signitive signals, i.e., it can use “note-signs” as signals. This is the foundation of all possible learning, for example. When the signals are in the form of sounds they may constitute at times what (very falsely) has been called ‘animal language’. [51] The so-called “animal language” is not language, because the animal lacks meanings; it only possesses, or can possess, sonorous signitive signals. In man, the notes utilized as signals have, as I shall explain later, quite a different character; they are signalizing realities. But in both cases the notes are signals due to a function extrinsically added to them: they are notes in function of being signals. Therefore we may once again ask, What is a sign?

Medieval philosophy did not distinguish among signal, meaning, and sign. It called everything “sign”, and so defined it: that the knowledge of which leads to the knowledge of something different. Whence the classical distinction between natural signs (smoke as a sign of fire) and artificial signs. But this is inadequate, and moreover quite vague, because the question is not whether a sign leads to knowledge of something different; what is essential is in how it so leads. It could do so through mere signalization (such is the case with the smoke) or through meaning; and in neither of these cases would it be a sign. It will be a sign only if it leads by “signing”.

What is a sign and what is signing? In order to answer this question it is necessary first to stress the distinction between sign and signal. Something is formally a sign and not a simple signal when that to which the sign points or leads is an animal response. A sign consists in being a mode of formality of the content: the formality of determining a response. And “signing” consists in the mere signitive determination of that response. But secondly, and in addition, we are not dealing with “knowledge,” but with “sensing,” with apprehending in an impressive way; that is, sensing something as “signing”.

A sign is, then, the formality of otherness of the mere stimulus of a response. It is the mode in which what is sentiently [52] apprehended is situated as something merely arousing; this is signitivity. Formalization is, as we have seen, independence, autonomization. And that which is apprehended in a merely stimulative manner is independent of the animal but only as a sign. This independence and, therefore, formalization, is merely stimulative. The distinct sensed qualities as mere stimuli are distinct response signs. Every sign is a “sign-of”. The “of” is a response, and this “of” itself pertains formally to the manner of being situated and sensed signitively. Thus heat is a thermic response sign, light a luminous response sign, etc.

Now, to sign is to determine a response sentiently in an intrinsic and formal way. And to apprehend something in a mere signing or signitive otherness is that in which apprehension of pure stimulation consists.

3) But every impression has a third moment, the force of imposition of what is apprehended on the apprehender. As the sign has a form of independence, a form of signitive autonomy, it follows that its merely signitive independence is what should be called, in the strict sense, an objective sign. ‘Objective’ here means the mere signitive otherness with respect to the apprehendor qua imposed upon him. Hence I say that the determination of the response always has the character of an objective imposition. The sign reposes signitively upon itself (it is formalization of a stimulus), and therefore it is imposed on the animal as an objective sign. It is from this objectivity that the sign receives its force of imposition.

The impressions of an animal are mere objective signs of response. Apprehending them as such is what I
call *pure sensing*. Pure sensing consists in apprehending something as a mere objective arousal of the sentient process. In pure sensing, {53} the sensible impression is, then, *impression of pure stimulus*. In it, though the note may be an *alter*, it is an *alter* whose otherness consists in pertaining in a signing way to the sentient process and, therefore, in exhausting itself there. It is unnecessary to stress that tonic changes are also signitively determined. And it is in this that the structural character of the entire life of an animal consists: life in objective signs. Naturally, this signitivity admits of grades; but that is not our immediate problem. {54} 

§2

**APPREHENSION OF REALITY**

Besides the sensible apprehension of mere or pure stimulus, proper to animals, man possesses another mode of apprehension in his so-called “senses.” Man apprehends the sensed in a particular way, one that is exclusively his. That is to say, the same notes apprehended in a stimulative way by an animal present a formality to man quite distinct from stimulation. To be sure, we are dealing with a sensible apprehension; hence we are always dealing with an apprehension in an impression. But it is a distinct mode of impression, and the distinction is strictly modal and one which modally affects the three moments of impression. Hence, in order to rigorously conceptualize this new mode of impression, we must successively examine three points:

1. The new formality of that which is apprehended.
2. The modification of the three moments of an impression.
3. The unitary nature of this mode of apprehension.

1. **The new formality of that which is apprehended.** The content—this color, this sound, this taste, etc.—is apprehended by an animal only as a determinant of the tonic modification and of the response. Thus, the animal apprehends heat as warming, and only as warming. This is what we express by saying, “Heat warms”. Here “warms” is not an action verb, but a verb of objective personal experience: there is a warming. The formality of heat consists in {55} heat being only what I sense in the personal experience of heat. Therefore it does not refer to something merely “subjective”, but to something “objective” whose objectivity consists in determining the living experience of the animal. We shall see this later. Hence, heat thus apprehended is clearly distinct from the apprehender; but in the distinction itself this warming heat pertains formally to the apprehender: the distinction is in and for the sentient process. The heat “is situated” then as a moment which is “other”, but with an otherness which formally pertains to the sentient process itself. On the other hand, in the new mode of apprehension the heat is apprehended as a note whose thermic characteristics pertain to it in its own right.

This does not mean that the characteristics are “properties” of the heat, but that those characteristics pertain to it in its own right, and not that they are characteristics of a subject called “heat” (which is in any case not something primitively given). Rather, they are the “heat’s own”. Every property is something’s own, pertaining to it as its own; but not everything which pertains to something as its own is a property of it. To be sure, the word ‘property’ is not always taken in this strict sense of a property which emerges from the thing, as for example weight, which by emerging from something is a property of it. The word ‘property’ can also be taken in a wide sense, and then it signifies rather the pertaining as its own to something, for example the pertaining as its own of the thermic characteristics to the heat. Here when speaking about the “in its own right” I do not refer to property except in its widest sense: the pertaining to something. But with this clarification, there is no difficulty in speaking about “in its own right” as a property just as I can call every note a quality, as I said a few pages ago. ‘Note’, ‘quality’, and ‘property’ {56} can be used as synonymous terms in the wide sense, and thus I shall use them. But rigorously speaking, they designate three distinct aspects of the real, of the “in its own right”: the “note” is what is noted as its own; the quality is always and only a quality “of” the real; and ‘property’ is the note insofar as it emerges (in whatever form) from the nature of the thing.

Now, in the apprehension of reality the note is “in its own right” what it is. In pure stimulation, on the other hand, heat and all of its thermic characteristics are nothing but signs of response. This is what I expressed by saying that “heat warms”. In the apprehension of reality, on the other hand, they are characteristics which pertain to the heat itself which, without ceasing to warm (just as it warmed in the previous mode of apprehension), nonetheless now is situated in a distinct mode. It does not “re-
main” only as pertaining to the sentient process, but “is situated” by itself as heat “in its own right”. This is what we express by saying, “The heat is warming.” Here “is” does not mean “being” in an entitative sense, especially since reality does not always consist in being. The fact is that one cannot prescind from language already created, and thus it is inevitable at times to recur to the “is” in order to signify what pertains to something as its own. The same thing happened when, in Parmenides’ philosophy, “is” was spoken of meaning that “being” is one, immobile, uncreated, etc. The verb “to be” appears twice in these phrases, first as an expression of what is understood and then as the thing understood itself. The second acceptance is the essential one: when we say that heat “is warming” the verb “is” does nothing but indicate that what is understood, the heat, has the characteristics which pertain to it “in its own right”. (That this “in its own right” consists in being is a false and obsolete conception.

Nor do we refer to heat as mere otherness pertaining signifi- cantly to the sensing process, but rather to an otherness which as such only pertains to the heat by itself. The heat apprehended now does not consist formally in being a sign of response, but in being warm de suyo. Now, this is what constitutes reality; and thus we have a the new formality: formality of reity or reality. I shall shortly explain this neologism ‘reity’, which I have been obliged to introduce into the description of the formality of human apprehension. Given the totally different character which the term ‘reality’ can have in ordinary language and even in philosophy, viz., reality which goes beyond any apprehension, the term ‘reity’ can help us to avoid confusion. But having made this clarification, I shall employ the two terms indiscriminately: ‘reity’ means simple reality, simple being de suyo. The characteristics of heat are apprehended impresively as being “its own”, i.e., of the heat itself and insofar as they are “its own”. As opposed to the pure animal sensing which apprehends the notes stimulatively, and only stimulatively, these same characteristics are apprehended in human sensing, but as characteristics of the heat de suyo: the heat is apprehended really. Suggestive independence has become the independence of reality. Reality is formally the de suyo of what is sensed: it is the formality of reality, or if one wishes, reality as formality.

It is necessary to delimit this general concept of reality, although only initially. Above all, it is necessary to delimit it with respect to an idea of reality which consists in thinking that reality is reality “in itself” in the sense of a real thing in the world independent of my perception. Then reality would be what was understood by “reality” in the old realism, which was later called “ingenious realism”. But here we do not refer to that. We do not refer to going beyond what is apprehended in apprehension, but rather to the mode in which what is apprehended “is situated” in the apprehension itself. It is for this reason that at times I think that this formality should be referred to as “reity” rather than “reality”. It is the de suyo of what is present in the apprehension, the mode of the thing presenting itself in a real and physical presentation. Reality is not here something inferred. Just as mere stimulus is the mode of what is immediately present in apprehension, i.e., of what is present only in stimulative fashion, so reality is here a formality of what is immediately present, the very mode of the note “being situated” as present. In accordance with this mode, heat, without need to go outside of it, presents itself to me as warming de suyo, i.e., as being warming. This is the formality of reality.

In order to stave off confusion, let us stipulate the following:

a) Primordially, reality is formality.

b) This formality belongs to the thing apprehended of itself. I repeat: the formality of reality is something in virtue of which the content is what it is prior to its apprehension. The thing is that which, by being real, is present as real. Reality is de suyo.

c) This formality is not formally “beyond” or “outside of” apprehension. But just as forcefully it must be said that it is not something purely immanent, to use an old and literally inadequate terminology. Formality is on one hand the mode of being situated in the apprehension, but on the other it is that of being situated “in its own right”, of being de suyo. This structure is precisely what forces us to speak not only of my apprehension of the real, but of the reality of what is apprehended in my apprehension. It does not refer to some jump from the perceived to the real, but of reality in its dual role of being apprehended and of “being in its own right”. In due time we shall see in what the unity of these two moments consists formally.

d) This formality of reality is, then, as we shall see, what leads from apprehended reality to reality “beyond” apprehension. This “leading” is not, as I have just said, a leading from what is not real and purely immanent to what is real beyond perception, but rather is a leading from apprehended reality to a reality which is not apprehended. It is a movement within the very reality of the real.

In the second place, it is necessary to fix the de suyo in another direction. What is it, in fact, that we men ap-
prehend formally in sensing? We are told (by Husserl, Heidegger, and others) that what we formally apprehend in perception are, for example, walls, tables, doors, etc. Now, this is radically false. In an impressive apprehension I never intellectually apprehend a table, nor do I ever sentiently apprehend it either. What I apprehend is a constellation of notes which in my life functions as a table. What I apprehend is not a table but a constellation of such-and-such dimension, form, weight, color, etc., which has in my life the function or meaning of a table. Upon apprehending what we call a “table”, what is apprehended as de suyo or “in its own right” is not, then, the table as table. The table is not de suyo a table. The table is a table only insofar as the real thing thus named forms part of daily life. Things as moments or parts of my life are what I have termed “meaning-things”. But nothing is a meaning-thing de suyo. The real thing apprehended as something de suyo is not a “meaning-thing”, but what I have called 60 a “real-thing”. It is what in another order of problems I have usually expressed by saying that the real thing is that which acts on other things or on itself in virtue, formally, of the notes which it possesses de suyo.1 And a table does not act on other things as a table, but as having weight, etc. The table is not a reality-thing, but a meaning-thing.

Therefore, formality of reality or reality is formality of the de suyo as a mode of being situated in the apprehension.

2. Modification of the moments of this apprehension. This de suyo is a formality, a formality of the sentient impression. And this formality shapes the three moments of the impression.

a) Above all, it shapes the moment of affection. In an animal, affection is mere stimulus: it senses the stimulus merely as a stimulus to itself. We say, for example, that when cold is a mere stimulus apprehended by a dog, the dog “feels cold.” The affection is a mere stimulus; it is a stimulus relative to a response of warming or something of that nature. In man, on the other hand, an affection triggers a sentient process of a different sort: a man “is cold.” His affection is not mere stimulus; but rather the man feels that he is affected in reality, that he is affected really. And this is because what affects him is not apprehended as a mere stimulus but rather as reality: it is stimulating reality. And not only is this apprehended reality not apprehended as a mere stimulus, but its reality may fail to have the character of a stimulus at all. Every stimulus is apprehended by man as reality, but not every apprehended reality is necessarily a stimulus. For example, a bit of scenery is not necessarily a 61 stimulus, nor is an elemental sound. Affected thus by something which is “in its own right”, affection itself is real affection. A man not only senses cold, but moreover really feels himself cold. This “feeling himself”—apart from other dimensions of the problem which it involves—expresses here precisely the character of reality of the affection. This affection is impressively sensed as a real affection and not just as an affection of mere stimulus. We do not sense only affectant notes (heat, light, sound, odor, etc.) but rather we feel ourselves affected by them in reality. This is real affection.

b) In this real affection something “other” is present to us; this is the otherness. This otherness has a proper content, ultimately common to animal apprehension. But what is essentially distinct is the mode in which its formality “is situated” in the impression. We have just explained that. The content “is situated” as something “in its own right” and not as “signing”. This “in its own right” has an essential and absolutely decisive character. Heat is warming; this is not a verbal tautology. “Is warming” means that the heat and all of its thermic characteristics are sensed as “its own.” Heat is thus heat in and for itself. And precisely for this reason the heat is a note so very much “in its own right” that not even its inclusion in the sentient process pertains to it. The heat is in a way included in the sentient process, but only because it already is heat. Heat as something de suyo is, then, prior to its being present in sensing. And this does not refer to a temporal priority; it is not the priority of what is apprehended with respect to the response which it is going to elicit, for example. That priority is given in every apprehension, including that of animals. In an animal, the sign is apprehended as objective before the response which the animal is to make. The difference is on another point and is essential. 62 In animal apprehension, the sign is certainly objective, but it is so only as a sign; i.e., with respect to the animal itself. The animal never apprehends the sign as something which “is” signitive; rather, the sign is present “signing” and nothing more. It is a pure signitive fact, so to speak. And precisely by being so it can automatize itself in the apprehension: its objectivity is to sign. In the example cited, the objectivity of the heat—sign is to warm. On the other hand, the note is present to a man as real; what is present is something which is apprehended as being prior to its being present. It is not a priority with respect to a response, but a priority with respect to the apprehension itself. In the objective sign, its objectivity is not objective except with respect to the response which it determines. In contrast, the note is

1 Sobre la esencia, p. 104.
real in itself, and herein consists being formally prior to its being present. This is not a temporal priority, but one of mere formality.

We are dealing, then, with a priority which is very elemental but at the same time decisive: heat warms because it is “already” warm. This moment of the “already” is precisely the priority of which I speak, and this moment of priority is that which I am accustomed to call the moment of prius. It is a prius not in the order of process but in the order of apprehension: it warms “being” warm. “To be warming” is not the same thing as “to warm”. The “is”, in the apprehended heat itself, is a prius with respect to its “warming”: it is “its” heat, the heat is “its own”. And this “its own” is just what I call prius. The note “is situated” as being a note in such a form that its content “is situated” reposing like reality upon itself and formally grounding its apprehension. Thus, in accordance with this character, what is sensed in impression has installed me in the very reality of what is apprehended. With this, the road to reality in and of itself lies open before man. We are in what is apprehended in the formality of reality. Formalization is autonomization. And in man we are present at what I call hyperformalization: the autonomized note is so autonomous that it is more than a sign; it is autonomous reality. This is not autonomy of signitiveness, but autonomy of reality; it is alterity of reality, it is altera realitas.

c) This alterity has a force of imposition of its own. Alterity is not just mere objectivity, nor mere objective independence as in the case of the animal. The more perfect it is, the more perfectly objective is the animal. But this is not reality. Reality is not objective independence but being de suyo. Thus what is apprehended is imposed upon me with a new force: not the force of mere stimulus but the force of reality. The richness of animal life is a richness of objective signs. The richness of human life is a richness of realities.

The three moments of affection, otherness, and force of imposition are three moments of an impression. And therefore this impression is always a sensible impression because in it something is apprehended impressively. Now, when what is apprehended is reality, then sensible impression is precisely and formally what I have termed impression of reality. The impression of the animal is impression of mere stimulus. But man, in impression, apprehends the very formality of reality.

Since philosophy to date has not distinguished between content and formality, I have termed the sensible qualities (or rather their content) impressions. But then to speak of an impression of reality might lead one to think that another impression is added to that of red or heat, viz., the impression of reality. But this is absurd. Sensible impression is exclusively contained in formality. The sensible impression of reality is a single impression with content and formality of reality. There are not two impressions, one of content and another of reality, but a single impression, that of sensed reality, i.e., reality in impression. But as the essential part of our problem is in formality, I shall more generally refer to the moment of formality as sensed as the impression of reality. I do so in order to simplify the expressions, but above all to emphasize the contrast between this conceptualization and the common notions of impression in philosophy. Strictly understood it is, then, a denomination which is technically incorrect.

3. The Unitary Nature of this Apprehension of Reality. The intrinsic unity of real affection, otherness of reality, and force of reality is what constitutes the unity of the apprehension of reality. This is a unity of the act of apprehending. It is not, as I shall explain later, a mere noetic—noematic unity of consciousness, but a primary and radical unity of apprehension. In this apprehension, precisely in virtue of being an apprehension, we are in what is apprehended. It is, therefore, an “actual being” [estar]. The apprehension is therefore an ergon which could perhaps be called noergia. Later I shall explain how the “being present” as “actual being” is the essence of “actuality”. In an apprehension what is apprehended actualizes itself to us. Actuality is opposed here, as we shall see, to “actuity”. Noema and noesis are not primitive intellelctual moments. The radical moment is rather a becoming of “actuality”, a becoming which is not noetic or noematic, but noergic. This theme will reappear in Chapter V.

In this apprehension, then, we apprehend the reality of the real impressively. For this reason I call it the primordial apprehension of reality. In it the formality of reality is apprehended directly, and not by way of representations or the like. It is apprehended immediately, not in virtue of other apprehensive acts or reasoning processes of whatever sort. It is apprehended unitarily; that is, the real, which can and does have a great richness and variability of content (in general), is in its content apprehended unitarily as formality of reality pro indiviso, so to speak. Later I shall speak of this content; for now I refer only to the formality itself of reality. It is in the unity of these three aspects (directly, immediately, and unitarily) that the fact that the formality of the real is apprehended in and through itself consists.

In the primordial apprehension of reality, the real is apprehended in and through itself. By virtue of being an
apprehension, in it we “are actually” in reality itself. And this apprehension is primordial because every other apprehension of reality is constitutively grounded on this primordial apprehension and involves it formally. It is the impression which primarily and constitutively installs us in the real. And this is essential. One does not have a primordial impression and besides it another apprehension; rather, what we have is a primordial modalized apprehension which is, at the same time, in distinct forms. The real, apprehended in and through itself, is always the primordial thing and the essential nucleus of every apprehension of reality. This is what the expression “primordial apprehension of reality” signifies.

The three moments of impression (affection, otherness, and force of imposition) have become dislocated in modern philosophy. And this dislocation falsifies the nature of the impression of reality and the nature of the primordial apprehension of reality.

Considering impression only as mere affection, primordial apprehension would be merely my representation of the real. Now, this is not the case because impression does not consist only in being affection of the sentient being, but rather has an intrinsic moment of otherness (of content as well as of formality.) Hence, that which is usually called “representation” is nothing but the moment of affection of the impression from which the moment of otherness has been subtracted, so to speak. It is in this way that the impression of reality has been deformed into a mere impression of mine. It is necessary to return to the impression its moment of otherness.

If one eliminates from the impression of reality the moment of force of imposition of the content according to its formality, one ends up conceiving the primordial apprehension of reality to be a judgement, however elemental it may be, but still only a judgement. Now, this is not the case. A judgement but affirms what, in the primary force of imposition of reality, is impressively imposed upon me, and which compels me to make a judgement. It is necessary to restore to the impression its impressive moment of force of imposition.

If in the impression of reality one takes only the moment of otherness by itself, then one will think that the primordial apprehension of reality is nothing but a simple apprehension. And this is because in the simple apprehension, “simple” classically means that one does not yet affirm the reality of what is apprehended, but that what is apprehended is reduced to mere otherness. In the simple apprehension we would have otherness as something which reposes upon itself without being inscribed in the affection and with the force of imposition of reality. On the contrary, it is necessary to inscribe the moment of otherness within the impression of reality as affection and as force of imposition. And then it is no longer simple apprehension but is rather what I have so many times called simple apprehension of reality, and which I now call primordial apprehension of reality. I have replaced the former expression in order to avoid confusion with simple apprehension.

The idea that the primordial apprehension of reality is my representation, affirmation, or simple apprehension, is the result of the dislocation of the primary unity of impression. Impression, on the contrary, intrinsically and formally involves the unity of the three moments of affection, otherness, and force of imposition.

Finally, we repeat that if one takes primordial apprehension as a mere conscious act, then the primordial apprehension of reality is the immediate and direct consciousness of something, i.e., intuition. But this is impossible. As we saw in the first chapter, we are dealing with apprehension and not mere consciousness. Impression, as I have said, is not primarily noetic—noematic unity of consciousness, but is an act of apprehension, a noergia, an ergon.

This primordial apprehension is so, then, in the impression of reality. Hence, if we wish to analyze the nature of this apprehension what we must do is analyze the structure of the impression of reality. {68}
APPENDIX 2

FORMALIZATION AND HYPERFORMALIZATION

I have already said that it is formalization which unlocks the richness in the life of an animal. The more formalized is its impression of a mere stimulus, the richer its internal unity of stimulus. For a crab, “color” is a sign of its prey; but this same color apprehended in richer constellations constitutes a great variety of objective signs. The chimpanzee apprehends “things” which are much more varied and rich than those apprehended by a starfish. Whence the chain of responses to a more formalized arousal can be much more varied than in the case of a less formalized animal. For this reason, the animal must “select” its responses. Nonetheless, the unity of arousal, tonicity, and response, despite its richness and variety, is in principle fixed by the structures of the animal in question within, of course, the animal’s limits of viability. Moreover, all of this has rigorous phylogenetic limits, and it is just these limits which are the frontier between the human animal and all other animals.

As one progresses through the animal kingdom, from lower to higher forms, the various species sense their stimuli as “note-signs” which are increasingly more independently of themselves. That is, the animal senses the stimulus as something which is more and more detached from the apprehendor. But this formalization reaches an extreme point, so to speak. At that point, the stimulus presents itself as so independent of the animal, so set off from it, that it ends up “being situated” completely detached from the animal; formalization has thus been changed into hyper-formalization. Man is this hyperformalized animal. “Hyper” here has a very precise meaning: it signifies, as I have just said, that independence has reached the point where it presents the stimulus as something totally detached from the human animal. Thus the animal situation of man has completely changed.

a) In the first place, it is apparent that the detachment has gone so far that the stimulus has lost its merely signative character. The content of the stimulus is no longer formally a sign of response. It was so while it was signing: to be a sign consists in being something signively joined to the animal. Therefore when it is detached, the stimulus is no longer formally a sign. The content no longer has mere stimulus for its proper formality; it is no longer a “note-sign”. This is the fundamental characteristic of the “hyper” of hyperformalization: the independence which extends to complete detachment, to complete distancing. Man is the animal of “distancing” or “stepping back”.2 His hyperformalization determines him to be actually sensing, and therefore to be in a certain way in what is sensed, but to be so as “distanced”. This distancing is the essential moment of hyperformalization. Distancing is not a physical removal; that would be impossible. It is not a going away “from” things, but a distancing “among” or “in” them. “Distancing” is a mode of being among things. In virtue of it something can happen to man which could never happen to an animal: he can feel himself lost among things. In signitivity, an animal can remain lost among many responses. Indeed, this “being lost” is not a being lost among things but rather a disorientation in responses; that is, it is not strictly speaking a being lost but a responsive disorder. Only man can remain without a disorder, but lost among things, lost therefore not with respect to a disorder of his responses, but in the distancing of what is sensed.

b) In the second place, the stimulus itself thus detached no longer has its unitary outline. It has ceased to have it with respect to what concerns content: it no longer has the proper unity of being “a” sign. But in addition it has ceased to have its formal unity of independence. Upon making itself so independent, so hyperformalized, the stimulus no longer has the proper unity of mere stimulus which before it had, because it no longer has the signate independence of a response. From the point of view of mere stimulus, then, the unity of the stimulus has been broken. It has become something open: the “hyper”. Hyperformalization has opened the closed world of the stimuli to a formality which is not mere stimulus.

c) In the third place, this means that the stimulus, when it ceases to be apprehended as a mere stimulus, when it becomes totally independent and thus completely detached from the apprehendor, when it ceases to be a

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2[Stepping back” is the most natural English rendering of Zubiri’s technical term tomar distancia, meaning literally “to take distance”. It is discussed at length later in the book. — trans.]
sign, is present in a new and different formality: the rupture of sign-ness is the presence of something “in its own right”. This is what I have called “reity”. The new formality is no longer objective independence but reity. The stimulus itself is no longer “sign-note”, but “real-note”. This is not a gradual but an essential difference. Hyperformalization is the step from objective independence to reity. It is the “hyper” \(^{(72)}\) of sensible impression, this impression being constituted with it in the impression of reality. The “unity of sign”, then, has been lost and the “unity of reality” substituted for it.

\(d)\) In virtue of the foregoing, the human animal no longer has its suitable responses fixed precisely because it does not have “signs”. It is a “hyper-signitive” animal. Therefore, if it is to be viable, it must apprehend stimuli not as objective signs but as realities. A hyperformalized animal is not viable without apprehension of reality. To be sure, this does not mean that the animal “necessarily” requires that apprehension. What I want to say is that the animal requires it “if” it is going to be viable. It could have not had that apprehension, but in that case the hyperformalized animal would have only been one of many biological “essays” of individuals not capable of speciation and in which the biological phylum terminated. What I mean is that a species whose sensory apparatus had the hyperformalization of human sensory apparatus, but which did not have apprehension of reality, would not be viable.

\(e)\) Thus, in order to give suitable responses, the human animal cannot limit itself (as do the rest of the animals) to biologically “selecting” these responses, but must “elect” them, or even invent them, in function of reality. In an animal, the signs point to one or many responses, and in this chain of signed responses the animal biologically selects the response which it is going to give. But man lacks these \textit{selection signs}. Thus he must determine his response as a function of the reality of the stimulus, of what he has apprehended, and of his own real apprehension. Man intellectually elects his response. To elect is to determine a response in reality and according to reality; it is, if one wishes, a selection which is not “signitive” but “real”. \(^{(73)}\)

Hyperformalization is not a phenomenon of adaptive conduct, but rather a structural principle. It has to do with structures which pertain formally to the animals in question. In other words, what we are doing here is a structural analysis of reality as formalized in some cases and hyperformalized in others, not an analysis of evolutionary mechanisms. Animal structures are found to be “adapted” by their capacity of formalization. The question remains, and we shall not discuss it, of whether this adaptation is what determines the course of evolution (Lamarkism) or is a consequence of it (Darwinism).

And we do not refer here to mere concepts, but to the “physical” structure of \textit{reality apprehension}. It is a human structure, and as such has its organic aspect. As we saw, the formalization of the animal is a structure of it which is determined anatomically and physiologically. So, too, hyperformalization is a structure of the human animal as a whole, and therefore one with an organic aspect. For example, the form of structural regression of the brain causes the ambit of hyperformalization to regress to being a mere formalization. Cajal observed that the human brain is much richer in neurons with short axons than the brain of any other animal. Could it perhaps be that a brain thus structured is precisely a hyperformalized brain?

Hyperformalization is, then, a structural character. Certainly it is the result of a process. But this process is not the process of sensing, but something completely different and prior to sensing: it is a morphogenetic process.

This process does not constitute apprehension of reality, but is what intrinsically and formally opens up \(^{(74)}\) the ambit of this apprehension. Apprehension thus hyperformalized is precisely the impression of reality.

(Since these ideas go beyond the limits of a mere analysis of the apprehension of reality. I have grouped them in the form of an appendix.)
CHAPTER IV
STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY:
SENTIENT INTELLECCTION

In the previous chapter, we have seen what sensible apprehension is and what its modes are: apprehension of a mere stimulus and apprehension of reality. The first constitutes pure sensing, proper to animals. The second is what constitutes human sensing. Human sensing is essentially and formally the impression of reality. Now, it is necessary to inquire diligently about the formal structure of the apprehension of reality. This is the third of the questions which I enunciated at the end of Chapter I.

Since human sensing has as its essential nature the impression of reality, to analyze the apprehension of reality is but to analyze the impression of reality. We shall accomplish this in two steps:

1. What is the impression of reality?
2. What is the structure of the impression of reality?

§1
THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY

The impression of reality is always and only proper to an act of apprehension. This apprehension qua impressive apprehension is an act of sensing. In fact sensing is, formally, apprehending something in impression. This we have already seen. It is the first moment of the impression of reality. But this impression is of reality in addition to being an impression. That is the second moment. Hence, the following are necessary:

1. Clarify each of the two moments in and of itself.
2. Analyze the unity of the two moments, i.e., the formal nature of the impression of reality.

1. Moments of the impression of reality. We have already carefully explained what an impression is: it is the moment of sensing. What we are missing, then, is an analysis of the other moment, the moment of sensed reality. Now, just as the first moment, the moment of impression, qualifies the apprehending act as an act of sensing, so also the moment of reality qualifies that same act in a special way: as apprehension act as an act of sensing, this act is formally the act which we call intellective knowing." That is what we must now clarify.

Classical philosophy never set itself this question, viz. In what, formally, does the act of intellective knowing consist? It described some intellective acts, but did not tell us in what intellective knowing consists as such. Now, I believe that intellective knowing consists formally in apprehending something as real.

In fact, apprehension of the real is in the first place an exclusive act of the intelligence. The stimuli apprehended by the intelligence are not apprehended as mere stimuli, but are apprehended really. Now, mere stimulus and reality are two different formalities, and the distinction between them is not gradual, but rather essential. A complex of stimuli, however formalized they may be, is always just a response-sign. It will never be something "in its own right," or de suyo; i.e., it will never be formally reality. Reality is, then, essentially distinct from signiness. To apprehend reality is, therefore, an act essentially exclusive to the intelligence.

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1[English rendering of the Spanish verb inteligir, which corresponds to the Latin intelligere.—trans.]
2[Intelligence renders the Spanish inteligencia, which has the same root as inteligir (translated as ‘intellective knowing’). It is used in the broad sense of total human capability of the mind to confront and deal with reality, and should not be narrowly construed as referring to what “IQ” tests measure.—trans.]
But, in the second place, to apprehend something as real is the elemental act of the intelligence. Every other intellective act is constitutively and essentially grounded upon the act of apprehension of the real as real. Every other intellective act, such as forming ideas, conceiving, judging, etc., is a manner of apprehending reality. Thus, conceiving is conceiving how the real is going to be; judging is affirming how a thing is in reality, etc. In all intellectual acts this moment of turning to the real appears. The apprehension of reality is therefore the elemental act of the intelligence. Classical philosophy has described well or poorly (we will not pursue the matter) some of these intellective acts; but it has gone astray on this matter of the apprehension of a thing as reality, on this elemental act.

Finally, in the third place, apprehending reality is not merely an exclusive and elemental act of the intelligence, but is its radical act. Man is a [78] hyperformalized animal. The autonomization in which formalization consists has become changed into hyperautonomization in man, i.e., it has been changed from sign into reality. With this, the catalog of possible suitable responses to a stimulus becomes practically indeterminate. This means that in man, his sentient structures no longer assure his suitable response. That is to say, the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and response would be broken if man were not able to apprehend stimuli in a new way. When the stimuli do not suffice for a suitable response, man suspends, so to speak, his response and, without abandoning the stimulus, but rather conserving it, apprehends it according as it is in itself, as something de suo, as stimulating reality. That is, he apprehends the stimulus, but not as mere stimulus: this is the radical dawn of intellection. Intellection arises precisely and formally at the moment of transcending or going beyond mere stimulus, at the moment of apprehending something real as real when pure sensing is suspended.

Hence, the apprehension of reality is the exclusive act, the elemental act, and the radical and primary act of intellective knowing; i.e., apprehension of reality is what formally constitutes the proper part of intellective knowing.

Now, the impression of reality is the formality of an apprehending act which is “one”. This impression qua impression is an act of sensing. But insofar as it is of reality, it is an act of intellective knowing. And this signifies that sensing and intellective knowing are precisely the two moments of something which is one and unitary; two moments of the impression of reality. And that is what we must examine now: the unity of the impression of reality. [79]

2. Unity of the impression of reality. Above all it is necessary to describe this unity of the impression of reality. That will give us an idea of intelligence, to wit, sentient intelligence. Then it will only be necessary to repeat what we have obtained in order to better confront the usual idea of intelligence.

A) Formal unity of the impression of reality: sentient intellection. Sensing is not the same thing as intellective knowing. But is this difference an opposition? Classical philosophy has always set intellectual knowing over against sensing. Even the one time when Kant sought to unify them, it was always a “unification”, but not a formal structural “unity” which was in question. The fact is that classical philosophy, just as it failed to conceptualize what intellective knowing is in a formal sense, never conceptualized what sensing is in a formal sense either. Given this situation, the foregoing presumed opposition remained, as I said before, as part of the intellectual atmosphere. We have already seen what intellective knowing is: it is apprehending something as real, i.e., in the formality of reality. What is sensing? Here there lurks a hidden confusion which it is necessary to dispel. Indeed, failure to realize this confusion has had grievous consequences for philosophy. Sensing, in fact, consists in apprehending something impressively. But “sensing” can denote “only sensing”, where the “only” is not merely a negative conceptual precision, but a proper positive mode of sensing as impression; this is what I have called “pure sensing”. Sensing apprehends something impressively. Pure sensing apprehends this something which is impressing in the formality of mere stimulation. Therefore, sensing is not formally identical to pure sensing. Pure sensing is only a mode of sensing as such. Whence the necessity to carefully distinguish these two aspects in that which we designate with the single word ‘sensing’: sensing as sensing and pure sensing. [80]

The failure to recognize this difference has had serious repercussions, the first and most radical of which is the opposition between intellective knowing and sensing. But there really isn’t any opposition; intellective knowing and sensing are not opposed. Pure sensing senses what is apprehended in the formality of mere stimulation; intellective knowing apprehends what is known in the formality of reality. If one wishes to speak of faculties, it will be necessary to say that pure sensing is the faculty of mere stimulation, and that intellective knowing is the faculty of reality. To be sure, as we shall soon see, this expression “faculty of reality” is here absolutely incorrect, but for the time being it is useful to us. In any case, it is clear that pure sensing and intellective knowing are only modes of sensible apprehension. For this reason, they are both in-
scribed within the ambit of sensing. To pure sensing there corresponds another mode of sensing which is (as I shall explain forthwith) intellective sensing. And therein lies the strict opposition: pure sensing and intellective sensing. But both are modes of sensing.

Classical philosophy confounded sensing with pure sensing, and hence thought that there is opposition between sensing and intellective knowing. This is not true, and the proof is that there is an impression of reality. An impression of reality as impression is sensing; but, because it is of reality, it is intellective knowing. Impression of reality is formally sensing and intellective knowing. In the impression of reality sensing and intellective knowing are but two of its moments. This is a radical and essential overcoming of the dualism between sensing and intellective knowing. From Parmenides through Plato and Aristotle, philosophy was based on the dualism according to which a thing is something "sensed", and which at the same time "is". In the midst of all of the discussions about the dualism or non-dualism of things, the duality of the two acts has been left intact: the act of sensing and the act of intellective knowing. But, I believe that in man, sensing and intellective knowing are not two acts, each complete in its order; rather, they are two moments of a single act, of one unique impression, of the impression of reality. Now it is necessary to determine this intrinsic and formal unity.

In the impression of reality we are dealing with a single complete act. To think that there are two acts would be the same as thinking that in pure sensing there are two acts, one of sensing and another of apprehending the stimulation. But there is nothing more than one act: the act of pure sensing. The moment of "pureness" of sensing is nothing but this: the moment of the unique act of pure sensing. Analogously, there is but one act of reality-impression. Intellecutive knowing and sensing are only two moments of a single act. To be sure, these two moments can be separated phylogenetically; but this does not mean that the separation consists in sensing and intellective knowing. Separated from intellective knowing, the terminus which remains to us is not "sensing", but rather "pure sensing". We could never have a separate sensing without its own proper formality. When it does not have the formality of reality (given that we have separated sensing from intelligence), sensing has the formality of mere stimulus. There are not two acts, then, but two moments of a single act. The sentient moment is "impression", the intellective moment is "of reality". The unity of the two moments is the impression of reality. What is this unity?

It is not a synthesis, as Kant thought, because we are not dealing with a case where the acts conform to a single object. The unity in question is not an objective synthesis, but a unity which is formally structural. It is necessary to emphasize this: it is sensing which senses reality, and it is the intellective knowing which intellectively knows the real impressively.\[82\]

The impression of reality in its structural unity is a fact. And this fact is, as I said, the overcoming of the classical dualism between sensing and intellective knowing which has so imperturbably cast its shadow across the long history of philosophy. Thus, in order to overcome or go beyond this dualism, one does not have to engage in difficult reasoning processes, but to pay careful attention to the act itself of the impression of reality.

In the conception of the two acts, an act of sensing and the other of intellective knowing, one might think that what is apprehended by sensing is given "to" the intelligence so that the latter might intellectually know it. Intellecutive knowing would thus be apprehending in a new way what is given by the senses to the intelligence. Thus the primary object of the intelligence would be the sensible, and hence that intelligence would be what I term sensible intelligence. But this is not correct: the impression of reality is a single and unique act, the primordial act of the apprehension of reality. In what does it formally consist?

This act can be described in two ways, the two ways in which one can describe the impression of reality. In the impression of reality we can start from the impression itself. Then "in" this impression is the moment of reality. As impression is what formally constitutes sensing, and reality is what formally constitutes intellective knowing, it follows that saying that the moment of reality is "in" the impression is the same as saying that intellective knowing is structurally "in" the sensing; i.e., the impression of reality is intellective sensing. For this reason, when we apprehend heat, for example, we are apprehending it as real heat. An animal apprehends heat only as a thermic response sign; this is pure sensing. In contrast, man senses heat as something "in its own right", as something \[83\] de suso: the heat is real heat. But we can describe the impression of reality starting from the moment of reality. In that case the moment of impression is structurally "in" the moment of reality. For the above example, we apprehend the real as being warm. Sensing is thus "in" the intellective knowing. In virtue of this, that intellective is sentient intellection. In the impression of reality I sense real heat (intellective sensing). I sense warm reality (sentient intellection). The impression of reality is thus intel-
lective sensing or sentient intellection. The two formulae are identical, and so I shall use them indiscriminately. But in order to better contrast my views with the usual idea of the intelligence, I prefer to speak of sentient intelligence, embracing in this denomination both intellective sensing and sentient intellection. Hence I shall say that the impressive apprehension of reality is an act of the sentient intelligence.

The apprehension of reality is, then, an act which is structurally one and unitary. This structural unity is what the “in” expresses. Classical philosophy, on the other hand, believed that there are two acts: the act of sensing gives “to” the intelligence what it is going to work on, i.e., to know intellectively. But this is not the case. The difference between “to” and “in” is essential. That difference expresses the difference between the two concepts of the intelligence. To say that the senses give “to” the intelligence what it is going to work on is to suppose that the intelligence has as its primary and suitable object that which the senses present “to” it. If this were true, the intelligence would be what I call a sensible intelligence. A sensible intelligence is an intelligence “of” the sensible. On the other hand, to say that the senses sense what is sensed “in” the intelligence does not mean that the primary and suitable object of intellective knowing is the sensible, but rather something more than that, viz. that the very mode of intellective knowing is to sense reality. Hence, it is a sensing which is intellective qua sensing. In this case the intelligence is sentient. Sentient intelligence consists in intellective knowing being only a moment of impression: the moment of the formality of its otherness. To sense something real is, formally, to be actually sensing intellectively. Intellection is not intellective “of” the sensible, but rather intellective “in” the sensing itself. It is clear, then, that sensing is intellective knowing: it is intellective sensing. Intellection knowing is thus nothing but another mode of sensing (different from pure sensing). This “other mode” concerns the formality of what is sensed. The unity of intelligence and sensing is the unity of the content and formality of reality. Sentient intellection is impre"sive apprehension of a content in the formality of reality; it is precisely the impression of reality. The formal act of sentient intellection is, I repeat, impressive apprehension of reality. The senses do not give what is sensed “to” the intelligence, but rather are actually sensing intellectively. There is no object given “to” the intelligence, but rather an object given “in” the intelligence itself. Sensing is in itself a mode of intellective knowing, and intellective knowing is in itself a mode of sensing. Reality is apprehended, then, in the impression of reality. This is sentient intelligence. That which we call ‘intellective knowing’ and ‘sensing’, I repeat, are but two moments of the single act of sentiently apprehending the real. As it is not possible to have content without formality nor formality without content, there is but a single act, viz. intellective sensing or sentient intellection: the sentient apprehension of the real. This act is, then, intrinsically and structurally “one”; it is, I emphasize, the impression of reality. Sentient intellection is, then, purely and simply impression of reality. In this apprehension intellective knowing is the very mode of sensing. (85)

Classical philosophy has erred with respect to the impression of reality. It is this impression, nonetheless, which comprises the primordial intellective knowing, and not the combinations, however selective, of what is usually called “animal intelligence”. Still less can one speak—as is commonly done today—of artificial intelligence. In both cases what is carried out, whether by the animal or some electronic apparatus, is not intelligence because what they operate on and are concerned with is just the content of an impression, but not its formality of reality. What these animals or machines have are impressions of content, but without the formality of reality. It is for this reason that they do not have intelligence.

Intellection is, then, constitutively and structurally sentient in itself qua intellection. Conversely, sensing in man is constitutively and structurally intellective in itself qua sensing. Thus it is that sensibility is not a type of residual “hyletic” of consciousness, as Husserl says, nor a factum brutum as Heidegger and Sartre call it, but rather is an intrinsic and formal moment of intellection itself.

The impression of reality is a fact which it is necessary to emphasize as against the classical dualism. Sentient intellection is a fact. On the other hand, the dualism between intellective knowing and sensing is a metaphysical conceptualization which distorts the facts.

It is only necessary to repeat what has been said above in order to confront the idea of the concipient intelligence.

B) Sentient intelligence and concipient intelligence

1. The sentient intelligence:

a) Has an object which is not only primary and suitable, but a normal proper object: reality. (86)

b) This formal object is not given by the senses “to” the intelligence, but is given by the senses “in” the intelligence.

c) The proper formal act of knowing intellection
is not conceiving or judging, but “apprehending” its object, viz. reality.

d) What is apprehended in impression, i.e., what is apprehended sentiently, is so in the impression of reality. In virtue of this, there is but one single act: the sentient apprehension of the real as real.

2. In contrast, classical philosophy has always believed something quite different. Classically, intellective knowing would be, as I have repeatedly said, newly apprehending what is given by the senses “to” the intelligence. The primary and suitable object of the intelligence would be, therefore, the sensible. Thus, by reason of its suitable object, this intelligence would be what I call sensile intelligence. We are not told in what intellective knowing consists; the only thing we are told is that when intellective knowing takes place, there is a conceiving and judging of what is given by the senses. In this way intellection is progressively converted into being a declaration of what a thing is, i.e., there is an identification of intellection and predicative logos. This was the great discovery of Plato in the Sophist which culminated in the work of Aristotle, for whom the logos itself is the apophanesis of what a thing is. That is what I term the logification of the intelligence.

Absorbing, as is justified, conception and judgement under one rubric, I shall say that this intellection, which is sensible by reason of its proper object, would by reason of its act be concipient intelligence.

The concipient intelligence:

a) Is that whose primary object is the sensible.

b) This object is given by the senses “to” the intelligence.

c) The proper act of this intellection is conceiving and judging that which is given to it. This intelligence is concipient not because it conceives and judges, but because it conceptualizes concipiently, i.e., it conceptualizes what is given by the senses “to” the intelligence.

Abandoning the concipient intelligence does not mean that the real is not conceptualized. That would be simply absurd. What it means is that the conceptualization—even though it is an inexorable intellectual function, as we shall later see—is not what is primary and radical about intellective knowing, because intellection is primarily and radically sentient apprehension of the real as real. Conceptualizing is just an intellective unfolding of the impression of reality; hence, we are not talking about not conceptualizing, but rather about the fact that concepts are adequate not primarily to things given by the senses “to” the intelligence, but to the modes of intellectually sensing the real given “in” the intelligence. Concepts are necessary, but they must be concepts of the sentient intelligence and not concepts of the concipient intelligence.

Here we have, then the unity of the impression of reality: sentient intellection. What is the structure of that unity? Or what comes to the same thing, what is the structure of the impression of reality? [88]
The dualism between acts of sensing and acts of intellectual knowing led to conception of dualism of faculties: the faculty of sensing and the faculty of intellectual knowing. But this conceptualization, besides not being a fact, distorts the facts. If one wishes to achieve a conceptualization which does justice to the facts, I believe that it is necessary to follow a different route. I shall indicate it in the spirit of not evading the question, but I shall do no more than indicate it because our present problem is the analysis of the facts and not theoretical conceptualizations, be they metaphysical or even scientific.

This conceptualization has two essential points: what is sentient intellection as a faculty, and what is this faculty within the structures of human reality.

1. The sentient intelligence as a faculty. Man can sense and can know intellectually. This idea of “being able to” is what the Greek word dynamis expresses. But dynamis is something very rich, and its diverse aspects have not been outlined with conceptual rigor.

   a) On one hand, since Aristotle’s time, dynamis has signified potency, that according to which something can receive actuations or actuate itself, and this acting is not just on something apart from the agent, but also on the agent itself (though insofar as this is distinct from its own actuation). {90}

   b) On the other hand, the Latins rendered the word dynamis by potentia seu facultas, potency or faculty.

   Now, to my way of thinking, this equivalence cannot be admitted. Not every potency is a faculty by the mere fact of being a potency. In order to be able to realize its acts, it is not enough for the potency to be a potency; rather, it must be “facultized” to realize them. To be sure, there are potencies which by themselves are facultized to produce their acts. Thus these potencies are also faculties. But there are cases in which this does not occur, and then the potency cannot produce its acts unless it is intrinsically and structurally “united” to another potency, unless it is “one” with it. That is to say, the potency is not now facultized by itself to produce its own acts; it is only so in its structural unity with another. In that case the two potencies structurally comprise a single faculty, and that faculty realizes one single act. Neither of the two potencies acts by itself to carry out with its actuation part of the total act; i.e., the two potencies do not each produce a partial act of the total act. On the contrary, the two potencies act only in structural unity; they do not act by themselves either totally or partially, but only unitarily. The two potencies are “co-determined” as a faculty. The potencies are not concurrent, but co-determine, and only in this and through this codetermination do they produce a single act. The real act is only in the “co” of the co-determination. In the act itself the two potencies are structurally “one”. The two potencies constitute the two moments of a single faculty and a single act.

   Now, such is the case with sentient intellection. To be sure, there are two potencies, the potency of sensing and {91} the potency of intellective knowing. As potencies they are essentially distinct. In as much as it is a potency, the intelligence is essentially irreducible to pure sensing, because a formality of reality will never emerge from a sign-based formality. But this intellective potency is not by itself facultized for producing its act. Nor can it produce other than as intrinsically and formally united with the potency of sensing—the unity in virtue of which, and only in virtue of which, the intellective potency acquires the character of a faculty. By the same token, sensing cannot be human sensing, i.e., cannot produce the act of impression of reality unless it is intrinsically and formally “one” with the intellective potency. This unity is the sentient intelligence. On the other hand, pure sensing is already facultized: it is a “potency-faculty”. The sentient intelligence is not a potency but a faculty. It is a faculty composed not only intrinsically but also—and this is the essential point—structurally by two potencies, that of sensing and that of intellective knowing. Hence, it is not the case that these two potencies concur in the same object (the classical idea until Kant’s time), nor that they concur partially in a total act (Kant’s objective synthesis); there is no concurrence, but rather codetermination. They are codetermined in a single act of sentient intellection, in the act of impression or sentient apprehension, in the impression of reality. The intelligence as a faculty is sentient, and human sensing as a faculty is intellective. Hence the unity of the impression of reality is the unity of the act of a single faculty.

APPENDIX 3
SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE AS A FACULTY
This conceptualization is not a fact—that I have already noted—but it is to my way of thinking the unique conceptualization which permits us to realize the fact of the impression of reality. The impression of reality is a fact, and therefore so is intellectual sensing or sentient intellection. The conceptualization of a faculty structurally composed of sentient and intellectual potency is, I repeat, the only scientific conceptualization of the fact of the impression of reality.

It should also suffice to note that potency and faculty do not exhaust the nature of the “being able to”. There is at least a third sense of being able to, different from potency and faculty, and that is capacity. But this is not relevant to the present question.

Here, then, we have what sentient intelligence is as a faculty. Now, this faculty is the faculty of the structures which comprise human reality. Thus it is necessary to explain (though rather summarily) in what this faculty consists when considered as a structural moment of human reality.

2) **Human reality and the faculty of sentient intellec-**

The question is very appropriate since up to now we have spoken of sentient intelligence as a habit, as a mode of having to do with things. Thus, if we wish to conceptualize the faculty of sentient intelligence with what we have termed ‘habit’, we shall be compelled to return to the idea itself of a habit.

In every living being there are, ultimately, three distinct strata which must be considered.

A) First, there is the most visible stratum: the execution of the vital acts. This is the “arousal–tonic–modification–response” structure of which we spoke some pages back. A living organism carries out these actions while finding itself “among” things, some external, others internal to itself. This “among” in which the living organism finds itself has two characteristics. First, there is that according to which the living organism finds itself placed among things: it has its fixed *locus* among them. This is a characteristic essential to the living organism, though one which it shares with all other non-living realities. But the living organism has a proper modal characteristic exclusive to it: when it is thus placed among things, it is *situ*ated in a determinate form among them; i.e., it has its *situs* among them. The category of *situs* had no role in Aristotle’s philosophy because he considered it as a highest category of being. Nonetheless, to my way of thinking this is not true. It is an essential metaphysical category, but only of the living organism. Position and situation, taken in the widest sense and not just in the spatial sense, are two radical concepts of this stratum of the living organism. They are not identical, but neither are they independent: a single positioning gives rise to quite diverse situations. Thus positioned and situated among things, the living organism lives by its vital processes. This stratum, nonetheless, is the most superficial.

B) The living organism never remains univocally characterized by the web of its vital processes. In the vital processes of a mole and a blind dog we shall never encounter a situation of luminous character. But the difference is essential; the mole does not visually cope visually with things “before him”, but the dog does. Therefore, beneath the vital processes there is in every living organism a primary mode of dealing with things and with itself: the habit. Habit is the foundation of the possibility of every possible vital process. In fact, through its habit, through its mode of dealing with things, these latter “are situated” for the living organism in a certain formal respect; this is the *formality*. In Aristotle’s philosophy and in all of medieval philosophy one sees this category completely shipwrecked. But to my way of thinking, this owes to the fact that Aristotle considered the *habitus* as a highest category of being, ultimately reducible to a quality. Nonetheless, I think that we are dealing with a radical metaphysical category of the living organism. In contrast to both Aristotle and the medievals (for whom the *habitus* is a disposition encrusted more or less permanently in the subject), I formally conceive of what I call ‘habit’ as a “mode of dealing” with things. For this reason, it is a category exclusive to living organisms since non-living organisms do not have a mode of dealing with things. And as a category of living organisms it is radical in them.

*Situs* and *habitus* are the two supreme categories of the living organism in its life. The habits can be quite diverse in the same living organism. But there is in every living organism a radical habit upon which ultimately depends its entire life. The biography of every dog is different, but they are all canine biographies because they are inscribed in the same habit. Now, if we compare all living organisms among themselves, we shall discover three radical habits: the habit of growth to sustain itself (this is the etymological meaning of *trepho*, to favor the development of what is subject to a growth process), the habit of sensing, and the habit of sentient intellective knowing. In accordance with this, things fall into three different formalities: as trophic, as stimuli, and as realities.

“Habit—in its formal respect”: here we have the second stratum of the life of every living organism.

Now, habit has two faces. On one hand, the habit determines the type of vital process. On the other, it is
something determined by the very nature of the structures of the living organism. Whence the mode of dealing with things is always something intermediate, so to speak, between action and structures. Thus, sentient intellection is a habit which determines every human process, but is (95) at the same time determined by the human structures. Analysis of the facts moves among actions and among the habits taken in and by themselves; but these habits conduce to something which is not a fact but a terminus of a structural conceptualization. This is the third stratum of the life of every living organism.

C) Every animal has its own structures. This system of structural notes determines the habit. Now, the structures qua determinants of the habit to my way of thinking comprise what we call potencies and faculties.

a) In every living organism things determine its vital processes as stimuli. Every cell, whether plant or animal, is stimulable (irritable) and is stimulated (irritated). Under this aspect, every living organism, plant or animal, has what I call susceptibility.

b) But there are living organisms whose susceptibility has a special character, viz. the animal. Although every living organism is stimulable, the animal is the living organism which has made stimulation into an autonomous biological function. It is this autonomization of stimulation which to my way of thinking comprises sensing. Sensing is not a creation of animals; it is only the autonomization of a function proper to every living organism, viz. susceptibility. Sensing is a structural moment of the living animal. This structure consists in the stimuli stimulating by an impression. This impressive structure qua determinant of the habit of mere stimulation is the "potency-faculty" of pure sensing.

The somatic structure and, therefore, its potencies and faculties of sensing, assume diverse forms. In the first animals, it was a type of diffuse sensing which I term sentiscence. In the more developed animals [96] we find a systematization of the structures of stimulus-based impression. This systematization is to my way of thinking the proper formal nature of what quite appropriately we call the nervous "system". The nervous system is the systematization of impressivity. This impressivity makes sentiscence into a strict sensibility. The systematization has for its part a unique character, viz. centralization, by which the nervous system is the transmitter of the stimulus. This systematization grows in complexity from the first nerve centers to the brain and within the brain to the cortex wherein formalization culminates. Susceptibility, sentiscence, and sensibility are the three different forms of the structure of stimulation.

c) All of this happens in man, but there is in him something different as well. In addition to the biological autonomization of the stimuli, he has the potency to know intellectively in a way determined by the hyperformalization of his sentient structures. This potency is not by itself a faculty. The structural unity of intelligence and sensing is determinant of the habit of sentient intellection whose formal act is the impression of reality. Now, qua determinant of that habit, the unitary structure "sensing-intelligence" is the faculty of sentient intelligence. It is because of this that man impressively senses reality. We are dealing, then, not just with habit but with structures. It is for this reason, I repeat, that intellection is an act of sentient apprehension of the real. It is an intellection which in a certain way (although not exclusively) we could term "cerebral". The brain is the sentient organ which by its hyperformalization determines in an exact way the need for intellection to assure man’s ability to respond suitably. (97) In addition, the brain has an even deeper function: that of keeping intellection in a state of suspense. This is what gives rise to its state of vigilance. Finally, by virtue of being sentient, the activity of the brain formally and intrinsically modulates the intellection itself, i.e., the impression of reality. In the unity of these three moments (the exacting nature of hyperformalization, vigilance, and intrinsic modulation) consists the structural sentient moment of the sentient intelligence.

Through its structures, an animal determines the habit of mere stimulation. In it there lies open a medium. Medium is the environment in which this habit is formalized in the animal sensing. Man through his structures determines the habit of reality. In it he is open not only to a medium but is open to a field and to a world; this is the field of the real and the world of the real. To be sure, man has a medium, and this medium qua humanly apprehended is the field of reality. But the field of reality is transcendentally open to the world. Whence the field of reality, as we shall see, is the world qua intellectively sensed. This is the work of the sentient intelligence as a faculty.

In contrast, as a structural note, intelligence:

a) Is not a note of mere stimulation that is completely elaborated. In contrast to all such notes, the intelligence is essentially removed from all merely sign-based stimulation.

b) Nor is it a systematic note. Rather, it represents a new element, but one which is elemental though necessitated by the hyperformalized material structures and formally and intrinsically modulated by them. (98)
Nonetheless, as I see it, this is not the radical difference among the senses in the case of human sensing. The organs of the human senses sense with a sensing in which what is sensed is apprehended as reality. As each sense presents reality to me in a different form, it follows that there are different modes of the impression of reality. Now, the radical difference between the senses is not in the qualities which they present to us, nor in the content of the impression, but rather in the form in which they present reality to us. On this point, philosophy has gone astray. It has simply assumed that the thing sensed is always something which is “in front” of me. But besides being quite vague, this obscures a great falsehood, because being in front of me is only one of the different ways of a real thing being present to me. Since the fact that an apprehension is of reality is what formally constitutes intellection, it follows that the modes of reality’s being present to us in the human senses are eo ipso diverse modes of intellection. For the sake of greater clarity I shall successively examine the modes of presentation of the real in sensing as modes of intellec
tive sensing and as modes of sentient intellection.

A) The modes of presentation of reality: intellec
tive sensing. In what follows, I shall limit myself to a brief sketch. Sight apprehends a real thing as something which is “in front”; we say that it is “before me”. The thing itself is before me according to its proper configuration, according to its eidos. But this does not apply in the case of hearing. To be sure, a sound is just as immediately apprehended in the sense of hearing as a color can be in the sense of sight. But in the sound, the thing sounding is not included in the audition; rather, the sound directs us to it. This “direction” or “sending back” is what, following the etymological meaning of the word, I shall call “no
tice”. What is real of the sound is a mode of presentation proper to it: notifying presentation. In smelling, an odor is apprehended immediately as in the case of a sound or a color. But the thing is neither present as in the case of sight, nor merely made known by notification, as in the case of hearing. In smelling, reality is presented to us apprehended in a different form: as a scent. Smell is the sense of scents. In the case of taste on the other hand, a thing is present, but as a possessed reality, “savored”. Taste is more than notice, or scent; this is the ent. Still more than that, it is the sense of a taste. In the case of touch (contact and pressure) a thing is present but without eidos or taste; this is the naked presentation of reality. But the senses also present reality to me in another form. In kinesthesia I no longer have reality present, nor any notice of it, etc. I only have reality as some-
thing ‘towards’. This is not a ‘towards’ reality, but reality itself as a ‘towards’. It is thus a mode of directional presentation.

I have spoken in these last lines of sensed qualities and of the thing which possesses them. Clearly, this distinction between things and qualities is not primary but derived from the organization of our perceptions. However, I have utilized it not to fix therein the difference between quality and thing, but so that the essential idea becomes clearer, viz. that qualities are formally real and that their mode of being present to me in impression has the enunciated modalities. They are not modalities of reference to some problematic thing, but rather modalities which are intrinsically constitutive of each of the qualities themselves in its proper and formal reality. Thus, for example, sound is a quality whose modality of reality is to be directional. Directional in relation to what? That is another question which for the moment is of no concern to us. It could be that there is no sonorous thing, but the sound would not therefore cease to be directional, whether to another sonorous quality or simply a directional in relation to empty space. In addition, I should note that each one of these qualities has a possible negative mode. Thus, for example, taste has as a counterposed quality distaste, etc. The denominations of the qualities are for this reason simply denominations which are purely a potiori.

But neither reality nor my sensing are exhausted in these types of sentient apprehension. Above all, we must consider heat and cold; they are the primary presentation of reality as temperant. There is in addition the apprehension of reality not simply as temperant but also as affectant: sorrow and pleasure are the primary expression of that affection. Reality is temperant and affectant. But the apprehension of reality has still another moment, viz. reality as position. This is what is proper to the sense of equilibrium. According to it, I apprehend reality as something centered.

But I apprehend reality in still another form. When we apprehend our own reality, we have an internal or visceral sensibility which can be quite diversified, but which globally I shall call ‘coenesthesia’. Thanks to this sensing, man is in himself. That is what we call ‘intimacy’. ‘Intimacy’ means purely and simply ‘my reality’; it is a mode of presentation of the real. The visceral sense is in a certain way the sense of the “me” properly speaking. The other senses do not give the “me” as such unless they are encompassed by coenesthesia, as we shall immediately see.

Eidetic presence, notice, scent, taste, naked reality, towards, temperature accommodation, affection, position, and intimacy are first line modes of presentation of the real; they are therefore modes of the impression of reality. It is not the case that the “me” mode of reality’s presence is vision, and that the other modes are nothing but replacements for vision when it fails us. Indeed, exactly the opposite. To be sure, the modes are not all equivalent; but all are in and by themselves proper modes of the presentation of reality. The preponderant rank of some modes over others does not proceed from the fact that they are replacements for vision, but from the very nature of reality. There are, for example, realities which cannot have any other mode of presentation than naked reality apprehended tactilly. And in these cases it could be that reality thus sensed is of a rank much superior to any reality eidetically sensed. In all modes of presentation of reality, then, there is always an intellective sensing.

Now we must expound this same unitary structure starting from intellec­tion; all human intellec­tion is primarily and radically sentient intellec­tion.

B) The modes of presentation of reality: sentient intellec­tion. In this respect, classical philosophy has erred in two fundamental directions.

In the first place, it has erred in a direction which is so to speak global, proceeding from the dualism of opposing intellective thinking and sensing. Thus we have the celebrated aphorism: nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus (there is nothing in the intelligence which was not previously in the senses, with the exception of the intelligence itself). This is radically false, because it expresses precisely the character of sensible intelligence. All intellec­tion, however, is not just sensible, but sentient. Intellec­tion is in sensing as a determinant moment of the formality apprehended therein. Inasmuch as we apprehend sensed reality, the intelligence not only apprehends what is sensed, but is in the sensing itself as a structural moment of it. And this, as we shall immediately see, is true with respect to the intelligence itself. The intelligence as intellec­tion of itself is primarily and radically sentient intellec­tion; the intelligence is not in itself except sentiently.

In the second place, such a preponderance has been given to the presentation of the real in vision that what is not seen is declared eo ipso to be unintelligible. And this is absurd not only philosophically, but also scientifically. Indeed, elementary particles are realities, since they are given a splendid mathematical description in quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, they are not visualizable as if they were waves or particles. Their real structure is such that they are emitted and absorbed as if they were corpuscles and they propagate as if they were waves. But
they are neither. And it is not just that in fact we do not see these particles, but that they are in themselves realities which are “non-visualizable”. And as we shall immediately see, the identification of the visible and the intelligible is philosophically false: every intellection is sentient and, therefore, every mode of apprehension of the real—even if that reality be neither visual nor visualizable—is true intellection, and what is apprehended therein has its proper intelligibility.

There are in fact different modes of intellection and of intelligibility. With respect to vision, intellection has that character of apprehension of the eidos which we could call *videncia*. In the sense of hearing or audition, intellection has a peculiar and unique mode: to know intellec
tively is to auscultate (in the etymological meaning of the word); this is intellection as auscultation. In the sense of taste, intellection is apprehension as enjoyable (whether pleasurable or not). The enjoyment is not consequent upon intellection, but is the enjoyment itself as a mode of intellection, as a mode of apprehension of reality. Let us not forget that *sapere* [to know] and *sapientia* [wisdom] are etymologically *sapor* [taste]; the Latins, indeed, translated the Greek *sophia* as *sapientia*. In the sense of touch, intellection has a special form, viz. groping or what we could perhaps better call roughly estimating. In the sense of smell we have another special mode of intellection, the scent. I lump together in this concept both the scent properly so-called and the trace or vestige. In the sense of kinesthesia intellection is a *dynamic tension*. It is not a tension towards reality, but reality itself as a “towards” which has us tense. It is a mode of intellec
tive apprehension in the “towards”. [106]

With respect to other forms of presentation of reality, intellection has modes proper to each. Man intellec
tively knows the real through accommodating himself to reality and being affected by it. Accommodation and affection are modes of strict apprehension of reality, of strict intellection. And when reality is presented as centered, intellection is an *orientation* in reality. Finally, there is a mode of intellection proper to the presentation of reality in visceral sensing: it is intellection as intimation of the real, as intimate penetration into the real. This does not refer to some intimation which is consequent upon the apprehension of reality, but rather the intimation itself is the mode of apprehending reality.

Thus, all of the senses *qua* intellection and all intellections *qua* sentient are structural modes of the impres-

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[1] [English rendering of the Spanish *videncia*, etymologically related to the verb *ver*, to see.—trans.]
All of these forms of overlapping are authentic overlapping, that is, each mode is intrinsically and formally in the rest as a structural moment of the rest of them. No mode has any prerogative, not even the visual mode. It is in the diversity of overlapped modes that the immense richness of the apprehension of reality consists. To be sure, not every real thing is apprehended according to all of its modes; but this does not mean that they do not all overlap, because those modes according to which a reality is not present to us are modes of which we are positively “deprived”. Indeed, if we were radically deprived of a sense, independently of the fact that we were deprived of the qualities which that sense can apprehend, we would not have the mode of presentation of the real proper to that sense. A man blind from birth not only does not see black and white or colors, he cannot have the presentation of the real of the other senses as something which is here-and-now {110} “before him”. He not only doesn’t see qualities, but is deprived of apprehending the real as something which is “before”. Such a man apprehends the “naked” reality of something tactically, but never apprehends it as something which is “before” him. Quite different is the situation of the blind man who at one time was able to see. In this blind man there is not an actual seeing of black and white or colors, but the act of apprehending the real from the other senses as something real “before him” still exists. Thus, a blindness to black and white or colors is not the same as a blindness to the mode of presentation of the real “before me”. Hence, in every primordial apprehension of the real there is a strict unity not of sensible qualities, but of modes of presentation of the real, although at times it may be in that special form which we term “prative”. Each of these modes taken by itself is nothing but a reduced and deficient mode of the primary impression of reality, whose plenitude is the primary unity of all eleven modes. But then, what is this unity?

B) One might think that the various senses constitute a primary diversity such that what we call “impressive apprehension of reality” would be a “synthesis”; the intelligence would thus be what synthesizes the senses. In my view, this is false because it does not correspond to the facts. The unity of these senses is already constituted by the mere fact of being senses “of reality”, by being modes of apprehension of reality. The unity of the senses is not, then, a synthesis, but a primary unity, the physical unity of being apprehensors of reality. And since apprehending reality is intelligence, it follows that the unity of the senses is in being moments of the same “sentient intellecction”. Hence, the apprehension of reality is not a synthesis of senses, but on the contrary “the” senses {111} are...
“analyzers” of the apprehension of reality. From the point of view of the qualities—the only one adopted up to now by philosophy—one easily arrives at the idea of a synthesis. Scholastic philosophy conceived this synthesis as a “common sense”. The distinct qualities which comprise the perceived thing in each case would be submitted to a synthesis of qualities. But this is false: that synthesis is not what is primary; rather, it is the unity of reality. And it is this primary unity of reality which constitutes the foundation of the synthesis of the qualities. The qualities are in fact qualities of a reality. Pure animal sensing also has a unity which is prior to any possible synthesis of qualities. The senses of an animal are also analyzers of its pure sensing. And in the animal, the unity prior to the senses is a unity of stimulation in which the animal’s senses are the differentiation of the stimulation. There is, then, a unity of being in stimulation prior to the diversity of the senses. In man, the unity of sensing is also given, but not in the form of a unity of being in stimulation, but a unity of reality. The unity of being in stimulation does not coexist in man with the unity of reality. Indeed, it is the replacement of the unity of being in stimulation by the unity of reality which is the constitution and origin of sentient intelligence. If the two unities were to coexist, man would have senses “and” intelligence, but he would not have sentient intelligence. Sentient intelligence is the structuralization of the diversity of the senses in the intellectual unity of reality. If man could have only the mere unity of being in stimulation, it would signify a complete regression to the state of animality.

The impression of reality, then, has its own very precise structure. To impressively apprehend the real as {112} real is to apprehend the thing as actually being “before me” and in its “naked reality”, and in its “enjoyability”, and in its “direction”, etc.

This does not mean that one successively apprehends the same real thing in these modes of presentation, because they constitute structural moments of every unitary act of apprehension of something as real. Therefore, except in cases of congenital privation of a sense, all of these moments function pro indiviso in the act of sentiently apprehending any reality whatsoever, independently of the one or more senses by which its qualities are apprehended. It is for this reason that, when one loses some particular sense, he does not lose the structural moment proper to that sense’s presentation of the real—except, I repeat, in the case of a congenital absence of that sense. Conversely, in the exercise of the sentient apprehension of reality, that which each sense delivers is not just the sensible quality, but also its own mode of apprehending that quality as reality. And all of these modes are just that, “modes” of presentation of the real, which in its primary and radical unity comprises the modal moments of a single structure and, therefore, of a single act: the impression of reality.

This primary unity is sentient intelligence. And thanks to this primary unity, it is possible and indeed necessary for there to be an overlap of some modes by others. Overlap is grounded in the primary unity of the sentient intelligence. Sentient intelligence, therefore, is not some vague concept, but, as I said before, something endowed with its own structure. Thus, the diverse modes of sentient intelligence emerge from its structural unity. {113}

This means that the modes of sentient presentation of reality constitute an intrinsic and formal limitation of our intellection due to the fact that this intellection is sentient. Sentient intellection installs us in reality, but its limitations are the root of all effort, all possibilities, and the whole problematic of the subsequent intellection of reality. But I do not wish to anticipate ideas which I will develop at length further in the book. The only thing which I now wish to emphasize is that reality is apprehended as reality and is present to us as such, and that our limitations are not a type of cut-out within reality, but are in their very limitation the positive principle of the presentation and apprehension of reality.

Thus, sentient intellection is intellection of reality which is modally structured.

2

Transcendental Structure of the Impression of Reality

Each of the modal moments of the impression of reality has its own qualitative content which is always very specific: this color, this sound, this weight, that temperature, etc. But sensing is constituted not indeed by that qualitative diversity, but by the unity of the presentation of the real; i.e., by the unity of the moment of formality, by the unity of the impression of reality. Now, from this point of view, the impression of reality is always constitutively non-specific, in contrast to its content. Formality is not just one {114} more quality. But this is a conceptualization that is purely negative; positively, the impression of reality is non-specific because it transcends all of those specific contents. It has, therefore, a transcendental structure. ‘Transcendental’ is the positive face of the

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1['Transcendentality’ is a neologism of Zubiri. It is the noun corresponding to ‘transcendental’, and must be distinguished from that used in previous philosophy, generally ‘transcendence’. For Zubiri, ‘transcendence’ refers to the content of reality, whereas ‘transcendentality’ refers to the formal-
negative non-specificity. It is the structure of the de suyo as such, i.e., a structure which concerns reality qua impressively apprehended.

Transcendentality is a central concept both in ancient and modern philosophy. But modern philosophy conceived of transcendentality (as it could scarcely otherwise do) from the standpoint of the conceiving intelligence. The sentient intelligence leads us to a different concept of transcendentality. To reach it we must first of all clarify what transcendentality is. Then we shall be able to rigorously conceptualize its constitutive moments.

1. What is transcendentality? Transcendentality is the structural moment by which something transcends itself.

What is this something? What is the transcendental? That which is transcendental is that which constitutes the formal terminus of the intelligence, to wit, reality. And this reality is present to us in impression. Hence, that which is transcendental is reality in an impression.

In what does its transcendentality itself consist? What is transcendental depends on how one conceives the “trans”. “Trans” does not here mean “being beyond” apprehension. If that were true, the impression of reality would be impression of the transcendent—which would mean that the sentient apprehension of the real would be, formally, (i.e., qua apprehension) apprehension of something which in and through itself were real beyond apprehension; it would be (115) to think that the moment of otherness meant that the content of the impression of reality were transcendent. Now, it may or may not be true that that content is transcendental; that would have to be investigated in each case. But it is false that, formally, the otherness of reality is transcendental. That would mean that in the mere act of apprehending something we are apprehending a real thing which is and continues to be real even though we do not apprehend it. And this, I repeat, is formally false. In apprehension we have something real “in its own right”. But that “in its own right” should mean real beyond apprehension is, in the first place, something which must be justified. And in the second place, this justification must be based precisely upon transcendentality. The possible transcending is based, then on transcendentality, and not the other way around.

‘Trans’ means something completely different here. Provisionally, it means that we are dealing with a characteristic of the formality of otherness and not with a characteristic, transcendent or no, of the content itself. It is a characteristic which is internal to what is apprehended. It does not withdraw us from what is apprehended, but submerges us in its reality; it is the characteristic of the “in its own right”, of the de suyo. And it is this reality which, in a way to be made more precise forthwith, goes beyond the content, but within the formality of otherness. This intra-apprehensive “going beyond” is precisely transcendentality. The impression of reality is not impression of what is transcendent, but rather transcendent impression. Therefore “trans” does not mean being outside of or beyond apprehension itself but being “in the apprehension”, yet “going beyond” its fixed content. In other words, that which is apprehended in the impression of reality is, by being real, and inasmuch as it is reality, “more” than what is it as colored, (116) sonorous, warm, etc. What is this “more”? That is the question.

For classical philosophy this “more”, i.e., transcendentality, consists in that moment in which all things coincide. Transcendentality would be commonness. Although the notion of transcendentality is not Greek but medieval, that which it designates is Greek. In what do all things coincide? They coincide in being. Parmenides told us that to intellec-tively know something is to intellec-tively know that it “is” (such, at least, is my interpretation). The “is” is that in which all things coincide. And Plato called this coincidence commonness, koinonia. This commonness is participation. Nothing, for example, is “the” being, but everything participates in being. In turn, this participation is a progressive differentiation of a supreme genus which is “the” being. Things are like branches of a common trans, of a supreme genus, which is “the” being. Unity, participation, genus: here we have the three moments of what I believe constitutes in Plato the first sketch of what we are calling ‘transcendentality’. I leave aside the fact that these three moments are not, for Plato, the only ones to characterize being; four other equally supreme genera apply: movement, rest, sameness and otherness. Together with being they are the five supreme genera of things. They have a commonness among themselves, at least a partial one, and participation is grounded on this community. Aristotle profoundly modified this scheme but remained in the same general conceptual line. For Aristotle, being is not a genus, but a supreme trans-generic universal concept. Whence community is not participation; it is only a conceptual community of things. Transcendentality is what is proper to a concept in which what is conceived is in all things. Being is the most universal concept, (117) common to everything. Other concepts are not transcendental, except possibly generic concepts. And this line of thought was followed throughout the middle ages. Transcendentality consists in being a trans-generic concept.
In Kant, modern philosophy conceptualized that what is intelligible is the "object" of intellection. Therefore, everything known intellectually consists in "being-object". Transcendentalism as such is not the character of all things conceived in the universal concept, but rather is the character of all things qua objectually proposed to the intellection. Transcendentalism is thus objectual community. And this idea lived on in all idealist philosophy.

In both of the two conceptions, viz. the Greco-medieval and the Kantian, transcendentalism is clearly a radical and formally conceptive moment. The transcendental is that in which everything conceived (object or being) coincides. And its transcendentalism consists in universal community of what is conceived. This is transcendentalism conceptualized by a concipient intelligence. But more radical than this latter is sentient intelligence. Therefore it is necessary to conceptualize transcendentalism from the standpoint of sentient intelligence; i.e., with respect to the impression of reality. In that case, transcendentalism is not community or commonness, but something quite different.

Above all, the transcendental is, first of all, something proper to what constitutes the formal terminus of intellection. And this is not “being” but “reality”. I shall consider the idea of being at length in another chapter. In the second place, this intellection is sentient. Hence, the real is transcendental by virtue of its reality as its own formality; reality is formality. In what does the transcendentality of this formality of reality consist? [118]

Being the characteristic of a formality, “transcendentality” does not mean being transcendental “to” reality, but being transcendental “in” realities. It is the formality of reality which is transcendental in itself. And this “transcendental” should not be conceptualized as a function of that toward which we have transcending, but rather as a function of that from which we have it. It is like a drop of oil which expands out from itself. Transcendentality is something which, in this sense, extends from the formality of reality of a thing to the formality of reality of every other thing. Thus transcendentality is not community, but communication. But this communication is not causal; there is no question of the reality of one thing producing or generating the reality of another; that would be absurd. Rather, we are dealing with a communication which is merely formal. The formality of reality is constitutively and formally “ex-tension”. Hence, it does not refer to mere conceptual universality, but to real extensive communication. The trans of transcendentalism is an “ex”, the “ex” of the formality of the real. In what does this “ex” consist? This is the question which we must now consider.

2. The Formal Nature of Transcendentalism. We shall not construct concepts of the nature of transcendentalism. Reality is the formality of impression, and transcendentalism is the moment of the “ex” of this formality. The analysis of the “ex” is, then, an analysis of the impression of reality. It is not a theory. There in the impression of reality do we immediately discover transcendentalism as an “ex”. This analysis shows us that transcendentalism has four constitutive moments. [119]

   a) Reality is the formality of the de suyo. Now, if for any reason the content of a real thing is modified, the real thing does not therefore necessarily become another reality. It can continue to be the same real thing, although modified. What is this sameness? To be sure, it is not a simple phenomenon of perceptive constancy but a strict numerical sameness of the moment of reality. The content of the de suyo, i.e., what is de suyo, has changed but has not changed the de suyo itself as such. The same formality of reality, with numerical sameness, “reifies” whatever comes into its content. The thing is the same although not the same. The sameness in question is not a conceptual identity; it is not mere community. It is communication, reification. This does not mean that the concept of reality is equal in the two distinct realities, but that there is a numerical sameness. Each new apprehension of reality is inscribed in the formality of reality numerically the same. This is what constitutes the first moment of transcendentalism: openness. The formality of reality is in itself, qua “of reality”, something open, at least with respect to its content. The formality of reality is, then, an “ex”. By being open this formality is that by which a real thing qua real is “more” than its actual content. Reality is not, then, a characteristic of the content already completed, but is open formality. To say “reality” is always to leave in abeyance a phrase which by itself is begging to be completed by “reality of something”. The real qua real is open not in the sense that each real thing acts on all the others by virtue of its properties. We are not dealing with actuation but with openness of formality. The formality of reality [120] as such is openness itself. It is not openness of the real, but openness of reality.

   Being open is why the formality of reality can be the same in different real things. It may be said that in our apprehensions, we apprehend multiple real things. This is true; but in the first place, that multiplicity refers above all to content. And, in the second place, although we are treating of other realities, these realities are not “others” conceptually but are formally sensed as others. Conceptually, the multiple realities would be particular cases of a single concept of reality. But sentiently the other realities
are not particular cases; rather, they are formally sensed as others. And, therefore, when we sense them as others, we are expressing precisely the inscription of different real things in the numerical sameness of the formality of reality. Hence we are not talking about “a second reality”, but “another reality”. Openness: here we have the first moment of the “ex” of transcendentality.

b) Since reality is formally “open”, it is not reality except respectively to that to which it is open. This respectively is not a relation, because every relation is a relation of one thing or of a form of reality to another thing or other form of reality. In contrast, respectively is a constitutive moment of the very formality of reality as such. Reality is de suyo and therefore to be real is to be so respectively to that which is de suyo. By its openness, the formality of reality is respectively transcendental. Respectivity transcends itself. The “ex” is now respectivity. It is reality itself, the formality of reality, which qua reality is formally respective openness. [121] To be real is more than to be this or that; but it is to be real only respectively to this or that. Respective openness is transcendental. This is the second moment of transcendentality.

c) To what is the formality of reality open, to what is this respectively open? Above all, it is open to the content. And thus this content has a precise character. It is not “the” content, taken abstractly, but is a content which is de suyo, which is “in its own right”. Therefore, the content is really “its own” [suyo], of the thing. The content is “its” [su] content. The grammatical subject of this “its” [su] is the formality of reality. Upon being respectively open, the formality of reality not only “reifies” the content but moreover makes it formally “its own” [suyo]. For this reason it may be called ‘sufficating’ or ‘own-making’. Prior to being a moment of the content, the “its-own-ness” [suidad] is a moment of the formality of reality. That formality of reality is, then, what constitutes its-own-ness as such. As a moment of the formality of reality, the its-own-ness is a moment of the “ex”, it is transcendental. This is the third moment of transcendentality.

d) But openness is not respective just to content. The fact is that real content, thus reified and suffied by being real, is not only its own [suya] reality, but precisely by being real is, so to speak, purely and simply real in reality itself. The formality of reality is open to being a moment of the world; it is a formality which, upon making the thing be reality purely and simply, makes of “its” [su] reality a moment of reality itself; i.e., of the world.

What is the world? It is not the conjunction of real things, because this conjunction presupposes something which “conjoins” [122] these things. Now, that which conjoins real things is not some common concept with respect to which the real things are simply special cases. That which conjoins is a physical moment of the real things themselves. And this moment is the moment of pure and simple reality of each one of them. The character of being purely and simply real is what—because it is an open character—formally constitutes that physical unity which is the world. It is the formality of reality qua open, qua transcendent, of the real thing, and what constitutes it in a moment of reality itself. It is an openness, then, which radically and formally concerns each real thing by the fact of being purely and simply real. Therefore, were there but one single real thing, it would be constitutively and formally “worldly”. Everything is de suyo worldly. In this respect, each real thing is more than itself; it is precisely transcendent; it has the transcendental unity of being a moment of the world. The formality of reality is thus “world-making”. This is the fourth moment of transcendental, of the “ex”.

Thus there is a transcendental structure in every real thing which is apprehended in an impression of reality. The formality of reality is respective openness, and therefore is reifying. This respectivity has two moments: it is own-making and world-making. That is, each thing is “this” real thing; in a further sense it is “its own” reality (own-making); in a still more ulterior aspect it is pure and simple worldly reality (world-making). This does not mean a “contraction” of the idea of reality to each real thing, but just the reverse: an “expansion”, a physical “extension” of the formality of reality from each real thing. This is the transcendental structure of the “ex”: being de suyo is extended to being “its own” [suyo], and thereby is extended to being “worldly”. [123]

This is not a conceptual conception. It is an analysis of the very impression of reality. We sense the openness, we sense the respectivity, we sense the its-own-ness, we sense the worldliness. This is the complete sensing of the thing in the formality of reality. The sensing itself is then transcendental.

Thus we have transcendentiality conceptualized in the sentient intelligence:

a) The transcendental is not “being”, but “reality”.

b) Transcendentality is precisely and formally respective openness to worldly its-own-ness.

c) The “trans” itself is not a conceptual characteristic of real things. It is not, I reiterate, the concept of maximum universality. What this latter concept may be is something extremely problematic and may even depend upon the language which one employs. Moreover, it is truly problematic that a concept of total universality even
exists. But be that as it may, transcendentality is not of
conceptual character, but of physical character. It is a
physical moment of real things qua sensed in the impres-
sion of reality. It is not something physical in the same
way as its content, but is, nonetheless, something physi-
cal; it is the physical part of formality, i.e., the “trans-
physics” as such.

3

Structural Unity of the Impression of Reality

We have examined the structure of the impression of
reality in its two-fold modal and transcendental moment.
As modal, the structure of the impression of reality is
the structure of sentient intellection. As transcen-
dental, the structure of the impression of reality is the
respective openness to worldly its-own-ness. Now, these
two structural moments are not independent. Indeed, they
are but moments of a single structure and they are mutu-
ally determined in constituting the unity of the impression
of reality. This is what we must now clarify.

On the one hand, real notes, as I said, have a great
specificity in virtue of their content. On the other, the
formality of reality is formally not just non-specific, but
constitutively transcendental. Now, its content, qua ap-
prehended as something de suyo, is no longer mere con-
tent but “such-and-such” a reality. This is what I call
“suchness”. Suchness is not mere content. In mere
stimulation a dog apprehends the same stimuli as a man,
but it does not apprehend “suchnesses”. Reality is for-
mality and, therefore, on account of being respectively
open to its content it involves this content transcenden-
tally. In this process, the content is determined as suc-
chness; it is the suchness of the real. Suchness is a tran-
scendental determination: it is the such-making function.

In contrast, content is that which constitutes the fact
that the formality of reality is “reality” in all of its con-
creteness. The real is not only “such-and-such” a reality
but also “reality” as such. The content is the determina-
tion of the reality itself. This is the transcendental func-
tion. It too involves content, and not just in an abstract
way, but also as making of it a form and a mode of reality.
Reality is not something insubstantial, but a formality
which is very concretely determined. There are not only
many real things, but also many forms of being real.
Each real thing is a form of being real; we shall see
this in a later chapter. Thus it is clear that transcenden-
tality does not conceptually repose upon itself, but de-
pends upon the content of things. Transcendentality is
not something a priori. But neither is it something a pos-
teriori. That is, it is not a type of property which things
have. Transcendentality is neither a priori nor a posteriori;
it is something grounded by things in the formality in
which they “are situated”. It is the content of real things
which determines their transcendental character; it is the
mode in which things “are situated”. It is not a property
but a function: the transcendental function.

The such-making function and the transcendental
function are not two functions but two moments which are
constitutive of the unity of the impression of reality.
Hence the difference between suchness and transcenden-
tality is not formally the same as the difference between
content and reality, because suchness as well as reality
both involve the two moments of content and formality.
Content involves the moment of reality in a very precise
way, viz. as “making-it-such”.

Green is not suchness qua mere content; suchness is
the mode by which green consists in real green. At the
same time reality involves content in a very precise way.
It is not true that content is simply a particular case of
reality, but rather that reality involves content in a very
precise way: as transcending it. Transcendentality could
not be given without that of which it is transcendental.
Such-making and transcendentalization are the two in-
separable aspects of the real. They constitute the struc-
tural unity of the impression of reality. {126}

To summarize, sentient intelligence intellectively
knows reality in all its modes, and transcends them in
their total unity. Sentient intelligence is impressive ap-
prehension of the real. And this impression of the real is
constitutively modal and transcendental. That is, it is
precisely impression of “reality”.

In this chapter, we have studied the structure of the
apprehension of reality. It is apprehension by the sentient
intelligence. But now three important new problems
come to mind:

1. In what does intellective knowing as such con-
sist?

2. What is the character of the reality thus
known?

3. What does it mean to say that reality is in the
intellection?

The three ideas of intellection, intellectively known
reality, and the being of reality in intellection, are distinct
and comprise the three themes which I shall study in the
next three chapters: the idea of the essential nature of in-
tellection, the idea of reality as known intellectively, and
the idea of reality in intellection.
It is necessary to stress a bit more what transcendentality is. Following the thread of the impression of reality we see ourselves led to something which is not mere analysis, but to a theoretical conceptualization of reality itself. Since this conceptualization does not strictly pertain to the analysis of the impression of reality, I have grouped these considerations in an appendix. I do not do so capriciously, but rather because these considerations comprise the frontier between a philosophy of the intelligence and a philosophy of reality. And they are not a frontier which is, so to speak, geographical, but are considerations which originate from the analysis of the impression of reality and therefore mark out for us the path of a philosophy of reality.

1) To say that one treats of the physical in “trans” already permits us to glimpse that we are dealing with a characteristic which is “meta-physical”. And indeed this is the case. But since the idea of meta comes to us already loaded with meanings, it is necessary to here fix precisely the meaning of ‘metaphysics’.

Naturally, it does not mean what it originally meant for Andronicus of Rhodes, viz. “post-Physics” or “what comes after the Physics”. Very soon after this editor of Aristotle, ‘metaphysics’ came to signify not what is “after” physics, but what is “beyond” the physical. Metaphysics is then “beyond-physics”. This is what I have just called the ‘transcendent’. Without employing the term, its greatest exponent was Plato: beyond sensible things are those things which Plato calls ‘intelligible things’, the things he termed ‘Ideas’. The Idea is “separated” from sensible things. Hence, what later was called meta came to mean what for Plato is “separation”, khorismos. Plato boldly debated how to conceptualize this separation in such a way that the intellect of the Ideas would permit intellective knowing of sensible things. From the standpoint of the sensible things, they are a “participation” (methexis) in the Ideas. But from the standpoint of the Ideas, these Ideas are “present” (parousia) in things, and are their “paradigm” (paradeigma). Methexis, parousia, and paradeigma are the three aspects of a single structure: the conceptive structure of the separation. Aristotle seemingly rejected this Platonic conceptualization with his theory of substance. But ultimately, Aristotle nurtured himself on his master’s conceptualization. In the first place, his “first philosophy” (later termed ‘metaphysics’) does not deal with separated Ideas, but does deal with a “separated” substance: the Theos. And, in the second place, among physical substances Aristotle (after an initial disclaimer) in fact occupied himself more with primary substance (prote ousia) than with secondary substance (deutera ousia), whose link to primary substance he never saw very clearly. And the fact is that ultimately, even after he converted the Idea into the substantial form of a thing, Aristotle always remained in an enormous dualism, the dualism between sensing and intellective knowing which led him to a metaphysical dualism in the theory of substance. In this way the idea of the “meta-physical” as “beyond-physical” lives on.

Though with somewhat varying interpretations, medieval thinkers understood that meta-physics is “trans-physics”; the term even briefly appeared at one time. But here is the great error which must be avoided. In medieval thought, “transphysical” always means something beyond the physical. And what I am here saying is just the opposite: it is not something beyond the physical, but the physical itself, though in a dimension which is formally distinct. It is not a “trans” of the physical, but is the “physical itself as trans”. For this it was necessary to overcome the dualism between intellective knowing and sensing which in Greek and medieval philosophy always led to the dualism of reality. The terminus of sensing would be sensible things, changeable and multiple as the Greeks were wont to call them. Thus, for the Greeks, transcendental means what “always is”. The “trans” is, therefore, the necessary jump from one zone of reality to another. It is a necessary jump if one starts from the concipient intellect. But there is no jump if one starts from sentient intellect.

In modern philosophy, Kant always moved within this dualism between what Leibnitz called the ‘sensible world’ and the ‘intelligible world’. To be sure, Kant saw the problem of this duality and the intellective necessity of a unitary conceptualization of what is known. For Kant, indeed, intellect is knowledge. And Kant tried to re-establish the unity, but along very precise lines, those of objectivity. The sensible and the intelligible are for Kant...
the two elements (\textit{a posteriori} and \textit{a priori}) of a primary unity: the unity of the object. There are not two objects known, one sensible and the other intelligible, but a single sensible-intelligible object: the \textit{phenomenon}. What is outside of this unity of the phenomenal object is the ultra-
physical, \textit{noumenon}. And that which is beyond the phe-
nomenon is therefore transcendent; it is the metaphysical.
Hence, the Kantian unity of the object is constituted in
\textit{sensible intelligence}: \{130\} it is the intrinsic unity of
being an object of knowledge.

In one form or another, then, whether we consider
the Greek and medieval or the Kantian conception, meta-
physics has always been something “transphysical” in the
sense of beyond the physical, in the sense of the transcen-
dent. Only a radical critique of the duality of intellec
tive knowing and sensing, \textit{i.e.}, only a \textit{sentient intelligence},
can lead to a unitary conception of the real. We are not
dealing, I repeat, with the \textit{unity of the object} as an object
of knowledge; but of the \textit{unity of the real} itself unitarily
apprehended. That is to say, we are not dealing with a
sensible intelligence, but a sentient intelligence: the
impression of reality. In it, the moment of reality and its
transcendentalty are strictly and formally physical. In
this sense of “trans-physics”, and only in this sense, the
transcendentalty of the impression of reality is a charac-
teristic which is formally metaphysical; it is metaphysical,
not as intellecction of the transcendent, but as sentient ap-
prehension of the physical transcendentality of the real.

2) With regard to the concipient intelligence, it was
thought that the transcendental is something which is not
just beyond physical reality, but indeed is a type of canon
of everything real. The transcendental would thus be \textit{a priori},
and moreover something \textit{conclusive}. We have
already seen that the transcendental is not \textit{a priori}. I
might add now that it is not something conclusive, either;
\textit{i.e.}, transcendentalty is not a group of characteristics of
the real fixed once and for all for everything. On the
contrary, it is a characteristic which is constitutively \textit{open},
as I have already said. To be real \textit{qua} real is something
which depends on what the real things are and, therefore,
is something open, because we do not know nor can we
know whether the catalogue of types of real things (\textit{i.e.}, of
what is reality \textit{qua} reality) is fixed. \{131\} This does not refer
to whether the type of real things is open, but rather
to the question of what reality is as such. For example,
the Greeks thought that the character of substance ex-
pressed the real as such. But personal subsistence is an-
other type of reality as such about which the Greeks did
not think.

For this reason, when it came to consider the novelty
of personal reality \textit{qua} subsistent reality, philosophy found
itself compelled to remake the idea of reality \textit{qua} reality
from a viewpoint not substantial but subsistent. To be
sure, in classical metaphysics—unfortunately—subsistence
has been considered as a substantial mode, which to
my way of thinking has corrupted the notion of subsis-
tence. But this does not affect what we are here saying,
\textit{viz.}, that the character of reality \textit{qua} reality is something
open and not fixed once and for all.

Now, transcendentality not only is not \textit{a priori},
and not only is it open, but in fact this openness is \textit{dynamic}.
To be sure, it could have been otherwise; but in fact we are
dealing with a \textit{dynamic openness}. This means not only
that new types of reality can continue to appear, and with
them new types of reality \textit{qua} reality; but also to the fact
that this apparition is dynamic. It is reality as reality
which, from the reality of a thing, goes on opening itself
to other types of reality \textit{qua} reality. This is the \textit{dynamic
transcendentality}, the transcendental dynamism of the
real.

One might think that I am here alluding to evolu-
tion. In a certain respect that is true; but it is secondary,
because evolution would have to discharge here not a
cosmic function, \textit{i.e.}, “in such a way”, but would have to
be a \{132\} characteristic of reality itself \textit{qua} reality.
Suchness, I said, has a transcendental function. Now, the
transcendental function of evolution would be, as I have
already indicated, \textit{dynamic transcendentality}. But evolu-
tion in the strict sense is a scientific question, and as such
is a question merely of fact—a fact however well
grounded, but by virtue of being a scientific fact, always
disputable. For this reason, when I speak here of evolu-
tion I do not refer to evolution in the strict and scientific
sense, \textit{i.e.}, to the evolution of real things, but to evolution
in a more radical sense, which can even be given without
scientific evolution. It is that the different modes of real-
ity as such go on appearing not just successively but
grounded transcendentally and dynamically one in an-
other. And this is not a scientific fact, but something pri-
mary and radical. It is \textit{dynamic transcendentality}.

For a sentient intelligence, reality is being \textit{de suyo}.
There are different ways of being \textit{de suyo}, ways which
continue to appear, grounded in things because reality is
formality, it is the \textit{de suyo}, and this is a formality
grounded and constitutively open and dynamic. To be real
as such is an open dynamism. Reality as such is not a
concept of concipient intelligence; it is a concept of sen-
tient intelligence.
CHAPTER V

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

We have seen that the apprehension of reality is sentient intellection. We have concentrated on the question of what it is to be sentient; the answer is, to apprehend something in an impression. Later we shall examine what intellection is: briefly, it is the apprehension of something as real. The sentient intelligence is, then, impressive apprehension of the real, i.e. the impression of reality. But in this way, we have conceptualized sentient intelligence only in virtue of its intrinsic structure. Now we must ask ourselves what sentient intellection is, not in virtue of its structure, but with respect to the formal essence of its act. What is sentient intellection as such, and what is its formal nature? It is to this formal nature that I here give the name ‘essence’ in an unqualified way. What, then, is the essence of sentient intellection?

Upon formulating this question, we immediately sense that we have in some ways returned to Chapter I. There we were asking about the act of intellection. The reply was: it is an act of apprehension. Apprehension, I said, is the moment in which the thing intellectively known is present in the intelligence. And this being sentiently present is what constitutes human apprehension of reality. Now let us take one more step: Formally, what is this being present in sentient intellection? To be sure, these questions overlap somewhat; hence, some repetition is inevitable. But it is not simply repetition, because now we have a different point of view.

We consider sentient intellection as an act of being present. What is this act? That is the question.

Let us proceed first in a negative fashion, i.e., let us say what this act is not. In this endeavor, let us ignore for the time being the sentient aspects of the act and limit ourselves to its intellective aspects.

Above all, intellection is not an act which intellectually known things produce in the intelligence. Such an act would be an actuation. It is what, in a very graphic way, Leibniz called communication of substances. Thus, for Plato and Aristotle the intelligence would be a tabula rasa, or as they said an ekMageion, a wax tablet on which there is nothing written. What is written is written by things, and this writing would be intellection. Such is the idea running through almost all of philosophy until Kant. But that is not intellection; it is at best the mechanism of intellection, the explanation of the production of the act of intellection. That things act upon the intelligence is quite undeniable; but it is not in the way that the Greeks and Medieval thought. Rather, it is by way of “intellective impression”. But that is not the question with which we are now concerned. We are only asking about the result, so to speak, of that actuation: the formal essence of the act. The communication of substances is a theory, but not the analysis of a fact. The only fact we have is the impression of reality.

Modern philosophy, as I said, has attended more to the act of intellection in itself than to its production. To be sure, it has done so with a radical limitation: it has thought that intellection is formally knowledge. But for now, we leave this point aside and concentrate on knowledge qua intellection. It is obvious that in intellection, the object understood is present. Now, this general idea can be understood in different ways. One could think that the being present consists in what is present being put there in order to be known intellectually. Being present would be “actually being put there”. Of course, this does not mean that the intelligence produces what is known intellectually. Here, position in the sense of “being put” means that what is known intellectually, in order to be so, must be “put before” the intelligence. And it is the intelligence which does this “putting before” or “proposition”. That was the idea of Kant. The formal essence of intellection would then consist in positionality. But it is also possible to think that the essence of being present is not being “put”, but in being the intentional terminus of consciousness. That was the idea of Husserl. Intellection would be only a “referring myself” to what is
WHAT ACTUALITY IS

The expression ‘actuality’ and what is conceptualized by it tend to obscure an ambiguous point which it is necessary to bring out and clarify. What traditionally has been called “actuality” (actualitas by the Medieval philosophers) is the character of the real as act. And they understood by act what Aristotle called energeia, i.e., the fullness of the reality of something. Thus, to say that something is a dog in act means that this something is the fullness of that in which being a dog consists. To be sure, for this general way of thinking, ‘act’ can mean “action” because action derives from something which is in act. To everything real, in virtue of having the fullness of that in which it consists in reality, and consequently, in virtue of its capacity to act, the expression “being real in act” was applied—a quite improper denomination. This characteristic should rather be called actuality: Actuality is the characteristic of act of a real thing.

To my way of thinking, actuality is something quite distinct. Actuality is not the character of the act, but the character of the actual. Thus we speak of something which has much or little actuality or of what acquires and loses actuality. In these expressions we are not referring to act in the sense of Aristotle, but rather we allude to a type of physical presence of the real. Classical philosophy has not distinguished these two characteristics, viz. actuality and actuality. {138}

But as I see it, the difference is essential and of philosophic importance. Actuality is a physical moment of the real, but not in the sense of a physical note. The moment of act of a physical note is actuality. Its other moment is also physical, but is actuality. What is actuality? That is the question.


1. Actuality has as its salient characteristic, so to speak, the being-here-and-now-present of something in something. Thus, when we say that viruses are something having much actuality, we mean that they are something which is today present to everyone. Here one can already perceive the essential difference between actuality and actuity. Something is real in act when it has the fullness of its reality. Viruses are always realities in act; nonetheless, their being present to everyone is not this actuity. Only a few years ago, the viruses did not have this here-and-now presence; they did not have actuality.

2. One might perhaps think that actuality is a mere extrinsic relation of one real thing to another; in the foregoing example, the relation of the viruses to the men who study them. But this is not necessarily always the case. There are times when the real is “making itself present”. Thus we say that a person made himself present among others or even among inanimate things (thus man has made himself present on the Moon). This “making oneself” is already not mere extrinsic relation as the actuality
of the viruses might be; it is something which carries us beyond pure presentiality. It is undeniably an intrinsic moment of a real thing; the person in question, in fact, is what makes himself present. In what does this intrinsic moment consist? It clearly consists in that his presence is something determined by the person \[139\] “from within himself”. Thus, being a person is indifferent for our question, because every real thing has (or can have, we will not pursue the question) the character of being present from within itself. This “from within itself” is the second moment of actuality. Then we should say that actuality is the being present of the real from within itself. Through this moment, actuality carries us beyond pure presentness. Because in this “being present here-and-now” what confers its radical character upon actuality is not its presentness, nor the being here-and-now “present”, but the “being here-and-now” of the present inasmuch as it is now present here. Let us make a comparison. A piece of wax on my table is dry. If I put it into a container of cold water, it continues to be dry; the water does not act by moistening it. But the immersion has established an actuality: dry is now formally the character of “not-moistened”. Dryness has not been produced (actuality), but the actuality of the dryness has. I take this example only in a descriptive sense, with no reference to any physical explanation of moistening and non-moistening. Actuality is only the presence in this “being here-and-now”. Actuality is not mere presentness, but what is present inasmuch as something “is now”.

3. But this is not sufficient. A few lines above I said that any real thing has or can have the character of being present from within itself. The fact is that a real thing can be present or not be so according to its notes. But what is inexorable is that everything real in its formality of reality (and not just by its notes) is here-and-now present from within itself. This is a constitutive character of everything real.

Thus we have: being here-and-now present from itself by being real. This is the essence of actuality. When we impressively \[140\] sense a real thing as real we are sensing that it is present from within itself in its proper character of reality.

Classical philosophy has been a philosophy only of act and actuity; but a philosophy of actuality is urgently needed.

4. Actuality and actuity are not identical, but this does not mean that they are independent, because actuality is a character of the “being here-and-now”. But, “to be here-and-now” is the very character of the real. The real “is” in the sense of “is here-and-now”; we shall see this in the following chapter. In the impression of reality, the formality of reality is, as we saw, a \textit{prius} of apprehension itself. What is apprehended is “of its own”, i.e., \textit{is de suyo} in the apprehension but before the apprehension. It is apprehended though precisely as something anterior to the apprehension—which means, therefore, that the apprehension (as the actuality that is, as we shall forthwith see) is always and only of what is “of its own”, i.e. actuality of reality, of actuity. Hence, every actuality is always and only actuality of the real, actuality of an actuity, a “being here and now in actuality”. Whence actuality, despite being a distinct character of actuity, is nonetheless a character which is physical in its way. There is a becoming of the real itself according to its actuality which is distinct from its becoming according to its actuity. This does not mean that in this unfolding of actuality, formally considered, the thing acquires, loses, or modifies its notes; reality does not unfold as an act, but does unfold formally as actuality. It is true that things, in order to be actual, may have to act, i.e. acquire, lose, or modify notes. But such actuation is not that in which the actuality formally consists. \[141\] The unfolding of actuality is not formally an unfolding of actuity.

We can now discern the importance of what I just said. Among the thousand actualities which a real thing can have, there is one which is essentially important to us here: the actuality of the real in intellection. Thus we can understand at the outset the serious confusion of ancient philosophy: because having actuality is a physical character of the real, they thought that intellection was a physical action, a communication of substances. Those philosophers went astray on the matter of actuality. And this has been the source of all manner of difficulties. What is intellective actuality?

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\section*{ACTUALITY AS INTELLECTION}

Intellection is actuality: this is what we must clarify. Intellection is formally and strictly sentient. Hence, it is fitting to analyze intellection as actuality in its two moments: the properly intellective and the sentient. Only after that will it be possible to clarify in a unified manner what sentient intellection is as actuality. In this section, then, we shall occupy ourselves with intellection as intellective actuality.

For this task it is necessary to clarify first what intellective actuality is as actuality, and second the proper
nature of intellective actuality.

1. **Intellection as Actuality.** That what is known intellectually is present in the intellection is perfectly clear. This “in” is just “actuality”, but it does not refer to things acting on the intellection. I am as yet ignorant of whether and how they act. But that things act is something which we can only describe basing ourselves on the analysis of the actuality of those things present in the intellection. The intellection of the actuation of things is only consequent upon the intellection of the real in actuality. The proper intellective moment comes into play by extremely complex structures and, therefore, by extremely complex actuations. But this just means that such actuation delimits and constitutes the real content of the intelligence as known intellectually. On the other hand, in the intellection itself this content is merely actualized. Actuation concerns the production of the intellection; it does not concern the formal aspects of this intellection. Intellection is “being present here-and-now” in the intellection, i.e., it is actuality. And this is not a theory, but a fact. In order to manifest it I need only situate myself in the midst of any intellective act. Here we deal with an intellection, and therefore what is known intellectually is always apprehended in the formality of the de suyo, as something which is “of its own”. This formality is, as I have just pointed out, a *priors* with respect to apprehension. Whence it follows that the apprehended real is real before being apprehended; i.e., the real, upon being now known intellectually, is present, is here-and-now in actuality.

Thus, in every intellection there are three structural moments that are important to our problem: actuality, presentness, and reality. It is necessary to dwell a bit on this structure in order to preclude false interpretations.

a) In the first place, actuality is not a relation or a correlation. Intellection is not a relation of the intelligent being with the things known intellectually. If “I see this wall”, that vision is not a relation of mine with the wall. On the contrary: the relation is something which is established between me and the wall which is seen; but the vision itself of the wall is not a relation, but something anterior to any relation. It is an actuality, I repeat, in the vision itself, given that it is in the vision “in” which I am here-and-now seeing the wall. And this vision as such is actualization. Actuality is more than a relation; it is the establishment of the things related. Actualization, in fact, is a type of respectivity. Nothing is intellectually actual except with respect to an intellection. And this actuality is respectivity, because the formality is of reality and, as we have seen, this formality is constitutively open *qua* formality. (144) The intellective actuality, then, is in the primary sense grounded upon the openness not of intellection, but of the formality of reality. The openness of intellection as such is grounded in the openness of its proper formal object, in the openness of reality.

Reality, I repeat, is something formally open. Intellection is not, then, a relation, but is respectivity, and it is so because it is actuality; actuality is nothing but the respectivity of something which is formally open. Every formality is a mode of actuality, a mode of “remaining” or “staying”. Hence, even in stimulation the stimulus “remains”, but only as a sign. The stimulus has that actuality of being an objective sign; it is signitive actuality. But in the formality of reality what is apprehended has the actuality of the “of its own”. It is actuality of reality and not just of signitivity. Nonetheless, there is an essential difference. In signitive actuality the sign, precisely by being a sign, pertains formally and exclusively to the response. On the other hand, in the actuality of reality this actuality has the character of a *priors*. Hence, in both cases we start from a conceptualization of what is apprehended according as it is apprehended. What happens is that in the second case what is apprehended, by being a *priors*, is the actuality of sensing by being already the actuality of reality. They are two modes of impressive otherness. They both are equally immediate, but only the second has the moment of priority of the de suyo, and only the de suyo is respective in transcendental openness. Hence, despite the equal immediateness of both types of otherness, their difference is essential.

b) In the second place, consider actuality and presentness. Intellective actuality, like all actuality, is that moment of reality according to which the real thing is here-and-now present (145) as real from within itself. Nonetheless, intellective actuality is not presentness; it is not a being “present” here-and-now, but a “being here-and-now” present. Presentness is something grounded on actuality. This is essential, because what I have been saying about reality could be interpreted in a completely false way. Indeed, one might think that to say that what is perceived is present as real means only that what is perceived is present as if it were real. Reality would be then mere presentness. This, basically, is the celebrated thesis of Berkeley: *esse est percipi*. Obviously, that is not what I mean. For Berkeley, to be perceived is to have an esse which consists in pure presentness. We leave aside the question of whether Berkeley speaks of being and not of reality; for the present discussion it does not matter. Nor does it matter that Berkeley refers to perception, because perception is a mode of sentient intellection. Now, what Berkeley said is not a fact, because while the presentness
of what is perceived is certainly one of its moments, it is a moment grounded in turn upon another moment belonging equally to it, viz., actuality. It is not the case that what is perceived “is present as if it were” real, but as “being present here-and-now”.

In perception itself, if we stay within its confines, its moment of presentness is seen to be grounded upon its primary mode of actuality. To be perceived is nothing but the moment of presentness of actuality, of the “being now in actuality”. Having confounded actuality with mere presentness, having reduced the former to the latter, is as I see it, Berkeley’s great initial error. What is present is so by being actual in perception; but only “being here-and-now actual” is it “perceived”. {146}

c) In the third place, consider actuality and reality. Actuality and reality are two intrinsic moments of every intellection, but they are not of equal rank. Although I have already explained this before, it deserves repetition here. Actuality is actuality of reality itself, and therefore is grounded upon reality when apprehended intellecively. And this is so because the formality of reality is a prius of the thing apprehended with respect to its apprehension; whence its actuality in intellection is grounded as that actuality in reality. Intellecutive apprehension is always and only actuality “of” reality. Reality is not grounded upon actuality, i.e., reality is not reality of actuality, but rather actuality is actuality of reality.

To summarize, in every intellection we have reality which is actual, and which in its actuality is here-and-now present to us. Such is the structure of intellection as actuality.

Now, not every actuality is intellecutive. Hence, we must pose the following question: In what, formally, does intellecutive actuality qua intellecuitive consist?

2. Intellecutive Actuality. By being actuality, intellection is a being here-and-now present of the real in it by virtue of being real. Thus, this actuality is intellecutive formally because in it the real not only actualizes itself but does nothing other than actualize itself. This is what I call being “mere actuality”. What is it to be mere actuality?

a) Above all it refers to a character of the real in apprehension itself. Although I have already said so many times, it is useful to emphasize this again, because to say that intellec tion is mere actualization of the real can lead to a serious error, one that I might even term ‘fatal’. {147}

It consists in interpreting that phrase in the sense that the real things of the world make themselves present to the intelligence in their very worldly reality. This idea was expressly affirmed in Greek and Medieval philosophy, but is rigorously untenable and formally absurd. The things of the world have no reason to be present as such in the intellec tion. With this question we now find ourselves facing another question, viz. that of transcendentality. And I have said categorically that transcendent actuality does not formally mean transcendent character. What I affirm in the phrase we are discussing is exactly the contrary of what is affirmed in this conception of the transcendent, a conception which I reject as a formal moment of intellection. The phrase in question does not affirm anything about real things in the world, but rather says something which concerns only the formal content of what is intellec tively apprehended. It deals, then, with the formality of reality and not with transcendent reality. Thus, I say of this content that the only thing intellec tion “does” or “makes” is to “make it actual” in its proper formality of reality, and nothing more. I shall immediately return to this point; but for now, one more step.

b) Through this formality of reality, the apprehended content remains as something “of its own”. What is important to us here is that we are dealing with a “remaining”. To remain is not just to be the terminus of an apprehension, but to be remain with this content present and such as it presents itself. I said this from another point of view at the beginning of the book: what is apprehended has a content and also a formality, which is the mode according to which what is apprehended is here-and-now present through the mode of the apprehendor “having to deal with it”; i.e. {148} by reason of habitude. This mode is what I called ‘remaining’ or ‘staying’. In every apprehension the thing “remains” in the apprehension. And this remaining is either a “remaining” of a stimulus or a “remaining” of reality. Thus, qua real the content does nothing but “remain”. The content is actualized, and is only actualized: it “remains”. What the mutual actuation of the apprehendor and the apprehended might have been is something which does not affect the proper formality of the latter. With regard to what does affect this formality, the content does not act; it does nothing but “remain” in its reality. Mere actuality is, then, actuality which formally consists in a “remaining”.

c) Yet one more step. The real “remains” in the intellec tion. This means that its formality of reality “rests” upon itself. Here, ‘to rest’ clearly does not mean that the real is quiescent, but, even when mobile and changeable, this change is apprehended as real, and thus its reality (as formality) rests upon itself. This does nothing but describe the “remaining” from another point of view. Nevertheless, to do so is not useless, because one might think that I am referring to intellec tion as action. And that is
untrue; I refer to intellection according to its formal essence, i.e., to actuality. That intellection as action is “rest”, in the sense of having its end in itself, is Aristotle’s old idea of *energeia* which dominated all of the ancient and Medieval worlds, and in large measure the modern world as well, for example in Hegel. For Aristotle there are actions like intellecitive knowing and loving which have their *ergon* in themselves; they are done only for the sake of doing them. Thus, intellecitive knowing has no other *ergon* than intellecitive knowing, and love no other *ergon* than to be now loving. For this reason these actions are [149] *energeiai*. But be that as it may, whether these actions have no other end than themselves, our problem is not the nature of the intellecitive action, but the formal nature of its actuality, the formal nature of intellecction itself. Thus, reality *qua* “remaining”, rests upon itself: it is reality and nothing more than reality.

To summarize, the formally proper part of intellecitive actuality *qua* intellecitive is to be “mere” actuality, i.e. to have as terminus the formality of reality such as it “remains resting” upon itself.

In intellection, then:

1. What is known intellecively “is here-and-now” present as real; it is something apprehended as real.

2. What is known intellecively “is just here-and-now” present; it is not something elaborated or interpreted, or anything of that nature.

3. What is known intellecively is only present “in and for itself”; hence, the real is an intrinsic and formal moment of what is present as such. It is not something beyond what is apprehended; it is its “remaining” in itself.

It is in the unity of these three moments that the fact of the intellecction being mere actuality of the real as real consists.

But intellection is formally sentient. And here a great problem arises: Is it true that what is intellecively and sentiently known is *qua* impressively apprehended mere actuality?

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§3

ACTUALITY AS IMPRESSION

Intellection is just actualization of the reality of what is known intellecively. This intellection is sentient; i.e., I intellecively know the real impressively, in an impression of reality. And not only the formality of reality, but its sensed content as well pertains to this intellection; it is, indeed, precisely this content which has the formality of reality. Therefore this content as such is real, that is to say, just reality actualized. Apprehension of the so-called sensible qualities: color, sound, taste, etc. is therefore an apprehension of a real quality. That is, sensible qualities are real. But it is necessary to explain this assertion.

1. Sensible qualities are above all *our impressions*. And it is now that we must point out that an impression has a moment of affection of the sentient being and a moment of otherness of what is sensed. We saw this in chapter III (let us leave aside for now the third moment of force of imposition of what is sensed upon the sentient being). Those two moments cannot be separated. Impression is not only affection, but the presentation of something “other” in the affection, viz., color, sound, taste, etc. The fact that sensible qualities are our impressions means that in the impressive moment something other is present to us. This other has a content (which we also saw), for example, green, and a formality which can be of stimulation (in the case of an animal) or of reality (in the case of man). In the formality of stimulation a quality is [151] apprehended only as a sign of response. On the other hand, being the formality of reality consists in the content being “of its own” what it is; it is something *de suyo*. Reality is, then, the formality of the *de suyo*. This, then, is what happens in our apprehension of sensible qualities. They are sensible because they are apprehended in an impression; but they are real because they are something *de suyo*. The green is such-and-such a shade, intensity, etc.; it is all of this *de suyo*, it is green *de suyo*. It would be a mistake to think that the color is green because of some structures proper to my sensory receptors. Be as it may the psycho-organic structure of my sensations and perceptions, that which is present to me in them is present *de suyo*. Reality, I repeat, is the formality of the *de suyo*. Hence, the qualities are something strictly and rigorously real. That they are our impressions does not mean that they are not real, but that their reality is present impressively.

2. This reality of the *de suyo* is just actuality. The process of sensing a quality involves an extremely complex system of structures and actuations, both on the part of things and on the part of my sensory receptors. But what is formally sensed in this process is not these actuations, but rather what is present to me in them: the green itself. Sensed green is not an actuation, but an actuality. That the green is seen does not consist in my sentient process being green, but in the green which is seen being something *de suyo*. Being sensed only consists in being
here-and-now present in my vision. And this is reality in the strictest sense of the word. It is not as if the green which is sensed were present with some pretension of reality, i.e. as if it were real; rather, it is present in accordance with what it is in itself, with what it is de suyo. This means that not only is the perception real, but so is its formal qualitative content; this green is a content which is de suyo green.

3. This reality, I affirm, is formality. Consequently, reality is not a special “zone” of things, so to speak. That is, we are not referring to a zone of real things which is “beyond” the zone of our impressions. Reality is not to be there “beyond” an impression, but rather, reality is just formality. In virtue of this it is necessary to distinguish not reality and our impressions, but rather what is real “in” an impression and what is real “beyond” the impression. Thus we are not contrasting realities with my impressions, but two ways of being real, or if one wishes, two zones which both possess the formality of reality. What is real “in” an impression may not be real other than in the impression, but this does not mean that it is not real there. Today we know that if all animals with sight were to disappear, real colors would also disappear; so not just some impressive affections, but realities as well, would disappear. What happens is that these realities are not real other than “in” the impression. But the real “beyond” the impression would continue unperturbed. Now, this is not some trivial verbal distinction, because what is real is always and only what it is de suyo. What is real “beyond” is not so by virtue of being “beyond”, but is real through being de suyo something “beyond”. Beyond is nothing but a mode of reality. Reality, I repeat, is the formality of the de suyo whether “in” an impression or “beyond” it. The impressively real and the real beyond coincide, then, in being the formality of the de suyo; i.e., they coincide in being real.

4. This is not mere coincidence; rather it is a real unity of these two modes of reality. We do not refer to these two modes as being only two particular cases of the same concept, the concept of the de suyo. Rather, we refer to a physical unity of reality. In fact, the impression of reality actualizes the formality of reality, as we saw, in different modes, and among them is the mode “toward”. This means that it is the real itself in an impression of reality which is really bearing us toward a “beyond” the perceived. Hence, it is not a going to the reality beyond perception, but is a going from the real perceived to the real “beyond”. That leaves open the question of what the terminus of the “toward” might be. It is a terminus that is essentially problematic; it could even be an absence of reality, but further investigation is necessary. But in any case this emptiness would be known intellectually in the moment of reality in the “toward”, which is constitutive of the impression of reality. In point of fact, we know today that sensible qualities are not real beyond one’s perception, but we must emphasize that they are real in the perception. This is a distinction within the real itself. And what of reality beyond the perceived might correspond to these qualities which are real in perception is something which can only be known intellectually by basing ourselves on the reality of those qualities “in” perception.

To summarize, sentient intellection, with respect to what it has of the sentient, is just actualization of reality.

For modern science and philosophy, sensible qualities are only impressions of ours, and as such are considered as merely affections of the sentient being. Thus, to say that qualities are impressions of ours would mean that they are nothing but affections of our sensing; they would be at most “my” representations, but their content would have no reality at all. But this, as we have just seen, is unacceptable. The moment of affection and the moment of otherness in an impression cannot be split apart (as we have already seen). Being impressions of ours does not mean being unreal, but rather being a reality which is impressively present. The determination of what these qualities are in the world beyond what is formally sensed is precisely the task of science.

§4

THE FORMAL UNITY OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

In both itsintellective and sentient aspects, sentient intellection is formally just the actuality of what is apprehended as real. It is this actuality, then, which constitutes the formal unity of the act of sentient intellection. In what does this unity of actuality consist? That is what we must now clarify.

1. Above all, the reality of what is known intellectually is actual, i.e., is here-and-now present, in sentient intellection. But not only this, since when the intellectually known thing is present (for example, when this rock is present), I not only see the rock but I sense that I am now seeing the rock. The rock not only “is seen”, but “I am now seeing” the rock. This is the unity of the rock being here-and-now present and of my vision being here-and-now present. It is a single “being here-and-now”, a
single actuality. The actuality of the intellection is the actuality of what is known intellectively. There are not two actualities, one of the rock and the other of my intellection, but only one single actuality. Actuality in the sentient intelligence is, then, at one and the same time, actuality of what is intellectively known and of the intellection itself. It is the same actuality. What is this sameness? That is the question.

One might think that we are dealing with two actualities, so to speak equal; i.e., of the character of actuality in two points of application: in the thing and in the intellection. But this is not true. We are not dealing with two equal actualities, but a single common actuality of the intellectively known thing and the intellection. Let us explain how.

A) Commonness means here a numerical sameness. The actuality of what is known intellectively and of the intellection is numerically the same and identically the same. That which is actual is clearly distinct: what is known intellectively is distinct from the intellection itself. But qua actuality it is numerically identical. If one wishes, there are two distinct actual things in one single actuality. This numerical sameness is of the essence of intellection. We are not dealing with some theoretical construct, but making an analysis of any intellective act. This rock being now present in one’s vision is the same as now seeing the rock.

B) But I must stress that it is a commonness of mere actuality. We are not referring to some common action produced by the thing and my intelligence; that would be a commonness of activity, a communication of substances. That commonness is above all a metaphysical construct and not a fact. Moreover, even as a construct it is very problematic and debatable. On the other hand, in the formal nature of sentient intellection we do not have a common act, but a common actuality. Thus it is commonness of actuality. In the very act of seeing this rock, the actuality as rock-seen is the same as the actuality of seeing the rock. It is precisely in this identity that the difference between the rock and my vision is actualized. It is an actuality which actualizes at one and the same time these two terms.

Thus we have here the complete essence of sentient intellection: in the actuality of the thing and of the intellective knowing, the intellection and what is known intellectively are actualized—through the numerical identity of their actuality—as two distinct realities. {157}

When I say, then, that sentient intellection is just the common actualization of the real in it, I do not only refer to real things but also to the reality of my own sentient intellection as an act of mine. My own act of sentient intellection is a real act, a reality. And this reality is actualized with the reality of the thing in the same actuality as the thing. Let us dwell a bit on this point.

a) Above all, through being a common actuality, the reality itself of my act of sentient intellection is actualized in it. When I see this “real rock” I am now “really seeing” this rock. The reality of my own act of sentient intellection is actualized in the same actuality as the rock; this is how I am here-and-now in myself.

b) This being now in myself is sentient. And it is so not only because the “me” is sensed as reality (for example, the kinesthesia, as we saw), but because the “being now” itself is sentient—the only point which is now important to us. By sensing the real, I am there as really sensing. If this were not so, what we would have is something like an idea of my intellective act, but not “really being there” knowing myself in my reality. I am now in myself sentiently.

c) We are talking about a “being here-and-now”. Consequently, being here-and-now in myself is not the result, so to speak, of a returning upon my act; i.e., we do not refer to having an intellection of my act after having had the act of intellection of the rock. I am not here-and-now in myself because I return, but rather (if one wishes to speak of returning) I return because I am here-and-now already in myself. There is no returning upon the act, but an already being in it really. I am now in myself by being now intellectively and sentiently knowing the thing. Conversely, I can never be here-and-now in myself otherwise than by being here-and-now in the thing. Whence being here-and-now in myself has the same actuality as the being here-and-now in the thing; it is the common actuality of reality. To intellectively know something sentiently is to be here-and-now intellectively knowing sentiently the proper reality of my act.

It was necessary to conceptualize it thus in order to avoid the fundamental error of thinking that being here-and-now in myself consists in returning from things upon myself. That was the conception of reflection in medieval philosophy (reditio in seipsum), and is what in modern philosophy is called introspection. It would be necessary to enter into myself, in my proper reality, and this reality would be a “return”. But this is false. In the first place, that return upon the act itself would be an infinite regress: when I return upon myself I would have to return upon my own return, and so on indefinitely. If the turning in upon myself were a “return”, I would never have succeeded in doing so. But in the second place, what is radically false is the idea that it is necessary to turn in upon
myself. It is not necessary to “enter” or “turn in”, since I am now already there in myself. And this is so by the mere fact of being here-and-now sensing the reality of some thing. I am now in myself because my being is actualized in the same actuality as the real thing. Every introspection is grounded on this prior common actuality.

For this reason, the possibility of introspection, like the possibility of extro-spection, is grounded upon the common actuality of the thing and of my sentient intellective act. Thus there is no infinite regress. Extro-spection is the entrance into the reality of a thing. Its possibility is in the sentient actualization of the reality of a thing. And the possibility of entering into myself in the same act of mine is based on the fact that this real act has numerically identical actuality as the sentient actuality of the real thing. Both “enterings” are grounded on the fact that every actuality is of reality, and the common actuality is so of the reality of the thing and of my own act. Introspection therefore has the same problematic character as extro-spection. It is no less problematic to be intellectively knowing the reality of my intellection than to be intellectively knowing the reality of a thing. What is not a problem, but a fact, is that sentient intellection is common actuality.

2. This commonness of actuality has its precise structure, because in the numerical identity of the actuality two realities are actualized. And these two realities qua actualized are not simply two. To be sure, their actuality is numerically the same; but it intrinsically involves a duality of actualized realities, and this duality has a precise structure.

In the first place, when a thing is actualized in sentient intellection, as I said, the reality of the intellection itself remains actualized. That is, the intellection remains “co-actualized” in the same actuality as the thing. When I sense the real rock, I repeat, I am here-and-now sensing it. The common actuality of what is intellectively known and of the intellection has above all this character of “co-” or “with”.

In the second place, in that common actuality the thing is now present “in” sentient intellection; but also sentient intellection is present “in” the thing. I believe it essential to thematically emphasize this point. To describe intellection as the presence of a thing in the intelligence is to make a unilateral description. The intelligence is just as present “in” the thing as the thing “in” the intelligence. Naturally this does not refer to sentient intellection as action somehow acting on the thing known, for example, on the sun. That would be absurd. What I maintain is that sentient intellection as actualization is now “in” the same actualization as the sun. Through being common actuality, then, we have a single “in”. Common actuality has the character of “with” and the character of “in”.

In the third place, this common actuality is actuality of reality. This actualization of the reality of a thing and of the sentient act as a real act is, then, actualization of the same formality of reality. Now, the formality of reality has, as we saw, the character of being a prior. Reality is the formality of the “in itself”, of the de suyo, and in virtue of it what is actualized, what is real, is something prior to its actualization in sentient intellection; every actuality is “of” the real. In virtue of this, the common intellectional actuality is the actuality “of” the thing, and the thing is the actualizer “of” the intellection. It is the same “of”. The common actuality has, then, the character of an “of”. This moment of the “of” pertains to the intellection precisely and formally by being actuality, and only by being actuality. It is not an immediate characteristic.

These three characteristics of “with”, “in”, and “of” are but three aspects of a single common actuality; moreover, they are what formally comprises the commonness of actualization. And as aspects, each is based on the following. The “with” is the “with” of an “in”, and the “in” is an “in” being “of”. Conversely, each aspect is grounded upon the previous one. Actuality as an “of” is so precisely through being actuality “in”; and it is “in” precisely through being “with”. The unity of these three aspects is, I repeat, what formally constitutes the commonness of actualization, i.e., the formal unity of sentient intellection.

3. This unitary structure in turn reveals to us some essential aspects which it is necessary to point out explicitly.

A) We are dealing with a common intellectional actuality, with sentient intellection. This common actuality is co-actuality.

Co-actuality is a character of common actuality qua actuality. Now, this aspect reflects, so to speak, on the intellectional character of the actuality: when a real thing is intellectively known in sentient fashion, sentient intellection itself is sentiently “co-intellectively” known—not, to be sure, like one more thing, but in that form which is expressed by the gerund “I am here-and-now sensing”. If as is commonly done (though very inappropriately) one calls intellective knowing scientia, science, it will be necessary to say that in virtue of the common actuality of the intellection as actuality, that common intellection as “intellective” actuality will not be just science but cum-scientia: con-science, i.e., consciousness. Consciousness is intellective co-actuality of intellection itself in its proper
intellection. This is the radical concept of consciousness. Intellection is not consciousness, but every intellection is necessarily conscious precisely and formally because the intellection is “co-actuality”; intellective but co-actual. And since intellection is sentient, i.e., since reality is intellectively known in impression, it follows that consciousness is radically and formally sentient.

But it is necessary to make two observations here.

In the first place, this consciousness is not, formally, introspection. Introspection is only a mode of consciousness: it is the consciousness of the act of turning in upon oneself, as we have already seen. But the act of turning in upon oneself is grounded upon the act of being here-and-now in oneself (kinesthetic intellection), and therefore the introspective consciousness is grounded in the direct consciousness of co-actuality. {162}

In the second place, modern philosophy has not only made intellection an act of consciousness, but has extended this idea to all human acts. But, this is false. Consciousness, as we saw in Chapter I, does not have any substantive acts of consciousness do not exist, only conscious acts. And among these latter, some like intellection are of course fully conscious, but are not intellective by being conscious. Rather, just the reverse is true: they are conscious by being intellective. Other acts are not necessarily conscious.

Now let us proceed to examine the area of common actuality. Common actuality is actuality in the character of the “in”. Hence, when I have sentient co-intellection, i.e., when I have sentient consciousness, I have consciousness of sentient intellection “in” the thing. In common actuality I am now sensing myself “in” the thing, and sensing that the thing is now “in” me. Because this is intellective actuality, I then have not only sentient consciousness, but moreover I am here-and-now consciously “in” the thing and “in” my own intellection. That is what we mean when we say of someone who is very perplexed about a subject or not enthused about it that he is “not into it”. Because of the common actuality in the character of the “in”, when I intellectively know in sentient fashion my being here-and-now in a thing, I have sentient consciousness of being now “in” it. This is another aspect of the distinct consciousness of the “cum”, and how it is grounded in the common actuality.

Moreover, common actuality has the character of an “of”: a thing is an actualizer “of” sentient intellection, and sentient intellection is intellection “of” the thing. This is an aspect which corresponds to the common intellective actuality qua actuality. Now, the character of the “of” as a moment of common intellective actuality qua {163} intellective is then “consciousness of”, it is “taking-cognition-of”, the thing and of my own sentient intellection. The actuality in “of” is “intellection-of”, i.e., “consciousness-of”. This “consciousness-of” is a character grounded in the common intellective actuality. Furthermore, the “consciousness-of” is grounded in the “consciousness-in”. Only being here-and-now “in” a thing am I taking cognizance “of” it. And since I am now in it sentiently, the primary and radical taking cognizance is always and essentially sentient.

In summary, consciousness is not intellection but pertains essentially to sentient intellection. Sentient intellection is common actuality, and this common actuality qua actuality of intellection knowing makes it consciousness. And consciousness is not primarily and radically “consciousness-of”, but rather the “consciousness-of” is grounded on the “consciousness-in”, and the “consciousness-in” is grounded on the radical “cum”, on the impressive “cum” of sentient intellection.

When modern philosophy took leave of the “consciousness-of” (Bewusstsein-von), it committed a double error. In the first place, it essentially identified “consciousness” and “consciousness-of”. But essentially and radically consciousness is “con-scient”; and only through “consciousness-in” is the “consciousness-of” constituted. But in addition, as I have repeatedly said, modern philosophy has committed an even more serious error: it has identified intellection and consciousness. In such case, intellection would be a “taking-cognition-of”. And this is false since there is only “consciousness” because there is common actuality, that actuality which is the formal constitutive character of sentient intellection.

With respect to stimulation, this same thing happens in animals. The impression constituting pure sensing, {164} by reason of its moment of otherness, makes what is sensed to be sensed as a stimulus. But at one and the same time it makes the animal “co-sense” its own affection as a stimulus; i.e., it makes the sentient animal “co-sense”.

In an animal, what is present to it is so as stimulus, and in this presentation the signed presence of the animal itself qua responsive animal is co-present, co-sensed. Now, this stimulus-based co-sensing is what constitutes what ought to be called the animal’s sensitive consciousness. This is frequently spoken of, but never explained. At most we are given to understand that an animal “recognizes” what is sensed just as does a man, the difference being only that the animal “recognizes” many fewer things than does a man. But this difference, though great, is absolutely secondary. The radical difference turns upon
The fact that the animal’s “recognizing” is essentially different than that of a man, even with respect to those impressions whose content might be the same for both. Human sensing is co-actualization of reality; in this “co-” of reality human consciousness is grounded. Animal sensing is signitive co-stimulation; this “co-” of sign is the sensitive consciousness of the animal. And only because this sensitive consciousness is thus essentially different from human consciousness does the animal necessarily have to “recognize” far fewer things than man. Human consciousness as well as animal consciousness is sentient; what distinguishes them is that human consciousness is of reality, while that of the animal is of stimulus. [165]

B) Common actuality is not only fundamental to consciousness, but also to something different though quite essential. Since this actuality is common, one might think that it is constituted by the integration of two things which, in the usual terminology, are subject and object. Seeing this rock would be an act in which the seeing subject and the object seen were integrated. But that is not the case. On the contrary: it is through being common actuality that sentient intellecction is actuality of what is intellectively known in intellecction, and of intellecction in what is intellectively known. With respect to the actuality of what is intellectively known, that actuality leads to a conceptualization and a discovery much fuller than what is commonly but improperly called ‘object’. Qua actuality of intellecction, it is this actuality which will later lead to discovery and conceptualization of the intelligence itself, and in general to everything which, with the same propriety, is usually termed ‘subject’. Common actuality is not the result, but the root of subjectivity. The essence of subjectivity consists not in being a subject of properties, but in “being me”. It does not consist in dependence upon me, but rather is the character of something which is “me”, be it something like a property of mine, or something of the thing qua thing, something which is “me” just by being of the thing and, therefore, by depending not on me but on it. Sentient intellecction is not given in subjectivity, but on the contrary sentient intellecction as just actualization of the real is the very constitution of subjectivity; it is the opening to the realm of the “me”. Hence the two terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are not “integrated” in sentient intellecction, but rather it is this which in a certain way “dis-integrates” itself into subject and object. Subject and object are grounded in the common actuality of sentient intellecction, and not the other way around. [166]

C) The common actuality has a special character which should be expressly pointed out. We said, in effect, that the real itself is the actualizer of sentient intellecction. This means that it is the real which determines and grounds the commonness. To be sure, without intellecction there would be no actuality; but if there is to be actuality of the real, it is something determined by the real itself. Now, reality is the formality given in an impression of reality. And this impression, as we saw, is open actuality, a respective openness; it is transcendentality. Hence, the real qua determinant of the actuality of sentient intellecction determines it as something structurally open. Common actuality is thus transcendent, and its transcendentality is determined by the transcendentality of the reality of the real. Common actuality is formally transcendental actuality because such is the impression of reality, i.e., because the impression is sentient. Kant told us that the structure of the understanding conferred transcendental content (transcendentaler Inhalt) upon what is understood. But this is not true. In the first place, transcendentality is not a proper character of the understanding but of the sentient understanding. In the second place, an intellecction is transcendental through finding itself determined by the real in a common actuality with that intellecction. This actuality is, then, not only common but transcendental. The commonness of the actuality is a commonness in which sentient intellecction is respectively open to the real when intellectively known in impression. And it is because of this that sentient intellecction itself is transcendental. It is not transcendental as a conceptual moment, nor by being constitutive of the real as object. It is transcendental because, [167] by being common actuality, the sentient intelligence remains open to reality in the same openness in which the real itself is open qua reality. It is the openness of reality which determines the openness of sentient intellecction. And it is because of this, I repeat, that sentient intellecction itself is transcendental.

Moreover, it is because of this that sentient intellecction is transcendentally open to other intellecctions. Diverse intellecctions, indeed, do not constitute an edifice by some sort of mutual coupling or joining together, i.e., because one intellecction is “added” to others which outline, organize, or amplify it. On the contrary: all of this takes place, and must necessarily take place, through the transcendentally open nature of each intellecction. Transcendentality as respective openness of sentient intellecction is the radical foundation of any possible “edifice”, of any possible “logic” of intellecction. But this requires further explanation.

D) One might think that the openness of an intellecction to others is referred to the content of the intellecctions. This is not the case. The openness concerns something much more radical: the very mode of the common actuality. This common actuality can adopt diverse modes; i.e., there are diverse modes of actualization. Each of them is
open to the others, and this openness of the modes of actualization as such is what formally constitutes the transcendental foundation of every logic, or rather, of all the intellections whose articulation the logic studies. We shall study this at length in other parts of the book.

Jumping ahead a bit, it is fitting even now to emphasize what I regard as an error of ancient philosophy, according to which intellection is logos. In this view, everything the intellection has would be only moments of the logos; hence, intellection \{168\} would be formally logos. But as I indicated a few pages back, I think that this is false. Instead of “logifying” intellection it is necessary to “intelligize” the logos. Now, to intelligize the logos is to consider it as a mode of “common” intellectional actualization. Under conditions which we shall study in other parts of the book, the primordial apprehension of the real, by being transcendently open, determines that mode of common intellectional actualization which is logos. Logos is intellection only because it is a mode of actualizing what is already intellectively known in intellection, a mode which is transcendently determined by actualization in the primordial apprehension of reality. Intellection has other modes which are not that of logos. But all these modes are just that: “modes”. And they are not modes which are simply diverse, but modes which are transcendently grounded upon each other. Hence the modes are essentially “modalizations” of an actuality which is primarily and radically transcendental. As I said, this primary and radical intellectional actuality is the primary and radical sentient intellection, what I have called since the beginning of the book the primordial apprehension of reality. But, I repeat, this is just a preview. We shall return to this subject at some length in chapters VIII and IX, and above all in the other two parts of the work.

We have seen what the formal essence of the act of intellectional knowing is: it is just actuality of what is known intellectively in sentient intellection. It is a simple “remaining” of what is apprehended in an impression of reality, and a “remaining” of sentient intellection in what is impressively known intellectively. It is just a common and transcendental actuality in which two things are made actual: what is impressively known intellectively and sentient intellection itself. This actuality has \{169\} the character of consciousness and is what constitutes the realm of subjectivity. And precisely by being common actuality, sentient intellection is transcendently open to other modes of actualization, and with that to other intellections. This transcendental openness of sentient intellection is the radical and intrinsic foundation of all intellectional construction, of every logos.

This is the first of the three questions which I proposed at the end of chapter IV. It was, “In what does the character of sentient intellection as such consist?” That is what we have just examined; now we must proceed to the other two questions. First of all, What is the character of what is intellectively known in sentient fashion; i.e., what is the character of reality (the second question)? After that, we shall go on to the third question: In what does reality “in” sentient intellection consist? \{170\}
APPENDIX 5
REALITY AND SENSIBLE QUALITIES

Given the importance of the problem of sensible qualities, it is useful to examine this question by itself even at the risk of some repetition of what has already been said. The exposition will perhaps contain boring repetitions, but I deem them necessary to clarify the idea of what I understand by the reality of sensible qualities.

The reality of sensible qualities above all seems to be in contradiction with modern science. These qualities, we are told, are nothing but our subjective impressions. Indeed, if all animals endowed with visual sense were to disappear from the universe, all colors would eo ipso disappear as well. The reality of things is not colored. To affirm the contrary would be, we are told, an inadmissible ingenuous realism. In turn, by accepting this scientific conception, philosophy has thought that these subjective impressions of ours are referred to reality only through a causal reasoning process. The real would thus be the cause of our subjective impressions. This was the idea expressly propounded by Kant himself, later termed critical realism. Nonetheless, I believe that neither the subjectivism of science on this point nor critical realism are acceptable.

Naturally, to reject what science says about the reality of things would be to reject something which nowadays is justifiably admitted to be a definitive conquest. This cannot be stressed too much, but it does not touch the problem with which we are concerned. Indeed, one could say that science has not even addressed our problem. For what is understood by ‘reality’ when science labels our impressions and hence sensible qualities as ‘subjective’? One understands by ‘reality’ that these qualities are foreign to sensible perception and, therefore, are real independently of it. But when we affirm here that sensible qualities are not our subjective impressions, but rather are real, do we affirm something akin to the idea that these qualities are real with an independence going beyond perception, i.e., beyond sentient intellecution? Clearly not; reality does not consist in things (in our case, qualities) being something beyond perception and independent of it. Hence, the radical and crucial problem is found in the concept of reality itself. What is understood by ‘reality’?

That is the question upon which depends the meaning of our affirmation of the reality of sensible qualities.

1) Explanation of this idea. Let us first recall two ideas which have been developed throughout this book.

In the first place, the idea of reality does not formally designate a zone or class of things, but only a formality, reity or “thingness”. It is that formality by which what is sentiently apprehended is presented to me not as the effect of something beyond what is apprehended, but as being in itself something “of its own”, something de suyo; for example, not only “warming” but “being” warm. This formality is the physical and real character of the otherness of what is sentiently apprehended in my sentient intellecution. And according to this formality, heat not only warms, but does so by being warm. That is, the formality of reality in what is perceived itself is something prior with respect to its effective perception. And this is not an inference but a fact. For this reason one should speak, as I said a few pages back, of reity (thingness) and reism (thing-ism), rather than of reality and realism (be it critical or ingenuous). ‘Reity’, because we are not dealing with a zone of things, but a formality; ‘reism’, because this concept of reity or reality now leaves open the possibility of many types of reality. The reality of a material thing is not identical with the reality of a person, the reality of society, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the reality of my own inner life identical to that of other realities. But on the other hand, however different these modes of reality may be, they are always reity, i.e., formality de suyo. And here we have the first idea which I wanted to set forth: reality is the formality of reity impressively apprehended in sentient intellecution. It is not what all the “realisms”, from the ingenuous to the critical, have understood by “reality”, viz., a determinate zone of things.

In the second place, it is necessary to propound the idea that intellecution is just actualization. Actualization is never formally actuation. Hence, it is not a question of what is apprehended pretending to be real or seeming to be so, but of its being already something de suyo and therefore real. Reality, in which what is apprehended consists de suyo, is impressively apprehended in its very
character of reity. Intellection is just actualization of the real in its proper and formal reity or reality. (174)

Granting this, I maintain that sensible qualities apprehended in sentient intellection are real, i.e., what is present in them is real since they are de suyo this or that quality; moreover, this reality of theirs does nothing but be actualized in our sentient intellection. This is the thesis which requires further explanation.

First of all, it is necessary to insist once again that reity or reality does not designate a zone of things, but is only a formality. In virtue of this, reality is to be real beyond what is perceived. When one asserts that the qualities of the physical world are not really the qualities which we perceive, one understands by ‘reality’ what these qualities are outside of perception, what they are beyond perception. And thus it is clear that, according to science, if all animals endowed with visual sense disappeared from the universe, the colors would also disappear; the reality of the universe is not colored. But such an affirmation clearly shows that, by ‘reality’, one understands something real beyond perception, a zone of things, viz. the zone of the “beyond”. But, this concept is neither primary nor sufficient because the things “beyond” are real not by being “beyond” but by being in this “beyond” what they de suyo are. That is, what is primary is not reality as a zone, but as formality, reity.

Now, in this line of formality we say that that formality is given not only in the zone “beyond” what is perceived, but also in the zone of what is perceived, a zone not any the less real than the zone “beyond” what is perceived. “Reality” means not only what is real “beyond” the perceived, but also what is real “in” the perceived itself. This distinction must be emphasized. In perception, what is perceived—for example, colors, sounds, etc.—are de suyo, just as much de suyo as the things beyond perception. Naturally I am here referring only to sensible qualities sensed in perception. And to be sure we are clear on this point it is essential to recur to the distinction between actualization and actuation. In order to be perceived, the things of the world act upon the sense organs, and in this actuation the physical notes of these sense organs as well as of the things themselves are modified. It suffices to note that, for example, the sense of smell takes place by means of an actuation (let us call it that) of the olfactory receptors upon the reality “beyond”. In this actuation what we call the sensible qualities are produced. But, this scientific theory notwithstanding, I affirm that as actualizations, (1) the qualities are real, and (2) they are not subjective.

a) They are real. That is, they are de suyo really and effectively what they are. But for science they are not real beyond perception. Considered from the standpoint of the presumed real things beyond perception, i.e. arguing not formally but from the scientific viewpoint, we would say that sensible qualities are the real way in which these things beyond perception are reality “in” it. It is not that colors seem to be real or pretend to be so; but that they are present in their own reity in perception. Continuing this line of argument from science, we should say that perceived qualities are real because the sense organ is real and likewise the actuation of real things upon it. Hence, from the viewpoint of science, what is perceived by this actuation is also real; i.e. the qualities are real in perception. The sensible qualities thus produced, according to science, in the actuation of things upon the sense organs, and of the latter upon the former, are apprehended as realities de suyo in an act of sentient intellection which is mere actualization. That these qualities may be the result of an actuation is something totally indifferent for the purposes of intellection as such. Intellection is just actualization, though what is actualized follows an actuation. Thus it is clear that if the visual sense organ disappeared, so likewise would the actuation and hence the colors. That is, these colors are real in perception but not beyond perception.

This concept of the real “in” perception is necessary. What is apprehended does not cease to be real because it is real only in perception. Considered from the standpoint of things beyond perception, qualities are the real way in which real things are really present in perception. It is the real quality which is present as formality in perception. Actuation does not mean that qualities do not pertain really to a thing, but that they pertain to it only in this phenomenon which we call ‘perception’. Therefore, to affirm that sensible qualities are real is not ingenuous realism—that would be to assert that sensible qualities are real beyond perception and outside of it. The fact of the matter is that science has feigned ignorance of the sensible qualities, and this is unacceptable. Science must explain not only what, cosmetically, color, sound, odor, etc. are in perception; but also the color qua real perceived quality. But neither physics, chemistry, physiology, nor psychology tell us a word about what perceived sensible qualities are, nor how physico-chemical and psycho-physical processes give rise to color and sound, nor what these qualities are in their formal reality. Phenomenology only describes them. This is a situation which I have often characterized as scandalous—that the question which, when all is said and done, is the foundation of all real knowledge should be thus sidestepped. This situation is a scandal to be laid at the feet of science; let us not bur-
den ourselves with it. For us it suffices to point out, without eliminating it, the fact that sensible qualities are real moments of what is perceived, but they are real only in perception.

We might note in passing that the reality of sensible qualities does not coincide with the assertion that these qualities are proper to "things". What we call "things" is something genetically elaborated in our perceptions over the course of years; thus for a child of two, things do not have the same aspect as they do for an adult. This is the result of formalization. For the time being, we are not concerning ourselves with what these things are qua things, but rather what qualities are in them and not qua qualities of things. And it is in this sense that I say that qualities are real in perception prior to being qualities of things. Formally each sensible quality is real in itself "in" perception.

b) These qualities are not subjective. For science, we are told, sensible qualities are something merely subjective. The theory is that up to a certain point a "correspondence" is established, more or less bi-univocal, between these presumably subjective qualities and the things which are real beyond perception. But thus to admit without further ado that sensible qualities are subjective by virtue of not pertaining to real things beyond perception is an ingenuous subjectivism. If it is an ingenuous realism—and it is—to make sensible qualities into properties of things outside of perception, it is an ingenuous subjectivism to declare them simply subjective. Real things are set off in some zone beyond perception, and everything else is put into the zone of the subjective. "The subjective" is the repository for everything which science does not understand about this problem. Scientism and critical realism are ingenuous subjectivism, and this is unacceptable for many reasons.

In the first place, there is no possibility whatsoever of establishing that presumed correspondence between sensible qualities and "real things" if one begins by asserting that the former are subjective qualities. Because if the entire sensory order is subjective, where and how can the intelligence take leave of the sensory and jump to reality? Rationalism in all its forms understands that this jump is given in the concept: the concept tells me what a thing is. The reality of the sun, we are told, is not what I perceive of it, but what the concepts of astronomy tell me about it. But if one takes this assertion rigorously, it is not just that the astronomical concepts do not in fact conceptualize the sun's reality, by themselves they are incapable of doing so. And this is because concepts by themselves do not go beyond being objective concepts; they are never by themselves real and effective concepts of reality. Reality is not the same as objectivity; it is something toto caelo different from all objectivity. Thus science would be purely and simply a coherent system of objective concepts, but not an apprehension of reality. In order for concepts to be concepts of reality, they must be based formally and intrinsically upon sensed reality. The concepts are indispensable; but what is conceived in them is real only if the real is already given as real, i.e., if the reality is sensed. Only then does a concept acquire the scope of reality; only then can the concept of the sun tell me what the sun is. To be sure, with only perception of the sun there would be no science of astronomy; but without the solar reality being given in some way in my perception, there would likewise be no science of astronomy because what there would not be is the "sun". And astronomy is not the science of the concepts of the sun, but a science of the sun.

Granting this, the correspondence between concepts and what is sensed would be impossible if what is sensed is subjective. There would in that case be no possible correspondence between a perception, qualified as subjective, and any reality beyond the perception, despite the fact that to achieve this goal one calls upon a great richness of concepts. If one insists that reason inquires about the existence of something real based upon the principle of causality applied to our subjective impressions, then he would have to say that this already presumes that these impressions are real; i.e., it presupposes the reality of the impression. But as reality, these impressions are not subjective either inasmuch as they involve something perceived or in their percipient aspect. Not the latter because they are not subjective acts, but substantial acts—something quite different. And not the former because the qualities are not "subjective" realities, i.e., they are not qualities of me as subject, because that would be equivalent to affirming that my intellect is warm, sonorous, etc., which is absurd. Hence, if they are not reality of the subject, and one denies that they are real in themselves, where will the causality be grounded? Causal reasoning will bear us from the subjectively colored thing to the concept of a colored subject distinct from mine, but never from a subject to a reality. Causality does not start only from subjective impressions of reality, but must be based in the perceived itself. And if what is perceived is formally subjective, then the causality collapses. There is no causality whatsoever which can lead from the purely subjective, i.e., from subjective impressions, to the real. This critical realism is, in all its forms, a pseudo-realistic conception.

But in the second place, even leaving aside this extremely serious difficulty, there is the fact that science has not posed for itself the problem of that mode of reality
which it fleetingly calls ‘subjective’. We saw this a few pages back: it labels as ‘subjective’ everything which is relative to a subject. Thus it terms sensible qualities ‘subjective’ because it deems that they are necessarily relative to the sensory organs and dependent upon them. But this does not have the least thing to do with subjectivity. Subjectivity is not being a property of a subject, but simply being “mine”, even though it may be mine by being of a real quality, i.e., by being this reality de suyo. Now, something can be de suyo even if fleeting, variable, and relative in a certain way, without ceasing to be real in its fleetiness, variability, and relativity. Fleetingness, variability, and relativity are characteristics of “unicity” but not of “subjectivity”. This unicity is a characteristic of a reality which is de suyo unique. Why? Because it concerns the actuation of things upon the sense organs. It is an actuation which is respective to the organ and the state in which it is encountered, and which is variable not only from some individuals to others, but also within the same individual, even in the course of the same perception. But this organ and its interaction with things {181} are both something real. All the physiological states of an organism, however individual they may be, do not for that reason cease to be real states. And these states, when they concern the receptive organs, individualize that very thing which they apprehend. But what is apprehended itself, despite its relativity and organic individuality, does not therefore cease to be real. What happens is that this reality is “unique”. The zone of the real in perception has this character of unicity. But it does not have the character of subjectivity. The impression of the reality which is proper to the qualities is just an impressive actualization that is “unique” but not “subjective” in the acceptation which this word has in science. To assert that the unique, by being fleeting and relative, is subjective, is just as false as to assert that the only thing which is real is what is beyond perception. In the final analysis, science has not posed for itself the question of what subjectivity is. In science, any call upon subjectivity does not go beyond a commodius expedient to sidestep a scientific explanation of sensible qualities as well as subjectivity itself.

But in the third place there is something still more serious, and which is the root of this idea we are presently discussing. It is that one starts from the supposition that sensing, what I call ‘sentient intellecction’, is a relation between a subject and an object. And this is radically false. Intellecction is neither relation nor correlation; it is purely and simply respective actuality. Whence all this scaffolding of subjectivity and of reality is a construction based upon something radically and formally false, and hence erroneous at each of its steps.

In conclusion, sentient intellecction is just an actualization of the real as much in its formality as in its qualitative content. With this I have said what is essential {182} to this question; but for greater clarity it will be useful to insist upon it at some length, pointing out problems which go beyond the character of plain sentient intellecction and concern rather the task and scope of scientific knowledge in this order of sensible qualities. That is what I shall call the articulation of the problem of qualities.

2) Articulation of the problem of sensible qualities. For this we shall give a precis of what has already been explained.

A) It is clear that the two things to be contrasted are not what is “objective-real” and what is “subjective-irreal”. Rather, they are two zones of real things: things real “in” perception, and things real “beyond” perception. But the reality of these latter does not consist just in being beyond perception, but in being so de suyo, because reality is nothing but the formality of the de suyo. Not having conceptualized reality other than from the point of view of what things are beyond perception has been a great conquest of science, but a limited one, because such a conquest does not authorize a reduction of reality to the “beyond”. There is reality “in” perception, and reality “beyond” perception. We may note in passing that the thing beyond what is immediately perceived has nothing to do with the Kantian thing-in-itself. What is real beyond perception is a reality which, from the Kantian point of view, would pertain to the phenomenon. Phenomenon is for Kant simply object. Reality beyond is not a metaphysical entity.

B) In both zones, then, one deals with reality, authentic and strict reality. Reality or reity is the boundary within which the two zones are inscribed. What is this reality which “is” divided into reality in perception and {183} reality beyond perception? The answer we have already seen and repeated time and again: it is being de suyo what it is, being what it is “of itself”, i.e., being reity. The two zones of real things are really de suyo; they are equally reity. Things beyond perception are real not by virtue of being “beyond”, but by being de suyo what they are in this beyond. Qualities are real in perception because they are de suyo what is present in them. Reality is neither thing nor property, nor a zone of things; rather, reality is just formality, the de suyo, reity.

C) The two zones of reality are, then, identical qua reality. In being de suyo the realities in perception and the realities beyond perception are identical. What is different is the content, what is de suyo. The content beyond
perception can be different from the content in perception. This does not mean that the content of a perception is not real, but that its reality is insufficient in the line of realities. The insufficiency of reality in perception is what distinguishes the two zones of reality, and what bears us from perceived reality to the reality beyond perception. For this reason, the zone beyond perception is always problematic.

D) These two zones, then, have an intrinsic articulation in reality itself, in the reality apprehended in sentient intellection. Reality is not apprehended sentiently in only one way, but many; and especially important for our problem is that mode which is sensing reality “toward”. Reality is apprehended by the sentient intelligence, as we saw, in all of the diverse ways of being sensed; and one of them is sensing it in a directional way. It is not, as we have already seen, a “toward” extrinsic to reality, nor a direction toward reality, but is rather reality itself as direction, or if one wishes, direction as a mode of sensed reality. Hence the terminus of this direction is always something problematic in principle; it is just reality beyond perception. Now, these two different modes of presentation of reality are, as we saw, overlapping and comprise one single perception of reality. The “toward” overlapping the other sensings is now the “toward” overlapping the sensible qualities in themselves and, therefore, propelling us “toward” what is real beyond the perceived.

Since the “toward” is directional, and this direction can be quite diverse depending upon the senses in which it is articulated, it follows that the terminus of this “toward”, i.e., the “beyond” itself, can have different characteristics, as we said. It can be “another thing”, but it can also be the same thing present but toward what is within itself. We shall not pursue that problem here; I only point it out to show that the “beyond” is not necessarily another thing, and that what is immediately perceived and what is beyond the perceived are not necessarily two numerically different realities. Moreover, these different modes of the “beyond” have among themselves and with what is immediately perceived an internal articulation. It is possible, indeed, that something which is discovered as being “other” beyond the immediate ends up being the very foundation of the immediate, but exceeding it in profundity. Whence, the “beyond” is simultaneously the same thing as the immediate, i.e., its formal foundation, and nonetheless cosmically another thing which is merely immediate by reason of cosmically exceeding it. A reality which is part of the foundation of the formal reality of something, but which exceeds it precisely by being its formal foundation, is not just a reality added to the first, purely and simply. It is rather the same reality in profundity. I shall immediately return to this point.

From this internal articulation of the two zones of real things, the zone of things real “in perception” and the zone of things real “beyond perception” three important consequences follow.

a) To go to the real beyond perception is something inexorable, an intrinsic moment of the very perception of sensible qualities. Every quality, indeed, is perceived not only in and by itself as such-and-such a quality, but also in a “toward”. The reality of qualities “only” in perception is precisely what constitutes their radical insufficiency as moments of the real; they are real, but they are really insufficient. In their insufficiency, these already real qualities are pointing in and by themselves in their proper reality “toward” what is real beyond perception; this is the onset of science. What science says of this “toward”, i.e., of that beyond perception to which the sensible qualities point, can be owing to a reasoning process which may be causal. But this causal remission (1) is grounded in the “toward” itself and not vice versa; (2) is based upon realities, not upon the reality of my subjective impressions but upon the reality of the perceived quality which, being insufficient, points toward something which causally is discovered by science; (3) is something that can be conquered by means of a causal reasoning process and be, nonetheless, a formal moment of the foundation of that about which one reasons. Thus science is not a capricious occurrence, nor an arbitrary collection of concepts, but something inexorable whatever may be its modes.

The modes of the “toward” of the most primitive man just as much as our own are modes of “science”, i.e., modes of an inexorable march from perceived reality toward what is real beyond perception.

b) The point of departure and the entire raison d’etre of the affirmation of the real beyond perception is, then, precisely the real which is perceived. Everything that science affirms of the physical world is only justified as an explication of what is perceived qua real “in” perception. Electromagnetic waves or photons, for example, are necessary for perceived color. However they are necessary not only as productive causes of the perceived quality, but, as I see it, they are necessary in a deeper and more radical sense: those waves and photons do not remain “outside” of the perceived quality, but are the reality of this quality “inside” of it; they are a formal moment of its reality in profundity. Color is not produced by the wave (as critical realism affirms), but, I believe, color “is” the wave perceived, is the perceptive visual reality “of” the wave itself. Hence, the visual perception of color “is” the electromagnetic wave “in” perception. Similarly, sound carries us beyond its sonority to elastic longitudinal waves. Again,
these waves are not only the causes of sound in perception, but ultimately are formally constitutive of sound itself in its proper sonority. The electromagnetic as well as the elastic waves exceed color and sound respectively; in this respect they are “something other” than these qualities, since their cosmic reality lacks color or sound. But because “in addition” they comprise the formal foundation of color and sound, it follows that those waves and these qualities are not purely and simply two things. Because if indeed outside the realm of this perception the waves are something else, nonetheless within it (and only within it) the qualities and the waves are numerically one single thing and not two—as they would be if the waves were the cause of the qualities. Sensible qualities are real in perception; they are the perceptive reality of what cosmically exceeds them. If the sensible qualities had no reality, or if this reality were numerically distinct from that of the cosmos, then science would be a mere system of concepts but not a knowledge of the real. If one maintains that sensible qualities are produced with respect to their content by the receptors themselves, they would not stop being thereby just an actualization of that real product. But in fact this conceptualization is a pure metaphysical construct and not a fact.

One will then ask how waves, for example—that is, reality beyond perception—can give rise to a real immediately perceived quality in perception. To which I respond that this a problem for science, and that science, as I indicated, has sidestepped it. And this is the scandal of our present-day knowledge.

The perceived real, then, is what bears us inexorably to the real beyond perception; the real beyond perception has no more justification than the real perceived.

c) This means that in directionally apprehended reality what is de suyo is converted into a problem for us. Not the problem that something is de suyo, but the problem of what the structure is of what is de suyo. Sensible qualities, despite being real in perception, and despite (188) inexorably leading us beyond what is perceived, can be abolished beyond the perceived precisely to be able to be an explanation of what is perceived. Elementary particles, atoms, waves, etc. not only are not perceived by themselves in fact, but are by nature not sentiently apprehendable or visualizable, as the physicists have been saying for some years now. But they are, nonetheless, necessary for what we formally do perceive. This necessity is described in contemporary physics through rigorous unified mathematical structures which overcome the visual dualism of wave and particle. According to these unified structures, elementary particles can behave as particles in their creation and absorption, and as waves in their propagation. Quantum mechanics is the unified mathematical formulation of this non-visualizable reality of the particles. And thus science is not just an explanation of what is perceived, but an explanation of the whole reality of the cosmos; that is the enormous task of the concepts, laws, and theories of science.
CHAPTER VI

THE IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION

In contrast to the classical idea of intellection, we have staked out a new and different one: sentient intellection. It is just the impressive actualization of the real as real. But this entails an idea of reality which is quite different than what is understood by reality in a conceptualizing or concept-producing intellection. Up to now we have studied reality as a mode of otherness. But now we must study it in and for itself. This will involve inevitable repetitions.

Sentient intellection apprehends the real impressively. What is thus apprehended has, as we saw, a formality and a content. Neither of these moments is independent. The formality of “reality” as a proper moment of what is apprehended makes of this latter what we call a ‘real thing’. And we express this character by saying that heat not only warms, but “is” warming. In this way three terms appear here: ‘reality’, ‘the real’, and ‘being’. This is just what we now must analyze.

The foregoing terms refer to three ideas apprehended in sentient intellection. They are three ideas different from the usual ones which are intellectively known in a conceptualizing intellection. For this reason I shall, in each case, indicate that contraposition, but only with the motive of outlining the ideas. Moreover, our analysis will be cursory. These three ideas are intrinsic and formal moments of what is apprehended; i.e., they are three boundary ideas. In fact, the actuality of what is intellectively known in sentient fashion is an actuality which is common to what is thus known and to the intellection itself; that we have already seen. So, these three ideas anchored in that common actuality pertain on one hand to the reality of intellection itself, and on the other to the reality of what is intellectively known. With respect to the first, these ideas are a constitutive part of intellection and, therefore, of any philosophy of the intelligence. With respect to the second, they are the constituting thing itself of reality and, therefore, part of any philosophy of reality, of metaphysics. The boundary between the two aspects is precisely the common actuality; this actuality is the boundary between the philosophy of the intelligence and metaphysics. Since what I am here propounding is a philosophy of the intelligence, I shall say only what is necessary for my task about these three ideas.

I shall examine, then,

1. Reality.
2. The real.
3. Being

REALITY

As we have been saying over and over, reality is first and foremost a formality of otherness of what is sentiently apprehended. And this moment consists in what is apprehended being situated in the apprehension as something “of its own”, something de suyo. Reity (thingness) or reality is the formality of the de suyo.

This de suyo is the moment in which what is apprehended is “already” what is apprehended. This “already” expresses the formal anteriority of what is apprehended with respect to its being here-and-now apprehended; it is the prius. In virtue of it, the formality of reality installs us
in what is apprehended as reality in and through itself. That is, for a sentient intelligence:

1. Reality is something sensed; it is a formality of otherness.

2. This formality is the de suyo.

3. It is the most radical part of a thing; it is the thing itself as de suyo.

What is now important to us is this radicality of the thing itself. What is reality as a moment of a thing?

The question is justified because we are not now dealing with a mode of being here-and-now present, but of pertaining to a thing in its radical “of itself”. The de suyo constitutes, then, the radicality of the thing itself as real and not only as otherness. And this is essential. {192}

It is essential because one might think that reality coincides with existence. Something would be real if it were existent, and if it did not exist, it would not be real. But the matter is not quite so simple as it seems. To be sure, what doesn’t exist isn’t real, and what exists is real. But that is not the question, because what must be asked here is if a thing is real because it is existent or rather if it is existent because it is real. The question is justified because not only is a thing not real if not existent, but neither is it real if it does not have determinate notes. Now, existence and notes concern the content of the real. To be sure, existence is not just another note of the content. But that isn’t the question, because though it may not be a note, existence is a moment which formally concerns the content of what is apprehended but is not formally a moment of its reality. For this same reason, the fact that this content is real is something “anterior” to its existence and to its notes. Only in being real does a thing have existence and notes. Permit me to explain.

We are not dealing with a temporal anteriority, nor saying that a thing may be real before being existent; that would be absurd. Nor are we referring to some order of temporal succession, but rather to an order of formal fundamentation. And then it is clear that reality is formally anterior to existence. Existence pertains to a thing de suyo; a real thing is de suyo existent, which means that in a real thing its moment of existence is grounded in its moment of reality. We said on several occasions and quite properly that a thing has real existence. ‘Real’ means that it is an existence which pertains de suyo to the thing. Were this not so we would have not reality but a spectre of reality. And that is, I think, the key to interpret the metaphysics of the Vedanta: existence is only a moment of reality {193} and not the other way around—as if something were formally real by being existent. What formally constitutes reality is not existing, but the mode of existing, viz. existent de suyo. For that, it does not matter to me how one conceptualizes existence, whether like St. Thomas, for whom existence is an act of essence; or like Suarez, for whom existence is really identified with the essence. That is, it is not at all clear that there is this thing which we call ‘existence’; there are “existent things”, but it is not clear that existence is a moment which is somehow really distinct from the notes. The nature of the relation between notes and existence in content is the subject of metaphysics, but not our present problem. The only important thing here is that existence always and only concerns the content of what is apprehended in the same way that it concerns its notes, despite the fact that, as we have said, existence rigorously speaking might not be a note. What is formally apprehended as real in the sentient intelligence is what is de suyo, not what is “existent”. De suyo is a radical and formal moment of the reality of something. It is a moment common to sentient intellection and to the real thing: as a moment of intellection, it is the formality of otherness; and as a moment of the real thing, it is its own de suyo. Every metaphysics of reality as existent and as possessor of its own notes must inexorably ground itself in the formality of reality, in the de suyo. The relation of these two aspects of the common actuality is the prius of the de suyo. That is, the de suyo is not only the mode in which an apprehended thing is present to us, but is thereby the constitutive moment of the reality of the thing in and through itself.

This is an idea of reality grounded upon the sentient intelligence. The conceptualizing intelligence erred with respect to this moment of the {194} de suyo, and headed in the direction of a metaphysics of reality as existence. But reality is something intellectively sensed in things: it is “sensed” and is so “in” a thing. What is thus sensed “in” a thing is an “in” which is prius; hence, this intrinsic priority is the radical moment of the thing itself.

A thing qua determined in the formality of reality is constitutively a real thing; it is the real.
APPENDIX 6

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE FORMALITY OF REALITY

We have already explained that reality consists in the formality of the de suyo. It is this formality which (pardon the redundancy) formally constitutes reality. But it would be a serious error to saddle this idea with all of the conceptual elaboration subsequently brought to pass by the intellection of reality. It is not our purpose here to examine, even summarily, the content of this elaboration. The essential point is that this elaboration has not been arbitrary, but determined by the moment of the impression of the formality of reality. Thus it is necessary for us to apprehend with precision the moment or moments of the impression of reality which are in themselves determinants of that elaboration. This does not go beyond an analysis of the impression of reality; however, it carries this analysis not by way of intellection but by way of reality. It is for this reason that I here only point out the subject.

Now, the moment of the impression of reality which determines the elaborations to which I am referring is the moment of transcendentality. As we already saw in Chapter IV, transcendentality is the openness of the formality of reality as such. Reality is the de suyo, and this de suyo is open as de suyo as much to what a thing is in its-own-ness as to other things. This refers not to a conceptual openness, but to an openness which in its own way is physical. In virtue of it, a real thing is real by being “more” than what it is by being colored, having mass, etc. This “more” is, then, a moment which intrinsically and constitutively pertains to the very structure of the de suyo. As I shall say forthwith, there are two serious errors about this matter which must be avoided. The first consists in thinking that the “more” is the formal mode of reality. In that case the de suyo would be something grounded on the “more”. But that is impossible; the “more” is always and only a moment of the de suyo, and hence is only a grounded moment. The other error is in the opposite direction. It consists in thinking that the “more” is some type of thing more or less imaginary which is added to reality, to the de suyo. This is also impossible; the “more” pertains structurally and constitutively to the de suyo itself. Both errors are the consequence of not having apprehended the articulation between the de suyo and the “more”. And this articulation is the transcendentality of the formality of reality.

Transcendentality is real; by being real, a thing is “more” than what it is by being warm or sonorous. But at the same time this “more” is a “more” of reality; it is, therefore, something which is inscribed in the de suyo as such. Transcendentality is the openness of the formality of reality as such; hence, it is “more” than the reality of each thing. It is thus grounded in the de suyo and is a moment of the de suyo itself but without being an extrinsic addition to it.

Let us now see more concretely what this structure means.

Reality is open formality. Hence reality is constitutively respective. In virtue of this each thing, [197] by being real, is from within itself open to other real things—whence the possible connection of some real things with others. That this connection exists is a fact, and nothing more than a fact. But what is not a fact, but an intrinsic metaphysical necessity, is that if such a connection exists it is grounded on respectivity. According to this line of transcendent openness, the moment of reality acquires a special character, what in ordinary discourse we call ‘the force of things’, which consists in the force of imposition of the real. To be sure, it is not a force in the sense of Newton’s or Leibnitz’ physical science; but rather a force sui generis, “forceness” or necessity. We say that something has to occur by the force of things. Here we can see clearly that this force of reality is grounded on what reality formally is with respect to its force of imposition, in the de suyo. But it is not a moment added to reality; it is a moment which expresses the respectivity of things; it is just their transcendentality. This idea of the force of things has given rise to many different conceptual elaborations. It is not important to analyze them here; rather, it will suffice to cite some examples so as to show that all of these conceptual elaborations are grounded on the transcendent moment of the force of reality. One of the most ancient (and problematic) of them is, for example, the idea of destiny, the moira in Greek tragedy. Together with it one could interpret the force of reality as nature; nature would thus be the intrinsic moment of the force of reality. But the force can be conceptualized in still another form. It can be conceptualized as law; that is what is proper to modern science. But in any case, whether law as nature or destiny, we have elaborations of something {198} in
which the formality of reality itself is found to be inscribed, viz. the force of reality. This force is a transcendental characteristic of the openness of reality as such. Reality is not force, but this force is always and only a transcendental moment of reality as reality, a transcendental moment of the de suyo.

But there is still another line of transcendental openness. It is that the formality of reality is in itself a moment which has primacy over the content of each real thing. As I said, this moment of reality is, for example, a reifying moment; it is in addition a “such-ifying” moment, a moment through which what is de suyo [of its own] is formally suyo [its own] and makes suyo [its own] everything which happens to the thing; it is “own-ness”. This primacy has a very precise name: power. Philosophy has continued to blot out of its realm the idea of power. It returns in a pointed way in Hegel, but even there just with respect to the philosophy of the objective spirit. “Power”, as I see it, is not “force”; it is mere dominance. Now, metaphysical power is the dominance of the real qua real. The real through being real has its own power, the power of the real. This is the dominance of the moment of reality over all of its content. Real things do not consist only in the intrinsic necessity of the structure of their content and the force with which this content is imposed upon us according to its formality; they consist as well in transcendentally conveying the power of the real, the dominance of formality over content. Force and power are thus two different dimensions of the impression of reality in its character of respectivity, of transcendental openness. Here, then, we are not dealing with a mythical concept; the salient characteristic of a myth is not “power”, but that determinate conceptualization [199] of power which we might better term ‘powerfulness’ or ‘potency’. A myth consists in conceptualizing the power of the real as potency, and in conceptualizing the reality of things as the seat of potencies. This idea is elaborated in turn according to various interpretations, one of which consists in interpreting potency as animity; that is animism. Animism is not the conceptualization of things as power nor even as potency, but just the opposite, viz. potency as what makes animism possible. And then we clearly see that in the same way as animism presupposes potency (without being identified with it), so potency presupposes the power of the real as a dimension of things qua real. Power has nothing to do with potency nor animation; power is a transcendental moment of the real as real. It is grounded in reality, in the de suyo. Otherwise, we should fall into an absurd mythism. But neither is it a mere addition to reality; rather, it is a moment which is transcendently constitutive of reality.

Force of reality and power of the real are the two points of the transcendental impression of reality upon which a whole gamut of subsequent conceptualizations has been based. But in themselves, those two points are formally given in the impression of reality. These three moments—de suyo, force, and power—pertain to every impression of reality and, therefore, to every conceptualization of reality in whatever historical period it may be found. I shall only add that to affirm that force and power are anterior to the de suyo is just to forget the moment of the de suyo. Within reality we do not deal with the preponderance which some [200] moments can have over others, but with inscribing them congenerically in the de suyo. Is not this precisely what, at the dawn of philosophy, Anaximander’s celebrated arhke expressed?

The impression of the formality of reality is the impression of the de suyo transcendentally open as force and as power.
§ 2

THE REAL

Reality is the formality of the de suyo determined in the apprehension by a mode of formalization of content which is different from the formalization of stimulation. Formalization is, as we saw, what constitutes the mode of otherness of apprehended content; it is the autonomization of this content. Such autonomization has two moments: it is independence, or autonomy of the content with respect to the apprehended with respect to other apprehended things—what I have called the moment of closure, or better, the moment of the closed unity of what is apprehended. Now, when these two moments are moments of the formalization of reality, i.e., when they are moments of the de suyo, then autonomization as independence of content and as closed unity of notes takes on its own character, viz. the character by which the apprehended is the real. What the real is, then, is something which can only be conceptualized based on formalization, i.e., on the sentient intellective apprehension of what we call real things. Constituent sufficiency is, formally, constitutional sufficiency. It is what I call substantive reality, what I call substantive reality, what is known intellectually is a system. That is, when it has the positional and constructed unity of its notes; it is what I formally term a system. The formalization of what is in sensing is the impressive moment of sentient intellection; in this case the formalization consists in a constellation of notes, and what is thus impressively known intellectually is a system. That is, when it has the formality of the the de suyo, the formalization of the the notes as constellations acquires the character of substantive system; it is the unity of the system. This system unity is constructed unity. Only the system now has constitutional sufficiency. Formalization sentiently grounds this intellective apprehension of what we call real things not as “things” (as we shall see immediately) but as units of systematic substantive. This does not refer to a conceptual elaboration, but to a close analysis of the apprehension of the real.

But it is not the only case nor the most general, because what in fact happens is almost always that the apprehended content does not have a single note but many; it is a constellation of notes. In that case all of these notes have the same formality of reality, which is numerically the same and which “reifies” the total conjunction of notes. Each note by itself is no longer a reality. What is real, what is de suyo, is then not each note but only the whole ensemble. By itself, no note has the capacity or sufficiency to constitute the real, but this capacity, this sufficiency, is proper only to the whole ensemble. Therefore only this ensemble is what has substantive. But, this ensemble is more than a mere ensemble. In what is thus apprehended, each note has a determinate “position” in the ensemble. Hence, each note is not an element “in” an ensemble, but an element “of” an ensemble; it is a “note-of”. Every note qua note is then formally “of”. That is what I call the constructed state, in which each note is a constructed moment “of” the ensemble; it is a “note-of” the ensemble. This does not refer to some type of mysterious adhesion of the content of some notes of the substantive to others, but to the fact that each note is real qua note only in the unity with other real notes as notes. Thus the ensemble itself is not just a mere ensemble but the positional and constructed unity of its notes; it is what I formally term a system. The formalization of what is sensed in sensing is the impressive moment of sentient intellection; in this case the formalization consists in a constellation of notes, and what is thus impressively known intellectually is a system. That is, when it has the formality of the the de suyo, the formalization of the the notes as constellations acquires the character of substantive system; it is the unity of the system. This system unity is constructed unity. Only the system now has constitutional sufficiency. Formalization sentiently grounds this intellective apprehension of what we call real things not as “things” (as we shall see immediately) but as units of systematic substantive. This does not refer to a conceptual elaboration, but to a close analysis of the apprehension of the real.

1) Apprehended notes, by being de suyo independent, have their own formal character: they are constitution, the constitution of the real. Constitution is the moment in which the notes determine the form and the mode of the real in each case. And here we have the first characteristic of the real: to be constitutional. This is not a theoretical concept, but a moment of the impressive apprehension of the real. Content has the capacity to be de suyo. And this capacity is, therefore, the capacity for constitutionality. It is what I call sufficiency in the order of independence or of the de suyo; it is constitutional sufficiency. And the real as constitutionally sufficient is what I call substantive reality, substantivity. Substantivity is, formally, constitutional sufficiency, sufficiency for being de suyo.

This capacity in the order of constitutional sufficiency, i.e., in the order of substantive, can be quite varied. A real color green apprehended in and by itself is something de suyo. Each note which is apprehended in and by itself as reality (even though provisionally) has constitutional sufficiency. Being green is a mode of constitution of the real; it is the verdeal or green form of reality. And in turn, the real green has, taken in and by itself, that constitutional sufficiency which is substantivity. It is what I call elemental substantivity, because it is the independence of a single note. It is the primary and radical substantivity, because each note which is provisionally apprehended in and by itself is what gives us the impression of reality, i.e. the formality of reality.
same. For greater clarity I concentrated almost exclusively on the constitutional sufficiency of systems in my book On Essence. In them, constitution is clearly the mode of unity of a system. The moment of sufficiency is constituted through being a closed totality. But this concept of constitution is based upon the more radical concept of constitution as determination of form and mode of reality. The substantivity of a system is not comprised by the substantivity of its notes; on the contrary, the substantivity of these notes does not go beyond being provisional for the effects of their intellective actuality. But this same thing applies to all substantivities—all of them are merely provisional. There is only one strict systematic substantivity, that of the cosmos. Constitution, I repeat, is the determination of the mode and form of reality through notes. And this constitution can be elemental or systematic. Constitutional sufficiency is thus a substantivity which is either elemental or systematic.

2. The real, then, has a moment of reality (the de suyo) and another moment of autonomized content. Now, these two moments are not independent. To see this is suffices to look closely at systematic substantivity. Again I repeat that we are not talking about constructing theoretical concepts, but carrying out a careful analysis of any apprehension of the real whatsoever. In systematic substantivity, the unity of the system constitutes its in, its intus, its interiority. Here, ‘interiority’ does not mean something hidden, lying beneath the notes, but just the unity of their system. This unity is what makes them a construct, viz. being “notes-of” the system. The notes by themselves are the projection of the unity; they are its “ex”, its “extra-”, its exteriority. Every reality is thus an in and an ex, an interiority and an exteriority. It is interior because it is a system; exterior because it is a projection in its notes. As a system, every reality is internal; as a projection in its notes, every reality is external. These are not two conceptual moments, but two physical moments, described apprehensively, of the sensed construct. The projection of the unity in its notes has two aspects. On the one hand, it is a molding of the unity in its notes, a molding of the interiority; in this aspect the notes are the ex-structure of the construct, the structure of the in. But on the other hand, this interiority, this in, is actualized in the notes in which it is melded. Molding and actualization are not the same. Now, the formal respects according to which the in, the unity of the system, is actualized in all or some groups of its structural notes is what I call dimension; it is the actuality of the interiority, of the in of the system, in the exteriority of its structure. The real is, then, structural and dimensional substantivity.

I appealed to systematic substantivity for greater clarity. But what was said applies equally to elemental substantivity. A note apprehended in and by itself as real has a “numerical unity” of reality. The actualization of this unity in the note is just its dimension. [206] I use the term ‘dimension’ because in each dimension the substantivity is measured. What are these dimensions?

Let us assume that we apprehend any real thing whatsoever, for example a rock, a dog, or a star. When we do so the thing is situated in the apprehension first of all as a whole, a totum. Upon apprehending one or several notes, I apprehend, for example, a dog. The whole actualized in each note or in any group of notes is the primary dimension of substantivity. In the second place, this whole is not a mere ensemble of notes, as I have already observed. Precisely because each note, qua note, is a “note-of”, the presumed ensemble of notes has a coherence in its own “of”. The system is actualized in each note or in any group of notes, as a coherent whole. Finally, in the third place, this coherent whole has a type of steadiness or solidity on account of which we say that it is durable. To endure is here “to be here-and-now being”. Substantivity has this triple dimension of totality, coherence, and durability. The real is de suyo total, coherent, and durable. This is not some conceptual construction, but just an analysis of any apprehension of the real. Totality, coherence, and durability are three moments of what is apprehended in its primordial apprehension.

Thus in dimensional substantivity we have the real from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence.

Classical philosophy, both ancient and modern, confronted the problem of the real with a conceptualizing intelligence. Thus it thought that the real has a very precise character. Parmenides believed that what is known intellectively is given as a jectum (keimenon); that was the origin of idea of the “atom” (Democritus). Aristotle went a step further: what is known intellectively is not the jec-
tum, but [207] the sub-jectum (hypo-keimenon), substance. Its notes are “accidents”, something which super-
vanes on the subject and which cannot be conceived except as being inherent in it. Modern philosophy took yet another step along this line. What is known intellectively is jectum, not sub-jectum but ob-jectum. Its notes would be objective predicates. Jectum, subjectum, and objectum are, for a conceptualizing intelligence, the three characteristics of the intellectively known real.

But for a sentient intelligence, reality is not jectum (nor subjectum nor objectum), but what has the formality of the de suyo, whether it be a note or a system of notes.
sensed in their reality. The real is not a “thing” but something “of its own”, thing or not. In contrast to what was thought in the conceptualizing intelligence, viz. that the real is substantiality and objectuality, in the sentient intelligence the real is substantivity. Hence, the notes are not accidents “in-herent” to some substantial subject, nor are they predicates of an object, but rather moments which are constitutionally “co-herent” in a constructed substantive system.

Thus we have what, from the standpoint of the sentient intelligence, is the real. But the problem does not end here. When I contrasted stimulus and reality, I said that heat not only warms but “is warming”. Thus we have not only reality as a de suyo, and not only the real given as substance de suyo; but moreover there appears here this subtle term “is”. That is the idea of being itself. The real de suyo is. That is what we must now elucidate. [208]
Since they deal with concepts and problems on the frontier between the study of intelligence and the study of reality, the following considerations at times go beyond mere analysis of the act of sentient apprehension of the real.

The real has its constitutional notes. These notes, by being real, almost always comprise constellations, i.e., unities which are closed and independent of the apprehender by virtue of that formality of reality, “of itself”, de suyo.

As closed, systematic unities, the notes have a type of closure which is common to all men, for whom real systems all present the same aspect, viz., they are things which are relatively independent of each other by reason of their notes. That is owing to the sentient structure. If it were not so, the systematic unities would be radically different from those which we now perceive. If we were to see the colors and forms of this tree with a different type of retina, we would perceive streams of photons or electromagnetic fields, for example; and that which we call a tree would not have, as a system, the character which it has in our sensible apprehension. This is what I term the homogenization of systems; it is determined by the structures of formalization. It is thanks to them that we apprehend independent “things” instead of fragments of a cosmos.

In the second place, these systems come demarcated with a certain coefficient of invariance. Not that the notes are completely invariant, but the system of them has nonetheless a relative invariance in virtue of which we say that we have apprehended the same thing. That is, we are not dealing with the mere constancy of what is perceived, i.e., the invariance of notes—a phenomenon which, as is well known, is also common to animals. But what the animal does not apprehend is that type of “real constancy” which we call sameness; sameness is formally the identity of reality of a system apprehended sentiently in the invariant structure of its system of notes.

Homogeneity and sameness are two characteristics of a system of notes qua closed. But much more important and profound are the diverse types of independence of the real as determined by the type of system of its notes, i.e., inasmuch as they are independent systems “of their own”.

But in the second place, there is something more. Content does not comprise only the form of reality, but also the mode of reality. A star, piece of iron or copper, a holm oak, a dog, a man, etc., are distinguished from each other as forms of reality only by their respective constitutions, that is, by the character of their notes, by their constitution. But there is a much more profound difference between these realities. The real is the de suyo. Now, in the examples cited, one sees immediately that these real things differ not only by virtue of their notes, but more importantly by the way in which these notes are “theirs”, are of substantivity. That is, they differ by the mode of reality, by the mode of substantivity. Thus, despite their constitutional difference and, therefore, despite their different forms of reality, iron and copper nonetheless have the same mode of substantivity; it consists “just in having as its own” its notes. This “as its own” is what is then conceptualized as a “property”. In sentient intellecution the “of its own” does not formally consist in being a “property”, as was thought in the conceptualizing intellect; but on the contrary being a “property” is grounded upon the sentient apprehension of the “of its own”. With respect to animals, each has its own constitution and, therefore, its own form of reality. Nonetheless, they all have the same mode of reality which is different from mere “having as its own”. An animal has an independence and a specific control over its environment based in large measure upon sensing. In sensing, a living animal in a more or less rudimentary fashion is an autos, a self. An animal always has at least a primordium of autos which is richer as one ascends the zoological scale. It is a mode of reality different from merely having notes as its own; it is indeed a new mode of reality which we call ‘life’. Life is not “auto-motion”, as it has usually been described since the time of the Greeks; but a kind of “auto-possession”, i.e. being in reality and sensing itself as an autos. Here we are not dealing with the constitution as a form of reality, but with the fact that the system as such in its independence is that which constitutes the
radically formal part of an animal. And man has a mode of reality yet more profound; he is not only something which possesses itself, something autos, but an autos of a different kind: viz., being not only his own substantivity, but also his own reality qua reality. The simple autos consists in pertaining to oneself by reason of the systematism of one’s notes. But in man we are dealing with an autos in which self-pertaining is not by virtue of notes, but formally and reduplicatively by the very character of reality. Man pertains to himself as reality; he is a person. A person is formally and reduplicatively a real its-own-ness.

Many forms of reality can, then, have the same mode of reality. And these modes, as we have just seen, are three: mere having “as its own”, self-possessing, and being a person. They are not independent; each involves the previous one. Thus only by having determinate notes can the real be an autos, a living being. And only by being alive and by having determinate properties such as intelligence can the human animal be a person. But this in no way keeps the mode of reality from being something different from the form of reality.

But there is still more. The real is not only something independent by virtue of its notes and their mode of being real to it; rather, each real thing is a moment of pure and simple reality; i.e., it is real in the world, it is real in a worldly fashion. Worldliness is the respective openness of the impression of reality qua impression of pure and simple reality. Through it we sentiently know the real as established in the world. Now, there are various figures of establishment in reality. Living as well as non-living things are part of the world. Their establishment in reality consists, then, in that figure which I call integration. Man partakes of this condition, but is not reduced to it because as a personal reality man is not only formally and reduplicatively “his own” as reality, but his own “facing” everything real. This is a type of withdrawal in the world but “facing” the world; a type of confrontation with the world. Hence he senses himself in reality as relatively independent of everything else; i.e., as relatively “absolute”. He is not part of the world, but is in it yet falling back upon himself in his own reality. The establishment of man as a personal reality in the world is thus not integration but absolutization, so to speak. In contrast to what Hegel thought, viz. that the individual spirit is but a moment of the absolute spirit, we must affirm that through his personal reality, and inasmuch as he is personal, man is not integrated into anything, either as a physical part or as a dialectical moment. To be sure, a person is integrated into the world by some moments of his reality; for example, his body. But qua personal, this same body transcends all integration; the body is personal but is so formally and precisely not as an organism or a unified system, but as principle of actuality. On the other hand, that absolute character is grounded in a transcendence, in something which, though starting from the world (as an organism), nonetheless is in it transcending it, i.e., having a relatively absolute character. But this relativity as a moment of the absolute is not integrable, or rather, is only relatively integrable. Whence the possible unity of men has a character which is completely different from that of an integration. Men can be directed to others in a way which pertains only to men, viz., in an “impersonal” way. Other realities are not impersonal, but “a-personal”. Only persons can be impersonal. And therefore, while the unity of other things (because they are a-personal) is integration, the unity of men is primarily “society”, a unity with other men taken impersonally, i.e., taken just as others. Moreover, by maintaining themselves as persons, i.e. as realities which are relatively absolute, men have a type of unity superior to mere society; this is “personal communion” with others as persons. All of this I say by way of illustration because in itself, the subject pertains to the study of man as established in reality.

Establishment in reality is radically given in the impression of reality. Whence it follows that reality qua reality is not a mere concept, but is physical establishment in reality. To be sure, I have a concept of reality qua reality; but this concept is never primary. What is primary and radical is the de suyo as a moment of reality qua reality. And this moment is “establishment” in reality, in the de suyo; it is apprehended in the sentient intelligence, and precisely because of that is not primarily a concept, but something anterior to any concept. For a conceptualizing intelligence, the fact that something is purely and simply real means only that it is a particular case of reality. But for a sentient intelligence, being purely and simply reality means “being now restored” in reality. Reality qua reality is, then, a physical moment of the real, that moment which I have called ‘establishment’. And the reality in which every real thing is established is not the objective field of the concept of reality, but the physical formality of reality apprehended in every sentient intellection. And since this formality is constitutively open, as we saw, the establishment itself admits various manifestations. In other words, reality qua reality is a moment which is physically open to different establishments. And in fact this openness is dynamic. There has indeed been dynamic progress in the real qua real, because there has been progress in the establishment in reality. We do not know if this dynamic progress will always march forward; that is a problem which is outside the scope of our concerns here. But in principle, reality as such is something which continues to be open.
THE BEING OF THE REAL

When I contrasted reality and stimulation, I stressed that in both cases we are dealing with formality of otherness. For clarification, I presented a trivial example. As otherness of stimulation, heat is what is explained by saying “heat warms”. On the other hand, as otherness of reality, we say that “the heat is warming, is warm”. In this example, what I wished to draw attention to is the difference between the two formalities of otherness. In stimulation, heat pertains formally to the sentient process of the animal; it is its sign. It is, then, a type of signate pertaining or property. But heat as reality is something to which its thermic qualities pertain de suyo; it is warming. These two phrases reveal the contrast between the two modes of presentation of what is apprehended. The second (heat “is warming”) shows a mode of presentation which transcends mere presentation: to say that the heat “is warm” or is warming is a mode of presentation in which the reality that is present is a prior moment of what is presented, i.e., a moment of what is presented as real in and by itself and not as a moment of its presentation. To this reality its thermic qualities pertain de suyo: prior to its presentation, the heat is warm. But then we find ourselves in a situation where what is apprehended, the heat, is described not with one term but with two. Insofar as the thermic qualities pertain to it of itself, de suyo, we say that the heat has reality in and by itself. But [218] on the other hand we utilize a second term; we say that the heat “is” warming. And here it is not just the reality of the heat which intervenes, but also what the “is” designates, viz. the being of the heat. And this poses the problem of the difference between a warm reality and a warm being; i.e., the difference between reality and being. We have already seen in what reality consists, viz. the de suyo. Hence, we must now clarify in what this which we call ‘being’ consists.

The idea of being has always been fashioned with respect to the understanding, which is to say with respect to the conceptualizing intelligence. However, the conceptualizing intelligence is essentially grounded on the sentient intelligence, which turns the ideas of reality and being upside down. Reality is not something understood, but something sensed, viz. the formality of the de suyo as proper to what is intellectively known in and by itself, prior to its actually being impressively present. Now, prior to being understood in a real thing, being is sentiently apprehended in it. In what does this being consist, which is sentiently apprehended?

Being is something much more radical and complex than the empty “is” about which we are usually told.

A) In the first place, being is above all actuality. We have already seen that actuality is something different than actuity. Actual and actuality is a “being here-and-now present” not quia present, but quia being here-and-now. It is being here-and-now present “from within itself”, and not as some extrinsic denomination. It is, finally, being present from itself “by being real” and insmuch as it is real. The radical actuality of the real consists in the unity of these three moments (being here-and-now, from within itself, insmuch as it is real). I say ‘radical’, because the real has many actualities; but there is one which is primary and radical, viz, that which I just [219] explained. How is the real actually present from within itself by being real? Clearly, by being real and insmuch as it is real, that wherein the real is actual is precisely in the pure and simple worldly respectivity. The real is open as reality, is open to the world. And to be here-and-now present in the world is to have actuality in it. That is the primary and radical actuality of the real. Now, the actuality of the real in the world is just its being. Being is worldly actuality. Thus the real is not only real, so to speak, not only the worldly, but the real which is present in the world and insmuch as it is present therein. This is being. Let us now consider a couple of examples which do not formally pertain to our analysis of the primodal apprehension of reality but which illustrate what we have been saying.

An oak tree is an oak tree and nothing more; that is its reality. We see that this reality, in its form and in its mode, has its figure of establishment in the world. All of that, as I said, pertains to the reality of the oak. But the being of the oak is in another direction. Its establishment in the world “makes” (if I may be permitted the expression) the oak be purely and simply real. But this establishment of the oak in the world refloows, so to speak, upon the established oak as a whole (with its suchness, its form, and its mode) in a very precise way. It does not by making it tree-reality (that it already was), but by making the oak which is established in the world to be here-and-now present in the world just by being here-and-now established in it. And this being now present is just being. Reflowing here consists in determination of actuality; it reaches all moments of the oak—its suchness, its form, and its mode of reality. The “such-and-such reality” [220] is converted into “such-and-such being”. The same thing happens with the form and mode of reality: they are converted into “being form and being mode”. This “being” is not, then, a conceptual moment, but a physical one. But it is a physical moment of actuality. It is what I have expressed in the idea of reflowing. If the oak tree
could speak it would say, “I am now established in reality as an oak.” This is what a man does when he says, “I am established as a personal reality in the world.” Through reflooding, in the case of man his personal reality is converted into an “I”. The “I” is not the reality of the person, but his being. This phrase does not only say “I am this or that”, but also “this or that is what I am.” Here the “I” fulfills a task strictly of emphasis: it is I who is this or that. And this occurs not because man is capable of saying so; on the contrary, he is capable of saying so because ultimately he is so. The “I” is the reflooding of the pure and simple reality in a personal reality established therein. So, while the oak clearly cannot say it, it unquestionably has an “is thus”. The “is thus” is just actuality; it constitutes the reality of the oak qua present in the world. And therein being formally consists. Thus, being is clearly something very rudimentary in the case of rocks, of the oak, and of dogs, for example. Where it is not rudimentary is in the case of man, whose personal reality is actual in the world as “being I”. In the other realities, being is the most rudimentary of worldly actualities; but it always pertains to a real thing.

Hence being is something independent of any intellection; even if there were no intellection there would be—and there is—being.

B) In the second place, since every actuality is “posterior” to actuality, if follows that “being” is something posterior to {221} reality. In other words, being as actuality is ulterior to the real; it is the ulteriority of being. This ulteriority has its own formal structure, viz. temporality. To be sure, not every ulteriority is temporal; but the ulteriority about which we are here speaking, the ulteriority of being, is so. Temporality is not a structure grounded in ulteriority, nor is ulteriority something grounded in temporality. Rather, the structure of this ulteriority is formally temporality. In other words, the essential character of the ulteriority of being is temporality; the real “is”. This actuality consists first of all in that a thing “already-is” in the world; and secondly, in that the thing “still-is” in the world. Hence, “being” is always “already-is-still”: this is temporality. We are not referring to three phases of some chronological occurrence, but three structural facets of the ulteriority of being. The intrinsic unity of these three facets is what the expression “to be here-and-now being” expresses. Etymologically it is a present participle, being here-and-now actually present in the world. Its adverbial expression is “while”. Being is always and only being “while”. I have explained this at greater length in “El concepto descriptivo del tiempo” (Realitas II, 7-41).

With this, two errors which I would like to explicitly state have been eliminated. One consists in thinking that ulteriority is chronological posteriority. This is false because ulteriority is not chronological posteriority, but purely formal posteriority; i.e., just temporality. And temporality does not have the structure of the three phases but rather the modal unity of three facets. The other error consists in thinking that due to its ulteriority, being is accidental to the real, something adventitious to reality. But this {222} is absurd, because being is actuality in the world, and this actuality pertains de suyo to the real. Ulteriority then simply means that reality is not formally being, but that, nonetheless, reality is de suyo ulteriorly being. Ulteriority pertains to the real de suyo. “Worldliness”, in fact, is a constitutive, transcendental dimension of the impression of reality, as we saw; and because of it actuality in the world is not adventitious to reality. This actuality the real has—indeed, has to have—de suyo; it “is” because it is “real”. If one wishes, reality is not being; but reality “really is”. That is what I express by saying that reality is not esse real, but realitas in essendo.

Since the real is substantivity, it follows that it is substantivity which has being; being is the being of substantivity. This does not refer to what is usually called “substantive being”. There is no substantive being because being itself lacks any substantivity; only the real has substantivity. I shall immediately return to this point. Thus, there is no “substantive being”, only the “being of the substantive”; this is substantivity in essendo, “being” (as participle). The “being” (as participle) of reality is just the being of substantivity.

This ulteriority of being is essential; because of it reality is not a mode of being. Just the opposite: being is the ulterior actuality of the real. Being is something grounded on reality, in the actuity of the real; and this being grounded is just ulteriority. Let us return to the example which we have been considering for the last several pages: heat is warming. This “warming” has two meanings. First of all it means that heat has warming reality. “Warming” then means that heat is a form of reality, viz. warming reality. To warm is thus to warm {223} things. But it can also mean something different. To be here-and-now warming can mean that warming is a way of being here-and-now in the world. This does not refer to warming things, but to being here-and-now in the world warming. So, the actuality of the heat in the mundane sense of being here-and-now warming is being. Thus we are not dealing with a form of reality, but a form of being. This is the whole difference and the whole unity of reality and being: everything real inexorably “is”, but “is” by being already “real”.
Our return to the foregoing case is not a simple exemplification of what we have been expounding; it is something more. It is a return to the essential point: being is not something understood, but something sensed. This is the heart of the matter.

C) What is the sensed being? Being is ulterior actuality of the real. And since the real itself is sensed, the foregoing question is but to ask ourselves how it is that when we sense the real, we are already sensing its being. The formal end of sentient intellection is always and only reality. In virtue of this, reality is intellectively known in sentient fashion directly in and by itself, as impression of reality. Now, this reality thus apprehended in impression “is” ulteriorly. This ulteriority is, then, “co-sensed” when reality is sensed. The way of intellectively sensing ulteriority is to “co-sense” it. It is not sensed directly, but only indirectly. If one wishes, reality is sensed modo recto; whereas ulteriority is sensed modo obliquo. This obliqueness is just what I have called “co-sensing”. When I sense the real in and by itself modo recto, I am co-sensing modo obliquo its physical and real ultimacy. What is co-sensed is being. Hence, being is co-impressively sensed when reality is sensed. This does not refer to an accidental co-sensing, but to an inexorably physical and real co-sensing, {224} because it is just reality which “is” de suyo. Therefore, when we sense what is apprehended de suyo we impressively co-sense its being here-and-now “being” (participle). The impression of reality is transcendental openness to the world. Hence, it is quite inexorable that when we impressively sense the real we should be sensing that it is being in the world; this is sensed being. The apprehension of being pertains, then, physically but obliquely to the apprehension of the real; this is the obliqueness of being.

Actuality, ulteriority, and obliqueness are the three structural moments of being. Being is thus primarily and radically sensed. Such is the idea of being from the standpoint of the sentient intelligence.

Classical philosophy has addressed the problem of being from the standpoint of what I have termed the ‘conceptualizing intelligence’. To know intellectually would be to “understand”; and understanding would be intellectually knowing that something “is”. That was the thesis of Parmenides and Plato, and it has stamped European philosophy with its peculiar character. But the conceptualizing intelligence is constitutively grounded upon the sentient intelligence; whence follow essential differences in the problem which we are discussing.

a) Above all, there is a profound difference in the very mode of confronting the problem. Basing themselves on Parmenides, both Plato and Aristotle subsumed intellection under logos; that is what several pages back I called the logification of intellection. But this is not all; it is furthermore the case that, for this theory, what is intellectually known consists in “being”. Whence it follows that reality is but a mode of being—to be sure, the fundamental mode, but nonetheless only a mode: the esse reale. That is to say, the real is formally ens; reality would thus be entity. This is what I call {225} the entification of reality. Logification of intellection and entification of the real thus converge intrinsically: the “is” of intellection would consist in an affirmative “is”, and the “is” known intellectually would be of entitative character. This convergence has in large measure etched the path of European philosophy. However, the problem does not exhibit the same character from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence. The logos is grounded upon sentient apprehension of the real; i.e., on sentient intellection. Therefore, instead of “logifying” intellection, what must be done is, as I said, to “intelligize” the logos; i.e., make the logos an ulterior mode of the primordial apprehension of the real. The formal terminus of intellective knowing is not the “is”, but “reality”. And thus it follows that reality is not a mode of being; indeed, being is something ulterior to reality itself. In virtue of this, as I said a few pages back, there is no esse reale, but rather realitas in essendo. Reality cannot be entified, but must be given an entitative ultimacy. The ulteriority of the logos goes “along with” the ulteriority of being itself.

b) A precise idea of ens was never reached from the standpoint of the conceptualizing intelligence. (I must of necessity repeat some things already said in order to clarify this point.) It can indeed already be seen in Aristotle, who tells us that ens (Ôn) has many meanings. They are essentially eighteen: being true and false, being act and potency, being essentially and accidentally, being accident (nine modes of being accidental) and being a subject or substance, where this subject is at the same time matter or form or composed of both. This naturally permitted Aristotle to treat the problems of first philosophy with some rigor, from his point of view. Nonetheless, it would be fruitless to inquire {226} as to what, definitively, he understands by ens. He would always reply with his eighteen senses, linked only by a vague and imprecise analogy, and based upon Parmenides’ idea that ens (Ôn) is a keimenon, a jectum. But by his logification of intellection, Aristotle conceptualized this jectum as a sub-jectum (hypo-keimenon)—something which did not much clarify the question. Aristotle remained trapped in this net of concepts. Given the situation, some Medieval philosophers thought that no precise and unitary concept of ens exists. But in general they thought that reality is existence; and then either understood existence as act of the
IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION

existing thing (St. Thomas) or as a mode of the existing thing (Duns Scotus). But in both cases the ens would be an existent thing which is either effectively existent or aptitudinally existent. But this is not so from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence; because as we have already seen, reality is not existence, but rather being de suyo. That is to say, it does not have to do with either a de facto act of existing, nor an aptitude for existing, but rather something prior to any act and any aptitude, viz. the de suyo. The real is de suyo existent, de suyo apt for existing. Reality is formality, and existence concerns only the content of the real. And thus the real is not ens, but is the de suyo as such. Only by being real does the real have an ulterior actuality in the world. This actuality is being, and the real in this actuality is ens. Reality is not ens; reality has its entity de suyo, but only ulteriorly. Reality is not formally entity.

Modern philosophy modified the medieval conception somewhat; this was the objectualization of the ens, of the esse reale. In various forms this is the basic idea of modern philosophy. {227} Originating from the esse objectivum, from the objective being of Henry of Ghent (14th c.), it became the central idea of Descartes’ philosophy in which what is conceived, as he tells us quite literally, is not formaliter reale, but is realitas objectiva (Meditation III and Primae et Secundae Responsiones). For Kant and Fichte to be is to be an object, to be now put there as an object, so that reality is not entity, but objectuality. But this is inadmissible, because even granting that impossible identification of being and objectuality, what is proper to an object is not its “positionality”, but its “actuality” in the intellection. And the same must be said for being as intentional position or as unveiling: intentional position and unveiling are only modes of actuality, modes of being now put there, of being now intended, of being now unveiled.

Hence the very idea of ens is vitiated at its root in the conceptualizing intelligence. Reality is not ens, but formality of the de suyo. And the real is ens only as actuality in a world.

c) Finally, the being of which we speak is the being of the conceptualizing intelligence; it is being which is understood. But, primarily and radically being is not something understood, but is sensed being; this is the obliquity of the sentient apprehension of being. The old thesis of Parmenides canonized the opposition between intellecutive knowing and sensing which has been sustained throughout all of Western philosophy. Nonetheless, this opposition, as we have seen, does not exist. To know intellecively is to apprehend the real, and this apprehension is sentient. Being is nothing but the oblique moment of what is apprehended in an impression of reality. From the standpoint of a conceptualizing intelligence, what is known intellecively modo recto is “being”; whence it follows that what is oblique would be the apprehension of the real. It would be what we could call {228} the obliqueness of the real. And as I see it, that constitutes the radical flaw of European philosophy on this point (only on this point, naturally). Being understood, taken in and by itself, is always and only the human expression of being obliquely sensed in an impression of reality.

With this we have now studied two of the three points which I set forth. The first concerned the character of sentient intelligence as such; the second was the character of what is sentiently known. Now we must address the third and final point: in what does reality “in” sentient intellection consist.
CHAPTER VII
REALITY IN SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH

In chapter V we saw that intellection is mere actualization of the real as real, and we have analyzed what it is to be mere actuality. It is not actuity, i.e., it is not an act, because it neither adds, subtracts, nor modifies in any way the physical notes which constitute the real. But while it is not an act, actuality is a physical moment of the real. And at this juncture the question inevitably arises as to what this moment adds to the real. Actuality, in fact, is not some empty moment, so to speak; but has its own structure determined by that in which the real is just real. What actuality adds to the real is precisely this being “in” the intellection. We saw what intellection is and what reality is in the two previous chapters. So now we must see what reality is “in” intellection, and we shall proceed in two stages:

1. What, formally, is this intellective “in”? That is, What, formally, does it mean that the real is just actualized “in” intellection? That is what I term real truth.

2. What are the structural moments of this “in”? They are the dimensions of real truth.

§ 1
REAL TRUTH

A real thing is apprehended as real in and by itself; it is de suyo what it is. Since this moment of formality is a prius of things, it follows that reality does not consist formally nor is it necessarily exhausted in being known intellectively. Hence, on account of its intellectively knowing what a thing is, we say that intellection is true. What the mere actualization of the real adds to reality is, then, its truth.

What is understood by truth? At first glance truth seems to be a quality of a judgment. But this is not so because a judgment is only a mode of intellection. Intellection is neither exclusively nor primarily judgmental. Rather, it consists formally in apprehending something as real, and this intellection also has its truth. As I just said, truth is intellection qua apprehending what is real and present as real. Truth adds nothing to reality in terms of notes; but does add to it its intellective actualization. Hence, the question of what truth is, is a question which concerns intellection as such, and not just the judgmental intellection.

Reality and truth are not identical. Intellection, and therefore truth, are aspects of actualization. And actuality, I repeat, adds no physical note to the real. Nonetheless, it does add the actuality of truth to it. And since not every reality is actualized nor has to be, if follows that not every reality has truth.

For the same reason, reality and truth are not correlative, either; i.e., reality does not consist in being a correlate of truth. Every truth involves reality; but not every reality involves truth.

Reality grounds truth. Reality is what gives truth to intellection when it is just actualized therein. And this actualization is true because it involves reality. Reality, then, is what gives truth, and I generally refer to this “truth giving” with the expression ‘to truthify’. Reality truthifies in intellection. Thus, the “in” in which intellective actuality consists is nothing but truthifying. For this reason, not only is truth not something correlative to reality; they are not even related. It is, rather, respectivity, a moment of pure actualization, pure truthifying. Truth is purely and simply the moment of the real intellective presence of reality.

Bearing this in mind it is necessary to purge two conceptions of truth which, by dint of continual repetition, are acceded to without examination, but which in my opinion are false.

The first is the conception according to which truth
is objective consciousness. This is the conception upon which all of Kant's philosophy is erected; though in fact it goes back several centuries before him. The problem with this view is not just that it is false, but something more serious: it is an incorrect analysis of the fact of intellection. The ideas of consciousness and object resound in this conception. Yet intellection is not an act of consciousness, but an act of apprehension; and what is intellectually known does not just have objective independence, but real independence. The conception of truth as objective consciousness is, then, flawed at its heart.

The second conception consists in an appeal to the fact of error: there are intellections which are not true. And from here one goes on [232] to say that truth and error are two qualities which function *ex aequo*, and that intellection as such is “neutral” with respect to this difference. Intellection would thus be something neutral in itself and, therefore, its proper nature would not be to have truth, but to be an aspiration for truth. Deep down, this was Descartes’ conception, associated immediately with the idealistic analysis of intellection. Nonetheless it involves a string of serious errors. In the first place, the truth and error of which it speaks are the truth and error of judgment. Now, as we have repeatedly said, judgment is never the primary form of intellection; there is an anterior mode. And so it must at least be said that whether this primary mode of intellection includes truth and error is debatable. It is necessary for us to examine that question, and we shall do so immediately. But, in the second place, even with respect to judgmental intellection, the indisputable fact of erroneous judgments is in no way equivalent to putting truth and error on an equal footing. Errors of judgment are possible only because truth grounds the possibility of error. An error of judgment does not, therefore, consist in a mere “lack” of truth; but is formally and rigorously a “privation” of truth. The judgmental intellection, therefore, is not something neutral. It is not the case that judgmental intellection “can be” true “and” false, but that in fact it “has to be” of necessity either true or false because the judgmental intellection has to be true de suyo. Hence, truth and error cannot be put on the same footing as qualities which supervene upon an intellection which is in itself neutral. Intellection, even judgmental intellection, is something more than aspiration. Therefore, truth is neither objective consciousness [233] nor one quality of intellection that is opposed to another which is error. Truth is the moment of actualization of the real in sentient intellection as such. How exactly does this work?

I reiterate that we are dealing with the truth of sentient intellection as such, i.e., with the primary and radical nature of the sentient actualization of the real. Thus we are not dealing with just any intellective actualization. As we have already seen, sentient intellection in its primary and radical form is that in which what is apprehended is in and for itself, that is, what is apprehended is there directly, immediately, and unitarily apprehended. Now, in this sentient actualization what is apprehended is so de suyo. And this moment of formality of the *de suyo* is a moment of a thing anterior (prius) to its own being here-and-now apprehended—and precisely therein does its reality consist. But to be sure, this *de suyo* which is prior to the apprehension is nonetheless apprehended in its own anteriority; i.e., is present in sentient intellection. Hence, this *de suyo* as anterior to the apprehension is reality. And this *de suyo*, this reality, *qua* present in the apprehension is just truth. Truth is reality present in intellection *qua* really present therein. Thus the primary and radical truth of sentient intellection is not identified with reality; nor does it add to the real anything different from its own reality. What it does add is a kind of ratification by which what is apprehended as real is present in its apprehension; and this is just ratification of the *de suyo*, ratification of the reality proper. *Ratification* is the primary and radical form of the truth of sentient intellection; it is what I call real truth. [234]

It is truth because it is a moment which is not formally identical to reality. Reality is a formality of a thing, but truth is a quality of intellection insofar as the real is present in it. This and nothing else is the difference between reality and truth: real truth is ratification of reality.

It is real because it is reality itself which is in this truth; it is the real itself which truthifies. To be sure, we are dealing with reality as formality of the *de suyo*, and not with reality as beyond apprehension; it is the reality of what is apprehended just as it is apprehended in its apprehension. I shall immediately return to this idea.

Here we have the essential nature of real truth: the real is “in” the intellection, and this “in” is ratification. In sentient intellection truth is found in that primary form which is the impression of reality. The truth of this impressive actuality of the real in and by itself is precisely real truth.

Three observations may serve to bring this idea into sharper focus.

Above all, we are dealing only with ratification; and this is essential. Classically philosophy has gone astray on this matter and always thought that truth is constituted in the reference to a real thing with respect to what is conceived or asserted about that thing. It is because of this that I believe that the classical idea of truth is always what
I term *dual truth*. But in real truth we do not leave the real thing at all; the intelligence of this truth is not conceptualized but sentient. And in this intellecction nothing is primarily conceived or judged; rather, there is simply the real actualized as real and therefore ratified in its reality. Real truth is ratification, and [235] therefore is *simple truth*. For greater clarity, and though anticipating some ideas which will appear in the other two parts of the book, I will say that truth can adopt diverse forms. In the first place, there is *simple truth*, i.e., real truth in which we do not leave the order of the real; it is truth as *ratification*. In it, not only do we not leave the order of the real, but moreover there is a positive and difficult act of not doing so; this is the very essence of the ratification. In the second place, there is *dual truth*, wherein we have left the real thing and gone toward its concept, toward a judgment, or toward an explanation of the thing. If we return to the thing from its concept, that is truth as *authenticity*. If we return to the thing from a judgement, that is truth as *conformity*. And if we return to the thing from some explanation of it, that is truth as *fulfillment*. As we shall see, this third form has never been considered by classical philosophy. Authenticity, conformity, and fulfillment are the three forms of dual truth. But in contrast to the case of dual truth, in real truth there are not two terms which are primarily foreign to each other, such as the real thing on one hand, and its concept on the other; or similarly its judgement on one hand and its explanation on the other. There is but a single term, the real thing in its two internal moments: its own actuality and its own ratification. It is because of this that every dual truth is grounded upon real truth. In real truth, the real is *ratifying*. In the truth of authenticity, the real is authentication. In the truth of conformity, the real is truth-stating, i.e. the real is stating its truth. In the truth of reason, the real is verifying. Authenticating, truth-stating, and verifying are three forms of dually modalizing real truth, i.e., ratification. Therefore this real truth is, as we shall see at the appropriate time, the foundation of dual truth. [236]

The second observation concerns what I pointed out earlier: real truth is not the opposite of error for the simple reason that the primary intellecction of the real does not admit of the possibility of error. Every primary apprehension of reality is ratifying of what is apprehended and, therefore, is always constitutively and formally real truth. There is no possibility whatsoever of error. Truth is ratification of the real in its actuality. This has nothing to do with the question of whether there is or is not an actuation of a real thing in order for it to be apprehended. If we situate ourselves in the real outside of apprehension, it is possible that this actuation deforms the thing and that therefore what is apprehended is not the same as what the thing is outside of perception. But this does not prevent what is apprehended from being real “in” the apprehension itself, whether or not it is real outside of the apprehension. In the case of any error whatsoever, for example, that of illusion, one leaves the realm of what is apprehended and goes beyond it. Illusion is therefore a phenomenon of duality. But the mere actuality of what is apprehended “in” the apprehension itself is not dual; it is a series of notes which pertain to what is apprehended “of its own”, i.e., *de suyo*. Hence, error consists in identifying the real which is apprehended with the real beyond or outside of the apprehension; in no way does it consist in what is apprehended being unreal “in” the apprehension and yet being taken as real. In an apprehension the apprehended content is real in and by itself; when ratified as such it constitutes real truth. There is no possibility of error. The same can be said about errors owing to things such as malformations of the sensory organs themselves, e.g. Daltonism. In one type of Daltonism, the subject sees a dark grey color where a normal person sees red. But in both cases, and within each perception, the grey [237] which the afflicted person sees is no less real than the red which the normal person sees; nor is that red any more real outside of perception than the grey. Every sentient intellecction in which something is seen in and by itself is always and constitutively real truth. Reality is nothing but the formality of the *de suyo*, and real truth is this *de suyo* ratified as *de suyo* in the apprehension. Error is only possible when we leave this intellecction and venture out to a dual intellecction which goes beyond the apprehension.

Finally, a third observation. Real truth, as I have just said, is simple truth. But it is necessary to conceptualize this simplicity in the correct manner. For Aristotle, to be simple consists in not having any multiplicity whatsoever, in being “purely simple” so to speak; thus sensible qualities as the proper formal object of each sense would be *ta hapla*. But this is not correct. What is apprehended in sentient intellecction has, in general, a great variety of notes; indeed, it is a substantive system of notes. The simplicity of this apprehension does not consist, then, in the “pure simplicity” of what is apprehended; but in the fact that all of its internal variety is apprehended in and by itself in a unitary fashion. Thus we are not dealing with a simplicity of content (something which in fact is never given), but rather with the simplicity of the mode of apprehension, viz, the mode of apprehending something directly, immediately, and unitarily; i.e., *per modum unius*. To see a landscape, or to see a book *en bloc*, so to speak, without stopping to apprehend each of its notes or any combinations of them, is a simple apprehension in the
unitary sense. This unitary vision of a system, ratified in the intellec tion of what is thus presented, is its simple real truth. It could also be called its elemental truth. [238]

Thus we have the essential nature of real truth: ratifi cation. And this truth has some extremely concrete di mensions.

[239] § 2

THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH

In real truth, it is reality which in and by itself is truthifying in the intelligence; i.e., it is reality which di rectly, immediately, and unitarily is giving its truth to the intellec tion. As we have seen, this reality has structurally speaking three dimensions: totality, coherence, and dura tion. Now, the ratification of each of these dimensions is a dimension of real truth. These dimensions are formal respects; they are the ratification of the different moments of the respectivity in which the real consists. When I discussed the dimensions of the real I explained that what was said with respect to systems of notes is applicable to each of them by itself; thus I may excuse myself here from referring to anything but systems.

A) Everything real as a system of notes has that dimension of being a systematic whole; this is the dimension of totality. When a real thing is actualized in its formal respect of totality, its reality is ratified in a very pre cise way, viz. as the richness of what is apprehended. Richness is not the totality of notes of the real, but that totality qua ratified in sentient intellection. It is a dimen sion of real truth, the dimension of totality of the real as ratified in intellection.

B) Everything real is a coherent system of notes. Formal coherence is a dimension of the real. But this coherence ratified in intellection constitutes [240] real truth as truth of the coherence; this is what we call the what of something. It is a dimension of real truth. To be “what” is the ratification of the real coherence of the system in intellection.

C) Everything real is a durable system in the sense of enduring. If it did not have the quality of dura bility, a thing would not have reality. Now, the ratification of durability in intellection constitutes the truth of this durability, viz. stability. ‘Stability’ means here the character of being something established. Being here-and-now established is the dimension of duration, of present ing the being of the real, ratified in intellection. Being here-and-now established is just what constitutes the ratification of the presenting being here-and-now. The reader can observe that this idea of stability is conceptualized here in this problem in a different way than in other publications of mine.

Reality, then, has three dimensions: totality, coherence, and duration. These dimensions are ratified in real truth and constitute the three dimensions of this truth: totality is ratified in richness; coherence is ratified in “what”; and duration is ratified in stability. Richness, “what”, and stability are, then, the three dimensions of real truth. But ratification itself is not some amorphous character, so to speak; rather, in each case there is a proper mode of ratification. Totality is ratified in richness according to its own mode of ratification, viz. manifestation. Manifestation is not the same as making evident, because what is evident is certainly manifest, but it is ev ident because it is manifested. Manifesting is the mode of ratification of the totality in richness; a thing manifests the richness of all its notes. Reality is coherent, and is ratified in a “what” according to a proper mode of ratification, viz. [241] firmness. What we call the “what” of a thing is just that in which it consists and therefore which gives it its own firmness: it is iron, it is a dog, etc. The mode in which this coherence is ratified is, then, just firmness; the real has the firmness of being a “what”. Finally, durable reality is ratified in stability according to its own mode, viz., corroboration or steadiness. Steadiness is not apprehension of some mere fact; it is a mode of ratification, the apprehension of presenting being here-and-now.

To summarize, the three dimensions of the real (totality, coherence, duration) are ratified in the three dimensions of real truth (richness, “what”, stability) via three modes of ratification (manifestation, firmness, steadiness). The intrinsic unity of these three dimensions of ratification and its corresponding modes constitutes the radical part of real truth, the radical part of the ratification of reality in intellection.

This idea of ratification is not just a conceptual clarification, but something which touches the most es sential part of sentient apprehension of the real. By being sentient, this apprehension is impressive; and every im pression, as we saw in Chapter II, has three moments: affection, otherness (content and formality), and force of imposition. The sentient intelligence is essentially constituted by the impression of reality. As impressive, this intellection is sentient. Inasmuch as it senses the other as otherness “of itself”. de suyo, this sensing is intellective. Inasmuch as apprehended reality is ratified in the impres-
Ratification is the force of imposition of the impression of reality; it is the force of reality in intellection. And since this impressive intellection is just actualization, it follows that it is not we who go to real truth, but that real truth has us so to speak in its hands. We do not possess real truth; rather, real truth has possessed us by the force of reality. This possession is not just some mental state or anything of that sort; rather, it is the formal structure of our very intellection. Every form of intellection subsequent to the primary and radical intellection is determined by the real itself; the determination is thus a “dragging along”. We are possessed by real truth and dragged along by it to subsequent intelllections. How? That is the problem of the subsequent modes of intellection; it will be the theme of the other two parts of the book. But before going on to them it is fitting to conclude this first part with a modal consideration. Permit me to explain.

What has been done up to now is analysis of the formal structure of intellection as such; this is sentient intellection. But in many passages I have pointed out that we were dealing with the primary and radical intellection. This indicates that there are intelllections which are not primary and radical but which, nonetheless, are intelllections; that is, they have the formal structure of intellection. This means that in our analysis we have simultaneously treated the questions of what is intellection and what is its primary mode. Now it is necessary to delineate these two formal and modal moments of intellection with greater precision. That will be the theme of the following chapter.
APPENDIX 8
SOME CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH

Once again I prefer to group in an appendix those concepts which go beyond the limits of pure analysis of the apprehension of reality. Here I would like to do two things: (1) by way of illustration, to share certain linguistic facts which are very well known; (2) to point out the possible dimensions of real truth in subsequent intellect.

I. As is well known, the Greeks called truth *aletheia*, discovery, patentization or revealing. But this is not the only term by which truth is designated in our modern languages. I here reproduce a page which I wrote and published on this subject in 1944:

For the sake of accuracy, it is important to point out that the primary meaning of the word *aletheia* is not “discovery,” or “revealing.” Although the word contains the root *la-dh*, “to be hidden,” with the -dh- suffix of state (Latin *lateo* form *la-i* [Benveniste]; *ai*, *rahu*-, the demon who eclipses the sun and the moon; perhaps the Greek *alastos*, he who does not forget his feelings, his resentments, the violent one, etc.), the word *aletheia* has its origin in the adjective *alethes*, of which it is the abstract form. In turn, *alethes* derives from *lethos*, *lathos*, which means “forgetfulness” (the only passage is Theocritus 23, 24). In its primary meaning, *aletheia* connotes, then, something which is not forgotten; something which has not fallen into “complete” oblivion [Kretschmer, Debrunner].

II. Real truth, i.e., the ratification of reality in intellect, then, has three modes: manifestation, firmness, and Germanic languages all express the idea of truth based on the root *uero*, whose original meaning is difficult to pin down; it is found as the second term in a Latin compound *severus* (se[d]-verus), “strict”, “serious”, which would lead one to suppose that *uero* must mean to happily trust in; whence *heorte*, festival. Truth is the property of something which merits confidence, security. The same semantic process appears in Semitic languages. In Hebrew, *aman*, “to be trustworthy”; in Hiph., “to trust in,” which gave *’emunah*, “fidelity”, “steadfastness”; *’amen*, “truly, thus it is”; *’emeth*, “fidelity, truth”; in Akhadian, *ammatu*, “firm foundation”; perhaps *antu* [Amarna], “truth”. On the other hand, Greek and Indoiranian start from the root *es-*, “to be”. Thus Vedic *satya-*, Awadhi *haithya-*, “that which truly, really is.” The Greek derives from the same root the adjective *etos*, *etos*, from *s-e-to*, “that which is in reality”; *eta* = *alethe* [Hesych.]. Truth is the property of being real. The same root gives rise to the verb *etazo*, “to verify”, and *esto*, “substance”, *ousia*.

From the linguistic viewpoint, then, there are three inseparable dimensions articulated in the idea of truth, whose clarification should be one of the central themes of philosophy: reality (*es-*), security (*uero*), and revealing (*la-dh-)*.

The radical unity of these three dimensions is just real truth. For this reason I have alluded upon these linguistic data {245} as an illustration of a philosophical problem.”

and steadiness. As I wrote in my book On Essence, every real truth essentially and indissolubly possesses these three dimensions. None of them has any preferential rank or perogative over the other two. The three are congeneric as structural moments of the primary intellective actualization of a real thing. Nonetheless, they are formally different; so much so that their deployment in subsequent intellection fundamentally modifies man's attitude toward the problem of the truth of the real.

Man, in a word, can move about intellectually according to his preference amid the "unfathomable" richness of the thing. He sees in its notes something like its richness in eruption. He is in a state of insecurity with respect to every and all things. He does not know whether he will reach any part, nor does the paucity of clarity and security which he may encounter on his path disturb him overmuch. What interests him is to stir up reality, to make manifest and to unearth its riches; to conceive them and to classify them with precision. It is a perfectly defined kind of intellection: intellection as adventure.

Other times, moving cautiously and, as it were, in the twilight, as he must in order not to stumble or to become disoriented in his movements, man seeks in things securities on which to base himself intellectually with firmness. [He seeks certainties, certainties about the things that are in reality.] It is intellection as achievement of the reasonable.

On other occasions, finally, he precisely restricts the range and the figure or pattern of his intellectual movements amid reality. He seeks the clear constatation [steadiness] of his own reality, the aristate [finely edged] profile of what he effectively is. In principle, nothing remains excluded from this pretension; however, even when it is necessary to carry out painful amputations, he accepts them; he prefers that everything in which he does not achieve the ideal of clarity should remain outside the range of intellection. It is intellection as science, in the widest sense of that term.

Every subsequent true intellection has something of an adventure in reality, something of a certain firmness, and something of a science (in the wide sense), because manifestation, firmness, and steadiness are three dimensions constitutive of real truth, and hence cannot be renounced. But the predominance of some of these qualities over others in the development of intellection modifies the intellectual attitude. Because of that predominance, they constitute three types of intellectual attitude.

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4 On Essence, p. 131 [English edition., p. 152, with bracketed material added—trans.]
CHAPTER VIII
THE PRIMARY MODE OF INTELLECTION:
PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY

If now we collect the threads of our exposition, we will readily discover that they are tied together at three points which it behoves us clearly to spell out. In the first place, we should emphasize that what we have analyzed is strict and rigorous intellection. The second is that there are different modes of intellection. But these different modes are not only different, but—and this is the third point—they are modalizations of a primary and radical mode. This fact obliges us to say what that primary and radical mode of intellection is.

It is, then, necessary to pull our discussion together around three essential points:

1. What is intellective knowing?
2. What is the modalization of intellective knowing?
3. What is the primary and radical mode of intellective knowing?

All of this has already been discussed in the foregoing chapters; but I now emphasize it for the following reason. When one speaks of sentient intelligence, it is easy to leave the reader with the idea that sensing is definitely a moment of intellection, but to let him forget that this sensing is in itself intellective, that intellection is sensing, and therefore that when we have conceptualized sentient intellection, we have already conceptualized intellective knowing itself.

§ 1

WHAT IS INTELLECTIVE KNOWING?

When we speak of intellective knowing and intelligence we do not only think about whether sensing is a distinct moment of intellection; rather, we ordinarily think that intellective knowing is something more than sensing. Intellective knowing would be something like understanding what that which is intellectively known is. And this capacity to understand would be in turn a type of mental effort; there are some people who have more of it than others, and we tend to think that this means they have a greater capacity to understand things. To be sure, there is much truth in this. But just as in other problems, there is more to the question of what intellective knowing is than meets the eye. And I am not referring to the difference between conceptualizing intelligence and sentient intelligence, but to what is usually thought of as intelligence. Let us ask, then, what this is.

A) Let us pause for a moment and consider what we term ‘understanding’. Certainly hearing a sound is not the same as understanding it. For the first, it suffices not to be deaf; the second on the other hand requires a science called ‘acoustics’. But this leaves the question unanswered. What is it that the understanding understands? How and why the sound is really as it is. When the sound has been understood, what we have before our mind is the real sound itself unfolded, so to speak, in all of its structures. And thus it is clear that if, upon hearing a sound, we had before our mind all of these structures, there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of what we call ‘understanding’. Nonetheless, no one will deny that we have intellectively known the sound; rather, it is just the opposite. Hence, this having the real before our mind is that in which intellective knowing consists. And this shows us the following:

a) That understanding consists in filling a gap in our apprehension of reality (in our example, the reality of sound).

b) That the essence of understanding is in intellective knowing, and not the other way around, as if the essence of intellective knowing were understanding.
To know something intellectively consists in having its reality before our intelligence. The effort of intellectual knowing does not primarily consist in the effort to understand, but in the effort to apprehend reality. A great intelligence is a great capacity to have the real unfolded before it, a great capacity to apprehend the real. To intellectually know something is to apprehend its reality; intellection is apprehension of reality. I indicated in chapter IV that apprehension of reality is the elemental act of intellection. That does not mean that it is some sort of rudimentary act, but rather is the basic formal structure of every intellection as such. Intellec-tive knowing is always and only apprehending reality. Understanding is only a special act of intellection, i.e., one act among others of apprehension of reality. The rest of the special acts of intelligence are to apprehend reality more and better; i.e., to know intellecc-tively better.

B) Intellec-tive knowing, I said, is apprehending the real as real. And for this reason the word ‘real’ (and hence the word ‘reality’) has a double function in this sentence. On one hand, (250) ‘reality’ designates the proper formal object of intellective knowing. An animal does not apprehend reality because the proper formal object of his apprehensions is not reality but stimulation. But on the other hand, ‘reality’ also designates the structural nature of the act of intellective knowing, viz. that type of turning of the apprehension to the real. That is to say, reality is not only the formal object of intellection; intellection itself consists formally in being apprehension of the real as real.

C) Whence the unity between intelligence and reality is not a “relation” but merely “respectivity”; it is “being here-and-now” apprehensively in reality. This apprehensive being is described through its three moments:

a) We are actually, in reality, sensing what is sensed as de suyo, i.e., we are actually in reality sentiently. Hence, to say that I am actually sensing something real is to express that I am intellectively knowing, that I am here-and-now apprehensively in reality. From this point of view, reality could better be termed sensible than sensible.

b) This “being here-and-now” has a very precise character. It is to be here-and-now merely actualizing what is apprehended, in which we are here-and-now. “To be here-and-now” is here mere actualization.

c) In this actualization we are here-and-now installed in reality. Reality is not something to which one must go, but primarily something in which one already is here-and-now, and in which, as we shall see, we never cease to be here-and-now. When we sentiently apprehend a real thing we are already intellectually installed in reality. Intellec-tive knowing is being here-and-now apprehensively in reality, in what things are de suyo.

This installation has a dual character. Upon intellec-tively knowing a real thing, we remain installed in it. But this installation is, in one aspect, ultimately very fleeting; (251) another real thing may immediately supervene, and upon intellec-tively knowing this new thing we are in it. According to this first characteristic, installation is being here-and-now installed in a real thing. But this does not completely exhaust the nature of installation, because as we have seen, the impression of reality in which we intellec-tively know each real thing is ide-ntically and numerically the same in all apprehensions. Reality reifies whatever comes to the real. The content of each real thing remains thus inscribed, so to speak, in the same impression of reality given to us by the previous real thing. That is to say, as we saw in chapter IV, the impression of reality is transcendentally open. And this means that when we intellec-tively know a real thing, that in which we are installed is not only this real thing, but also pure and simple reality. A real thing thus has two functions: that of being something real, and that of being pure and simple reality. There is an essential linkage between these two moments. This linkage does not consist in being a juxtaposition or an adding together of the real thing and reality, because pure and simple reality is not a type of sea in which real things float around. No, reality is nothing outside of real things. Nonetheless, it is not something identical to all of them nor to their sum. Rather, it is just the moment of transcendentality of each real thing. This is the linkage between the two moments of the real thing and reality: transcendentality. In virtue of it, we are in pure and simple reality by being here-and-now, and only by being here-and-now, in each real thing. When we apprehend a real thing, its force of imposition is as we saw a ratification. Now, this ratification, this force of imposition, is not only the force with which this real thing is imposed upon us, but also the force with which, in it, pure and simple reality is transcendentally imposed upon us. Ultimately, (252) to know intellectively is, I repeat, constitutively and formally to be here-and-now apprehending pure and simple reality, i.e. what things are de suyo as such. Therefore this installation in pure and simple reality is physical and real, because the transcendentality of the impression of reality is physical and real. When we sentiently apprehend a thing as real, we are actually with the real thing, but we are with that thing in reality.

Thus, reality is not something which needs to be justified for the intelligence; rather, it is something which is not only immediately apprehended, but also—and above
all—constitutively apprehended. We are thus not dealing with conceptual constructions and chains of reasoning, but merely with an analysis of any act of intellection whatsoever.

The intrinsic and formal unity of the three moments (sensing the real, mere actualization, and installation) is what constitutes sentient intelligence. Sentible reality is apprehended in sentient intelligence, and its apprehension is just an actualization which apprehensively installs us in reality. We are installed in reality by sensing, and for this reason to sense the real is to be here-and-now intellectually knowing.

But this apprehension of the real is modalized, because the impression of reality is transcendentally open. Whence apprehension itself is transcendentally modalized. This is the second point that we must examine.

§ 2

WHAT IS MODALIZATION?

To know intellectually, I said, is just to actualize the real as real. But there are different modes of actualization. I am not referring to the different modes in which the senses present to us what is apprehended “of its own”. Here by ‘mode’ I understand not these different modes of sensing the real, but the different modes of actualization in sentient intellection qua intellection, determined by the different modes of reality itself.

Every intellection is, I repeat, just actualization of the real; but the real is respective. Now, each real thing is not only respective to intellecutive knowing, but as real is de suyo something respective to other real things. Reality, in fact, is a transcendentally “open” formality. The real has, then, different real respectivities. And all of them are anchored in the structure of each real thing. Thus when a real thing is actualized in intellection, it can be actualized in its different formal respects. And because of this the intellecutive actualization itself can be affected by the diversity of formal respects of each thing. The diversity of the actualization of the real according to its different formal respects constitutes what I here call modes of intellection. Permit me to explain.

For the effects of our problem, let us recall that reality is transcendentally open formality. This openness is primordially the openness of each real thing to its own content; but it is also and at one and the same time openness to the reality of other things. Things are real in and through themselves, but they are also given respectively to other real things by the transcendent openness in which the formality of reality consists. Now, the intellection of one real thing respective to others constitutes the intellection of what that real thing is “in reality”. What is apprehended in and by itself is always real; but how it is apprehended with respect to other real things determines the question of what that real thing is “in reality”. To apprehend what something is in reality already implies the apprehension that this something is real, and that its reality is determined with respect to other realities. If it were not for this respectivity, the apprehension of the real would not give rise to the question of what a real thing is in reality because we would already have an exhaustive apprehension of the real thing qua real. This “qua real” is just its respectivity to every other reality; but then it is this respectivity which, in a single act of apprehension of the real, will actualize reality for us in and by itself, as well as what the thing is in reality. But this does not prevent the two dimensions “reality” and “in reality” from being formally different. Let us not forget, indeed, that we are not dealing with two actualizations but with two modes of the same actualization. Including them in a single act does not imply abolishing their essential difference.

Now, the respectivity to other real things is not something univocal, because the openness of the formality of reality has, as we saw, different lines so to speak. Hence, real things are actually transcendentally open in different formal respects. In each of them we intellec- tively know what the thing is in reality. They are different modes of intellection. And since there are two respects, it follows that there are two different modes of intellection of what something is in reality. We shall see this in great detail in the two following parts of the book.

These two modes are not only different, but in their diversity intrinsically and formally involve a basic structure with respect to which each mode is not just a diversity but a modalization. What is this basic structure? To see it, it suffices to attend to what I just said. Intellectively knowing what a thing is in reality is another mode of intellec- tively knowing what is already so known in and by itself as reality. This is, then, the basic formal structure, the apprehension of something “as reality”. The “in reality” is a modalization of the “as reality”.

The foundation of this modalization is clear. The real is sensed in an impression of reality, and this impression is the unity of all of the modes by which the real is present to us in what is sensed. One of these modes is reality in the sense of “toward”. Now, the real which is transcendentally open in the “toward” is what inexorably
determines the modes of intellection. A real thing as transcendentally open toward another thing is just what determines the intellection of what that former thing is in reality. The “toward” in itself is only a mode of reality’s being here-and-now present. But when the “toward” is considered as a transcendentally open moment, then it determines the intellection of what the real thing is in reality.

But this reveals to us that that basic structure of intellection, of the mere actualization of the reality of something, has a precise character; because in order to be able to talk about what something is “in reality”, the thing must be already apprehended “as real” in and by itself. And this means that the apprehension of the real thing as something, prior to its subsequent modalization, constitutes at one and the same time a proper and primary mode of intellection. This is just what I call the primordial apprehension of reality. The intellection of what something is “in reality” is, then, a modalization of the intellection of what this something is “as reality”. With respect to this primordial apprehension, the other modes of intellection are not primordial but ulterior or subsequent. ‘Ulterior’ comes from a very old Latin word als which means trans. It only survives in the positive form ultra, the comparative form ulterior, and the superlative form ultimus. So we are not dealing, then, with “another” intellection but with a different mode of the same intellection. This is the first intellection itself, but “ulteriorized” so to speak. I will shortly explain this more rigorously.

The primordial apprehension of reality coincides with the mere intellection of a real thing in and by itself, and therefore, with the impression of reality. It is for this reason that I have indiscriminately used the expressions for the impression of reality, “intellection of the real in and by itself”, and “primordial apprehension of reality”. But now it is fitting to distinguish them. In this primary intellection there is the “formal” aspect of being an intellection, viz. the mere impressive actualization of the real in and by itself. And there is the “modal” aspect of primordiality. Now, that about which we are now asking ourselves is intellection qua primordial mode of apprehension of the real. This is the third point.

§ 3
THE PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY

By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is apprehension of reality in and by itself. This intellection, as we saw in chapter II, is in a radical sense an apprehension of the real which has its own characteristics. It is fitting to repeat this in order to focus better upon our present question. Intellection is formally direct apprehension of the real—not via representations or images. It is an immediate apprehension of the real, not grounded on inferences, reasoning processes, or anything of that nature. It is a unitary apprehension. The unity of these three moments is what makes what is apprehended to be apprehended in and by itself. And we have also observed that this unity does not mean that what is apprehended in and by itself is something simple. Just the opposite: apprehension can have and indeed always has—except in a few cases—a great variety of notes. For example, when we apprehend a landscape, what is apprehended has an immense variety of notes. If I apprehend them unitarily and not as notes and things related to each other, then the landscape, despite its enormous variety of notes, is apprehended in and by itself, i.e., unitarily. Moreover, what is apprehended not only can have a great variety of notes, but these notes can also be variable. And this is essential, as we shall see. The landscape, in fact, may have flowing water, or undergo changes in lighting, etc. Though varied and variable in its notes, if the content is apprehended directly, immediately, and unitarily, it is apprehended in and by itself. To be the apprehension of something in and by itself is not, then, the same as having simplicity of notes. And as we shall see below, this observation is essential.

Every intellection is mounted in one or another way on this intellection of the real in and by itself. Nonetheless, that intellection is modalized. This means that the intellection of the real in and by itself, besides being what is “formally” intellective, has its own “modal” character, a primordial modality; the apprehension of something in and by itself is, modally, the primordial apprehension of reality. What does this mean?

As I just said, every intellection is based on apprehension of the real in and by itself. But I can have this apprehension in two ways. I can take it as the basis of other intelllections, e.g., as the basis for judging what is apprehended. But I can have the apprehension of something in and by itself “only” as something in and by itself. Then this moment of the “only” constitutes the modal character of the apprehension; the intellection of something “only” as real in and by itself is modalized by the “only” in the primordial apprehension of reality. This is the primary mode of intellection.

Nor is this a subtle point. It might seem so if I consider that what is apprehended is a system of notes. But if I consider the apprehension of a real note, just in and by
itself, then it is clear that the concept of primordial apprehension has a great simplicity both in the first and second cases. Let us take, for example, the color green. Apprehending it in and by itself would signify that there is an apprehension of this color as the unique real terminus of apprehension. This would be what has \{259\} usually been called the sensation of green. Experimental psychology debated this problem of sensation: Does pure sensation really exist in this sense? The experimental discussions have been numerous, but they do not affect our problem, because the fact that something is real in and by itself does not mean that it is separated from everything else. If I perceive a tree with all of its notes, I may direct my attention to but a single one of them, e.g., the color green. This note is given in the system with the others, but I can fix my attention on it alone. Then that note is apprehended in a primordial apprehension of reality even though it may not be in itself an elemental sensation, i.e. a terminus separated from everything else. The problem of the primordial apprehension of reality is not a problem of the psychology of sensation. The problem of the apprehension of a note just in and by itself is thus not identified with the classic problem of that note's sensation. In sensation one tries to isolate a note perceptively. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is no dividing up of anything; rather one perceptively fixes upon a single note even though it may be part of a system.

Hence—independently of this question—a system as complex as a landscape, if apprehended only in and by itself, is as a primordial apprehension of reality something as simple as the apprehension of a single note. Modality is essential to the intellection; and as modality, primordial apprehension encompasses everything from the apprehension of a single note to the apprehension of a system as enormously complicated as a landscape.

And now two questions inevitable arise: What is the constitutive act of the primordial apprehension of reality? And, What is the proper intellective nature of what is apprehended in this act?

In the first place, let us consider the constitutive act of the primordial apprehension of reality. I speak of “constitutive act” in a loose sense, because it is not an act but a mode of the act of intellection. This mode, as I have already said, is fixation or concentration; I concentrate on one or several notes, or even the whole system considered unitarily. Now, this concentration qua intellective modal act, or rather as primary modality of the intellective act, is attention. Attention is not just one psychological phenomenon among others; it is a modal moment of intellection, because attention is not “simple” concentration. It is a proper intellective mode, that mode by which I concentrate “only” on that which I apprehend in and by itself. Strictly speaking, it is not an act of attention but an attentive intellection. As concentration, attention has two moments. One is the moment in which I center myself on what is apprehended; this is the moment of centering. The other is the moment which I shall call the moment of precision; it is the moment in which what is not apprehended as center remains on the periphery of the apprehension. This does not mean that it is not apprehended, but that what is apprehended outside of the center is not the subject of attentive concentration. Thus it is not excision but simple marginalization. Nor are we referring to mere abstraction, because what is not centered is nonetheless actually apprehended, but in a special form, viz. it is co-apprehended, it is apprehended but “imprecisely”. ‘Imprecision’ does not mean here that it is apprehended incorrectly, confusedly, or anything of that nature. Rather, im-precision regains its etymological sense of not having to do with precisely what I am here-and-now doing, with what I am now \{261\} intellectually knowing.

And similarly, ‘precise’ does not mean the correctly and distinctly apprehended, but to be something which I am singling out without singling out everything else. The “precise” in the ordinary sense of the word, viz. what is distinct, clear, etc., is always something grounded on the “precise” as that which I am singling out. Only because I look in a precise sense at something, and not at something else, only for this reason can I see or not see with precision what this something is. Now, what is not the center of attention is imprecisely relegated to the margin or periphery. And it is then that what is the center of attention is apprehended in and by itself, and only in and by itself, i.e., it is precisely here-and-now or is precisely apprehended.

The intellection of something in this way is what I call “primordial apprehension of reality”. The primordial apprehension of reality is not what formally constitutes intellection, but is the primary modality of the intellection of the real in and by itself. This modality consists in what is apprehended being so precisely in attentive intellection.

In the second place, what in the positive sense is the nature of the actuality of what is intellectively known in this mode? Actuality is above all something which concerns the real itself; it is its proper actuality. But, as we have already said, the real has different formal respectivities. And the different modes of actualization depend upon the different modes of the actuality of the real. The modes of intellection correspond to these modes of actuality of the real in respectivity. The modes of intellection...
are essentially and formally grounded on the different modes of actuality of the real; it is these modes which determine those intellections. The modes of intellec- 
tively knowing what a thing is in reality correspond to these modes of actuality. Now, a mode of actualization in the attentive intellec- 
tion pertains to the intellec- 
tion of something real in and by itself, but “only” as real in and by itself. This mode of intellec- 
tively knowing depends upon the mode of actuality of the real, upon the “only” in which we apprehend the real in and by itself. This mode of actuality is formally “retention”; it is what the “only” expresses in a positive sense. A real thing, in and by itself, only as real in and by itself, is something whose actuality rests “only” on the real thing in and by itself. And this mode of actuality is just what I call retention of its own reality. Actual- ity in the mode of “only” is an actuality which retains its own reality and which, therefore, retains us in its apprehension. When we are actually apprehending something attentively we are retained by the real in its proper actuality. Retention is the positive and primary mode of actuality. In the primordial apprehension of reality we are, then, attentively retained by the real in its proper reality; this is the complete essence of the primordial apprehension of reality.

This retention in which we are on the part of the real admits various degrees. Retention as a modal moment of the apprehension of reality is only a line of actuality of the real. In this line different degrees can fit. The attentive intellec- 
tion can make us concentrate at times on the real in a mode which is more or less “indifferent”; reality is intellec- 
tively known only in and by itself, step by step. At other times the attention more or less stays fixed upon a thing. Both of these cases are equally degrees in the modal line of attentive intellec- 
tion. There is finally a very important mode, “absorption”. We are and remain- 
situated in a real thing as if there were nothing but this thing. The intellec- 
tion is then as if completely emptied into what is apprehended, so much so that it does not even recognize that it is intellec- 
tively knowing.

Indifference, fixation, and absorption are three rigor- 
ously and formally intellec- 
tive qualities of the primor- 
dial apprehension of reality. They are not psychological states but modal qualities of intellec- 
tion. For this reason they do not constitute degrees of primordial apprehension; they are only degrees of the exercise of the act of intellec- 
tion, but not degrees of its formal structure, in the same way as vision, for example, has its own formal structure, always the same, independently of the fact that in the ex- 
cercise of the faculty of vision there may be differences due to better or worse vision.

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In summary, to know intellec- 
tively is to apprehend something formally real; it is just impressive actuality of the real in and by itself. When we thus apprehend the real “only” as real in and by itself, then the intellec- 
tive apprehension has the modal character of attentive and retaining intellec- 
tion of the real. This is the essence of the primor- 
dial apprehension of reality; it is the primary mode of intellec- 
tion. The other modes are modalizations of this primary mode, subsequent modalizations of it. Its more rigorous albeit simply programmatic conceptualization is the theme of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IX

THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION

It is most important to explain the relationship between the modes of intellection and the primordial apprehension of reality. And when this is done, we must pose two questions. First, the radical question: what are the ulterior modes of actualization of the real? Second, in broad outline what are the ulterior modes of ulterior intellection qua intellection?

Thus we shall examine the following:

1. What ulteriority is.
2. The modes of ulterior actualization.
3. The modes of ulterior intellection.

§ 1

WHAT IS ULTERIORITY?

Ulteriority consists very concretely in intellectively knowing what that which has already been apprehended “as real” is “in reality”.

It might seem as though it is in these modes that intellection par excellence consists, while the primordial apprehension of reality is something quite poor. But this is not true. Though necessary, of the greatest richness, and of incalculable perspective, the ulterior modes of intellection are but succedaneous. It is only because the apprehension of something as real is insufficient that we have to intellectively know what that real thing is in reality. To be sure, the primordial apprehension of reality essentially and inescapably involves a great determination of content. But despite this there is a certain insufficiency in that primordial apprehension. This insufficiency affects the content of the apprehension, specifically, the notes of the content. In ulterior modes of intellection, the content becomes immensely richer; but it is a content which is intellective only by virtue of being inscribed within the moment of formality of reality of the primordial apprehension. It is not the content which constitutes the formal essence of intellection. To know intellectively is formally to apprehend reality, and to apprehend it just in its actuality of reality with all of its content. And in this respect the primordial apprehension of reality is not only much richer than the intellection of the ulterior modes, but is intellection par excellence, since it is therein that we have actualized the real in its reality in and by itself. It is therein that all of the enrichments of the intellection of what something is in reality have to be inscribed. Hence, despite its enormous volume and richness, the intellection of the ulterior modes is unutterably poor with respect to the way in which the primordial apprehension apprehends reality. The intellection of the most poor reality intellectively known in the primordial apprehension is immensely richer as intellection than the intellection of reality in its ulterior modes. It is only as referred to the primordial apprehension of reality that the ulterior modes are what they are, viz. intellections of the real. It is because of this that these ulterior modes are just succedaneous.

On the other hand, precisely because the ulterior actuality consists in respectivity it follows that its intellection has a fuller content than that of the primordial apprehension. Of course, there is no more reality; but the reality is actualized more richly. If this were not so, the whole system—for example of the sciences—would be constitutively futile. Ulterior apprehension is the expansion of what is already apprehended as real in the primordial apprehension. And thus it is clear that what something is
“in reality” is an enrichment of what it is “as reality”. The unity of these moments is ulterior intellation.

§ 2

THE ULTERIOR MODES OF ACTUALIZATION

We have already seen that intellation formally consists just in the impressive actuality of the real as real. To reach this idea we have analyzed the intellation of a real thing in and by itself, and only in and by itself. But in general the impressive apprehension of the real apprehends the real in and by itself, to be sure, yet not “only” in and by itself, because several things are given in that apprehension at the same time; and each of them can be a terminus of intellation. There are several reasons for this. The first has to do with the nature of the attentive intellation. One’s attention can be directed more to some aspects than to others; thus what is perceived is so to speak fragmented into distinct things. What was unitarily “a landscape” in and by itself becomes a tree, a brook, a house, etc. Or it can be the case that one has an apprehension of things which are distinct not through fragmentation but because they are independent of each other. In every case, the intelllective apprehension is profoundly modified because we are not referring to the fact that these various things, each in and by itself, might be the terminus of a particular apprehension. If that were the case, we would have a multiplicity of apprehensions. We are not now referring to that but to the fact that there is a single apprehension whose terminus is formally multiple: I have different and distinct things within the same apprehension.

Thus things are apprehended distinctly, but not by virtue of being undivided. It thus happens that apprehension itself as act has its own formal unity, different from the unity of each of the various apprehended things. So we can say that things apprehended as multiple in this case nonetheless constitute a particular unity. A thing is real in and by itself; but reality is formally and constitutively respective. Whence it follows that the real is not just real but is diversely respective reality. The actualization of the real is intrinsically and formally modalized qua actualization.

The foundation of this modalization is clear, as we have seen; it is the “towards” as transcendent openness. This openness has different directions, so to speak.

Above all there is the openness of the thing apprehended as real to other real things which are also apprehended. This is the openness of the “its-ownness” of each real thing, apprehended as real, to the “its-ownness” of other things, also apprehended as real. It is the openness of each thing apprehended with respect to apprehended “its-ownness” of other things. When a real thing is actualized respectively to other real things in the direction of openness, we say that the thing is found in a field of reality. To intelllectively know what a real thing is in reality is now to intelllectively know it as a moment of the field of reality, as being respective to other things of the field.

But the formality of reality is respectively open in another direction as well. By being pure and simple reality, it is transcendentally open to being a moment of reality itself. It is, then, open to what we have called the world. Thus to intelllectively know what a real thing is in reality is to intelllectively know it as a moment of the world.

These are two different modes of intellation because we intelllectively know different modes of ulterior actualization of the real. To intelllectively know what a color, which we see, is in reality is to intelllectively know what it is in the field-sense with respect to other notes, e.g. sound. But to intelllectively know what color is in reality as a moment of the world is something different; it is to intelllectively know it, for example, as a light wave or a photon.

Respectivity in a field and worldly respectivity are not, to be sure, two respectiveities; but they are two different dimensions of the respectivity of the real as such. We shall dwell a bit on these points.

The field of reality is not an order of things which is extrinsic to their reality. On the contrary, it is an intrinsic moment of each thing, a field-sense moment of it. Even if there were but a single real thing, this thing would still be in a field, i.e., of field-nature. As we know, each real thing has a moment of content and one of formality. It is only by the second moment that things constitute a field of real things. Since things themselves in our impression of reality give us their moment of reality, it follows that the field of reality is determined by real things themselves and not just by the unity of my act of perception. This reality is in fact formally and constitutively open, as we saw. And only because each thing is intrinsically and formally open to a field, only because of this can many things be in a field. In virtue of it, there is a rigorously cyclic respectiveity between a real thing and the field of reality. Each real thing grounds the field, but the field reworks, so to speak, the real things which have determined it. This is also what happens in physical nature. The charges on bodies generate the electromagnetic field, just as masses
generate the gravitational field; but these fields affect the charges and masses of the bodies, so that the field itself acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the bodies. For a trivial analogy, we might say that a real thing is a source of light which spreads light everywhere, i.e. generates the field of clarity. And in this clarity, i.e., in this light, we not only see the other things but also the source of light itself. Whence the field of clarity acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the sources of light. The field moment does not withdraw us from real things, but draws us more deeply into them because it is a constitutive moment of the formality of reality qua transcendentally open.

As a concept, the field forms an essential part of scientific knowledge. Given a certain quantity, if at each point in space this quantity has a fixed value only by virtue of its position, physicists say that this space constitutes a field. Thus Einstein was able to say that a field is nothing but the physical state of space. Space as a kind of empty recipient of every structure is a chimera; that which we might call ‘empty space’ is purely and simply nothing—a splendid definition. In other sciences as well, for example biology, one speaks at times of phyletic fields.

The field of reality does not coincide with this physical field nor with the phyletic field, because both space and the phyletic directions are but moments of reality, moments of the field of reality. Thus, for example, every distance is a moment of the field of reality and not the other way around. Whatever space may turn out to be, it must always be understood from the standpoint of the other way around. Whatever space may turn out to be, it must always be understood from the standpoint of the field of reality and not the physical state of space. Space as a kind of empty recipient of every structure is a chimera; that which we might call ‘empty space’ is purely and simply nothing—a splendid definition. In other sciences as well, for example biology, one speaks at times of phyletic fields.

But the real is not open only to the “its-ownness” of each real thing; that which is really its own is, by the mere fact of being so, reality. In virtue of this, the real is a moment of pure and simple reality and, therefore, everything real in its immense multiplicity has a certain proper unity as worldly reality. This unity does not consist in the unification of real things qua real, but is unity itself as an intrinsic and constitutive moment of each real thing qua real. This unity of moments is what constitutes the world. Even if there were only a single real thing, it would be formally worldly.

In summary, each thing is real in and by itself, and is reality which is in a field and in the world. These two latter moments are, then, two dimensions of transcendentality. But they are not independent. Each thing is purely and simply real, i.e. worldly, because “its-ownness” is what constitutes it as real. And because this respective reality is above all in a field, it follows that worldly transcendentality affects the field itself. Conversely, a field is nothing but the world qua sensed moment of “its-ownness”. And since this “its-ownness” is sensed in the manner of a field, it follows that the field is the world qua sensed; it is the field which is constitutively open to the world. The world is the sensed transcendentality of the field.

And this is not just some conceptual subtlety. The thrust of this distinction can be seen most clearly in human reality. For purposes of clarity, when one speaks of realities, one always thinks of a real thing as something distinct from oneself. But this is essentially false; real things are not just the rest of the real things, but also include me as a reality. Now, my reality (i.e. every human reality) has actualization in a field. This is what ultimately constitutes what we term the ‘personality’ of each individual. Personality is a mode of actuality of my own reality in the field of all other realities and of my own reality. And for this reason, personality is inexorably subject to the inevitable vicissitudes of the field of reality. So on account of my personality I am never the same. My own personal life is of a character defined by a field. But what I am as reality is not exhausted in what I am in contradistinction to all other things and my reality among them; rather, my reality in a field, my personality, also includes other things as moments of my personal life. Thus, meaning-things, which are not pure and simple reality, are nonetheless constructed moments of each thing with my personal life. Every meaning-thing is a constructed moment of the field-sense actuality in which my personality consists. But my reality also has a worldly actuality. I am a person, i.e. I have personhood, and as pure and simple reality, my reality is not personality; it is something more elemental and radical, viz. personhood. As a worldly moment, I am a person, i.e. personhood, and as a field-sense moment, I am personality. And thus we can see what is of a field-nature, i.e. the personality, is the personhood actualized in a field. Personality is the field-sense qualification of personhood. For this reason I am always the same (personhood) although never the same thing (personality).

Actuality in a field and worldly actuality are, then, different modalities of the respective actualization of the real. And each of these actualizations determines a proper mode of intellection.
§ 3

THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECCTION

Intellection is always just the actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. This intellection is precisely the primordial apprehension of the real in and by itself. But the real as sensed is ulteriorly actualized as in a field and as in the world. Thus it is that what is intellectually known as real can be ulteriorly known intellectively according as it is “in reality”. This “in reality” has the two dimensions of being in a field and being in the world.

To intellectively know what something real is in reality is above all to intellectively know the already apprehended real as real, according as it is what it is in a field with respect to other things. This intellection is no longer primordial. I intellectively know what a real thing is in reality as “its-ownness”; I intellectively know what the real thing is in function of other realities. And this intellection is what constitutes the logos. Logos is the intellection of what the real is in its reality in a field. So I intellectively know a real thing from the standpoint of other real things; I intellectively know it therefore in the field-sense. Hence the logos is an enrichment of the content of the primordial apprehension; the enrichment which “proceeds from”, and is “grounded in” the other things of the field “toward” which what the logos intellectually knows is open in the field sense. The openness of a field is the foundation of the logos and of the enrichment of the content of the primordial apprehension. Here ‘logos’ means not only a proposition or a judgment, primarily because simple apprehension as judicatory apprehension pertains so essentially to it, and the logos itself consists in its constitutive unity. Simple apprehension is not just something to which a judgment is added; rather, it is nothing by itself and is what it is only in its intrinsic unity with judgment. Conversely, no judgment can be a judgment if what is affirmed is not firmly part of what is simply apprehended. This is the logos. What is the intrinsic nature of this unity? We shall see it subsequently: it is a dynamic unity. Why? Because every intellection is sentient. The ulterior intellection which the logos is, is a modalization of sentient intellection. And this modalization is grounded upon the dynamism of the logos. The logos is formally sentient logos, and for this reason, and only for this reason, it is a dynamic logos.

But there is another reason not to confuse logos with judgment. Logos does not always rest upon itself qua judgment, but can rest upon other logoi. Thus it pertains to the logos not just to be a judgmental intellection, logos, but also to be an intellection grounded on other logoi, i.e. syllogismos, what is usually termed ‘reasoning’. Logos is not only judgment; it can also be co-legere or inference in a field. This inferring has been called ‘reasoning’. But the word is incorrect; it might seem to indicate that reason consists formally in reasoning, in mounting one logos upon one or more others. But this is doubly false, because in the first place reasoning does not by itself constitute an intellection of the real; indeed it does not go beyond being a mode of the logos itself as mere intellection. And in the second place, reason, as I am about to discuss, does not aim at the logos but at the real itself; and this is not a constituent of reasoning. [277]

And here once again the greatest amplitude, the greatest enrichment proper to ulterior intellection reappears. The real in and by itself is reality apprehended in a primordial apprehension; and conversely, reality as real is not actualized as real except in primordial apprehension. But not everything excluded from this primordial apprehension is also excluded from its intellection in the logos. Thus, what we call a table is not something actualized in the primordial apprehension of reality, because the real as such is not the table as table, but as a “thing” with properties; and it is only a table in a constructed function with the reality of my life. I do not apprehend tables, but I have a logos of tables, and in general of every meaning-thing. This is the enrichment of the reality of my life as constructed with the real. Logos does not amplify reality, but constitutes an undeniable enrichment of its content.

Logos, then, is a dynamic intellection in a field of what something is in reality. But there is another mode of intellection, the intellection of the real as a moment of the world. Now, the world is the transcendental part of the field, because the field is nothing but the world as sensed. Hence, intellection of the real as in the world is formally based on intellection of the real as in a field, i.e. on the logos. It is for this reason that the former intellection is not a simple mode of the logos, viz. it is an intellection of the world. And this intellection is what formally and rigorously constitutes what we call reason. It is not an argument nor the result of arguments or other chains of reasoning, but a progression from reality in a field to worldly reality. This progression cannot be reduced to the logos. To be sure, it is dynamic; but not every dynamism is a progression. The logos does not progress toward anything, but is already in a field and moves in the real already apprehended in the field. On the other hand, the dynamism of reason consists in being here-and-now in progress. It is not a dynamism within a field but a dynamism which leads from the field to the world. Reason is not argument but transcendental progress toward the
world, toward pure and simple reality. Since the “toward” is a sensed moment of the real, it follows that not only is the logos sentient, but reason itself is too; it is *sentient reason*. In virtue of this the expression “toward” reality can lead to a mistake, that of confounding “towards” other things with “towards” the world. Both reason and logos are grounded upon the “towards” of the transcendental openness of the real as such. The “towards” is therefore a “towards” within the real. Thus we are not referring to a dynamism or progression “toward” reality; on the contrary, we have a dynamism and a progress which is already within reality itself. Reason does not have to “achieve” reality because it is born and progresses in it.

In other words, the field-nature moment and the worldly moment are modes of actualization which are determined intrinsically and formally by the real itself. And as every intellection is actualization of the real, it follows that the real known intellectively and respectively to another real thing has two moments of actuality. The first is the moment of reality in and by itself; it is the primary and radical actuality, what rather vaguely and imprecisely I have called ‘the individual moment of reality’. But the real in respectivity does not have a new actuality; rather, what it acquires is the actuality of its own reality respectively to other things. So we are not dealing with another actualization but a re-actualization of what the real is in and by itself. The intellection of the real in this aspect is, then, constitutively “re-actuality”. This “re” is what [279] formally expresses the fact that we are dealing with an ulterior intellection. Ulterior intellection is a re-actualization in which the actuality of a thing is intellectively known as actualized with respect to another reality.

Since primordial apprehension is sentient and takes place in impression, ulterior intellection is impressive ulteriority; hence logos is sentient and reason is sentient. Ulteriority is grounded in the very structure of the impression of reality. The intellection of a real thing as respectively open, as re-actualized, is what I call ‘intellectively knowing what the real is “in reality”’. What is primordially apprehended is always real; but if we ask what it is in reality, this “in reality” consists in an actual determination of the real thing with respect to other real things. If this were not so, the apprehension of the real would not give rise to the question of what this real thing is in reality. All that is possible only because intellection is sentient. Hence, neither logos nor reason has to get to reality; on the contrary, reality is actualized in sentient intellection. It is because of this, and only because of it, that logos and reason arise, and that both of these intelllections take place already within reality. It is, I repeat, why logos is sentient and reason likewise is sentient.

How this ulterior modalization occurs, and what the structure of its link to primordial apprehension of reality is, will be the respective themes of the other two parts of the book. They are the themes of the dynamic sentient logos, and the progress of the sentient reason.

But before embarking on that task, it will not be out of place to return to the point of departure of this first part in order to see better the unity of our analysis. [280]
CHAPTER X
SENTIENT INTELLECTION AND HUMAN STRUCTURES

This study has been an analysis of intellection as apprehension of the real and of its primary mode, the primordial apprehension of reality. To facilitate the task, I have contrasted the analysis of intellective apprehension with apprehension which is just sensible, with pure sensing.

Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing. And sensing is a process having three essential moments: arousal, tonic modification, and response. Now, arousal as a moment of sensing takes place in impression. An impression thus has two quite different aspects. One is the aspect in which the impression is an arousing function. But there is another aspect which is prior and more radical, viz. what the impression is in its own formal structure. Arousal and impression must not be confused: arousal is a function of an impression, and is grounded on the latter’s formal structure. Arousal is of a process character; impression of a structural character. They are, thus, two different problems.

I began by studying the formal structure of impression. An impression is an apprehensive act; hence it is necessary to speak of impressive apprehension. Sensing is apprehending impressively, and this apprehension is what formally constitutes sensing. An impression has three essential moments: affection of the sentient being, presentation of what is sensed, i.e., otherness (in its dual moment of content and formality), and the force with which the sensed is imposed upon the sentient being. This sensing has two different natures which depend upon the formality of otherness. Otherness as stimulation is what constitutes the pure sensing proper to animals. Stimulation consists in that formality by which what is sensed is formally just a sign of tonic modification and of response. But otherness can be of a different nature, if the formality of what is sensed consists in what is sensed being something de suyo, something “of its own”; this is the formality of reity or reality. Now, to apprehend reality is the formally proper role of intellection; hence, impressive apprehension of reality, impression of reality, is formally sentient intellection.

This sentient intellection constitutes the proper and formal structure of intellective knowing. It is what we have studied throughout the course of this first part of the book. By way of complement to it—and only as complement—let us now direct our attention to the other aspect of intellection, viz. sentient intellection as a determinant moment of the human process. I have already said something about this subject in Chapter IV. It leads us to two questions: the determination of the other two moments of tonic modification and response, and the moment of the unity of the process of sentient intellection qua process.

A) Above all there is the determination of the other two specifically human structures. Intellection determines the affects or tonic modifications. I speak of “affects” in order to distinguish them from the affections proper to every impression. The modification of the animal affects by the impression of reality is what constitutes feeling or sentiment. Feeling is an affect of the real; it is not something merely “subjective”, as is usually claimed. Every feeling presents reality qua tonically modifying as reality. Feeling is in itself a mode of turning toward reality. In turn, response is a determination in reality; it is volition. When the sentient tendencies describe reality to us as determinable, determining, and determined, then the response is will. Feeling is the sentient affect of the real; volition is a determining tendency in the real. Thus, just as intellection is formally sentient intellection, so also feeling is an affecting feeling and volition is a tending will. The essential part of sensing in its three moments of arousal, tonic modification, and response is formally structured in intellective apprehension, in feeling, and in volition. Only because there is sentient apprehension of the real, i.e., only because there is impression of reality, is there feeling and volition. Intellection is thus the determinant of the specifically human structures.
To be sure, we are dealing with intellection in its function of sentiently installing us in the real. We are not dealing with what is usually called intellectualism. Intellectualism is not given other than in the conceptualizing intelligence; it consists, in fact, in assigning to concepts the radical and primary function. But here we are not talking about a concept being the determinant of the other structures; that would be totally false. Here we are talking about sentient intelligence; and what this intelligence makes (284) is not concepts but the apprehension of what is sensed as real. It is not, then, an intellectualism; it is, rather, something different toto caelo, what I might call an intellectionism. We are dealing with intellection as sentient apprehension of the real; and without this intellection there would not be, nor could there be, feeling or volition.

B) Now, the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and effective response is the intrinsic and formal unity of the structure of sensing as sensing. Sensing is not something which only concerns arousal; rather it is the intrinsic and indivisible unity of the three moments of arousal, tonic modification, and effective response. This unity of sensing is primary and radical; hence, the formal structure of sentient intellection, when it determines the openness of a formality distinct from the merely sentient, does not break the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and response of animal sensing. Not only does it not break it, but indeed it enters into play precisely by the structure of hyperformalization, which is a structural moment that is properly sentient. Whence it follows that the unity of what is intellectively known as real is a unity which does not eliminate sentient unity, nor is superimposed upon it (as has been said from the standpoint of the conceptualizing intelligence throughout the course of philosophy), but is a unity which absorbs and formally contains the structure of animal sensing. Directed to reality, man is thus the animal of realities; his intellection is sentient, his feeling is affecting, his volition is tending.

When it determines these specifically human structures, intellection inexorably determines the proper character of life in its unfolding. Human life is life in “reality”; hence, it is something determined by intellection (285) itself. If we employ the word ‘thinking’, not in a rigorous and strict sense (that we shall do in other parts of the book), but in its everyday sense, we shall have to say that it is intellection, the sentient apprehension of the real, which determines the thinking character which life has. It would be false to say that it is life which forces us to think; it is not life which forces us to think, but intellection which forces us to live as thinking.

But this processive function of intellection as life is something which does not intervene in any way whatsoever in the structural nature or in the formal nature of sentient intellection as such. The conceptualization of the act of sentient intellection is the only thing which is involved in the response to the question “What is intellective knowing?” I have explained this structure in the previous chapters; and it is fitting to emphasize that what is expressed in them is not a theoretical construct, but a simple analysis—to be sure prolix and complicated—but just a simple analysis of the act of sentient intellection, i.e., of the impression of reality.

* * *

With this we have responded to the question of what intellective knowing is; it is just impressive actuality of the real, just actuality of the real in the sentient intelligence. The primary mode of this intellection is the primordial apprehension of reality. Now we come face to face with the problem of the ulterior modes of intellection; that will be the object of the following two parts of the book. The second will treat of the sentient logos, and the third of sentient reason.
Part II

Intelligence and Logos
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this book, we investigated intellective knowing and its primary and radical mode. This is the problem which I propounded under the title *Intelligence and Reality*. But intellection admits of two *ulterior modes* of intellection; these will be the subject of the second and third parts of the book.

In order to commence this study it will not be out of place to set down some of the essential ideas expounded in Part I; I hope that they will facilitate correct comprehension of Part II.

Above all, intellective knowing is not an act of consciousness, nor an act of realizing something, because to realize what is intellectively known, it has to be present in the intellection. And this act of capturing something and making it present is what we call *apprehension*. This is the radical act of intellective knowing, an act of apprehension.

What is this apprehension? Every intellection is an act of apprehension, but not every act of apprehension is intellection. Sensing is also apprehension. These two apprehensions can be directed to the same object, for example a color, a rock, etc. Hence, in order to conceptualize what intellective apprehension is, the most direct road consists in studying the modes of apprehension of this terminus which is common to both of them.

In the apprehension of this common terminus, for example color, the apprehension has its own radical character: it is sentient apprehension. Sentient apprehension consists in apprehension in impression. Impression is not just an affection of the apprehendor; rather, in this affection the impression presents to us something other than the apprehendor and his affection. This other thing has three constitutive moments: a *content*, a *mode of being other* (which I have called the ‘formality of otherness’), and a *force of imposition*. For our problem what is essential is found in the moment of formality. What is apprehended remains in the apprehension according to its formality; this is what I have called *actuality*. Actuality is not presence, but a being actually in presence. It is therefore a physical moment of what is apprehended.

Now, this actuality, this being situated or being actually present can have two modes. Something can be actually present as a mere response sign; this is the actuality which I have called ‘arousal’. It is the *formality of arousal or stimulation*. The characteristics of what is apprehended, for example its luminous intensity or its sound, are thus determining moments of a response. For this reason what is apprehended has an actuality but only as forming part of the response in itself. This is what constitutes pure animal sensing.

But there are apprehensions in which the characteristics of what is sensed in an impression are characteristics which are formally apprehended as pertaining to what is apprehended as its own: the intensity of a color or a sound is a moment apprehended as pertaining to what is apprehended even before the apprehension itself (prius). As this mode of being situated in the apprehension is a mode of being situated in impression, it follows that the apprehension is an act of *impression of reality*. In it, its content is actual in the impression, but with no reference whatsoever to a response. This is what I call *mere actuality*: what is apprehended is present and is just present. Now, these three moments (impression, of its own, and mere actuality) unitarily constitute what I call being *de suyo*. This is the formality of reality: a mode of otherness which consists in the *de suyo*. It does not refer to reality in the sense of the real as something “outside” of the impression, but to a formality present “in” the apprehension itself. And as such this formality is a physical moment of what is apprehended.

This apprehension of something in the formality of reality is just *sentient intellection*, or if one wishes *intel-
lective sensing. To apprehend the real as real is precisely the formal character of intellection. Being an impression is the formal character of sensing. Hence the impression of reality is the only act constituted by two moments: impression (sensing) and reality (intellective knowing). This apprehension is a sensing, but not a pure sensing as in the animal, but an intellective sensing, a sensing in which reality is sensed as reality. Man has this human sensing which the animal lacks, but also has a sensing which is purely on an animal level of stimulation in certain zones of his reality. Animal sensing is certainly a sensing “of man”, but is not a “human” sensing. In human sensing, the sensing is already a mode of intellective knowing, and intellective knowing is already a mode of sensing reality. Sensing and intellective knowing are thus not two acts, either successive [14] or concurrent; nor are they partial acts. Rather, they are two structural moments of a single act. This unique structure is therefore sentient intelligence, a formal structural unity whose only act is just the impressive actualization of the real.

Since it pertains of its own to what is apprehended, it follows that this formality of reality has two aspects, one opening onto what is apprehended, the other onto the sentient intelligence. The first aspect submerges us in and makes us penetrate into the real itself. The second, on the other hand, leads us to submerge ourselves in the intellective itself. This is what is important to us here, although the two aspects neither are nor can be independent.

The formality of reality is open *qua* reality; a single impression of reality encompasses the most diverse contents. This openness is transcendentality; it is not a concept of maximal universality, but a physical commonness of reality and therefore a moment of communication. In virtue of this openness, each thing is *de suyo* real only with respect to others; i.e., every real thing opens onto a *field of reality*. This does not refer to an extrinsic relation among things but to the moment formally constitutive of the openness of each real thing as real. Each real thing has, then, two moments. One, the individual moment (so to speak) of its own reality; the other, the moment of opening up or onto a field, the moment of field nature. They are two moments of a single reality; everything real is individually and in this field-sense real, and is always apprehended in these two moments.

Thus we have here what intellective knowing is, viz. the mere actualization of the real in sentient intelligence.

This intellection has diverse modes, i.e. diverse manners of actualization in the sentient intelligence [15] *qua* intellelction, determined, as I said in Part I, by the respectivity of reality itself, by the modes of actualization.

Above all, there is the primary and radical mode, what I have termed the *primordial apprehension of reality*. This primordiality comprises two characteristics. First, what is apprehended is actualized directly, immediately, and unitarily (despite its possible complexity of content, for example in the case of a landscape). This is the apprehension of the real *in and by itself*. The reality thus actualized has twin moments, individual and in a field; but they are apprehended indivisibly as moments of a real thing itself. This is what I term the *compact* apprehension of reality. But primordial apprehension has a second characteristic: it not only apprehends the real compactly in and by itself, but moreover apprehends it “only” in and by itself. The “only” is the modal characteristic of the primordial apprehension of reality.

But there are other modes which are *ulterior modalizations* of this primordial apprehension. The real, in fact, can be apprehended not only as something which has the characteristic of being in a field, but also as something which, by opening up a field, is included in it. Thus the real is not only apprehended as *being in a field*, but the *field itself is apprehended in the same way*, i.e. by means of the field which the real has determined. The moment of being in a field which in the primordial apprehension is actualized compactly together with the individual moment, is now autonomized so to speak with respect to the individual moment. The field is no longer just a compact moment of the real thing, but is the *ambit of reality*, an ambit which encompasses many real things. Thus each real thing should be intellectively known therein not just in and by itself but also with respect to the other [16] realities of the field. In this way we intellectively know not just that the thing is *real* but moreover what the real thing is *in reality*. This “in reality” is an ulterior modalization of the intellection of the thing as real.

Now, the actualization of a thing (i.e. one already intellectively known as real) within the ambit of reality of other things is the intellection which we call *logos*. It is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality, i.e. with respect to other real things. This logos is a mode of sentient intellection. It is above all a mode of intellection by being a mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence; this mode is a “re-actualization”. As such, the logos is an intellective moment. But this real thing is reactualized in a movement which *bears it* to others, and in function of them; only thus is a real thing reactualized. In accordance with this moment the logos is an impressive movement; it is the sentient moment. In it is where what the real thing is in reality is re-actualized. Hence it follows that the logos is sentient intellection; it is a *sentient logos*. The sentient logos is intellection within a field; it
is a modalization of the impression of reality. To intellectionally know what something is in reality is to restore the unity of the field nature moment and the individual moment of the real.

It is essential to observe that we are not dealing with a process but with a structure. When one intellectively knows what something is in reality after having intellectively known it as real, this ‘after’ does not mean that what one does is to “set oneself” to the task of intellectively knowing what that thing is in reality. The intelligence does not “set itself” the task of understanding what something is in reality; rather that task is already thrust upon it by reality itself, by the unity of its individual and field aspects. It is reality itself which, upon being apprehended as real, determines its intellectation “in” the unity of the field-nature moment and the individual moment. This is not an act which starts from me, but rather is a mode of actualization which starts from reality itself qua formally sensed reality. It is the sensed character of the real which necessarily determines us to understand what something is in reality.

To be sure, the real is not respective only to other things which are real within a field; it is at one and the same time respective to other real things qua real, i.e. qua of the world. World is the respective unity of everything real qua real. But I shall deal with the world and its respectivity to the field in Part III of the book. The second part is devoted to the sentient intelligence as logos: Intelligence and Logos.

This study will be conducted in three sections:

Section 1. The intellection of things in the field of reality.

Section 2. The formal structure of sentient logos I: logos as movement, as dynamic structure.

Section 3. The formal structure of sentient logos II: logos as mediated intellection.
SECTION I

INTELLECTION OF THINGS IN THE FIELD OF REALITY

In order to study the intellection of things in the field of reality, we must start from a conceptualization of that field. Every real thing has two moments in its formality of reality: the moment of individual reality and the moment of reality within a field. Hence, the field is a dimensional moment of a real thing. This field-nature moment can be considered in different ways. The field is something determined by each real thing, and this determination has two aspects. One, the most obvious, is that of being actually determined by the real thing itself; the other, that of being something which, determined by each thing, is a field which encompasses all sensed real things. According to the first aspect, reality is something open in itself, and according to the second aspect it is something which includes all things, it is the ambit of reality. Comparing the field to light, we might say that a real thing is above all a source of light, it is luminous, it is what bathes the field in light. But seeing that a thing is luminous is not the same thing as seeing that all other things, and the illuminator itself, are illuminated by the light which emanates from this real thing. The light from the illuminator insofar as it is such is a note determined by this luminous thing. But if we consider the light as something which illuminates real things, then this light is no longer just a note of each thing, but an ambit which encompasses everything [20] in the ambit of illumination, including the source of light itself. It is indeed not the same thing to see how the light shines forth from the luminous thing as it is to see this thing as illuminating, as spreading its light over everything else. In this comparison, the light is the field. And through its being determined by each thing, when I apprehend something in primordial apprehension, I do so not just in its moment of individual formality, but also in the moment of its formality within a field. This is true both with respect to it being a note of the illuminator, as in its being an illuminating source of reality. The field is the compact unity of these two aspects.

Granting this, if we apprehend things in the field of reality we can in turn apprehend them in two ways. One, as things which are included in the field; this is to intellectually know them as of field-nature. But we can also apprehend them as a function of the field in which they are included; this is to intellectually know them in the field sense, i.e., from within the field. Apprehending a thing in a field is proper to the primordial apprehension of reality. Apprehending it from within the field is proper to the logos.

Hence there are two steps in our problem:

1. The field of reality.
2. The real as intellectually known from within the field.

They will be the themes of the next two chapters, respectively.
CHAPTER II

THE FIELD OF REALITY

The field is first and foremost a moment of the formality of each real thing. Therefore understanding the field is something proper to the primordial apprehension of reality. The field is not just something privative with respect to the logos; indeed, it is not a primary moment of the logos. It is a moment of the logos, but one which is consequent, i.e., derived from immediate apprehension. It is necessary to insist upon this point: everything we may say about the field is already given in the primordial apprehension of reality of each real thing. Hence, this study should have been included in the first part of the book; but nonetheless I have reserved it for the second part because it is here that the field discharges its most important function.

We shall study the field in three successive phases:

1. General characteristics of the field of real things.
2. Strict concept of the field.
3. Internal structure of the field itself.

§ 1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD OF REAL THINGS

In general, language has only terms taken from visual apprehension to describe the field. And so, it might seem that the field is only a visual one. But this is a simple limitation of our language. Thus, recall that there are such things as background music, layers of footprints, etc., and that there is a field of displacement as much of things as of my own body. So taking the problem in all of its generality, we may say that the field is the unity of all these things insofar as all of them are actually in it, and therefore the field encompasses them. Even when we employ visual language, what is designated by that language is much broader than just the visual. Thus we are treating the field as the ambit of reality.

The field has a general structure which is very important. Above all there is in the field one or several things which are directly apprehended; they constitute the first level of the field. And when this first level is reduced to a single thing, that thing then acquires the characteristic of the center of the field. With respect to this first level, other things constitute the domain of the rest. And the rest of the things have a precise relation to the first level. In the first place, some of them constitute the background against which the things of the first level are apprehended. This dimension is what constitutes standing out: the things of the first level stand out against the background of the others. But in the second place there are other things which are not part of the background, but simply something which is in the periphery of the field. Thanks to this, the rest of the things of the field acquire a dimension of proximity or distance. The periphery is not strictly speaking a line but a variable zone. As one extends the things of the periphery, they recede further and further until they are lost. For this reason the periphery is the zone of the indefinite, both because it can remain indeterminate in itself, and because even when it is determined it can remain unnoticed by me. First level, background, and periphery are the triple dimension, so to speak, of the field. To be sure, these structures are not fixed. For example, I can vary the first level—which automatically changes the background and the periphery.

The field thus constituted is so, if I may be permitted the expression, in a private way, because the totality of this field in its three zones (first level, background, periphery) is surrounded at the same time by a line which positively determines what the field encompasses; this is
precisely its *horizon*. The horizon is not merely a line circumscibing it, but an intrinsic moment of the field itself. To be sure, it does not pertain directly to the things apprehended; but it does pertain to them insofar as they are encompassed in my apprehension of them. This circumscibing has two aspects. One determines the things which constitute the field as a totality, with its own character; every field has this kind of total character which we call, in visual terminology, a *panorama*. The intrinsic pertaining of the horizon to the field makes of the latter a panorama. The mode of apprehension of this panorama is *syn-opsis*. The placement of things within the synoptic panorama (24) is *syn-taxis*. Synopsis and syntaxis are the aspects of the panoramic unity of apprehension.

But the horizon also has another aspect. An horizon is what marks that which is outside the field. This is not “other” things but the pure “outside”. It can be other things outside the field, or something which is outside of everything, viz. the “undefined”. It is necessary to stress that “indefinite” is not the same as “undefined”. The indefinite is a mode of definition; the “undefined” is not defined even in the sense of indefinite. This difference is essential. The things outside of the field are the undefined.

To be sure, as I have already indicated the structure of the field is not fixed but variable. That dimension of it by which the field is variable is what we call *amplitude*. The amplitude is variable as much by amplification as by retraction. And by this I do not just refer to the quantity of things which the field encompasses, but to the mode of its unity as a field. This variation depends not only on me, but also on things. Above all, new things modify the horizon; this is the *displacement* of the horizon. Moreover, every new thing which is introduced into the field, removed from it, or moved inside of it, determines a change in the first level, in the background, and in the periphery; this is a very profound *reorganization* of the field. Displacement of the horizon and internal reorganization are the two aspects of variability of the field. They are not always independent of each other, but we cannot get into this question or other problems concerning the field because it would take us away from the central question. Let what has been said suffice for now.

Next we shall try to conceptualize with some rigor what this field is.

§ 2

THE STRICT CONCEPT OF FIELD


1) Above all, we are here posing a very fundamental problem. The panoramic constitution of the field in its two aspects of apprehensive synopsis and positional syntaxis might lead one to think that the field is always something extrinsic to things. But this, as we are going to see, is not the case. The field is nothing beyond real things; I shall repeat that over and over. And even when describing the field I spoke of what is “beyond” the horizon, this “beyond” pertains to the things themselves. Without these things it would not make sense to speak of “beyond them”. The field, then, is something in the things themselves. We shall see this immediately.

The field of which we have been speaking can be described first of all through its content, by the things that are in it: rocks, trees, the sea, etc. But the field can and ought to be described according to its own unity. This unity, from the viewpoint of the things it contains, constitutes what can be called the *perceptive field*. But this denomination is quite inappropriate as we shall see forthwith. Clearly, in this sense the field does not concern the things themselves. That some of them may be near or far, that some may be in the center or the periphery of my apprehension, has nothing to do with the things themselves (at least formally). It is only my perceptive act which encompasses them in a single field. (26) The character of the field is constituted in this case only by my perceptive act. The field is thus extrinsic to the things. To be sure, the things themselves are not completely detached from their position in the field; their size, for example, is not indifferent to their position in the field. But even so, these things which the perceptive act encompasses in unity, are things by reason of their specific content.

Nonetheless, these same things can and ought to be described not only by their content but also by their formality; they are things which are formally real in apprehension. Therefore it is necessary to speak of a *field of reality*. That which, as I said, we improperly call a ‘perceptive field’ is nothing but the apprehended content of the field of reality. Strictly speaking, one ought to speak only of a field of real things. The field of reality, in contrast to what up to now we have called the perceptive field, is open in and by itself; in and by itself it is unlimited. On the other hand, described from the point of view of the content of things, the field is closed by the things which constitute and limit it. The merely perceptive field...
offers a panorama of things; the field of reality offers a panorama of realities. In fact, let us suppose that in this perceptive field there is a light which is turned off, and all of a sudden it is turned on. From the point of view of the content, i.e., with respect to what we have called the perceptive field, there is something new: a new light in the meadow or on the mountain. But from the point of view of the field of reality there is a real thing which comes from beyond the reality that was apprehended before. And it comes not only to the meadow or the mountain but also to the reality of my field; it is something new in reality. With it the horizon of reality has been pushed back, although not so for the (27) horizon of the things seen. With the entrance of the light in the merely perceptive field, this field has been additively enriched; viz., another thing has been added to those that were there before. But from the point of view of reality, there is not properly speaking an addition; rather, what has happened is that the character of the field of reality has encompassed, so to speak, a real thing which previously was not in it.

Therefore, this amplification of the field of reality is not properly speaking “addition” but rather “expansion”; what constitutes the formality of the new thing is numerically the same character of reality which constituted the rest of the things of the field. The real as “thing” is now distinct; but this thing as “real”, i.e. its formality of reality, is physically and respectively the same in number. Whence it follows that what has happened is that the field of reality has been expanded in order to encompass a new thing. The amplification or contraction of the field of reality, i.e. the changes of the field of real things perceptively apprehended as real is not additive but expansionary. Thus, in contrast to the perceptive field (in the sense of a thing contained in the field), which is extrinsic to things, the field of reality is intrinsic to them; it is given to me in the impression of reality. This reality is, as we saw, formally and constitutively open. And this openness concerns the impression of reality as such, and therefore all the modes of presentation of the real. Among them there is one, the mode of the “toward”. What is now important about this “toward” is that the other realities are in this case, as we have already said, other real things with respect to which each is what it is. Now, this respectivity is formally what constitutes the moment of each real thing in virtue of which each thing is in a field. This field is thus determined by each real thing with (28) respect to itself, from which it follows that each real thing is intrinsically and formally of a field nature. Even were there no more than a single thing, this thing would be de suyo of field nature. That is, every real thing, besides having what we might loosely call ‘individual respectivity’, formally and constitutively has field-nature respectivity. Every real thing, then, has the two moments of individual “thingness” and field-nature thingness. Only because each real thing is intrinsically and formally of field-nature, only for this reason can the field be constituted by many things.

If we wish to express in a single word the nature of the field such as we have just described it, we can say that the field “exceeds” or “goes beyond” a real thing inasmuch as it is an opening toward others. The field-nature moment is a moment of “exceedence” of each real thing. And because this moment is at the same time constitutive of the real thing, it follows that the field is both exceedent and constitutive; it is a “constitutive exceedent”. So more concretely, What is this field-nature moment of the real, i.e., what is this exceedence, this going beyond?

2. The field, we said, is “something more” than each real thing and therefore something more than their simple sum. It is a proper unity of real things, a unity which exceeds what each thing is individually, so to speak. Since thing and field have, as we saw in Part I, a cyclic character, i.e., each thing is a “field-thing”, that exceedence can be seen from two points of view: the field as determined from real things, and real things qua included in the field.

A) Viewed from real things, the field-nature exceedence is a mode of what in Part I we called ‘transcendence’. Transcendentality is a moment of (29) the impression of reality, that moment in virtue of which reality is open both to what each thing really is, to its “its-own-ness”, and to what each thing is qua moment of the world. It is, in a synthetic formula, “openness to the its-own-ness of the world”. And because this openness is constitutive of the impression of reality as such, it follows that the openness is what makes each real thing, by being real, to be more than what it is by being green, sonorous, heavy, etc. Every real thing is in itself, qua real, something which is itself and only itself; but by being real it is more than what it is by its simple content. This is a transcendental exceedence, and it is proper to every real thing in and by itself. But when there are many real things in the same impression of reality, then transcendentality is what makes it possible for these things to comprise a supra-individual unity; this is the field-sense unity. “Field” is not formally transcendentality, but a field is a sentient mode (though not the only one) of transcendentality. The respectivity of the many sensed things becomes field-nature respectivity in virtue of transcendentality. Tran-

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* ‘Field nature’ translates Zubiri’s campo. It means being within a field, and furthermore that this is an essential characteristic of the thing. trans.*
scendentality is what sentiently constitutes the field of reality; it is the very sentient constitution of the field of reality. The field as exceeding real things is the field of their transcendental respectivity. In this way, the field is a moment of physical character.

B) But it is also necessary to see things from the standpoint of the field. In this sense, the field is something more than the real things because it “encompasses” them. Upon apprehending the formality of reality, we apprehend it as something which, to be sure, is in a thing and only there, but which exceeds it as well. And thus this formality acquires a function which in a certain way is autonomous. It is not only the formality of each real thing, but [30] that “in which” all things are going to be apprehended as real. It is the formality of reality as ambit of reality. The field is not only as transcendent, but also as the ambit of reality. It is the same structure but seen now not from the standpoint of things but vice versa, so that things are seen from the standpoint of the field.

The ambit is a physical characteristic of the field of reality the same as its transcendentality; it is the ambit of a real thing itself.

The ambit is not some sort of material covering or wrapping, like some atmosphere which envelops the real things. In particular, I stress that the ambit is not space. In the first place, space is not a radical part of things, but something determined by something radical in them, viz. spaciousness. Things are spacious, and only because of this is there space. Spaceness is neither relative nor absolute space. But neither is the ambit spaceness. What spaceness and space are is something which has to be understood with respect to the ambit, and not the other way around—as if the ambit were either space or spaciousness. The ambit is rather something like the ambience which things generate. Therefore it is nothing which goes beyond them. The ambience is ambient “in” things themselves just as transcendentality is transcendentality “in” them. Nonetheless, things and their ambience of reality are not formally identical. The ambit is the ambience “in” things; it is a physical characteristic of them, consisting above all in being the ambient of real things. The ambience is not the atmosphere which surrounds things but the ambience which they themselves determine. This is respectivity as ambit. And for the same reason this ambit is not a void of reality—that would be for us to leave real things altogether and is impossible. The ambit is the ambit of the proper formality of reality, which is [31] perfectly physical. Encompassing is just a physical moment of the formality of reality; it is respectivity qua constituent of the field.

In summary, the field of reality has two important characteristics which express its excedence with respect to real things. The field is “more” than each real thing, but is more “in” them. The field is, in fact, the respectivity of the real qua given in the impression of reality. And this respectivity is at one and the same time transcendentality and ambit. They are the two characteristics which give to respectivity its full meaning. Like transcendentality, the respectivity of the real leads in a certain respect from each real thing to other realities. As ambit it is the ambient which encompasses each real thing. Ambit and transcendentality are but two aspects of a single characteristic: the field-nature of the sensed real. This characteristic is what we shall always call transcendental ambit. The formality of the real thus has two aspects. On one hand, it is the formality of each thing in and by itself, what loosely speaking might be termed “individual formality”. But on the other hand it is an excedent formality in the thing, i.e., it is a field-nature formality. And this field-natureness is transcendental ambit.

Anticipating some ideas I may say that according to the moment which I have termed ‘individual’, the intellection of a real thing consists in intellectively knowing it as real: “this thing is real”. According to the moment which I have termed ‘field-nature’, the intellection of the real thing intellectively knows reality as being this thing in this way in reality: “reality is this thing”. They are not two different apprehensions but two moments of a single apprehension; but as moments they are distinct.

In the transcendental ambit we have the general character, [32] or the global character, so to speak, of what we call the ‘field of reality’. But it is necessary to take one more step; it is necessary to ask ourselves, in fact, What is the intrinsic structure of the field of reality, of the transcendental ambit of reality? This is the subject of the next section.

§ 3

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIELD OF REALITY

In virtue of being a transcendental ambit, the field of reality can contain many real things. But it does not contain them in just any form, i.e., as some mere multitude; on the contrary, this multitude has very precise structural characteristics. They are the very structure of the field of reality. It is a structure which, as I will state, is given in the primordial apprehension of reality.
1

Some Things “Among” Others

In order to discover the structures of the field of reality, let us start from the fact that reality, such as it is given to us in impression, has different forms, one of which is the “toward” by which reality inexorably leads us to other realities. This does not refer to an inference or anything of that nature, nor is it a going toward reality; rather, it is an apprehending of reality itself in the mode of “toward”, in a directional mode as a moment of reality. This “toward” is not just a mode of reality’s presenting itself, but is, like the other modes, a mode of presentation which is transcendentally open. This means that every thing by virtue of being real is in itself of field nature; every real thing constitutes a form of reality “toward” another. To be sure, the “toward” is formally a form of reality; but the “toward” in transcendental openness (proper to the impression of reality) is formally of field nature. And since this impression is numerically identical in all real things apprehended in an impression, it follows that in the field determined by the reality of each thing all the others are there as well. This is a structural and formal moment of the field; the field determines the reality of each thing as a reality “among” others. The “among” is grounded in the field nature and not the other way around; it is not the case that there is a field because there are some things situated among others, but rather some things are situated among others only because each and every one of them is in the field. And there is a field precisely and formally because the reality of each thing is formally of field nature. The “among” is not just a conglomeration; nor is it the mere relation of some things with others. Rather, it is a very precise structure, that of the actualization of one thing among others.

To be sure, the “among” is a moment of the activity of the real: a real thing as such is among others. But the “among” also has a characteristic of actuality: the thing is actualized “among” others. Clearly these two aspects of “among” do not coincide, because there can be many things situated among others which are not intellectually present in actuality. What is important to us here is the “among” of actuality. It is a positive characteristic proper to each real thing qua of field nature. The “toward” of field-natureness is above all a “toward” in “among”, or in other words, an “among” which positively has the characteristic of a “toward” of reality. If this were not the case, the “among” would be pure emptiness. But it is a field because it is reality open in a “toward” from each thing to all the others. And it is so because that openness is in turn determined by the reality of each thing. By being determined by the reality of each thing, the “toward” is a real “toward”; it is reality in “toward”. And it is in this that the field as “among” consists. Because of this things are not only some among others, so to speak materially, i.e. in actuality; but moreover they have a position with respect to others, they are among others by reason of their actuality. The field as the first plane, as the periphery, as the horizon, is just the structure of positionality; i.e., the structure of the “among” as a “toward”. The field is not only something which encompasses things, but prior to doing so is something in which they are included, each and every one. Prior to encompassing things, and in order to be able to encompass them, the field includes the things in itself. And this inclusion is grounded in the field-nature characteristic of each real thing qua real. Hence: 1) the real thing determines the field; 2) the field determines the inclusion of the real in it; and 3) the field encompasses what is included in it. Such is the first structural moment of the field, viz., the position in the “among”. Etymologically ‘among’ means the interior determined by two things. But each one represents the possibility of this determination because each thing is real in the “toward”. In this way the “among” is a moment of the transcendental ambit.

But this is not the only structural moment of the field, because things are not only various but variable.

2

Some Things as a “Function” of Others

All things are variable in the field of reality. Above all, they can enter and leave it, or change their position with respect to other things. But in addition, each note, for example color, size, etc., taken in and by itself, is something which can change and does change. Now, when we apprehend various things in a field, none of them is apprehended monolithically, so to speak, as if the unity of the field were merely additive. On the contrary, each thing is actualized together with others, or after them, or outside of them, or on the periphery of the field, etc. Each real thing in a field is actualized not just “among” other things but also as a function of them. Po-

* Zubiri is here adopting language from mathematics, e.g. variable x is a function of y and z. The sense is that each thing is connected in an essential way to others, and changes in terms of (or as a “function” of) their actions.-trans.]
position, so to speak, is proper to a thing “among” others, but this is an “among” in which each thing has the position it does as a function of the others, and changes as a function of them. A real thing can disappear from the field; but this is never a type of volatilization of the thing, but a ceasing to be “among” the other things. Hence, it always (and only) disappears as a function of them. The unity of the field-nature moment and the individual moment is a functional “among”; it is what I term the functionality of the real. Here ‘functionality’ is taken in its broadest sense, and hence without any allusion to the diverse types of functionality which can be present. The fact that a thing is of field nature implies a character of functionality that is radical. Conversely, real things are not primarily encompassed by the field, but rather each is included in it, as we say; encompassing is grounded upon inclusion. Now, the mode of field-nature inclusion of each real thing has the intrinsic and formal characteristic of functionality.

What is this functionality? I have already described it: it is dependence in the broadest sense of the word. This functional dependence can assume diverse forms. We may cite some which are of special importance. Thus, a real thing can change as a function of another real thing which has preceded it; this is pure (37) succession. Succession is a type of functionality. The same must be said of something which is not successive but rather coexistent, namely when one real thing coexists with another. Coexistence is now functionality. From this point of view, every real thing in the field occupies a position by virtue of a field-nature function, in the field; it is next to other things, it is in the first plane or on the periphery, etc. But there are still other forms of functionality. Real material things are constituted by points. Each point is “outside” of the others; it is an ex. But it is not something which is simply outside; rather, the ex is a unity constructed with respect to the other ex’s as points of the thing. We express this by saying that every ex is an “ex-of”. In virtue of this every point has a necessary position with respect to other points by reason of its “ex-of” or “out-of”. This quality of position in the “ex-of” is what I call spaciocity. It is a property of each material reality. Now, the functionality of real spacious things qua spacious is space; this is spaciality. Space is grounded in spaciocity. And this functionality depends upon the other notes of the things. That is to say, it is things which determine the structure of the functionality, i.e. the structure of space. As I see it, this determination is movement; the structure of space is thus the geometric cast of movement. (Naturally, I do not refer to geometric space but to physical space.) It can be quite varied: topological, affine, and metric structures, for example, and under this latter there are different metrics, viz. Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Succession, coexistence, position, spaciocity and spatiality, etc., and types of functionality. I do not claim to have made anything like a complete enumeration; I have only mentioned these cases to exemplify functional dependence. (38)

This functionality is, I said, an intrinsic and formal characteristic of the field; i.e., it is not the case, for example, only that B depends upon A; rather, there is an inverse function as well. In the case of temporal succession, B may certainly succeed A, i.e., be dependent upon A. But in turn, A precedes B; it is the antecedent. Functionality, then, is not a relation of some things with others, but is a structural characteristic of the field itself qua field; some things depend upon others because all are included in a field which is intrinsically and formally a functional field. This means that every real thing, by virtue of its moment of field nature-ness, is functional reality. Moreover, the functionality is an intrinsic field-nature characteristic because it pertains to each real thing by the mere fact of being of field-nature: each thing determines the field-nature-ness, and therefore its own functionality. Field-nature reality itself is, qua reality, of a functional character. That each real thing depends upon another is owing to the proper reality of both of them, to the intrinsic functional character of the field itself. The field is in itself a field of functionality. Only on account of this can each thing depend upon others. But it can also be independent of some of them. Independence is a mode of functionality.

I repeat, functionality is a moment of the reality of each field-nature thing. And each thing is a “toward” which is transcendentally open to other real things. Each thing is formally real by being de suyo. Now, each real thing is de suyo transcendentally open, and this openness has a dimension which is formally functional. This field-nature functional actualization is proper to the unity of all the modes of sensed reality, one of which is the “toward”. What is of field-nature is functional in the “toward”.

Whence arises an essential characteristic of functionality. It is not (39) a functionality which primarily concerns the content of the notes of the real, but rather concerns their actualization as real. It is not that a body, for example, is of functional character qua body; i.e., it is not that a body depends upon some other body or some other content. That will always be problematic. What is not problematic is that by being real, the body is in functional dependence with respect to other reality qua reality. Hence we are dealing with the functionality of the real as real. This is the essential point, as we shall see forthwith.

Now, this functionality is what is expressed by the
preposition “by”. Everything real “by” being field-nature real is functionally real, “by” some reality. This “by” is something sensed and not something conceived. Human sensing is an intellective sensing that is radically an impression of reality; it is something given “physically”. Hence any subsequent intellectively physically moves in this already physically given reality. Intellection does not need to get to reality because it is formally already there. Now, because this reality is actualized in a field-nature way, the field-nature-ness is a moment of the impression of reality; and therefore the functionality itself is a moment which is given in the impression of reality. It is given as one of reality’s formal moments. Thus we are not dealing with inference or anything of that nature, but rather with a datum which is immediately and formally given in the impression of reality.

Conversely, the datum is a datum of simple functionality. It is essential to insist upon this point in order to preclude serious errors.

Above all, ‘functionality’ is not synonymous with ‘causality’. Causality is but one type of functionality among others. In classical philosophy a cause is that from which something (40) proceeds by means of a real influence upon the being of the effect. Now, causality is not something given. We never perceive the productive influence of a real thing upon another. Thus, as I see it, the experimental studies (otherwise of the first rank) dealing with the presumed immediate perception of causality are radically incorrect. Our perception never perceives causality, but always does perceive the functionality; in the field of reality we sense reality in its functional moment as a field-nature moment of the impression of reality. We perceive that a thing is real as a function of others, and functionality which can be and is quite varied. Causality is only a type of functionality, and moreover very problematic. For example, with respect to efficient causality no refutation of metaphysical occasionalism is possible in the intramundane order. But for now I leave aside human actions; they will be taken up again in Part III. The “by” is functional, but this does not mean that it is causal. The “by” is something which we always perceive.

In the second place, this functionality is formally sensed, i.e., not only is it something accessible, it is something for which access is already physically given in sentient intellectation, in the transcendental “toward”. Whence the error of Hume’s critique. For Hume, causality is not given, but only temporal succession. Now, I have just said myself that causality is not given. But Hume did not notice that there are two different aspects of the question. First of all, he did not see that temporal succession is just a form of functionality. In the second place, the succession is not the succession of two impressions, but the same impression of reality, one which is of successive nature—which means that what is essential about functionality does not concern the content of the impressions (41) but their formality of reality. In Hume’s example, the ringing of the bell just follows upon the pulling of the cord. Now, it is not the case that the bell’s ringing is qua ringing a function of the pulling of a cord qua cord; rather, the fact is that it is the reality of the ringing qua real which is a function of the reality of the pulling of the cord qua reality. And this is something perfectly given, even supposing that the ringing were not a function of the pulling of the cord. Functionality is functionality of the real inasmuch as it is real. In this sense it is a concept which encompasses many possible types. This functionality, this “by” as such is given in the impression of reality. Hume’s whole critique is based upon the content of sensing, but he erred on the matter of formality. Content is always problematic. There isn’t sensing “and” intellective knowing, but only sentient intellectation, impressive intellectation of the real qua real.

In the third place, let us observe that the exordium of Kant’s Critique is Hume. Since causality is not given, for Kant it is an a priori synthesis, a synthetic a priori judgement as the possibility of objective knowledge. Now, this is unacceptable. Above all, functionality is neither an analytic judgement (Leibniz) nor a synthetic judgement (Kant). Functionality is given in impression, not in its content but in its formality of reality, because it is a moment of the “toward”. And the “toward” is not a judgement. As such it is not something a priori to the logical apprehension of objects, but a datum of the impression of reality. Whence the formal object of knowledge is not causality but functionality. The science of which Kant speaks (Newtonian physics) is not a science of causes but a science of functions of the real qua real.

* * *

In summary, the field of reality has a structure which is determined by two moments: the moment of the “among”, and the moment of the “by”. Each thing is real in the field among other real things and as a function of them. These two moments are not independent. Functionality, the “by”, is rigorously speaking the form of the “among” itself. The form of being “among” is functional.

With this we have set forth in broad outline the structure of the field of reality. In order to preclude false interpretations it is not out of place to stress again the
concept of the field. Above all, the field of reality is a moment which concerns things, but in their formality of otherness; i.e., it concerns things when they are intellec-
tively known. The field is not a moment of these real things *qua* real beyond impression. The field is a dimen-
sion of the real such as it is given in apprehension itself. But on the other hand the field is not something which depends upon sentient intellec-
tion as an act of mine; it is not therefore something so to speak “subjective”. The field is a dimensional moment of the real given in sentient intellec-
tion, but only as actualized therein. It is a moment of actuality, not of actuity. To be sure, this actuality is only given in apprehension, in sentient intellec-
tion; but it is a physical moment of the real which is apprehended *qua* reality. This actuality is merely actual-ity, and as such constitutes an intellec-
tion. As actuality, it is always and only actuality of reality itself. Therefore the field as a dimension of the actuality of the real is not a moment of the real beyond apprehension; but neither is it a subjective moment. It is a moment of actuality of the real as real in sentient intellec-
tion. [43]

In this field thus determined in and by each real thing we apprehend in subsequent intellec-
tion what the things already apprehended as real are in reality. This is a modal intellec-
tion of its primordial apprehension. Which? That is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

THE REAL INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN WITHIN A FIELD:
THE SENTIENT LOGOS

In primordial apprehension one apprehends each real thing in its twin dimensions as individual and in a field. But to intellectively know something in this latter way is not necessarily to intellectively know it in the field manner, i.e., as in a field. Being in a field concerns the notae of the real thing; the field is a dimension of these notae. But intellectively knowing something as in a field is something different: it is intellectively knowing the real thing inasmuch as it is included in the field which it itself has previously determined by its notae; it is to intellectively know not the field-thing but to intellectively know it “in” the field.

The intellection of a real thing in the field of reality is, as I have already said, an ulterior intellection or modalization of the primordial intellection of something real. To be sure, this modalization is not only about being in a field; every intellection of a real thing has the modalization of being intellectively known as a moment of the world. In both cases we not only intellectively know something as “real”*, we also intellectively know what this real thing is “in reality”. But in field-type intellection we intellectively know what something is in reality with respect to other real sensed or sensible things; while in the worldly intellection we intellectively know what something is in reality in the world. In this second part of the book I refer only to what something is in respect to other things within a field.

In order to see what this intellection is, we must explicate two great problems: (1) In what does field intellection as such consist? And (2) What is the basic structure of this intellection? {47}
thing is, the Greeks claim that one deals with the logos in an autonomous sense: declarative logos (logos apopphantikos). This declarative logos consists in “declaring something about something” (legein ti kata tinos). The logos always involves a certain duality of “somethings”. But the Greeks did not concern themselves with the first “something”; they thought that that which is said can be in itself just an idea. But as I see it this is untenable because the so-called ‘ideas’ always come from things, and only from them. Whence the declaration of what something is cannot be fully carried out except as based on something else in the field. What something is in reality cannot be understood except by referring it to some other thing within the field. Therefore logos, prior to being a declaration, is intellection of one thing in the field based upon another. And this means that the logos itself is a mode of intellection and hence is not a structure which rests upon itself. The tendency of the Greeks was always in the opposite direction, a tendency which I have termed logification of intellection. At the dawn of philosophy, in Parmenides, there is a growing intervention of phræzein, of expressing; a tendency which culminates in a “discerning with logos”, krinein logoi. And this was not just a manner of speaking; the proof is that Parmenides’ disciple Zeno is presented to us by Plato as a theoretician of dialectical discussion. Even in theology, logos has been attributed to God, in the philosophical sense of judgement. But this is impossible. Intelligence is not logos; rather, logos is a human mode of intellection. God has intelligence but does not have logos. One cannot logify intellection but on the contrary must intelligize the logos. [49]

3) For the Greeks, logos was a problem of the first magnitude. But they always understood this problem seeing in the logos the supreme form of nous, of intelligence; i.e., the nous as expressed or expressible. After Parmenides, only this logos type of intellection is intellection in the strict sense; the rest is mere doxa, opinion. Regardless of what Parmenides himself understood by doxa, it is certain that Plato and Aristotle understood that doxa is aisthesis, sensing. And so with Parmenides thus enconced in nous, he tells us that to intellectually know something is the same (tauton) as to intellection know that this something “is”: that which is intellectually known is on, being. The logification of intellection thus brought along with it the entification of reality. And as the logos always involves a certain duality, Parmenides therefore insists that the on, being, is one, hen.

To the Greeks the force of all this was overwhelming. And the proof is the manner in which Plato and Aristotle disputed with Parmenides. To Plato, the identity of what is intellectively known with being leads to the problem of negation: one says of something that it “is not”. Hence the “parricide” which Plato believes he is committing against Parmenides is but an act of supreme fidelity: to intellectively know that something “is not” is always to intellectively know that what “is not”, “is”. That was the idea of the being of non-being in Plato. Aristotle confronted the problem of Parmenides not from this identity of the legomenon with the on, but from the presumed unity of being itself. For Aristotle “being” is expressed in many ways; the unity of being is not destroyed but rather is endowed with diverse types of unity. His logos is a copulative “one” which possesses different modes of unity.

In the final analysis the Greeks saw the radical problem of logos in the formal plane of being and unity, i.e. in the plane of what is said or expressed. But as I see it the discussion should not have been carried to this formal plane; [50] rather it should have descended to a more fundamental plane.

In the first place, is it true that logos formally falls back upon an “is” (including also the “is not”)? The truth is that the Greeks never tell us in what, formally, intellection knowing consists. Nonetheless they believe that intellection knowing and therefore logos is always intellection of the “is”. Now as I see it the formal act of intellection knowing is not intellectively knowing the “is”, but rather consists in apprehending reality; the formal terminus of intellection knowing is not being but reality. I have explicated this already in the first part of the book. One cannot entify reality, but on the contrary must reify being.

Hence intellection knowing is something previous to any logos, because the real is proposed to the logos in order to be declared. In virtue of this, intellection knowing is not formally judgement, nor saying what the real “is”. One cannot logify intellection, but must do the reverse, viz. intelligize the logos; i.e., conceptualize the logos as a mode, as a modalization of intellection knowing, which is to say of the apprehension of the real as real.

Entification of reality and logification of intellection knowing are the two great presuppositions of Greek philosophy. For my part I think that it is necessary to reify being and intelligize the logos. And with that, one reaches the fundamental plane of the logos. What is the nature of this plane?

For the Greeks, intelligence (nous) and sensing (aisthesis) were always opposites. Be as it may the doxa of Parmenides, there is no doubt that Greek philosophy always ascribed the doxa to sensing. But what is sensing? It is of course the presentation of something which in one or another way has a moment of reality. But if this is so,
there is never a [51] structural opposition in man between intellec
tive knowing and sensing. As intellec
tive knowing is apprehending the real, it follows that if the real is al-
ready presented in and through the sens
es as real, then intellection itself already has a radically sentient charac-
ter. There is then no opposition between intellec
tive knowing and sensing, but rather a structural unity. Intel-
lective knowing and sensing are just two moments of a
single act, the act of impressively apprehending reality. It is
the sentient intelligence whose act is impression of re-
al
ity. Logos is a modalization of this impression of reality.
Logos is not intellection of being but of reality sensed in
impression; the “is” of the logos is but the human expres-
sion of the impression of reality. Hence ultimately the
logos is intrinsically and formally a mode of sentient in-
tellection; it is sentient logos. What does this mean in
more concrete terms? We shall answer that question in
detail throughout the course of this book; but to orient the
reader I shall anticipate some ideas which will be devel-
oped later.

Most importantly, I do not refer only to the fact that
the logos is based on an impression of reality; in such case
it would be only a sensible logos. Rather, I mean that the
impression of reality is itself what has need of the logos.
And this necessity is what confers upon the logos its sen-
tient character. Logos in effect tells us what something is
in reality. And the difference between “real” and “in re-
al
ity” is determined by the impression of reality in its field
moment.

Furthermore, I do not mean that what is intellec-
tively known in the logos is sensed the same as a color or
a sound; I can intellec
tively know, in my logos, irrational
numbers, for example. But the fact is that both the color
and the irrational numbers pertain to the content of what
is intellec
tively known, whereas the intellection itself in
its sentient mode concerns not the content but the mode in
which this content shows up in the apprehension. [52]
We shall investigate this at some length below. The irra-
tional numbers are not apprehended like a color, but just
as color they are apprehended in the same formality of
reality, in the same impression of reality in which color is
apprehended. An irrational number is not the same as a
color, but it is real in the same formality of reality in
which the color is real. In both cases the formality of re-
al
ity is numerically the same. Logos is sentient not by vir-
tue of what is intellec
tively known, but by virtue of the
mode of its intellection; it is an intellection within the
formality of sensed reality.

What is the structure of this logos?

In the first place, logos as mode of intellection is an
ulterior mode of mere actualization of the real. This mode
consists in being a “re-actualization” within a field of
what has already been actualized in the primordial appre-
hension of reality. Underlying every act of logos is the
reactualization of the real within a field. This is what
makes of the logos a mode of intellection, a mode of actu-
alization of the real. Logos is to be understood with re-
spect to intellection; we thus have an intelligization of the
logos.

In the second place, this actualization is imposed by
the impression of reality; it is what bears us from the im-
mediately real to what that real is in reality. What is in-
tellec
tively known in the logos is what is real in its field
moment, i.e., within a field, because every impression of
reality is of field-type. Nonetheless the real thus appre-
hended is not necessarily sensed as within a field. Every
impression of reality is, in fact, of field-type; it has a mo-
ment of transcendental openness to other sensed things.
The sensed real has thus a formality of reality with two
moments: an individual moment, so to speak, and a field-
type moment, a moment within a field. But apprehend-
ing the real in the field manner is something different; it is
not apprehending that the individual reality opens up a
determinate field, but is [53] apprehending the individual
reality based on the reality field itself. And it is not ne-
necessary that this always occur; it is not necessary that the
individual formality be apprehended in the field manner.
But on the other hand, apprehending the individuality in
the field manner, i.e. based on the field, is necessarily a
mode of sensing. And in this mode of sensing I sense not
just that what is apprehended is real, but also what the
apprehended thing is in reality. Now, apprehending what
something is in reality is nothing but logos. Hence the
logos is the field-type mode of sensing reality, and con-
versely sensing the real in the field manner is already an
incipient logos. The logos is, then, a mode of sensing,
and sensing is incipiently a mode of logos; it is sentient
logos. It is the mode of sensing the real in a field, i.e., the
mode of intellec
tively knowing the real based on the field
of sensed reality.

In the third place, the impression of reality sentiently
“bears” us to the logos. Hence sensing in the field manner
is formally movement. It is not a movement which bears
us from one intellection to another; but rather the move-
ment itself is that in which reality is formally reactualized.
What is this movement? It is not a simple intentionality,
nor a directing of oneself to one terminus from the other.
Beneath the intention there lies something more radical:
attention. Attention is not merely a psychic phenomenon,
but a properly intellec
tive moment, yet not the most rad-
ical one. Attention, in fact, is borne from one terminus to
the other. And that which attentionally bears us is there-
fore prior to attention itself. And this is precisely the movement in which the logos formally consists: only because we are moving ourselves do we attend to different termini; and only by attending to different termini do we also have different intentions. Now, that movement is strictly and formally sentient. In order to apprehend something real based on the field we need, within the field itself, to distance ourselves or to step back from the real thing in question. This is not a stepping back with respect to space, but in the ambit of reality, of a reality sensed as formality. That stepping back is thus sentient; it is structurally found to be based on the moment of the “towards” of sentient intellection. It is therefore a stepping back in sentient intellection. And with the thing thus apprehended by stepping back, in the field manner, from the field “toward” it, affirming what it is in reality. Affirmation is the reversion of sentient intellect to the real. Distance is a stepping back in sentient intellection, and the reversion to the thing in sentient intellection is the very essence of affirmation, is the logos. It is a sentient intellection in stepping back within a field. Dynamism, formally constitutive of logos, is being an intellective movement in which we have stepped back in the sensed field of reality.

Reactualization of the real, movement within a field, is what logos essentially is, viz., sentient logos. An intelligence which was not sentient would not be able to have, nor would it need to have, any logos whatsoever. In contrast to classical philosophy, it is necessary to think, then, that logos is formally and constitutively sentient logos.

Granting this, it is necessary to explain at greater length this structure. It will be done in two steps: What is the basic structure of any logos? And What is the formal structure of the logos? As this second step is quite involved, it will constitute by itself a separate section, Section 2, of this volume.

§ 2

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE LOGOS

This basic structure has, as I have already pointed out, three moments. First, the logos says something about something. Therefore there are two somethings; this is the dual structure of the logos as a mode of intellection. In what does this duality consist? Secondly, the logos moves in this duality. In what does this movement consist? Thirdly, the logos declares what something is in reality, and how it is installed in a reality field as a reality constitutive of the medium of intellection itself. The basic structure of the logos has these three moments: duality, dynamicity, mediality. Only upon this base can there be a declarative logos about something. Let us examine these moments in turn.

I. The duality of intellection in which the sentient logos consists. We shall repeat what has already been said in order to explain it in a coherent fashion. The logos tells us something about a real thing, and what it tells us is what this thing is in reality. And what it tells us of the thing is in turn based on the prior intellection of another real thing, because what it tells us, the so-called ‘ideas’—as I have already indicated—do not exist on their own but are the intellection of things. The fact that the logos tells us something about a real thing means that we do not intellectively know what this thing is in reality except by intellection of something prior. Now, these two things—that of which we seek to know what it is in reality, and that prior thing by which we intellecively know it—are each a terminus of a primordial intellection. And the result is that in the intellection of what something is in reality two apprehensions intervene. First, this thing is apprehended as real in a primordial apprehension; for example, I apprehend something as a reality in a landscape. But there is another apprehension, the apprehension of this same real thing already apprehended, and inasmuch as it is what it is in reality: from what was apprehended in the primordial apprehension we now say that it consists in being a tree. For this, I recur to the previous apprehension of something that was a tree. And it is based on the intellection of this tree that we intellecively know that the real thing in the landscape consists in reality in being a tree. This second apprehension is not a primordial apprehension of reality; it is something different: an apprehension which I shall term dual. For it is certainly true that a real thing is apprehended, but it is so with reference to something previously apprehended.

That which is apprehended, instead of being apprehended directly, is apprehended as a function of a previous apprehension. One has, so to speak, one foot on the thing which is being intellecively known, and the other on something which has already been so known. For this reason, the apprehension is dual. It is thus intellecively known that the thing (of which we seek to know what it is in reality) is the same, similar to, or different from that first and previously known. The apprehension of the real as “real-among” is constitutively dual because this appre-

1 The English to step back is used as the most natural translation of the Spanish distanciar, a word which expresses a concept Zubiri has derived from Heidegger. - trans.
hension involves the apprehension of the real thing and the apprehension of that “among” which the thing is. If there were no “among”, the apprehension would never be dual. But having an “among”, the apprehension is necessarily dual. And as the “among” is sensed, so also is the duality.

What is this duality? Dual apprehension is a mode of actualization of the real. It is not constituted by the fact that some notae of its content are complete. That has nothing to do with the matter, because even the most simple part of its content can be intellectively known in a dual apprehension; the simplicity of content would be a derogation or absorption of all complexity. It is therefore not this which constitutes the dual apprehension. Dual apprehension is a mode of actualization of this content, simple or complex, a mode of being present to me. Hence, dual apprehension is contrasted with the primordial apprehension of reality, which is constituted as a mere actualization of reality. They are then two structurally different modes of actualization. The primordial apprehension is the actualization of the real in and by itself; the dual apprehension is its mode of actualization based on another thing. I repeat, this is a structural difference, and therefore not a difference which is psychic or vital in character.

It is clear that this apprehension is not rigorously dual, but rather plural, because I can and in general do start not from one single thing but several. But in order to simplify matters I shall lump them together under the rubric ‘dual’.

In primordial apprehension every possible type of thing is apprehended in a unitary mode; for example, a landscape with trees. But now we do not apprehend these things unitarily; we do not apprehend, as we did before, the landscape with many things. Rather, we apprehend each thing that there is in the landscape. We do not apprehend a “varied landscape”, but “various things in a landscape”. These diverse things are certainly in the same field, and therefore in “one” actualization; but this “one” actualization is not “unitary”. It is rather what I term differential (or ‘differentiated’) actualization. We are dealing, then, with a unity, but one which is “differential”, and not simply “varied”. In differential actualization there is a strict unity; otherwise it would not be \(^{58}\) “one” actualization. But with respect to this unity, things are not merely notae of the landscape; rather each of them is in and by itself a thing. Hence the unity of actualization is differentiated in things, which are differently moments of the unity of actuality.

The differential actualization is a mode of intellec
tive actualization, a mode of a real thing being present to us in sentient intellec
tion. This does not mean that the content of the differential actualization is multiple, but that it is positively actual differentially. Now, upon being differentiated, the apprehension of the real thing becomes converted into something of which we say what it is in reality.

This brings us to a stricter conception of what duality is. To intellectively know what a thing is in reality among others is to go from something priorly apprehended toward something of which I desire to intellectively know what it is in reality. If one were to think that the duality consisted in two apprehensions, the apprehension of the thing of which I desire to intellectively know what it is in reality, and the apprehension of the prior thing to which I recur, then what I would have would be “two” primordial apprehensions of reality; but not “one” dual apprehension. Two “ones” do not make a “two”. Duality does not consist in two primordial apprehensions but is a dual apprehension.

In the second place, one might think that this prior presence of the thing, on the basis of which one intellectively knows what another thing is in reality, consists in an internal fusion (the name does not matter), a type of radical reminiscence, so that the apprehension of what the thing is in reality would in large measure be a composite of apprehension and reminiscence. But this is not what constitutes the duality of which we are here speaking. For whatever this fusion may be, \(^{59}\) the presence of one apprehension in the other is not a fusion; i.e., the duality is not a composition.

The duality in question is thus neither duplicity nor a composition of primordial apprehensions. And this is because duplicity as well as composition affect only the content of intellec
tion, the content of what is dual; but the duality itself is something much simpler and decisive. And this in turn is because the dual apprehension is the apprehension of a “real” thing which I want to apprehend as it is in reality; and in this reality, and not in its content, is where the duality is formally found: to be in reality what is real. Reality has intervened twice, and in this identical formality consists the unity of the two apprehensions. The dual apprehension consists in something like apprehending the reality of a thing in light of the reality of something else priorly apprehended. The prior apprehension is present in the thing which we wish to intellectively know like a light by which this thing is apprehended as it is “in reality”. The “based upon” is the light generated by the apprehension of the thing priorly known. And this is the essential point. But it is necessary to fix more precisely just what this light is.
One might think that it is just a type of “comparison” between the second apprehension and the first. But this is not so, because any comparison presupposes an “appearing together” of what is compared and is based on that appearing. And it is precisely in this appearing where the dual impression is found. The real thing appears in the light which constitutes the reality of the prior thing. And this light or clarity of appearing is just the dual apprehension. This apprehension is “an” apprehension, but is an apprehension in the light of something priorly apprehended. What we here term “light” \([60]\) is but the moment of each real thing in a field which constitutes reality itself. We are dealing with the fact that it is in the light of the reality in a field of the thing previously apprehended that one apprehends what a real thing is in reality, be it the same, similar, or completely different from the prior thing. And precisely because of this the entire process of intellection along these lines is always saddled with the weight of the old, because the old makes it possible to apprehend what the new is in reality; but it tends to excessively assimilate the new to the old.

In order to prevent misunderstandings, let us summarize what has been said. The primordial apprehension of a real thing, and the apprehension of what this real thing is in reality, are two apprehensions; but only the second is in turn dual. Let us not confuse the two acts of apprehension (primordial apprehension and apprehension of what something is in reality) with the internal duality of the second of the two apprehensions.

Now, this brings us to the possibility of a logos.

1. Every real thing, besides being individual, is de suyo of field nature, i.e., within a field. And this field nature is what determines the field of reality in which the thing is included and which encompasses all the others. This field, then, has been generated by the reality of each thing; which means in turn that the unity of being in a field and being individual is a unity which constitutes within the thing itself a type of unfolding of the two moments in the thing: its “reality”, and its “in reality”. The logos is intrinsically and formally based on the fact that a real thing refers, within a field, in transcendental openness, to another real thing. The logos is referring intellection, a mode of actuality \([61]\) which refers from the reality of something to what this something is in reality.

2. This unfolding is in turn the intrinsic and formal foundation of the ambit of its actualization in intellective duality. When we refer to a prior thing, the ambit takes shape in which the logos is going to be constituted in a dual intellection. This is the ambit of the proper intelligibility of the logos.

3. This duality is the intrinsic and formal foundation of the apprehension of the two somethings, of the something which is said \((i)\), and of the something of which it is said \((kata tinos)\). Only because we are referred to something prior can it be intellectively known what this something is. The ambit of the intellective duality is what makes the two apprehensions possible. Only because there is an intellection that there be apprehension of an prior thing which illuminates us. With this, the something of this prior thing is constituted in a principle of intelligibility of the real thing.

And here we have the first basic structural moment of the logos: duality. But there is a second essential moment, that moment by which one goes from a real thing to another prior one, and inversely from the latter to the former. This “going” is \([62]\) manifestly of dynamic character. The logos “says” something about something, and this saying is a “going”, a dynamic intellection. The modalization in which the sentient logos consists is a dynamic modalization; and we must now proceed to examine it.

II. The dynamism of intellection in which the sentient logos consists. As we have just said, in the logos there are two “somethings”. And of these two somethings, the logos in dual intellection “says” or “speaks” about one based upon the other. This saying or speaking has its own essential, basic, structure. The logos involves a duality, but not static duality; rather, one in which sentient intellection apprehends one real thing while going, so to speak, from another. The logos, then, consists in a duality in which the two termini are two moments of a unitary movement. This is a dynamic duality, and is the second basic structural moment of the logos. In what does it consist?

1. Above all, this movement starts from the thing already apprehended as real in primordial apprehension. This apprehension as a point of departure is an apprehension in which we already are here-and-now present in the
real. What is this “being here-and-now present”? It is just what constitutes a state [estado]. This is an essential concept. Modern philosophy in general has erred regarding the reality of the state. To my way of thinking, this reality must be recovered. In our problem, a state is not a mode of affection counterposed, for example, to acts. If that were so, the state thus understood would be, together with all of its indispensable nuances, a psychological state. Here we are not referring to that at all, but to the state in another sense: “being here-and-now” is a “being situated in” something. Every impression has, as we have already seen in the Part I, a moment of affection. But every impression has another moment, the moment of otherness, which consists in that what is present in an impression doing nothing but remain in accordance with its own formality, be it of stimulus or reality. Here we are interested only in the formality of reality, the “remaining” of what is presented as something on its own. And this remaining is here the essential point; it is the very essence of the “being here-and-now”. A state is above all a “remaining”. And this “remaining”, that in which we have remained, is the point of departure of the movement of the logos.

But it is necessary to forestall certain misunderstandings. First, this is not a “relation” but a “respectivity”, and moreover a respectivity common to the impressive intlection of the real and to the real itself. This “remaining” is not something static; i.e., “remaining” is not opposed to “not quiescent”, because remaining is neither quiescent nor not quiescent. These two characteristics do not have to do with remaining but with the content of reality as mine, as much as with things. But “remaining” is something which concerns the mode in which reality, be it quiescent or not, is situated in my impression.

In the final analysis, a state is above all a “remaining in” as a mode of being here-and-now, and a “being here-and-now” as a mode of “remaining”; it is a “to be remaining”. And this state is therefore a physical and real moment. But primordial apprehension as a point of departure of sentient intlection, in which the logos consists, is not any type of remaining.

From what has been said it might seem that state is nothing more than another name for actualization. But this is not the case, because as the point of departure of movement, remaining has a precise formal character which is essential and decisive. Impression, in fact, besides the moment of affection and the moment of otherness, has a third moment which I have called the force of imposition of the real. Now, as point of departure of intellective movement, this imposition force of what is intellectively known in primordial intlection, consists in this: the real thing apprehended, in moving us toward what is in reality, retains us insofar as it is real. This is the retention of the real. We are in the real, and we remain in the real, and we remain retained by the real. We continue to be retained not in this red color qua red, but in this red qua real. By the expression “remain in the real as real”, we are referring to a state; by “being retained in it” we mean a formally initial state. Retention is not a certainty or anything like that; because every certainty and even every intellective intention is grounded in a previous retention. The real retains us. But how?

2. We are retained by the real according to all the modes of reality, one of which is the “towards”. The “towards” is a mode of the real presenting itself. Insofar as it determines intlection it has a particular character. On the one hand we go “towards” that which is presented as real in the “towards”. But we do not go outside of the real; just the opposite: continuing to be retained in the reality which we left, we go to more reality. And therein consists the intellective movement as movement: it is by being in the process of moving in reality that we are retained and sent forth by it. Toward what? Toward the diverse real things “among” which the real, which we seek to intellectually know, is. This is a concrete movement by reason of retention of the point of departure, and by reason of the field-nature “among” towards which we go. It is a movement in reality. Hence it is a movement of sentient character, a movement of sentient intlection. The logos is sentient logos not only by virtue of being dual, but in virtue of being movement in reality as a field. The logos is not simply “to go” by moving oneself; but rather “points” to a terminus which can be unknown, or even empty. This is proper to a sentient movement. If it were not sentient, there would not be movement in the logos. [65]

3. This movement goes from what we seek to intellectually know toward something else priorly apprehended in the real itself, a second something based on which we, moving ourselves, seek to intellectually know the first thing. In virtue of this, that based on which we are going to intellectually know the new thing, is something distinct from it. This is distancing or stepping back in the reality field. It does not refer to a merely verbal distinction, but to a stepping back in the field. The two moments of the formality of reality, the individual moment and the moment within a field, are in a certain way autonomized in the real thing itself. In the field, things are included, and

1 [The Spanish quedár means to remain or to stay, as in Tennyson’s poem The Lady of Shalott: “She stayed to look down to Camelot.”-trans.]
the field encompasses them; so that the field itself, as we said, acquires a certain autonomy of its own. And this field “exceeding” with respect to each thing, actualizes each of them in a very precise way, viz. through its stepping back. This is a rigorous distance; not simply longitude or distinction. Longitude is distance only when it is or is supposed to be traversed. Intellective movement traverses the “among”, and hence the position of some things “among” others acquires the character of distance. Intellective movement is distancial, so to speak; distance is the traversed distinction.

4. This distance is traversed in a very precise manner. The point of departure in the “towards” points to its terminus, toward that based on which it is intellectively known. With this terminus the movement itself is not univocally fixed, but it needs to be. Whence the intellective movement in stepping back is essentially an oriented movement. The orientation is not a type of extrinsic colocation of the intelligence so that it can let fly its movement; but rather is the character of the intellective itself as intellection. Every apprehension of things in a field bears the imprint of the orientation in which they have been [66] primordially known intellectively. The orientation does not consist so much in that the “from” and “towards” of the movement are fixed, but rather that even within this fixing, different trajectories of intellection will fit. These trajectories express what I here understand by ‘orientation’. With the same “from” and with the same “toward” there can be and there are different orientations for going from one thing to another. This diversity of orientations is ultimately arbitrary; it is the result of an intellective choice. Whence the optative character of concrete intellection in movement. Here, naturally, the problem of this option qua option does not interest us; we are only concerned with its foundation in the reality of what is intellectively known. This foundation is just the sentient character of intellection; it is by being sentient that this intellection is oriented.

5. Finally, intellection in distance or stepping back is not defined only by reason of the trajectory, but also by reason of the terminus to which it points the “towards” from which it is started. I can, indeed, choose somewhat arbitrarily that on which I am going to base myself in order to intellectually know a thing; I can go toward different things, things which are more or less arbitrarily selected. The movement which constitutes intellection of what something is in reality is not univocally determined in that from which one starts. And this lack of univocity actualizes the field of reality precisely as a field of liberty. In large measure, the intellection that differentiates what something is in reality is a free intellection. By this I do not mean that this intellection is an arbitrary act of the will, but that the intellective movement toward the thing, and toward what it will determine in the intellection, is a movement which is not univocally determined other than by a free act. [67]

This intellective movement, as we saw, is not something primarily of the intelligence, as Hegel thought. Intellective movement (‘dialectic’, Hegel called it) is not the formal structure of “the” intelligence, but “a” determination of the intelligence according to the differential mode of presentation of the real. Moreover, as this differentiality is constituted by the character of reality impressively given, it follows that intellective movement is a determination not of “the” intelligence but of the “sentient intelligence”, and of this intelligence qua ulterior and field-nature actualization of reality. For these two reasons, I say, the idea of the Logic of Hegel is false in its very root. No dialectic is mounted upon itself.

6. What is the character of this intellective movement? The real retains us not so much by its content as by its formality of reality, as I have pointed out above. Now, we have already seen that we intellectually sense the formality of reality as being “more” than the reality of each thing. I have already said this, and repeat it for greater clarity in this other context. The “more” is not exterior to the real thing, but is an intrinsic and formal characteristic of its reality; it is precisely the moment of the thing’s reality within a field. The real has the two moments of formality: individual and within a field, and this formality in its two moments is what has us retained.

This rententivity or retention in turn has two of its own moments in reality. First, the real, by being in a field, retains us in a very concrete form, viz., by thrusting us to the field of reality. This is the impelling moment of the retentivity of the real, the impellence of the real. What is real about a thing is something which impels us to this “more”, this “beyond”, which is proper to reality. [68]

But it does not pull us out of reality; rather, it keeps us there. In thrusting us impellently to that “more”, it does not make us abandon the thing, but just the opposite; all impelling involves a constitutive reversion toward the thing. It is not a strict reversion because we have not left the reality of the thing; it is a reversion in the sense of a constitutive avoidance of such leaving. And it is this avoidance which I call reversion; it is the reversion of the field-nature moment to the individual moment. This reversion is what is expressed by the phrase “This thing is this in reality”. While the impelling retains us by opening up for us, by going from a thing to its field, being in the
field retains us by carrying us from the field to the thing. This moment of going from the field to the thing is what I call intentum. Permit me to explain, because as I see it this is an essential concept.

The intentum is what, etymologically, the word means, viz. a “tending to”. It is not primarily an intention—as we shall see forthwith—but a tending. But this tending is not a “tendency” in the psychological sense; rather, it is a structural tension, the tension by which reality retains us in the thing from which we have stepped back. Every apprehension of the real is on this side a tension. Let us discuss this concept.

The intentum as tension is, as the word itself expresses, an intent. But this intent as a tension is not an intent to reach the reality of the thing, since we have never left it; it is the retentivity itself of the thing which tensely retains us in it. Hence, the intent in question is not an intentum of reality, but reality in intentum. If one desires to employ the metaphor of light, it is the reversion of clarity upon the illuminating sources themselves. {69}

Nor is intentum a type of effort to apprehend the real thing. In our language, “intent” is something like “attempt”; but with respect to its origins, intentum is not attempt, nor an attempt to go to reality, because we already are in the reality of the thing and cannot abandon it. It does not make sense, then, to speak of an attempt. It is in order not to confuse intent with attempt that I recur to the Latin word intentum.

Neither is intentum formally intentionality. ‘Intentionality’ is a word and a concept which uses philosophy from the past centuries. In general terms, it is an act, or at least the character of the act in which we look at something, at what is intellectively known. This is the acceptance of willful intention translated into the act of intellection. This intentionality has at least two senses. In the scholastic sense, intentionality is the character which what is intellectively known has, considered only as intellectively known. As so known, it is the terminus of an intellective glance. And if something has no entity other than being intellectively known in intention, a scholastic would say that it has only intentional existence. In contemporary philosophy the idea of intentionality is not exactly that. For phenomenology, intentionality is not a character of an entity intellectively known, but a character of the act of consciousness; consciousness is a “referring oneself to” something, a noesis which as such is referred to something which is therefore its noema. Now, the intentum of which I am speaking is not intentionality in either of those two senses. Both, indeed, are based upon the idea of intellection being a glance toward something. But intentum is not that, because such an intentional glance presupposes that by its own nature we have to go “toward” reality, so that reality would be something toward which one must go. Ultimately, one would be dealing with a correlation. And this is false. {70} We do not go toward reality; rather, we are already in it and retained by it. The intentum is not a “going” but a “being here-and-now” tensively in the real thing, retained by it. There can only be intentionality because there is basically an intentum. This we shall see in another chapter.

Whence the intentum does not have an intentional but a “physical” character. In the first place, intentionality is not something purely intentional, but something physical. It is, as I see it, a physical act of the intelligence, the physical reference to what is intellectively known; and it is also and above all the strictly physical character of the act of intellection. It is the very physics of intellection—something like virtue. Virtue is not just a value at which I decide to aim, but is the physical character of being now in this value, or of having incorporated it into my physical reality. It is not an act of will which accepts some value as an object; but rather a physical character of this act of accepting itself, a valuable affecting in itself qua acceptance. Virtue is “moral physics”. Now, intentionality is just the physical character of the intellective act. It is a mode of the intentum. It is because of this that I have said, and will go on saying, that there is no intentionality except as a mode of the intentum. We shall see forthwith what this mode is. Moreover, the intentum is in itself something physical. As we are already in the real, the reversion is not a “going toward” but a “being-now-tense-in”. Both noesis as well as noema are grounded upon the intentum. But the Nous is an ergon. And this ergon is the intentum. The primary structure of intellection is not noetic but noergic. Strictly speaking, noergia is not a character exclusive to the intentum because the intentum is an ulterior moment of the primordial apprehension of reality. And it is this apprehension which formally and constitutively is noergic. Retained by reality, we are {71} physically impelled to what is in the field, and are also physically tense in the real thing. The physical actuality of the real is physically retentive in its two moments of being impelled and reversion.

Ultimately, the real in impression retains us in its two aspects, individual and within a field, not as aspects juxtaposed, but in the radical unity of the impression of reality. This structure has the double moment of being impelled and of intentum. They are not something added to the impression of reality, but rather constitute the very structure of the impression of reality qua of field nature. As intrinsically and formally of field nature, the impres-
sion of reality is impelling and is intentum. Conversely, being impelled and intentum are what they are only as structural moments of the impression of reality insofar as we are, in the field manner, retained in it.

7. This intellective movement, precisely on account of its moment of being impelled, is a movement in distance. And qua intentum, it has a very definite character. Starting “from” a prior real thing and going “toward” another in a movement oriented across the field of reality: this is how we apprehend what reality this real thing is. Now, as we have still not yet apprehended it, we do not yet have dual apprehension, but only dual movement toward it; this is expectation in the most etymological sense of the word, a “looking at from afar” (from which has been derived the meaning of “to expect”). Intellective movement is formally and constitutively expectant. Expectation is not a psychological state of general tension in waiting, but an intrinsic and constitutive character of intellective movement qua intellective. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation of itself as other. It is a mode of intellective; we intellectively know what a thing is in reality in a movement from afar, and therefore expectant. One might tend to think that this means that we are surreptitiously asking ourselves what the thing is in reality. But this is not the case: asking is but the prior real thing and going “toward” another in a movement oriented across the field of reality: this is how we apprehend what reality this real thing is. Now, as we have still not yet apprehended it, we do not yet have dual apprehension, but only dual movement toward it; this is expectation in the most etymological sense of the word, a “looking at from afar” (from which has been derived the meaning of “to expect”). Intellective movement is formally and constitutively expectant. Expectation is not a psychological state of general tension in waiting, but an intrinsic and constitutive character of intellective movement qua intellective. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation of itself as other. It is a mode of intellective; we intellectively know what a thing is in reality in a movement from afar, and therefore expectant. One might tend to think that this means that we are surreptitiously asking ourselves what the thing is in reality. But this is not the case: asking is but the propositional form of expectation, and not the other way around. We ask because we are intellectively expectant. Moreover, we are generally expectant without asking or asking ourselves anything; we simply “are”. The question is always something intentional; expectation on the other hand is something noergic. Expectation is intellect as distanced in via as intellect. What we expect is what the thing already apprehended as reality is in reality.

This intellective movement is that in which the logos’ own “saying” consists. Naturally I am not referring to “saying” as such but rather to what is said qua said in this saying. Logos is sentient intellect in which we are retained by the real in its field moment, i.e. in the “towards” of reality. The terminus of this “towards” is something distanced from the particular real thing which we wish to intellectively know. To this terminus we are impelled by the real, but retained by this real to which we see ourselves turned by this thing itself. Logos is not simply a dual intellect, but one in which this duality is intellectually known over some time period, in a movement. Intellection is not just dual, but traverses this distance of the dual. And over this time period, from one terminus to the other, intellection is a movement which consists in saying (or explaining) what one thing is in reality from or based on another. The basic radical structure of the “saying” is movement. Hence I do not refer only to the fact that my act of intellection is dynamic, but moreover to the fact that the real sentiently actualized is actualized in a dynamic duality. (73) This is, I repeat, an intrinsic moment of the sentient actuality of the real. And as we have already seen, this actualization is what makes the “saying” possible. The dynamism of the intrinsic duality of each real thing is what makes possible the movement of saying something about something else.

But there is more. The logos with which we here occupy ourselves not only has two “somethings”, and not only says something about something else: this “saying” has a supremely precise character: declaring. And this declaration is a time period in a medium of intellection. It is the third structural moment of the logos.

III. The Mediality of Intellection in which the sentient logos consists. The “saying” of the logos can and in fact does adopt many different forms. But for the purposes of intellection there is only a declarative “saying”, apophantikos. This is a movement in which something is intellectively known from something else by declaring what the first thing is in reality. What is the basic radical structure of declarative intellection?

The intellection of the logos moves in the duality of a field of reality. But let us recall what this field of reality is. Every real thing qua real is open to other real things; this is the “towards” as transcendental openness. In virtue of this, every real thing is among other real things. This “towards” of the “among” is what formally constitutes the field of reality. As this field is the same in all the things included in it, It follows, as I have said many times, that this field takes on a certain autonomy of its own. The field is neither a concept nor a relation; it is a physical moment of the real in its actuality. Hence we say that “we are here-and-now present” in the field of reality. And it is in this field, in which we now are through primordial apprehension, that we intellectively know, in the field sense, what something is in reality.

The field as reality is that “in” which the logos, “in” which the differentiating intellelction, moves. That is, the field of reality is a field of movement. But of what movement? Not, to be sure, some kind of movement through an empty space—that would be a throwback to the idea of the field as space, and the field is not a spatial field but the field of reality. As the field of reality, the “among” has many different characteristics, for example that of physical or vital surroundings. But we are not concerned with that here; rather, we are concerned with the unity of the “among” as a “towards” of reality. In virtue of it, the field is neither a place nor some other thing which contains things; it is rather something essentially different: a
field which upon being traversed, and in the very act of traversing, constitutes the intellection; it is the field of intellection.

This field is intellectually known in a dynamic sense. But what is thus known is not known only as one more thing; as we have just said, the field is not a “thing”. Yet it is something which is intellectually known. How? Not like an ordinary thing or object, but like something whose function is not to be seen itself but to make things seen in themselves; it is the “medium” of intellection. What is a medium? And in what does its intellectual character consist?

1. ‘Medium’ here is not that by means of which we go from one thing to another; i.e., it is not that by which we intellectually know one thing starting from another. Were that true, every intellection of the logos would be mediated or made into a medium by that by means of which we know intellectually. That this could occur is undeniable; but as the formal character of the logos it is false because there is also the immediate logos. If I say that this paper I see is in reality white, my logos is immediate. [75] The “medium” which we are here examining is something different. In making the medium into a medium, or “mediatizing”, there are two apprehensions: (1) the apprehension of that by means of which I know intellectually, and (2) the apprehension of its mediatization function in virtue of which the apprehension of that to which this medium mediately leads us is united to the vision of the “thing-in-medium”. But in the medium which is of interest here we are not referring to something which is apprehended in some act distinct from its medial function; rather, we refer to the fact that what is apprehended is only this function itself. The function is not something which is seen but something in which one sees, something which allows seeing. Thus light (leaving aside psychological questions) and a mirror are not things seen but things which make other things seen. In reality, this medium is not seen in a separate, different act from that in which we see the things which it makes us see. Indeed, in order to intellectually know the medium as if it were the terminus of intellection, it would be necessary to bring about a type of retortion upon the thing seen; in order to see a perfect mirror a special effort of retortion is necessary so as to convert it into something seen. Every logos is mediated, even if it be immediate.

This concept of a medium is essential in all orders of intellection. Modern philosophy has considered intellection of things to be the result of two factors, so to speak: of intelligence and of the thing itself. But this is inadequate, because it is essential to consider the medium of intellection. To intellectually know a thing individually, in a certain way by itself, is not the same as to intellectually know it in a social medium. In this aspect society is a medium of intellection. It is not something which pertains to what is intellectually known, but it is nonetheless something which makes what is so known to be seen in a particular way. Moreover, in different media the same intellections can have different modalities. And I do not refer only to the social medium in general, but also to particular ones, [76] for example a guild or corporation, whose particular medium makes things to be seen in a special way. It is not the same to intellectually know something in a social medium (general or particular) as to intellectually know something in a religious medium. Society in its diverse forms, such as religion, etc., are from this point of view not what we intellectually know, but something which makes us to intellectually know things. In different media things are seen in different ways. For this reason I say that the medium is something essential to intellection in all orders.

2. But if this is true, if the nature of the medium profoundly affects the intellection of things, how can one speak of the intellection of a real thing, as we have done up to now, viz. as something determined in the field of reality solely by the thing itself? This is the essential problem.

To answer this question it suffices to consider more carefully what we have just said about the social, religious, and other media of intellection. These media are media because we see things in them, but we see them in different ways. But what things? Real things as real. Then it is clear that these different media are but different modalities of what makes me see things as real. To see real things in an individual or social medium presupposes seeing them medially as real. Thus all the different media point to a primary medium, a basic medium which makes me to know intellectually what things, as real things, are in reality. What is this primary medium?

To intellectually know real things in a movement from one to another is to intellectually know them, as we have seen, in the field of reality. And this means that the field of reality—or rather, reality as field—is just that in which we intellectually know one thing from others. That is, reality [77] within a field quâ reality is the very medium of intellection of the logos. This is what we were seeking: all the other media are qualifications of this primary and basic medium, reality within a field quâ reality. Why is this so? The answer is clear: intellectually knowing is the mere actualization of the real as real. In the primordial apprehension of reality we intellectually know a thing as real. But the intellection in the field manner is a modalization of the primordial intellection of the real:
we intellectively know what something is in reality in a mediated, not a direct way. Therefore this intellection is just a reactualization. Whence it follows that the field of reality, insofar as it concerns our problem, is a field of actuality, or better, a field of reactuality. Reality within a field makes us see the actuality of a real thing from another and in the process reactualizes the real. It is as a field of actualization that reality in the field sense constitutes the primary and basic medium of the intellection of the logos; it is reality as medium.

Logos, then, is not only dual and dynamic; it is also medial. To see a thing from another while moving in the field of reality is to actualize the real as physically real in the medium of reality. And this reactualization of the real as real is precisely its “declaration”, the logos apophan- tikos. Medial intellection is declarative intellection. The field of reality as medium of actualization is the medial foundation of declaration. Such is the structure of the declarative logos. Only the mediality of reality as field makes the logos qua declarative possible.

In summary, the logos as such has a primary, basic structure: it is an intellection within a field, of dual character, dynamic and medial. Logos is a sentient intellection in which one declares dynamically, in the medium of reality within a field, what one thing is in reality, based on another. This is its basic structure. Logos is sentient logos precisely because it occurs within a field.

Granting that, we now ask about the formal structure, rather than the radical structure, of this intellection. This formal structure has two moments: the dynamic and the medial, because duality is ultimately a characteristic of the other two moments. The study of this formal structure in its two moments constitutes the subject of the following two sections.
SECTION 2

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS:

I. DYNAMIC STRUCTURE

Even at the risk of monotonous repetition, let us once again take up the thread of our problem. The primordial apprehension of reality has as we know the two moments of individual formality and formality within a field—two moments of a single, same formality of reality of a thing. The unity of these two moments, apprehended explicitly and formally, is what constitutes the intellection of what a thing is “in reality”. In the primordial apprehension of reality, the unity of the individual and the field moments is immediate; and on account of this it is an apprehension which we might term ‘compact’. In differential actualization, the unity in question changes profoundly in character, because then one intellectively knows one thing “among” others. And this means that the intellectively known thing is so known in the distance that there is between it and all the others. Whence it follows that the real thing to a field, to the field of reality itself. Impelling is stepping back from what the thing is in reality. And in fact, in order to intellectively know what a thing is in reality, with respect to (i.e., among) others, one must first “stop to consider” the thing. And this stopping to consider is above all a type of intellective suspension, a “stepping back” from the thing but in it and from it itself.

On the other hand, in this stepping back the real thing keeps us tensively in it, and therefore turned toward it in an intentum by virtue of the very tension of the distance we have taken. It is a movement of the intentum in order to intellectively know from the field what the thing is in reality. Therefore it is a referring of ourselves from the field to the thing; it is intellective intention. The intentum has become intention. In the “stepping back” and the intellective intention we have the two moments of intellective movement.

In order to study the dynamic structure of this apprehension we must examine:

Chapter 4: What is “stepping back” from a thing?

Chapter 5: What is intellectively knowing by stepping back what a thing is in reality?
CHAPTER IV
DISTANCING OR STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS

In this intellection, a thing sends us to a field of reality in order to intellectively know therein what that thing is in reality. In other words, as we have just said, it is above all necessary to position oneself at a certain distance from the thing, or to “step back” from it.

There are then three points to examine:

1. What is distance?
2. What is “stepping back”?
3. What is the structure of that which is apprehended in this act of stepping back?

§ 1
WHAT IS DISTANCE?

We have seen that every real thing has an individual moment and a moment within a field; this is the structure of its unfolding. When this thing is apprehended in primordial apprehension, the difference between the two moments is in a way abolished; that is what I have termed ‘compaction’. But when a thing is apprehended “among” others, then the unity is just dual. Now, this unity, in unfolding, is what formally constitutes distance. Thus ‘distance’ does not mean a spatial distance, but something essentially different. Let us make this concept more precise.

A) First, unfolding is not distance from reality. Were that the case we would be situated “outside” of reality, which is impossible. A real thing is the terminus of a primordial apprehension of its reality; and this very apprehension is what, because it is of reality (but without our leaving the formality of reality), situates us in the field of reality itself as something expressly distinct from individual reality. This installation in reality itself is the work of the primordial apprehension of reality, from which it is impossible to prescind.

B) But reality itself is not an ocean in which all real things are submerged; it is only a moment of each real thing. It is a moment through which each real thing, in being real in and by itself, is nonetheless in and by itself something “more”. This character of “more” is not a “beyond the thing” but rather a “more in the thing”. Hence distance is only a moment within the thing itself. We do not go outside of the thing but rather we are “in it”. Not only do we not go outside of reality, we do not even go out of the thing itself; distance is a moment intrinsic to the thing, something in the thing itself. What is this moment?

C) In this distancing its two moments are not distanced correlatively from one another. What a real individual thing is in reality is distanced from this reality as individual reality. That is, the reality of an individual thing is maintained as much in its formality of reality as in its content; but we distance ourselves with respect to what it is “in reality”. That is, we make the field something autonomous, a field which has to be traversed. In this distancing the real individual thing is installed in the field of reality. Therefore, I repeat, we do not go outside of either the real thing or the field of reality; we remain in its field moment in order to intellectively know from it what, in reality, is its individual moment. Thus we go in the real thing from its field moment towards its individual moment; we intellectively know it in the field manner, as being in a field. That is, we traverse the distance as an internal moment of the thing; we traverse the duality as a unity in unfolding.
This being the case, it is clear that a real thing apprehended among other other real things propels us to the field in a very precise manner: it compels us to “position ourselves at a distance” or to “step back” from the thing. What is this “stepping back”?

§ 2

WHAT IS “STEPPING BACK”?

Naturally, it is to be carried by the thing itself in its formality of individual reality to its moment within a field differentially autonomized. This motion has several important characteristics.

1) First, with respect to what does one step back? One steps back from the thing in the field of reality precisely as that real thing is in reality. In what way? By removing ourselves from its unity within the field moment of reality.

2) The real thing is not thereby eliminated. Quite the contrary, since it is the real thing which impels us from its individual reality to the field of reality itself. Hence, this compelling does not consist in abandoning the real thing, but in maintaining us in it, but only as a point of departure for an intellective unfolding which leaves in suspense what that thing is “in reality”. This suspension is a particular kind of movement; it is an effort which I term retraction. Retraction is intellective of a real thing, leaving in suspense what it is in reality. Stepping back, then, is a “movement of retraction”. To be thrust by a formally real thing to the field of reality itself is to leave retractively in suspense what the thing is in reality.

3) Thus it is clear that the intelligence, without ceasing to be in reality and without abandoning real things, is surely situated in them but in a certain way “above” them. [85] In “retraction”, the intelligence is situated “above” what things are in reality. The articulation of those two moments, between the moment of retraction and the moment of being above things, is essential. Ignorance of it has been the source of a dual error. First, the intelligence “is” not above things through itself—that was the mistake of all of idealism from Descartes to Schelling, and ultimately Husserl and Heidegger as well. Rather, the intelligence “comes to be” above things through a movement of retraction in confronting them. The “above” is grounded on “retraction”. Secondly, that on which intellective “is” is not pure and simple reality, but only what real things are “in reality”. We have seen that what the intellective movement knows intellectively is not the real qua real, but what the real, already understood as real, is “in reality”. I reiterate that it is for this reason that every intellective movement is only a modalization of the primordial apprehension of reality.

4) That is to say, in retraction we intellectively know reality itself as something open to what things could be in it. Hence, to be in this form in reality itself is to be liberated, so to speak, from what the things are in reality. But this, in accordance with what we said above, is not to abandon them. What we are doing is intellectively knowing what they may be in reality only as a free terminal point of what reality itself is, i.e., intellectively knowing that reality itself is this thing. When what the thing is in reality is thus known, the firm base of this new intellect is reality itself, and what the real might be in each case is nothing but a mere terminal point of reality itself. In retraction, therefore, we bring about a liberation from the “in reality”, basing ourselves on reality itself. Seeing what things are in reality is understanding them freely. A thing as a mere free terminus {86} “isn’t” what the thing is in reality, but only what it “might be” in reality. The “might be” is the proper and formal mode by which the thing is maintained in retraction. The reality of the terminal qua merely terminal is reality as it “might be”. Real things, present now only as the terminus of a retractive apprehension, have an intrinsic ambivalence. On one hand they pertain to reality, and in virtue of that they are real in their primordial reality. But on the other hand, what they may be in reality is a merely terminal moment of intellect; it is simply what they “might be” in reality. I shall explain this forthwith.

5) In what, more precisely, do these things in retraction consist? In being impelled, intellectation is no longer primordial apprehension of reality, but simple apprehension, the mere terminus of intellectation. What a thing is “in reality” is now simple apprehension. ‘Simple’ here means being just the terminus of apprehension. Let us explain in more detail.

Classical philosophy has always conceived a) that simple apprehension is apprehension of something which formally has no character of reality, but on the contrary prescinds from this character; b) that this apprehension is the first proper act of any possible intellectation; and c) that the intellectation of something formally real is always an ulterior intellectation, viz. judgement. Judgement is thus the unique intellectation which formally involves the moment

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[85]Might be’ is used in this context to translate the Spanish sería, which as the conditional literally means ‘would be’, but here has the sense of the future of probability. - trans.]
of reality. But these three affirmations are, as I see, incorrect.

In the first place, simple apprehension does not formally prescind from the character of reality, but rather formally perseveres in it; the fact is that the apprehended real is in reality a terminal moment and only a terminal moment of reality itself. In any simple apprehension whatever we apprehend a thing formally as if it were a moment of something which really and effectively is a reality. We do not prescind from reality; that would be impossible. It is apprehension alone of what the thing might be “in reality”. Thus we are not dealing with a retraction from the real qua real, but a retraction from what this thing, formally persevering as real, is “in reality”. And this unity of reality and retraction is what constitutes the “might be”. It is not the “might be” of “reality” but the “might be” of the “in reality”. Hence simple apprehension formally involves the character of reality. Classical philosophy has made of simple apprehension something which reposes upon itself as the material from which judgement is composed. That is, it has considered simple apprehension only as a “material” moment of the logos as judgement. This conception is the result of the logification of intellection. But simple apprehension formally involves reality. Therefore simple apprehension cannot be understood as a moment of the logification of intelligence; on the contrary, the logical moment of simple apprehension should be understood as a mode of actualization, i.e. as a mode of intelligizing of the logos.

In the second place, simple apprehension is not the first proper act of every intellection; rather, each simple apprehension is but a simple apprehension by “retraction”. It is an apprehension “retracted” from a primordial apprehension. Hence the first proper act of intellection is not simple apprehension but primordial apprehension of reality.

Finally, and in the third place, formal and effective reality is not the patrimony of judgement, but of the primordial apprehension of reality. We have already seen this: the primordial apprehension of reality is what formally involves the character of reality prior to judgement. Considering only simple apprehension, the adjective ‘simple’ denotes that what a thing is “in reality” is apprehended only as a terminal moment of reality itself: reality itself is here and now, this or that, “in reality”.

What is the structure of what is apprehended in this act of stepping back which is simple apprehension?

§ 3

STRUCTURE OF WHAT IS APPREHENDED “AT A DISTANCE”

This structure poses three serious problems. I have already spoken of them but they should be set forth clearly here: What is the origin of a simple apprehension? What is the condition of what is simply apprehended? And, What are the modes of simple apprehension?

1) The origin of simple apprehension. Consider simple apprehension as such. We are not dealing with what, classically, is called the origin of ideas, because not every simple apprehension is an idea. We must confront the problem of the origin of simple apprehension not along the lines of ideas but at its primary root. This origin, as we have already seen, is an act of retraction imposed by the real itself primordially apprehended; its field dimension is what imposes that act.

A) This retraction does not consist in a simple “prescinding”, because prescinding is always something which affects the content of what is apprehended, a content which comprises -- as we shall see forthwith -- both what is classically called ‘essence’ and what is called ‘existence’. But retraction conserves the entire content of a thing as reality; and what it leaves in suspense is not “the reality”, but what the thing is “in reality”. Reality continues to be de suyo, but we do not know what this de suyo is in reality. And this is not an unimportant subtlety. [90]

B) By the field moment of what is primordially apprehended we are thrust toward other things in the field. These latter are certainly real and are apprehended in a primordial apprehension; but through the moment of retraction the content of these things ceases to be the content “of them”, and is reduced to being the principle of intelligibility of the thing which directed us to them. To be a principle of intelligibility consists in being that with respect to which a real thing becomes re-actualized. And this is simple apprehension: intellection of a real principle of intelligibility. The content of these things, then, is not the content of a thing but just the principle of intelligibility of one or more other things.

C) This movement, and consequently simple apprehension, takes place within the physical field of reality. But the content of what is simply apprehended in this movement is in the field only as a principle of intelligibility. As such, this content “is” not in itself other than the content of the thing I wish to intellectively know “might
be". The “might be” is the character of the content of things reduced to a principle of intelligibility. These things are not left outside of the field of reality, nor are they in it as a content which “is”; rather, they are there as a principle of what the thing in question “might be”. The principle of intelligibility pertains to the field of reality; it is there that the movement of retraction takes place and the principle of intelligibility is constituted. If, in primordial apprehension, I see a bulky form, and I do not know what it is in reality, I am therefore impelled to things which are in the surrounding landscape, for example, to the trees. These trees are apprehended in a primordial apprehension the same as the bulky form; but considered as what the form “might be” [91] in reality, they have become converted into a merely terminal moment of the apprehension of what the form is “in reality”. I repeat, this does not mean any type of renunciation of their content, but rather its reduction to a principle of intelligibility. It is a new condition of what, before, was that content. What is this condition?

2) The condition of what is apprehended in simple apprehension. What is apprehended remains, as we have said, as the condition of mere terminus of apprehension as a principle of intelligibility. Being thus a mere terminus is having the content of reality qua content stay suspended, so that this content is no longer properly speaking real, but unreal. In retraction, what things are in reality constitutes, so to speak, the sphere of the unreal. Thus everything depends on what one says is unreality.

Unreality is not just not having reality. If something unreal had nothing to do with reality, if would not be “unreal” but “a-real”. To be unreal is thus a way of having to do with the real. This is obvious, indeed, since as we have said, simple apprehension is formally constituted in the very field of reality as reality. What is this way, then? That is the question. The structure of the unreal is comprised of three moments.

a) First, the unreal does not rest upon itself, but upon the real. Everything unreal is constituted by “disrealization”. And the “dis” is not a purely negative moment; if it were, I repeat, the thing would not be unreal but areal. Therefore it is a positive “dis”; it is, so to speak, a realization in the form of “dis”. What is this “dis” as a form of realization? To understand that we must recall [92] what reality is. One might think, in fact, that to be real is to be existing; from which it would follow that the unreal is what does not have existence and might be only what used to be classically termed ‘essence’. The “dis” would be nullity of existence. But this is impossible, because reality is not existence but being de suyo. And being de suyo is a formality beyond classical essence and existence. The existent is real only when existence belongs de suyo to it. Otherwise the presumed existence would not make the thing something real (this is what I have termed spectre; it is a subject we cannot get into here). To be real is thus structurally prior to existing. Likewise, the unreal is not an essence in the classical sense, because classical essence is formally the essence of what the thing is de suyo. In virtue of this the “dis” of disrealization includes the real thing in toto with respect to both its classical existence and essence. The unreal has unreal existence and unreal essence. The character of the “dis”, then, leaves intact from this discussion. And the fact is that reality should not be understood as existence nor as essence, but as being “de suyo”. And then unreality consists in a “dis” of the “de suyo”. What does this mean?

In each real thing, in each de suyo, we have distinguished an aspect of individual reality and an aspect of field reality which, autonomized, we call “reality itself”. This is the unfolding; these two moments are first and foremost physical and not just conceptual moments. As moments, they are different. In the primordial apprehension of a real thing, we apprehend them unitarily. Since, however, reality is open in its mode as “towards”, we understand being in a field as a distinct moment, in which the real thing is set apart from other real things in reality itself. This means that it is [93] possible to remain in the field even when suspending its unity with a specific individual formality. Then we have reality itself as the ambit but without its own proper individual reality. This “without” is just the negative outline of the positive “dis” of disrealization. Disrealization does not affect what pertains to the field, to reality itself, but to the real thing in the moment of what it is “in reality”. That is, reality itself is no longer necessarily here and now this real determine thing. Disrealizing is not suspending reality itself, but suspending the content which is real here and now, suspending that in which reality itself is realized. Now, reality is the de suyo. Hence reality itself is a “de suyo” which de suyo can be realized in this or that thing. The real thing is no longer de suyo that in which reality itself is realized “in reality”. Thence arises unreality. Unreality is the dis-realized mode of being in reality itself. It is the first moment of unreality. Through this moment the unreal involves reality itself. First, it involves it formally, because it can only be unreal by being in reality itself disrealized, i.e. without it necessarily having a determinate content. And secondly, the unreal involves reality physically, because in the unreal reality is reality itself which we apprehend physically in the primordial apprehension
of any real thing. Reality itself is not a concept or idea or anything of that nature; it is the physical field dimension—that of being in a field—of real things. It is the "physical reality" itself of this landscape, of this rock, or of this meadow; it is, I repeat, this very physical reality which is constituted within a field in every simple apprehension of whatever type. In a centaur the reality itself apprehended is the same as in this rock. What is not the same is the content. Simple apprehension does not preclude from reality itself [94] as is usually claimed, but rather involves it formally and physically as reality without its own content.

b) This ambit of disrealization is a physical ambit of apprehension. And it is in this reality as something physical that the content of every intellective apprehension lies actualized. Intellection, in which reality itself is actualized, is not an empty intellection but one in which the ambit is actualized at the same time that various simple apprehensions are being elaborated in it. Reality itself disrealized in every individual real thing lies actualized in the simple apprehensions of my intellection. This is the second moment of the unreal: the moment of actualization of reality itself in simple apprehensions.

c) But then, simple apprehension remains in reality itself, though freely realized and reduced to an intellective principle of what the content of reality itself "might be". Actualization is actualization of something as content of reality itself. It is therefore a liberated actualization, and is like the inverse of that actualization of reality itself. It is also the third moment of unreality. In virtue of being a realization that "might be", it is a realization which is constitutively free. The unreal is not some mental object treated as if it were real, nor is it a physical thing; rather it is a free thing. This does not mean that I freely consider this content to be real, but rather just the opposite: I consider freely that the physical reality in a field "is thus", i.e., that it has this determinate content. For example, the real in fictional writing does not consist in being a fiction of reality, nor in feigning reality, but as we shall see forthwith consists in being reality in fiction. What we feign is the content of the reality. Reality itself remains freely actualized in something which is realized [95] in it. That from which it is free is not reality itself but its determinate content.

Actualization of reality itself, and the free realization in it of what is intellectively known, are the two moments which intrinsically and jointly comprise the character of disrealization in a positive way. Of these two positive moments, the second is grounded upon the first: the content is realized because physical reality itself has been actualized in intellection without content. In virtue of this first moment, that which is apprehended, i.e. the unreal, is really unreal; in virtue of the second moment the unreal is unreal. The unity of these two moments is what constitutes the unreal, which we express in "might be". "Might be" is the unity of an actualization disrealized and of a free realization. With it the domain of the unreal is characterized. The unreal is thus a free thing, and therefore a created thing. Creation is creation not of reality but of the content in it; correctly understood, a free realization. If one desires to speak of ideas (an odious expression, but quite common as I have said), I would say that to create is not to give reality to my ideas, but just the opposite: to give my ideas to reality. Hence the seriousness of this intellection: physical reality itself comes into play in virtue of its content; i.e. what real things are in reality. To actualize disrealized physical reality in a free content—this is the essence of creation.

To summarize, the apprehension of the real in retraction from content, i.e. in simple apprehension, has the formal character of unreality. Unreality is the intrinsic and formal unity of actualization of physical reality itself and free realization of its content; it is the "might be". The "might be" is an unreal mode, not in the grammatical sense but in the sense of reality itself in the mode of its free content. [96]

Granting this, we may ask what are the modes of simple apprehension, i.e., what are the structural modes of intellection of the unreal. That is the third point we wanted to examine.

3) The structural modes of simple apprehension. Reality itself is preserved physically and formally as the ambit of free creation of the unreal. But neither disrealization nor creation are absolute. They are a movement which is always based upon a real thing, but which can be based on different dimensional moments of it. In that movement, these moments are actualized. As moments they pertain to every real thing, but the movement of disrealization actualizes them explicitly and formally in intellection. And in accordance with these moments, the movement of disrealization confers different characters of unreality upon simple apprehension. There are different types of simple apprehension which are not numerically distinct, but are distinct structural moments of reality itself as the ambit of free creation. Those dimensions are three, and they constitute in a positive way, and in their radical unity, the definition of what I have called being “in reality”. These dimensions of a real thing are, as I said, three.

A) Most importantly, the first thing which can be
disrealized in a freeing retraction is the content of the complete real thing. It is not the thing prescinds from reality itself, but reality itself terminates freely in this thing as that which this thing “might be” in reality. In virtue of this, the real thing is actualized in a dimension proper to itself: being “this”. Here “this” is not an adjective, i.e., “this” thing, but a noun (i.e., “this” insofar as it is a “this-ness”). Apprehending “this” thing is what constitutes the primordial apprehension of reality; [97] for example, perception. Now, the “this-ness” pointed to of “this” thing, when disrealized, is the “this” no longer “qua real” but “qua perceived”; it is the “this” of the thing qua mere terminus of perception. It is the “this” qua mere terminus of perception that I shall call percept. The first form of simple apprehension reduces the content of the thing to a percept. It is not a percept of reality, but reality itself in percept. It is reality itself terminating freely in “this”. The point must be emphasized, because classical philosophy, regardless of its notion of simple apprehension, never included percept among its simple apprehensions. As I see it, not only ought percept to be included among simple apprehensions, but it is in fact the primary form of them and the very possibility of every other simple apprehension.

This percept as such is a free creation. To be sure, its content is given to me. But reducing this content to just a percept is my act of liberation. I have liberated the “this”, I have liberated it from the real thing qua real. Moreover, it is a very concrete liberation.

This is because the liberating reduction is not an arbitrary act carried out in a vacuum, but a liberation brought about “in” the apprehension of a primary real thing as real from another thing to which I have withdrawn. Only when seen from this latter thing is the content disrealized. Liberation and therefore disrealization are only possible in a differential actualization; and in virtue of that are only possible as a function of some things determined within the actualization as a field. It is only possible when one thing is referred to the rest. And this reference always has an aura of liberty, because if I had moved toward a different thing, the aspect might have been different as well. The simple apprehension of a real thing [98] as a mere percept is (1) an act which I freely execute, and (2) that which is actualized in it has an intrinsic character of liberty of “ad-spection”, or if one wishes, of inspection.

This movement is not only “free”, it is a free “creation”, because a real thing is certainly a “this”, but reducing the “this” to a mere percept is a creation in the rigorous sense. All free “ad-spection”, i.e. every free aspect of a percept is a creation. This creation clearly does not concern the content of the thing itself qua real, but does concern its “thisness” reduced to a percept. When “this” content is reduced to a percept, the “this” is a strict aspectual creation; it is the perceptual creation of the “this”.

To summarize, when apprehended at a distance by stepping back, a thing is in reality the terminus of a simple apprehension which actualizes it to us as a “this” in a free and creative movement of reduction of this thing to its “thisness”, a mere percept. That is what “this” might be in reality.

B) But in the liberating retraction, a thing is in reality disrealized in another dimension. Every “this” is a unitary system of real notes. In accordance with this unitary system, the thing is not a mere complex of random notes, but of those notes systematized in a certain “manner”, so that if they were systematized in a different manner it would no longer be the same thing but something else. That is, a real thing in its “thisness” has in addition to its notes the “how” of its systematization. When the “this” is reduced to a percept, it retains its “perceptual how”. Now, I can withdraw so to speak, liberating myself in the “thisness” itself from its own “how”. Simple apprehension is then free to create the “how”. To be sure, I am not limited to creating the “how” by leaving the notes intact; rather, the notes deriving from perceptions can then be freely created in order to make a [99] new “how” from them. The terminus of this creative intellective movement of the “how” is a feigned “how”, something fictitious, a fictum. The fictitious is formally fictitious of a “how”; the simple apprehension of a thing as a fictitious “how” is fiction.

Let us clarify a point. Fiction is above all something unreal in the sense that it is disrealized. Therefore fiction is a fictitious thing but still “in” reality. It formally involves the physical moment of reality, that moment apprehended in impression of reality. The fiction, as I have already said, is not a “fiction of reality” but “reality in fiction”. Reality itself is not feigned, but only that reality itself is “thus”. It is the “how” reality itself might be, i.e., how the thing might be in reality.

In the second place, the fictional work is something freely created, but it is doubly free. The work has its own “this” which is also something unreal, something disrealized, as in the case of the percept. But its “thisness” is only the notes which constitute it. These notes are given, but reduced to a mere perceptual “this”. So we have the first side of the unreality of a fictional work, namely the unreality of its notes. Therein the unreality comes to-
gether with the perpect; but only with respect to the notes considered each by itself: they are unreal “this-notes”. Moreover, the fictional work has freely created the “how”, something not done by the perpect. The perpect is the whole thing given and reduced to a perpect. In the fictional work the “how” itself is reduced. That is the second side of the unreality of the fictional work; it is a creation of the second degree, so to speak. The notes are made unreal separately and recomposed in a free “how”; this is free recombination. But it is not a recombination in a vacuum; rather, the most free of the fictional creations is always orientated by the “how” of real things in order to feign them in some way, whether being like them, different from them, or even opposite to them. What does not happen and cannot happen is a fictional work which has nothing to do with something previously apprehended as real.

In the third place, this fictional work is not—as one might think and as is often stated—an image produced by the creative imagination. Creative imagination is something animals also possess. An animal has imaginary creations based on stimuli. What the animal does not possess is intellective apprehension of the creation of what was imaginatively created. The animal lacks the moment of reality. The fictional work is “reality in fiction”; it is “how” a thing might be in reality. Therefore I term this intellective apprehension fantasy; it is a fantastic intellection. Animals do not have fantasies in this sense. Man does with his imagination what the animal cannot do: fantasize. The essence of “human” imagination is fantasy. To contrast the fictional work in this sense to what is imagined, I reserve for the fictional work the word phantasm in its etymological sense.

And in the fourth place, simple apprehension of a real thing as fictional is an act of strict sentient intellection. It is intellection, because it is the intellective apprehension of “how” the thing might be in reality. It is sentient because the imagination is the sentient moment of this intellection. In its unity, this sentient intellection is the simple sentient apprehension of a thing in accordance with how it might be in reality; it is the fictional thing, the phantasm.

Simple apprehension at a distance actualizes for us, then, two dimensions of a real thing: the “this” and the “how”. Free expectant intellection has respectively the two forms of percept and fictional work. They are the first two forms of simple apprehension. [101]

C) But there is still more. In the liberating retraction it is not just the “this” and the “how” which are actualized in a stepping back, because “this” and “how” are two dimensions of what—without making any special assumptions whatever—I would call the configuration of a thing. But this configuration refers to a more precise dimension, to what is the thing thus configured. The “what” is the third dimension of things actualized when apprehended at a distance, by stepping back. In retraction the “what” as such is now actualized. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is a “what”, certainly, just as there is a “this” and a “how”. But these three dimensions are unitarily compact in a thing which is directly apprehended as real. Only in simple apprehension at a distance can they actually be discriminated: this, how, and what. Now, when a thing is disrealized by free retraction, its “what” is made unreal and reduced to a mere “what” qua apprehended; it is exactly what we term concept. A concept is not something primarily logical but something primarily real; it is the “what-concept”. A concept formally and physically involves reality: it is physical reality itself as if it were this “what”: we conceive what a thing might be in reality. Reality itself, I repeat, is not an intentional but a physical moment, the moment of reality apprehended in primordial apprehension. A concept is, then, reality terminated in a free “what”. Hence it is not “concept of reality” but “reality in concept”. Then the simple apprehension in respect to intellection at a distance is conception. The concept is what is conceived in the conception. This is not tautological: the concept is the “what” of a thing reduced to a mere terminus of conception. [102]

This concept is an unreal terminus (in the sense already explained). It is reality itself in its mere “might be” terminal. And the movement which disrealizes the “what” and reduces it to a mere concept is a free and creative movement. Let us examine this more closely.

a) It is above all a liberating movement of the “what” as made unreal. It does not tell us what a real thing is, because our intellection is still taking a step back. And in this distance we have the inexorable freedom of conceiving the “whats” in and by themselves. This does not refer to any effort to ascertain which of those “whats” the real thing is as dually apprehended. That will come later. Now we are in the simple apprehension conceiving of those “whats” qua termini of apprehension. In the ambit of stepping back we freely conceive the “whats”. These “whats” are, in fact, what reality itself “might be”. This is a free movement. But its freedom is bounded by the primordial apprehension of reality from which we started in the dual apprehension. We always conceive “what” a thing, apprehended “from” one or more others previously apprehended, might be. It is the first real thing which orients us toward the conception of what “might be”, because despite being free, no conception is an act of
freedom in vacuo. It is a freedom which gives us things apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality in order to conceive the rest. And therefore it is a freedom circumscribed both with respect to its point of departure and the goal to which it is directed.

b) This liberating movement is creative. What it creates is the form in which the field of reality is actualized and the form in which real things in it are. The “what” reduced to a mere concept is the “might be”, and is so in two forms. {103}

In the first place, it is an abstract “what”. In this aspect, the disrealization of a conception is abstraction. Abstraction should not be confused with any sort of extraction. Extraction is a “division” into parts; its outcome is a “thing-extract”. Abstraction does not divide one part from another but, upon intelligently knowing one or more of them, “prescinds” from the others. It is a “precision” in the etymological sense of prescinding. The outcome is then an “abstract”. This precise movement qua movement is what is essential to abstraction. Generally, when speaking of abstraction, one pays attention only to the outcome, to what is “abstracted”, thus emphasizing the negative aspect of the process, viz. prescinding. No attention is paid to the “abstraction” itself. Qua abstraction, it is a movement, essentially positive and creative; it is the creation of the very ambit of the “abs” as ambit of unreality. The form as reality itself terminates in a “what” reduced to a concept; this becomes the ambit of the “abs”. The abstract is the outcome of this abstraction. This abstractive movement is freely creative, because every abstraction requires a direction and is brought to completion in that direction. Moreover, this direction is never univocally determined. For example, if we abstract what we conceptualize to be the “what” of a man, we can do it in several different ways: with respect to his animal-like figure, his psycho-animal functions (language, etc.), his personal nature, the character of his collectivity, etc. Along each of these lines the “what” created by abstraction turns out to be formally distinct from the others. Abstraction involves a precise intellecctive direction. What this direction does is to create, in a qualitative sense, the ambit of the “abs”. It is not sufficient to consider the abstract character of the result. This abstractive movement prescinds from notes, but does not prescind from {104} the formality of reality within a field. Therefore the abstract is not an “abstracted from reality” but “reality in abstraction”.

But, in the second place, the “what-concept” is not only abstract; it is also a construct. I employ this expression here not to designate the “construct state” but as an everyday synonym for something constructed. Traditionally philosophy has thought that concepts are abstract, that they are abstracted from real things. That is correct. But the truth is that the majority of concepts, especially scientific concepts, are not just abstracted but are constructed by the intelligence itself. Intellection of concepts is in itself constructive intellection. The “what-concept” is reality in construction. In a fictional work we are already present at a first manner of construction, viz. the combination of notes in the work. But here the construction has another aspect, because it does not operate on separate notes but only on “prescinded” notes, on abstract notes. Hence the outcome is no longer a fictional work but a concept, a “what”. To be sure, these two ways of construction are not necessarily independent. I can certainly construct a fictional work following the thread of a contracted concept; this, for example, is what happens in physico-mathematical construction. I can for now but allude to the problem without stopping to treat it in detail.

In the movement of retraction, in which the real is reduced to a mere concept, we have the third form of simple apprehension in reality itself.

This movement is a free and creative movement. We are habituated to seeing concepts organized, as if their organization were already logically preordained—once again the logification of intellection. To understand this it suffices to consider the organization of {105} concepts according to genera, differences, and species. Its expression is the definition. To say that man is animal “and” rational is not a definition. In order to be so, it is necessary that the concept of “animal” be the genus, that the difference be “rational”, and that the “species” then be man. But this is a free construction. To achieve it, a man whom we apprehend in primordial apprehension of reality has directed us to other things also apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality, and it is from these other things that we go on to form the generic concept. Now, these other things are freely chosen. If I choose “animal” as the thing toward which I refer the man apprehended in primordial apprehension, then clearly “animal” can discharge the function of genus. “Animal” might be a genus which is differentiated into “rational” and “irrational”. But this choice of “animal” is perfectly free. I could choose as genus simply “rational”. Then “rational” might be the genus, while “animal” might be a simple difference. “Rational” might be divided into “animal” and “spiritual”. This was basically the conception of Origen,

1 [A linguistic term referring to the grammar of the Semitic languages.- trans.]
that man might be a soul, purely spiritual, which has fallen into a material animal. The strict conceptualization of what is apprehended in primordial apprehension is, then, the outcome of a free and creative movement.

To summarize, we have inquired about the mode of intellection of a real thing in reality itself, in the field of reality. This intellection has the character of a dual apprehension, and hence a character grounded in the unfolding, within each real thing, of its “reality” and its “in reality”. We have then posed the problem of the internal structure of an intellection in this unfolding. And the first thing which must be said is that we are dealing with a movement of retraction in which we step back from what each thing, apprehended in primordial apprehension, is in reality. In this retraction we intellectively know in a simple apprehension what the thing might be. What the real thing is in which reality itself terminates is therefore the apprehension of the real in unreality. This “stepping back” actualizes expressly three dimensions of each real thing: its “this”, its “how”, and its “what”. These three dimensions, reduced from the real thing to the terminus of simple apprehension, give rise to three forms of simple apprehension: the percept, the fiction or fictum, and the concept. The “this” is apprehended in a simple apprehension as “percept”; the “how” is apprehended in simple apprehension as “fictitious”, and the “what” is apprehended in simple apprehension as “concept”. These are the three forms of intellection of simple apprehension at a distance, the three forms of impelling actualization of the intellection of the real as differentiating.

Now, what we insist on calling ‘being “in reality”’ formally consists in the unity of the “this”, the “how”, and the “what”. Here we have what a thing is “in reality”; or rather, what the thing “might be” in reality. The real is apprehended in primordial apprehension. What reality might be is this same reality intellectively known as “this, how, what”. This intellection can be just a retraction; that is what the “might be” expresses.

But in this stepping back, and with this utilization of percepts, fictions, and concepts, the intelligence turns expectantly from its free creation to real things from which it has stepped back, intent on intellectively knowing them not merely as a terminus of apprehension, i.e., not merely as terminus of what a real thing “might be”, but as it “is” in reality. The intentum is thus something different from a simple apprehension. {107} It is no longer creation, but affirmation. The expectation leads, by stepping back, in the roundabout way of simple apprehension, to an affirmation. This is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality, an intellection in stepping back. The intentum in now an affirmative intellection.
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CHAPTER V

INTELLECTION THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” FROM WHAT A REAL
THING IS IN REALITY

The intellective movement, as I remarked above, has
two phases. First is the movement that impels from a real
thing to a field, to the field of reality, in which what the
thing is in reality is left at a distance through a disrealiz-
ing retraction. It is the movement in whose intellection
we intellectively know by simple apprehension what the
real thing “might be” in reality (percept, fictum, concept).
The intellective movement has a second phase. The real
thing which has impelled us from itself to reality itself in
a field constrains us tensely there; it is the phase of the
movement of return to the real thing, the intentum for
intellectively knowing, from the field, what this thing “is”
in reality out of the sphere of what it “might be”. This
intellection is then a discernment, a 

krinein, a judging. Dual apprehension has lead us to intellectively know what
a real thing is in reality in a movement of retraction t o-
ward what this thing “might be” in reality, and in a r e-
verse movement which leads us by stepping back (i.e.,
“distanced”) and with discernment to intellectively know
what the thing in fact “is” {110} in reality, i.e., to a
judgement. It is this which we must now study.

A judgement is an “affirmation”. The intentum ac-
quires from the field the character of affirmative intention
of what the thing is or is not in reality. This “in reality” is
the unity of the “this, how, and what” which generally
(though not always or primarily) is expressed in the “is”. Therefore our problem is the study of the structure of af-
firmation as such.

Affirmation, as I said, is an intellection which re-
turns, distanced from (stepping back from) what the real
thing is in reality. It is not just a return to the real thing,
as if the thing had been left abandoned; rather, it is a non-
abandonment of the real, and therefore concerns an intel-
lectual return within the real itself. This “within” is not
just a material “within”, so to speak. We are not talking
about the fact that we are within the real; rather the
“within” is a “within” which is formally such, i.e., this
intellection is expressly and formally intellectively know-
ing the real in a movement of intellective return to what
the real is in reality, that is, in a formal movement of real-
ity. Simple apprehension is a retractive intellection from
what a thing “might be” to what it “is” in reality. But
always “in reality”.

What is this intellection? The question is more
complicated than one might think, because intellection
can take on a variety of forms. Moreover, in each of them
affirmation can have different modes as well. Therefore
we must address three groups of questions:

1. What is affirming?
2. What are the forms of affirmation?
3. What are the modes of affirmation?

§ 1

WHAT IS AFFIRMING?

‘Affirmation’ here means a “firm” intellection as
opposed to the “retracted” intellection constituting simple
apprehension. Stepping back distends or relaxes, so to
speak, the intellection of what the real is. Affirmation is
affirming to ourselves intellectually what is the real in that
stepping back, in that distension. It is always and only
that which is intellectively known that is affirmed “at a
distance" or by stepping back in the process of return. What is this affirmation?

Two concepts of affirmation have been put forth, both of which are false, in my opinion, though for different reasons.

In the first place it has been thought, especially since Descartes, that to affirm something is "to believe" that what is affirmed is so. Affirmation would thus be belief. This conception can assume various shades of meaning depending upon one's understanding of belief. It can be understood as a mere sentiment, so that affirming would be the expression of an intellectual sentiment. Or it can be understood not as a sentiment but as a decision of the will; thus affirming would be the expression of a volition. This was above all the idea of Descartes, for whom, as a consequence, the problem of truth is but the problem of the good of the intelligence, and falsehood would be its sin. Finally, one can understand that belief, without becoming a strict act of volition, is at least an act of admission: to affirm would be to admit something. But in any one of these forms, the conception seems to me incorrect, because on a different level, all of them (112) and any related ones minimize the intellective aspect of affirmation. And the fact is that upon saying that A "is" for example B, the questions inevitably arise what is it that is believed, what is it that is decided, what is it that is admitted. Strictly speaking, what is believed or decided or admitted is that "something A is B". In virtue of this, prior to the whole gamut of modes of belief, there is that which is believed, decided, or admitted: "something is B". And in this "something is B" in itself is what the affirmation consists. Affirmation does not consist in believing. This "something is B" is a formally intellectual act. There is always a serious ambiguity when one speaks of judgment. On one hand, judging can mean the psychical act, that mental act which, so to speak, we may term assertion. In this sense, judging is asserting. But there is a more radical and deeper meaning of judging, namely judgement as affirmative intention, affirmation. Assertion and affirmation are not the same. Assertion is a mental act of mine, whereas affirmation is the intellective intention independently of whether or not it be asserted by me. Moreover, the affirmative intention forms the possibility for assertion; only because there is an affirmation, only because there is an affirmative intention, can there be an assertion. In fact the same affirmation can be the terminus of different modes of assertion. Now, here we are referring only to affirmation as affirmative intention. I shall employ the word 'affirmation' in this sense, in absolute contradistinction to 'assertion'. In what does this affirmation consist?

Here we meet up with a second conception much more general than the previous one: to affirm is to say "A is B". B is the predicate, but as is well known, I can and I should include B in the "is", and then the predicate is "is B". (113) Judging would then be predicing of A "being B". This is the venerable conception of Aristotle which, with more or less important variants, has run throughout the course of history. It is, as I see it, a conception which is also inadmissible for two reasons. In the first place, it is assumed that affirming is "saying". But what is understood by "saying"? Certainly no one, not even Aristotle himself, thinks that here "saying" can be expressed in some language. But the question remains: what is the intellective nature of the saying as saying? There is no alternative but to appeal to affirmation qua affirmative intention: saying would be having "affirmative intention". And this is conceptualized as something irreducible. But, is it really something irreducible? And above all, in what would its irrededucibility consist? That this question has not been rigorously posed constitutes a serious defect of the whole conception, as I see it. Indeed, it has been admitted without further ado that judging is affirming; without questioning formally what the affirming is. Secondly, affirmation is identified with the predication "A is B". And this, as we shall soon see, is formally false regardless of what conception one has of the predicate (whether "B" or "is B"). Not every affirmation is predicative. But that is a subject which concerns not affirmation in itself but what I have called forms of affirmation, which I shall treat subsequently.

With this we are at the point of being able to formulate our problem precisely. In the first place, we are not concerned with what assertion might be, but with what affirmation is. In the second place, we are not concerned with the various kinds of concrete affirmations, but with the function of affirming itself—just as in previous chapters, when treating of intellection, I did not refer to various kinds of intellecutions but only to what intellective knowing consists in, (114) to the function of intellective knowing itself. Hence we shall now ask not about the various kinds of concrete affirmations but about the function of affirming as such.

Affirming, as we have said, is intellective knowing in a movement of return; i.e., the intellection itself is now formally dynamic. To understand that we must clarify two points: (1) in what the movement of affirmation qua movement consists, and (2) in what the intellection itself in this movement consists. They comprise the two essential questions—affirmation qua intellective movement, and intellective movement qua affirmation. Affirmation only is necessary and possible in a field-based intellection,
i.e. in sentient intellection. A non-sentient intelligence would apprehend the truth of our judgement, but would not apprehend it in the form of an affirmation. The logos qua affirmation is constitutively and essentially sentient; it is sentient logos. In what follows I shall speak in general about affirmation as sentient logos, prescinding from the fact that simple apprehension pertains to it; i.e., I shall speak of the logos only as judgement.

1) First of all, then, what is affirmation qua movement? Even at the risk of monotonously repeating the same idea, let me state that affirmation is an intentum. This intentum is not in itself noetic but noergic; it is the dynamic tension of returning to the real, formally already within reality, within this particular real thing. With it the intentum has been converted from a movement at a distance within reality, to a movement "toward" the thing; it is intention. This intention is, then, an internal moment of the intentum. It is no longer a mere "being tense" but a "movement towards" what the real thing is in reality. {115} The intention is a moment of the reversive intentum at a distance, i.e. from reality itself to what, through stepping back (i.e., at a distance), it is "in reality". Intention then is not something purely noetic because it is a moment of the intentum, which is noergic. Intentionality is thus the physical ergon of intellection in stepping back, i.e., at a distance. The moment of returning is a formally constitutive moment of affirmation. Intellec tion, in stepping back, must fill up that stepping back, and do so in a very precise way, viz. by movement. Every stepping back, in fact, should be gone through. Otherwise the distinction between what a thing is as real and what it is in reality would not be a “distance”; it would be at best mere separation. And that is wrong.

To be gone through is formally constitutive of distance, of stepping back. Therefore intellective going through of distance is formally constitutive of affirmation. To affirm is to “go” from one thing to another “among” the rest. The “among” of differential actualization of the real is a distantial “among”. To affirm is to come to intel lectively know what a thing is in reality, but based upon others. It is a “coming to” and not a merely “being in” it. But let us avoid a possible mistake which would be very serious. The “coming to” is not a movement which consists in going from one intellection to another, but rather a movement which consists in the very mode of actually intellectively knowing each thing. It is not a “coming to affirm” but an “affirming by coming” or “coming by affirming”, a movement which constitutes intellection in the coming itself. In other words, the movement constituting intention is not the intention of directing me to one thing after another, but the intentional intellective movement of the intentum of each thing. It is not intention of intellection, but intellective intention. Judgement therefore {116} is of formally dynamic nature qua intention. The intention itself is formally dynamic.

As I see it, failure to consider formally the dynamic character of judgement is one of the most serious errors in the philosophy of human intelligence from Kant to the present. Intellectual dynamism has not been a subject other than in that dynamism called ‘dialectic’, i.e., reasoning. Dialectic, as usually understood, is that movement constituting the reasoning process. It has been emphasized that the intelligence can go from some intellec tions to others by combining them suitably; and the first dialectical laws of this process have been rigorously established. But no one has asked why this happens. Is it just a simple fact? I do not think so. I believe that the intellective movement of reasoning is founded in something constitutive of a mode of intellection, the intellection qua stepping back and returning, i.e., the affirmative intellection. Therefore this movement is not a mere fact, but something anchored in a structural moment of affirmation, namely, in stepping back. This stepping back is not something peculiar to dialectical reasoning, but a structural moment of every affirmation. Dialectical movement of reasoning should have been founded upon the structure of affirmation as stepping back. Aristotelian philosophy has never asked about this structure; it went astray on the matter of distance and stepping back, i.e., on the basic radical structure of the logos. What is dynamic in dialectical reasoning is founded in, and is a consequence of, the dynamic character of affirmation. It was necessary to have started from this latter, because not only dialectic but affirmation itself is structurally dynamic. To be sure, Kant saw in dialectic something more than a mere combination of affirmations; {117} but he opted to make a simple logical system out of that combination. With regard to our present question, the position of Kant concerning affirmation as such is, strictly speaking, the same as that of Aristotle.

For other philosophies, e.g. that of Hegel, dialectical movement is more than a fact; it is the formal structure of intellection. Hegelian dialectic is not the movement of some affirmations to others, but the dynamic structure of intellection as such. But this view, as I see it, is just as unacceptable as that of Aristotle, and is so for the same reason but with a different emphasis. Clearly, movement is a structural character of intellection, not a mere fact. But it is a structural character not of intellection as such but only of distanced intellection. Just as in Aristotle, there is absent in Hegel the moment of stepping back. This stepping back, this taking of distance, in fact is not a
moment of intellection in the abstract, but something which only applies to a sentient intellection. Now, sentient intellection can apprehend the real in and by itself without any stepping back, and therefore without movement. Only when sentient intellection intellec-tively knows at a distance do we have movement. The dialectical dynamism is, then, a structural moment of intellection; but only of affirmative intellection, because this, and only this, is distanced intellection, intellection by stepping back. Intellection in itself is not dynamic.

For Aristotle, then, dynamism is just a characteristic of reasoning and not a structural moment of affirmative intellection. For Hegel, dynamism is a structural moment of intellection, but of intellection as such. In both conceptions {118} the idea of distance and stepping back is absent and therefore I believe that they are unacceptable. Stepping back is a structural moment, but only with respect to affirmative intellection.

In what does this affirmative intention consist, not as movement but as affirmation?

2) Intellective movement qua affirmation. This movement is the logos. I repeat: we do not deal with particular affirmations but with affirmation in the sense of function of affirming as such. One usually considers affirming as something “added”, so to speak, to the apprehension of things, an addition which consists in a type of internal intellectual “attack” in which the intelligence “decides” to affirm something as real. Now, neither of these two characteristics (being added and being the outcome of an “attack”) describes in a rigorous way what affirming is, what intellective movement as affirmation is.

A) In the first place, consider affirming as “added” to the apprehension of things. What apprehension is meant? If one means simple apprehensions, then affirming is certainly something “more”; it is much “more” than simple apprehension. But the fact is that judgement is not based primarily upon simple apprehension, but upon the primordial apprehension of the real. Now, affirming is “more” than simple apprehension, but it is “less”, much “less”, than the primordial apprehension of reality. Every intellection is an intellective actualization of the real, and as we saw in Chapter I, in primordial intellection we apprehend something not only as if it were real, but as something which is formally and truly real and which is apprehended as real. And in this being “real” of what is intellectively known in a primordial apprehension, in an apprehension prior to any affirmation, in this “real”—I repeat—is where affirmation as such intellectively moves. {119} Affirmation, in fact, does not arise except when what is already apprehended as real is distended by stepping back in the field of the real. Affirmation formally but also constitutively involves the impression of reality. It is sentient logos in virtue of being basically and formally constituted by the impression of reality. Hence, affirmation not only does not add anything to the primordial apprehension of reality, but in fact is an “indebted” mode (because it is “grounded”) of being intellectively in what has been already intellectively known as real. It is a distended mode of being already in the real. It is a modalization of the primordial apprehension. Therefore affirmation, which in certain respects is an unfolding, an expansion, of the primordial apprehension of the real, is nonetheless something founded in a “reduction” of the primordial apprehension of the real, because it is a distensive mode of intellective actualization of the real. It is essential, in my view, to stress this reductive, distensive character of affirming as a mode of being intellectively in the real. Affirming is intellective actualization in which something is intellectively known which is real, but through returning from a stepping back. It is because of this, ultimately, that the conceptions of judgement as a “relation” are wrong. A relation adds, but affirmation adds nothing; on the contrary, it moves distendedly in what already is intellectively. Affirmation not only adds nothing, but in a certain way it subtracts, in that mode of subtraction which is distension. All of those attempts to characterize affirming as something added to apprehension, and as something irreducible to it, are in my view vitiated at their root. Simple apprehension is already a retraction, not of the real, but in the real; and affirming is a being in the real but intellectively known {120} in this stepping back, i.e., in a reduced form, a being distended. Affirmation is not reducible to simple apprehension. And not only is it irreducible to primordial apprehension; rather, one intellectively knows in it distendedly; distendedly, but in it. It is a reduced and distended mode in the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., in something already intellectively known in its reality. Affirmation, to be sure, is formally in reality, but is not the reason why affirming is the primary and radical mode of being intellectually in reality; that, rather, is because affirming is a reduced and distended mode within a prior intellectively being “existing” in reality. By this I do not mean that a determinate judgement is a type of “contraction” of what “the” judging would be; rather, I refer to the function of judging as such. It is not only “a judgement” but “the judging” as such, affirming as such, which is a reduced form of intellection, a reduction and a modalization of that radical and primary form of intellection which is the primordial apprehension of reality.

B) Moreover, this intellection is neither added nor
does it consist in a type of “intellective attack” which “decides” what is real; nor is it a “diving in” as it were, in order to pledge oneself to what one takes to be real. Just the opposite. Let us recall, once again, that we are not referring to concrete affirmations but to the function of affirming as such. Now, intelligence is already formally in reality; therefore it does not have to “go forth” to reality. Rather, it is already moving intellectively in reality. Affirmation does not consist in installing ourselves in reality, affirming that something is real, but in being already anchored in reality and intellectually knowing if this reality is “thus” in reality. It is actually being in reality discernedly in sentient intellection. If I must affirm, it is because the real in which I am is intellectually known by returning from a stepping back, and only because of that. This necessity is the intellective moment which I have termed “retention”. Distended in the real, I am nonetheless always retained in the real by the real itself. It is for this reason that affirming the real is not some decision or “attack” of mine, but on the contrary a trip within the real already known intellectively as real in the formal sense. This is just the opposite of an “attack”: it is the actualization of the real in a retained form. It is not a “going” to intellectually know the real, but “intellectively knowing the real while going” from one point to another in the field. It is not, as I have already pointed out, a going from one intellection to another; nor is it an intention of intellection. Rather, it is a mode of this intellection, an intellective intention. As such, what an affirmation possesses of affirmation; i.e., affirming as such should be understood from the actuality of the real, and not the opposite, viz. the actuality of the real from the affirmation. It is not so much “I affirm” as the opposite “the real is affirmed” in my intellection. Permit me to explain.

To be sure, affirming is a movement of mine. But movement does not mean spontaneous activity. Every intellection, even the primordial apprehension of reality, is an intellection of mine; and in this sense affirmation is mine also by the mere fact of being intellection. But this does not mean that intellective movement, in virtue of being movement, is a spontaneous movement of mine, because intellection is primarily act and not activity. Assertion, true, is a spontaneous activity. But affirmative intention as such, affirming as such, is not. It is movement, but a movement imposed on the intelligence by the stepping back from the real in differential actualization. I am really led by the real to affirm. To conceive affirmation as an “attack”, i.e., as a spontaneous activity, is to thrust upon affirmation what is proper only to assertion. And the two are very different things. As I have said, there are many ways of asserting the same affirmation. Moreover, assertion as such is made possible by affirmation as such. Affirmative intention is, in fact, at a distance by stepping back, and distended; and it is on account of that that it opens the mental ambit of assertion, the ambit of “maneuvering room”, so to speak, of assertion. Assertion is a spontaneous attitude of mine; but this spontaneity is possible through the “maneuvering room” of affirmation and only through it. What has led to confusion between asserting and affirming is the dynamic character of affirming. The fact is that affirmative movement, affirmative dynamism, has a precise character, viz. a movement in reality, but a movement in outline or sketchy form, an outline in reality and in what the thing is in reality. Therefore this movement is anything but an “attack”, because it is not a spontaneous activity of mine. To be sure, as an outline this movement pertains to me and in this sense it can be said that it is I who affirm. But this outline, even though a dynamism of mine, is a dynamism which is just as receptive as looking, feeling, hearing, etc. can also be. This movement of my intellection is a dynamism of it, but not an action whose intentionality results from any action of mine; rather, it results from a dynamic intention in which my intelligence is found, and precisely in this order—I stress the phrase—my mind. It is in this sense that I say that it is not so much that I affirm as that I find myself in affirmative intention.

C) This outline in reality has a definite character and name: it is discernment. The discerning outline is an intellection which is determined in my intelligence by the actuality of the real as stepped back from. Stepping back determines distention, and distention determines discernment; it is purely and simply the retentivity of the real. Discernment is not the mode of actually knowing intellectively, nor the mode of going to be present intellectually in reality, but on the contrary is a way of moving about in reality, in which one already is intellectively. Discernment, krinein, is something founded in primordial apprehension, i.e. in the radical intellection of the real as real. To be sure, on many occasions the intelligence affirms without sufficient discernment. But this is a different question; when speaking of the adequacy of discernment I refer to what in a subsequent part I shall call ‘evidential demand of the real’, a demand or requirement which admits many degrees. Often one affirms without discernment just because primarily discerning is given to us by the real only sketchily; it is a moment of sentient intellection.

Thus, affirmation has four constitutive moments, moments which are formally constitutive of it.
1) In the first place, affirming is actually being intellec
tively in the real, intellecively knowing it both for-
mally and precisely as real. It is not just conceiving or
anything like that. This moment forms part of affirma-
tion owing to the primordial apprehension of reality, to the
impression of reality. Affirming is not an autonomous
function of the intelligence but a modalization of the in-
tellec function as such. It is a mode of intellec of the
real in its physical and formal actuality of real, a for-
mality already known intellecively in primordial appre-
hension. Affirmation does not innovate; nor is it the mo-
ment which immerses us in reality. Rather, it is only a
modalization of the intellec of reality, a reality
which in we are already immersed in primordial appre-
hension.

2) This modalization is intellec by returning
from stepping back. One intellec knows by stepping
back in inten what something is in reality. By thus
taking distance, by thus stepping back, the intellec is
returning to the thing; by so returning, it knows intellec-
tively what the thing is in reality. It is a modalization,
then, of the intellec function as such; the inten remains
modalized in intentionality. This is intellec in inten. The inten is a “going towards”, and its intellec knowing is intentionality. Only this concep
tion of affirmative intention as a moment of a noergic in-
ten, as I see it, can constitute an adequate concept of
the essence of affirmative movement qua affirmative.
This is the modalization of primordial apprehension in
affirmative intellec.

3) This modalization is not determined by me but
rather by the formally sentient nature of my intellec.
Only because my intellec is sentient do I apprehend
the real in two modes of actualization: unitary and diffe-
ential. Only the latter gives rise to affirming. That
determination does not consist in any type of impulse to af-
firm, but rather in the actuality of the real in differential
actualization. We do not have to hurl ourselves at reality;
in our own primordial apprehension of the unitary ac-
ualization we are already intellecively knowing the real
in its physical and formal actuality of the real. In differential
actualization, then, I am already actually in reality and
have only changed the mode in which the real thing is
made actual to me in sentient intelligence. This mode of
actuality is actuality a reverse actuality of stepping back,
i.e., a return after stepping back. And such actualization
of what the real is in reality is what formally constitutes
affirming. Affirming is not an act of mine but a
mode of actually being now in reality. What is mine is
discerning what is affirmed. It is not a function carried
out as process; rather it is something acquired but through
the mode of intellec actualization of the real qua real. Ultimately, affirming is a modulation of the impression of
reality.

4) This intentionality is constituted in discernment;
but discernment is not formally constitutive of affirma-
tion. Affirmation is that in which discernment is given, and
must be given; but affirming qua affirming is not dis-
cerning.

To summarize, then, affirmation has four constitu-
tive moments:

a) It has a moment of effective reality of what is af-
fermed as being real. It is a moment which impinges upon
the judgement of the impression of reality, something
given in the impression of reality.

b) It has the affirmative moment as such. It is the
mode of intellecivly knowing reality by stepping back in
a movement of return “toward” the real, in intentional
intellec.

c) It has the moment of being a differential actuali-
zation of reality within reality. It has never been formally
outside of the real. Therefore affirming is not going to the
real from the not real, but is going from “the real” to what
is “in reality” but via unreality; it is actually reducing the
retroactive reduction itself by a return. This reduction of
the reduction formally consists, as we shall see, in what I
term ‘realization’. It is the essence of affirming.

d) It has the moment of discernment of what is af-
fermed, the discernment of the many “might be’s” of that
which “is”. {126}

Now, in contrast to the primordial apprehension of
reality, every affirmation, in virtue of being “at a dis-
tance”, i.e., by stepping back, is dual intellec. It
therefore involves first something which is judged or af-
fermed, and second what is formally judged in the judg-
ment. Let us quickly review these two points: About what
one judges, and What one judges.

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1

About What One Judges

At first glance one might think that he is judging
something to be real which has been apprehended in sim-
ple apprehension as unreal; i.e., he would think that what
“might be” real is judged as something which “is” real.
Therefore that of which he judges would be the content of a simple apprehension, something unreal. Nonetheless, this is incorrect. That of which one judges is something previously apprehended as real. And for just this reason affirmative intellecction is constitutively dual. It presupposes and bears in its breast the intellection of something as already real. What is then affirmed if the thing is real? We shall see that forthwith. But although philosophy is not accustomed to inquire about it, one must understand that that of which affirmation is made is not something possible or unreal, but something perfectly real.

This is evident in affirmations which refer to real things. For example, when one says that this water is warm or is freezing, he presupposes that that thing about which he judges, the water, is real. And this is true even when meaning-things are intellecctually known. A meaning-thing is not formally a real-thing, but every meaning-thing bears within it a real-thing. A table is not a real thing qua table, but rather a meaning-thing. But the table would not be a table were it not a table by virtue of being a real-thing. Now, I can make affirmations about the table, but only thanks to the fact that “table” is the meaning of a real-thing, for example, of a thing which has a certain size, shape, etc. One might say that there are many judgements which are not of this type because they refer to things which are not real; this is the case with all mathematical statements, and also of the innumerable judgements which play a part in a work of fiction, e.g., in a novel. Every such work contains judgements, even though that about which affirmations are made is fictional. It is thus not evident that that about which one judges is necessarily a reality apprehended in primordial apprehension. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate what I just said. It is certain that neither a geometric space nor Don Juan are real things in the same form as a glass of water. But, do they act, so to speak, as something purely and simply not-real? Not at all. Let us examine the two cases separately.

a) Consider first geometric space. No geometric space, starting with Euclidean space, is qua geometric a physical space. Nonetheless, a geometric space is not just a concept or synthesis of concepts. If it were, such a space would not go beyond what space “might be”. Now, mathematics does not deal with spaces which “might be”; but only with those that “are”; and it studies them very fastidiously. This means that concepts, simple apprehensions of what spaces “might be”, become concepts of what “is”. How? Concepts become concepts of something which “is” thanks to a system of postulates.

What are these postulates? I.e., what is it that the postulates postulate? That is the question. As I see it, the postulates do not postulate “truth”, i.e., they do not ask that we admit their truth. If they did, mathematics would be purely and simply a combination of truths. Ultimately just a phase of logic. Many have thought this, including mathematical thinkers of genius. But that does not prevent it from being false. Mathematics is not a system of necessary truths, merely coherent among themselves with respect to the “principles” of logic; rather, it is a system of necessary truths about an object which, in its way, has reality before the intelligence. What the postulates postulate is not “truth” but “reality”; what is postulated is the reality of that about which one postulates. If one wishes to go on speaking about truths, it will be necessary to say that the postulates enunciate the “real truth” about what is postulated. That is, the postulates are not mere logical statements but statements of the characteristics which the “content” of the “reality” of what is postulated has. “Postulation” is founded upon the “might be” and formally consists in its transformation into “is”, thanks to the postulation of reality. This transformation, as we shall see in the Appendix following this section, is formally construction.

b) Let us consider the other case, the things which go on in a work of fiction. Such a work, as we have already seen, is how the real “would be” or “might be” in reality. But a novel, for example, does not tell us what “might be reality” but, in its way, what “is reality”. Therefore a novel is full of characteristics or notes which are very different from those initially attributed to its characters or situations. The fact is that the story told in the novel, by virtue of being told as a real story, has other properties than those formally enunciated in a principle. Thus one can justifiably discuss whether this fictional character, say Don Juan, is or is not an effeminate person. In general terms, a novelist feels that his characters force themselves upon him, that they bear him along, that they compel his writing, etc., in virtue of properties which they have through having been realized initially in concrete situations. And this indicates to us that that about which judgements in fictional works are made is clearly not a concrete person, e.g., some citizen of Seville; but is something more than a “how it would be”, namely “it is thus”. That “is” expresses a reality not like that of a stone, but indeed a reality. All the judgements of the fictional work refer to this reality, which is that given in the impression of reality by the stone. The novelist constructs by creation in this reality “according to definite items of fiction”. This is the difference between a novel and mathematics. Both are constructions of reality, but in mathematics one constructs “according to concepts” (as we shall see forth-
with), whereas in a novel one constructs “according to items of fiction and percepts”.* To be sure, the novel has many concepts; but it is not constructed along those lines. The novel as such is not formally constituted in the creation of the reality of the fictions, but in the construction of the content in reality itself according to those fictions. The novel does not refer to fiction but to the reality constructed according to the items of fiction.

c) If we take the judgements of mathematics and those of fictional literature one by one, we shall see that in each of them that of which one judges is “something real”. The concepts, the fictions, and the percepts are simple apprehensions; they express what the real “might be”, i.e., they are formally and explicitly inscribed within reality itself. But in reality itself not qua terminus of a concrete content but qua it “might terminate” therein; that is, they express not what it “is” but what it “might be”. Therefore we say that this simple apprehension expresses something unreal. I need not emphasize it more since it was discussed above. Now, the judgements of mathematics or fictional literature do not concern something formally “unreal”, but something unreal though “realized”; they consider that the reality terminates in fact in this or that thing. I use a word from mathematics to refer in a unitary sense to this “concrete” termination, namely ‘postulating’. The unreal, without ceasing to be unreal, acquires a postulated reality. When the mode of realization or “making real” is construction, then we have the reality both of mathematics and of fiction. The affirmations of mathematics and fictional literature thus refer to something unreal which is realized (made real) by constructive postulation, whether in the form of construction according to concepts (mathematics) or construction according to percepts and fictions (fictional literature). The intelligence is thus not limited to apprehending what “is already” in it, but also realizes (makes real) its concepts, its fictions, and its percepts in it, or rather, before it. What is intellectually known “is” not then before the intelligence but is something “realized” by the intelligence before itself. To be sure, one can realize without constructing; this is the case with the majority of judgements whose content is realized in the real but without construction. What one cannot do is to construct without realizing. Whence the inevitable consequence that the real, when realized by postulation—despite being so according to concepts or fictions or concrete percepts—may then have, as we are going to see, more notes of its own than those formally included in the concepts, in the fictions, and in the percepts. It is from this reality realized by constructive postulation that mathematics and fictional literature take their point of departure for their judgements.

Thus every judgement, every affirmation, is about something real presupposed as such. When things are real in and by themselves, that presupposition is formally the primordial apprehension of reality. When the things are real, but realized constructively, then the presupposition is formally postulation. Postulation is possible only by being intrinsically and formally founded in the primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the primary and radical structure of judgement is to be an affirmation of a thing already apprehended as real (in primordial apprehension) but according to its formal moment of being in a field. In virtue of this, a judgement is not an immediate intellection of something real, but an intellection modalized from that apprehension, that direct and immediate intellection; it is intellection in returning from a stepping back. What is judged in this intellection?

Before tackling this question it is advantageous to clarify just what this reality of mathematics is as postulated. Judgement presupposes the primordial apprehension of reality. But, I must emphasize, it does not deal with any presupposition of process type; i.e., one does not apprehend reality prior to judging. Rather, this reality apprehended prior to judging is maintained as a formally constitutive moment of judgement as such.

* [The phrase “items of fiction” is used here to translate Zubiri’s fictos; etymologically, both derive from the Latin fictum, from facere, to make. The English plural ‘fictions’ should be understood here in this sense.—trans.]
APPENDIX

THE REALITY OF THE MATHEMATICAL

We have seen that the mathematical is composed of judgements which refer to something real by postulation. But then the inevitable question arises: What is this postulating of the mathematical real? I said above that the postulating is a postulation of reality; now let us ask ourselves in what this postulation consists. The type of reality which the mathematical possesses depends on that answer.

Stated negatively, the reality of the mathematical is not like that of a stone, for example, because the stone is something real in and by itself. On the other hand, a mathematical space is not real in and by itself, but it does not therefore become not-real. The fact is that, as we have seen at length, reality and content are not the same. In the differential actualization of the real, the moment of formality of reality in a field is formally distinct from the moment of content. Nonetheless, that formality is always physical; the same formality of reality can encompass different contents, not just simultaneously but also successively. Thus, if the color of this stone changes, the content of its apprehension will also change; but its moment of reality has been conserved as numerically the same. Whence it is revealed to us that in these conditions physical reality itself is a moment which perhaps does not have such concrete content. Reality within a field is in fact, as we saw, the autonomized “de suyo”. It is not a kind of ocean in which things are immersed; rather, it is purely and simply the field moment proper to the formality of reality of each real thing. And we have just seen that according to this moment, each real thing is more than it is by virtue of its content. This moment of the “more” is reality itself. Reality itself is therefore a physical moment and not just a conceptive one. And precisely because it is “more” it is possible for it to have such-and-such a concrete content, i.e., it can have some other. Under these circumstances (1) the “more” is actualized in concepts, in simple apprehensions; and (2) these concepts are then realized as content of the “more”. The unity of the these two moments is, as we saw, the unreal object expressed in the “might be”. Now, when one postulates that the object “is thus”, then one has passed by postulation from the “might be” to the “is”. We have reality itself actualized in intellection, and the realization of what is conceived, but realized as a free thing. A free thing is the physical reality with a freely postulated content. Such are the objects of mathematics, for they are real objects constituted in the physical moment of reality itself in a field, the same reality according to which things like this stone are real. The moment of reality is identical in both cases; what is not the same is their content and their mode of reality. The stone has reality in and by itself, whereas the circle has reality only by postulation. Nonetheless the moment of reality is identical. The reality of mathematical objects is the “more”, that same “more” of every real thing in and by itself. And precisely by being a “more” it is extended to have a free content by postulation. How mathematical objects are constituted in their postulation I shall explain forthwith.

For now I should like to recall what I explained in Part One, viz. that reality is not synonymous with existence. Existence and notes pertain only to the content of the real; on the other hand, the formality of reality consists in this existential content and these notes being such de suyo. An existence which did not de suyo concern what is existent would not make of it something real, but rather something which is a phantom. Existence and notes, I repeat, pertain only to the content of the real. Now, the moment of reality in a field is the moment of formality of the “de suyo” autonomized when things are apprehended some among others; i.e., the ambit of reality, an ambit strictly and rigorously physical. Reality itself in a field is “physical” but not formally existent. Certainly if the content were not existent what was apprehended would not be real; but rather something which is a phantom. Existence and notes, I repeat, pertain only to the content of the real. Now, the moment of reality in a field is the moment of formality of the “de suyo” autonomized when things are apprehended some among others; i.e., the moment of reality is the ambit of reality, an ambit strictly and rigorously physical. Reality itself in a field is “physical” but not formally existent. Certainly if the content were not existent what was apprehended would not be real; but neither would it be real if it did not have such-and-such determinate notes. That is, there is no reality without content (existential and notes). What happens is that there is “field reality”, i.e., reality in a field, a field which
is *de suyo*, but without *this particular determinate content*, i.e., without such-and-such determinate notes and their determinate existence. The field moment is the *de suyo*, but in a form such that the “*suyo*” [itself] of this “*de suyo*” remains free. Both the notes and their existence remain free, but the *de suyo* persists as the formal moment of reality. The impossibility that if there is no existence there is no reality does not mean that reality is existence; it only means, as I just said, that while reality is a formality, there cannot be a *de suyo* without a content of notes and existence. These notes and this existence are what a postulate postulates for reality; they are notes and existence realized only by being postulated in reality itself. In virtue of this, the notes or properties, like their existence, are notes and existence as postulated; but these notes and this existence are real only [136] by free postulation in reality itself, in the *de suyo*. For greater clarity let me add that when, in mathematics, an existence theorem is formulated (e.g. the existence of a root of every algebraic equation, or of an integral in an ordinary differential equation, or the non-existence of an algebraic equation having e as a root), existence means the naked realization of a note in virtue of the realization of other notes. Since the naked realization of these notes involves a postulated existence, the naked realization of the content is what, with full justification, one calls mathematical existence. It is always a question of realization, but not in the sense of identifying reality and physical existence in and by itself.

In conclusion, actualization of reality itself in intellection leaves its content free. And then what the postulate postulates is that such-and-such determinate content (for example, Euclidean parallelism or non-Archimedean topology), both in its notes and in its existence, is what is realized in reality itself, in the “more”, in that same physical reality by which this stone is real. This content thus realized is, as we have said, a “free thing”. Geometric space is real with the same reality as has this stone. It is not just a concept, but is reality freely realized; free, but real, real but free. This postulation therefore postulates that reality itself is realized in such-and-such content; it is this realization which is postulated.

The mathematical mode of this postulation is what I here term ‘construction’. Geometric space is not a system of objective concepts; rather, *the construction realizes*, by postulation, these objective concepts. Constructing is not only making something an intentional and unreal terminus (that would be a question of simple content); rather, it consists in projecting this [137] unreal part of the concept onto reality itself “according to concepts”. Therefore construction is a mode of realization; it is realizing according to concepts.

One must avoid two possible errors with regard to this idea of construction: construction in the sense of Gödel and construction in the sense of Brouwer.

Gödel calls ‘constructing a group’ the operation of generating it via the iterated application of certain operations axiomatically defined in the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. One must emphasize this: we are dealing with operations “defined” as such and not with the procedure to bring them about. These groups are what Gödel called *constructables*. His disciple Cohen (1963) based himself upon non-constructable groups in this sense. The elements of every group in fact have two classes of properties. Some, the *specific* ones, correspond to the postulates and operational axioms to which I have just referred. Others are *generic*, in virtue of which they form a group leaving indeterminate the specific properties, which would “force” the generic properties to be specific. The groups thus obtained having only generic characters are by definition *non-constructed*. Cohen bases himself (for his sensational discovery of the falsity of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis) on these non-constructable groups. This seems to contradict what I just said about all of mathematics being constructed. Nonetheless, the contradiction is only apparent, because what I here call construction is something different. In the first place, this is so because what Gödel and Cohen construct is ultimately the *objective concept* both specific as well as generic. But in contrast the construction to which I refer consists in realizing before my intelligence a concept [138] already objectively constructed (whether constructable or not). And in this sense the realization itself can and ought to be called construction. It is then something very different from construction in the sense of Gödel and Cohen. Both the constructable groups and the non-constructable ones are constructed in the sense of things realized before my intelligence. Secondly, this realization is the construction of a content in physical reality; it is an intellectively free realization in physical reality itself. It is, precisely, postulating. And this construction thus postulated is construction of the content in physical reality. The groups of Gödel and Cohen are constructed (in my concept of construction) in physical reality. So the construction itself does not formally concern concepts, nor is it a “conceptive” construction; rather, it is a realization in physical reality itself, but “according to concepts”—two completely different things. And in this sense every mathematical object is constructed by being postulated. It is for this reason that the object thus constructed is a strict reality which can have properties or notes “of its own”, or “proper”, and not just properties “deduced” from the axioms and postulates. This does not refer to deduced properties but to properties which are already formally in the object. Mathematical objects have their properties *de suyo*, i.e., they are real. The fact is that the real object made real by being postu-
lated according to concepts has, by being realized, more notes or properties than those defined in its postulation. On account of this and only on account of it are problems posed which may not be solvable with the finite system of axioms and postulates which defined its realization. What is constructed in reality itself is, by being realized, something more than what was postulated when realized. This, as I see it, is the thrust of Gödel’s theorem. It does not refer to a limitation intrinsic [139] to affirmations based on axioms and postulates qua affirmations—that is the usual interpretation of the theorem—; rather, it leaves the character of reality of what is constructed according to the axioms and postulates in question to be revealed before the intelligence. It is not, then, the intrinsic inadequacy of a system of postulates, but the radical originality of what is constructed by being real, a reality which is not exhausted in what has been postulated about it. This object is not a real thing in and by itself as is this stone. But neither is it only what “might be real”; rather, it is what “is real” by being postulated and constructed. That, in my judgement, is the interpretation of Gödel’s theorem. The judgements of mathematics are then judgements of something real, judgements of the “postulated real”. They are not judgements about the “possible real” but judgements about “postulated reality”.

This conceptualization of mathematical reality by construction is not, then, a type of formalism, but neither is it in any sense what has been set forth in rigorous opposition to such formalism, viz. intuitionism, especially that of Brouwer. That is the other concept of construction which it is necessary to eliminate in this problem. For intuitionism, mathematical construction is not the same as defining and constructing concepts. Intuitionism rejects the idea that mathematics is founded upon logic; a demonstration which appeals to the logical principle of the excluded middle is not, for Brouwer, a mathematical demonstration. Mathematics is not a system of defined concepts and operations. An operation, if it is to be mathematical, has to be an operation actually carried out, i.e., one comprised of a finite number of steps. To be sure, mathematics is not interested only in finite groups; for example, it concerns itself with the infinite digit strings making up real numbers. It is true that [140] mathematics cannot actually carry out all the operations necessary to obtain an irrational number, because the number of steps would be infinite. But they can be given, and are given, in a rule or algorithm in which the operations are continued “indefinitely”. The object of mathematics, then, would be finite groups as the terminus of operations carried out on them. Intuitionism is a radical finitism. The majority of mathematicians therefore reject Brouwer’s ideas despite its applications to topology, because to amputate the infinite series would be for them to nullify an enormous part of the mathematical edifice. Brouwer, they tell us, if forced to be consistent with himself, would be compelled to abandon as invalid an enormous portion of infinitesimal analysis [calculus]. But let us not be concerned with this aspect of the question because in our problem the essential part is that intuitionism claims to be opposed to formalistic axiomism or formalism by putting forth actually carried out operations as opposed to axiomatic definitions. At bottom it is an idea of Kronecker in action: God created the whole numbers and man created the rest. The whole numbers would be a datum of intuition, and therefore constructing would be reduced finally to counting what is given. Defining does not suffice.

But this conception cannot be maintained because the groups—even if finite—are not formally intuitive nor do the operations carried out on them constitute the radical part of what I understand by mathematical construction.

In the first place, Brouwer’s finite group is not intuitive. Leaving aside for now the problems posed by intuition, let us say that intuition is the “vision” of something given immediately, directly, and unitarily. [141] In intuition I have the qualitative and quantitative diversity of the given, but never do I have a group. There are no strict intuitive groups, because in order to have a group I must consider, separately so to speak, the moments of the intuitive diversity as “elements”. Only then does their unity constitute a group. A mathematical group is always a group of elements, and only that. But then it is clear that no group, not even a finite one, is intuitive, because intuition gives only “diversity of moments”, never a “group of elements”. In order to have a group it is necessary to have a subsequent act of intellection which makes the moments to be elements. It is then necessary to have a construction. The so-called finite construction, presumably given in intuition, is nothing but the application of the group already intellectually constructed to the diversity of the given. This application is just a postulation: one postulates that the given is resolved in a group. Therefore rigorously speaking one cannot call Brouwer’s mathematics intuitionism. Brouwer’s group is not intuitive; it is the objective content of a concept of group which is “applied” to the intuitive.

In the second place, the very construction of the group is not, ultimately, a system of operations actually carried out. I say “ultimately”, because the carrying out of operations is not the primary component of what I have termed “construction”. The finite group is the content of objective concepts. Therefore the operations carried out on this content are operations, however much executed one may like, but always executed on objective contents of concepts. Finite or not, the groups with which Brouwer’s
mathematics is concerned and the operations carried out on them are concep tive groups and operations. And therefore they are inadequate, [142] as I see it, to ground mathematics: mathematics does not deal with “objective concepts” but with “things which are thus”. What I understand by ‘construction’ is something different. To be sure, it is not a construction of objective concepts by mere definition; but neither is it a series of operations carried out in Brouwer’s sense, because his operations are operations on objective concepts. And on this point Brouwer’s mathematics does not differ from that of Gödel and Cohen. What I am referring to is that constructing is not carrying out objective operations but projecting before my intelligence that objective content in physical reality itself. And this reality is not given in intuition but in the primordial apprehension of reality; it is given impressively. As this reality does not have determinate content, I can freely project upon it the content of what is objectively constructed operationally. This projection and not the operation is mathematical construction. The mathematical object, even if it is finite, and even if the operation which objectively produces its content is carried out, nonetheless has a radical proper reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is construction. Brouwer’s finite group not only is not intuitive, it is the result of a double postulation: the postulate that groups are applicable to what is intuitively given, and the postulate of conferring upon reality itself the content of the objective concept (operationally constructed) of group. A mathematical object is not intuit ed but apprehended in a primordial apprehension—two completely different things, as we shall see. Free creation, projected in this double postulation, is intrinsically and formally sentient. Only a sentient intelligence can, for example, [143] not sense the content of a continuous group, i.e., the group of irrational numbers, and nonetheless freely realize this content (conceptualized either by mere definitions, or by operations actually carried out) in a sentient way. A mathematical object, even though finite, and even though the operation which produces it is actually carried out, has, I repeat, its own reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is its construction.

Thus in summary, we may say about being constructed: (1) it is not being defined in the sense of Gödel and Cohen, and (2) it is not being carried out in the sense of Brouwer. The opposition between formalism and intuitionism is a problem internal to mathematics, and as such does not concern philosophy. For philosophy, the problem centers on conceptualizing the reality of the mathematical. And from this point of view formalism and intuitionism are not opposed to each other, because both consist only in the determination of the objective content of concepts. Now, constructing is something else; it is creating, freely projecting into physical reality itself a content according to concepts. Postulating is postulating reality. Without this construction and primary and radical postulation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, Cohen’s groups, and Brouwer’s intuitionism would all be impossible.

Mathematical construction is thus always an act of sentient intelligence. And therefore the mathematical object has postulated reality. It is not an objective concept of reality but rather is reality in concept. It is, I repeat, the reality itself of any real thing sentiently apprehended, but with a content freely constructed in that reality, according to concepts. What is postulated, I repeat, is not logical truths nor operations actually carried out, but the content of the real (already defined or carried out) [144] in and by postulated construction. The mathematical object is not constituted by the postulates; rather, what the postulates define is the “construction” before the intelligence of that whose realization is postulated, and which acquires reality by this postulation.

The objects of mathematics are “real objects”, objects in reality, in this same reality with rocks and stars; the difference is that mathematical objects are constructed by being postulated in their content. A rock is a reality in and by itself; a geometric space or irrational number is a reality freely postulated. It is common to refer to mathematical objects as “ideal objects”. But there are no ideal objects; mathematical objects are real. This does not mean —and I must reiterate it—that mathematical objects exist like rocks exist; but the difference between the former and the latter concerns only content, a content given in the one case, freely postulated in reality in the second. Therefore mathematical objects do not have ideal existence but only postulated existence, postulated but in reality itself. What happens is that their content (1) is constructed, and (2) is constructed according to concepts. What is so inappropriately labeled “ideal” is the real constructed according to concepts. Both existence and properties are constructed by postulation in reality itself. Therefore a mathematical object is not real just because of its definition or because it is carried out; but neither is it a real object in and by itself like things apprehended in sensible impression. It is something real by a postulate which realizes a content (notes and existence) freely determined thanks to the postulation.

As the moment of reality is just the “more” of [145] each real sensed thing, it follows that every mathematical object is inscribed in the formality of reality given in impression. That is, it is the terminus of a sentient intellection. This does not mean that a geometric space or irrational number is sensed like color is sensed; the former
objects are clearly not *sensible*. Rather, it means that the mode of intellection of an irrational number or a geometric space is *sentient*. And this is so (1) because they are intellectively known by being postulated in a field of reality, i.e. in the formality given in the impression of reality, and (2) because their construction itself is not just conception but realization, i.e. something brought about sentiently. Without sensing the mathematical, one could not construct mathematics. Here we put our finger on the difference between sensible intelligence and sentient intelligence about which I spoke at length in Part I of this work. Sensible intelligence is based on the senses; sentient intelligence intellectively knows everything sentiently, both the sensible and the non-sensible. A mathematical object is real with a content which is freely constructed in the physical reality given in impression, and its construction is postulation.

Mathematics itself has produced, among other things, two theorems whose essence, as I see it, is what I said previously, viz. the anteriority of reality over truth. Gödel’s theorem, according to which that constructed by postulation has *de suyo* more properties than those formally postulated, in my view expresses that what is postulated is reality before it is true. And Cohen’s theorem (let us call the non-Cantorian theory of groups that): groups are not just systems of elements determined by postulation; rather, prior to this, there are groups which he terms “generic” and which as I see it are not generic but the simple realization of the group, without the specific properties determined by postulation. The postulated properties themselves are then real prior to being true. The specification here is not a logical difference but a real determination. It is the reality of the group prior to the axiomatic truth postulated. In my view, this is the essential meaning of the theorems of Gödel and Cohen: the priority of the real over the true in mathematics.

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2

*What is Judged*

In every judgement, as we have seen, one judges about something real, and does so in reality itself. I said that affirmation is a dual intellection because the same real thing is intellectively known twice: once, as that of which one judges, and another, as that which is affirmed about it. This duality of affirmative intellection is based upon a deeper dimension. Since every real thing has a moment of individual reality, and a moment of reality in a field, when a real thing is intellectively known “among” others, these two moments are differentiated and in a certain way “distanced”, i.e., stepped back from; this is a dimension of the duality of what is intellectively known itself. What impels us and puts us into the field of reality itself is just the primordial apprehension of reality of that about which one judges. And it is in this field that intellectual movement takes place. That about which one affirms in this movement is the real thing already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality. That in which the affirmation moves is reality itself (it is the medium of affirmation). So in contrast to what is usually said—or rather repeated monotonously—judging is not affirming reality itself but rather affirming “in” the reality. Prior to judging and in order to be able to judge, we are already intellectively in reality itself. The function of reality itself is not to be a constitutive part of the judgement itself, because reality itself is also, as we have seen, a moment of simple apprehension. Reality itself is prior to every intellective movement, both simple apprehension as well as affirmation. Reality itself is not, then, a correlate of affirmation, but the formality of every intellective apprehension whether it is judgmental or not. Judgmental intellection is an intellective movement, and this intellective movement in reality itself is a “realization”. Upon judging one realizes reality itself in a real thing already apprehended, i.e., one judges about the termination of reality itself in this thing; he judges that which is the real. Now, with this reality itself is reintegrated, in a certain way against every stepping back, to the real thing, to its individual formality of reality. Therefore this reintegration is the formal establishment of the unity of being in a field and being individual. And this formal unity is just what a thing already apprehended as real is “in reality”, viz. its “this, how, and what”. Therefore that which is judged is what a real thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. Judging is affirming what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality.

Granting that, let us once again direct our attention to this affirmative intention of judgement. What is affirmed, I repeat, is the realization (of something simply apprehended) in this real thing as real; i.e., one turns to a real thing in reality itself. Now, reality itself is that to which, impelled by a real thing already apprehended in
primordial apprehension, we have gone in retraction, elaborating a simple apprehension. Therefore reality itself has all of its unreal content from what is simply apprehended. In virtue of this, realization in a real thing is realization in it of what is simply apprehended as unreal. What a real thing is “in reality” is expressed by the realization of simple apprehension in a real thing.

The poorly named “subject” of judgement is that real thing {149} about which one judges. It is not properly “subject” but “object” of judgement. What one judges is the realization of a simple apprehension in an object, i.e. in the real. Judging is not then attributing one concept to another but realizing a concept, a work of fiction, or a percept in a real thing already apprehended as real in primordial apprehension. Affirmation is the phase of intellectual movement opposed to retraction. In retraction one goes inside the real which is given toward the unreal apprehended in simple apprehension, toward what the real thing “might be” to what it “is”. Now one is not dealing with a realization in constructive postulation but with a realization in simple apprehension as such in primordial apprehension. This realization is the judgement. Judging is not, for example, apprehending that this thing which we call a man is real; nor is it apprehending what this man is (which is but apprehending what this thing “might be”). Judging is affirming that what it “might be” to be a man is realized in this real thing which we call a man, i.e., that this real thing which we call “man” is in reality what we understand by man. And this is not a tautology, because the concept of man is not univocal but depends upon that aspect, freely selected, from which one starts in order to conceive it. Starting from the zoological ladder is not the same as starting from the capacity to make tools (for example, from homo australopithecus or from homo habilis). Similarly, starting from social organization is different than starting from the modes and general forms of the real. Thus, what this thing is in reality which we call a man, by being the realization of a concept, is once again known intellectually with respect to the primordial apprehension of reality in each case.

Every affirmation is a dynamic intellection, by returning {150} from stepping back, of something already apprehended in a primordial apprehension, a dynamism which cuts across reality itself, and whose terminus consists in intellectually knowing what that which we have intellectually known as real is in reality.

This clarifies two points for us. First that the real world, i.e. the system of things qua real, does not consist in being the system of what the sum total of true judgements affirms. The system of real things qua real does not consist in being the correlate of what is affirmed. Rather, it is the system intellectually known in my primordial apprehensions of reality, the system given in them. Reality is always prior to affirmation. And the second point is that affirming as such is an intellection that expands the return to the real (from stepping back), with respect to the field of reality.

This structure makes of judgement something essentially dependent upon the way in which primordial apprehension becomes the terminus of affirmation. The way in which primordial apprehension is constituted as terminus of affirmation is what I call the form of affirmation. After having seen what affirming is, let us now ask what the forms of affirmation as such are.

§ 2

FORMS OF AFFIRMATION

When speaking about judgement, I am not referring to the classical division of judgements into quality, quantity, relation or modality, which is the division canonized by Kant. And this is because all these kinds of judgement are but forms of a single kind, viz. judgement as predication. Now, affirmation as such is not predication. There are, as we shall see, forms of judgement strictly pre-predicative. In predicative judgement, that about which one judges has a clear function: to be subject of the judgement. But that is not the only nor even the primary function of the reality about which one judges. Here I use the term ‘forms of judgement’ to refer to the diversity of judgements according to the function carried out by that which is judged; i.e., the diverse forms according to which a thing already apprehended is the terminus of affirmative intellection. The predicative function is just one of them. There are others, for example judgements in which the thing judged is proposed to the affirmation but not as a subject of it; these are propositional judgements but are pre-predicative. There are also judgements in which the thing judged is not proposed but only placed before the judgement. In these judgements the affirmation is not just pre-predicative but also pre-propositional; they are merely positional judgements. Each of these forms is based upon the previous one: propositional affirmation is based upon positional affirmation, and in turn predicative affirmation {152} upon propositional affirmation. What is the structure of these three forms of affirmation?

1. Above all, judgement is what I call a positional affirmation. Let us begin by posing some examples. I open the window and shout, “Fire!”, or perhaps, “rain, sun”, etc. Here there is something apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality, viz. what I apprehend
upon opening the window. And I apprehend it in all its notes, in primordial apprehension, as something real and in all of its richness and variety of notes. But I do not intelletically know what it is “in reality”. Intelletically knowing it as fire, rain, etc. is just the proper affirmation of the judgement, viz. what I have apprehended is in reality. These names, as mere names, are simple apprehensions (percepts, fictional items, or concepts). But in affirmative connotation they express that what is simply apprehended is realized in what I have apprehended primordially, and is what this latter is in reality. If I did not have these simple apprehensions there would be no judgement and I could not say, “Fire!”; I would have only the primordial apprehension of this igneous reality which, without knowing what it is in reality, I apprehend primordially upon opening the window. In this sense I say that that affirmation is positional, because the thing which I judge is not previously apprehended in turn in a simple apprehension which qualifies it, as is the case in other forms of judgement. If I say that the fire is burning, the subject is already qualified as fire in a previous simple apprehension. But when I shout, “Fire!”; what I apprehend is not intelletically known previously as fire. Precisely on account of this, what I see upon opening the window is not designated by any previous denomination because every denomination is a denomination of something already simply apprehended. Here what is apprehended upon opening the window is the terminus of a primordial apprehension [153] of reality, but without qualification, without previous denomination. In every judgement the primordial apprehension of that of which one judges is anterior to the judging itself. But this does not mean that a real thing was already previously qualified in some previous simple apprehension. In positional judgement the real is not already qualified by a simple apprehension; rather, there is a simple apprehension, say that of fire, which forms a part not of the subject but of the predicate, and whose realization is affirmed so to speak globally. It is for this reason a positional judgement. On one side I have the primordial apprehension of reality; on the other, the denomination. Its identification in what is in reality what I have primordially apprehended is just positional judgement. It is because of this that there are not two denominations as in other types of judgement, one of what I see and another of what I affirm as realized in what I see. There is here but a single denomination, and what is denominated is posed as reality. There is but the total, global realization, of this unique single apprehension in the primordial apprehension of reality. It is, to speak a bit loosely, the identity or identification of with simple apprehension; or from the standpoint of simple apprehension, the integral realization of it in the real. I repeat that I am not saying “this is fire” but simply “Fire!” . The positional judgement is, in a certain way, not the denomination but the denominative affirmation of the real apprehended in its totality. When I say “Fire!” I clearly have a simple apprehension, that of fire. Otherwise I could not say “Fire!” . But that which I see upon opening the window is posed directly as global realization of this simple apprehension, without it having been [154] previously qualified by another simple apprehension. Here the function of the real thing of which one judges is to be “posed” for my denomination or identification as real.

I maintain that this is an affirmation and not a primordial apprehension of reality. In primordial apprehension of reality we have only the real thing apprehended, and this real thing immediately fills the field of reality itself. But in positional judgement this real thing is intelletically known as realization of something already apprehended in simple apprehension, as a realization of fire. We intelletically know what is apprehended via the route of identifying it with what is, for example, fire simply apprehended. The primordial apprehension of reality is immediate, and therefore is more than a judgement: it is the apprehension of the real thing in and by itself as real, without the necessity of affirming or judging. On the other hand, in positional judgement, the real is intelletically known as a realization of fire or rain, etc. In this intellection what is affirmed is just what in reality is that which we have apprehended as real upon opening the window. In this “position” the real apprehended as a whole is “placed” as realization. It is for this reason that I term it “positional judgement”. The affirmative moment of this judgement is not expressed with a new name but with a single substantive name (noun) having an affirmative connotation. And this connotation is expressed in the intonation; for example, by shouting. On the other hand, in primordial apprehension of reality, there is no name whatsoever: it is the mere apprehension of the reality of the real. Positional judgement, then, is pre-predicative; but it is also pre-propositional: the real thing apprehended is not a subject of judgement, nor is it proposed for judgement; it is simply “posed”.

2. There is a second form of judgement, viz. propositional judgement. [155] In it the real already apprehended is not apprehended only as real, but is also apprehended as something which for its part is already qualified from a simple apprehension. Let that of which one judges be A. A is not just something which I apprehend as real, but as something which is already A. And therefore, when it becomes the terminus of an affirmation, this A is not simply “posed” for the judgement but “proposed” to it, i.e., posed “as reality” for a subsequent position of what it is “in reality”. A proposition is a special form of position; it is the propositional judgement. Permit me to explain.
Consider some common examples in order to establish a frame of reference. “Corruption of the best, worst” (corruptio optimi pessima); “Everything excellent, rare” (omnia praeclara, rara); “All men, equal”; “A woman, always changeable and fickle” (varium et mutabile semper femina); “What’s bred in the bone will out in the flesh” (genio y figura, hasta la sepultura); “This, my vocation”; “Thou, the one Holy One, the one Lord”; “Thou, my God”; “Thou, Lord”.

In all these affirmations there is something, A, which is posed as already real; and not simply as real but as something real already qualified in a previous simple apprehension: the corruption of the best, the excellent, the woman, Thou, etc. But the affirmation is constituted in prehension: the corruption of the best, the excellent, the something real already qualified in a previous simple apprehension, “Thou, Lord”.

In this affirmation what is affirmed clearly has two moments. One, the moment pro-posed A. This moment is not only real, but moreover its reality is already qualified and proposed as terminus of a subsequent position. There is, in addition, that of which this real thing is affirmed B. In itself B is not something real, but rather a simple unreal apprehension. But upon becoming the determination of the thing already real, of A, B is realized in and by A. That is, the reality of B has been posed qua that of A, or what is the same thing, the reality of A has been posed not in itself (since it has been proposed as something already real), but qua B. For this reason it is, I repeat, a position which is pro-positional. What is this position of B in A? That is the essential question.

First of all, it is not a “positional” position in the sense explained earlier; if it were, what is affirmed would be two realities, the reality of A “and” the reality of B, but not “one” reality, to wit, the reality of A as B. But neither is it an “attributive” position: I do not affirm that A “is” B. Propositional judgement is pre-predicative. The force of the affirmation does not fall upon something attributed to A. To be sure, A and B are not identical. But:

a) B “is founded” on A; it is not attributed to A from outside but pertains to A in a way, so to speak, intrinsic to A.

b) This foundation is formal; it is the very “nature” of A, its constitutional nature, so to speak, that which founds B. I am not simply affirming that a woman is always changeable, but that she is so by virtue of her nature qua woman. Here “nature” has a connotation which is deliberately vague. It does not concern reality in itself, as if it were the essence of reality; rather, it refers to reality qua apprehended in primordial apprehension.

c) This B is not only determined intrinsically by the reality of A; rather, the determination itself, i.e., B, has reality but “in the reality of A”. That does not just refer to the fact that a woman by her own nature determines changeability, but to the fact that what is (157) determined—this changeability—is a moment of feminine reality itself: B is a moment of the reality of A.

The reality of A involves, then, by virtue of its own nature, the reality of B in A. This is what I affirm in a propositional judgement. Now, the unity of these three moments: being grounded on A, being grounded on the nature of A, and being a moment of the reality of A, is what I call unity of constitution: “AB”. It is not unity of attribution but unity of constitution. And this unity is that which A is “in reality”.

Whence arise the two parts of this affirmation. First of all, there is that which is affirmed. What is affirmed here is not a thing, i.e., neither A nor B (A is not affirmed but rather presumed qualitatively); what is affirmed is the constitutive unity “AB”. The second part is the affirmation itself. As affirmation, it consists in putting into reality itself the constitutive unity. It is this unity which is affirmed to be real, or rather, it is this unity which is that in which A consists in reality: A is in reality not just “A” but “AB”. The intentum has thus been changed in a twofold way. In the first place, it is modified by being an affirmation, an intention; it is an intentum of intellection of a reality stepped back from, i.e., from simple apprehension; it is a judgement. But in the second place, the propositional affirmation is a modification of positional affirmation. When what is posed is formally a constitution and not a thing, then the position is constitutive. Propositional affirmation is, then, constitutive position, an affirmation of what a thing constitutively is in reality.

The expression of a propositional or constitutive judgement is a nominal phrase. It suffices to return to the (Latin) examples given earlier to discover in them two essential aspects. The nominative phrase, (158) above all, lacks a verb; it is an a-verbal affirmation, having only nouns. This does not refer to a verbal ellipsis but to a particular and originary mode of “averbal” phrase. But in

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1 [Zubiri’s word is complexión, which means constitution in the physiological sense.—trans.]
contrast to positional affirmation which only has a noun, the nominal phrase always has at least two nouns. These two nouns do not designate a subject and predicate, but a single constitutive reality. The nominal phrase is propositional, but it is pre-predicative. On the other hand, this phrase expresses the affirmative moment of a mode which is proper to it, in the “pause” between the two nouns. The pause is the expression of the constitutive affirmation as such. It is not merely a position, nor is it copulative attribution; this aspect is what the pause expresses. The nominal phrase is generally used in invocations, but not exclusively there. The problem which interests me here is not the when and where—something that varies from language to language—but the nature of the affirmation enunciated in such sentences; this is a propositional affirmation.

This propositional judgement is not the only form of non-positional judgement. There is another form, which I shall provisionally term predicative judgement. In this way we have the three forms of judgement: positional affirmation, propositional affirmation, and predicative affirmation. In what does this last consist?

3. The third form of judgement, I repeat, is predicative judgement. For the moment, borrowing some terminology from classical logic, let us say that it is the judgement whose scheme is A is B. It is because I have referred to classical logic that I have termed the two previous forms of judgement pre-predicative. The linguists call everything said of something a ‘predicate’; the predicate here would be is B, and A would be the subject. But this, while it may be true, nonetheless cloaks the proper character of what is affirmed in a judgement. For one of the essential moments for this judgement is that the affirmation be made using a verb, which in the foregoing scheme is the verb “is”. And there is another moment which must be pointed out. Ultimately we are dealing more with a copulative affirmation than a predicative affirmation; the verb to be, in fact, discharges the function of a copulative. Whence there is some justification in calling only B the predicate, in respect of which A would be the subject. Given this initial clarification, to which we shall shortly return, and without making the notions more precise at the moment, let us speak somewhat loosely about predicative judgement in the sense of copulative affirmation.

This affirmation is, above all, pro-positional, in the sense explained above. The intentum, in fact, refers to an A previously posited as real. And this reality already posited, A, is posited in turn for a subsequent determination B. Therefore A is a reality pro-posed in order to be affirmed qua B. In this aspect, the copulative affirmation is strictly pro-positional. By being so, the copulative affirmation puts the reality of B qua B as a moment of A. And this B is in itself the terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, item of fiction, or concept), whose reality is affirmed upon being posited in a real A. Hence, in every propositional affirmation, the intellective movement is, on one hand, the position of A qua B, and on the other, the position of B in the reality of A. They are two aspects of the same movement.

Up to now, the predicative affirmation has only been a propositional affirmation. But the role of the predicative affirmation (160) is in the mode of position of A as B, or what comes to the same thing, of B in A. With which position are we dealing?

To be sure, it is not a positional position of either A or B. That would not be “one” affirmation but “two”. But neither is it a constitutive position, because B is certainly grounded on A, but not necessarily in the nature of the reality of A. And here is the difference between predicative or copulative affirmation and merely propositional affirmation. For now, one thing is clear: predicative affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation, just like this latter is a modification of positional affirmation. What is this predicative modification?

Modification of predication consists in B being grounded on A, but in such a way that this foundation of the reality of B in A is not necessarily—as in the case of propositional affirmation—the very “nature” of the reality of A. Rather, it consists in that B, though being in A, is so only in the sense of “merely being”. Here “being” is used in the sense of “realizing” something, independently of the character of of this realization. In propositional judgement what is affirmed is that this realization is what is in the “nature” of something. But here we are dealing with a realization in which we disregard its mode, whether necessary or not necessary. A and B each have their own entity, and their unity consists in B being realized in A. In this fashion the reality of B in A, or the reality of A as B, involves two moments. On one hand, B is in fact in A. But on the other, B is something which, although it takes its reality from being put in A, nonetheless its reality is maintained in a certain way as its own reality inside the reality of A; and therefore (161) even though it is in A, it is, in a certain way, different from A. Therefore between A and B there is a unity to be sure, but a unity which, within A, maintains a certain distinction between the reality of A and the reality of B. Hence it is not a simple constitution. The constitution not only puts B in A but puts this B in the very “nature” of the reality of A, whereas now B is put in A though as something formally distinct from A. A is certainly B, but does not consist in being B, nor does B consist in being A. This is no longer constitution; it is what I shall term connection. There is a

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great difference between constitution and connection. Connection is union as well as distinction; union and separation are the two aspects of the unity of connection. This connection can have various characteristics; it can be either necessary or de facto. But one is always dealing with a connection “derived” from the reality of A. On the other hand, in the unity of constitution, rather than a “necessity of A”, one deals with the very “nature” of A. The constitution is thus more than necessary; it is in a certain way constituting. When one says, “femina, variable”, one affirms that a woman is changeable by virtue of being a woman. Similarly, when one says “this paper, white”, that about which one is thinking, to wit, “this paper”, is white precisely because it is “this”, i.e. one thinks in a certain way about the nature of “this”. But when one says “this woman is changeable” or “this paper is white”, one does not affirm that “this” woman consists in being changeable nor that “this” paper consists in its whiteness. In propositional judgement one thinks more about the nature of A than in the reality of the “other thing”, B. In predicative judgement there is the reality of A and the realization of B in A, but in an A which as such has its nature independent of B; it is for that reason that there is connection. It is no longer AB but rather A-B. This is the connective or copulative affirmation. {162}

We see immediately that this affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation. Propositional affirmation puts the reality of B as a moment of the nature of the reality of A. Now, however, B is in a way less pegged to the reality of A. In place of constitution, we have connection; and in place of propositional affirmation, we have predicative affirmation.

This connection is not properly speaking a “relation”, because every relation presupposes the two things related. In a connection one does not presuppose the reality of B, but rather puts B in the reality of A; hence it is B which receives the reality of A. In this fashion the presumed relation is consequent upon the connection. And this brings us to the question of the parts which make up this predicative affirmation.

On the surface, this affirmation comprises three “parts”: A, B, and is. Whence it follows that function of the copula “is” is to express the relation between B and A. But this really doesn’t say much of importance. A correct analysis of copulative affirmation strictly requires that the affirmation have only two parts: what is affirmed and the affirmation itself.

In the first place, what is affirmed? The connective unity of B and A. That is, in what is affirmed A and B enter, and what is affirmed of them is their connection. We have, above all, A and B. Some think that A and B are two variables of the same type and that their difference is merely functional: A carries out the function of subject, and B that of predicate. For just this reason it is possible to switch their functional positions, making B the subject and A the predicate. This is the so called “conversion” of propositions in formal logic: “All men are mortal”, {163} and by conversion, “Some mortals are men”. Apart from the quantifiers, A and B do not differ in the two cases other than by their functional position. But this is actually not correct. Strictly speaking, A is not a part of what is affirmed; rather it is simply “what” is proposed to what is affirmed. Hence, rather than being a part of the judgement, it is assumed by it. This assumption is usually called the “subject”; but strictly speaking it is not the subject but rather the “object” (sit venia verbo) about which one judges. The function of that which is already apprehended is now being pro-posed as “subject”. This interpretation of what is proposed to the judgement as its subject is certainly a very debatable one. It depends upon the concept one has of the structure of the unity of things and their notes. Conceptualizing a thing as the subject of its inherent accidents is nothing but a theory. In my view, this theory is unacceptable. But that is not what interests us at the moment. Rather we are concerned not with the ulterior concept of connection, but the connective character of B with A, whether or not it has the character of a subject. And only in order to clarify the expression will I call A the subject; it is in fact the reality already apprehended as something which is not the “subject of” B, but the “subject to” a connection.

On the other hand, B is not something which is on a par with A, so to speak, because in itself B is a term proposed not as real, but as something unreal, as terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, or concept). Hence its connection with A has all the character of “realization” of B in A. To identify A and B with two interchangeable magnitudes, as if they were homogeneous terms, is to speak nonsense. The subject is reality and the predicate realization. They do not function on the same level. Even when I carry out the so-called “conversion” of a judgement, the essential difference is not in the quantification of A and B, {164} but in the fact that in the second judgement A is by itself now a simple apprehension realized in B, which is the reverse of what happened before. Thus A and B are not, formally, on the same footing. The difference between them is not a difference in location in the judgement, but an essential difference. A and B can be interchanged so that A is sometimes the subject and other times the predicate. But their formal difference is always essential not interchangeable. The subject is always a proposed reality and the predicate is always something unreal which is realized. It is the same thing which happens in the case of all propositional judgements: it doesn’t make sense to convert the nominal proposition, “all
women, changeable” into “something changeable, woman”.

What is affirmed of $A$ and $B$ is their “connection”. We have already seen that this connection is not a relation; rather, the “relation” is something consequent upon the “connection” and founded upon it. The connection establishes $A$ in $B$. The relation between $B$ and $A$ exists, but only after $B$ is established in $A$, i.e., after the connection. The relation—if one desires to speak of relations—is what results from the realization of $B$ in $A$, i.e., it is the result of the connection. The formal conceptualization of $A$ and $B$ refers to this relation, which presupposes its essential connective difference. Therefore the so-called formal logic is based upon the relation resulting from the connective affirmation. Now we see that this logic is not what is primary, because the formal relation between $A$ and $B$ is grounded on the affirmative connection of realization of $B$ in $A$. That is, every formal logic is founded upon a more radical logic, the logic of affirmation. “Formal logic” is the play of two homogeneous variables, whereas the “logic of affirmation” is the intellect of the realization of something unreal ($B$) in something already real ($A$). And this is the essential point: the logic of the affirmative intellect of the real. As our subject is not logic, it suffices to have pointed out this idea which I deem essential; we are not seeking to invalidate modern formal logic, only to find it in the logic of affirmation.

That which affirmed is, then, the realization of $B$ in $A$ in connective form. Thus, $A$ is reality proposed, and $B$ is something unreal realized in $A$; and this realization is of connective character. What is the affirmation?

The affirmation itself does not consist in connecting $B$ with $A$ but in putting the connective unity $A$-$B$ into reality itself. If one desires to continue talking about relations, he must say that affirmation does not consist in affirming the relation of $B$ with $A$, nor that of $A$ with $B$; rather, it consists in putting this relation into reality itself. The unity of $B$ in $A$ moves along a line of relation. On the other hand, affirmation moves along a line which in a way is orthogonal to this latter. That is, in affirmation one does not go from $B$ to $A$ nor from $A$ to $B$ but from $A$-$B$ to the reality of what is primordially apprehended. In propositional judgement affirmation is orthogonal to constitution. In predicative judgement affirmation is orthogonal to connection.

With this we see that predicative judgement is a modification of the intention, but a modification which is threefold. The intention modified has become an intention of judgement, i.e. an affirmative intention. Secondly, the predicative judgement involves a propositional intention, which is a second modification of the absolute intention. And thirdly, the propositional judgement has been taken in predicative intention.

The grammatical expression of this predicative affirmation requires some special consideration. It is the expression by the “is”. This “is” discharges, as I see it, not two but three functions:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] It expresses an \textit{affirmation}; as such it means the “reality” of the connection $A$-$B$. This connection is given in reality itself.
  \item[b)] It expresses the \textit{connection} of $B$ with $A$, i.e., it expresses the “connective unity” $A$-$B$, and what $A$ is “in reality”.
  \item[c)] It expresses the \textit{relation} which is established between $A$ and $B$ in this connection and by it. In this aspect, the function of the “is” is to be a copula. It is the “copulative relation”.
\end{itemize}

These are the three functions of the verb \textit{is}: “reality”, “connective unity”, and “copulative relation”. Now, these three functions have a precise order of foundation, to wit, the copulative relation is founded in the connective unity, and that in turn is founded in the affirmation of reality. This order is essential; it cannot be inverted, and so one cannot think that the primary function of the “is” is to be a copula and that the connection is merely a relation, and that this relation constitutes judgement. Such a conception is absolutely untenable. To see why, it suffices to refer to linguistic considerations. They show us quite clearly the fact that the verb \textit{to be} (\textit{est}, \textit{esti}, \textit{asti}, etc. does not in any respect constitute a special verb. In the first place, \textit{every verb}—and not just \textit{to be}—has the two primary functions. If I say “the bird sings,” the horse runs, the man talks,” etc., the verbs ‘sings’, ‘runs’, ‘talks’ have the two functions of expressing an affirmation, i.e., the position of something in reality itself, and also of expressing a connection between the horse, the bird, and the man with some states or actions or qualities (the exact expression does not matter here). Whence the serious error of thinking that predicative affirmation is necessarily in the form “$A$ is $B$”. The judgement “the bird sings” is just as predicative as the judgement “$A$ is $B$”, not because “sings” {167} is equivalent to “is a singer’’—which is absurd, just as absurd as saying that in the nominal phrase there is an ellipsis of the verb \textit{to be}. The judgement affirms the connective unity of the bird and its singing. It is on account of this that I said at the beginning that I was only provisionally expressing predicative judgement in the form “$A$ is $B$”. Now, in this very case the verb \textit{to be} is present. Originally it was a substantive verb like all the rest; and like them, it expresses the affirmation of the connective unity of $A$ and $B$. However, not all verbs—but many old verbs, e.g. in Greek or Latin—have, in addition to their verbal meaning stemming from their etymological root, a copulative character which they have gradually
acquired. Consider the verbs *meno, auxanomai, hyparkho, pelo, gignesthai, phyo, etc.*, etc., etc... Among them is one which merits special attention. From the Indo-European root "*sta*" derives the Greek verb *histemi*, which as an intransitive verb means to be firmly on one's feet. Its compound *kathistemi* has, in the primitive aorist tense *katesten*, the sense of being established, constituted, installed, etc. And this aorist acquired—as one can readily understand—a copulative sense as well. From "being established" the verb took on the meaning "is". From the same root derives the Latin *stare*. Already in the classical period it sometimes had the meaning of a copula as a strong synonym of *esse*. It passed into the Romance languages, and in particular into Spanish as *estar,* which unites to its "substantive" sense a copulative sense founded upon it. Later I will examine in detail what in my opinion constitutes the difference between the two Spanish verbs for "to be": *ser* and *estar.* In all of these verbs the "connection" fades into "relation". Now, the verb *to be* also passed from being a substantive verb to being a copula. The copulative meaning of these verbs was, then, acquired, and its acquisition was founded in the previous substantive meaning, so to speak. {168} Moreover, the copulative meaning not only was acquired, but was always secondary. So we can say that the three functions are founded in the above-mentioned form, and none is exclusive to the verb *to be*, especially if one remembers that there are very many languages which do not even have this verb.

If, for greater simplicity, we return to the predicative judgement such as it is generally used in formal logic, we shall have to distinguish in every such judgement—as I wrote some sixty years ago—its grammatical structure and its intellective structure. Grammatically, the subject is the object expressed in only one of its aspects (its intellective structure. Grammatically, the subject is the real object pronounced. The predicate is another aspect of the same object, which designates the unity, both connective and relational, of these two aspects. But from the point of view of its intellective structure, the subject is the real object proposed, with all of its real properties (the property of being A and all the remaining properties). The predicate is a simple unreal intentional apprehension of one or several notes of the object, realized in it in connective form. The copula is the affirmation that this connective unity pertains to reality, or rather, to what A is "in reality".

This structure is essential for two reasons. First, because it shows us the structure of predicative affirmation; and second, because it places before our eyes something decisive, viz. that the "is", the "to be", does not rest upon itself but upon reality. That is, reality is not a mode of being; rather, being is founded in reality. We saw this already in Part I, and we shall return to it in more detail in a subsequent section.

To summarize, affirmation is a moment of intellective movement which intellectively knows what a thing, already apprehended {169} as real, is "in reality". Moving in the field of reality itself, the intelligence steps back from a real thing in a retraction in which it intellectively knows what the thing "would be" in reality. This is simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, concept). Now, following in the field of reality itself, the intelligence turns therein to a real thing in order to intellectively know, in this stepping back, what the thing is in reality. And that intellection is, as we have seen, affirmation. Affirmation is the "distanced" *intentum* of a thing, i.e., in a stepping back. That about which one judges is something already apprehended as reality, and that which one judges of the thing is what it is "in reality". For it, the thing of which one judges can have three functions: mere position, pro-position, and subject of predication. And each of these functions constitutes a form of affirmation.

This difference among the three functions of the real in affirmation has a formally sentient character. Only because there is an impression of reality is there a field of reality, a field of the *de suyo*. The three functions are founded in and established by the impression of reality. It is sentiently as if I see myself having stepped back from what something, already apprehended as real, is in reality; and it is sentiently I find myself retained by the real as apprehended and returned to it: this is sentient logos. In this reversion, the logos intellectively knows the realization of the simple unreal apprehension, and intellectively knows it by a determination of what has already, previously, been apprehended. This determination is, to be sure, anchored in the fact that it is my intellection which, by being sentient, is distanced or stepped back from, and which by being so returns to the real in three different forms: positional, propositional, and predicative. But it is because the real, when impelling me impressively to step back, opens to me {170} the three possibilities of determination: positional, constitutive, and connective. They are thus three ways of traversing the distance from the unreal to what the real is in reality (through stepping back and returning). They are three forms of *intentum*. A non-sentient intellection cannot step back, and therefore it cannot have the three functions: positional, constitutive, and connective; nor can it intellectively know in the corresponding triple intentionality: positional, constitutive, and connective. The logos is born from the impression of reality and returns to it in these three forms, founded upon the three forms determined by the real as apprehended primoridially. Now, in what, formally, lies the difference

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* [As noted earlier, *estar* has the meaning of "is" in the strong sense of "is actually" or "is here-and-now".— trans.]
between these three functions? To intellectively know what something is in reality is to intellectively know the unity of the field moment and the individual moment of the real. These two moments are moments of the formality of reality impressively given in it. Whence it follows that the three functions are three forms of the unity of what is of the field and the individual, i.e., three forms of unity of the formality of reality. In this unity something which we may call “the force of reality” is made patent; not in the sense of force of imposition of the real, but in the sense of force of unity of the moment in a field and the individual moment, i.e., force of realization. The strongest unity is positional form; it is the supreme form of intellectively knowing with the logos what something is in reality. Less strong is the propositional or constitutive form; it affirms unity as constitution. Weakest, finally, is predicative affirmation, which affirms the unity of the real as connection. Altogether, then, there are three degrees of force of realization, three degrees of intellectively knowing what something is in reality.

But in each of these three forms of affirmation there can be distinct modes. The problem of the forms of affirmation (171) thus leads to the third problem. After having examined what affirming is, and after examining what the forms of affirmation are, we now have to confront the problem of the modes of affirmation.

§ 3

THE MODES OF AFFIRMATION

I said earlier that the forms of affirmation are distinguished according to the function carried out in an affirmation by the thing about which one judges. On the other hand, what I call the modes of affirmation concern the affirmative intention itself qua affirmative. This is our present problem.

Let us begin again to clarify the ideas. Affirmative intention or judgement is an intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back, of what a thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. This intellection has its own characteristics.

Above all it is, as I said, an intellection in movement, a movement which consists in intellectively traversing the distance in which we are with respect to what a thing is in reality, i.e., in stepping back from it. This intellective movement is, then, dual. By being so, the intellective movement which is intellectively knowing that a thing is real, is not intellectively knowing yet what this real thing is in reality. In this sense, the intellective movement is above all an absence of intellection of what the thing is in reality. But it is not just a movement characterized by this absence, because it is the movement of a dual intellection, in which the movement is directed towards a fixed point, toward what the already real thing is in reality. The duality thus stamps the movement with its own character, in the sense that what is not intellectively known is going to be so, or at least is intended to be so. Whence it follows that this movement is not just an absence but something essentially different, a privation. (173) Privation is the character which duality stamps on intellective movement qua movement. This intrinsic unity of movement and duality is what constitutes expectation. The movement of privation as such is what constitutes expectation. Conversely, expectation formally consists in privational intellective movement. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation as “other”. This concept already greeted us some pages back when we spoke of the concept of intellective movement.

Now it is important to repeat that expectation is what, in its etymological sense, corresponds to “looking at from afar”. But this does not refer to some psychological state of anticipation; rather, it refers to an intrinsic character of the intellective movement as such. What is this character? One might think that it consists in that intellective movement which is “questioning”. But we have already seen that this is not the case: questions are founded upon expectation, and in most cases we are in intellective expectation without asking ourselves anything.

What is it that we expect in this expectation? We have already answered many times: not pure and simple reality (because that is given to us already in primordial apprehension, prior to any judgements, and only on account of it is judgement possible); rather, what we expect is not “reality” but what the real is “in reality”.

This “expectant” movement takes place in stepping back. And in this being moved back a step, the intellection has, as we saw, its own character: intellective intention. It must be stressed that every intention—in order to be such—is in itself formally and constitutively expectant. I deem this concept essential. It does not refer to the fact that one must expect an (174) affirmation, but to the fact that the intention itself is the proper and formally intellective moment of expectation. If it is necessary to intellectively know that A is B, not only do I have the intentionality of B in A, but precisely because I start from A this point of departure constitutes an expectation of what the intentionality of A is going to be. Every intention is, then, formally and constitutively expectant. Conversely, every expectation, as the character of intellective movement, is formally and constitutively intentional. Intellective movement is a movement “from-toward”. In this
movement I can consider only that “toward” which one is going. That is the only thing which up to now has generally been considered; in the classical concept of intention, one considers only the fact that the intention “intends” its end, an end which therefore is usually termed “intentional”. But I believe that this is inadequate. The fact is that one can and should consider the intention itself not only as “going toward” but also as “departing from”. And then the intention is expectation. Expectation and intentionality, then, are but two intrinsically unified aspects of a single intellective movement, which is therefore “expectant intention” or “intentional expectation”. Whence it follows that the intellective movement in which we intellectually know what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality is, I repeat, intentional expectation or expectant intention.

Granting this, we must ask ourselves how this intentional expectation is resolved. Resolution is the affirmation in which expectation is molded; it is intellective itself as affirmation. But let us not get confused. There is on one hand the intellective intention itself qua intention; and this intention is intrinsically expectant. But on the other hand, there is the affirmation in which this intention is molded. [175] Since it is molded intention, I have called it and will continue to call it affirmative intention. Let us not confuse, then, the intellective intention with the affirmative intention. This latter is the resolution of the first, the resolution of the intentional intention. So how is intentional expectation resolved into affirmative intention?

Affirmative intellection, as the intellection that it is, is an intellective actuality of the real. Now, this actuality of the real has different modes; and these different modes of actuality of the real determine different modes of affirmation. Each mode of affirmation thus depends essentially and constitutively upon the mode by which the actualization of the real determines or resolves the intentional expectation. Permit me to explain.

a) Above all, it is an intellective actualization of the real, but of the real as already apprehended as real; it is therefore reactualization. And this reactualization is such with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectually know what the real is in reality. We are dealing, then, with the realization of a simple apprehension in what has already been actualized as real. Now, this realization depends first of all upon the characteristics, the traits, which are already given in the primordial actualization of the thing as real. I speak of the traits as “given”. This phrase is chosen for now to be deliberately neutral, because the real qua reactualization poses two questions. The first is, What is the mode by which such-and-such real thing determines the realization in it of simple apprehension? The second is that of ascertaining in what the determining itself consists, in what the real qua determining principle of this reactualization in all its modes consists. We shall concern ourselves with the latter question in Part Three. For now let us fix our attention on the first. [176] in the diverse modes through which the real determines its reactualization, i.e. the diverse modes through which the given traits of the real determine the realization or non-realization of what is simply apprehended. And it is because of this that I speak about the fact that the traits are given in reactualization. To simplify the terms, in place of reactualization I shall speak simply about the actualization of traits given in the realization of simple apprehensions. Do not confuse the actualization and the realization of traits of what is simply apprehended in reality itself with this actualization of a real thing in simple apprehensions and with the realization of these simple apprehensions in the given thing. Now, the simple apprehensions are realized in different ways depending upon the nature of the actualization of the real.

b) Now, this actualization is an intrinsic determinant of the modes of resolution of intentional expectation. Thus, if the traits of the real with respect to what it is in reality are intellectively known in a confused or ambiguous way, the resolution of the intentional expectation takes on different characteristics. And in virtue of this, these modes of resolution are those expressed in the modes of intellection itself qua affirmative intention. Thus the ambiguity, as we shall see, is a proper mode of actualization of the traits of the real with respect to simple apprehensions; and according to this mode of actualization, affirmative intention, affirmation, has that mode which constitutes doubt. To preclude any confusion I shall systematically develop the two ideas just outlined.

First, all these modes of affirming depend essentially and constitutively upon the modes of reactualization of the real in the order of simple apprehensions. [177] Ambiguity, for example, is a mode of this actualization. It is the real itself insofar as it actualizes its traits in an ambiguous way with respect to simple apprehensions, with respect therefore to what the real is in reality. It is a characteristic prior to any affirmation; it is, let us repeat, the mode of actualizing the traits of the real with respect to what this particular thing is in reality, with respect to the simple apprehensions at my disposal.

In the second place, these different modes of actualization define different modes of affirmation and of affirmative intention; for example, ambiguous actualization of the real determines dubitative affirmation or dubitative affirmative intention—doubt properly so-called. In these modes, for example the doubt-mode, we are not primarily
dealing with a state of insecurity in which we are assaulted by ambiguity, in contrast to other states, such as that of security. We are not talking about states, but formal modes of affirmative intention. We do not mean that when one affirms that something is ambiguous he finds himself in a state of doubt; rather, we mean that doubt is the ambiguous affirmation of the ambiguous qua ambiguous. It is the affirmative intention itself which is intrinsically and formally doubting. The ambiguous is not just that to which affirmative intention refers, nor it is only a characteristic of what is intellectively known; rather it is at one and the same time a characteristic of intellection and the affirmation itself. Doubt is not just an “affirmative intention about the ambiguous” but an “affirmative ambiguous intention in itself, determined by the ambiguity of the actualization of some real thing. Doubt is then a mode of affirmation, not a state consequent upon affirmation; and the proof is that both moments can be quite disparate. I can be in a state of insecurity with respect to a doubting affirmation. In such a case, I am sure that the affirmation \{178\} is of doubt; I am sure that the thing is in reality doubtful. The same applies mutatis mutandis for certitude and all other modes of affirmation, as we shall see forthwith.

Therefore what we call ‘modes of affirmation’ formally consist in the modes such as the diverse actualizations of the traits of the real which determine the resolution of intentional expectation.

In what does this modality as such consist? We have already seen that affirmation is a sentient intellection at a distance, the result of “stepping back”. And its sentient nature reveals that the return to the real has the character of a force, the \textit{force of realization}. This force has three different degrees depending upon whether one is dealing with positional, propositional, or predicative affirmation. And this force not only has degrees, but also a quality which we might term \textit{firmness}. It is just what the term and concept ‘affirmation’ refer to. “Grade of realization” and “firmness” are not the same thing. Each of the three degrees of force of realization can be exercised with different firmness. For example, the difference between doubt and certainty has nothing to do with the force of realization, but rather with the firmness with which this force operates. I can doubt or be certain that “every woman, fickle”, or that “A is B”. The first phrase is nominal (a constitution), the second predicative (a connection); they are two degrees of the force of realization. But doubt and certainty are in the firmness with which the constitution or connection is realized. Every logos is sentient, and is so in two moments. First, because I sentiently intellectively know what something is in reality as a \textit{force of realization}; and second because I sentiently intellectively know with a certain \textit{firmness}. That is, there is force and there is firmness. The firmness is the very mode of affirmation. Now, the differences of firmness are the different modes of affirmation. \{179\}

Granting this, the modalization of affirmation has a clearly defined structure. Above all, we have the real actualized with its traits in primordial apprehension. These traits are notes of the real of quite diverse character, both with respect to quality and intensity as well as position. But the real we now make the terminus of a second intellection, the intellection of what it is in reality. Then intellection qua act acquires its own character; it becomes intentional expectation of what that which we have already apprehended as real is in reality. The resolution of this expectation has three moments:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textit{a}] Above all it is the \textit{moment of contribution of our simple apprehensions}, or to use common parlance (but to speak much less precisely), it is the contribution of our ideas. Only as a function of our simple apprehensions can we intellectively know what the real is in reality.

  \item[\textit{b}] With respect to these simple apprehensions, the traits of the real are actualized in different ways; this is the \textit{moment of reactualization}. These traits, as moments of the real and simply real, are what they are in and by themselves, and nothing more. But with respect to simple apprehensions, they can take on a different mode of actualization. A far-off figure is apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality as a far-off figure, and nothing more; in itself it is something actualized as real and nothing more. But if I am to intellectively know what this figure is in reality, I draw upon my simple apprehensions, for example that of shrub, man, dog, etc. Is this figure a shrub, a man, a dog, or what? With respect to these simple apprehensions, and only with respect to them, do the traits of the far-off figure acquire a reactualization, because the fact is that I seek to intellectively know if this figure realizes the characteristics of the simple apprehension of a man, \{180\} a shrub, a dog, etc. It is then a second actualization but—I must again insist—only with respect to the realization of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is intellection brought to fullness in the light of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is a second intellection; and this second intellection is distinguished from the first by being intellection in the light of simple apprehensions. Herein consists the “secondarity” of second intellection: in being an intellection qualified by simple apprehensions. Simple apprehensions are not merely the terminus of an intellection, but are also and formally an intrinsic qualification of intellection. Simple apprehension is the “qualifying” moment of second intellection itself. Second intellection is intellection at a distance, from stepping back, and in virtue of that one knows intel-
fectively only in the qualified light of simple apprehen-
sions. A perfectly determined trait in primordial appre-
hension can be, as we shall see, only slightly determined
with respect to the realization of a simple apprehension,
because reactualization is actualization of the real as re-
alization of a simple apprehension. And this reactualiza-
tion is what has different modes: the unknown shape can
reactualize the characteristics of a shrub, of a man, of a
dog, etc. and actualize them in a more or less vague way,
and so forth.

c) I intellectively know these diverse modes of reac-
tualization, and I affirm them with respect to realization
itself; this is the moment of affirmative intention, the
moment of affirmation. Depending on what the modes of
reactualization have been in the second moment, affirma-
tion takes on different modalities because every affirma-
tion is in itself modal. To be sure, this modality has
nothing to do with what in classical logic is referred to as
modality, viz. the difference in connection {181} of sub-
ject with predicate according to whether it is contingent,
necessary, etc. Here we are not talking about the connec-
tion between subject and predicate, but about the mode in
which the actualization of the notes of the real are af-
firmed.

Such is the structure of the modes of intellection at a
distance.

The study of this structure can be made from differ-
ent points of view. These modes, in fact, are mutually
dependent. And this dependence is of the greatest impor-
tance in our analysis. But it is essential to delineate
carefully the ideas involved, because this dependence can
be of different types. “Dependence” can mean the mode in
which an affirmation depends upon others with respect to
its production in the mind. The dependence is then a psy-
cho-genetic fact. But it is not this connection which is of
concern to us here. The only decisive thing is the internal
structure of each mode of affirmation. And it is this
structure which is found to be dependent, qua structure,
upon other affirmations. Thus it is possible that an af-
firmation might be doubtful as compared with a certain
affirmation, for example. But this can mean two things.
It can mean that the affirmation began as something
doubtful and that doubt has given way to a certain af-
firmation. This is the psycho-genetic connection. But it
can also mean that as a mode of affirmation the structure
of the doubtful affirmation occupies a well-defined place
with respect to a certain affirmation. This is a structural
nexus or dependence. The two types of dependence are
quite different. Our certain affirmation almost never
comes preceded by a doubt, but is generated in other ways.
Nonetheless, in every case the structure of certainty, the
structure of what certainty is, is dependent constitutionally
upon the structure of what doubt is. What we are here
trying to conceptualize is not a psychogenesis {182} of
our affirmations, but the intellective spectrum, so to speak,
of its diverse structures. And it is only to this dependence
of structural nature that I refer when I speak of the fact
that some modes of affirmation are dependent upon oth-
ers.

What are these modes? That is the problem we must
now address.

1. In the lower part of the spectrum of affirmative
structures we find a peculiar mode of affirmation. We
have apprehended something as real and we seek to know
intellectively what it is in reality. It can happen that we
do not succeed in this effort. In that case we say that the
affirmation is an affirmation of our ignorance; we do not
know what the thing is in reality.

But this description is radically wrong and com-
pletely inadequate. In the first place, the verb “to know”
[saber] is used.* True, up to now we have not spoken at
all about what “knowing” is; that subject will occupy us
elsewhere. Up to now I have spoken only of intellective
knowing [inteligir] and of intellection. But disregarding
that for the time being—however essential it is, as we
shall see—let us employ the verb to know as synonymous
with intellection. But even so, the previous description is
radically wrong. In fact, what is this business of not
knowing what something is in reality? The Pithecan-
thropic man from Java, for example, did not know what a
rock is in reality. Do we then say that he was ignorant of
what a rock is in reality? As I see it, No, because being
ignorant of what something is in reality is a mode of in-
tellection of something already apprehended in the pri-
mordial apprehension of reality. All ignorance is there-
fore always ignorance of something already apprehended
as real. We intellectively know the reality of the “rock-
thing”, but we are ignorant of what it is in reality. Now,
the Pithecanthropic man did not have {183} primordial
apprehension of the “rock-reality”. Therefore his not
knowing what the rock is in reality is not ignorance; it is
nescience. The Pithecanthropic man did not have any
intellective actuality of the thing we call a rock. His “not
knowing” here is “non-intellection”; it is an “absence”
of intellection. On the other hand, in the case of ignorance

[* [Zubiri employs several Spanish verbs which have the English
translation, ‘to know’: saber, from the Latin sapere; conocer,
from the Latin cognoscere; and inteligir, from the Latin intel-
ligere. The first refers to knowing in the sense of intellectual
or practical knowledge; the second generally means ‘to know’
in the sense of ‘to be familiar with’ or ‘to know someone’; the
third is what is translated throughout this book as, ‘to intel-
lectively know’.—trans.]
one has intellecction of the real, but not yet intellecction of what that real thing is in reality. Therefore it is not an “absence” of intellecction, but a “privation” of it. Ignorance is privation of intellecction of what something which has already been apprehended as real is in reality; it is not merely an absence of intellecction. Strictly speaking, when one is ignorant of something one knows what the ignorance is of. The formal terminus of ignorance is the “in reality” of something already apprehended as real. To be sure, there are types of ignorance which refer to the mere reality of something. But no reality is intellecctively known as merely real; rather, it is founded (in whatever way; that does not concern us here) upon something already intellecctively known as real, where intellecction of what it “in reality” demands the mere reality of something else. And it can happen that we are ignorant of this reality. But then it is clear that in its ultimate root, ignorance concerns the “in reality” of something already apprehended as “real”. Otherwise we would be in the situation described before: our non-intellecction of mere reality would not be ignorance but nescience. It would be a case of not having the vaguest idea of that reality. But this is not ignorance; it is more than ignorance, it is nescience. Ignorance then is not nescience but a positive characteristic of affirmative intellecction. Which characteristic?

Let us return once again to our modest point of departure. We have an intellecction of a certain real thing and we seek to know intellecctively what it is in reality. Intellecction is \{184\} then a movement of intentional expectation, which has to be resolved. And the resolution of this expectation has three moments.

a) Above all we make use of our simple apprehensions, and with them try to intellecctively know their possible actualization in what is already intellecctively known as real. Does the figure actualize the simple apprehension of a man, of a shrub, or of something else? At this point the two other essential moments of intellecction arise in the intellecction.

b) Intellecction of the realization of simple apprehensions (which we have at our disposal) in the real already apprehended as such, is the second essential moment. This realization can have different modes which are, so to speak, different degrees of sufficiency.

There is a lowest degree. With respect to the simple apprehensions which we have at our disposal, it can be the case that the real realizes none of them. The thing is real but it has not been actualized with respect to any simple apprehension; it is what I term indeterminate actualization. And this type of modal actualization constitutes a mode of realization of the order of the simple apprehensions in the real thing. And this realization is also indeterminate. What is this indetermination? Of course, it is not a “lack” of actualization, but a positive “privation” of the “understood” actualization. In what does this privation consist?

Let us recall what it is to intellecctively know what something is “in reality”. Every real thing apprehended in its formality of reality has two moments, that of individual reality and that of reality in a field. And it is precisely their intrinsic unity which formally constitutes what the real thing is “in reality”. Now, as I have already said, when one intellecctively knows something real “among” others, these two moments are \{185\} in a certain way functionally differentiated, since the field encompasses not one but many things. Whence the unity of being in a field and being an individual is not apparent. It is rather mediated by simple apprehensions in the field of reality itself. It is the realization of these simple apprehensions which fills the field moment and its unity with individual reality; mediation is the actualization of a real individual thing in simple apprehensions. Now it can happen that individual reality is not actualized in any of the simple apprehensions we have had. In that case there is a unique actualization, viz. the actualization of the real thing as in a field, but an empty field. The real thing thus is inscribed in the “hollowness” of the field. Whence it follows that the unity of the individual thing and the field remains in suspense. That is, what this thing is in reality remains in suspense. This suspension is not just an absence, nor some lack of determination; rather, it is a positive mode of actualization, viz. privational determination. It is the positive actualization of the “in reality”, but in a privative mode. It is then the privative actuality of a hollowness; and this privational actuality is precisely the “indetermination”. Indeterminate, then, does not here mean indefinite, because being indefinite is a mode of determination. Indetermination means neither “un-defined”, “Un-defined” is not the same as “indefinite”. In virtue of that, the ambit of the indeterminate is constitutively open without limits; it is open to everything else. “Everything else” does not refer to other things, but to what the “un-defined” thing might be in reality. It is the “everything else” of the “in reality”. What is un-defined is the mode of unity of the individual and of the being in a field, i.e., what the thing is in reality. As it is the \{186\} un-definition of something already definite as real in primordial apprehension, it follows that this un-definition is privation. Privation is the actuality of the “hollowness” of the individual in the field; it is the “in reality” in suspense. Simple apprehensions are what determine the actuality of the indeterminate.

And here one sees the difference between the traits of a thing in and of itself, and its traits with respect to a second actualization. The traits of a real thing in and of themselves can be perfectly determinate in their individual reality, and yet their intrinsic unity with respect to the
field can be indeterminate. The real thing is determinate, but what it is in reality is indeterminate.

1. This actuality of the indeterminate, this actuality of the “hollowness” of the field of individual reality, in turn defines its own mode of intellective affirmation because it defines its own mode of realizing something in simple apprehension. Every intellective movement is, as we have seen, intentional expectation. And therefore, qua mere intellection, that movement is a privational intention; it is in just this respect that its expectant character consists. This intentional privatical expectation is resolved in an affirmation whose mode is determined by the mode of the actualization. When the actualization is a privatical “hollowness”, the affirmation takes on a special mode. Every expectant intention is in itself privatical; when the actuality of the expected is indetermination (in the sense explained), it follows that intentional privation becomes the character of the affirmation; it is the privational aspect of intention molded into a mode of affirmation. It is not privation of intention; that would be just an intellective deficiency. Nor is it intention itself as deprived of a positive terminus, because that would be just some manifestation. It is an intention which consists in the very mode of affirming; it is the affirmation itself as privatical. Privationality of the act of affirmation is vacuous affirmation. Now, this mode of affirming is precisely what constitutes ignorance. Ignorance is affirming “privationally” the “in reality”. It is an affirmation suspended in itself as affirmation. It is a positive mode of affirmation. A mode of affirmation such that the affirmative intention is as if folded back upon itself is a proper intentional hollowness; the empty affirmative intention as a mode of affirming is what ignorance consists in. It is like a shot in the dark. It is, then, in the first place a hollowness, but in the second a hollowness of what the real is in reality. Hollowness is then a positive affirmative ambit; a positive affirmation in hollowness, an indeterminate affirmation. The expectant privatical intention is folded back upon itself, molded into a suspended affirmation. It is being suspended as a mode of affirmation itself, not merely a suspension of what is affirmed. Such is the essence of ignorance: a suspended vacuous affirmation, of the indeterminate as such.

Precisely because ignorance is a mode of affirmative intellection, man not only has to go on learning what things are in reality, he also has to learn to be ignorant. Only thus can he create new simple apprehensions which in time can lead from ignorance to other modes of affirmative intellection. The access to ignorance, on the periphery and above nescience, is a firm intellective movement.

The realization of simple apprehensions is therefore not a simple task. Insofar as this realization progresses, real things actualize their traits in a more definite way; this is the structural emergence of other modes of affirmative intellection.

2. What a thing is in reality can begin to actualize and realize more of its traits with respect to simple apprehensions.

a) Actualization of a real thing in these simple apprehensions is not purely and simply indeterminate. The actualization, in fact, is sometimes a more or less vague, even fleeting, moment; sometimes it is extremely concrete. It is the moment in which the announcement of a determination begins to emerge, however vaguely. It is a purely dawning or inchoative moment. But it is an indication which is no more than an indication, since scarcely has the actualization been indicated when the emerging traits once again dissolve and become invalid. It is what I shall term a “revoked indication”. Now, this revoked indication formally constitutes that mode of actualization which is the hint. It is not mere indetermination, but neither is it determination; it is the dawning of revoked determination, the mere suggesting of a possible determination, its first indication. The hint is a mode of actualizing a real thing with respect to what it is in reality, i.e., with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectively know it. The traits of the real thing are never hints; they are what they are and nothing more. On the other hand the hint is always and only a hint or evidence of something, and this something is what is apprehended in simple apprehension. It is then only a hint of what the real thing is in reality.

b) This mode of actualization and realization moulds the affirmation in accordance with a particular mode of intention, viz. the affirmative intention of the hint as guess. A guess is a mode of affirmation. This does not refer to guessing an affirmation, but to affirm by guessing, so to speak. The emptiness of intention, i.e., of ignorance, now gives way to that of guessing the intention. This is the intellection of the first pointer to the determination of what a real thing is in reality. One guesses only what the thing is in reality, because it is actualized for us as a hint.

This intellection naturally admits of various degrees. Merely pointing to a determination can be a pointing which tends to make itself clear. But it is a pointing quickly revoked. This mode of hint is what I call clarescence, the breaking of the dawn of clarity. Guessing the affirmative intention of the clarescent is glimpsing, the glimpsing of the clarescent. The hint can be more than just clarescence. In the revoked pointing of the hint, not only may the light which is dawning be actualized, but some traits of the thing as well. But these things, now
revoked, actualize the thing as something which is in reality poorly drawn or sketched. This actualization of the hint can be called blurred. Something blurred consists in traits being actualized sketchily with respect to what the thing is in reality. It does not refer to a type of mix of traits, but to a rigorous sketching. Sketching is not the privation of figure, but neither is it a precise figure. “Sketching” here refers to the revoking, which actualizes the traits as not being determinately of the thing such as it is simply apprehended. And this “not” actualizes the thing not as indeterminate but as sketched. The revoking sketches the traits of the thing actualized in simple apprehension. Nothing is blurry in itself but only is so with respect to \{190\} simple apprehensions. And the blurred formally consists in this sketching. Now, affirmative intention, the realization of the blurred qua blurred is confusion. This does not refer to some confusion of “ideas” or anything of that sort; rather, it is a mode of affirming, affirming confusedly that something is in reality blurred. We dimly perceive what that thing is in reality. Finally, in the repeated appearance and disappearance of actualized traits, there are some which do not point to something else, which remain as definitively revoked; whereas others continue to point insistently. The blurred thus continues to manifest vaguely its traits. So the hint is more than what is sketched of the blurry; it is realization as indication. It is a “pointing manifestation”, but one which is revoked as soon as it points. Therefore we say that its traits are only indicated. There is only an indication of what the thing is in reality. Now, affirmative intention of something indicated, realized as such, is what we call suspicion. It is a mode of affirmative intention: one suspects something which is only indicated. It is a suspicion of what the thing is in reality.

To summarize, hint can present three qualities: clarescence, blurredness, and indication. The intellec
tive intention of the hint as such, the guess, thus possesses three qualities determined by the hint: the glimpse of the clarescent, the confusion of the blurry, and the suspicion of the indicated.

But this last quality, suspicion, is already the inchoate transition to a different mode of affirmation.

3. In fact the peak of the indication conduces to fixing a set of traits with respect to simple apprehensions. \{191\} In them a real thing is actualized in a way different from and superior to the hint, and this actualization determines an affirmative intention superior to the guess.

a) What is this actualization? Recall first that in the actualization of indetermination and hint, the multiplicity of traits is always an open multiplicity: the hollowness and revocation leave open the multiplicity of actualizable traits. But now, the traits do not remain revoked or even just manifested; they are on the contrary sustained. Before, even though manifested, they did not go beyond being indices, since they were going to be revoked immediately. But now, what is manifested is not revoked. Thus the manifested traits become sustained. What are these sustained traits? They form a multiplicity of a very definite character. Above all it is a multiplicity of traits which is quite fixed: something real has this or that set of traits; for example, the traits of a shrub or a dog, but not those of a man. The thing in question is in reality only a dog or a shrub. It is in this that sustaining formally consists. When they are not revoked, the traits comprise a multiplicity which is not open but closed, a bounded multiplicity. To be sure, the traits are not determined, but neither are they random; the scope of their non-determination is one which is bounded. Moreover, this multiplicity not only is bounded, it is a defined multiplicity: the traits are of a dog, a shrub, etc. The indetermination is not just bounded but also defined. The bounding of the area of indetermination, and the definition of the traits constitutes a decisive step beyond mere indetermination.

Here we have the traits of a real thing actualized now with respect to simple apprehensions. But it remains to go \{192\} one step further. These traits are sustained, but by whom? By the real thing itself. It isn’t enough to say that traits comprise a bounded and definite multiplicity; rather it is necessary to say in what the sustaining itself consists. The sustaining is thus the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to the simple apprehensions of dog and shrub. Hence what must be said is in what the sustaining consists as actualization. When something actualizes its traits in a sustained manner, we do not say that the thing could be one thing or another indifferently, but that it could be one thing as well as another. Sustaining is not mere insistence, but that mode of actualization of the “either one”. Now, these traits pertain to the real thing. It is the real thing which sustains the traits of the dog or of the shrub. And then this thing is no longer either indeterminate nor a hint. It is no longer one or the other, but as much one as the other: it is ambiguous. The mode of actualization of what a real thing is in reality now has the mode of ambiguity. In the sustaining of multiple traits of a bounded and defined multiplicity, a thing is in reality ambiguous. What is bounded and defined of the multiplicity concerns the traits; the ambiguity concerns its sustaining, its actualization; it is an intrinsic mode of actualization. Together with the mode of actualization of indetermination and hint, we now have a third mode of actualization: ambiguity. It is a real thing itself which in reality is actualized ambiguously with respect to simple apprehensions.

b) Now, actualization of a real thing as ambiguous is molded into its own form of realization of affirmative in-
tension; this is doubt. Doubt is formally the affirmation of
the ambiguous real qua ambiguous. Doubt is etymologi-
cally a mode of duplicity. But here we are not dealing
\(^{193}\) with the duality of intellection by stepping back, at
a distance, but the dual character of the actualization of
the real. It is this special mode of duality which constit-
tutes ambiguity. Let us remark in passing that when
speaking of doubt and ambiguity, it is not necessary that
there be only two terms (dog, shrub); there could be a
greater number. But for the sake of clarity I limit myself to
those cases where there are two. And this is the essential
point. Doubt is not founded in disjunction; it is not
founded in the fact that a real thing is in reality either a
dog or a shrub. Doubt is founded, on the contrary, upon a
conjunction, namely that something can be as much dog
as shrub, i.e., upon an ambiguity. And as a mode of af-
firmation, doubt is not a type of oscillation or vacillation
between two affirmations. It is on the contrary a mode of
affirming what a real thing is ambiguously in reality. We
vacillate because there is a doubtful affirmation; but there
is no doubtful affirmation because we vacillate. Doubt is a
mode of affirmation, not a conflict between two af-
firmations. We affirm yet with doubt the ambiguity of what
something real is in reality. It is not a not-knowing where
to turn, but knowing that the thing is in reality ambigu-
ous. It is of course understood that the thing is really am-
biguous with respect to my simple apprehensions; nothing
is ambiguous in itself.

Here we have the third mode of affirmation: doubt.
It constitutes a structure erected upon the structure of ig-
norance and of conjecture. The emptiness of indetermina-
tion is molded into the conjecture of the hint. And this
conjecture or guessing grows: the glimpse of the clare-
scent becomes the confusion of the blurred; and this confu-
sion is pinned down in the suspicion of the indicated.
Now, the suspicion of the indicated is pinned down in the
doubt of the ambiguous. In the reduction of \(^{194}\) inde-
termination to hint and hint to ambiguity, one is so to
speak stretching the circle of what the real thing is in re-
ality. One more step, and this circle takes on a qualita-
tively different mode, which in turn determines a different
mode of affirmative intellelction.

4. In fact, it can happen that something which is pre-
sent, while still ambiguous, is found to be closer to one of
the two poles of the ambiguity than the other. This ap-
proximation is not just gradual but the expression of a
new mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality, a
mode which in turn determines a new mode of af-
firmation, of realization.

\(a\) As actualization with respect to simple apprehen-
sions, a real thing is closer to one than the other. What is
this proximity? In ambiguity one deals with a multiplicity
which is bounded and limited. But now a new character-
istic appears, that of “weight”, pondus. Actualization has
a certain weight; it is not just a metaphor introduced \(a d
hoc\). It is something extremely precise which is expressed
in a term, preponderance. The intrinsic character of ac-
tuality is more than simple ambiguity; it is preponderance.

What is preponderant is the actualization of the traits with
respect to a simple apprehension. Approximation pertains
intrinsicly to the actualization of a thing; and this in-
trinsic approximation is what constitutes preponderance.
In virtue of that, the actuality of a thing includes, just as
in the case of ambiguity, two terms “bounded” and “de-
+ined”; but it sustains one more than the other. Therefore
the thing is no longer “one as much as the other” but
“rather more one than the other”. The “rather one than”
is the preponderance. In ambiguity this character of pre-
ponderance is cloaked, so to speak. From such a point of
view, \(^{195}\) ambiguity would be an equi-ponderance. But
the converse is not true: ambiguity is a mode of actuality
which is intrinsically distinct from and independent of all
ponderance. The continuity of the transition is a mode of
actuality to the other; its intrinsic irreducibility cannot be
reduced.

\(b\) Now, actualization of the preponderant as such
determines its own mode of realization, of affirmative
intention, viz. opinion. Opinion is formally a mode of
affirmation; it is affirming not vacuously, nor by guessing,
nor in a doubting fashion, but as opinion. This does not
refer to an opinion one may have about a possible af-
firmation; rather, it is a mode of affirmation. What the
thing is in reality, preponderantly, is for example a dog;
and the mode of affirmation of the preponderant as such is
formally opinion. Nothing is preponderant nor therefore
subject to opinion in itself; rather being preponderant, to
be subject to opinion is to be so only as an actuality with
respect to simple apprehensions. In and by itself, the dis-
tant dim figure has all the features of a distant dim figure,
and nothing more. But with respect to my simple appre-
hensions, this distant dim figure has the traits of a dog
rather than a shrub. Affirmation as an intentional mode of
the “rather than” is an affirmation which is intrinsically
subjectable to opinion. Only as the terminus of this af-
firmation can preponderant be called subject to opinion.

As a mode of affirmation, opinion can have different
characteristics depending upon the weight of the traits
actualized. Preponderance, preponderant actuality, can at
time be only a light tilting or attraction. It is a kind of
inchoate gravitation. The affirmative intention \(^{196}\) of
the actual as tilting or attraction is that intention we call
inclination. This is an expression which is most definitely
ambiguous. It can suggest, indeed, the idea of a tendency
or something like it, as happens when one speaks of good
or bad inclinations. But here it means only inclination as
an intrinsic mode of affirming. The same thing happens with this expression as with the word ‘intention’. From meaning the intention of an act of will it came to mean the intentionality proper to intellect. I believe that it is necessary to bring about the same thing with respect to this expression as happened centuries ago with the word ‘intention’. Inclination is a modalization of this intention; it is the mode of affirming, of realizing actuality as tilting or attracting.

Just one more step and the form in which the preponderant traits are actualized will no longer be merely tilting or attracting; rather, those traits will “carry” more on one side than the other. We may term this mode of actuality gravity, a gravitation not merely inchoate but in a certain way macroscopic. The affirmative intention of the preponderant with gravity is probability. Here I refer to probability as a mode of affirmation, not of probability as a characteristic of physical reality. What physics understands by probability is as I see it what we might call the measure of possibility. All physical states of the electron described by its wave function are possible. But all are not equally possible. The quantitative structure of this of this possibility is what as I see it constitutes real probability. But here we are not dealing with that. We are not dealing with the measure of the real but with modes of affirmation; I affirm probably that a thing is such or such in reality. The modalization of the preponderance according to gravity constitutes a probable intention as a mode of intention.

Finally, it can happen that certain traits have so much “weight” that their load is clearly to one side. This is the actuality of the preponderant as conquest. The mode of affirmation, of realization, of conquest is conviction. We say that traits drag us along toward an affirmation. Being in a dragged-along intention is that mode of affirmative intention constituting conviction. The “conquering” [vincere] within a thing is “at the same time” the “con-vicing” of the intention.

In summary, weight, preponderance, has three qualities of actuality: tilting (or attraction), gravity, and conquest. And these qualities determine three qualities of affirmation: inclination, probability, and conviction. They are the three modes of opinion.

But however much the traits drag along and determine the conviction of intellective knowing, they are but pointed out or indicated. One more constriction in this structure might lead us to a different mode of affirmative intention.

It can happen, in fact, that a thing is actualized in traits which are perfectly and univocally determinate, but which nonetheless are not necessarily what the thing is in reality. Rather, they constitute only, so the speak, the outward appearance of what it is in reality. This determines its own mode of affirmative intention.

a) What is this mode of actuality? A dim figure in the distance has all the traits proper to a dog. Here, then, we are not involved with any ambiguity at all, nor with any preponderance. The traits are neither ambiguous nor preponderant; they are on the contrary univocally determined. We say, then, and with reason, that we see a dog. [198] But is this the same thing which occurs when I see a dog in my house? I also see the dog in my house; but there is an essential difference between these two apprehensions. In my house, I see something which in fact “is” a dog, whereas that which I see in the distance, although it has all the canine characteristics perfectly defined and delineated, nonetheless only “has” them. This “having” indicates precisely the difference in actualization of the real with respect to the traits of simple apprehension of the dog. What is this having, in what does it consist, and what is the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to it? These are the important questions.

In the first place, the “having” designates a certain difference between what a real thing is in reality and its traits. Otherwise the verb “to have” would lack meaning. This does not refer to ambiguity or preponderance, because ambiguity and preponderance concern the traits of a thing and here these traits are univocally determined. The difference marking off “having” has to do with a different dimension, the effective volume of a thing. Permit me to explain. Actualized traits are univocally determined, but only constitute what is superficial—the superficies—or the surface of the thing’s real volume. Now, the volume qua circumscribed by these “facies” or faces has that mode of actuality termed aspect. Here, ‘aspect’ does not mean something which is only more or less precise, variable, or ephemeral and circumstantial. On the contrary, aspect is here something perfectly precise; and in its precision it pertains intrinsically, really, and determinately to the thing. But it does so in a special way. Aspect is only a mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality. It does not refer, I repeat, either to ambiguity or preponderance of traits; rather, it refers to the fact that, in its own precision, this group of traits comprises the aspect of what the thing is in reality. What the dim distant figure has is precisely the aspect of a dog.

In the second place, What is this ‘having’ itself? The aspect is not formally what the real thing is in reality, but an aspect “of” the thing. This “of” is a genitive of intrinsic pertaining. In virtue of it the aspect is something like an envelopment or external projection of what a thing is in reality. This envelopment is not a type of encapsulating, because then the aspect would not be intrinsic to
the real thing but would contend with it. Now, having \textit{tener} is not containing \textit{contener}. The dimly perceived figure in the distance has the traits of a dog; nonetheless, it is but the dog’s aspect. The pertaining of the aspect to a real thing is a type of pressure, by which the aspect is more or less “attached” to what the thing is in reality. What the thing is in reality is projected, so to speak, in its traits, which are thus its “ex-pression”. The unity of the aspect with what a thing is in reality is the unity of “ex-pression”. And this expression is a manifestation, therefore, of the thing. Having is, as such, manifesting. Aspect is the ambit of manifestation of what a thing is in reality. Here we see clearly the difference between ambiguous manifestation and preponderance. The ambiguous and the preponderant are constituted in what “is now” manifested. On the other hand, with regard to aspect, one does not deal with what is now manifest, but with manifesting itself.

In the third place, “What is the mode of actualization in aspect and manifestation of what a thing is in reality? When I apprehend a dog in my house, I apprehend the dog and in it the manifestation of its traits, its aspect; I therefore say that it is in fact a dog. But when I see at a distance a figure which has the aspect of a dog, I do the inverse operation: I apprehend the aspect and intellectually know in it the actualization of what the thing is in reality; I go from the aspect to the dog. The first thing which strikes me about this actualization is the dog’s aspect. And this “striking me” is what, etymologically, comprises \textit{obviousness}. In the obvious a real thing is actualized, but merely as aspect. And upon going from aspect to thing, it is obvious that the latter has been manifested in aspect: a thing is obviously what is manifested in its aspect. Precisely on account of this it never occurred to anyone to say without further ado that what is apprehended is a dog. But it is a dog only obviously. The obvious is on one hand the aspect as being “of” a thing; on the other hand this “of” admits of degrees of pressure. And in virtue of this the aspect is, in a certain way, “attached” to the a thing but with \textit{laxity}. Laxitude is the formal character of merely “having”. Laxitude of determination is univocal, but the “of” itself is lax; strictly speaking a thing could be in reality different than its aspect. Actualization has, then, a precise mode: it is the aspect which manifests as obvious what a real thing is in reality. \textit{Obviousness} is the new mode of actualization. Like all the rest, this mode is so only with respect to simple apprehension. Nothing is obvious in itself, but only with respect to a simple apprehension. The realization of the simple apprehension as aspect is only now obvious.

\textit{b)} Now, the actualization of a thing as something obvious determines a proper mode of affirmative intention of realization; it is \textit{plausibility}. Plausibility is formally affirmation of the obvious. It is a mode of affirming, viz. affirming plausibly that a thing is in reality such as its aspect manifests it. Plausibility is a mode of affirming, and that which is affirmed in this mode is the obvious. But since the obvious is what strikes us, it follows that plausibility is the form in which intentional expectation of intellection at a distance is molded. Simple apprehension is plausibly affirmed as realized in a thing. The plausible, just by virtue of being so, is what a thing is in reality, as long as the contrary is not evident. This “as long as” expresses at once the character of the obvious reality from the aspect and the plausible character of its affirmation.

This idea of the obvious and the plausible is, as I see it, what constitutes Parmenides’ \textit{doxa}. The mind is borne to what strikes it when it apprehends things in accordance with their \textit{form} and their \textit{names}. \textit{Onoma} and \textit{morphē} are the mode in which things strike us; \textit{nāma-rupa} say some of the \textit{Upanishads}. Forms and names are the obvious aspect of a thing. And affirming that things are thus in reality is just the plausible, the \textit{doxa}. It is not a question of mere phenomenological appearances, nor of sensible perceptions, much less of concrete entities as opposed to being as such. As I see it, the question is one of obviousness and plausibility. All affirming of the concrete multiplicity of things is simply affirming the obvious, affirming that things are in accordance with the aspect which strikes us. Therefore that affirmation is only plausible. For Parmenides, the philosopher goes beyond the obvious and the plausible, to the true being of things. For Parmenides and the most important philosophers of the Vedanta, our science and our philosophy could only be science and philosophy of the aspectual. This mutual implication between aspect, obviousness, and plausibility is, as I see it, the interpretation both of Eleatic philosophy as well as some Vedantic thought. \textit{[202]}

What a real thing is in reality is thus univocally determined, but in a lax sense. A thing “has” this or that aspect in reality, and therefore is obviously the way it is. Affirmation of the obvious as such is plausibility. The plausible is the mode of affirming the “real-manifesting”, but nothing more.

But we are not yet finished.

6. Let us suppose, in fact, that the thing in question I do not apprehend off in the distance but nearby, for example in my house. I apprehend that the thing is a dog. Then I do not say that the thing has the aspect of dog, but that it \textit{is} a dog. What is this mode of actualization of the thing and what is the mode of its affirmation?

\textit{a)} Above all, the difference between a dog and a canine aspect is not primary. Rather, it is always posterior to the intellection apprehension of the dog itself, and
therefore is founded in the intellection of dog. The nature of aspect is thus founded upon the actualization of what a thing is in reality, and not the other way around, as previously occurred. In this actualization what we previously called "aspect" is not, properly speaking, an aspect but a moment incorporated into the thing. Aspect is now what gives body to the thing. A thing is not just volume but body. Incorporation is the primary character of the new mode of actualization. What we previously called "aspect" is only the form of actuality of what the real thing is in reality. And as such it should be called corporeity. I am not referring only to the body as an organism or anything of that nature; rather to the body as merely the moment of actuality of a real thing itself. It is the moment of actuality of a simple apprehension in the real thing itself.

In the second place, precisely on account of this, the actualization (203) means that it is the thing itself and not only its manifestation which realizes my simple apprehension. This simple apprehension is not actualized only in the aspect; it is not an aspectual actualization but an actualization of what a thing is in reality. That is, what is realized from a simple apprehension constitutes a moment of the real thing itself in its reality. That is the constitutio...
upon precisely that which one aimed at”; “to be now sure of” something is not a type of security but a goal reached. Whence the verb acquired the meaning of encountering. Certainty is thus the supreme degree of firmness of intention. By the same token, we can say that it is unqualified firmness, as opposed to other modes of affirmation such as doubt or probability. Certainty is not the maximum probability, as is often said; rather, it is another mode of affirming with a different firmness. In certainty we have firmness par excellence. Here I again emphasize the difference between a judgement which is certainly firm and the primordial apprehension of reality. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is, if one wishes, a primary firmness of an intellection of the real in and by itself; this is the mode of intellection of the compact. But strictly speaking primordial apprehension does not have firmness; that rather is the exclusive province of certain judgements. In certainty, one deals, so to speak, with a “confirmation” of what was the firmness of the primordial apprehension.

The two characteristics of re-constitution and confirmation, taken together, i.e. taking together the “re-” and the “con-”, are the two moments of certain affirmative intellection in contrast to the compact apprehension of reality; they are the two moments of certain firmness, of certainty. For this reason we can say that certain judgement recovers a real thing, but at a different level. And this different level is the “in reality”.

With this we have structurally analyzed the most important zones of the spectrum of affirmation modes. For this purpose I have had recourse to examples which make the point clearly, e.g. the dim figure at a distance. But in order to preclude incorrect interpretations it is important to point out that these modes are applied not only to what it is to be a dog, a shrub, etc., but also to the most modest and elemental trait of the real. Thus, if we seek to intellectually know the color which a thing possesses in reality, it can happen that a thing has, in the intellective movement of my apprehension, an indeterminate color. For example, I have a hint that the color is blue, green, or a lilac hue; it can be that it is moreblue than green, that it has a blue aspect, or that it is in fact blue.

All of these modes constitute the spectral gamut of affirmation modes. The actualization can be indeterminate, a hint (clarescent, blurry, indicating), ambiguous, preponderant (tilting or attracting, gravity, conquering), obvious, effectively. Correlatively, the modes of affirmation, of realization, are determined: ignorance, conjecture (guess, confusion, suspicion), doubt, opinion (inclination, probability, conviction), plausibility, certainty.

All these modes are so many modes of resolution of the intentional expectation in affirmation. They are modes of firmness. And these modes depend upon the diverse modes in which the real is actualized differentially in intellective movement.

But this poses a decisive question for us, because all these modes of affirmation—as we have just seen at great length—are modes in which the real determines affirmation in its dimension of firmness. But now we have to ask ourselves not what they are nor in what the modes of determination consist, but rather what is the determining itself. The study of what affirmation is, of what its modes are (force of realization), and what its modes are (modalities of firmness), has been the study of the structure of affirmation. Now we have to delve into this other important question: the real determinant of affirmation, the medial structure of the sentient logos.
SECTION 3

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS

II. MEDIATED STRUCTURE

We saw in Section I of this Second Part what the intellection of a real thing is with respect to other things, i.e., what the intellection of a real thing in the field of reality is. This intellection is what we call ‘logos’. This logos as intellection has three basic, fundamental characteristics. In the first place, the logos intellectively knows what a real thing is in reality; but does so based upon another thing simply apprehended through stepping back, i.e., at a distance. To be in reality is to be a this, a how, and a what. This intellective knowing based upon another thing is the moment of duality. In the second place, in this duality one intellectively knows what the real is in reality going from a real thing to the other things of the field. This is the dynamic moment of intellection. This movement has, as we saw, two phases. In the first we are impelled from the thing which we seek to know intellectively toward that based on which we are going to intellectively know the former. This phase is a movement of retraction. In it one intellectively knows in simple apprehension what a thing “might be” in reality. But as we are restrained by the real thing, the movement of being impelled or retraction is going to be followed by a second phase, one which in a certain fashion is contrary to the first. This is the movement of return or intentum from reality itself in a field toward the thing. In this return one intellectively knows not what a thing “might be” but what it “is” in reality; it is affirmation. The study of intellective movement in its two phases has been carried out in Section 2.

Now, the step from the “might be” to the “is” is determined in the field of reality itself. The field, we said, is not something which is seen but something that makes us see; it is the medium of intellection. Here the duality does not constitute a structural moment of the dynamism, but a moment of the “mediality”. The medium is what makes us discern, from among the many “might be’s” of the thing, that particular “might be” which is more than “might be”: it is the “is”. And this poses a new problem for us. In Section 2 we studied the formal dynamic structure of the logos, but now we must study the determination by which the medium of intellection, reality, makes us “discern” what a real thing is among the various “might be’s”. That is, what is it that determines the realization of a determinate simple apprehension of the real thing. This is the theme of Section 3, the formal medial structure of the logos. We shall center this study on two questions:

1. What is that determination in itself.
2. What is the character of the logos qua determinate; truth and logos

The study will be carried out in the following two chapters.
CHAPTER VI
DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF

First of all we may ask, What is the determination of the logos in itself? The medium of reality is what permits us to see this determination. And since the medium of reality proceeds, ultimately, from things themselves, it follows that the determination proceeds likewise from this or that real thing. Thus we may pose four problems:

1. What is this determination of the logos? The evidence.
2. What are the intrinsic characteristics of evidence?
3. Based on this we shall discuss some ideas about evidence accepted without discussion in philosophy, but which I believe are false.
4. We shall make our thought more precise with respect to two classical conceptions which, under another name, can correspond to our problem: intuitionism and rationalism.

§ 1
WHAT DETERMINATION AS SUCH IS:
EVIDENCE

In the phase of being impelled, we step back within the field from the thing which we seek to know intellectually. But the retaining of its reality makes us return to that real thing; the stepping back is thus an operation of approximation. We have not stepped back from the real except to see it better.

How is it possible that a real thing gets closer to us when we step back from it? This does not refer to intellection of a real thing in and by itself; rather it refers to the intellection of what this real thing is in reality. Now, intellection is mere actualization of the real as real. Therefore it is this intellective actuality of the real thing which, by being actuality in difference, brings us closer while we step back.

How does this take place? We have already seen that every real thing has two intrinsic and formally constitutive moments of its intellective actuality: the individual moment and the field moment. They are two moments of each real thing in and by itself. But in a thing put at a distance, its intellection is an apprehension which is certainly “one”, but also “dual”. This duality concerns not only the movement in which the intellection of the logos consists, but also and above all the real thing itself qua actualized; the thing itself is intellectively known as a temporary duality. In virtue of this, the actualization of a real thing has, as a formal moment belonging to it, what we might term an internal “gap”. The unfolding that occurs in the real actualized thing between its individual and its field moment constitutes, in this actualization, an hiatus or a gap between what it is “as reality” and what it is “in reality”. This does not refer, let me repeat, to a gap in the content of the thing apprehended, but to a gap in its intellective actuality. When it becomes present “among” other things, every real thing has a gap in the constitutive actualization. It is on account of this gap that a thing impels us to step back from it, in a retractive movement, whose terminus is simple apprehension. But this gap is a gap which is filled by the affirmative moment, by affirmative intention. Affirmation fills in the distance between a real thing as real and what it is in reality. Both moments, retraction and affirmation are, as we have said, only different phases of a single unique movement: the movement by which a thing not only impels us to the field, but keeps us in its reality as well. Therefore this retaining is in the very root of the actuality of the thing which is intellectively known, in the root therefore of its own gap. This means that the gap itself has a structure of its own by virtue of being a “retaining gap”. Whence it follows that the gap is not here (as it was
nonetheless in the case of ignorance) a mere emptiness or hiatus, but rather is something having a positive structure. The real thing itself, in fact, is what opens its own gap in its intellective actuality. In its power to open a gap, the real thing confers the structure of the gap by retaining us intellectively in it. In other words, the gap is opened on the real thing itself and by the real actual itself, whose unity of reality underlies the gap and confers upon it its structure. Therefore the gap is created and structured by the primary and original unity of reality. “Filling” the gap consists in overcoming the duality; therefore in making what the thing “could be” to be determined as the thing which it “is”. This determination makes the thing real. In being retained the thing itself qua foundation is what determines the form in which the gap has to be filled. In its power of overcoming the gap, the function of the real thing as determinant consists in being the function in accordance with which that thing determines the positive structure of the gap. What is this structure?

1. Above all, this gap is structured by the real thing qua actualized. Now, actuality is a physical moment of a real thing. To be sure, it is the intelligence which, in its intellection, confers intellective actuality upon a thing. But what the intelligence qua intelligence confers upon it is only the intellective character of its actuality; it does not confer the actuality qua actuality. And what is important to us here is the thing qua actual, which moves the intelligence. How does it move the intelligence? Not, to be sure, by any of its own actions, because a real thing does not “act” upon the intelligence but is only “actual” in it. But our languages do not have all of the words we would like to mean just ‘actuality’; rather, our words almost always refer to some action. Therefore we have no choice but to go back to the word ‘action’, knowing that with it we are referring not to action properly speaking but only actuality. Granting this, what is the nature of the “action” such that its actuality moves the intelligence? This action is not a governing or directing one, so to speak. It does not consist in the real thing guiding us in the intellective movement. This guiding action, i.e. the movement going to one’s head from something is what in Latin was termed ducere, to lead or conduct. If one wishes to continue using the compound “to conduct”, it will be necessary to say that the action of a thing in the [215] intelligence does not consist in bearing us or conducting us or guiding us in intellective movement. That is the false idea that intellection, by being our action, consists in things being ultimately what guides or conducts us to such-and-such intellec- tion. This cannot be because that type of action is definitely something ab extrinsico. But actuality is not what moves us by itself; it is the very reality of a thing insofar as the thing is present in the intelligence by virtue of the fact of being real. Because of this, the action with which a real thing moves is, to intellection, an action which stems from the reality of the thing; it is the real thing itself which, in its actualization, moves us ab intrin- sico, from its interior so to speak. And it is just this intrin- sical motion that in Latin has been called agere as opposed to ducere. The actuality of a real thing does not guide us but rather has us ab intrinsico in movement from itself; it “makes us see”. If one desires to use the fre- quentative of agere, i.e. agitare, one might say that a real thing, by its naked actuality in a differential actualization, agitates us, has us agitated. For what reason? In order to intellectively know what the thing is in reality. Indeed, a compound of agere expresses the actuality as an intrinsic motion of the real thing, viz. the verb cogito (from co- agito), to agitate intellections. The action of the intelli- gence and the agere of a thing are identical; this is what the cum expresses. We should not be surprised, because in intellection the actuality of a thing and the intellective actuality of intellection are identically the same, as we saw; they are a “co-actuality”. This agere proper to a real thing actualized in differential actualization has the double moment of being impelled and being retained. I said before that they are not two movements but two phases of a single movement. Now, this “one” movement is the agere. {216}

Thus we have the first structural moment of the gap: it is being retained in agere.

2. But this agere has a characteristic moment here. That has already been indicated, in a certain way, in what we have just said; but it must be pointed out expressly. The agere is, as I said, a motion ab intrinsico. But of this motion, the agere does not express anything more than its being a movement proper to the actuality of a thing. It is now necessary to express more thematically the intrinsic character of this movement of the agere. It is, in fact, what one expresses in the strict sense with the preposition ex. This preposition has two meanings: it can mean “to expel” (in Greek ex-ago); but it can also mean to make to leave “from the inside”. This second meaning is more important to us here. The two meanings are not necessarily independent. In the first, a real thing pushes “to- ward the outside” of itself, i.e., to what we have called the field moment; this is to be impelled. Strictly speaking, if it were not an abuse of etymological formations, one could say that being impelled is being “ex-pelled”. The “ex” is in this aspect not an “outside” but an exteriorization. But the fundamental meaning is the second: a real thing makes us go out from inside of itself by an action in which the given thing does not remain left behind, because that
movement belongs to the very actuality of the thing. Therefore being expelled formally bears in its breast what I have called being retained: a real thing makes us move ourselves to the outside of it from the inside and by the inside itself; it is a movement grounded upon interiorization. The unity of both moments (being impelled and being retained) in the agere is the unity of the ex. The ex as moment of the agere thus has a very precise meaning: it is ex-agere, exigir [in Spanish], “to demand”. The structure of the gap makes a demand. The gap is not something vacuous; it is the ambit of what makes a demand, a gap stuffed with the demand of realization. It is the reality of a thing qua actualized which demands the intellection of what it is “in reality”. The gap is an actuality that makes a demand. The function of a real thing in the differential intellection then consists in making a demand: it demands that determinate form of realization which we call “being in reality”. The “in” of the “in reality” only is intellectively known in the “actuality” in ex. The demand of actuality in differential actualization, i.e. in stepping back, is the demand for “realization” as such.

It is easy to understand now that this moment of making a demand is one of the forms which, in Part One of this study, I termed force of imposition of the impression of reality. In the differential actualization of the real, sensed intellectively as real, the field of reality is imposed as making a demand. In the differential actualization the two moments of individual formality and field formality are different, but both are “reality” sensed impressively. Now the moment of field reality has, by virtue of being a sensed reality, a force of imposition of its own, viz. It makes a demand. To make a demand is a modulation of the force of imposition of the impression of reality.

3. But this is not enough, because in virtue of that demand a real thing impels us to an intellection in stepping back from itself: one intellectively knows in simple apprehension what a thing “might be” in reality. But the demanding itself is compelling us to return to the field of reality to intellectively know what a real thing is “in reality”. This intellection is the affirmative intention. These two moments (simple apprehension and affirmation) are but two moments of a unique intellection: where it dis-tends and steps back from what a real thing is in reality “among” others. The unity of both moments is what constitutes the intellection in ex. What is the structure of this unity?

The idea of this demanding has led us above all to an innumerable group of simple apprehensions. And this same demanding is what makes us return to a thing, but from what we have intellectively known in being im-
pelled, i.e., from what we have apprehended in simple apprehension as what the thing “could be”. The return to the thing not only does not leave behind the being impelled which thrust us towards the simple apprehensions; rather, it is a return to the thing from these same simple apprehensions. Therefore the intellection in this return is essentially dual. The intellection of the thing in this differential actualization is not an immediate apprehension of what the thing is in reality, but the mediated apprehension of which one or many of the simple apprehensions are those realized “in reality”. Without this duality of primordial apprehension of reality and of simple apprehension, there would not be affirmative intellection of what a thing is in reality. The unity of this duality is “realization”. It is of intellective character, and it is an intellection that makes a demand. This unity, qua dual, has two aspects. On one hand it is a “contribution” so to speak, of many simple apprehensions; but on the other hand it is a “selection” that makes a demand of the simple apprehensions, whether they are excluded or included in the intellection. The realization of these latter is determined by the real thing in what it demands; it is an intellective determination that makes a demand, which happens in selection.

In what does it consist? Here we see ourselves forced, once again, to bend the lexicon of our languages. Almost all expressions referring to intellection—if not indeed all—are taken from the verb “to see” [Latin, videre]: they express intellection as a “vision”. This is a great oversimplification; intellection is intellection in all of the sentient modes of presentation of the real, and not just the visual one. Therefore throughout this entire book I express intellection not as vision but as apprehension. But there are moments of intellection which our languages do not permit to be expressed except with “visual” verbs. There is no problem in utilizing them provided that we firmly maintain the idea that here “vision” means all intellective apprehension, i.e., intellection in the fullest sense. Granting this, we shall say that the nature of making a demand which determines which simple apprehensions are excluded, and which are realized, is the nature of making a demand of a vision; we see, in fact, which are realized and which not. But the essential point is that we tell what vision we are dealing with. It is not a primordial intellective vision, i.e. it is not a seeing [videncia], because we are dealing with a very precise vision, namely mediated vision. We see, mediate, that a real thing realizes B and not C. But neither is this the strict nature of the vision proper to affirmative intellection, because there we deal with a determinant vision. The determine vision of the affirmation of realization is not
only a mediated vision “of” a thing, but is a mediated vision “from” the real thing itself, i.e., it is a vision demanded by it. It is a vision in the ex. It is just what we call e-vidence. The quality of a vision determined by a demand [“ex-igence”] is “e-vidence”. The vision of the evident has, as its principle, a demand [exigencia]. This demand is the intrinsic and formal arkhe of “e-vident” vision. Evidence is vision based on demand, or what is the same, a visual demand, and visual demand of a dual character, i.e. of the realization of simple apprehensions. The real thing A is not just evident, it is {220} more than evident. We shall explain forthwith. What is evident is that it is B and not C. And this vision is demanded by the vision of A in the medium of reality. Therefore the determinant function of a real thing in affirmative intellection is the demand of vision, evidence. The realization intellectually known in evidence based on demand is the intellection of what a real thing is in reality. A thing has opened the gap as ambit of the idea making a demand, and has filled this gap with the vision demanded by the medium of reality itself, with evidence. The function of reality itself in differential intellection is thus intrinsically demand, evidential. And here we have what we sought: the determination of the affirmation is in itself evidence of realization. Reality itself is what makes us see; it is the medium. And this medium which makes us see has an evidential structure: it makes us see what a thing is in reality. Whence it follows that evidence is proper only to a subsequent act of sentient intellection. Only because there is sentient intellection there is dynamic duality; and only because there is dynamic duality is there evidence. An intelligence which was not sentient would not intellectually know with evidence. Evidence is the character of “some” acts of a sentient intelligence.

And it is here that the insufficiency of purely visual language is palpable. First, because as we have just seen, all modes of intellection—not just the visual—have their own demands; all modes of sentient intellection have their own proper evidences in differential intellection. Second, because the conceptualization of intellection as vision carries with it the idea that intellection has a noetic structure. Now, vision, just like every other intellection, is not formally noetic, but rather formally apprehensive: noesis is only a {221} dimension of apprehension. Apprehension as such is formally noergic; it involves the imposition force of the impression of reality. And therefore evidence, which is a vision determined by the “physical” demand of differential actualization of a real thing, is not of noetic but of noergic character. It is a mode of capturing what things are in reality. And it does so in virtue of the radical demand of its actuality. To see that seven plus five is twelve is not evidence but “vidence”, seeing, i.e., mere “making plain” or “making evident”. Only seeing that in seven plus five one has not the number 14 but 12, because the actualization of 12 is demanded by the actualization of the sum of 7 plus 5, only this vision as demanded, I repeat, makes the affirmation evident. In passing, it is from this point that, as I see it, one must begin to discuss the Kant’s celebrated thesis that the judgement “7 plus 5 is 12” is synthetic.

Evidence is then a demanding vision of the realization of simple apprehensions in a thing already apprehended primordially as real. In its mediating structure, the logos is evidential.

This idea of evidence requires some further elaboration:

a) Above all, evidence in this strict sense is exclusively a moment of judgement, of affirmation; only in judgement is there evidence. Evidence is the principal determinant of mediated intellection, of the logos. This presupposes that it is an intellection which lacks that determinant. This determination is about the simple apprehension made real in a thing already apprehended as real. And that intellection is formally judgement and only judgement. What is evident is that the thing is this or that, i.e., the evidence is evidence of realization. But it is evident, I repeat, by {222} being demanded by the real thing. If there were not this duality between simple apprehension and real thing, there would not be evidence.

A real thing in primordial apprehension is never evident; it is more than evident. In primordial apprehension the purely and simply real is or is not actualized in intellection, and nothing more. Primordial apprehension is not and does not need to be determined by anything. Primordial apprehension is the very actualization of the real. It is not determination but actualization. And actualization is always more than determination, because determination is grounded upon actualization and receives from it all of its force. It is for this reason that the logos is, as I said, a mode of actualization, the “determinate” mode. In virtue of that, to make primordial apprehension something evident is to make actualization a mode of determination, which is impossible. Primordial apprehension is thus more than evident; it is the pure and simple actualization of the real in and by itself. In primordial apprehension the vision of a thing does not “leave from” (ex) the thing, but rather “is” the thing itself “in” its actuality. Only the realization in it of a simple apprehension is evident, qua realization demanded by that real thing already actualized. Evidence, I repeat, is determination needed or demanded by a real thing. On the other hand,
in primordial apprehension a real thing is not determinant but rather purely and simply actualized. Evidence is subsequent to primordial apprehension. Evidence is determination; primordial apprehension is actualization. In evidence a real thing already apprehended determines the intellection; in primordial apprehension we have in actuality a real thing itself in its own reality. To say that primordial apprehension is evident is the same as saying that primordial apprehension is judgement. This, as I see it, (223) is absurd. So in summary, evidence is a structural moment, but only of judgement.

b) In the second place, evidence is a moment of every judgement, because every judgement has as one of its moments an evidential determinant. This could seem false, since there are, as one might observe, innumerable non-evident affirmations. For example, consider all the affirmations having to do with a faith, be it religious or secular. Now, this is true, but does not contradict what we have been saying, because—let us not forget it—the vision which evidence claims is justly claimed, i.e., it is demanded. In virtue of that, evidence is not so much a vision as a demand for vision. Strictly speaking, judgement does not have evidence but judges in evidence; evidence is evidential demand. This means that evidence is a “line of demand”, a line of determination within which the two opposites—what one sees and what one doesn’t see—both fit, together with all the intermediaries (which are only half seen). That is, judgement is an intellection which, by virtue of its own nature, is contained in a line of evidence. A non-evident judgement is a judgement “deprived” of evidence and not simply a judgement “lacking” evidence. Every judgement is necessarily evident or non-evident; in virtue of this, it is formally in the line of evidence. But in addition there are other considerations which I shall immediately explain and which help fix the nature of this presumed non-evidence.

c) But first, there is another essential aspect of evidence. Evidence is a necessary line of demand, but one which is traced within the domain of freedom. It cannot be otherwise, because intellection in movement is constitutively free. What is this freedom in evidence? It does not mean that evidence is in itself formally free. That would be absurd. (224) What I mean to say is something quite essential and which is often forgotten, namely that evidence is a line traced in the space of freedom. In fact, intellection movement goes toward something, but starting from something else. Now, this other thing is freely chosen, because in order to intellectively know what a man is in reality I can start from a living thing, from a grouping, from a form, etc. Moreover it is a free creation in the field of simple apprehensions, which are made real in a thing and are going to be affirmed with evidence. Finally, that trajectory is free which, in different orientations, is going to lead to intellection. Hence evidence is traced essentially in a domain of intellective freedom. Evidence is only possible in freedom; it is something proper to our sentient intellection. Evidence is the demand of the impression of reality stepped back from, i.e., at a distance; it is the imposition force of the impression of reality, as we have said. In virtue of this force, the evidence acquired starting from other things, according to other percepts, fictional items, or concepts, and following other routes, is an evidence qualified by a border of freedom. One might then think that evidence does not pertain to judgement even along the line of demand. If I say, “God has a disease”, this is an absolutely free affirmation, indeed, it is an arbitrary affirmation; but it does not thereby cease to be an affirmation. An arbitrary affirmation would never be along lines of demand; it is precisely for this reason that it is arbitrary. Nonetheless, let us think for a minute why this is so. In an arbitrary affirmation, if that which is affirmed (let us call it the ‘subject’) is a reality (whether by itself or by postulation), then the judgement is not arbitrary in the order of evidence, but is simply a false judgement—something quite different. We shall concern ourselves with truth later. The false judgement (225) is also along the lines of a determination which is demanded: precisely for this reason I can describe what is false. But if the subject is not real, nor is posed as real, then neither is there arbitrariness in the order of evidence, but rather in the order of the affirmation itself. Its arbitrariness consists in being just a combination of ideas (God, disease, having). But a combination of ideas is not a judgement. To judge is to affirm the realization of a simple apprehension in a real thing; it is not to forge the idea of an affirmation freely. The idea of an affirmation is not an affirmation; it is at best an “affirmation schema”. And this affirmation schema also has an evidence schema. Therefore, no judgement is outside the lines of evidence.

d) This evidential line is necessary, but it can be and is of very different types, in accordance with the nature of the real thing about which one judges. Each type of reality has its own modes of demand. It would be not only unjust but in fact false to measure all demands with a single canon of demand, for example the canon of conceptual analysis. Personal reality, moral reality, esthetic reality, historical reality, etc., not only have distinct demands, but also and more importantly, demands of a different nature. And precisely for this reason the evidence of one order cannot be confused with that of another; nor can one call ‘non-evident’ everything which does not figure in the evidence of an order canonically established. In the concrete
the essential characteristics of the determination of intellect. Granting this, we now have to ask ourselves what are the real thing and what, by means of evidence, one affirms the sense of the presence of an “intermediary” between a mediate and mediated, one gives to the mediated evidence What happens is that upon separating evidence into immediate cause strictly speaking there is no immediate evidence. But I do not think this is the case, because in this sense primary. And we are told that this latter is immediate evidence. But I do not think this is the case, because strictly speaking there is no immediate evidence. What happens is that upon separating evidence into immediate and mediated, one gives to the mediated evidence the sense of the presence of an “intermediary” between a real thing and what, by means of evidence, one affirms about it. And in this sense, not all evidence is mediated. But the fact is that two distinct concepts are confused here: the concept of the intermediary term and the concept of medium. Now, not all evidence has an “intermediary” term, but all evidence is based constitutively in a “medium”, i.e., in the medium of reality itself. Whence it follows that if indeed not all evidence is mediated in the sense of bringing into play an intermediary term, nonetheless all evidence is mediated. The confusion of these two senses of mediation is what has led to the theory of immediate evidence. In virtue of it, evidence is always and only something mediated, and therefore something “achieved”, never something given. Only real things are given, and they are given in primordial apprehension. Evidence is never given, but only “achieved” in mediated fashion based upon things apprehended primordially. Intellection achieved via mediation is, in a certain way, an “effort”, an effort of mediated intellection. Evidence is a demand of the real, a visual mediated demand of a real thing actualized by stepping back, i.e., at a distance. And therefore evidence is never a given, but something achieved. This characteristic of not being given but achieved and mediated is essential to evidence.

2. This evidence is not something quiescent, i.e., is not something which one has or does not have; rather, by virtue of being achieved, it is formally something dynamic. This does not refer to the fact that I make an effort to gain evidence, but rather to the fact that the effort is an intrinsic and formal dynamism of the evidence itself; evidence is a mediated vision in dynamism. Of what dynamism do we speak? Not of a dynamism which consists in a type of movement from the “predicate” to the “subject” and back again, because even leaving aside the fact that not every judgement is of subject-predicate form (for the present purpose, as every judgement involves a duality, there is no reason not to simplify the discussion by speaking of subject and predicate), that presumed movement is expressed in the verb “is”, and therefore would be always—and only—a movement in the plane of being; it would be a dialectic of being. But evidence is dynamic in a much deeper and more radical sense, namely the very demand of the real which determines the dynamism of being. We shall see this upon treating Reality and Being. That demand is formally a dynamism consisting in demand. The dialectic of being moves in the plane in which things and simple apprehensions “are”. But the dynamism of demand moves in a third dimension orthogonal to the previous plane; it is the dynamism of reality which “demands”, and not the dynamism of the reality which “is”. Therefore every dialectic, every dynamism of being takes place on the surface of the real. Evidence, on
the other hand, takes place in the volume and body of the real. The danger is always in taking the surface of the real for the real itself. There is never evidence of being—we shall see this in a few pages—rather, there is always and only demanding evidence of the real. All logical and ontological dynamism is possible only as something grounded in the demanding dynamism of evidence. This dynamism is a “selective” dynamism, because among the many simple apprehensions, the demand discerns through its own dynamism that or those which are realized in a real thing. To be sure, this does not mean that the simple apprehensions which we have are in any sense the most adequate. This demanding dynamism is but the dynamism that makes a simple apprehension real in the actuality of a real thing. It is a dynamism of the real in actuality. Intellection in differential actualization is, then, in itself formally dynamic; it is the dynamism of intellective realization. Therefore this dynamism of actuality is energetic, because it concerns the actuality of a thing, actuality which is a physical moment of it. And this dynamism, as I said and as we shall see again in another paragraph, is prior to the dynamism of being and is the foundation of it.

3. The classical conceptualization of evidence is based upon what is seen in evidence. But evidence is not in-vidence (seeing), nor in-vidence, but e-vidence. Therefore the quality of what is seen, of what is intellectively known, is rather what I would call constituted evidence. It is grounded in the dynamic and demanding moment of radical evidence, which, therefore, is a characteristic that is not constituted but constituting. And it is so precisely because it is a sentient dynamism.

Constituted evidence is always—and only—a result. Therefore it comes too late. What is first is the constituting and demanding dynamism: evidence is formally evi-den-tiation or making evident. This constituting character is never arbitrary; it is intrinsically necessitating, because the constitution does not concern the order of reality in and by itself, i.e. the order of “actuality”, but the order of intellective “actuality”. Let us not confuse necessary being and necessitating being. Necessary is a mode of actuality which is opposed to the contingent. It is necessary that fire burns; it is not necessary that this book be on this table. The difference has to do with the reality of the fire and the book. But necessitating is a mode of actuality. Evidence has a necessitating character; it is the necessity that given a real thing in determinate dual actuality, it is necessary to affirm it as such with evidence. Qua evidence, there is no difference whatsoever between assertoric and apodictic evidence. The difference is not found in the evidence but in the reality of a thing.

Evidence is always necessitating. However much it may be a matter of fact that this book is found upon this table, it is absolutely necessary to intellectively know that it is on this table, just as necessary as intellectively knowing that two plus two are four. The demand with which the intellection of two plus two constitutes the intellection of the realization of four is not a demand which is formally different from the demand with which this book which is on the table demands that it be so affirmed. This is the necessitating. All evidential demand is constituting; and while the constitution itself is not always necessary, it is always necessitating. This does not refer to the necessity with which a predicate is linked to a subject, or the necessity with which a subject is tied to a predicate; rather, it concerns the necessity with which a real concrete thing (necessary or contingent) actualized mediately in my intellection, determines my affirmations about it.

4. Thus we have the formal character of evident intellection. As a result of a “demand”, intellection in differential actualization has, as its own characteristic, to be “exact”; this is exactitude or correctness. Exactitude is the quality of being demanded. It is what does not have the primordial apprehension of reality. If I may be permitted a Latin mode of expression, I should say that the primordial apprehension of reality is not “ex-acta”; only differential intellection is “ex-acta”. In the incompact emptiness of its exigencies, a real thing determines the exactitude [correctness] of its intellection. This intellection is therefore strictly speaking an “exaction”. As it is a dynamic demand, exacton involves a moment of rigor. Whence the demand itself is similar in this respect to one of the meanings which exigere has in Latin, viz. to weigh with exactitude. Now, this is what is proper to evidence: the exactitude of the weight of intellection. Therefore evidence is contained within the strict bounds of what is demanded. And this being contained within the boundaries of demand is exactitude. To this being contained we give the name “strict”, and it is what I shall call constriction. All evidence is exact [correct], i.e., is determined by a constrictive demand.

Exactitude [correctness] thus understood is not modelled upon any special type of intellection which might serve as a canon for the rest. For example, what is exact or correct in mathematics does not acquire its power from the fact that it is mathematical, but from the fact that the evidence is always exact or correct, i.e., from being a knowledge in which what is known is strictly determined by what is demanded or “exacted”. This exactitude or correctness does not mean “logical rigor”, even in mathematics; rather it means “a construction which
demands”. The logical is simply a procedure for con- straining the demand, and not the other way around—as if to be exact or correct were to be logical. Therefore all knowledge, whether mathematical or not, has its own ex- actitude or correctness. History itself has its type of ex- actitude. Moreover, it is not just science which is correct, but all differential intellection, however elementai it ma- y be. And it is precisely on account of this that science can be and is correct: it is so by being differential intellection. Naturally, correctness, just like evidence itself, is only a line, the line of correctness. The intellection of the reality “between” is formally and constitutively in the line of cor- rectness.

Let us summarize. Evidence is an intellection which demands. And as such it is not given to us, but is achieved mediately in a dynamism which is necessitating, evidencing, and constituting that sentient intellection, which has as its own formal character as correctness and demanding constriction. Evidence, then, is something achieved, something dynamic, constituting, and accurate.

Whence those conceptions of evidence which are ac- cepted uncritically in modern philosophy are radically false. Let us examine them.

§ 3

FALSE IDEAS ABOUT EVIDENCE

These ideas have been propounded since the time of Descartes and reach their highest degree of development in Husserl.

1) For Descartes, evidence is clarity: clara ac dis- tincta perceptio. But this, as I see it, is radically inade- quate for two reasons.

a) It is undeniable that in evidence there is clear and distinct vision. But this does not exhaust the question, because the fact that in evidence there is clear and distinct vision is not the same thing as evidence consisting in clear and distinction vision. Indeed, that which is clear to me in evidence is that I see with clarity the fact that the thing has to be seen thus as necessitated. My clarity is intrinsically determined by the demand of what I am seeing. It is a clarity which does not rest upon itself, but upon a real demand; otherwise it would be vision or non-vision but not evidence. In intellecutive movement only that vision is clear in which clarity is constituted by the constrictive demand of the thing. Evidence is not clara ac distincta perceptio, but rather, if I may be permitted the expression, exigentia clarificans; it is reality already apprehended as real, which is unfolded by demand in clarity.

b) But in addition, by being a demand, evidence is not just a moment of vision but something noergic, just as percep- tio itself is apprehension and not simply conscious- ness. This does not refer to consciousness of mere “being thus”, [234] but to an apprehension of the “to be here- and-now being” [estar siendo]. As we know, since classical times, to be here-and-now or actually, stare, has expressed the copula, but in a strong sense, a sense which grew in the Romance languages, especially in Spanish. And its “strong” sense consists, as I see it, in thematically connoting the physical character of that in which it is and of which it is. It is true that ser as opposed to estar tends to connote the profound and permanent dimension of something, in contrast to more or less transient determi- nations, as when we say that so-and-so “is” [es] a sick person versus saying the so-and-so “is currently” [está] sick. However, this does not contradict what I just said, because estar as a designation of a more or less transitory “state” [estado] connotes this state precisely because every state, in its very transitoriness, makes its character of physical actuality more prominent. And the result of this is that the distinction between ser and estar is not primar- ily that between the permanent and the transitory, but the difference between ser and estar without allusion to physical characteristics, and estar as physical reality. We shall see this later at the appropriate time. For now, with respect to “to be here-and-now being” [estar siendo], the force of evidence is found in the noergic demand of this being.

Descartes himself offers us a good proof of this when he talks about what, for him, is the evidence of all evidence, to wit, the evidence of the cogito, of thinking or cogitation. It is for him an incontrovertible and indubita- ble evidence. But in this evidence of the cogito, such as Descartes describes it to us, there is not just clarity but a demand which is anterior to all clarity, the demand of being here-and-now [estar]. What is clear is that what I am doing is “thinking”, and furthermore that “I am here- and-now [estar]” thinking. Descartes’ expression there- fore should not be translated “I think, therefore I am”, but rather [235] “I am here-and-now [estar] thinking, there- fore I am”. This expression is an incontrovertible judge- ment, but is so by the noegric force of the estar. This and not its conscious clarity is what makes the cogito a per- ceptio evidens, and what confers upon it its exceptional rank. The force of the cogito does not come to it from “thinking” but from the “I am here-and-now [estar]”. But Descartes, immediately thereafter, goes astray on the matter of this demand moment and once again tells us
that the evidence of the cogito is clarity—as if what the cogito gave us were supreme clarity. That is false. The supreme evidence from the cogito is based upon an immediate apprehension of thinking as a being here-and-now, i.e., that supreme evidence is grounded in reality. In the evidence of all evidence there is, then, the nature of the demand of the real as the foundation of clarity. Evidence is here eminently noergic; only because “I am here-and-now” [estoy] apprehending myself as thinking in a primordial apprehension of reality, only for this reason do I see myself constrained by this apprehension to pronounce the most evident of the judgements of Descartes, the cogito.

By straying on the problem with respect to clarity, i.e., by asking if clarity leads to reality, Descartes has sidestepped the noergic moment and with it has opened an unfathomable abyss between evidence and reality for all evidence other than that of the cogito. Indeed, the abyss is so unfathomable that in order to bridge it Descartes must appeal to nothing less than Divine veracity. But in fact there is no such abyss, because evidence is always noergic, and therefore formally involves the moment of reality. To be sure, there are errors and illusions, and what is worse, evidence which is taken as evidence of something which is not true. But this is owing to the fact that clarity does not lead to reality in any case, not even in that of the cogito itself, rather, it is reality which [236] in a demanding way determines clarity. Therefore the presumed abyss is not opened between reality itself and the evidence, but between reality apprehended primordially as real in an immediate intellection and what this reality is in reality: “something apprehended in a mediated intellection”. This is a difference not between intellection and reality, but between two intellections, i.e., between two intellective actualizations of the real, already within reality. Of these two actualizations, the second is demanded by the first. This is the essence and problematic of all evidence, including that of the cogito. From Descartes’ time until Kant, philosophy took a stand on the problem of the cogito, but followed different paths than that which I just proposed. As I see it, we are dealing with the fact that the cogito as a judgement is the mediated intellection of the reality of my being here-and-now thinking, a reality apprehended in the primordial apprehension of my being here-and-now myself. In all other evidence there is also a duality between a primordial apprehension of reality and its mediated intellection; because of this all evidence is in itself problematic. But this problem does not consist in whether evidence does or does not lead to reality, but in whether the real part of reality does or does not lead to the evidence, whether things are or not thus “in reality”.

Therefore the evidence is always noergic, and is a demand imposed by the real, by the force of imposition of the impression of reality. Whence the Cartesian idea of evidence is false from its very roots.

2) A second conception seems to bring us closer to the essence of evidence. Everything evident has a moment which we might call that of plenitude or fullness, by which what we intellecively know of the thing is seen in full measure in the thing. One might then think that the essence of evidence [237] consists in this fullness. That is the conception which culminates in Husserl. For Husserl, my intentional acts have a meaning which can be either merely mentioned, so to speak, in a way actually empty of the vision of a thing, or else they can be made present in it. In this last case we have an intention which is not empty but full. Fullness is for Husserl the “fulfillment” (Erfüllung) of an empty intention by a full vision. When this happens, Husserl will tell us that the intention is evident. Every intentional act, for Husserl, has its own proper evidence, and the essence of this evidence is “fulfillment”. But despite the fact that this idea has been accepted without further discussion, it seems to be untenable for the same reason that the concept of evidence à la Descartes is untenable. Evidence is not fulfillment; that would be seeing but not evidence. What Husserl calls ‘vision’ in the full sense is a noergic vision already constituted. But its demand moment is constitutive of fulfillment. Husserl situates himself in evidence already constituted; but evidence has a more radical moment, the constituting moment. Its dynamic constitutionality is just the unfolding of a demand: this is making evident or evidentiation. Because of this, evidence is not a question of fulfillment. We are not dealing with the question of how a simple empty apprehension is made evident by fulfillment, but rather how an intellection of the real becomes evident by demand, i.e., how a real thing demands the realization of a simple apprehension. We are not dealing with a vision which is only noetic. Evidence is always and only evidence of realization. Therefore when Husserl tells us that the principle of all principles is the reduction of every intentional noesis to originary intuition, i.e., to the fulfillment of the intentional by the intuited, he is making a totally false statement as I see it. Just as with Descartes, [238] Husserl has taken the road from clarity to a thing, when what should be taken is the road from the thing towards its clarity. The principle of all principles is not intuitive fulfillment, but something more radical: the real demand of fulfillment. Neither clarity, nor fullness, nor the essence of evidence. In evidence there is a full clarity, but it is like the expansion in the present of a demand of reality. What is specific about evidence
isn’t “full clarity”, but the “force of vision”; evidence is a “forceful vision”, i.e. a vision which is demanded. Constituted evidence is always and only the result of the constituted nature of evidence.

Husserl always moves on a conscious plane. Therefore all of his philosophy has a single theme: “consciousness and being”, and a single problem: absolute knowledge in a “vision”. But consciousness and being are grounded in intellection and reality. Intellection and reality are the radical and basic facts. Their intrinsic unity is not the intentional correlation expressed in the preposition “of”. We are not dealing with consciousness “of” being, nor with an act of intellection “of” reality, but with the mere “actualization” of reality “in” intellection, and of the actualization of intellection “in” reality. The intrinsic unity is “actualization”. Actualization is in fact actuality numerically identical with intelligence and reality. And only in differential actualization does this actualization acquire the character of a demand of reality, of evidence.

To be sure, this puts us on the borders of a very serious question, the problem of “apprehension and evidence”. Although what I think about this is implied in what has already been said, it is still appropriate to address the question directly.

[239]

§ 4

EVIDENCE AND PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION

If not always, then almost always classical philosophy has contraposited apprehension and evidence. This contraposition is usually designated with the terms intuitionism and rationalism, meaning that one is dealing with an opposition between two forms of knowledge of the real: intuition and concept.

Of this opposition I should say at the outset that its two terms are not correctly defined, nor for that matter even correctly expressed.

Let us begin with the second point. One speaks of a concept as a knowledge of things. And given that conceptualizing them is in this philosophy an act of “reason”, this form of knowledge has been called “rationalism”. Let us leave aside the reference to reason; it is a subject of which I will treat in Part III of this work. What is important to me here, whether or not it is an act of reason, is knowing if that act consists in a “concept”. Now, this whole idea is completely false for two reasons. First, the concept is not the only thing which is opposed to what is called “intuition” in this philosophy. There are also perceptions and fictional works which are modes of simple apprehension. Therefore the first incorrect thing about classical rationalism is that it speaks of concepts when it should speak of simple apprehensions. But while this error is serious, it is not the most serious one. That, rather, lies in the fact that rationalism refers to conceptual knowledge, (240) which at the same time is of the real. And here, in my view, is the second and most serious error of this presumed rationalism, because concepts do not intellec-tively know a real thing by conceiving it, but by affirming it according to a concept. The formal act of knowing (what is usually termed here “reason”) is not then either a concept or conceptualizing, but rather affirming and affirmation. Now, the radical character of affirmation is evidence. Therefore it is necessary to say that the formally specific part of rationalism is not in the “concept” but in the “evidence”; a thing is what is designated by the concept because of the evidence.

To this evidence, intuitionism is set opposite to knowledge of the real by “intuition”. Intuition can mean the instantaneous intellection of something just as if it were present before the eyes. But this is a derived meaning. The primary meaning is precisely this “being present before the eyes”. It is a direct and immediate mode, besides being instantaneous, i.e., unitary. The immediate, direct, and unitary presence of something to the intellection—this is intuition. The opposite of intuition would be a concept and discourse. Intuition is supposed to be determined not by its object but by the mode of intellection. As what is conceived is abstract and universal, one often says that the object of intuition is always something singular, a singulum; thus spoke Ockham and Kant. Only a singulum, it is thought, can be immediately, directly, and unitarily present. But for Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl there is intuition of what is not singular (the Idea, the categorical, etc.). We have no reason to explore this problem, but its existence shows us clearly that intuition has to be conceptualized not by its object but by the mode of presence of its object. And this is especially true since while it may be the case that only the singular is intuitable, this [241] does not mean that everything singular is necessarily intuitable. Intuition is a mode of presence of the object. Intuition is the immediate, direct, and unitary presence of something real to intellection.

But our problem lies in calling this intuition. That is wrong for two reasons. In the first place, this knowledge is not formally an act of “vision” except in a loose way, which is what the verb to intuit, and its Latin original,
**intueor**, means. But all the modes of sentient intellection, and not just the visual, directly, immediately, and unitarily apprehend the real. Therefore if one wishes to continue using the word ‘intuition’, it will be necessary to say that intuition is not just visual intuition, but that every intuition, be it tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc., is a direct, immediate, and unitary presence of the real to the intellection. If there is agreement on this point, there will be no inconvenience in continuing to speak of intuition as if it were vision.

The major and more serious problem is something else, viz. the second error of so-called ‘intuitionism’. And the fact is that even with amplification of the expression which we just pointed out, intuition always but expresses a “mode of seeing” a real thing; it is then something which is formally noetic. That is, intuition would be a direct, immediate, and unitary mode of recognizing what things are, i.e., a mode of consciousness. Now, the formal part of what has been called ‘intuition’ is not this recognizing, but the fact that a thing is present to the intellection; it is not the “presence” of the thing but is “being here-and-now” present. Therefore the act is not an act of recognizing what it is, but an act of apprehending the real. It is what, throughout the course of this work, I have been calling primordial apprehension of reality. Primordial apprehension is apprehension of the real in and by itself, i.e., immediate apprehension, direct and unitary. It is to the act of apprehension that, formally and primarily, these three characteristics are applied. And only for this reason, in a derivative way, can it be applied to the noetic moment. Intuition is but the noetic dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. The primordial apprehension of reality is then in itself much more than intuition; it is a noetic apprehension. It is not a seeing but an apprehending in the impression of reality.

In summary, the opposition between rationalism and intuitionism does not lie in an opposition of concept and intellection, but in being an opposition between evidence and primordial apprehension of reality.

But there is more. Because in this opposition, what is actually opposed, indeed, what is divided between intuition and concept? We are told that we are dealing with two forms of knowledge. But this is unacceptable, because knowing [conocer] is but a very special mode of intellectively knowing [inteligir]. Not every intellection is knowledge. We shall see that elsewhere in this work. Therefore we are not dealing with a contraposition between two forms of “knowledge” but with a difference between two forms of “intellection”: primordial apprehension and affirmation. This is not just a change of words, but a change which concerns the formal nature of what is designated by the words. And thus the question touches upon something essential.

In order to see this, let us accept for the moment the usual words. And then let us ask ourselves above all in what, formally and precisely, does the opposition between intuition and concept consist? For beneath this duality lies a unity which is the line along which the contraposition itself is grounded. What is this unity? Here we have the two points which must be considered. [243] I shall do it very briefly, given that the ideas which come into play in this problem have already been explained at length.

1. **The difference between intuition and reason: rationalism and intuitionism.** This difference is presented to us as a “contraposition” or “opposition”. In what does it consist?

For rationalism, the supreme knowledge is the rational. I have already indicated that here I am not going to delve into problem of what should be understood by ‘reason’; I am employing the word so as to conform to the standard language of discussion of these matters. What is designated here by ‘reason’ is conceptual evidence (the reduction of the rational to the conceptual is also conceded without discussion). Rationalism understands that intellective knowing [inteligir] is knowing [conocer], and that the knowledge [conocimiento] has to be rigorous, i.e., grounded upon strict evidence. From this point of view, what is called ‘intuition’ is not in the fullest sense either intellection or knowledge; because intuition would be confused intellection, confused knowledge [conocimiento]. It is on account of this that intuition would not be knowledge; it would be a problem, viz. that of converting into rational evidence what we intuit turbulently and confusedly. Intuition is rich, to be sure, but not in knowledge; rather, in problems. Therefore it would be reason, and only reason, which must resolve the problems posed by intuition. The apparent richness of intuition would therefore be an internal poverty. This is the idea culminating in Leibniz and Hegel. But is that the case? It is possible (we shall not now delve into the question) that what is intuited is what leads intrinsically and formally to evident intellection. But apart from this it is necessary to affirm that there are intuitive qualities and subtleties which intellection can never exhaust by dint of evidence. The richness of intuition always escapes strict rational evidence. Moreover, even when this evidence [244] seems to be totally given over to what is intuited and indeed absorbed into it, yet strictly speaking the irreducible individuality of the intuited is a limit inaccessible to any evidence. The intellection of the intuited real will never be exhausted in evidence. Evidence can be as exhaustive as one desires, but it will always be but evidence: a vision.
of what reality demands; but it will never be the original vision of reality. This is an unbridgeable difference. Intuition has an inexhaustible richness. In this dimension, intuition is not confused knowledge but primordial intellection of the real. Intuition can only be called confused if one takes rational evidence as the canon of intellection. But this is the very thing in dispute. A mathematical circle, we are told, is “perfect”. Real circles, on the other hand, are “imperfect”. But imperfect with respect to what? Naturally, with respect to the mathematical circle. But with respect to reality the situation is inverted. With respect to the real, what is imperfect is the geometric circle. Only the concept of the configuration of the real would be perfect (if we could achieve it), a concept which may only approximate the geometric one; but that is totally irrelevant to the problem. This is the richness of the intuited. To think that despite evident conceptual determinations we could manage to apprehend totally the intuited real via infinite predicates—this is the great illusion of all rationalism, especially that of Leibniz.

This is the point on which intuitionism has chosen to stand and fight. The intuited real is individual and inexhaustible in all its aspects. All rational evidence moves in approximations to intuition. Intuition is not confused intellection; rather, evident intellection is but clipped or reduced intuition. Only from intuition does rational evidence receive its value. [245] Let us consider the intuition of a color. Reason must conceptualize it making use of a system of colors previously conceived. None of these is the intuited color. But then, we are told, reason combines the colors it conceives, and by dint of these combinations it is believed that the cited color is apprehended. Impossible. Rational evidence is only impoverished intuition. I do not need to insist further on these well-known differences; it suffices to recall the example of Bergson. But is intuition purely and simply richer than evidence? I do not think so, because what is essential to evidence is not the tracing of boundaries, that tracing which has been called ‘precision’. Rigor is not precision; rather, precision is ultimately a form of rigor. The rigor proper to evidence is not precision but accuracy, viz. intellection constrictively demanded by the real. Evidence would be and is poorer than the content of the intuited. But it is immeasurably superior in accuracy. The richest intuition will never constitute even the minimal accuracy required by the intellection of one thing “among” others. Therefore intellection should be rich but also true. Rational evidence is not a reduced or clipped intuition nor an impoverished one, but an expanded intuition, which is not the same.

This discussion also reveals to us something which, to my way of thinking, is the essential point but which has not yet been introduced. And that is that if one considers the matter at all, one sees that the discussion we have had concerns the richness or poverty both of rational intellection and of intuition according to its content. Now, is the exact line along which the distinction between intuition and evidence is drawn? Not at all. Intuition and rationality, prior to being two fonts of intelligible known content, are two modes of intellection, i.e. two modes of apprehension of the real, [246] and therefore two modes of actualization of the real. The difference between the contents apprehended by these two modes is totally irrelevant to the problem at hand. The discussion, then, must fall back not on the richness or poverty of the content but on the formality of reality, i.e. on the modes of intellection, on the modes of actualization of the real. Is there an opposition of modes? If so, what is its nature?

The presumed opposition falls back formally on the two modes of intellection: intellection that something is “real”; and intellection of what this something is “in reality”. Now, these two modes of intellection are therefore two modes of actualization. One is the intellection of the real in and by itself; this is primordial apprehension. The other is the apprehension of a real thing “among” others: this is differential apprehension, i.e. apprehension as differentiated (essentially mediated). When the question is posed in these terms one sees above all that primordial apprehension is the supreme form of intellectively knowing, because it is the supreme form of actualization of the real in intellection. What happens is that this apprehension is inadequate with respect to the differentiation; it does not make us intellectually know what a real thing is in reality, what it is among others, i.e. with respect to others. Differential apprehension gives us this intellection, but only insofar as it is inscribed within primordial apprehension. And this inscription does not concern the content but the formality of reality, something which is given to us in primordial apprehension and only there. Now, this inscription is demanded by the primordial apprehension itself. The richest intuition in the world will never give to us men everything that the intuited is in reality. For that differential apprehension is necessary, because differential apprehension is not only grounded in upon primordial apprehension, [247] but also formally demanded by it. A real thing, intellectively known, is not just a system of notes but also a system of demands. And the formal terminus of evidence is discrimination of demands, not distinction of notes. Every thing and every aspect of it has its own demands articulated in the most precise way. As a discriminant of demands, evidence remains within the strict limits of what is demanded. And it
is in this constriction that accuracy consists: it is the rigor demanded by reality.

Here one sees that this undeniable difference between primordial apprehension and evidence is not some opposition or contraposition. It is something different, viz. a gap. And this gap will never disappear. The clearest intellection on earth will never succeed in eradicating the gap. A “filled in” gap is still a “gap”, albeit filled in.

In summary, there is no opposition between intuition and evidence, but only a gap of actualization demanded by the primordial apprehension which is constitutive of evidence. As we are dealing with two modes of actualization of a single real thing, it is clear that the difference between those two modes is inscribed within a unity, the unity of actualization, i.e. the unity of intellection. In virtue of this, man does not just have intuition “and” rational intellection, but this “and” is the harbinger of a more radical problem, that of the unity between intuition and reason in sentient logos.

2. The unity of intuition and reason. What is the unity between intuition and reason?

A) Following along the lines of intuitionism and rationalism, one might think that intuition and reason are two “fonts of knowledge”. In virtue of that their unity would constitute a single knowledge. This is the philosophy of Kant. The unity of intuition and concept would be the “unity of knowledge”. (248) Neither of the two fonts by itself, in fact, constitutes a knowledge. Now, knowledge is knowledge of an object. In virtue of that, “unity of knowledge” would be “unity of object”. Therefore intuition and concept would be the two fonts of a single knowledge by being two fonts of the representation of a single object. What is this fountainhead? Intuition gives us a multitude of qualities of an object, ordered in a spatio-temporal picture. But all these qualities are qualities “of” the object; they are not “the” object itself. To reach the object, we must go back to the concept. The concept is a reference to the object. But it is no more than a reference; and this means that when the two fonts are taken separately, i.e. intuition and concept, neither of the two offers us the representation of an object. Recall Kant’s famous phrase: intuition without concept is “blind”; concept without intuition is “empty”. Blindness of intuition in unity with the emptiness of concept: this is what, for Kant, constitutes the unity of the object and therefore of knowledge. The object is that to which the concept refers; but not just any object, only the object determined by the qualities given by intuition. The object is therefore the unity of intuition and concept. The concept would be “empty”, but in its emptiness it illumines intuition, which by itself would be “blind”; intuition fills the referential concept which by itself is empty. The unity of intuition and concept is thus “synthetic unity” in the object of knowledge.

But is this true? I do not think so, for what blindness and emptiness are we talking about? Naturally, the blindness and emptiness of the “object”. On this point Kant has done nothing but repeat Aristotle, whose idea has always seemed to be rather debatable because a thing is not the “object” of qualities but (249) of their “structural system”. Kant believes that the object is something in some way distinct from its qualities. And for Kant, only insofar as intuition does not give an object to the qualities can it be called “blind”; only because the concept does not contain the determinate object but just an indeterminate reference to it, can it be called “empty”. Now, this orientation of the problem toward the object is not, as I see it, what is primary and essential to either intuition or concept. It is possible that intuition may not formally contain objects (I have just indicated what is debatable in this assertion). But intuition always has a radical vision, the vision not only of the quality, but above all of the formality of reality. Like all previous philosophy, Kant assumed without question the idea of sensible impression as a mere subjective affection; but he does not have the moment of impression of reality. The Critique should not have been first and foremost a critique of knowledge, but a critique of impression itself. Intuition, although not a vision of the “object”, is vision of the “reality”. On the other hand, ‘concept’ is not a reference to an object, absent from the concept itself, but simple apprehension of what reality “might be”; the “might be” is not absence of reality, but a mode of its realization. Whence it follows that neither is intuition primarily blind, nor the concept primarily empty, because the formal terminus of these two presumed “fonts” is not an “object” but “reality”. Now, reality is the formal terminus of intellection; therefore every human intuition is intellective, and every human intellection is sentient. The unity of intuition and concept is not unity of object and quality, but the unity of formality, the unity of reality. And therefore its apprehension does not primarily constitute a knowledge but an intellection, viz. sentient intellection. (250) Here we have the essential point: not knowledge of an object but sentient intellection of a reality. And here is where the difference and the radical unity of intuition and concept is found. Kant’s very point of departure is already untenable.

B) The unity in question is not, then, unity of objective knowledge but a unity which is rigorously structural.

a) By virtue of being structural, it is above all a unity which is not noetic but noergic, i.e., a unity of apprehen-
sion. There are neither two apprehensions nor two fonts of knowledge, nor for that matter two principles of knowledge; there are only two moments (content and formality) of a single apprehension, of a single sentient intellection.

b) This unity unfolds in two intellections only when what is intellectively known is a real thing “among” others. Then intuition is just primordial apprehension of reality, and concept is also a mode of intellection, the mediated intellection of reality. They are but two modes of actualization of the same reality.

c) There is a unity between these two modes, not the “unity of synthesis” but the “unity of unfolding”. This unfolding is what comprises the ex in evidence. In virtue of that, there is an unquestionable supremacy of intuition over evidence, not because of its qualitative content but by virtue of the primary mode of apprehending reality. All evidence, however rich and rigorous it may be, is always intuition unfolded in the ex. Let me repeat once again that I am not referring to the content of what is apprehended but to the primary mode of apprehending reality. In contrast to what Kant maintains, it is not the concept which illuminates intuition, but intuition which illuminates the concept. And in turn, the concept is not a mere reference to the object, but to the reality apprehended in intuition, retrieved and unfolded in the form of “might be”.

d) All knowledge is an elaboration of this primary sentient intellection. We shall see this in another chapter.

In summary, intuition and concept refer back to primordial apprehension and to evidence. Their difference does not lie in their being two fonts of knowledge, but in being two modes of actualization of the real in a single act of noergic apprehension. In this apprehension, evidence and therefore the concept is not found in a synthetic unity with intuition—as Kant thought—but in unity of unfolding. The intellection of the real in this unfolding is affirmation. It is found determined by the evidence as a moment that demands. The concept is accurate intuition, and intuition is demand of a concept, i.e., of its unfolding.

Thus we have examined the two questions which we posed to ourselves about what it is to intellectively know a real thing at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. To do so is to affirm, to judge. And we asked ourselves about the structure of affirmation, i.e., what it is to affirm, and what are the forms and modes of affirmation. As affirmation is not, in any obvious way, univocally determined, we had to ask after studying its structure what it is in a real thing which determines the intellective intention of affirmation. This determination is evidential demand. With that we have finished our examination of what it means to intellectively know a thing at a distance, by stepping back. This intellective knowing of a thing by stepping back is the second phase of a “single” intellective moment. It is a movement in whose first phase one steps back from what the thing is in reality; being impelled thus acquires the character of stepping back. But in this stepping back, at this distance, the real thing holds us fast and then the intentum acquires the character of affirmative intention. In both of its phases alike, this intellection is an intellective movement in the middle of reality itself in which we intellectively know what a thing is in reality with respect to other things. It is a mode of intellection determined in the intelligence by a differential actualization in which the real thing is actualized “among” others. But prior to this, the real is already actualized in the intelligence unitarily, i.e., the real has been actualized in it in and by itself.

Now, mediated intellection of what a thing is in reality is an intellection determined by evidence, which confers upon affirmative intellection, upon the logos, its own character, viz. truth. Here the problem springs upon us: affirmation and truth. This is the theme of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII
SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH

When a thing is apprehended as real and intellectually known affirmatively as what it is in reality, when this intellection intellectually knows "really" what the thing is in reality, such as we affirm, then we say that the intellection is true. What is meant by ‘truth’? In order to focus correctly on the question, it will be useful to review in summary form what was said about this subject in Part I of the book.

At first glance truth seems to be a quality belonging exclusively to affirmation. But truth is a quality of all intellection and not every intellection is affirmation. Prior to affirmation there is primordial apprehension of reality, which also has its truth. Let us ask ourselves, then, what is truth as such, as a quality of intellection.

Truth involves a host of problems, because a real thing is actualized in intellection in at least two different ways, as we have seen: in primordial apprehension and in dual apprehension. Hence the different possible types of truth. The set of these questions is the problem of “truth and reality”. But as affirmation \{254\} has always been understood in a predicative form, it has been thought that truth would therefore only be a quality of predication; and that what constitutes truth is the “is” of the predication “A is B”. Now, since truth concerns intellection as such, and there are intelllections of reality which are not intellections of the “is”, it follows that reality and being are not identical. This is a third serious problem. So here we have formulated the three questions which we must examine:

§1. What is truth.
§2. Truth and reality
§3. Reality and being.

Let us now take up these problems from the standpoint of affirmation.

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\{256\}
sible only by virtue of truth. Error, in fact, is not a mere “lack” of truth but “privation” of truth. Intellection cannot possess error just the same as truth; rather, because it always involves a moment of reality, intellection is always radically truthful even though in some dimensions it can see itself deprived of this truth. How is that possible? This is the problem of truth and reality, with which we shall now occupy ourselves.

§2

TRUTH AND REALITY

The real is intellectively actualized in different ways, in virtue of which there are different modes of truth. There is above all a simple actualization. Its truth is also simple. But the real can be actualized in field “among” other realities. It is an intellection which I have called ‘dual’. Its truth is also dual. They are two types of truth which are very different—something which I already hinted at in Part One. Now I shall repeat that discussion in summary fashion for the reader’s benefit.

We shall examine the following:

1. Simple or real truth.
2. Dual truth.
3. The unity of truth.

1

Simple or real truth

The radical mode of presentation of the real in intellection is primordial apprehension of reality. In it the real is just actualized in and by itself. Its formality of reality has two moments, individual and field, but pro indiviso, i.e., in a form which I have called ‘compact’, which means that a thing is real and the reality in it is “thus”. This actualization is truth; it is the primary mode of truth. It is primary because this truth makes no reference to anything outside of what is apprehended. Therefore what this truth “adds” to reality is but its mere actuality; this is what I have termed ratification. As what is ratified is the real itself, it follows that its truth should be called real truth. It is real because in this ratification we have the real itself. It is truth because this ratification is actualizing. In virtue of it this real truth is simple. It is not simple in the sense of not being comprised of many notes; on the contrary, real truth, for example the primordial apprehension of a landscape, possesses a great multitude of notes. Real truth is simple because in this actualization these many notes constitute a single reality, and the intellection does not go outside of them; it does not, for example, go from the real to its concept.

Here one sees that every primordial apprehension of the real is always true, is real truth. Error is not possible in what is apprehended primordially as such. What is thus apprehended is always real even though it may not be so otherwise than in the apprehension itself; but there it is in fact real. Hence it is false to say that what is thus apprehended is a representation of mine. It is not a representation but primarily and primordially a presentation. And this presentation does not formally consist in being presentness but in its being here-and-now present; it is an actuality of the real. Primordial apprehension is therefore an actual presentation of reality. It is of reality, i.e., of what the apprehended is in itself, de suyo. This “being here-and-now” in presence is just actuality, the actuality of pure being here-and-now in presence. This actuality is ratification.

In summary, the primary mode of actualization of the real is to actualize it in and by itself. And this actualization is its real truth. This reality of what is really true is open in the field sense, and thus can be actualized in two intellections: the actuality of the real in and by itself, and the actuality in the field of this real thing “among” other realities. This second actualization of the real is thus real, but its truth is not yet real truth but what I term ‘dual truth’. It is the truth proper to the logos, to affirmation. After this summary of what real truth is, we must delve into the analysis of dual truth.

2

Dual Truth

The intellection of a real thing “among” others is, as we have seen and analyzed at length, an intellection at a distance, by stepping back. Each real thing in fact is intellectively known in the field of reality as a function of others. Through its field moment, each real thing is included in the field by its own reality, and then the field takes on a functional character and encompasses the rest of the things. Therefore each of them is, with respect to the field, at a distance from the others. Hence, as we have said, to intellectively know a thing among others is to intellectively know it as a function of those others and
therefore to intellectively know it at a distance, by stepping back.

But let us not confuse the field aspect of each real thing and the field of reality which it determines. Each real thing refers to others; this is the field aspect of each thing, its own field moment. The field itself is the ambit constituted by this referring; it is the field of referral. The field is thus [260] determined by the real thing. Each real thing refers to another, and in this field of referral what a referring thing is as a function of others is intellectively known. Only then has one intellectively known the concrete nature of the field aspect of each thing, i.e., the concrete nature of the unity of the field aspect and the individual aspect in the reality of each thing. This unity is what the thing is “in reality”.

The intellection of each thing thus takes place in the field as a medium in which each one of the things is intellectively known as a function of the rest. This intellection at a distance, by stepping back, is thus a mediated intellection; in the field of reality it is the medium of intellection. This mediated intellection is just affirmation. Affirmation formally refers back to the unity of the field and the individual, a unity intellectively known in the field of reality; i.e., it falls back upon what a real thing is “in reality”. Actualization, then, is not actualization of something real in and by itself, but actualization of what something already apprehended as real is “in reality”, i.e., among other things. Its intellection is affirmation.

This intellection has its own truth. What is it? Let us repeat what we have been saying: truth is the mere intellective actualization of the real qua intellective. When the actualization is not mediated, its intellection has what we have termed real truth, the formal ratification of the real in and by itself. And this truth, as I said, is simple. But when the actualization is mediated, then the real is made true in affirmation, not as pure and simple reality but rather as being in reality such-and-such among others. It is in this making true of the truth of the real in this mode of differentiating that the other type of truth consists, viz. dual truth. This is mediated truth.

Dual truth has its own character and structure. [261] Above all it has its own character. This intellection, in fact, is intellection at a distance, by stepping back. To intellectively know a thing “among others” is to intellectively know it from these others, and therefore to intellectively know it at a distance, by stepping back. In virtue of that, by being intellection “at a distance”, the intellection itself is an intellection that steps back. Therefore there is, so to speak, a duality and not just a distinction between the realm of intelligence and the realm of what is intellectively known in a thing. The realm of intelligence consists in being of dynamic character, i.e., in being an intellection in movement. The realm of the thing is its actuality intellectively known in this movement. As the thing is already actualized in primordial apprehension of reality, it follows that this new actualization is “re-actualization”. And since dual truth is constituted in this re-actualization, it follows that this dual truth has by the same token its own character: it is a constitution “in coincidence” of two realms which are formally distinct. Here ‘coincidence’ does not mean chance or anything like it; rather, it has its etymological meaning, “to be incident with”. Dual truth then has the character of intellective coincidence “between” the realms of intelligence (i.e., among the realms of intellective movement) and the realms of reality. The “between” intellectively actualizes the real thing (with respect to what it is in reality) as a “coincidence” of intellection and reality; it is the actuality of the real in coincidence. Such is the character of dual truth, coincidence, if I may be permitted the expression. It is the “between” which determines this character of coincidence.

This requires some clarification in order to avoid possible confusion. A coinciding actuality is not, formally, truth, but rather the ambit of dual truth. Therefore—to get a little ahead of ourselves—I should say that in this coinciding actuality, in this {262} ambit, error is also constituted. Hence the duality of dual truth does not formally concern truth as opposed to error, but rather the coinciding actuality itself which is the ambit of truth. What is radically and formally dual is the coinciding actuality. We shall see this at greater length later. So for now I will cautiously say the following: (1) Dual truth is constituted in coinciding actuality, and (2) this constitution is an event; in coinciding actuality dual truth happens. And this expression has a very precise meaning, viz. that coinciding actuality is a formally dynamic actuality, as I shall frequently repeat. Here “to happen” is not something opposed to that already done or intellectively known, but the formal and dynamic character of affirmation itself.

This dual truth has not only its own character but also its own structure, the structure of coincidence itself. This structure is extremely complex because coincidence is the character of an intellection which “comes” to coincide just because it “fills up” the distance between the two coincident terms, between affirmative intellection and what the thing already apprehended as real is in reality. Since affirmative intellection is, as we have seen, of a formally dynamic character, it follows that the coincidence itself also has a dynamic structure, as we have just indicated. The coincidental actuality of the real, then, has a formally dynamic structure. It is for this reason that truth “happens” in this actuality without thereby being formally identical with it. And this is the essential point.
Real truth either is had or is not had. But one reaches or does not reach dual truth in coincidence. And this “reaching” is just intellective dynamism. Therefore, I stress, dual truth is (263) essentially and constitutively dynamic. What is that dynamic structure? This is key problem.

In the first place, intellective movement takes place in a medium. Dual truth, by virtue of being truth in coincidence, is a mediated truth. Its foundation is, therefore, the medium. In this aspect the medium is “mediation” for the coincidence, and therefore is a dynamic mediator (not an intermediary) of dual truth. In what does the essence of this mediation consist? This is the problem of the dynamic mediating structure of coincidence, and therefore of dual truth. The total structure of dual truth is “mediating dynamic”.

In the second place, this movement takes place in the medium, but is not univocally determined in it. It is not certainly in its point of departure; but that is not what is important to us here. What is now important to us is that this movement does not have a univocally determined direction in the medium. Therefore the fact that the movement goes toward a determinate thing which is going to be intellectively known does not necessarily mean that the direction of this movement automatically leads to a dual truth. As we shall see it may not lead there. How is this possible? That is the problem of the dynamic directional structure of coincidence, of dual truth.

In the third place, the movement has not only medium and direction, but also, as we have seen, different phases. Hence it follows that coincidence is not the same with respect to all phases of the movement which bridges the gap between the real and what the thing is in reality. In virtue of that, dual truth, by being truth in coincidence, has different forms. What are these forms? This is the problem of the formal dynamic structure of dual truth.

In summary, the problem of the structure of dual truth is the problem of the structurally mediating dynamic (264) and directional character of the coincidence between affirmative intellection and what a thing is in reality.

The conceptualization of this structure unfolds in three questions:

A) The mediated dynamic structure of coincidence.

B) The directional dynamic structure of coincidence in the medium.

C) The formal dynamic structure of truth in mediated coincidence.

1. Mediating dynamic structure of coincidence. This is a “fundamental” structure. Here I understand by “foundation” the structure of that which intrinsically constitutes the fact that intellection “between” is coincidence. I say “intrinsically”, i.e. I do not refer to what originates the coincidence, but to that moment which intrinsically and formally pertains to coincidence itself, i.e. to the constituting moment of its own character. This intrinsic and formal foundation is the medium. The fundamental nature of the medium is thus, at one and the same time what is affirmed qua affirmed and the formal character of the affirmation itself as intellection. This “at one and the same time” is just coincidence. The medium is therefore a medium of dynamic coincidence. It is in this that its mediation consists. How?

A) Some pages ago we saw how the medium is constituted: it is constituted in and by the primordial apprehension of reality. Let us repeat the ideas already expounded in order to improve rigor and clarity. The real qua real is something which, in itself, is open to all other reality qua reality. This “in” is, as we already have seen in Part I, an intrinsic and formal moment of reality qua reality; it is its transcendental character, which here takes on more concretely the character of being in a field. The real in and by itself is (265) real in a way which is transcendentally in a field. The actuality of the real then autonomously actualizes the field as transcendental ambit. Being is a field is a moment of the primordial apprehension of reality; that it can function with autonomy with respect to the individual moment does not mean that it is independent of primordial apprehension. This moment is given to us there where the real itself is given to us: in the impression of reality. The impression of reality is, then, primordial sentient apprehension of the real in its individual formality and in a field; it is transcendental impression. Now, this impression has the structural unity of all the modes of reality impressively given. One of them, as I have been stressing throughout this book, is the “toward”. The “toward” is a mode of giving ourselves reality in impression. When one considers it as transcendentally open, then the “toward” is “toward the rest of the realities”; it is not only a mode of reality but the very mode of the differential actuality of reality. In virtue of this, the transcendental nature of the field moment takes on the character of a field which encompasses concrete real things. The field is thus constituted in a “medium”. So it is then clear that the medium is precisely and formally a medium because there are real things apprehended in the impression of reality. The real things, naturally, do not remain “outside” the medium, but neither are they merely “inside” it even though it encompasses them; rather, they “are” the concrete reality of the field moment itself of every real thing. Conversely, the medium as such is the field of every real thing insofar as it is in mediated fashion constituting, in each thing, the intellective unity of some things with oth-
To be sure, the medium, insofar as it is within the field, is not purely and simply identified with the individual part of each thing’s formality of reality; but this reality is actualized in the field manner in the medium. Hence it follows that the medium is, I repeat, but a moment of the actuality itself of the real \textit{qua} real. The medium is but the real truth of the field. The medium, then, has on one side a founded character; it is founded on the individual realities; but it is on the other hand the foundation of that differentiating unity which we call “between”. The “transcendental ambit”, the field, thus acquires the character of “medium”. Now, the medium is founding just because it has in itself, formally, the actuality of each real thing. This cyclic unity is characteristic of the medium.

B) The medium thus constituted has the function of mediation of coincidence between affirmation and what a thing is in reality. In fact, affirmation is an intellection at a distance, by stepping back. Therefore the confidence of both terms has to be founded in something in which it is established. But, What is the nature of this something?

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] We are not dealing with some third term which "produces" coincidence. That was the absurd idea nourished in large part by the subjectivist philosophy of the late 19th century; it was the celebrated idea of the "bridge" between consciousness and reality. We leave aside that fact that we are not dealing with consciousness but with intellection. The idea in question started from the supposition that one had to encounter a third term which would reestablish the unity of the intelligence and reality, the two terms which were thought to be found "outside" of each other. Yet all this is simply absurd, in a very radical way. It is not absurd because of what the nature of this "bridge" might be (e.g., \cite{267} some type of causal reasoning); rather, what is absurd is thinking about the necessity of the bridge, because what does not exist is the "exteriority", so to speak, of intelligence and the real. The difference between the two terms is a "stepping back", but not a "separation", which means that what establishes the coincidence is not a third thing different than the other two, but a moment which is intrinsic to them. This moment is just the medium. The medium is not some "bridge", i.e., it is not an "intermediary", but rather is that in which the two terms "already are". There is no bridge but only a medium. And this medium is easy to describe: it is just the medium in which stepping back (i.e., distance) itself has been established, to wit, reality itself. It is therein that stepping back has been established, a stepping back, but not a rupture. It is already in the real; stepping back is not stepping back \textit{from} reality but stepping back \textit{in} reality. Hence coincidence is not recomposition, but only an overcoming of of distance "in" reality itself.
\end{itemize}

In fact, what judgement affirms is not reality pure and simple, but what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality. And in turn, what a thing is in reality is just the unity of its individual and field moments, i.e., the concrete unity of each thing with all others in reality itself. Stepping back, then, in reality itself is how the intelligence is situated with respect to a thing. That is, the medium is just the moment of reality itself. Conversely, coincidence is the unity of intelligence and the thing in that medium which is reality itself. Truth as coincidence is above all coincidence of affirmation and of a thing "in" reality. And this reality is then the "in" itself, i.e., it is the medium; therefore it is something which is intrinsic to intelligence and the thing.

\begin{itemize}
\item[b)] Nonetheless we are not dealing with just any coincidence, \cite{268} because it has to be a coincidence along the lines of intellection itself, i.e., along the lines of intellectual actuality of the real at a distance. For this it is necessary that the medium be not only an intrinsic moment of affirmative intellection and of the real, but that it also be something whose mediated truth as truth constitutes the coincidence between affirmation and the real. Only then will the medium have the function of mediation, of intellective mediation. The medium has to be a true mediator of coincidence, i.e., of truth. And so it is in fact.
\end{itemize}

Let us recall that the real apprehended in primary actualization, in the primordial apprehension of reality, has in this actualization what I have called real truth. And to this real truth corresponds the truth of a thing in its field moment. In virtue of this, we say, real truth is a truth which is incipiently open, open to intellection within a field in coincidence, an intellection in which we affirm what a thing is in reality. The same thing, then, as I have already said, is apprehended twice: once, in and by itself as real; secondly, as affirmed of what that thing is in reality. Now, the primordial apprehension of the real pertains formally to affirmation itself; it is precisely that of which one judges. In turn, the medium itself is the physical actuality of the field moment of that real thing, of the primordial apprehension; i.e., it has its own real truth. This real truth of the medium is but the expansion of the real truth of the field moment of a thing apprehended as real, in order to be able to judge its reality. Hence it follows, as I have already said, that the medium is real truth; it is the real truth of reality itself of the field of reality itself. And it is in this real truth where, in mediated fashion, that coincidence between affirmation and the real thing is established. The real truth \cite{269} of the medium is the in-
trinsic and formal mediator of what is actualized in affirmation. In contrast to what is so often said, one must realize that affirming does not consist in affirming reality, nor for that matter in affirming truth, but in affirming something “in reality”, in affirming something “in truth”. Reality and truth are the mediated and intrinsic supposition of all affirmation as such. The coincidence between intelligence and the real is a coincidence which is established in reality itself in which both terms are true reality, in the real truth of the medium. The real truth of the medium is thus the medium of coincidence.

This is a moment which formally and intrinsically pertains to affirmation in order to be able to be what affirmation seeks to be. A judgement does not affirm either reality or truth but presupposes them; it affirms what a real thing is in “reality of truth”. And this truth is just the real truth. Mediation consists in being the real truth as a medium of judgement.

c) But this is not all, because coincidence, which the medium as real truth establishes, has a precise structure, viz. movement. There is a profound difference between intellectively knowing something with truth and intellectively knowing it in mediated fashion in truth. When all is said and done, in primordial apprehension of reality we already have reality with truth. But there is an essential difference with affirmative intellection, because the reality of primordial apprehension of reality is actuality of a thing in and by itself in its direct immediateness. But now, affirmative intellection of reality is intellection of reality in truth by stepping back. And distance is something to which real truth is incipiently open, and which has to be gone through. Therefore real truth is not just something in which intellective coincidence “is”, nor is it only something which makes that possible; rather it is something which pertains to affirmation itself because the medium is not something in which real things are submerged. It is indeed the actuality of the field moment of each real thing. Hence stepping back is only the mode of intellectively knowing in the medium. That is, the medium is a dynamic mediator. It is the mediated dynamism of the real truth of the medium. The medium is not only something which “permits” coinciding with the real, but also is constitutively something which pertains to the coincidence with the real.

Here we have the mediated structure of coincidence. It is coincidence in the medium of reality itself, intellective coincidence in its real truth, and dynamic coincidence in stepping back.

In summary, the mediated structure of affirmative intellection consists in the intellective movement in which we intellectively know what a real thing is “in reality of truth”, i.e., in the medium of the real truth. The real truth is incipiently open to being actualization of the real in coincidence, i.e., in reality of truth, and constitutes the intrinsic and formal medium of this last actualization.

But this coincidental dynamism does not have only mediated character. It also has a directional character. That is what we are going to see.

2) Dynamic directional structure of coincidence in the medium. Intellection movement takes place in the medium, but is not univocally determined there. This movement is a movement in which we are going to intellectively know what a thing is in reality as a function of others. That is, we are going “toward” that thing, but “from” the rest. The dynamism of intellection not only takes place in a medium, but is “from-toward”. This is the dynamic directional structure of coincidence. Intellection in movement is affirmation. Therefore affirmation itself is dynamic not only in mediated fashion but also directionally. This direction of affirmation has a complex structure, because both the “toward” and the “from” are fixed: the “toward” is what a thing which one desires to intellectively know is in reality, and the “from” is things as a function of which one is going to intellectively know the thing in an affirmative way. I shall lump all things in a single term, viz. that thing from which one affirms what something is in reality. Now, even with these terms fixed, affirmative movement does not have a univocally determined direction. Given the same “toward” and “from”, the intellective movement can and does follow quite different trajectories. That is, the direction and orientation of the movement can vary. And with that variance, coincidence itself arises within the power of the intelligence, i.e., of the intellective movement of what the real thing is in reality, and the real has a directional character. This obliges us to linger on some essential points, especially these three: A) what is, more precisely, the “direction” of affirmation; B) what is the directional part of coincidence as such; and C) in what does this bundle of directions consist which we may term the “polivalence” of affirmation with respect to the nature of coincidence.

A) Above all, what is the “direction” of affirmation?. Let us recall that affirmation is a dual intellection which consists in the thing “toward” which one goes being intellectively known “from” the light emanating from something else. The thing “from” which one goes is present in the thing “toward”, in a certain way as the light of the intellective affirmation of this latter. The first thing this light [272] determines is a “stopping” to consider what the thing can be which is going to be intellectively known in this light. This stopping is a stepping back, i.e., what I have called “retraction”.

It is not a retraction “from” reality but retraction “in” reality.
It is a retraction which is formally intellective. What one intellectively knows in this retraction is what a thing would be as a function of the light of another. This intellection is what constitutes simple apprehension in its triple form of percept, fictional item, and concept. But simple apprehension, as we saw, does not consist in pre-scinding from the moment of reality. On the contrary, every simple apprehension is formally constituted in the medium of reality. And the way in which reality corresponds to what is simply apprehended is that mode of reality which we call “might be”. What is simply apprehended is what a thing “might be” in reality. The “might be” is not something which concerns the content of a simple apprehension as something possible in it; rather, it is the unreal mode by which the content of a simple apprehension concerns the real thing.

Even when simple apprehensions are freely created, the thing which “might be” in the form of a percept, fictional item, or concept is always mentally denoted.

Now, direction is the formality of the “might be” of simple apprehension. Therefore simple apprehension consists formally in direction. Here we have the concept of direction, which we were seeking. Intellection through stepping back is above all, as we have seen, retraction; but it is an intellective retraction in reality. This “in reality” is the “might be”, i.e., the direction. Therefore direction, I repeat, is but the intellective formality of retraction.

In virtue of this, simple apprehension is not just a representation of some content, but a directional focus of what a real thing “might be” in reality. Furthermore, as I just said, this directional formality is what formally constitutes simple apprehension. In primordial apprehension there is no direction but rather immediate actuality. On the other hand, simple apprehension is a moment of distanced intellection, and its formal character is “direction”. Simple apprehension, I repeat, is formally intellective direction toward what the thing intellectively known by stepping back “might be” in reality.

To summarize, in this intellective movement which is affirmation, one comes to intellectively know what a thing is in reality as a function of others which reveal the possibilities of what it directionally might be.

Granting this, In what does the directional structure of the coincidence consist?

B) Directionality of coincidence. Every affirmation is a movement, and as such has direction. Toward what? We have already given the answer on several occasions: toward what a thing, intellectively known affirmatively, is in reality. This “in reality”, as we also saw, is the unity of the individual moment and the field moment of the real thing which is intellectively known.

This intellection is a movement which takes place in mediated fashion. And in this taking place, what the intellection, so to speak, does is to “go” to that unity. This “going” is but a returning from the retraction to the thing itself, i.e., going “in” the field “toward” the thing. Hence it follows that, qua intellectively known affirmatively, the unity in question is intellectively known as “unification”. The direction, then, is direction toward unification; it is the “might be” of the unification. In this direction the intellection seeks to reach the thing. But not as something which just is there, quiescent, but as intellectively known already as real in primordial apprehension.

In virtue of this, the thing which directionally we seek to reach is the thing which already has real truth, but which is incipiently open, and which therefore is dynamically unfolded as making a demand; it is the real thing as “making a demand” or “making a claim”. We have already met the concept of demand when treating the subject of evidence, where it was a vision called forth by a thing from itself, from its own reality. In the present problem this same demand has the directional function of intellection. Making a demand is always one of the aspects of the force of imposition of the real apprehended in the impression of reality.

The “might be” is direction; and what a thing “is” in reality is present to us as making a demand. Therefore the coincidence between intellective movement and a thing is a coincidence of formally dynamic character; it is the coincidence between a direction and a demand. And this coincidence between a direction and a demand is the step from “might be” to the “is” in which affirmation consists. It is, I repeat, a formally dynamic and directional moment of the mediated actuality of the real in affirmation. It is the coincidence between a simple apprehension freely created by me, and the positive or negative demand which the real has before it.

This actualization, by virtue of being dynamically directional, confers a precise structure upon affirmation. This coincidence, in fact, is not something which consists in “carrying” us to the actualization but rather is a moment of the actualization itself in its intrinsic and formal dynamic nature. This intrinsic and formal character of actuality in directional coincidence has that moment which is rectitude. Coincidence as “coincidence of direction and of demand” has the formal moment of rectitude. This is, as I see it, the strict concept of rectitude.

This coincidence, then, is not a quiescent but a dynamic one. It is above all a mediated dynamic coincidence, viz. a thing actualized in the medium of reality, i.e. actualized in the reality of truth; but it is also a directional dynamic coincidence, viz. a thing actualized in the recti-
ude of affirmative movement. The medium and the direction are not just conditions of affirmation, but intrinsic and formally constitutive moments of it, not just as an act of intellection but as actualization of the thing which is intellectively known. *Qua* actualized in intellection movement, a thing has a mediated and directional actuality; it is actuality in reality and actuality in rectitude.

Rectitude is perhaps what most clearly delineates the dynamic structure of affirmation. When all is said and done, one might think that the “medium” is just that in which affirmation resides, not affirmation itself. Rather, “rectitude” would clearly denote that one is dealing with a *formally* dynamic moment. Nonetheless, this dynamic character is not unique to rectitude but also applies to the medium itself, because we are not dealing with a medium in which one affirms, but rather with the mediated character of affirmation. It is the affirming itself which is mediated. Affirmation is a happening and its mediality is an intrinsic and formal moment of what is affirmed *qua* affirmed. A thing is intellectively known in affirmation; and as this intellection is at a distance, mediality is the intrinsic and formal character of the reality itself *qua* intellectively known. The medium is dynamic mediation and rectitude is—to speak pleonastically—*dynamic rectitude*. As I see it, one can never sufficiently insist on truth and rectitude is—to speak pleonastically—*dynamic rectitude*. Naturally there is in every affirmation a plurality of directions for going “toward” what is affirmed starting “from” something else. What is affirmed, in fact, has many notes and many aspects, which means that starting “from” some thing I can go “toward” what is affirmed in many ways. “Really” the thing “from” which one intellectively knows opens to us not a direction but a bundle of directions “toward” the thing intellectively known. Once the “from” and “toward” are fixed, there is still a plurality of possible directions. I can go toward a thing intellectively known in order to intellectively know the color it has in reality, but I can also direct myself toward the thing itself in order to intellectively know any other of its notes. In order to intellectively know what a man is in reality, I can start from his zoological relatives; but here is where the multitude of directions opens up: I can go in the direction of speech, but I can also go in the direction of upright walking, or of forming groups. In the first case the man will be in reality a speaking animal, in the second a bipedal animal (the one *par excellence*), and in the third a social animal, etc.

Within this bundle of directions, I move in one of them according to an option of mine, anchored securely in the richness of what is intellectively known, but in a direction determined only by an [277] option of mine. This *plural*ity of directions is, nonetheless, not what I term *directional polyvalence*. Valence is the quality of coincidence in the order of truth. Polyvalence consists in those qualities, those valences, being able to be diverse *within* each direction. It does not then refer to various directions, but to various valences within each direction with respect to the truth intended to be in them.

And this is because, as we have said repeatedly, in contrast to real truth which one “has” or does not have, dual truth is “arrived at” or not arrived at, or is arrived at by different means in the intellectional movement of affirmation. Now, in each case we have a strict coincidence between the direction and the demand of the real thing. Since in this coincidence the real is actualized, and therefore its intellective valences are diversified, it follows that directional valence has two aspects which must be conceptualized successively, viz. the aspect which concerns the very root of all valence, i.e. the aspect which concerns the actuality of the real in affirmation, and the aspect which concerns the polyvalence of this affirmation in the order of its truth.

a) Above all, there is the root of all valence, which ultimately is the root of all polyvalence. A real thing is, as we saw, the terminus of two apprehensions. One, its primordial apprehension as a real thing about which one judges. But this same thing, without ceasing to be apprehended as real, is the terminus of what, provisionally, we shall call *second actuality*: actuality in affirmation. Of these two actualizations, the second presupposes the first: affirmation presupposes the primary actuality of a thing and returns to actualize it in affirmation. Therefore, we said, affirmation is formally “re-actualization”. What is this “re”? That is the question. [278]

The “re” is not some repetition or reiteration of the first actualization. In the first place, this is because of the formal explanation of the term ‘to actualize’: in the first actualization we have a “real” thing, but in the second we have the thing “in reality”. We have reality, then, twice, but with different aspects. In the reactualization we have the real, but actualized “in reality”. The same reality is thus actualized in two different aspects. Insofar as the second aspect is founded in the first, we shall say that that second contribution is “re-actualization”. Here, “to reactualize” is to actualize what something, already real, is in reality.
But this is not the most fundamental characteristic of the “re”, because upon actualizing what an already real thing is “in reality”, this actualization is not an actualization only of a second aspect of the same thing, but is another mode of actualization or of actuality of the thing. Upon being intellectively known according to what it is “in reality”, a real thing is actualized at a distance, i.e., by stepping back, and in the direction of demand. Therefore, in affirmative intellection the real acquires not only another actuality, but above all a new mode of actuality. The primary actuality is “reality” pure and simple. The actuality in affirmation is an actuality through stepping back, and demanded with respect to a fixed direction. We are, then, dealing not with a repetition but with a new mode of strict and rigorous actuality. Now, the demanding actuality of the real in a fixed direction is what formally constitutes seeming. Affirmation is affirmation of actuality in coincidence, and the actual in this coincidence is seeming. This is, as I see it, the formal concept of seeming. The “re” of reactualization is, then, actualization of the real in seeming. Here we have the essential point. It was necessary to give a strict and rigorous concept of what seeming is. [279] It is not enough to make use of the term as something which does not require conceptualization.

Let us explain this concept at greater length. Above all, seeming is an actuality of a real thing; it is the real thing in its own reality, which is actualized as seeming. It is not to seem reality, but reality in seeming. But in the second place, it is actuality in “direction”; otherwise the real thing would not have any seeming. Something seems to be or not to be only if it seems to be or not be what it “might be”. That is, seeming is an actuality but in a certain direction, since as we have seen, “might be” is formally direction. But this is not yet sufficient, because the “might be” is always and only a determined “might be”. Something seems to be or not to be not what it might be without further ado, but what such and such a determinate thing might be. The determination of the “might be” is essential to seeming. Seeming, then, is not directional actuality but actuality in a “determinate” direction. In the third place, it is an actuality of a real thing insofar as this thing calls forth, in its actuality, inclusively as well as exclusively, determinate “might be’s”. Only then is there seeming. Without this third moment the “might be” would certainly be determined but would not go beyond being a directional moment of a simple apprehension. There is only seeming when this determinate “might be” is determined by a real thing in making a demand. Uniting these three moments into a single formula, I say that seeming is the demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. It is the actuality of the coincident qua coincident.

Now, what is actualized in intellective movement has its own exclusive content; it is not the purely and simply real, but what a real thing is “in reality”, i.e., the unification of the individual and the {280} field moment of the thing. Therefore this actuality, which is seeming, is formally actuality of what a thing is “in reality”. The content of seeming is always and only that which the real thing is in reality. In other words, seeming is always and only seeming what something real is in reality. The actuality of the “in reality” is seeming, and conversely seeming is intellective actuality qua intellective of what the thing is “in reality”.

It is precisely on account of this that seeming constitutes a proper and exclusive mode of actuality of a thing in affirmative intellection. Primordial apprehension of reality is not and cannot be seeming; it is purely and simply reality. All idealisms, whether empiricist or rationalist, take for granted that what is apprehended (i.e., what I call primordial apprehension of reality), is merely seeming, and that only to reason does it fall to determine what reality is. But this is absurd, because the immediate and direct part of the real, apprehended primordially, excludes a limine the very possibility of all seeming. Every idealism speaks of seeming, but none has taken care to give a strict concept of this mode of actuality. What is apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality has that intrinsic compaction in virtue of which it is but real. The compaction consists in not having, nor being able to have, the moment of seeming. It is real and only is real. Therein consists, as we saw, all of its inexhaustible greatness and its possible poverty. On the other hand, in the real apprehended not primordially but differentially, there is always a radical uncompacting; uncompacting is the difference between reality and seeming.

It is fitting now to explain the concept of seeming not just saying what it is, but also saying—and very forcefully—what it is not. [281] When we say that something “seems”, we do not intend to say more than that it “only seems”. But this is absurd. Seeming is not being an “appearance”; it is a mode of actuality of the real itself, and therefore the real actualized in an affirmation—as we shall see forthwith—is real and at the same time seems to be so. Seeming is not the opposite either formally or in fact, of being real. The real intellectively known by stepping back is real and seems to be so; at least it is not excluded that it may be so. Seeming as such is not something the opposite of the real, but a mode of actuality of the real itself. If one wishes, it is “appearing”. And in fact, what is purely and simply real has its own real truth, which as we saw is incipiently open. To what? We said that it is open to another actualization. Now, we should say that that to which the real truth, i.e. what is
purely and simply real, is primarily open is to seeming to be so in an intellec-tion in movement.

Now, this actualization in movement is just affirmation, judgement. From this arises the most strict and formal concept of judgement. Judgement, I said, is intellec-tion through stepping backing from what a real thing is in reality; it is then intellec-tion in coincidence. Now, in this stepping back and coinciding, intellec-tion is the actuality of a thing as “seeming”; so it follows that the formal terms of judgement is seeming. Judgement is, so to speak, the formal organon of seeming. And here we have the essential point: judging is always and only intellec-tively knowing the real in its seeming. Correctly understood, “seeming” here has the meaning explained above. A mind of the kind we usually call “purely intuitive” (let us not again discuss the concept of intuition as a moment of the primordial apprehension of reality) would not have “seeming” but only reality. And therefore it would not have judgements but only primordial apprehensions of reality. The absence of judgement would be founded upon the absence of seeming, and in turn the absence of seeming would be founded upon the compaction of the apprehended real in and by itself.

And this brings us not only to conceptualize judge-ment but also to give precise formal rigor to a concept which has been appearing throughout our study, viz. the concept of stepping back or distance. Negatively, as I have said on numerous occasions, ‘distance’ in this context does not mean spatial distance. Distance, I said, is that stepping back in which each thing is situated with respect to others when it is apprehended “among” them; it is the distance of the “reality-among”, the “between two” of the real. I said in chapter IV that this distance is the unity of the unfolding between the individual moment and the field moment of each real thing, i.e. the unity of the unfolding between being “real” and being “in reality”. This unfolding is distance because one must review the distinc-tion, and because the reviewing is a dynamic form of the unity itself. But there is besides another unfolding. When surveyed, in fact, this unity is in turn a unity between reality and seeming. By stepping back, and so being at a distance, being “in reality” is thus unfolded in turn into its “in reality” and into its “seeming”. Then the distance which formally is unity of unfolding between the individual moment and the field moment inexorably grounds the unity of unfolding of the field moment itself, the unity of unfolding between “being in reality” and “seeming”. It is a modality of stepping back or distance, affirmative distance; it is a distance proper to every differential actualization and only to it, proper only to move-ment within a field as such. Let us not confuse the unfolding of “real” and “in reality” with the unfolding of reality and seeming. [283] This second unfolding is proper only to the “in reality” of the first unfolding.

As this actualization is the very essence of judgement, it follows that the duality of being real and of seeming (in the actuality of each real thing thus intellec-tively known) confers upon affirmation an essential qua lity in the order of truth: a valence. Valence, we may now say, is the quality of coincidence between seeming and being. A valence can be diverse; this is polyvalence. It is a polyvalence with respect to dual truth. This is what must now be considered in greater detail.

b) Affirmation as affirmation, is in fact an intellec-tive movement in which a simple apprehension of mine freely forged confronts the reality of something already apprehended as real. In order for there to be affirmation there must be an intention of coincidence between the direction constituting the “might be” of my simple apprehen-sion and the demand for rejection or admission—let us call it that—of a real thing with respect to that simple apprehension. To be sure, we are not dealing with a re-jection or admission as an acting moment of the real thing, but only of that physical moment of it which is its physical actuality. It is this actuality which, when we confront it in the direction in which my simple apprehen-sion consists, is actualized in the form of a demand. But this is something which is exceedingly complex.

Above all, I can freely elect simple apprehension, and the direction in which I am going to confront a real thing. This option of mine is what is responsible for the fact that among the many directions which a thing opens to me when I apprehend it, only one of them acquires the character of being the direction embarked upon. The di-rection then turns into a path instead of an option, [284] the path of affirmation. Affirmation is not only a direc-tion but a path, the path upon which I embark in order to intellec-tively know the real affirmatively. This option is discernment, the krinein, and therefore is that by which every affirmation is constitutively a krisis, i.e., judgement. Affirmation is judgement precisely and formally by taking place in a path with choices.

But this necessary discernment is not sufficient for intellec-tive movement to be affirmation. Affirmation is not just an utterance, but a positive intellec-tion of the real. For this not only is the discernment of a path necessary, but it is also necessary that this path lead to a coincidence, i.e. that the affirmation possess rectitude and lead to the real. Now this second moment is not at all obvious, be-cause with what has been said, rather than an affirmation we would have only an intent of affirmation. In order for there to be an affirmation it is necessary for there to be coincidence, convergence, and rectitude between simple apprehension and the real thing.
This affirmative intellection in its own coincidence has different valences, different qualities in the order of truth. Every affirmation has in some way this diversity of valences. I say, “in some way”, because this is just what we have to examine now.

\textit{aa}) Every affirmation has in the order of truth an essential radical quality; it is what I call \textit{parity}. In every affirmation there is the actualization of that about which one affirms and the simple apprehension on which is based what one affirms. In every affirmation there are, then, two poles. But it is necessary that each of them not go off “on its own”, so to speak. This quality is parity. Permit me to explain. If I ask myself how many wings this canary has in reality, and if I answer “yellow”, that response is not an affirmative coincidence but just the opposite, because what is real about the number of wings of this canary is yellow is not a falsehood, but something more radical, viz. the incongruence or disparity between two lines of intellection. In order for there to be affirmation there must be “parity” between the direction of simple apprehension and the demands of the real. Only when there is parity is there coincidence and therefore rectitude. The disparity is formally and constitutively “uttered without parity”. Rectitude therefore is not synonymous with truth in even the slightest way, but is essentially pure and simple parity. What is parity? Every simple apprehension is a “might be”. Hence every simple apprehension directs us to the real not only by the mere fact of being a “might be”, but moreover in this direction a directional line of the actuality of the real \textit{qua real} is pointed out. What is pointed out is a mode of directing myself to the real as quality (please excuse the expression) of a line of the might be is acknowledged, in which the real as real is actualized. Yellow points out the line of that mode of being directed to the real which is its actualization; it is actualization as quality. Number points out in its mode of directing itself to reality another aspect of actualization of the real, viz. as quantity. Along these lines, then, the real as real is directionally actualized. Pointing out, in Greek, is called \textit{kategoria}. Every “might be” points out a line of actualization of the real \textit{qua real}, and it is in this the category consists, viz. directional actualization of the real \textit{qua real}. It is in this directional focus that, in my opinion, the problem of the categories of the real must be conceptualized. The categories are not supreme \textit{genera} of “being” (cf. Aristotle); they are not forms of judgement (cf. Kant); \cite{286} but rather they are the directional lines of actualization of the real \textit{qua real} along various dimensions. We shall see later the problem of the categories in all of its fullness. Returning to parity, we see that parity is parity of categorial line. Disparity is categorial disparity. So here we have the first qualitative moment, the first valence in the order of truth: parity. Its opposite is disparity. The opposition between “with-parity” and “disparity” is the first directional polyvalence of affirmation.

\textit{bb}) But there is a second quality with a valence. It is not enough that an affirmation be not a disparate one; it is necessary that, even if not so, it \textit{make sense}. “Making sense” or “being meaningful” is the second moment of valence. Making sense is not parity. Within something which is not disparate or absurd one can pronounce an affirmation whose direction does not fall back upon the possible demands of the object about which one is affirming. In such a case the direction of the simple apprehension veers toward emptiness. Direction toward emptiness is not the same thing as disparate.

This emptiness can occur in at least two ways. It can be that the sense of my simple apprehension remains outside of the demands of the real object about which affirmation is made. Then the affirmation is \textit{nonsense} or \textit{meaningless}. But it can happen that in the affirmation the sense of the simple apprehension destroys the positive demands of that about which one affirms; this is \textit{counter-sense} or \textit{contra-meaning}. And this is not some subtlety but something which has come to carry out an essential role in science and philosophy.

For example, if I consider an electron situated exactly at a precise point in space, and wish to intellec tively know what its dynamic state is in reality, i.e. its momentum, there is not and cannot be any answer. To attribute to it \cite{287} a momentum is, in itself, not something disparate but meaningless (because of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). An electron precisely localized in space cannot have any precise momentum. The “might be” of the momentum is a determinate direction, but it does not make sense to realize it in a localized electron. In virtue of this there is no directional coincidence, nor for that matter the actuality which is seeming. To fall into the void is just “not-seeming”. All the variables which physics calls ‘dynamically conjugate’ are found in this example from atomic physics. I have not cited them except by way of example. That is a problem of atomic physics which we cannot discuss further here.

The counter-sense or contra-meaning is, if one wishes, the more serious problem. It is not a falsehood, nor even a contradiction, but a destroyer of the possibility of any meaning. Thus Husserl thinks that to say that \textit{a priori} truths are founded upon contingent facts is not something which is just false or contradictory, but is contra-meaning. The meaning of the demands of the concept...
of “a priori” truth are annulled by the meaning of “empirical fact”. For Husserl the contra-meaning is the supreme form of not being true. But personally I think that there is something more serious than the contra-meaning, and that is disparity or absurdity. In disparity or absurdity, I repeat, the demands of that about which one judges have nothing to do with the direction of the simple apprehension. To intellectively know them unitarily in an object is the disparity or absurdity. On the other hand in contra-meaning there is no disparity or absurdity; what happens is that the direction of the simple apprehension does not find where to realize itself in the object.

The second valence in the order of truth is meaning. Polyvalence adopts the form of “with meaning” and “without meaning” and “contra-meaning”. [288]

cc) But there is a third quality of the coincidence in the order of truth.

Coincidence, I repeat, is dynamic coincidence between intellectual direction and the direction of the demands of the actuality of the real. In this direction one is going to intelligently know not the real as real (that would be primordial apprehension of reality), but what this real is in reality. That is, a real thing in dynamic coincidence acquires a new actuality, a reactualization of the real in the order of what it is in reality. This actuality of the real in directional coincidence is, we said, what constitutes seeming, viz. the demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. Therefore affirmative intellec
tion, what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality, is the coincidence of what it seems to be and what the real thing is in reality. Or stated more succinctly, it is the coincidence between seeming and being real (where it is understood that we are dealing with being “in reality”). This coincidental actuality is exceedingly complex. How are they “one”, i.e., in what are the two terms coincident? The actuality is actuality as coinciding; therefore that in which real being and “seeming” are “one” is in being actuality. But these two terms are not independent, i.e., are not juxtaposed; rather, seeming and being real are mutually grounded the one upon the other. There is always actuality in coincidence, but the coincidence can have two different foundations; i.e., there are two possibilities of coincidence. First, what a real thing is in reality founds what it seems to be; and second, what it seems to be founds what the real thing is in reality. In both cases—and I repeat this over and over because it is essential—there is coinciding actuality. But the quality of this intellective coincidence is in the two cases essentially different. [289] In the first, we say that affirmative intellec
tion, in its actuality in coincidence, has that quality which we call truth. In the second case, there is also actuality in coincidence, but its quality is what we call error. Each one of the two possibilities of actuality in coincidence is what constitutes that which we have previously termed ‘path’. Path is not only a direction upon which one embarks, but a direction along the lines of one or the other of the two possibilities. The first is the path of truth. The second is the path of error. The path or way of truth is that in which it is the real which founds the seeming or appearance. The way of error is that in which it is seeming or appearance which founds reality; reality would be what appears to us. Here we have the radical complexity of every affirmation in its directional structure; it is the third valence of coincidence.

To understand it better, we must first of all clarify what each of the two paths is. So let us begin with the path of truth. Judgement, I have stated, is the formal organ of seeming or appearance as such. Now, its truth consists formally in that appearance is founded upon what a thing is in reality. It consists, then, in what determines the actuality in coincidence of an appearance being what the thing is in reality. This is the path of truth. It is not something extrinsic to truth, nor is it the path to arrive at truth; rather it is an intrinsic and formal moment of truth itself as such; it is “truth-path”. It is the “path-like” character of affirmation about the real. Only in a derivative sense can one speak of a truth as a quality of what is affirmed. Primarily truth is a dynamic directional characteristic of affirmation; it is the direction by which “appearance” is determined by “real” being. Truth itself is this directional determination. It is the path in which one is intellec
tively knowing what something seems to be in reality [290] by making the intellection converge toward what the thing really is. This convergence of the path is truth itself. Only in and by this dynamic and directional truth is it that we can have truth in what is affirmed. We shall see this below.

But there is another path, the path of error. Error is also primarily a path. It is the path by which the actuality in coincidence of appearance is what grounds and constitutes what a thing is in reality. Error is above all a path, the erroneous path. It is possible that what is affirmed by this path turns out to be truthful, but it would be so only accidentally, just as the conclusion of a chain of reasoning can be accidentally true even though the premises were false. This does not prevent the way from being an erroneous one, of course. This path is an error, but with respect to what? With respect to the path which leads to an actuality in coincidence in which appearance is bounded in real being. To follow the contrary path—it is in this that error consists. Every error, and therefore all error, is a constitutive deviation, deviation from the path [via] of truth. In error there can also be actuality in coincidence—this must be emphasized—but it is an actuality in a deviate path. Therefore this actuality has in its very actuali-
zation its own character, viz. falsehood. Falsehood is actuality in coincidence along a deviate path. Even when accidentally its content turns out to be truthful, nonetheless this presumed truth would be a falsehood with respect to its intellective quality. Falsehood consists formally only in being a characteristic of actuality. It is a false actuality insofar as it is actuality. It is truly actuality but a not true actuality. The path of error is the path of a falsified actuality; it is the falsification which consists in taking my appearance (in its being appearance) as reality. Only derivatively [291] can one speak of falsity in what is affirmed. What is radical and primary is falsehood in the affirmation itself. Falsehood, I claim, is actuality in deviation, in error. Error is a dynamic and directional characteristic of affirmation itself prior to being a characteristic of what is affirmed.

Truth and error—here we have the two valences of coincidence in the order of truth. This statement may come across as confused because in it the word ‘truth’ and the concept of truth appear twice: truth as valence opposed to error, and truth as that in the order of which valence is constituted. But there is no such confusion; we shall see this forthwith. Before though let us speak of truth and error as valences. Truth is the coincidence between seeming and reality when it is reality which determines seeming, and error in the opposite case.

In contemporary philosophy there has been an effort to introduce other valences besides truth and error; there might be in fact an infinite number of them. Classical logic has always been bivalent (truth and error), but in the logics to which I allude there would be a polyvalence in the order of truth which is different from these two; this is polyvalent logic. I shall allude only to a trivalent logic because of its special importance. Besides the valences of truth and error, an affirmation can have a third valence, uncertainty or indeterminism. This does not refer to my not knowing what is real in a determinate way, but to whether an affirmation about the real is, in the order of truth, something formally uncertain or indeterminate. We shall return to the example I explained when speaking of the “meaning” of affirmation. We saw that in virtue of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle the statement that an electron which is precisely localized in space has a precise momentum would be one which makes no sense physically. Now, in trivalent logic [292] we are not dealing with the fact that such a statement has no meaning, because it does. The fact is that it would be a statement which is neither true nor false, but indeterminate in the order of truth. Thus we have three valences: truth, error, uncertainty or indetermination.

I am not going to delve into this problem; it is a topic of the logic of physics. Here I am not doing a study of logic but of the philosophy of intelligence. And from this point of view the question changes its aspect. And this is what dispels the confusion surrounding the concept of truth to which I earlier alluded.

In fact, as possibilities truth and error in affirmation are co-possible just because they are paths of actuality in coincidence grounded in real truth. This does not mean that truth and error can apply to an affirmation indiscriminately, because error is always deviation. Hence error is not just an absence of truth; if it were—and in fact it has been assumed to be in most of modern philosophy—truth would be just the absence of error. It would be as if would say that having sight is the absence of blindness. And this is not true because error, falsehood, is “deviation”; therefore it is not an absence but a privation of truth. Only with respect to dual truth is error possible. Both are co-possible, but this copossibility does not mean equality; rather it means the copossibility of effective possession and privation. Therefore the Hegelian idea that error is finite truth is unacceptable. Error certainly can be given in finitude, but the fact is that dual truth also can only be given in finitude. Dual truth is not less finite than error because both are grounded in the dual stepping back from reality primordially apprehended as compact. But error is finite also by virtue of being privation. [293] Error is then doubly finite: by being, like truth, grounded in a stepping back based upon real truth, and also because this basis or foundation is privational. Truth is in some form (as we shall see) prior to error.

If we consider the presumed third valence, indetermination or uncertainty, we find ourselves again with a priority of truth with respect to it. Because with respect to what would a given affirmation be uncertain or indeterminate? Clearly it is an uncertainty in the order of truth. Without being in some way in the truth, there is no uncertainty or indetermination. Truth is, as in the case of error, prior in some form to uncertainty or indetermination. And this is essential in any philosophy of intelligence.

And this makes plain to us the confusion in the concept of truth to which I have alluded on several occasions. Valence is, let us reiterate, the quality of coincidence in the order of truth. What is this order of truth? Here “truth” is coincidence between seeming and being, prior to which this coincidence is grounded in one or the other of the two terms. This coincidence is constituted in the medium of intellection through stepping back, that is, in the field. The field is a real moment. Now, the real truth of the field is truth as ambit, as ambit of coincidence. It is the mediated truth of every affirmation. The valence of every affirmation is the quality of this affirmation in the order of truth as ambit: truth as coincidence is the foun-
dation of valence. Error is also grounded in this truth as ambit; error is not truthful affirmation, but is truly affirmation. The valence of every affirmation is so in the order of truth as ambit; mediated truth is the foundation of truth itself as valence. There is then a difference between truth as ambit and truth as valence. As valence it is opposed to error, but as ambit it is the mediated foundation of truth and of error insofar as they are valences. Thus a true judgement is doubly true: it is truly a judgement and also it is a true judgement. A true judgement involves truth as ambit and as valence.

It is in this truth as ambit where every valence is constituted, not just the valence of truth. Affirmation has, in the order of mediated truth as ambit, different valences. The parity is clearly a valence apprehended in the ambit of mediated truth. Only because we move intellectively in mediated truth can we affirm with parity or with disparity. There could not be parity except as modality of truth as ambit. The same should be said of meaning: we apprehend it in mediated truth. Finally, the valence “truth” is apprehended in mediated truth. It is in the light of truth modally known intellectively that we intellectively know the light of each of the three valences: parity, meaning, and truth, and of all their respective polyvalences.

* * *

With this we have seen the dynamic directional structure of affirmation in its different valences. Each of them is a quality of a movement in which we go from something simply apprehended toward a real thing about which we seek to intellectually know what it might be in reality. Now this movement “from-toward” takes place in the medium, but is a movement having different phases. In each of them the actuality in coincidence is not only mediated and characterized by valence, but also has its own formal character: the dynamic structure of affirmation. This is what we must now examine.

3) Formal dynamic structure of mediated coincidence. Let us repeat some ideas. Affirmation is an intellection at a distance which is going to the real in the medium of and by the mediation of reality itself. This movement has a precise direction, viz. the direction toward the real as actualized in a coincidence. The actuality in coincidence of the real in a determinate direction is appearance. Therefore judgement is the formal organ of the appearance of the real. Coincidence is thus the actuality of the real in appearance, regardless of the determinant of this coincidence. Judgement is thus of a directional dynamic nature.

But this does not suffice, because in that intellectual movement we have considered the real up to now only insofar as it is that toward which an affirmation moves. But now it is necessary to consider the real itself precisely and formally “qua affirmed”. In our problem, what is affirmed does not float on its own, but is real though only “qua affirmed”. In this sense we can say that what is affirmed qua affirmed is the precipitate of the real in affirmation. This precipitate is the valence truth-error. Truth and error as formal structure of what is affirmed qua affirmed are the precipitate of the real along the path of truth or of error. That is what I indicated earlier when I said that truth and error as moments of the real qua affirmed are structures which are only derivative with respect to the paths of truth and error. Therefore truth and error as structural moments, as formal moments of what is affirmed qua affirmed, also have a formally dynamic structure.

In virtue of this, dual truth and error are of a formally dynamic nature in three respects:

1. Because they are characteristics or moments of an act of affirmation, which is an intellectual movement which takes place in a medium.

2. Because the affirmation is affirmation along some direction, along a path of coincidence of seeming and real being: the path of truth or of error of what is affirmed.

3. Because what is affirmed “qua affirmed” has a formal dynamic structure according to which what is affirmed is truth or error as dynamic precipitate.

What is this formal dynamic structure of truth and error? That is the problem.

To judge, I have indicated, is to intellectually know at a distance what a thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. Insofar as it is distanced, i.e., through stepping back, this affirmative intellection is directed toward the real thing from a simple apprehension. To judge is ultimately the intellection of the actuality of the realization of a simple apprehension in the thing about which one is judging.

What is this realization? Naturally we are not dealing with a physical realization in the sense of a real process of notes, but of a realization along the lines of intellectual actuality; it is the affirmation of realization as a moment of actuality. This realization is then known intellectually and formally as dynamic. A real thing, qua known intellectually, is intellectually known as “realizing” therein a simple apprehension. This gerund expresses the dynamic moment of what is affirmed qua affirmed, viz. the actuality of what is intellectually known is realizing actuality along the lines of actuality as such.

This dynamic respectivity has a very precise dynamic character. Affirmative intellection is a movement in dif-
different phases; it is a phased dynamism, because the two
moments of intellection through stepping back are a re-
traction with respect to what a real thing is in reality, and
an affirmative intention of what it is. And these two mo-
ments are (297) only phases of a single movement, the
movement of intellection at a distance. It is therein where
the intellective actuality of what a thing is in reality hap-
pens. As I have said, we are not dealing just with the fact
that there are two phases of a movement which “drives” to
an affirmation, but that they are two phases of a move-
ment in which the intellective actualization of what a
thing is in reality “goes on happening”. Hence this ac-
tualization itself is of a phased character. The realization
which a judgement intentionally affirms is then phased.
In this actualization the coincidence between seeming and
real being happens, and likewise truth and error as struc-
tures of what is actualized also happen. Truth and error,
then, are not just paths but are also as a consequence dy-
amic moments that are structurally phases of what is
affirmed qua affirmed.

To clarify this thesis, we must understand this
structure in three stages: a) In what, more precisely, does
the character of the phases of dual truth consist? b) What
is the nature of each of these phases? c) What is the unity
of these phases of dual truth?

a) The character of the phases of truth. If I speak
only of truth it is for two reasons. First, so that I do not
have to repeat monotonously the phrase “and error” when
referring to truth. And second, because error is a priva-
tion of truth; therefore the explication of what error itself
is can only brought to fruition by explaining what truth is.

In order to understand precisely the character of the
phases of truth, let us take the most trivial of examples:
“This paper is white”. The classical conceptualization of
truth is as a phase. For philosophy in general, the content
affirmed is “this white paper”, and as an affirmation it
means that in this paper is found “the white” which is
affirmed in the predicate, (298) or that “the white” is in
this paper. Now, all that is correct but is not sufficient,
because we are not here speaking of the white paper. If we
were speaking, in fact, only of the fact that the white is in
this paper, the usual interpretation would be correct. How-
ever, we are not dealing with this, but with the affirmative
intellection that this paper is white. And then the ques-
tion does not concern the fact that physically this paper
“has” whiteness, but how it becomes true, i.e., how the
intellective actuality of the whiteness in this paper comes
to “happen”. Therefore the truth “isn’t here”, but is
something which constitutively “happens”. The white is
had by this paper, but truth is not so had; rather it is
the intellective happening itself of the white in this paper.
Truth happens in the intellective actuality of what a real
thing is in reality; it is the happening of the actuality in
coincidence that this paper is really white. The “is” ex-
presses the actuality as a happening. To be sure, I do not
here take the verb ‘to happen’ as something completely
distinct from ‘fact’ (this distinction is the subject of an-
other discussion, that of the difference between happen-
ing and fact). ‘To happen’ expresses the dynamic character
of every realization as actualization. Truth is given in the
actuality in coincidence of the real in intellective move-
ment. In this coincidence the real, upon being actualized,
gives its truth to intellection. This “giving of truth” is
what I shall call ‘making true’ or ‘truthing’. Formally,
what is thereby constituted in actuality in coincidence is
appearance. And dual truth consists in what the real is
making true as appearance. Now, the making true is, in
dual intellection, the happening of truth qua truth of what
is affirmed; and conversely, happening is the making true
of the real. This happening is, then, the happening of the
actuality of the real as appearance. (299)

Now, this happening is much more complex than
one might think, because it has its own different phases.
These phases are not just “aspects” which are intellec-
tively known in accordance with the point of view one
adopts, but rather are constituent “phases” of the actuality
of what is affirmed as such; i.e., they are phases of the
dual truth itself. In fact, when affirming “this paper is
white”, I do not make one affirmation but two, because
that affirmation consists in the intellection of the real re-
alization of the white in this paper. And this involves two
moments. One, that the quality by which this paper is
intellectively actualized to me is that quality which con-
sists in “white”. The other, that this quality is realized in
this paper, and therefore is real in it. When affirming
“this paper is white”, I have uttered not one affirmation
but two: the realization of the white, and the realization
that this paper is white. One might then think that in this
judgement there are not two affirmations but three, given
that besides saying that the quality is “white”, and that
this quality is realized in the paper, I also say that this of
which I am judging is “paper”. True, but there are still
not three affirmations. First, because this does not happen
in every judgement but only in propositional judgment
and predicative judgement; it does not happen in posi-
tional judgment. When I open the window and yell,
“Fire!”, I make two affirmations: that I see fire, and that I
see it in the street or wherever. Moreover, even in the
positional or propositional judgements, the subject is not
affirmed but is purely and simply that of which one
judges, and as such is not affirmed but presupposed and
only indicated. In every affirmation there are then two
moments, and only two moments. These moments are in
phases; they are the phases of the intellective realization
of the predicate in the real thing, for example the realiza-
tion of the white in this paper. In fact, “the white” [300] intellectually known in itself in retraction is only a simple apprehension of what this paper or some other thing “might be”. Intellectively knowing that this “might be” is now real is an affirmation; intellectively knowing that this reality is established as real in this piece of paper is another affirmation. Only by virtue of the first affirmation is the second possible. There is then a rigorous ordering which grounds these two moments in intellective movement. The intellective movement and the truth actualized in it structurally involve two “phases”. We are not dealing with two “aspects” but with two moments which are strictly “phases” of what is affirmed qua affirmed. In this two-phased movement is where the truth of an affirmation happens. The affirmation then has two phases, each of which is true for each phase. We shall see later what the unity of these phases is. Now we must clarify each of these phases in and by itself.

b) The phases of truth. The phases of dual truth, i.e. of the coinciding unity, are of intrinsically different character. Dual truth, as I said, happens in the actuality in coincidence of the real in the intelligence. Actuality in coincidence means not the coincidence of two actualities, but an actuality which is strictly “one” in coincidence. This actuality consists, on the one hand, in being so along a fixed direction, in accordance with a fixed simple apprehension; here actuality in coincidence is “seeming”. But this same actuality is, on the other hand, intellective actuality of the real as real; it is what we call being “in reality”. The coinciding unity of seeming and of being real in the field is that in which truth, in phases, happens, and there are two phases.

The first phase of this happening consists in that which is affirmed of a subject being in itself what [301] realizes in it a fixed simple apprehension, for example “white”. White is a simple apprehension: its actuality in this role, independently of what the role might be, is the realization of this simple apprehension. Therefore when I affirm that this paper is white, the white itself is really actual, corresponding to the simple apprehension of the white. Here there is an actuality in coincidence which consists in the actual corresponding to my simple apprehension. And when this coincidence of the actual real with my simple apprehension conforms to it, the coincidence comprises authenticity. This is the first phase of truth. And as such, authenticity is “truth” in a certain phase. Authenticity is the actuality in coincidence as conformity of the real with my simple apprehension.

This requires some clarification. To accomplish this let us change examples and say, “This liquid is wine”. The authenticity of the “wine” is above all a characteristic, not of the wine as reality, but of its intellective actuality. The liquid as real is what it is and nothing more; only its intellective actuality can be authentic. In the second place, this characteristic of the intellective actuality is constitutively and essentially respective. The actuality of the wine can only be authentic if its actuality corresponds to the simple apprehension of the wine, or stated more crudely, to the idea which we have of wine. Without this respectivity to simple apprehension, the intellective actuality of the wine would not be authenticity; it would be a quality apprehended as real in and by itself, for example in the primordial apprehension of reality. In the third place, it is not necessary that this simple apprehension, with respect to which I affirm that this wine is authentically wine, be a “concept” of the wine. A few lines back I employed the common expression ‘idea’ just to leave open the [302] character of the simple apprehension with respect to which this is wine. It can be, certainly, a concept; the liquid which realizes the concept of wine will be authentic. But this is not necessary; simple apprehension can be not a strict concept but a fictional item or even a percept. Thus one can speak rigorously of an authentic or non-authentic character in a literary work. One might even speak of authenticity with respect to a percept when one understands that this percept presents reality to us completely and without distortion. That wine—and only that wine—will be authentic which realizes fixed characteristics which my simple apprehension of the wine intellectually knows.

Classical philosophy grazed—no more than grazed—this entire problem when it referred created things to God, to the Divine Intelligence. For this philosophy, the respectivity to the intelligence of the creator is what comprises what is called ‘metaphysical truth’ . But this is wrong on three counts. First, because every truth is metaphysical. What classical philosophy calls metaphysical truth should have been called “theological truth”. In the second place, this is not authenticity, because every created reality is conformable to the Divine Intelligence, including that reality which is non-authentic wine. For God there is no authenticity; authenticity is not theological truth but human intellective truth. And in the third place, this truth does not refer to the naked reality of things but only to their intellective actuality; it is not a characteristic of naked reality but of the actuality of the real. It is just on account of this that I call it authenticity. Only in a human intelligence can authenticity happen. And even so, it does not necessarily happen there. The wine in question may not be authentic but false. That is, truth as authenticity can happen [303] in the actuality in coincidence of what I call “wine”, but it may also not happen. The privation of actuality is falsity; we could be dealing with false wine. This obliges us to state with greater rigor what authenticity is as truth, and what the false is as error.
We say of something that it is authentic wine when, in its intellective actuality, it realizes all the characteristics bundled in the simple apprehension of wine, in the “idea” of the wine. The actuality in coincidence is then a conformity of what is actualized with its simple apprehension. And in this consists formally that mode of truth which is authenticity. In authenticity there is a “seeming”, but it is a seeming grounded in the reality of what is actualized; this seems to be wine and it is so; it seems to be wine because it is. It is in this coincidence of seeming and of real being, grounded in actual reality, that the “conformity” of wine with its simple apprehension consists. It is in this that authenticity consists. It is not simple actuality in coincidence but an actuality in coincidence which consists in conformity.

But something different can occur, because there is the possibility that we might take as wine something which only seems to be so. And because in this seeming as such I can consider only some characteristics of simple apprehension which are determinant of seeming, it may occur that the actuality of the real is not just seeming, but “seeming” only. To take as wine what is only so in appearance is exactly what constitutes the falsum of the wine. Correctly understood—and I must emphasize this—it is a falsum only along the lines of respective actuality. This which we call wine is not, in its naked reality, either true or false. Only the false is the opposite of the authentic. The authentic is what is conformable with {304} what seems to be in the actuality of the real; the false is what only has the appearance of conformity and does not in fact have conformity with respect to simple apprehension. It is not just a lack, but a privation of authenticity.

Here, then, truth is authenticity and error is falsehood. I have given the example of wine. Now it should be clear that the same must be said of any predicate whatever, for example, of “white”. If white were not authentically white, my judgement (that this paper is white) would be erroneous by virtue of the inauthenticity or falsity of the predicate.

However, this is but a phase of the truth of my affirmation. Although it is necessary that white be authentically white, it is also necessary that this authentic white, that this authentic wine, be that which authentically is realized “in” this paper or “in” this liquid. For that, conformity of the predicate with simple apprehension is not enough.

Second phase. In it we intellectively know, as I just said, that a real thing (this liquid, this paper) is authentically what we apprehend the predicate to be (authentic white, authentic wine). Here the coincidence is, as in the case of authenticity, a “conformity”, but a conformity of a different stripe. In both phases there is a conformity of intellection and reality. But in authenticity one deals with a conformity of a real thing with the simple apprehension by which we intellectively know the thing. On the other hand, in affirmation (this paper is white, this liquid is wine) what formally is known intellectively is the conformity of affirmative intellection with a real thing. They are, then, two conformities of different stripe. In authenticity one deals with a realization in what is intellectively known measured by the intellection itself; on account of this, what is authentic is wine or the white. On the other hand, if I affirm that {305} this liquid is wine or that this paper is white, I am dealing with a realization measured not by intellection but by the real itself. It is affirmative judgement which is conformable with reality. In authenticity it is the wine or the white which is measured by the idea of the wine or the white, i.e., the real in its “seeming” is measured by the idea; whereas in affirmative intellection the “seeming” is supposed to be measured by reality. In order not to generate neologisms, I shall call affirmations of the type, “This paper is white,” or “This liquid is wine,” affirmative intention or judgement. To be sure, authenticity is also affirmation, judgement. But as there is no expression which is the homologue of authenticity, for the time being I shall refer to this the second type of conformity as conformity of affirmative intention or conformity of judgement. I shall forthwith return to put things in strict order. This conformity of affirmative intention, this {305} conformity of judgement with the real, is what is called truth in contrast to authenticity. I insist that authenticity is also truth, but we shall now hold to the common use of language.

This requires some further clarification. In the first place, What is that real thing with which truth is conformable? Certainly it is the real itself; there is not the slightest doubt. But equally certain is the fact that it is not the real in its naked reality, so to speak, but the real actualized in coincidence in intellection. We are not dealing, then, with a conformity between an intellection “of mine” and a thing which “on its own account” wanders through the cosmos. That would be to give rise to a “material” coincidence, one which is extremely random. Rather, the conformity with which we are here occupying ourselves is a constitutive and formal coincidence. Now, a thing in its naked reality is foreign to this intellective coincidence; {306} and the same is true of intellection itself. Coincidence is not given formally other than in the intellective actuality of the real. And this actuality not only is not foreign to the real, but includes it. Intellective actuality is of no importance to the real, but intellective actuality formally includes the real. It is for this reason that there can be a conformity with the real.

In the second place, With what conformity are we
dealing? It is not a conformity such as the coincidence of physical notes or properties. The intelligence has no note in common with white paper or with this specimen of wine. As physical notes, the two things, intelligence and reality in actuality, are formally irreducible. We are dealing with a conformity of a kind which is merely intentional; that which intellection knows intellectively in its affirmative intention it knows as realized in the real actualized thing. This is a conformity between what is actualized as actualized and the very actuality of the real. But it is still necessary to correctly understand this realization, because we are not dealing with the case of affirming, “This paper is white” and that in fact the paper is white. Rather we are dealing with something more, the fact that formally and expressly what I affirm is the realization itself. If we were dealing with only the former, truth as conformity would be merely the conformity of a statement and a real thing (even though just actualized). But in the latter case, we are not dealing with the conformity of a statement but with the conformity of the affirmation itself as affirming a realization, with the realization itself as actualized in that affirmation.

Every judgement, then, affirms the realization of the predicate in the thing which is judged. This realization is in the first place a realization along the lines of actuality. And in the second place, it is a formally affirmed realization, the affirmation of a realization. When the realization affirmed as such is intentionally conformable with the realization of the real in its actuality, then and only then is there truth in the sense of truth of a judgement.

Anticipating some ideas which belong to Part Three of this study, I may say that this intentional conformity can have different modalities. One is the conformity as something which in fact is given. That is what I just explained. But it can happen that that conformity is something more than what is just “given”; it can be that it is something which has been intellectively “sought”. In this case the conformity is not just conformity but fulfillment, conformable to what has been sought and how it has been sought. Truth is not only authenticity and judgmental conformity; it is also conformity with fulfillment. It is a different type of truth, truth as fulfillment, the third phase of truth. But let us leave aside this essential problem for now, and limit ourselves to the first two phases.

When there is this intentional conformity of judgement with the actualized real, we say that the judgement is truthful. Truth is a conformity of seeming with a real thing. When there is a lack of conformity, the judgment is erroneous; this is lack of conformity between seeming and real being. That form of error is quite different than the form of error which is opposite to authenticity. As opposite to authenticity, the error judges seeming according to “appearances”. On the other hand, as opposed to the truth of judgement, error is a lack of conformity, or rather a “deformity”. Appearance and deformation are both privations. They do not rest upon themselves but upon the presumed truth of authenticity and conformity. In truth, whether of authenticity or conformity, seeming is grounded in the real; in error of appearance and deformity, the real is grounded in mere seeming. Correctly understood, this refers to intentional foundations. But seeming is always and only an seeming of the real. And it is precisely on account of this that there can be error. Therefore, to take seeming as real in and by itself is to falsify the seeming at its root, to deprive it of what constitutes its raison d’etre as seeming of the real. Now, judgement is the formal organ of seeming. Therefore the falsification of seeming is eo ipso a falsity of judgement; it is error, a privation. This also requires more detailed consideration.

Above all, truth and error are not forms of objectivity but forms of reality.

Affirmative intentionality is not objective, but is much more than objective, because it falls back upon reality itself. Ultimately, an objective error doesn’t cease to be an error because it is objective, and it is always called to be rectified at the proper time not in its objectivity but in the reality of what is affirmed. But as truth and error are forms of intellection, they inevitably pose two questions. First, How can we intellectively examine what truth and error of intellection are? And second, On what can we base ourselves to discern the error of truth?

First, let us consider the possibility of examining if something is true or erroneous. If it were a question of examining what I affirm of “external” reality, so to speak, with an affirmation of mine, I should be trapped in a circle from which there is no escape. And this is because such an examination would examine a judgement about another judgement, which would not further us in any way with respect to truth or error, because these two are what they are not as conformity of some judgements with others, but as conformity of a judgement with the real. If the real were not in a judgement there would be no possibility of speaking of truth and error. But the fact is that the reality which judgement affirms is, as we have seen, not a naked reality but a reality which is intellectually actualized. Now, this intellective actuality has two moments. One, which I have already mentioned, is the real “being here-and-now” from itself by the mere fact of being real. But this intellective actuality—let us not forget—has another decisive moment. I have already indicated it in the Part I of the book. It is that being real in intellection consists in a real thing being present to us.
as being de suyo what is presented; this is the moment which I called the moment of prius, which is formally constitutive of all intellection as such from its first, radical intellective act, the impression of reality. This moment is what “in the intellection” submerges it in reality. We shall see forthwith what this prius or prior thing concretely is in affirmative intellection. But for now let us note that the actuality which a judgement intellectively knows in coinciding is the actuality of the real in its two moments of being here-and-now present and of prius. Now, the actualized “real” and the “intellective” actualization of the real are the same actuality. Seeming and being real are given in the same intellective actuality. Hence the possibility of comparing not just one judgement with another, but of comparing a judgement with the real. This is but the possibility of comparing seeming and being real in the same coinciding actuality.

But this does not go beyond being a possibility. Let us then ask ourselves in the second place in what does the foundation consist upon which this possible discernment between seeming and being rests? It is a discernment which ultimately is between truth and error. To be sure it is a moment of actuality itself. But in an actuality, as I just said, the real is there [310] like a prius with respect to that actuality itself. Therefore in the “coinciding” actuality the real is present precisely in that very moment of prius. Now, the actuality in coincidence of the real is a coincidence between seeming and being real in the same actuality. Insofar as this actuality is coinciding actuality of the prius as such, the actual in this actuality has that formal moment of being remitted in coincidence from the seeming to what is real in that actuality. Now, this moment of remission, this moment of coincidental actuality in which the prius consists, is just what formally constitutes that which, a few pages back, I called demand. Demand is, precisely and formally, the coinciding actuality of the prius as such; it is coinciding actuality of the de suyo as suyo; it is the coinciding prius of the suyo. It is in this that, intellectively, demand consists. In virtue of this, demand appearing formally and expressly, leads to the real which “seems” in it. There is a seeming and a being real in the same actuality. And in it the real is being a prius of the seeming. This formal nature of the demand of the real with respect to seeming, this prius of the real with respect to seeming in the same intellective actuality is what not only permits but inexorably compels examination of the foundation of the coinciding of seeming and of being real. This does not refer to the fact that the seeming leads by itself to the real as something beyond the seeming itself; rather, it refers to the fact that seeming leads to the real as something real which is now actualized in the same actuality as the seeming. Here we have the foundation of the discernibility of error and truth: the coincidentactuality of the prius as such.

Since this demand is precisely evidence, it follows that in the coinciding actuality of the prius as such [311] the intrinsic unity of evidence and truth is constituted. It is a dynamic unity, because this unity is a unitary foundation, but one which is only of a principle. The intellective unfolding of this unity is therefore somewhat problematical; it comprises the whole problem of intellectual work, as we shall see in Part Three. This unity does not rest upon the unity of some first judgements which are self-evident with a first “immediate” truth in them. This, which has been so monotonously repeated in philosophy during the course of the last several centuries, is in reality once again to denaturalize the unity of evidence and truth. We are not dealing with a unity of judgements among themselves or of their constituent parts among themselves, but of the unity of every judgement as such with the real as such actualized in accordance with a coinciding prius in a single actuality. The so-called first judgements receive their truth from the same thing where all others receive it, viz. the coincidental actuality of the prius, from the priority of the real with respect to seeming in a single intellective actuality. To be sure, this does not mean that that unity of evidence and of truth does not have different modalities. But as I see it, that modalization of evident truth has nothing to do with what, traditionally, has been understood by types of truth. Let us briefly examine the matter.

Traditionally, the types of truth have usually been conceptualized as a function of the connection of the predicate with the subject. There are, we are told, truths which are immediately evident, those in which the predicate pertains to the subject with an evidence which is grounded in simple inspection by the mind, simplex mentis inspectio. In the other cases one deals with truths of mediated evidence, where the connection of the predicate with the subject is grounded in a third, different term. This third term could be rational unity; [312] and evident mediated truth is then what is usually called a truth of reason. There are cases in which the third term is not reason but experience; these are the truths of fact or matters of fact. But I think that this whole conceptualization is completely wrong, because while it is true that every judgement has a predicate and what may be termed a subject, not every judgement is a “connection” of these two. But even leaving this serious problem aside, the conceptualization which is proposed is still unacceptable.

Beginning with the last point, the division of mediated truths into two types (truths of reason and truths of fact) is inadequate. Their difference is supposed to be grounded in the necessity of the mediated connection of the predicate and the subject. Furthermore, these two
terms and their connection are conceptualized as moments of reality. It is reality itself which is either necessary or merely matter-of-fact. But to me, this difference is not adequate, even along the lines of the moments of reality. There are truths which are not of reason but which nevertheless are more than truths of fact. For example, if one says that the necessity for every effect to have a cause is a truth of reason (we won’t discuss the propriety of this example; it is just one which is commonly adduced), then it will be a truth of fact, for example, that this paper is white. Nonetheless I think that there are truths which are not necessarily of reason (let us call them truths of absolute necessity), and which are still more than truths of fact because they are truths which deal with that structural moment of the real by which it is necessary that the real have notes of fact. Thus, for example, we have the properties of the cosmos and the properties of history. The cosmos and history are not absolute necessities of the real, \(313\) but nonetheless are more than just facts; they are that in which every factual reality is a fact. Every fact is necessarily produced in the cosmos and in history. The cosmos and history are thus like the necessary fact of all facts. Therefore, if I call the truths of fact factical truths, I may term these other truths—in order to give them some name—factical truths. The proper constitutive essence of every reality is a factual moment of it. Therefore, from this point of view there are not just two types of truths, but three. There are truths of reason (I retain the name, though it is inadequate); they are necessary truths of the real \(qua\) real, which does not in any sense mean that this necessity is \(a\) priori, nor strictly speaking absolute either. There are factical truths; they are truths of fact. I include among them every factual reality, with its laws; the laws are necessities “in” the factual. But there are factical truths which concern the necessity that in the real there be facticity. They are therefore truths which are prior to every factual truth. I just said that the factual comprises laws. But these laws are, as I said, necessities “in” the factual. On the other hand, the necessity “of” the factual is prior to every fact and to every law; it is just the factual, the necessity of the factual. The truths about the cosmos and history as such pertain to this type of truth.

But with all of the foregoing, the difference between these three types of truths (truths of reason, factual truths, factical truths) as truths is completely wrong if we deal with them formally as truths. And the reason is that this difference does not concern truth, but only the reality which is truthful. Now, truth is formally a moment, not of naked reality, but of the intellective actuality of the real. And as such, truth has an evidence \(314\) which is always necessary. It may be that this paper is white only in fact, and that it might not be so. But supposing that I have this white paper in my apprehension, it is just as evident and necessary to intelligently know that this paper is white as to intelligently know that every effect has a cause, or that every fact has to be given in a cosmos and every event in a history. The difference between these three types, then, is not a difference of truth but of reality. And therefore to appeal to it is, with respect to the problem at hand, simply to step outside the question, because what we are here seeking is a difference of truths \(qua\) truths. The truth of fact is as truth just as necessary as the truth of reason \(qua\) truth. Nonetheless, there are different types of truth \(qua\) truth.

And from this very point of view, the conception which we are criticizing has even more serious effects. In the first place, it speaks to us of truths of immediate evidence and mediated evidence. But this difference is unacceptable. Usually one understands by “immediate evidence” that whose truth is grounded in the simple inspection of the predicate and the subject. But this is not the case. From the moment that intellection is a stepping back, its presumed connection is essentially and constitutionally a connection which is given in a medium of intellection. The presumed simple inspection, however simple it may be, is always inspection in a medium, the medium of reality itself. The fact that there is no intermediary does not mean that the connection is not evident in a medium. The immediateness refers to the lack of a third term which establishes the connection; but there is a medium and a mediation in which this connection is established. Having confused immediateness with immediacy is a cardinal error.

But in the second place, the usual conceptualization understands \(315\) that evident truth consists in a mode of connection, wherein the content of the predicate is linked to the content of the subject. But in fact, nothing could be further from the truth, because assertion as such, as we have seen, does not fall back upon these two contents and their connection, but upon the reality of the content of the subject and the realization in it of the content of the predicate. Therefore evident truth is not a conformity between two objective representations, but something essentially different, viz. the intentional conformity of my affirmation with the realization of the real. The constitutive \(priors\) of evidential demand is the \(priors\) of the real with respect to its coincidental actuality as real. That is, those instances of presumed immediate evidence are not immediate nor even evidences (they lack the moment of demand), which once again leaves the problem of the different types of evident truth \(qua\) truth as posed but not answered.

In the intellective actuality of the real, it is the real itself which “gives truth”, which makes truth or “truthifies”. Now, the real has different modes of making truth, and these different modes are just the different types
of truth *qua* truth. The forms of reality (of reason, factual, factual) are truths which differ according to their different form of coinciding actualization as such. There is a mode by which the real gives authenticity to what is affirmed in affirmation. In virtue of that I would say that the real makes truth as *authentication*. There is another mode according to which the real itself is what, so to speak, dictates to us what we must affirm of it. Let us recall the as early as Heraclitus the *logos* was something which the *sophos*, the wise man, had to “listen to”. In this regard it has for many, many years been the custom to interpret Heraclitus’ *logos* as the voice of things. Affirmation is a “verdict”, just what the word ‘judgement’ expresses. There is no word which is adequate (316) to express what I call “speaking [dictar] the truth”. If, for the sake of symmetry, and without any motive of employing the word outside of this context, I may be permitted to coin a new word, it should be the verb “to veridict”, to mean that the real has that mode of making truth in the judgement which I call *veridictant*. Finally, in truth as fulfillment—and I shall deal with it at length in Part Three—the real verifies the search for truth. The real then has that mode of making truth which is verification. In summary, *authentication*, *veridictance*, and *verification* are the three types of truth *qua* truth, i.e., the three modes by which the real is a *prius* in coincidental actuality.

Prescinding for the time being from the third mode, we may say that authenticity and what I have called conformity (which is veridictance) are two phases of truth, two forms of making truth. And for this very reason they are phases of a single movement in which, dynamically, the truth is formally constituted on an on-going basis. Therefore after having summarily examined each one of the phases in and by itself, it is necessary to confront the question of their unity; this is the problem of the unity of the phases of dual truth.

c) Unity of the phases of dual truth. Let us return to repeat some ideas. Every intellection is just intellective actuality of the real. When this actuality is the actuality of something real in and by itself, the intellection is primordial apprehension of the real. As such that intellection has its real truth. When a thing is intellectually known which has already been apprehended as real, but “among” others, then the intellection is an intellection at a distance through stepping back; it is affirmative intellection or judgement. There one does not apprehend the real as real (that was already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality); rather, one intellectually knows what this real thing is (317) in reality. In that intellection we do not leave aside the intellectually known actuality of primordial apprehension; on the contrary, the intellection through stepping back takes place formally within this apprehension, but with its own character, movement. In this movement the real thing already apprehended in primordial apprehension acquires a second actuality, viz., coinciding actuality. It is an actuality which happens in a movement. In this coinciding actuality the real acquires the character of seeming. As this movement is given within the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., within the radical intellective actuality of the real in and by itself, it follows that seeming and being real, forged in the coincident actuality, are given in the same actuality of the real already apprehended as such. Actuality in coincidence, as coincidence of seeming grounded in real being, is dual truth. Therefore dual truth is something which “is not present” in a statement but which “happens” in an affirmative coincidental movement, because it is there that the coincidental actualization of the real happens. Hence it is that dual truth “happens”. The predicative verb “is”, when it exists, expresses the happening not of the real as such (that is a different problem), but the happening of the real actualized in coincidental actuality. There, then, seeming and being real coincide. And the possibility of intellectively knowing this unity is the moment of the *prius* of every intellective actuality. In coincidental actuality this *prius* acquires that formal character which is demand. Demand, as I said, is coincidental actuality of the *prius* as such.

This actuality, and therefore this truth, is formally dynamic. They happen—let us repeat—in a movement which begins when we step back within a real thing in order to (318) know intellectually by retraction what it “might be” in reality, and then return intentionally to what it “is”. In this return, what the real is in reality is actualized as seeming. And its coincidence with the real already apprehended as such is the formal character of coincidental actuality, and therefore of the dual intellection of what the thing is in reality; the coincidence between seeming and being real is grounded on this. Such is the structurally dynamic character of dual truth.

The happening of this coinciding actuality has an essential character, and that is the “conformity” between what is intellectively known and the real. And this conformity is a dynamic conformation of the intellection, for the same reason that the coincidental actuality of the real is dynamic. This dynamism has, as we have seen, two phases. Above all, it is a conformity of what the real is in reality with what, in simple apprehension, we have intellectively known that it “might be”; it is conformity as authenticity. But it has a second phase, which I shall provisionally term ‘affirmative conformity’. As noted, this phrase is not strictly correct, because authenticity also is affirmative conformity. What I am calling ‘affirmative conformity’ we have already seen as veridictance (“speaking the truth”). Veridictance is affirmative conformity just as is authenticity. Therefore the unitary es-
sence of the two phases is in being conformity. In the actuality of conformity, the real is actualized according to the simple apprehension of what it might be; this is authenticity. It is the conformity of the real with respect to simple apprehension of what might be. In veridictance, it is conformity of what is intellectively known with the real. The two are both conformity, even if of different character. The first is the realization of a property in itself; the second is realization of this property in the subject of the judgement. This is the dynamism of conformity of the phases: one goes from the authenticity of the predicate to its realization in the already-real subject. It is in this passing that the happening of dual truth as conformity consists. In its two phases it in fact deals with conformity. Therefore it is conformity itself which is essential and constitutively dynamic. Each moment of it is one of its phases. Conversely, the formal dynamic unity of authenticity and veridictance consists in being the happening of conformity. Conformity is what happens in a movement of conformation.

This is not all, however. On the basis of only what has been said, one might think that conformation is a movement, to be sure, but that the conformity itself, which the conformation conforms, is not. Nonetheless I say that the conformity is intrinsically and formally dynamic. How can this be, and why is it so?

In order to understand this it is necessary to make an essential distinction between two moments of dual truth: conformity and adequacy. The promiscuity with which these two words have traditionally been employed must not obscure the fundamental difference of what is designated by them; they are two very different moments of truthful judgements. In what does this difference consist? Hence does it arise? And above all, What is its intrinsic articulation? Here we have the three points which need to be elucidated; that will be the clarification of the structurally dynamic character of dual truth.

a) In the first place, in what does the difference consist? It is something well known. Conformity means that that which is affirmed of a real thing in the judgement is realized in it. And that happens both in what I have called 'authenticity' as well as in what I have called 'veridictance' (speaking the truth). But to be sure, this does not mean that what is affirmed will be realized in a real thing in such form that there is a total recovery between simple apprehension, whose realization is effectively given in the thing, and what this thing is in reality. Only if there were this recovery would there be a strict “equation”; this is “ad-equacy”. Conformity would then be more than mere conformity, it would be adequation. Conformity is always given in dual truth, but not adequation. If I say that this paper is white, I speak in conformity with the paper. But this does not mean that the whiteness of the paper consists in pure and perfect whiteness. There is conformity, but not adequation. In order for there to be adequation, it is necessary to say not just “white” but “white in such-and-such degree”, specified with infinite precision. To say “white” without further commentary does not adequately express the whiteness of the paper. Conformity is not just adequation. The difference between these two aspects of judgement is well known. Although in philosophy it is commonly said that the difference exists, the problem of its origin has not been posed, and this is especially true of the articulation of these two moments.

b) Whence arises the difference between conformity and adequation? A little reflection on what I have just said will disclose that the difference does not stem from the connection between the content of the predicate and the content of the subject. On the contrary, it stems from the fact that the subject is the real thing about which one judges, and that the predicate is the realization of simple apprehension in this real thing. Now, the real thing of which one judges has already been given in a primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the difference stems from the nature of dual truth as such. The real thing, in fact, is already there to be intellectively known with regard to what it is in reality. For this the intelligence takes that retractive stepping back which is simple apprehension; these simple apprehensions of every order are innumerable. Now from among them, oriented by the other things from which I start in the process of simple apprehension, I select one by a free choice. Hence there is a double origin for inadequation.

Above all, the approximation to adequation is gradual; the conformity can go on becoming itself more and more adequate. But in addition to the gradual becoming, there is a moment which it is much more important to me to emphasize in a systematic way. It is that the movement of truth, let us not forget, has a directional character. And this means only that we intellectively know by going toward the real in a determinate direction; but it also means something essentially new. In the direction toward the real, in fact, the truths conformable with the real, but not adequate to it, constitute in their own conformity not so much a representation of the thing as a focus toward adequation. This means not that reality is such as I affirm it to be, but that even if it is so, the conformity itself is like the map of a road, whose truth consists in the fact that if I follow the road completely I will have found the adequation which I sought. Conformities are ultimately justified focuses. Taking each focus of these conformities, it turns out that they constitute an intentional scheme of adequate truth. Gradual becoming and directional focus are two characteristics of the dynamic unity of dual truth.
For these two reasons, which ultimately are one, simple apprehension and therefore the affirmation of its realization are not necessarily adequate to the real even if they are conformable to it. There is no "equation"; such is the origin of the difference which we study. It is not owing to the connection between the [322] content of the predicate and the content of the subject but to the character of an intellection that steps back from what the thing, already real, is in reality. Only the difference between primordial apprehension of reality and intellection in stepping back from what it is in reality, is the origin of the difference between conformity and adequation.

c) With this we have taken a decisive step in our problem: we have struck upon the very point and mode in which conformity and adequation are articulated. If philosophy has not in the past made an issue of the origin of the difference of these two moments of truth, we should not be surprised that it has not made an issue of the articulation between them. The primordial apprehension of reality actualizes the real to us as that which we are supposed to intellectively know in an intellection that steps back. A real thing is "placed", but placed "among" other realities in order to intellectively know by stepping back what it is in reality. This intellection is therefore a movement which goes "from" other things "toward" what the real thing is in reality as terminus of intellection. As terminus of the "toward", the real thing is the "goal" of intellectional movement. Now, in this movement the proper *intention* of simple apprehension of reality remains, as we have seen, distended in *intentum*. And in this distention the intention is not just an *intentum*, distended by stepping back, but is in intention in a peculiar "toward". The "toward" points to the real thing already placed. In this regard the formal terminus of the "toward" is adequation. This is the radical structurally dynamic moment of dual truth, adequation as terminus of the direction of the intellection in the "toward". But, how does this intentional movement take place? It does so step by step. And each of these steps is a terminus of a phase of the [323] intentional movement toward adequation. Each phase is therefore also intentional. But the terminus of this intention of phases isn’t the real thing “placed” by primordial apprehension, but what at each step we intellectively know of the thing in conformity with it. We go on intellectively knowing what the thing is in reality in diverse simple apprehensions, each realized in the real thing. But none is realized adequately. The fact that each of these is realized in the real thing is just what comprises conformity. The intention of affirmative movement has thus unfolded into two intentional moments: the intention directed toward the real thing placed by primordial apprehension, and the intention conformable (in each of its phases) with what the thing is. In the affirmative inten-
tion there are, then, two intentions, or rather two different intentional phases. Therefore the “conformable” intentions are but the system of phases in which the final intention of the "toward" progressively becomes more adequate. This unity of the two intentional moments is, then, formally and structurally dynamic: the conformity in the intentional phase of the final intention that is adequate to the thing, which has been placed for the affirmative intellection. Each phase of conformity is the inadequate coincidental actuality of seeming and of being real (the foundation of seeming); therefore this coincidence is but an intentional moment toward the coincidental actuality which is adequate to the real thing in its fullness, given in the primordial apprehension of reality. Here we have the precise articulation between conformity and adequation.

This articulation is, then, essentially dynamic. The conformity is in itself the unity as phases of the two phases themselves, the phase of authenticity and the phase of veridictance; and this conformity is in turn a phase toward adequation, which is formally the final terminus [324] of the intellectional movement. Each conformity is a direction toward adequation; such is the dynamic structure of dual truth qua truth. Heraclitus even told us (fragment 93) that the Delphic Oracle does not declare or hide, but indicates, signifies (*semainei*) what is going to happen. This is the nature of dual truth, that each conformity points toward the same adequation.

The foregoing is proper to every dual truth. To say that this paper is white is a conformity which gradually points more and more to the white which is adequate to that of this paper. All judgements, as conformity, point towards a remote adequation, off in the distance. This cannot be achieved by any intellectional movement. The adequate color is given as such-and-such a color in the impression of reality of primordial apprehension; but it is not there given to us as formally adequate. In order to apprehend it adequately we need an intellectional movement which continues to make more and more precise the real whiteness of the paper. When we move towards this goal in an intellectional movement, we continue actualizing moments of richness in conformity with what is the real whiteness of the paper. But to reach the goal adequately in this dynamic intellection is a never-ending and therefore unrealizable task. For the intellection in movement, the adequation will always be a far-off goal. Hence every truthful judgement, every dual truth, is structurally an approximation; it is the gradual approximation to the real, an approximation each of whose moments is a conformity. Every dual truth is therefore intrinsically and structurally approximate within reality, approximate to what an adequate truth should be. This approximation is a movement which slides over the real as given in primordial apprehension. [325] This is what makes it difficult to concep-
tualize that its dual actuality is formally dynamic.

What is this approximation? The approximation is always something gradual. But this does not mean that each degree of it is a type of falsity or deficiency. There are different types of approximation. In the example cited of the white paper, clearly “white” is inadequate because it only more or less approximates the real color of the paper, and this approximation consists in each degree being only a type of degree of accuracy, i.e., each degree is in itself a falsehood, a deficiency. But it is not necessary that things always be this way. Every inaccuracy is an approximation, but not every approximation is an inaccuracy. And this is essential in order to understand other types of judgements, for example those of mathematics and mathematical truth.

I am not referring to the so-called “mathematics of approximation”, but to the “mathematics of precision” as it were which yields properties which are strictly true of mathematical reality: numbers, figures, etc. Are these true judgements approximations? Clearly they are not in the sense of a degrees of inaccuracy. But there is an approximation of a different type than degree. What is it? In perceptive realities that reality is “placed” into primordial apprehension of reality as the terminus of a movement which adequately recovers it. Indeed, reality and adequate truth are not the same thing because adequate truth is only reality as terminus of an intellective movement which achieves and recovers reality which has already been primordially apprehended. With respect to mathematical realities, these realities are something “placed” by a double act: a “definition” of what that reality is, and a “postulate” of its reality. Now, mathematical intellective renders judgements of these realities thus defined and postulated which are strictly true. Are they approximations? In order to respond to this question we must agree on the terminus of that presumed approximation. That terminus is just what is defined and postulated. The intellective movement here pronounces judgements which are strictly necessary and therefore true. But that is not the question at hand, because that strict necessity concerns only conformity. And our question is in knowing if these properties themselves, which are strictly conformable to the thing, adequately recover that to which they refer, for example a number or a figure. For this it is necessary to know what that figure or that number “is”. But the question already has a disconcerting air. What does this “is” mean here? Because apart from the fact that these “things” can be understood in different ways, and therefore “be” in a way which is not univocal (a straight line can be understood either as the shortest path or as the line which has all of its points in the same direction, etc.), the strangeness of the question lies in the fact that all of these things are at the outset those which we have defined and postulated. And here the difficulty arises, because these “things” are not what they are through being defined and postulated in an isolated way, each independent of the others; rather, it is by each of them being what it is within the definition and postulate which structures the whole group to which they belong. This is essential. No mathematical “entity” is what it is except within a complete defined and postulated group, and only in reference to it does the apprehension of any one of the mathematical entities in question make sense. Each thing is but an “aspect” of this totality, an aspectual realization of what is defined and postulated. The mathematical world (327) is not a juxtaposition of mathematical entities each defined and postulated by itself; rather, each of those entities only is an entity within the complete group and as a moment of it. Thus, each figure is the figure from a space, etc.; each number belongs to a field of numbers, etc. Each mathematical “thing” receives its reality only from this aspectual character. Now, if that group had no structural properties other than those defined and postulated, every mathematical judgement would be true in the sense of being just an aspect, and therefore everything defined and postulated would be adequately apprehended in each thing. But this is not the case. Gödel’s theorem shows that the whole thus postulated and defined necessarily has properties which go beyond what was defined and postulated. This definition and these postulates in fact pose questions which are not resolvable with them alone. And therefore these solutions are just the discovery of properties which go beyond what was defined and postulated. Then the adequate intellection of each thing in this whole is left, at each step, outside of what was defined and postulated, properties which intellective movement does not achieve. These properties are not just “more” definitions and postulates, but rather are necessary properties of the thing and confer upon its reality a distinct structure in the complete whole. As each thing is not intelligible except as an aspect of this whole, it follows that each thing is a mode of reality, which is in some way distinct, on the basis of which it could be apprehended in a fully adequate movement. In virtue of that, each necessary conformity is an inexorable approximation to an adequation which goes beyond the thing defined and postulated. There is no approximation of inaccuracy, but there is approximation of the aspects. Were mathematics no more than a (328) system of theorems and demonstrations linked together logically, the difference between conformity and adequation would be nothing but a conceptual subtlety. But mathematics isn’t that; it is the intellection of mathematical realities, endowed with their own structure. It is for this reason that, as I see it, Gödel’s theorem does not refer only to postulated “reality”, but shows that with respect to it, every mathematical truth is an aspectual approxima-
tion, because that reality has a proper translogical “structure”.

We cannot investigate this question further here. There are types of approximation which are different than the approximation of inaccuracy and approximation of the aspects. That depends on the different types of reality, which is the problem we are not going to discuss here.

In summary, every real truth without exception is, like conformity, the happening of the dynamic approximation to adequation.

Now, this does not only happen with every dual truth. The fact is that it happens with intellective movement as such. The intellection of the real “among” other realities is by its own structure a dynamism of approximation to real truth. That is, “the truth” as such is a gigantic intellective movement toward what “the real” is “in reality” in a directional focus, schematic and gradual. And not just every dual truth, but also “the” dual truth is an approximation to “the” real truth. This is the whole of work human knowledge, viz. intellective approximation to reality.

With this we have completed our summary analysis of dual truth. Dual truth is the quality of an affirmative intention in which what a thing is in reality is coincidingly actualized in the intellection [329] “among” others. When, in this coinciding, seeming is grounded in real being, then the affirmation is truthful. This affirmation and its truth have a formally dynamic structure: the actualization takes place in a medium, in accordance with a determined direction and a dynamic structure. Dual truth is, then, constitutively dynamic precisely because it concerns coincidental actuality. On the other hand real truth, as we saw, is intellective actualization of the real in and by itself. They are, then, two types of truth. But these two types are not merely juxtaposed. Various times I have alluded to their internal articulation. Now it is necessary to expand this allusion into a summary conceptualization of the intrinsic and formal unity of real truth and dual truth.

3

The Unity of Truth

In what sense do I speak of the unity of truth? Let us briefly review the basic ideas. We are not dealing with the unity of phases of dual truth but with the unity of the two modes of truth, viz. simple truth and dual truth. Both truths have first and foremost the unity which just being true confers upon them: they are true, and hence are mere intellective actuality of the real. Insofar as what is actualized is real, it constitutes what we may, without further ceremony, call reality; insofar as this real is intellectively actualized it constitutes truth. These two moments of the real are not identical; but as we have seen, neither are they independent. Nor are they simply correlative; rather, they are seen to be intrinsically and formally [330] grounded in each other. Truth is always and only truth of the real; but it is not possible to think that reality is just the correlate of truth. The real, by being what it is de suyo, gives its truth to intellection, and is what makes truth therein. The real is then truthful reality (in the sense of “truthifying” or making truth), or reality “in truth”.

This intellective actualization of the real has in turn two moments: it is actuality of the real thing, and it is actuality of the field of reality which that thing determines. Truth is thus constitutively truth of a thing and truth within a field.

This “and” of the two moments can in turn be actualized in two modes, and therefore truth also has those two modes. One is that mode in accordance with which the real is intellectively actual in and by itself. This means that its two moments, individual and field, are actualized unitarily; it is a direct apprehension of the real thing, immediate and compact. The intellective actualization is then what I have called real or simple truth, in the sense that the real is actualized in and by itself. But there is another mode, that in accordance with which a real thing is actualized, not in and by itself, but “among” others. The thing is, to be sure, actualized as a “real” individual, but its field moment encompasses the other things. Hence this actualization of the real has two aspects. On one hand we have the thing as intellectually known, but on the other its unity with individual formality is problematic. As this unity is what the real thing is “in reality”, it follows that what is problematic in this actualization is found in what the real thing is “in reality”. I leave aside the attentive intellection for obvious reasons. [331] The intellection of the real is then dual; it is an intellective movement of affirmation that comes from stepping back, in which the real is actualized in coincidental actuality. This coincidental actuality is just dual truth.

Therefore truth is always and only intellective actualization of the real. The two modes of truth, simple truth and dual truth, have above all the unity which being true confers upon them, i.e., being intellective actualization of the real qua intellective. But this is not enough to speak of the unity of truth, because it could be treating of two types of truth, i.e., of two types of actualization. And this is not the case; there is an intrinsic unity, even a formal
one, of the two modes of truth, in virtue of which those two modes of actualization are not just “species” but in fact “modes” of actualizing. The actualization itself is intrinsically modalized. And this modalization is expressed in a second character of unity. The first was the unity which consists in the fact that both are intellective actualization. The second is that these two actualizations are not independent. Coinciding actualization of dual truth bears intrinsically and formally in its bosom the simple truth of the real. It is necessary to stress the formal presence of real or simple truth in every dual truth. This presence is twofold: in the first place, because the real truth of that of which one judges is intrinsically present to dual truth; and in the second, because dual truth is found to be based on the medium of intellecção and the medium of intellection is the real truth of the field. Affirmative intellection is in fact possible only by virtue of primordial apprehension of reality, and takes place in a medium which is also real truth. Hence every dual truth is always and only modulation of the simple truth of the real. But this simple truth is not just a foundation which is intrinsically present to the dual truth, but in that duality the real acquires, so to speak, its internal unfolding, the unfolding which consists in actualizing what the real thing is in reality. Simple truth is then inchoatively a dual truth. But the modulation of the simple truth, and the inchoate character of the dual truth, still point to a third unity more profound than mere actuality and simple dependence. What is this unity?

The fact is that the actualization of the real qua actualization is constitutively open. The openness is the intrinsic and formal unity of the two modes of truth; moreover, it is a character of all truth, both simple and dual. Modulating and being inchoate are the expression of openness. This is the third and radical character of the unity of truth. On what is the openness grounded? In what does the openness consist? In the second mode of actualization, the simple duality is the expression of the openness; every intellection is a turning, and is a turning because it is constitutively open, and is constitutively open because it is constitutively sentient. And as the intellective actuality of the real is truth, it follows that the openness of intellection is openness of truth and to truth. Because the intellection is sentient, truth is constitutively open. Each truth implies the others and is inchoatively turned to them. The openness is the radical condition in accordance with which all the real is apprehended, either actually or inchoatively, among other realities.

b) In what does this openness consist? In the sentient actuality of the real, the real is actualized in the unity of its two moments, the individual and the field. Now, the openness of the real which is of interest to us here is found formally in its moment of being in a field. Everything real is actually or incipiently open to what is within a field. Therefore its intellective actuality, its truth, also is so. Every actuality is either actually or incipiently open. And this diversity is apprehended intellectively in two modes: the unitary mode and the differential mode. As we already know, in the unitary mode the apprehension of reality involves the field moment in a compact unity with the individual moment, whereas in the differential mode the field moment is autonomized by an intellective movement that unpacks it. In both cases we are dealing with the same formal structure, viz. the structure of “fieldness”, i.e., of the nature of the field. But it is necessary carefully to avoid a possible point of confusion. Since intellection “in” the field of reality, as we have seen, is dynamic, it might seem that every intellection is formally dynamic. And this is completely false, because the dynamism is not proper to the structure of every intellection, but only that of intellection that steps back in a field, i.e. of the intellection of the real “among” other realities. To be sure, in every intellection there is or can be dynamism. But this does not contradict what I just said, because in the primordial apprehension of reality there can be dynamism because there is actualization, i.e. because it is already intellection. Such is the case, for example, with the effort to be attentive; while it takes place in differential intellective movement, an actualization is produced because there is dynamism. In this case it is intellective movement which determines the intellective actualization of the real. That is, intellection is not formally dynamic; only dual intellection is formally dynamic. The primordial apprehension of reality is not formally dynamic because it is not formally apprehension of the real “among”
other realities. What happens is that the real, in and by itself, is incipiently open to being actualized among other realities. Therefore its intellection isn’t formally dynamic, but only so consequent upon the primary actualization of the real; but it is incipiently open to being actualized in intellective movement, in dynamism, a dynamism of re-actualization. The reason is clear: all of the real is incipiently intellectually known according to what it is in reality. And since this intellection, when it is an intellective movement, is already formally dynamic by being so, it follows that the intellection of the real, even though not always formally dynamic, is nonetheless always incipiently open to a dynamic intellection.

Having said this, it is clear that the openness of which we are here speaking \cite{335} formally consists in “fieldness”, i.e., the nature of being in a field. Dual truth is formally and constitutively open by being actuality of the real in its moment of fieldness, in the ambit of reality. This is the third point to which we must attend.

c) The ambit of openness is the ambit of truth as a whole. In fact, every simple truth is incipiently open to a dynamic truth, and each moment of this dynamic truth is a moment of conformity which is structurally open to adequation with reality itself, open to “the” truth. But this openness to “the” truth has various aspects, because the openness of truth is but the openness of the actualization of the real, and therefore is but the openness of the field aspect of the real itself as real. There is an aspect of the real which is of cosmic character; every truth is in this aspect a truth open to all of the other cosmic truths. But there is in the real another moment, the transcendental moment, that moment which concerns the real qua real. Now, as we saw in Part I, this transcendental character is formally and constitutionally open. The real qua real is not something already and necessarily concluded. It is, on the contrary, a characteristic which is not \textit{a priori}, but really grounded in the real characteristic of the type of reality. This transcendental order is, then, constitutionally open. Therefore, if we call the truth of the cosmic unity of the real ‘science’, and we call the truth of the transcendental unity of the real ‘philosophy’, it will be necessary to say that this difference of types of knowing depends essentially on the nature of the known real. Science and philosophy are open truth. Human knowing is the enormous actualization of this constitutive cosmic-transcendental openness of the real.

Naturally, not every truth is scientific or philosophical in the foregoing sense. \cite{336} But every truth involves actuality of the real within a field. Therefore man is an animal open not only to thousands of modes of knowing, but to something more profound. In contrast to a pure animal, which is an animal of “closed” life, man is rather the animal open to every form of reality. But as the animal of realities, man not only is an animal whose life is open, but above all the animal intellectively actualizing the openness itself of the real as real. Only on account of this is his life open. Sentient intelligence, that modest faculty of impression of reality, thus actualizes in the human animal the entire openness of the real as real. Intelligence actualizes the openness of the real. In turn—but this is not our subject—when it arises from a sentient intelligence, the real itself is open, but it is another type of reality \textit{qua} reality.

What is this openness to the real? One might think that it is the openness to being. If that were the case, man would be the comprehender of being. But he isn’t. Man is the sentient apprehendor of the real. Truth is not the truth of being nor of the real as it is, but the truth of the real as real. Therefore, the problems posed to us include not only that of “truth and reality” but the serious problem of “truth, reality and being”. After having examined what truth is, and what the truth of the real is (in its diverse forms and in its primary unity) we must pose to ourselves the third problem: truth, reality, and being.

§3

TRUTH, REALITY, AND BEING

Every truth, we said, is intellective actuality of the real \textit{qua} intellective. Now, this actuality assumes two forms: the truth of the primordial apprehension of reality and the truth of affirmation. These two forms are unitarily the two forms of openness of the intellection to a \textit{real thing}. But philosophy up to now has not understood matters in this way. It has rather been thought that that to which intellection is firmly open is \textit{being}. This conceptualization is determined by an analysis only of dual truth. All of intellection is thus centered in affirmation, and in addition affirmation is identified with predicative affirmation of the type, “\textit{A is B}”; every other possible form of intellection would be a latent type of predication. Seeing this white color would be a latent way of affirming that this color “is” white. This predicative judgement has been the guiding thread of the accepted analysis of intellection. Nonetheless, I do not think that this conceptualization is viable. Above all, because judgement itself, not only in its predicative form but also as affirmation, does not fall back upon the “is” designated as a copulative but upon the “real”. The truth of an affirmation is not primarily and formally truth of what “is” but of the “real”. Moreover, the fact is that there is an intellection of reality
which is not affirmative, and which despite its undeniable originality and priority contemporary philosophy has passed over. This of course is the primordial apprehension of reality. And the primordial apprehension of reality is not a type of latent intellective affirmation. First, because this primordial apprehension isn’t affirmation, and second because this apprehension does not fall back upon being. Its formal terminus is not substantive being, the so-called substantive being is not the formal terminus of primordial apprehension; its terminus is rather the real in and by itself. Therefore the truth of primordial apprehension of reality is not truth about substantive being but about substantive reality. Reality, then, is not being, and the truth about reality is not the truth about being. Nonetheless, despite the fact that being is not formally and primarily included in the intellection of the real, it has an internal articulation with the real in the structure of every intellection. Therefore if we seek to analyze the nature of truth, we must proceed step-by-step. We must first of all see that affirmation, and therefore its truth, are not affirmation and truth of being but of reality. Then we must see that primary intellection, i.e., the primordial apprehension of the real, does not apprehend substantive being but reality. Its truth is what I have called ‘real truth’. But since being, despite not constituting the formal terminus of intellection can be included in some way in every intellection, we must determine the positive structure of every truth as such according to the internal articulation of its two moments of reality and being. 

Thus, three questions are posed for us:

A) Affirmation as affirmation of reality. This is the problem of “truth and copulative being”.

B) Primordial apprehension as intellection of reality. This is the problem “truth and substantive being”.

C) Internal structure of the truth of intellection in its two moments of reality and being. This is in all its generality the problem of “truth, reality, and being”. 

Truth and Copulative Being

Judgement, as we have seen, has three different forms: predicative, propositional, and positional.

a) Let us begin by analysis of the predicative judgement “A is B”, which is the guiding thread of the entire classic conceptualization of truth in its unity with being. Upon what does this judgement rest? We have already seen that the “is” has three different functions. It signifies the “relation” in which A and B are. That is properly what has given rise to the word ‘copula’: this is copulative being. But the “is” has another more profound function, one which is prior to the foregoing; this is the function of expressing the very connection between A and B, i.e., their “connective unity”. But besides this and prior to expressing this connective unity, the “is” expresses affirmation as such. And these three functions have a precise order of foundation, as we have also seen. The copula is grounded in a connection: only because A and B are in connective unity do they acquire sufficient functional autonomy to give rise to the relation of B and A. But in turn, this connective unity does not constitute predicative judgement; what constitutes predicative judgement is the affirmation of said connective unity, and therefore of the copulation. Predicative judgement consists in affirming that the unity A-B is in the terminus of the judgement. Therefore our whole problem centers on this primary function, to wit, on the “is” as affirmation. What is this affirmation?

We are not asking about the structure of the act of predicative intention but rather about what is predicated itself as such, i.e., we are asking ourselves about the “is” to which the copula alludes. What does this copula fall back upon?

To be sure, it does not fall back upon some objectivity; the “is” does not consist in “objectively it is thus”. Being is more than objectivity. There has been a tendency to think that the “is” of affirmation falls back upon the “being” of what is affirmed. Predicative affirmation would then fall back upon the being of A, of B, and of their connection. Only later would it be able to express the relation. Leaving aside for the moment this “relational” aspect of the copula, we may ask ourselves: Does predicative affirmation fall back upon being? Certainly not. That upon which the predicative affirmation falls back is the reality of A, of B, and of their connective unity. On the other hand, according to the generally accepted interpretation, affirmation would fall back upon the being of A, and upon the being of B. Formally, these two beings have nothing to do with each other, because being A isn’t being B, nor conversely. Therefore the being to which the copula ‘is’ would allude would be the unity of those two beings. In this unity the being of A and the being of B would be modified by their connective unity. Thus it is understood that the being of A-B would be a rigorously copulative being. Affirmation would consist in affirming copatively the unity of the two beings, A and B. But this is not correct. Affirmation and its “is” do not fall back directly and formally upon the being of A, of B, and of their connection, but rather upon the reality of A, of B, and of their connection. In predicative affirmation there is certainly a connection, however, it is not a connection of beings, but a
real connection or constitution; it is $B$ being realized in the reality of $A$. That $A$, $B$, and their unity are presented to us as “being” does not mean that my affirmation falls back upon this “being”; upon being itself, nor is it grounded on being. But it falls back upon the real—with however much “being” one may like—but only insofar as it is real. We are not dealing with a thing, the res as res essente qua essente, as res essente qua res. We saw this in the analysis of affirmation. That of which one affirms is always the real already apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. This real is “re-intellegized” among other real things. And the unity of this intellection is in the field moment of reality. The medium of intellection at a distance (by stepping back) is not being but reality within a field. And affirmation itself consists in affirming the realization of the simple apprehension $B$ in the reality $A$ already primordially apprehended. When this affirmation is predicative the intellective movement has its own character—it is a gathering together. Permit me to explain. Predicative affirmation, like all affirmation, is a dual intellection; it intellectively knows a real thing among others and from others. But it is dual in a second aspect proper only to predicative affirmation, because that thing which one intellectively knows is present in what is intellectually known, but only “in connection” with it. Every judgement is affirmation of a realization of the simple apprehension in that about which one judges. And when this realization has a connective character, there are two dualities: the duality proper to affirmation as intellection at a distance, by stepping back, and the duality of the connective unity of $B$ and $A$. This second duality is what is peculiar about predicative judgement. Predicative affirmation consists in affirming the unity of this duality. In virtue of it, the intellective movement of affirming $B$ in $A$ (or what comes to the same, the realization of $B$ in $A$) is, qua act, an act of connection; and it is this connective act qua act which I term ‘gathering together’ [Sp. colegir] in the etymological sense of “reuniting with” [Lat. col·legere], and not in the usual sense of inferring or something similar. Intellective movement through stepping back is now a movement that gathers together. In this gathering together one intellectively knows the connective real itself. The real is now actualized intellectively in the collecting. The real is intellectively known in the connective structure of its actuality, it is intellectively actualized, in the movement of gathering together. If one wishes, every judgement affirms a realization, and when the reality itself is connective, this realization is intellectually known in being gathered together. This gathering together is not just another form of movement, but constitutes in movement itself a moment which is proper to intellection. What is known intellectually through gathering together is the real in its connective unity; this real is what is affirmed in the “direct mode”.

But affirmation through gathering together affirms the connective real in the copula “is”’. What is this “is”? The “is” does not constitute affirmation. As affirmation, affirmation is constituted only as affirmation of the real. But the “is” nonetheless has its own meaning; it expresses the affirmed real qua affirmed. This expressing does not mean either the real or its truth, but what is affirmed qua affirmed. Affirmation, we have seen, is intellection by stepping back in intellective movement. Therefore affirmation is a coincidental actuality between the realm of intelligence and the realm of the real. So when affirmation is connective, the coinciding is actualization in a gathering together. Then the copulation is not just gathering together or reuniting $B$ and $A$, but above all reuniting or gathering together the intellection and the connective reality itself. The terms of the copulation are intelligibility and what is affirmed. The copulative “is” expresses this unity of intelligence and the real through gathering together. This unity is what is affirmed “qua affirmed”. Then one thing is clear: as the “is” expresses the real thing affirmed qua affirmed, it follows that the “is” is based upon reality and not the other way around. This is the ulteriority of being with respect to reality. Now, in affirmation we intellectively know the real as distanced, qua as given in by stepping back in the form of an impression of reality. Therefore “being” is the expression of a primary impression of reality. Affirmation does not intellectively know in a direct mode the being of the real, but rather the reality itself; but it intellectually knows in an indirect mode the being of the real. The obliquity is precisely what the idea of expression designates. Affirmation affirms reality in a direct mode and in an indirect mode the expression of what is affirmed qua affirmed, i.e., being. How? That is the essential question. We shall see how subsequently; but in any case we can already see clearly what I said many pages back: the dialectic of being is grounded in a dialectic of reality. And this grounding is what, in this case, the verb ‘to express’ designates. Being and its dialectic are but the expression of the real and of its connective dialectic. The element of predicative judgement is not being but reality. Therefore its truth is not the truth of being but the truth of the real.

But this is not the only problem with the conceptualization we are discussing. We are trying to see if, in fact, judgement is formally the place of being and of its truth. I have sought to make it clear that this is not the case for predicative judgement. But there is another more fundamental problem conjoined with this one, and that is that not every judgement is predicative. What happens with the other two forms of judgement, propositional judgement and positional judgement?

b) Contemporary philosophy has not occupied itself as it should have with these forms of judgement; rather it
has simply taken for granted that they are but incipient forms of intellection of what the affirmed “is”. Now, that is not true, and indeed therein one can see quite clearly the non-universality of “copulative-being” as the character of every intellective act. There are intellencelations, in fact, in which the copulative “is” does not intervene even in an incipient way. This is what we must now summarily discuss. {344}

What I have called ‘propositional judgement’ is what constitutes the meaning of a nominal phrase. This type of phrase lacks a verb. Classical philosophy, as we have already said, did not consider this type of proposition. At most, when any thought was given to it, people considered such propositions as incipient predicative judgements. To say, “woman, variable” would be an ellipsis for “a woman is something variable”. But this is completely untenable. No linguist would today agree that a nominal sentence carries in some elliptile sense an understood copula. The linguist thinks, and with reason, that a nominal phrase is an original and irreducible type of a-verbal sentence. There are two types of phrases: verbal and a-verbal; both are ways of affirmation essentially irreducible. In the second there is no verbal ellipsis. This is clearer when sentences with verbal ellipsis are most frequent, for example in classical Sanskrit. But together with them there are strictly nominal phrases without verbal ellipsis; for example in the Veda and the Avesta nominal phrases are rarely elliptical. And this is essential for two reasons. First, because of what I just said: a nominal phrase is in itself and by itself a non-verbal sentence. It lacks, then, copulative being. But it is not therefore incipient predication. Philosophy has traditionally reflected upon judgements which lack a subject (the so-called ‘impersonal’ judgements) or upon judgements which lack a predicate (the so-called ‘existential’ judgements), though with poor results. But it has never occurred to anyone to think that there might be judgements without a copula. Now, the nominal phrase lacks a copula, and nonetheless is a judgement in the strictest sense of the term. And this discloses to us the second reason why the theory of incipient judgement is untenable. A nominal phrase, in fact, not only lacks a copula; but just on account of that, as we have seen, {345} affirms reality with much more force than if the verb “is” were employed. To say, “Woman, variable” is to affirm the reality of variability in a way that is much stronger than saying “a woman is variable”. The nominal phrase is an explicit affirmation of reality without any copula. And this shows once again that the formal part of judgement is not the copulative affirmation of the “is”, but the affirmation of the real as reality.

This is even clearer if we consider positional judgement, which is the real intellectively known as “being”, for example “fire”, “rain”, etc. But it is not this being which is affirmed in the direct mode; rather what is affirmed in direct mode is the real apprehended in primordial apprehension, as primary and complete realization of a simple apprehension. That of which one judges is the real in and by itself, but without previous denominative qualification. Therefore there is only a single noun. And this is even more true than at first glance be supposed, because the copulative “is” is not limited to being absent as in the nominal phrase and the propositional judgement; rather there are facts which are much more important to our problem. Indeed, there are languages which lack the copula “is”, or if they have it, it never has the copulative function in them. But despite this affirmations about the real are made in them. They are not Indo-European languages. The theory of affirmation has been grounded exclusively upon Indo-European languages, and within that group, upon the Hellenic logos, Aristotle’s celebrated logos apophantikos. And this has led to a false generalization, to thinking that the “is” is the formally constitutive moment of all affirmation. To be sure, since we express ourselves in languages which derive from the Indo-European trunk, it is not possible for us to eliminate the verb “is” from our sentences. {346} and we necessarily have to say that this or that thing “is” real, etc. In the same way Greek philosophy itself, from Parmenides to Aristotle, had to use sentences in which one says “being is immobile”, etc. Here the “is” appears twice, once as that of which some predicates are affirmed, and once as the copula itself which affirms them. These two meanings have nothing to do with each other —something which clearly manifests the great limitation of the Indo-European sentence in this type of problem. Since the world’s languages have already been created, the essential point is not to confuse this historical and structural necessity of the Indo-European family with the conceptualization of affirmation itself. So leaving aside being as that which is affirmed, what is important to us here is that very act of its affirmation, the copulative “is”, is not constituted by affirmation about being. To be sure, affirmation falls back upon the real as something “being”, but “reality” is being; it is not the case that “being” is reality. It is the real given as realization of a simple apprehension, but it is not the real given as such-and-such reality, qualified and proposed for some ulterior act of another simple apprehension. It would be absurd to pretend that when I exclaim, “Fire!”, I am saying, “This is fire”. That would be just a translation of my exclamation, and a poor one to boot. The exclamatory affirmation does not fall back upon being, but upon the real. And once again, this affirmation affirms reality with much more force than its translation into a copulative sentence. It could be translated better by saying, “It is on fire”. But the affirmation of reality is clearly much weaker than in the exclamation without the “is”.
Nonetheless, both positional affirmation and propositional affirmation affirm the real in a direct mode, but at one and the same time affirm, in an indirect mode, their expression as “being”. The exclamation is in itself the expression of the real qua affirmed; it involves being as an expression of the impression of reality. That is to say, in copulative judgement as well as in propositional and positional judgement, there is a properly and formally constitutive moment, to wit, reality; but there is also a congeneric moment so to speak, which is the expression of what is intellectively known as being. How is this possible? One might think that it stems from the fact that while affirmation does not consist either expressly or incipiently in a copulatively known “is”, that of which one judges, the real, consists in being a “substantive being”, as opposed to the copulative being which is only given in judgement. Truth would then be the truth of substantive being affirmed in copulative being. Now, that is impossible. We have seen that judgement does not formally consist in the copulative “is”. Let us now examine if the real of which one judges consists, qua judged, in substantive being.

2

Truth and Being of the Substantive

I dealt with this problem in Part I, following along the lines of the discussion I devoted to it in On Essence. But for greater clarity I shall repeat what has already been said.

That of which one judges is the real apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. It is the primary and radical form of intellection, anterior therefore to all possible judgement, and something that falls back upon the real in and by itself. Therefore its truth is not the truth of either conformity or adequation as in a judgement; rather, it is purely and simply real truth. What we now ask ourselves is if this apprehension and its real truth fall back formally upon a thing insofar as it has being. As a real thing is substantive, the stated question is identical to asking whether the terminus of primordial apprehension and its real truth is a thing as substantive being. That was the idea of all of philosophy after Parmenides: affirmation states what the real is as substantive being. But to me, this is untenable. Intellelction, primarily and radically, simply apprehends the real in and by itself as reality. The so-called ‘substantive being’ is, to be sure, in this intellection, but only as a moment grounded inn the formality of reality. To think that reality is a mode other than being substantive is, as I shall explain forthwith, an enormous entification of reality. To see this more clearly, let us summarize briefly what the real is which we apprehend primordially, what being is, what substantive being is, and why the intellection of reality is at one and the same time intellection of the real and of its substantive being, i.e., what being real truth is.

a) We need not directly treat of the real qua real; that is a metaphysical problem. We are asking about the real in and by itself, but only insofar as it is apprehended in primordial apprehension of reality. In this primordial apprehension what is apprehended has the formality of reality; it is not a stimulus but rather something real, i.e., it is apprehended not as a sign for response but as something de suyo. This de suyo is not some logical necessity, so to speak, but rather means only that the moments of what is apprehended pertain to it not by virtue of the response which it can elicit, but as something “of its own”. Because of language constraints, we express this by saying that what is apprehended “is” of itself what it is and how it is. But here the “is” does not designate the formal and proper character of what is apprehended, as we have already seen. What is apprehended is reality, and not being, in the strict sense of the word.

This difference between reality and being we have considered up to now only in a negative way: reality is not being. Subsequently we shall view the nature of this difference in a positive way.

Let us consider a piece of iron. We repeat once again: it has such-and-such properties. But these properties are not the being of the iron, but the iron itself, the ferric reality; not “being iron” but “ferric reality”. And the same happens if what one desires to say is that the iron exists. Reality is the de suyo, and therefore is beyond the difference between essence and existence in the classical sense. Essence and existence concern only the content of what is apprehended; but the de suyo is neither content nor formality. Regardless of the nature of the difference between essence and existence, classical essence as well as classical existence are what they are only because that essence and that existence belong to a thing. The “being” of iron is not the “iron”. What, negatively, does this difference mean? Let us recall that we are speaking about the reality and the being of a real thing qua apprehended in primordial apprehension. Now, one might think that in contrast to “‘being’ iron”, he could lay hold of another verb to express the ferric reality. It would be the verb “there being”. One would say “there is” iron as opposed to “is iron”. The “there is” always and only means something which there is in my life, in my situa-
tion, etc. But it does not, simply speaking, designate “reality”. [350] Reality is a formality of a thing in and by itself; there is no question of “there is” or “there is not”. The verb which, as I see it at least with respect to Spanish, serves our need is *estar* [está] as opposed to *ser*. The difference between them has been stressed many times by saying that *estar* means something circumstantial, for example “being here-and-now sick”. On the other hand, *ser* means permanent reality, as when we say of someone that he “is an invalid”. Nonetheless, I do not believe that this is the radical meaning of the verb *estar*. *Estar* designates the *physical character* of that in which is in *actu exercitio*, so to speak; on the other hand, *ser* designates the “habitual” state, without any allusion to the physical character of reality. The tuberculosis patient “is” an invalid. But on the other hand, when we say that he is [está] coughing, he is [está] feverish, etc., we formally designate the character of the coughing and of the fever in a physical way: he “is” here-and-now [está] coughing, he “is” here-and-now [está] feverish, etc. It is true that very frequently the circumstantial is expressed by means of the verb *estar*; but it is just there that we are seeing in the circumstantial the formally physical character of its reality. The contraposition between *ser* and *estar* is not primarily one between the permanent and the circumstantial, but between a “mode of being”, habitual or otherwise, and the “physical character” of reality. On account of this, at times one uses the verb *estar* to designate the physical character of the habitual, for example when saying of someone that he “is [está] tubercular”. Now, the verb *estar* designates physical reality as opposed to the verb *ser* which has another meaning which we shall explain forthwith. In the primordial apprehension of reality, a thing “is” [está] physically and really apprehended in and by itself in my apprehension. Referring back to the concept of actuality which we have been explaining throughout the course of this work, let us recall that ‘actuality’ does not mean “presence” but the “being here-and-now” [estar] [351] present insofar as it is here-and-now [estar]; it is the real “being here-and-now [estando]” present in and by itself as real. Reality is not, then, being. So what then is being?

b) When we speak of iron, we may allude not to its properties, nor to its existence, but to what the iron might “be” [sea]. Properly speaking, it is this “being” [ser] which is opposed to “being here-and-now” [estar]. But it immediately springs to mind that this “being” [ser] is not a formal moment of ferric reality, because it is the iron, it, the ferric reality itself, which “is” [es]. It isn’t “being iron” (we have already seen that it isn’t) but rather that the “iron is”. What is this being? Everything real is, *qua* real, respective (let us not confuse respectivity and relation). And this respectivity of the real *qua* real is what I understand by ‘world’. This respectivity is constitutive of the real *qua* real; i.e., everything real is formally worldly. Now, a real respective thing *qua* reality is the physical reality of it and the world intrinsically and formally constituted by it. But I can consider a real thing not as constitutively and formally real (in its twin dimensions individual and worldly) but as an “actual” reality in the world. The world is “respectivity”; actuality in this respectivity of the real *qua* “is” here-and-now [está] in the world constitutes the actuality of the real in the world. Reality, then, is not only something which constitutes the world, but moreover is actual in the world constituted by it. Now, the actuality of the real in the world is just “being”. “Iron is” means that that which physically constitutes real iron is ferrically actual in the world. This being in the world as actuality of the real being here-and-now (estar) in respectivity (to the world) is what constitutes being. If iron were able to sense its reality, it would sense it as ferric reality, ferrically actual in the world. This and nothing more [352] is what “iron is” means. Everything else isn’t being but reality. Thus, it is one thing to describe man as a reality born of some progenitors and among other realities; and something else to describe him by saying that “he saw the light”. This last is the actuality of what was generated (reality) in the world (light). Being does not pertain to reality as a formal moment; being is not a proper and formal moment of reality. What then is the real insofar as it is? That being does not pertain formally to the reality of the real does not mean that being does not pertain to the real. And this is what we must now ask ourselves, viz. In what does this pertaining consist?

c) The real is not the subject of notes, but rather is a system constructed of constituent and constitutive notes. That is, the real is not a substantial subject, but a substantivity. Of this substantivity we say, and with reason, that it “is”. This means that being, although not identified with reality, is still completely poured into it, so to speak. And it is poured into it as substantive reality. Being is then being of substantivity. And one might term this ‘substantive being’. But that would be an incorrect denomination, because we are not dealing with the fact that being is substantive, nor the fact that substantivity is being, but rather that the substantivity of the real “is”. It is not a substantive being, but the being of the substantive. This is the most radical form of “being”, not because substantive reality is a mode of being, but because the being of the substantive is the being of what is most radical in a real thing, the being of its own substantivity. Let us not, then, confuse the being of the substantive and substantive being. If at times I speak of substantive being it should always be understood that I refer to the being of the substantive. And this brings us to essential consequences in the order of intellection.
d) Reality and being in fact are not identical. (353) but neither are they independent. When taken together, substantive reality and its being in primary intellection, i.e. in the primordial apprehension of reality, confront us with three essential characteristics.

In the first place, we meet with not only the distinction between but also with the anteriority of reality with respect to being. Reality is not the supreme mode of being, but on the contrary being is a mode of reality. For this reason there is no esse reale, real being, but only, as I say, realitas in essendo, reality in being. A real thing “is”; it is that, the real thing, which “is”, but it is not true that being is the reality of a real thing. Reality is not ens. And all the rest is an unacceptable entification of reality. Greek philosophy and subsequent European philosophy have always identified reality and ens. Both in philosophy as well as theology, real things have been considered formally as real entia (entities), and God Himself as the supreme reality would be subsistent being, the supreme ens (being or entity). But this seems to me totally unacceptable. Reality is not entity, nor is the real ens. Ens is only the real insofar as it is. But prior to being ens, the real is real. Only insofar as the real is encountered in the ulterior actuality of its being, only then can and should it receive the denomination of ens, a denomination which is posterior to its condition as real. Therefore the entification of reality is ultimately only a gigantic conceptual hypothesis. Even when treating of God, it is necessary to say that God is not the subsistent being nor the supreme ens, but an absolute reality in the line of reality. It is not the case that God “is”; one can only be called ens based on created things which are. But in and by Himself God is not ens. A real thing is not real because it “is”, but rather it “is” because it is real. So reality and ens are not identical. (354) Being is ulterior to the formality of reality.

In the second place, this ulterioriity does not mean that being is something like an ontological accident of the real. That would be absurd. Everything real “is”, and “is” inerexorably, because everything real is formally respective, and therefore is actual in this respectivity, i.e., “is”. Since “reality” is a physical formality of what is apprehended in sentient intellection, it follows that while the “is” and its ulteriority are not a physical moment of its formal reality, nonetheless this ulteriority of its actuality in the world as such, i.e., being, is an ulteriority which is certainly ulterior, but also physical in its way, just as physical is the actuality of the real. The real is not a mode of being, but the real is (at least is present) in the world, i.e., “is here-and-now [está] being”. To say that the real is here-and-now [está] in being means more concretely that the real is here-and-now [está] being. Although being is not a formal moment of the real, to be here-and-now [estar] being is a physical moment of the real, but consequent upon its formal reality.

Hence being is not primarily something understood, as has been assumed since Parmenides’ time; rather, being is something sensed when a real thing is sentiently apprehended in and by itself. Being is sensed, but not directly, i.e., it is not the formal terminus of that apprehension; rather, being is co-sensed, sensed in an indirect mode as ulterior actuality. The real “is” here-and-now [está] being by virtue of being already real. What is apprehended in the direct mode is the being here-and-now [estar]; the being [siendo] is not apprehended except indirectly. I shall return to this subject later.

In the third place, intellection is mere actualization in the sentient intelligence, and the real in this actualization is truth, real truth. Real truth does not make the “is” intervene as a formal terminus of it. Upon intellectively knowing the real (355) in and by itself, we intellectively know that the real is being by being real. Real truth is the unity of the real as something which “is” here-and-now [está] actualized in intellection, and as something which therefore is “being” [siendo]. Real truth does not require intervention by being but only by the real. Only because the real “is” here-and-now [está] being, is the “being” [siendo] co-intellectively known when the real is intellectually known. If the “being” [siendo] is found in this intellection, it is not to constitute it formally, but as an indirectly intellectually known moment in the real. Being is in the primordial apprehension, not as formally constitutive of it, but as an ulterior moment of that apprehension, even though in it. Let us not confuse being in the apprehension with constituting it formally. Real truth is not the truth of the being of the substantive, but it inexorably if indirectly encompasses this being of the substantive. How? That is the question of the internal articulation of truth, reality, and being in the intellection.

3

Articulation of Truth, Reality, and Being

In the two previous subsections the essential aspects of this articulation have been gradually emerging, above all their negative burden, which reveals what is unacceptable about the conceptualization we have been discussing. It was a conceptualization according to which truth falls back upon being, both copulative as well as substantive, in such a way that reality would consist only in a mode of being, albeit a radical one. As this view customarily says, “being” means “being real”. It was when criticizing this
conceptualization that the essentially negative aspects of the problem appeared. [356] Now we must gather those aspects in a positive way. This will make clear the rigorous nature of the articulation which we seek.

This is an articulation in the intellection. Reality, I repeat, is de suyo intrinsically and formally respective qua real; that is, it is “worldly” in the precise sense of world as the unity of respectivity of the real as real. But its worldliness is grounded precisely and formally in reality. It is reality which, by being real, grounds the world and is worldly. Hence reality, by being worldly, has its own actuality in this world qua world constituted by it; it is being. Therefore, upon intellectively knowing the real, we co-intellectively know, we co-sense, the real as being. And then the problem we face is what and how this co-intellection is possible; this is precisely the internal articulation of reality and being in intellection.

We have seen that the two moments cannot be identified nor are they independent. Being is always an inexorable real “necessity” of reality; therefore it is always “ulterior” to the real as real. Co-intellection is grounded in this ultiority, which has different aspects in intellection depending on whether one deals with the primordial intellection of reality or affirmative intellection. It is on one hand the ulteriority of what I call the “being of the substantive”, co-intellectively known in the primordial apprehension of reality. On the other hand, it is the ulteriority of being in affirmative intellection, what I call the “being of the affirmed”. The two ulteriorities are not independent, but possess an intrinsic and radical unity. The co-intellectual articulation of reality and being is what integrally constitutes truth. The problem of the articulation thus breaks down into four questions:

a) The intellection of reality in its being of the substantive. [357]

b) The intellection of reality in its being of the affirmed.

c) The unity of being in intellection.

d) Reality and being in truth.

a) The intellection of the real in its being of the substantive. We have already seen this in part I, but it is necessary to recall it specifically. When we intellectively know the real in primordial apprehension, we co-intellectively know the moment of being, as we have seen. How and why? This is the question.

In primordial apprehension, reality is the formality of what is impressively apprehended. In this impression of reality the real is apprehended in and by itself. But this reality impressively apprehended has in its very formality a worldly dimension. And the actuality of what is apprehended in this worldly dimension is what I have called ‘the being of the substantive’. That every primordial apprehension is worldly is clear because that apprehension apprehends formality in its two moments, individual and field. Now, the field of reality is but the worldly respectivity qua apprehended in impression. Hence to perceive a real thing in its field moment is to perceive it in some way in its worldly respectivity itself. Thus the actuality of something real in impressive intellection is also the actuality in the field of reality and therefore in the world. And the actuality of the real in the field and in the world is the being of the substantive. Only because the real is in and by itself within the field and in the world, only because of this does the real have actuality within the field and worldly; i.e., only because of this “is” it the real. That actuality, that being given in impression of reality, is therefore, [358] as I said, an ulterior and physical moment of the real. But that the ulteriority is physical does not mean that the terminus of the ulteriority is also something formally physical; that is another question. Indeed we are going to see shortly that ulteriority is a physical moment of the real, but that being is not physical in the same sense in which the notes of a thing are. The real is real and has in itself an “is” in physical ulteriority; but being is, formally, only just ulteriority of physical reality: it is not “something”, it is not a note. Therefore the real apprehended in impression is sending us, in impression, on to what is ulterior to it, to its being. This sending is not, then, a type of logical movement but a physically apprehended movement in reality given in impression; reality in impression is physically apprehended and impressively sends from the formality of reality to what is ulterior to it, to its worldly actuality, because the ulteriority itself is a physical moment of the impression of reality. In this way being itself is formally something “sensed”.

Thus this ulteriority has, in apprehension, a precise character to which I did not explicitly allude in the Part I, but which it is important to emphasize here. The real is not a simple otherness passively received, but is the real itself sending, by its own formality, from this individual formality to its actuality within the field and the world, to its being. This physical sending is a sending “from” what is present to us in an impression; therefore, this “from” is strictly an ex. The primary apprehension of the being of the substantive is therefore “ex-pression”; it is what is expressed in the “impression” of reality. The formal character of the ulteriority apprehended in primordial apprehension is expression. In the impression itself one apprehends in ex what is here-and-now present to us; [359] one apprehends what is impressively present in its physical ulteriority. It is, if one wishes, a type of physical
push of the impression from itself toward its being. The ex presupposes the impression, and is only apprehended in it; however, its apprehension is not a second act, but rather the same act in its dimension of indirect or indirect ulteriority. It is but the ex of the apprehension in impression itself. Impression and expression are two dimensions of one and the same primordial apprehension of reality: the dimension of in (direct) and the dimension of ex (indirect). These two dimensions are generated together but not as coordinated; rather, the expression is an expression only of and in the impression itself. In this expression what is expressed is the being of the substantive. Expression is a physical character of the primordial apprehension of reality. Its character of “being here and now present” is being here and now expressed physically. Being concerns real things by themselves, even if there were never any intellection of any of them; but in their intellection, the being of the real is expression. In the primordial apprehension of reality, we intellectually know reality in and by itself impressively; we intellectively know, expressively, the substantive being in it. And since ulteriority is a physical moment of the real—it “is here-and-now being” real—it follows that not only do we express reality in impression, but we inexorably have to express it. That is to say, to the primordial apprehension of reality in impression corresponds in an essential way its expression. Therefore upon intellectively knowing the real, we necessarily co-intellectively know its being, its worldly actuality.

It is unnecessary to stress that we are dealing with an intellective expression. The expression in all of its fullness is not something which is limited only to intellective expression of the real. But here we are dealing with expression just as intellective expression; it is the formal structure of the physical ulteriority of {360} what is apprehended in the impression of reality. It will therefore be useful to clarify the character of this expression, in which the intellection of the being of the substantive consists.

In the first place, this expression, as already noted, is not a second act, as if grounded in the apprehension of the real and carried out “after” the act of expression that apprehension. We are not talking about that. It is not a second act but a second dimension, the ex dimension of the same apprehensive act. Therefore what we have in the expression is not something that was expressed, but something which is strictly speaking expressed now. The expressed nature of reality in its “being here-and-now” present is the apprehension of reality in being. Therefore the “expressed reality” as “expressed” is its being. Expression is, then, ulterior expressed actuality.

In the second place, this ex-expression, by virtue of being the second dimension of the unique apprehensive act of reality, has also a simple character, i.e., the immediate dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. It is because it is immediate that it is not a type of latent affirmation (or anything like that) of some “is”. It is not latent predication but an intrinsic dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. What there is, is a dimension of this apprehension grounded on the dimension of the “in”; and just like the “ex”, the apprehension of the “ex” is indirect. Apprehension apprehends the real in a direct way, but also apprehends it in its being; therefore the being is indirectly apprehended. Now, this indirectness is expression. We directly apprehend the real, and in an indirect mode its worldly actuality. Precisely on account of this it is very difficult to distinguish being and reality. History amply manifests this difficulty.

In the third place, one might think that this character of expression proper to being (361) does not consist in that of which it is an expression, viz. the real, but rather something formally meant by the expression itself. Yet that is not the case. Being is neither meaning nor sense, but the expressed nature “of” reality. That something may be expressed in one of its dimensions does not mean that being expressed is “meaning something”. We are not dealing with an act of meaning something, but with an expressed actuality. Strictly speaking, it is not so much expression as an expressed character. Therefore reality is not the meaning of being, but on the contrary, being is what is expressed of reality in its being here-and-now [estar] present, however much “being” [siendo] one wishes, but being in being here-and-now present [estar]. Being is grounded in reality as what is express in what is impressed. Reality, as real, is being here-and-now present; it is thus reality which “is”, and not the case that being is reality. Therefore reality is not the radical form of being. On the contrary, what is indeed true is that the radical form of being is the being of the substantive.

Now, ratification of the real in its intellective actuality is real truth. Therefore to real truth corresponds essentially not just the being “here-and-now present” of the real, i.e. the impressive ratification of the real as real, but also the “being” [siendo] here and present, i.e., the ratification of its worldly actuality. The real truth of intellection is at once truth of the real which “is here-and-now”, and of the being here-and-now of the real. They are two aspects of real truth both grounded in a precise order: the truth of being [siendo] is indirectly of the truth of being here-and-now. Only the truth of the real qua real makes the truth of the real in its being of the substantive possible.

But the being of the substantive, which is the radical form of being, is not the unique form of being in the intellection. What is that other form, and why and how does it necessarily concern human intellection of the real?
b) The intellection of reality in its being of the affirmed. When I intellectively know a real thing not only in and by itself as real, but also among other real things, that real thing, as we have repeatedly said, is actualized in intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. The unity of the real as individual and within a field in reality is then unpacked; in a certain way it is distended. As the unity of both moments is formally what a thing is “in reality”, it follows that in the stepping back, what the thing is in reality remains problematic. Thus the field of reality becomes the medium of intellection in which what a thing is in reality is going to be intellectively known. This intellection—as we have already seen—is an intentional decrease of distance. When we assume a distance or “step back”, we have created simple apprehensions, and in the intentional decreasing we return to the real thing from within reality, which is then newly actualized, i.e., reactualized, but now in the order of simple apprehensions. This intellection, by virtue of being an intellection installed formally in the real as real, is therefore an affirmation. The formal moment of affirmation is, then, the realization of a simple apprehension in a real thing, a realization along the lines of intellective actuality. This is what constitutes what a real thing is in reality; i.e., the formal terminus of the affirmation is the “in reality”.

This is not all there is in affirmation, because what is affirmed in it is definitely a realization; and this realization, as the reactualization it is, concerns actualized thing itself as a real moment. But then I must consider not just what is affirmed as a moment of the real, but also what is affirmed qua affirmed, just because it is a distanced intellection, through stepping back. {363} There is not only the realization of a simple apprehension qua realization; there is also the realization itself qua affirmed. What is affirmed is intellectively known, but upon intellectively knowing it, what is affirmed qua affirmed is co-intellectively known. For greater clarity, if we take the example of predicative judgement, the affirmation “A is B” consists first of all, in direct mode, in affirming the realization of B in A; but it also consists in affirming, albeit in an indirect way, that this realization is intellectively known, i.e., that this realization “is” in the real. The affirmation co-intellectively knows that what is affirmed is something formally intellectively known qua affirmed. Affirmation always takes place as a unity of powers of intelligence and of what a thing is “in reality”. And this unity is on one hand affirmation of what a thing is “in reality”, but on the other affirmation of what this unity “is”. The “is” of the realization expresses the intellective actuality in its unity. Besides the direct mode realization, affirmation intellectively knows in an indirect mode that this realization is intellectively known in the real; and this being here-and-now is what affirmatively constitutes the “is”. The “is” is the being of what is affirmed of the real qua affirmed. This being is not, to be sure, the being of the substantive, because the being of the substantive concerns the real by being “real”, whereas the being of what is affirmed does not concern the “real”, but what the real is “in reality”. I shall return later to this point, because first it is necessary to clarify further what this being of the affirmed is.

In the first place, the being of what is affirmed expresses in an indirect mode, as I have been saying, what a thing is “in reality”. In this aspect the being of what is affirmed is expression. And it is so in the sense previously explained: the being of what is affirmed qua affirmed is {364} now expressed in the affirmation itself. But, in what does this being express consist? This is what must be clarified.

In the second place, there is the nature of this expression, of this “being expressed”. Only by seeing it will we have seen what the being of the affirmed is. When one intellectively knows a real thing, not in and by itself, but “among” others, it is necessary to recall that the “among” has at least three functions. It has a constitutive function (ratio essendi) in the thing, one which constitutes its distinction from others. It also has an intellective function (ratio cogitandi) which constitutes not its distinction, but the intellective stepping back from others. And finally it has an actualizing function (ratio actualitatis), the mode of actualizing a thing “among” others when the thing is intellectively known at a distance. The first function concerns reality, the second affirmation, and the third the intellective actuality of the real in intellection. For the problem at hand, only the second and third functions are of interest. These two functions have a precise articulation. Stepping back is an act of retraction in which we elaborate simple apprehensions. Their actualization in the real, the third function, thus has two aspects. Above all there is the most visible one, the relationship of a thing to what is simply apprehended. This is what constitutes what is affirmed, because what is affirmed is the realization of what is simply apprehended. But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to presuppose that intellection has carried out the stepping back. Then the respectivity to simple apprehension (the third function) rests upon respectivity to stepping back itself (the second function). That respectivity is not reactualization, because reactualization concerns the real with respect to simple apprehension. It is something previous, the respectivity to stepped-back intellection qua stepped back, {365} respectivity to the intellection of what a thing is “in reality”. If intellection were not distanced, a stepping back, i.e., sentient, there would be no opportunity to speak of what something is “in reality”; there would be nothing but “reality.”
Therefore everything real intellectively known at a distance, in stepping back, is constitutively respective *qua* intellectively known this way. And this respectivity to intellection at a distance, in stepping back (of what something is “in reality”) is what constitutes what I term the *intellective world*. It is a world by homology with the real world which is respectivity of the real *qua* real. But the intellective world is not the world of the real, but only the world of the “in reality”. Now, what is *affirmed* is what a real thing is in reality; and the “affirmed” *qua* affirmed is the actuality of the “in reality” in respectivity to the intellective world; it is a mode of being. And this actuality is what constitutes the “being of the affirmed”. Being affirmed is the actuality in the intellective world of what a thing is in reality. And since, in affirmation, this actuality goes out of (ex) the realization itself, it follows that the being of what is affirmed consists in being what is “expressed” of what a thing is in reality as actuality in the intellective world.

To preclude erroneous interpretations it is important to emphasize two points.

Above all, *intellective world* has nothing to do with what, classically, was termed *intelligible world*, a notion coined by Plato (*topos noetos*) and which is an essential part of the thought of Leibniz and Kant. The intelligible world is a world of strict necessities of what is conceived, and in this sense it is a world of absolutely necessary truths. It is a second world *juxtaposed to the sensible world*, and is above it as something *a priori* with respect to it. [366] But I doubt that such a world exists. Only a single world exists, the real world. And since the real is actualized in the formality of the impression of reality in a sentient intellection, it follows that the real world is at once and radically something intellectively known and sensed. But that is not all. The fact is that the intellective world is not constituted only by the objective content of simple apprehensions (be they concepts, fictional items, or percepts). This content is at most but a part of the intellective world. But what formally constitutes the intellective world is the respectivity of the “in reality”. In this respectivity, simple apprehension does not enter by reason of its content, but ultimately by its formal moment of reality, i.e., by being what the real “might be”. “Might be” does not mean that we apprehend is reality only approximatively. It means something else. Even if a concept were formally and exhaustively realized in the real, its character of concept would always consist in being formally a “might be” of the real, because the “might be” is the direction to the real. Now, the “might be” is grounded in stepping back, as the foundation, as the principle of the intellection of what things are “in reality”. This “in reality” concerns not just simple apprehension (either as content or as “might be”), but also and above all its actualization. And this radical respectivity of the “in reality” to stepping back is what formally constitutes the intellective world—something which has absolutely nothing to do with the intelligible world of classical philosophy.

But it is necessary to attend to a second point. The real world pertains to the real *qua* real; and this respectivity makes the real be a world. But the intellective world does not pertain to the real as such. It pertains only to the real primarily *qua* really known intellectually; {367} moreover it pertains only to the real intellectively known *qua* really intellectively known at a distance, in stepping back. And since this stepping back is a formal and exclusive moment of human intelligence, by virtue of being sentient intelligence, it follows that only with respect to a human intelligence, i.e. a sentient one, is there an intellective world. For an intelligence that intellectually knew the real in and by itself exhaustively, there would be neither affirmations nor an intellective world. This does not comprise any kind of subjectivity, because intelligence is always actualization of the real. And this actualization has two dimensions: the dimension of the “real” and the dimension of the “in reality”. That this duality is only given with respect to human intelligence does not mean that each one of its two terms is but a mere actualization of the real. The intellective world is an actualization of the real in an intelligence which intellectually knows in intellective movement, in a sentient intelligence. The intellective world is a world of the “in reality” proper to the “real” world. This duality is a duality along the lines of intellective actualization, and therefore has nothing to do with subjectivism.

In summary, the actuality of the real in the intellective world is the *being of what is affirmed*. And it is necessary to point out now in a consistent way the characteristics constitutive of the being of what is affirmed.

*a)* The being of the affirmed is not, to be sure, the being of the substantive. But neither is it merely copulative being. First, because the being of what is affirmed pertains to every affirmation and not just to predicative affirmation, the only one which has copulative being. Second, because the being of what is affirmed does not concern intellection itself *qua* intellection but only what is affirmed *qua* affirmed in it. Therefore, as I see it, it deals with a particular division of being. [368] one which is different from the classical division. Classically, being was divided into substantive being and copulative being. This division is unacceptable, because substantive being does not consist, as was thought classically, in real being (substantive being is only the ulterior actuality of the real in the world), and because copulative being does not encompass all forms of affirmation. The division should be
established between these two forms of being: the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed. Both are “what is expressed”: the first is what is indirectly expressed in primordial apprehension of reality; the second is what is indirectly expressed about what the thing is in reality. And since this duality is grounded in the actualizing characteristic of a sentient intellection, the question inexorably arises of what might be the unity of these two modes of being, i.e., the question of why they are “being”.

But in order to be able to delve into this topic, we must first attend to a second characteristic unique to the being of what is affirmed, which is extremely important, and which more clearly outlines the problem of the unity of being.

bb) The being of the affirmed is the actuality of the real in the intellectual world, in the world of the “in reality”. And this being is what is expressed in an affirmation. Now, there is a serious problem involved, that of negative judgement, because affirmation and the affirmed are the opposite of negation and what is negated. Hence it might seem to follow, first, that it is not true that intellection at a distance, in stepping back, consists in being an affirmation—it could be a negation—and second, that what is expressed “isn’t” always—it could “not be”. This is the whole problem of negation and of the negative. It is not some useless subtlety, but as we are going to see, is something which affects the most essential part of some great philosophical systems. [369]

There is, in fact, a serious ambiguity in the idea of “affirmation”. To be sure, affirmation can be the opposite of negation. In this sense, it would be absurd to pretend that intellection at a distance, in stepping back, is constitutive affirmation. But this is not the radical idea of affirmation. In the radical sense, affirming consists only in intellectually knowing at a distance, by stepping back into the reality of something, what this something is in reality. In this second meaning, affirmation is not the opposite of anything; it is only distinguished from primordial apprehension of reality. The primordial apprehension of reality is compact intellection of the real in and by itself, an apprehension which bears in an expressed way the being of the substantive. On the other hand, affirmation is unpacked and bears in an expressed way the being of what is affirmed. Here we are speaking of affirmation only in the second sense. And it is essential to keep this foremost in one’s mind. Even when one predicatively affirms “A is not B”, the affirmation itself is the affirmation that that “is” so. Therefore the “is not” does not concern the affirmation itself in the second sense. It is the same to affirm something in the first sense as to affirm that this something “is”. This sameness (tauton) was the celebrated thesis of Parmenides, albeit in a dimension and an aspect which are completely different from what constitutes what I call “being of the affirmed”. This is because for Parmenides, sameness refers to the sameness of both intellection and the “is” (something which we already saw is impossible). But Plato interprets the sameness as sameness of both predicative affirmation and the “is”. To simplify the terminology, I shall speak only of affirmation simpliciter in lieu of predicative affirmation; but understand that I refer only to predicative affirmation. Similarly, in place of the “is” one should speak of “is in reality”; but for the foregoing reason I shall speak only of the “is”. Granting this, for Parmenides [370] one could never either know or express in a statement the “not being”. Being, and only being, “is”.

But despite that, Parmenides’ own Poem continually uses—as it scarcely could avoid doing—negative sentences and judgements, affirmations that being “is not” this or that.

Despite this, I still think that affirmation is an intellection at a distance, in stepping back, in which we intellectually know what something “is” in reality. To affirm is always and only to affirm the “is”. But affirming is one thing and the character of what is affirmed qua affirmed another. Now, while affirming is always and only affirming the “is”, what is affirmed can consist in an “is” or in an “is not”. This “is not” is what is usually termed the negative. It is clear that if I affirm the negative I affirm that something “is” just negative. What happens is then the opposite of negation and the negative cannot be called “affirmation”, as if the negative were the opposite of the affirmative. This is unacceptable unless one is willing to maintain indefinitely something which is a serious ambiguity. The opposite of the negative (not-being) is the positive (being) and not the affirmative. Therefore every affirmation consists in affirming the “is”, but this being affirmed can have a positive character (“is”) or a negative one (“is not”). As I see it, all the negations in Parmenides’ Poem are negations only in the character of the thing affirmed, but not in the affirmation itself.

Affirmation, then, has two completely different meanings in our language. On the one hand, it means the intellection of the real at a distance, in stepping back; and on the other, the positive part of certain affirmations. Confusion of the two meanings has been the root of some serious consequences in the history of philosophy. Everything we have been saying throughout this book concerns only affirmation but not this positive part. [371] Thus we have the following schema: 1. being of the substantive; 2. affirmed being which in turn can be being, (a) positive or (b) negative.

But this by itself poses serious questions. In the first place, there is the question of in what the duality “being
and not being” formally consists as a duality between the positive and the negative in what is affirmed. This is the problem of what is negated. And since what is affirmed, i.e. the “being affirmed”, consists only in the “is”, there arises the second question, viz. What is the internal structure of the being affirmed in its double dimension of being and not-being?

First question: In what, formally, does the duality “positive-negative” consist, i.e., the duality “being and not-being”, in what is affirmed. Although for greater facility of expression I may set forth examples of predicative judgement, as I have said, the problem refers to all of affirmative intellection, whether predicative or not. What do we understand by not-being?

At first glance one might think that not being consists in affirming of A, instead of what it is, namely B, something which it is not, for example C. When I affirm, “A is C”, I affirm something which is not. In this aspect not being consists in error, and the error itself would be “not being” by being otherness. This is what Plato thought: to affirm what is not is to affirm of a thing “something other” than what it is. Not being is to heteron. The head of the Vedantists, Sankara, thought the same thing. Error would then consist in “superimposition” (adyasa), i.e., in transferring to one thing a notion which only fits another. But this does not suffice, because negative judgement itself, when affirming of something that it “is not”, can be perfectly truthful; it can be true that “A is not B”. And in this case the negation is not otherness. Moreover we are not dealing with the fact that a thing is (or is not) the same as what is attributed to it, {372} or something else; rather we are dealing with the affirmation itself according to which a thing “is not”, independently of whether this affirmation is or is not erroneous. Not being is not otherness but a dimension of the affirmed itself qua affirmed; it is affirming “is not”.

Nonetheless, this is not sufficient, because affirming “is not” can mean that we deny that “A is B”. In such case the negation would be negation of an affirmation, a negated copula; one denies that A “is” B. But neither is this correct. Not every negation is negation of an affirmation; rather, negation or denial is always in itself negative. It is not a negated copula but a negative copula. Put in the most general terms, we are dealing not with a negated affirmation but a negative affirmation. What, formally, this negative, this “is not”, is —that is the question.

Let us recall what has been said many times in these pages. Affirmative intellection is intellection at a distance, in stepping back of what a thing, already known intellectually as real, is “in reality”. We are not talking about distancing ourselves from reality, or stepping back from it, but keeping ourselves there. Hence every affirmative intellection is an intellection in reality. Since the negative is a mode of this intellection, it follows that the “is not” does not consist in unreality. The “is not” does not consist in either otherness or unreality. What the stepping back does is to “unfold” a real thing; it is the unfolding of “reality” and “in reality”. This unfolding therefore opens, as I said before, a type of gap in the real; it is the gap of the “in reality”. To be sure, this gap is just intellective; it does not concern the physical reality of a thing, only its actualization in stepping back. The affirmative intentionality is an intellective movement in this gap. [373] With this, our problem is now fully addressed, because affirmative intellection is first of all an intellection at a distance, in stepping back; second it is the opening of a gap, the gap of the “in reality”; and lastly it is an actualization of the real in this gap by means of an intellective movement. Therefore to ask ourselves, What is the “is not”? is to ask ourselves for a mode of actualization in movement of a real thing in the gap of the “in reality”.

In order to conceptualize this actualization, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are dealing constitutively with an actualization with respect to simple apprehensions, elaborated in the stepping back. What are these simple apprehensions? Their content, as we have already seen, can be quite varied: percept, fictional item, concept. But it is not this content which formally constitutes simple apprehension; rather, it is their intrinsic and unique dimension of reality: the “might be”. The “might be” is not the reality which is; but rather is, in reality, the distanced version of what a real thing is “in reality”. As I said, the stepping back opens a gap in reality, and this gap is the gap of the “might be” with respect to what a thing is. The gap of the “might be” is therefore the actualization of a thing in accordance with a twin possibility: the possibility of being or the possibility of not being the actualization of a determinate simple apprehension. The stepping back, and therefore the gap, is the foundation of this duplicity of actualization of the real in intellective movement. If we make use of a common though inaccurate expression, and call all simple apprehensions “ideas”, we may say that for Plato the realm of Ideas is the realm of full reality (ontos on, he called the ousia of the Idea). For Aristotle on the other hand, the realm of ideas is the realm of the abstract. I do not share either of these conceptualizations. [374] To begin with, an idea is not in and by itself reality, but neither is an abstraction. First because the idea, in this sense of simple apprehension, is not always abstract; it can have the concrete nature of a fictional item, and above all the radical concrete nature of the percept—a point over which classical philosophy has constantly stumbled. But moreover and above all, it is because the idea is neither the realm of reality nor the realm of the abstract, but the
realm of the “might be”. Every idea is formally and constitutively directed toward the reality of which it is an idea, and this direction is the “might be”. Therefore the realm of ideas, in its “might be”, constitutes a twin possibility of actualization: either the real actualizes the simple apprehension (the idea), or it does not do so. This is positive or negative actualization. They are two possibilities generated together precisely because they constitute the twin dimension of the “might be”, its twin structural dimension. The negative is not grounded in the positive nor the positive upon the negative; rather, both are grounded in the “might be” of simple apprehension as such.

Granting this we may ask ourselves what this actualizations is which we call negative. It has different moments which must be carefully distinguished.

aa) Let us take this piece of paper. Let us suppose it is not green. That means above all that the green, the greenness, is not actualized in the paper. But that is not sufficient for the “is not”, because we are not concerned with whether this piece of paper does or does not have greenness, but with whether this “not-having”, this not being actualized, becomes a mode of intellective actualization. We are not dealing with the fact that the green is not actual, but with the actualization of this “not” as such.

bb) We are dealing, then, not with actual being but with the intellect of the actuality of this “not”. To understand it, let us think about the fact that affirmative intellect is a stepping back, and that therefore there is above all the moment of contribution of the simple apprehensions for the intellectualization of what a thing is in reality. In our case, I contribute the simple apprehension of green. I see that it is not actualized in this paper. But this seeing is not a negation; it is merely the intellectual manifestation of the non-actualization. The negation is only a quality of intellective movement. Prior to the non-actualization of the green, the intelligence carries out a type of “turning away” from the green in the thing. We are not talking about a movement of the intelligence as carrying out some act, i.e., we are not talking about a “physical” movement. We are talking about an intellective movement qua intellective, qua intellectively knowing actuality of what is intellectually known in movement. The turning away is an intentional turning away; it is a positive act of turning away or aversive intellect. It is what the Greeks expressed with the preposition ἀπο, which in Latin is ab. Therefore the intellect in this apo is apo-phasis, negation. In it not only is the actualization manifest, but moreover the aversion itself consists in the positive intellectation of the “non” of “non-actualization”. With that the mere manifestation of “non-actualization” has become aversive intellectation, i.e., “actualization of the non”. The non-actualization is now negative actualization. It is intentional actualization in apo. But this which is absolutely necessary is nonetheless not yet sufficient for there to be negation in the formal sense.

cc) And this is because intellective movement is constitutively an intentional movement, i.e., intellectuation of an “is”. Now, given what has been said, we would at most have “not being” as such. But this is not a negation. Negation is the affirmation that this not-being “is”. That is, negation and the negative in it do not consist in “not-real” “not-being” but in “being not”. The negative actualization is the actualization of the not-being “qua affirmed”. The negativity in question is at one and the same time “non-actualization” and the actualization of the “not” and the “being not” of this actualization; and here we have the difference between the negative and negation. The “is not” is not just otherness, nor is it unreality nor mere actualization of a “no”; rather, it is the “being-not” of a thing qua actualized with respect to a determinate simple apprehension. Affirmation falls back in a direct mode upon the actualization of the “no” in the intellectively known real, but for this very reason expresses in an indirect mode what is affirmed qua affirmed, i.e. is the “being not” of the affirmed. But then, the “no” is inscribed in “being” just like “yes”. In what does this inscribing consist? That is the second question.

Question Two: The internal structure of the being of the affirmed. This “being” in which the “not” is inscribed is the being of the affirmed, not the being of the substantive. Therefore we are not talking about admitting, without further ado, the being of not-being, as Plato thought with his celebrated ‘parricide’ (patraloia) of Parmenides. For Plato, the Idea is full reality, ontology, and therefore to admit the idea of not-being is for him to admit the being of not-being, the very reality of not-being. But the “not-being” is a “being-not” of the affirmed such, and therefore the being of the not-being in question corresponds only to the being of the affirmed and not to being simpliciter. Now, “being-not” is one of the two possibilities generated together of the “might be”, together with that of “being-yes” so to speak (kataphasis). Hence it follows that everything we have said about negation can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to intellectation which is not a turning away or aversive, i.e., which is conversive, to the positive “yes it is”. The positive is not what is affirmed as such, but what is affirmed conversively, just as the negative is what is affirmed averagely. To say that this paper is white does not consist only in intellectively knowing it as having that quality, but in affirming that it is “positively” the white of my simple apprehension. The positive is what is intellectively known in the conversive
moment of the affirmed. Hence, it is the being of the affirmed itself which has the two moments of the “no” and the “yes”.

The being of the affirmed is the being of the “in reality”. This “in reality” is just the gap which the unfolding of one thing among others opens therein when it is actualized. This gap is not a gap “of” reality, but a gap “in” reality. The gap consists in the “in reality” of individual reality. Therefore when we intellecively know something in a stepping back, we already intellecively know the gap, not as something which is not real, but as something in the real. And just on account of this, intellecction in the gap intellecively knows, in an indirect mode, the gap itself as actuality in the real. And this is the being of the affirmed. The being of the affirmed is the being of the gap of the “in reality”. Now, the gap as such, I repeat, is not an absence of reality but just the opposite; it is a moment of the actualized real. The gap is, then, the field of the “in reality” open to what the real “might be”. The gap is therefore the openness of the being of the affirmed in its twin dimensions, positive and negative. Gap is opening, and therefore the actuality of the real in it is openness of the being of the affirmed. It is for this reason that the being of the affirmed inexorably has the two possibilities: being-not and being-yes. The gap is the ambit of intellecctive movement, and therefore is the ambit of the co-intellecction of affirmed being. And the intellecction of the real in this gap is therefore co-intellecction of its being in its twin dimensions, positive or negative. To be “in reality” is to be open to the “being yes” and to the “being not”. {378} The intellecctive world is the world of the “yes and no” of what the real is in reality. It is, at bottom, the world of the problem of the real. And here we have the internal articulation of the positive and the negative in the being of the affirmed.

With the foregoing, we have covered the essentials of the being of the affirmed as contrasted with the being of the substantive.

But we are not dealing with a difference in contraposition because both are “being”. Thus, as I said a few lines above, a question inexorably springs to mind concerning the intellecction of the unity of the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed.

c) The unity of being in intellecction. In order to see this unity it will suffice for us to review systematically what has already been said in the last few pages.

Classical philosophy identified substantive being with reality itself; it would be the esse real. That is what I call the entification of reality. On the other hand it identified what we here call ‘being of the affirmed’ with the being of predication, with the copulative “is”. That is what I call logification of intellecction. This, as we have already seen, is wrong. The being of the substantive is not substantive reality, but the being of real substantivity; being is “of” the real, but is not the real itself. Therefore real substantivity and the being of the substantive are not identical. On the other hand, the being of the affirmed is not formally identical with the copulative “is”, because not every affirmation is predicative. But starting from these two identifications, i.e., starting from the entification of reality and the logification of intellecction, which have run throughout the course of the history of philosophy, some great philosophical systems have conceived that the unity of the two forms of being is in turn a unity of identity. This is the identity of the entification of reality and the logification [379] of intellecction. It is the third and most radical identification in these systems. To the identity of the being of the substantive with reality, and the identity of the being of the affirmed with copulative being, the philosophical systems in question add the identity of these two identities, which would be the identity between the being of the substantive and the being of the copulative. That formal, complete identity would constitute the unity of “being”. Both substantive being as well as copulative being are identically beings. “Being” would then constitute the domain of the identity. And this has been a conceptualization fraught with enormous consequences, because when one conceptually identifies the being of the substantive and substantive reality on the one hand, and on the other identically conceptualizes the being of the affirmed and copulative being, the identity of both forms of being becomes decisive for the conceptualization of intellecction itself and of reality. To be sure, this identity is not necessary; but we must note that it is very difficult to avoid in the milieu of the entification of reality and the logification of intellecction.

Plato did not thematically conceive this identity. When he dealt with being, he considered the being of the real and copulative being indiscriminantly. For him it was sufficient that in both cases he was dealing with einai, esse, being. In Plato we are not talking about an express identification, but only with a serious lack of discrimination. And this lack of discrimination is what we may qualify with the expression utilized by Simplicius to expound Parmenides’ philosophy. For Simplicius the on is understood by Parmenides monakhos, in only one way. This non-discriminating, and therefore this conceptualizing as the same, with respect to “being” when one speaks of real being and copulative being, leads to the best-known concepts of Plato’s philosophy. His failure to discriminate between “is” and “reality” in turn led to a theory of intellecction (intellecction is [380] “vision” of the real, is Idea), and to a theory of the real itself (reality is what is “seen”, the Idea itself). The lack of discrimination between real being and copulative being led him to two
main thoughts which are, at one and the same time, a theory of intellec tion and a theory of the real centered upon two concepts: the reality of non-being, and the community (koínónía) of the different ideas among themselves and with intellec tion. This is the unitary structure of the real (the real “is” and “is not”) and of affirmation (community among predicates and a real subject). This is the philosophy stemming from a lack of discrimination between the two types of being, real being and copulative being. But as I see it, this lack of discrimination takes place in the deepest stratum of the entification of reality and the logification of intellec tion. And that is impossible. Being is not reality, and affirmation is not predication. Neither the real nor the affirmed being are comprised by community of notes or of genera, as Plato said.

Plato’s lack of discrimination becomes a positive identification of real being and copulative being in modern philosophy. In this identity, one can start from real being, and then the copulative being has the structure which the structure of real being imposes upon it. That was Leibniz’ philosophy. The real is a “single” substance (monad), whose identity consists in the vis of unity of union and separation of the “details” which comprise that monadic unity of the real. Predicative judgemen t is the intellec tive form of this monadic structure of the real; it is because of this that the judgement is a constitution or copulation. The copulative “is” is the adequate intellec tion of what reality is in itself. Seen from the point of view of intellec tion, both conceptive as well as affirmative intellec tion is intellec tion of what reality is in itself. This is what is called “rationalism”. But it is impossible. Affirmation is not a constitution, as even Aristotle thought and which was repeated constantly by Leibniz. But even in the case of predicative affirmation, its constitution does not consist in a bonding activity, but in actuality of realization. It is not the structure of the real which determines the predicative structure of intellec tion. The first is a question of actuality, the second of actuality. Once again, the radical mistake of this identification follows from the entification of reality and the logification of intellec tion. Rationalism consists in affirming the identification of entification and of logification, the latter grounded in the former.

This identity can be brought about by another route: real being is primarily and radically a moment of affirmed being. “Being” is the element of thinking, and the movement of thinking is at once structuring movement of the real and something “put” by thinking itself. That was Hegel’s philosophy. Being real is “a” determination of being as such, as thought being; this is idealism. Idealism consists, as I see it, in the identification of being real with the being of the affirmed, with the latter grounded in the former. In Leibniz, real being models intellec tion; in Hegel, the being of the affirmed (intellec tively known or thought, the expression used is immaterial) dialectically constitutes the being of the real. Dialectically, because the movement of thinking consists in starting from the “position” of being, and this position is ultimately a “judgment”. In Hegel thinking thus constitutes the logical genesis of being in all its forms. Dialectic, for Hegel, is an internal movement of intellec tively knowing as such. And by virtue of being intellec tion of “being”, this dialectic is a dialectic of being itself. This, as we shall see forthwith, is impossible, because dialectical movement does not rest upon itself. In the first place, it does not fall back upon being but upon the real; and secondly, because the real itself is not primarily known intellec tively in movement nor as position in movement.

Plato, Leibniz, and Hegel represent the identity of being real and copulative being. The entification of the real and the logification of intellec tion are the two foundations of classical philosophy; and it is not by chance that they have led to ontologist rationalism, even to idealism. But none of this is tenable. Being has kinds which are quite different but which nonetheless have the unity of that by which all are forms of “being”. It is necessary then to confront, in a positive way, the problem of this difference and its unity.

aa) The difference between the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed. The being of the substantive, let us repeat, is not substantive reality. The substantive “is here-and-now being”, an expression in which reality is designated in the ‘is here-and-now’, and being in the ‘being’. Thus being is not something accidental, because the real is being de suyo. Therefore there is no “real being” but instead “reality in being”, as I have been saying throughout the hundreds of pages of this work. On the other hand, every real thing is so among other things with respect to which this thing is what it is “in reality”. And here we have the radical difference: being as being of “reality”, and being as being of what it is “in reality”. The first is the being of the substantive, the second is affirmed being. And both are “to be here-and-now being”, either as pure and simple reality, or as being affirmed in accordance with what is one [se es] in reality.

This difference is then a difference in the “to be here-and-now being”. Therefore it is in the unity of the “being here-and-now” where the unity of being is constitutively found. In what is this difference grounded, and in what then does the unity of being in this foundation consist? [383]

bb) Foundation of the difference. The difference between the being of the substantive and the being of the affirmed is, as we have just said, a difference which concerns the real but which does so in a different mode in
each case. The being of the substantive concerns the real only by virtue of being real. And even were there no intellection, there would be and is in all the real a being of the substantive. But the being “as such” of the substantive does not consist only in the “being of the substantive”, but in the “as such” of this being. And this “as such” is not given except in the intellection of the real. This intellection is the impression of reality. On the other hand, the being of the affirmed certainly concerns the real, but does so according to its “in reality” among other real things. Now, this “among” is here an intellective function of what the real is in reality. And in this aspect the “among” concerns the real which is intellectively known in a movement which intellectively knows a thing among others. Hence it follows that being, both the substantive being as well as the being of the affirmed, lead back (albeit in different ways) to intellection itself, to an intellection which constitutively involves that double possibility of apprehending the real in and by itself and of apprehending the real as something which is “in reality” among other real things. This double possibility only concerns sentient intellection. The impression of reality has, in fact, the two moments of individual formality and field formality, whose unity in the formalism of reality constitutes what a thing is “in reality”. Therefore, in the unity of the formalism of reality in impression is where, in its foundation, the unity of the being of the substantive and of the being of the affirmed is constituted. An intellection which was not sentient, when it apprehended the real, would not have the duality of being as such of the substantive and of the being of the affirmed. And that means that this difference and hence this unity are not given within the being of the substantive. This being has no differentiation whatsoever along those lines. It is a difference which is given only in the “to be here-and-now being”, between the being of the substantive “as such”, and the being of the affirmed “in reality”. It is a difference which is thus given within sentient intellection and which pertains to the real in the order of actuality. The real is situated and actualized in sentient intellection as “real”, and as what it is “in reality”. Having identified these two actualities with each other, after having identified actuality with actuality, is also what has led to rationalism and to idealism. The internal root of the identification of these two actualizations is found in the fact that being is considered as something understood. But this, as we have seen, is not the case. Being is not formally understood but is something formally sensed in the impression of reality. And this being sensed, this being in impression, is what is divided into being of the substantive as such and being affirmed.

Granting this, In what does the unity of the being of the substantive and of affirmed being consist?

cc) Unity of being of the substantive as such and of the being of the affirmed. The unity in question is in the fact that both are “being”. The whole problem is then referred to the unity of “reality” and of “in reality”. Clearly this unity is the very formalism of reality, “of” which and only “of” which being is the being; it is the being of the real. The unity of being is therefore unity of the “of”. Now, this unity of the being “of” the intellectually known real has its own structure, which it is fitting to set forth.

The formal character of being has three moments. In the first place, being is actuality. It is not, therefore, a formal or constitutive moment of the real as real, but the worldly actuality of the real. This actuality is re-actualized in sentient intellection, because the world is apprehended sentiently as field.

This actuality opens the way to a second moment: being [noun] is ulterior actuality. Ulteriority is the second formal moment of being [noun]. By virtue of being a worldly actuality, being [noun] presupposes the worldly respectivity of the real. This respectivity is, on the one hand, the respectivity of the real qua real (world); and on the other, the respectivity toward other real things which, impressively understood, comprise the intellective world. They are not two worlds. This is only one world, the real world, but this world has its own dimensions according as one looks at the real world of what is “real” or at the real world of what is “in reality”. The ulteriority of being consists in the actuality of the real in that respectivity which constitutes the world. And being [noun] is “to be here-and-now in the world”, whether in the sense of real simpliciter, or of “in reality” what the real is. Now, this actuality, because it is ulterior, is not formally identical with the real, but the real is really in the world, i.e., “is being” de suyo.

In the order of intellection, the real is what is apprehended “directly”; and its ulteriority is apprehended, as we have seen, “indirectly”. When we impressively apprehend reality, we co-apprehend its actuality in that respectivity. When we apprehend the real in impression, we then have indirectly apprehended its very ulteriority; i.e., we have this ulteriority in the express sense. This is the third moment of being, indirectness or expression. Being is the expression of the impression of reality. Only because the expressed is co-intellectively known in impression can we and ought we to say that the expressed is indirectly known intellectively; indirectness is expression. Both the being of the substantive and the affirmed being have that formal unity of the ex which is grounded in the ulteriority of actuality. The “in” and the “ex” are the two dimensions of the formality of reality apprehended in sentient intellection. The first is the direct dimension;
the second, the indirect dimension. That being is “of” reality means, then, that the “of” consists in express ulterior actuality. And here we have the formal characteristic of being.

But the unity of being is not just formal. That is, we are not dealing with the fact that there are two species of being, viz. being of the substantive “and” being of the affirmed, but rather with the fact that these two presumed species are more than species because the unity of the “and” does not have a formally additive character. The “and” is dynamic unity. The fact is that the two forms of being are not just coordinated, but moreover the affirmed being is grounded in the being of the substantive as such. The substantivity of the substantive “as such” is the radical form of being. This does not mean, I repeat, that reality consists in being esse reale, but that the being of the substantive “as such” is the radical form of being in intellective actuality. Nor does it mean that affirmation falls back in a formal way upon the being of the substantive: affirmation falls back formally upon reality. Only because in that actual reality the being of the substantive is indirectly expressed, do we co-express the being of the affirmed when judging about the real. To say that the radical form of being is the being “as such” of the substantive means that inside the lines of intellectively known being, the radical type of being is the being of the substantive “as such”. It is in this that the being of the affirmed is grounded. And as the intellection of the real among other things of the field is a movement by which we are going from one thing to another, the unity of both forms of being is a formally dynamic unity. [387]

But it is necessary to purge a false idea about this dynamic unity, namely the idea that this dynamism is dialectical. Dynamic unity is not dialectical. The dialectic, regardless of the structure assigned to it, is always and only a “step” from one intellective position to another, not dialectic of actuality as such. When Hegel speaks to us of the dialectic of reality it is because he understands that reality is a moment of being and that being is a position of thought. But the dynamic unity of the forms of being in intellection is not the unity of “passing from one thing to another”. To be sure, in the affirmed itself there can be a “passage” from one affirmation to another. But the dynamism which leads from the being of the substantive as such to the being of the affirmed is not a “passing” in the intellection; rather it is the very constitution of the foundation of being affirmed in the prior structure of the being of the substantive as such. The “passing” is grounded in the being of the substantive; but this foundation is not, in turn, a passing. Reality is present in the primordial apprehension of reality, and is affirmed, in what it is in reality, in the affirmative intellection. Only there does the notion of passing fit.

This dynamic unity which is prior to any passing, and which constitutes the unity of being of the affirmed and of the being of the substantive as such, also has different moments.

Above all, the actuality of the real in worldly respectivity acquires its own character. Without abandoning the real, and therefore without abandoning either the being of the substantive as such, intellection goes from one real thing to another; the respectivity (of the real) as such, without ceasing to be what it is, is distended, so to speak, in respectivity to other real things among which the real is actualized in intellection; this is the primordial world as the field of reality. With it the actuality of the real in respectivity has [388] also become distended; the being of the substantive as such has been distended into the being of the affirmed. Distention is not a passing, but at most the structural condition so that there where the distention is manifested there may be a passing. Distention is the first moment of the dynamic unity of the being of the affirmed and the being of the substantive as such.

This distention is not bilateral, because the being of the substantive as such is the radical form of intellectively known being. Whence it follows that the being of the affirmed as distention of the being of the substantive is an unfolding of this latter, but an unfolding of actuality. The actuality of the real in worldly respectivity is unfolded in its actuality among other real things. Being affirmed is thus an ex of the being of the substantive. The being of the substantive as such is what is ex-pressed in the impression of reality; and in the distended im-pression in affirmative intellection there is ex-pressed affirmatively its being as being “in reality”. Each of the two beings is an ex-pression of reality. But in turn the real of the primordial apprehension of reality is the determinant of affirmation; this determination is evidence, an ex. Evidence is formally a moment of the real actualized in intellective movement. But since this actualization bears in an expressed way being, it follows that evidence is indirectly—and only indirectly—a moment of being. Evidence is not evidence of being, but evidence of the real. And just on account of that, indeed only on account of it, evidence of the real is indirect co-evidence of being. Therefore the expression in which the being of the affirmed consists, and the expression in which the being of the substantive as such consists, have the unity of being a distention unfolding itself, whose radical dynamic character is the ex of being. Only by means of this prior ex has the ex proper to the being of the affirmed been able to be constituted. [389] Being is being as such of the substantive “and” being of the affirmed. I said that this “and” is not additive. Now we can explain precisely: the “and” itself is the
character of an *ex*; the being of the substantive determines in *ex* the being of the affirmed. The dynamic unity of being is, then, unity of distension and of unfolding.

But this unfolding, this *ex*, in turn has its own character. *Ex* is the distended unity of the real which is here-and-now being. And so this gerundive takes on a modal characteristic: being [noun] is an ulterior actuality and hence gerundive actuality; it is a gerundive present. This “being” which is neither process nor a moment of a process, is rather a structure of the very being of the real, what I call *temporality*. Being [noun] does not happen temporally but rather is *temporal*. Temporality pertains to the substantive being of the real, and therefore also pertains, although in an indirect way, to substantive being in its impression of reality; this is the temporality of the being of the substantive. In what does it consist? Being, as I said, is ulterior actuality of the real in worldly respectivity. And this actuality is first of all a “being already”; but it is also a “yet to be”. The “is” of the being of the substantive is thus radically the unity of an “is already” and of an “is yet to be” in the “is now”. None of these three expressions is by itself actuality; only their intrinsic unity is actuality. Only that unitary actuality constitutes the actuality of the “is”. Already, now, and yet-to-be are not three *phases* of the happening of being, but three *faces* of its own unitary actuality. Its unity is the structure of the “being” [verb]. Temporality is the dynamic unity of the formal ulteriority of being with respect to reality. Time is grounded therefore in being and not the other way around. This temporality pertains to the real by itself and by the mere fact of being, independently [390] of any intellection, because independently of intellection the real has being of the substantive. But the being of the substantive “as such” is only given in sentient intellection; and therefore only there, albeit indirectly, is temporality apprehended as such. Its distention in the *ex* is expressed in a form proper to the being of the affirmed, viz. its temporal connotation. This temporal connotation, in accordance with whether it is a now, a before, or an after, is in its affirmation the unfolding of the temporality of the real apprehended in the impression of reality. The “being” [verb] of the being [noun] of the substantive is what determines the temporal connotation of the being [verb] of affirmed being [noun]. The temporal connotation of the “is” is an unfolding of the temporal unity of the being of the substantive.

In summary, being has the formal characteristic of actuality, ulteriority, and indirectness in expression; this is the formal unity of being. And this unity is constitutively dynamic: distension, unfolding, and temporeity are the structure of the dynamic unity of being affirmed and of substantive being as such.

We have thus seen the difference between the intellection of reality in its being of the substantive and in its being of the affirmed. We then examined the unity of being in sentient intellection. With this we are now able to consider the articulation of reality and being in what constitutes the truth of intellection. This is the *fourth of the questions we posed about truth, reality, and being*.

d) *Truth of intellection: reality and being in truth*. Allow me to repeat carefully what has already been expounded. Intellective actuality of the real has, as we know, two aspects. On one hand, there is the formality of the reality of a real apprehended thing. On the other, there is the intellective actuality of this formality, but *qua* “intellective” actuality. [391] And this comprises the radical truth of a thing, its real truth. This truth is constituted in the impression of reality, and as such the real truth has the dimension of an *in*. But as the real in impression has, ulteriorly, being, the being of the substantive, it follows that intellection expressly bears being as such, and therefore the impression itself has a dimension of the “*ex*”, grounded in the dimension of the “*in*”. To real truth there pertains, then, in direct mode the “*in*” of the formality of the real, and in indirect mode the “*ex*” of the express, of its being; the being express comprises the being of the substantive as such. This being as such is express only in intellection. Therefore the being of the substantive pertains, to be sure, to a thing; but the being of the substantive “as such” pertains only to the real intellectively known *qua* actual in intellection. In virtue of this, the primordial apprehension of the real constitutes real truth, but at one and the same time constitutes the formal truth of what apprehension itself is; intellection constitutes not only the truth of the real, not only apprehends the real, but also constitutes that moment in accordance with which apprehension itself is co-apprehending that which in it “truthifies” the real. The unity of “truth” of the real (in its reality and in its being) with the “being truth” of intellection itself, is the formal structure of real truth as such. Intellection not only intellectively knows the real, but also co-intelligently knows that this intellection “is” true. And of these two moments, the second, “being” truth is the *ex* itself, and is grounded in the truth of impression. Here we have the radical structure of intellection, of the actualization of the real: intellection actualizes the real “truthfully”, and actualizes so that this intellective actualization “is” truth. The second moment is grounded in the first. This grounding is not [392] a foundation or logical inference or anything like that; rather, it is the intrinsic and formal grounding character of the very impression of reality as actualization.

Truth, to be sure, is not only truth of the “real”; it is also truth of what a real thing is “in reality”. But this “in reality” is the distention of the field moment of the real,
already apprehended in primordial apprehension; and its intellection is an affirmative movement based on what a thing is “in reality”, and bears along with it, as co-intellectively known, the being of the affirmed as such. The being of the affirmed is the real being affirmed in this intellective movement of mine, and therefore the actuality of the being of the affirmed is at one and the same time the affirming intellection in its merely actualizing character; it is intellectively knowing that the intellection “is true”. It is an actualization of the “real” and of the fact that it is mere actualization, i.e., of the fact that the affirmation “is” true. The characteristic of the mere intellective actualization of the real which constitutes reality is then at one and the same time truthful intellection and intellection of the fact that the intellection itself is true. This is the unity of reality, being, and being true.

I do not deem it necessary to insist once again that here ‘truth’ does not mean anything more than the ambit of truth, because if we take truth in the sense of the truth of a determinate thing, then that ambit gives rise to two different possibilities: the possibility of truth and the possibility of error. Here we are dealing simply with the ambit of truth as mere actualization. And this ambit is not a mere “element” of intellectively knowing but is also an intellective, “physical actuality” of the real.
CONCLUSION

Let us review the general line of argument in this study. I asked about the structure of intellectively knowing what the real is in reality, i.e., as unity of its individual and field moments. This intellection is the intellection of the real among other real things. This “among” distends the two moments, individual and field, impressively sensed in the sentient intellection of reality. And then the intellection is converted into movement, into the unfolding of the impression of reality. It is a movement which starts from the real already apprehended in primordial apprehension, in the impression of reality; a movement which begins by stepping back from the real but within the field of reality. With that, the field of reality becomes a medium of intellection of the real; it is the “mediated” intellection of the impression of reality. That stepping back is a movement of retraction, in which the intellection elaborates the complex group of simple apprehensions (percepts, fictional items, concepts) whose formal characteristic is what the thing “might be” in reality. This “might be” is the directional foundation of the contribution of the simple apprehensions, in accordance with which intellection is moved toward the individual real and in stepping back knows intellectively what that real thing is in reality. This intellection is the affirmation, the judgement; it is the logos. To judge is to intellectively know what the real apprehended as real in an impression of reality, is “in reality”; and this sentient intellection consists in actualizing the real of which one judges in the order of simple apprehension; that is sentient logos. In other words, to judge is to judge of a realization; to affirm is sentient intellection of the realization of what “might be” in what “is”. It assumes different forms (positional, propositional, predicative), and different modes (ignorance, guessing, doubt, opinion, probability, plausibility, firmness). These affirmations are determined by the real itself in the order of its actualization with respect to simple apprehensions; this determination is evidence. It is a radical moment of the impression of reality; it is the force of imposition, the demanding force, of the real as given in impression. This intellection has its own essential character: truth. Truth is the actualization of the real in sentient intellection. It can be simple; then it is the truth of the real purely and simply known intellectively in and by itself. That is real truth. But this actualization can also be actualization of a real thing among others of the sensed field. Then one intellectively knows, in affirmation, a real thing based on these other things; this is dual truth, the coinciding and demanding actuality of intellection and of the real. With respect to affirmation this coincidence is “seeming”; seeming is demanding actuality of the real in a determinate direction. With respect to the thing, the coincidence is the “real”. Truth is coincidence of seeming and of the real, such that the seeming is grounded in the real. All of this is an intellective movement of formally sentient character, a movement of the impression of reality and in the impression of reality. Dual truth has the three forms of authenticity, speaking the truth or veridictance, and fulfillment. In all of them there is a moment of conformity with the actualized real, and a moment of possible adequate, but one which is imperfect and fragmentary with respect to the real. Conformity is no more than a step toward adequation. Both moments have between them that unity which we call “approximation” to the real. Every conformity is approximation to an adequation in an impression of reality. Truth has the dynamic unity of approximated being. In this truth and in all of its forms there is above all the real itself in a direct mode; but there is in an indirect mode its being, the being of the substantive as such and the being of the affirmed. Being is formally worldly actuality, ulterior and express, of the real impressively apprehended. Being is something sensed in an impressive actuality, of dynamic character, which culminates in temporeity. Intellection is at one and the same time truth of the real and its being, but truth of its being grounded in truth of the real. This actuality is not only actuality of the real and of its being, but is also at the same time an actuality of what is intellectively known qua intellectively known, and therefore an actuality of intellection itself; it is at one and the same time truth and being-truth. Intellection is not
just intellection of the real, but also co-intellection that this intellectively knowing of the real is true. And in this radical unity consists the internal articulation of reality, of being, and of truth in intellection.

This is the structure of the intellection of what something is in reality. In order to understand it, the analysis of all the moments of intellection in the order of reality was necessary. It was necessary to see step by step how every intellection consists formally in an unfolding of the impression of the reality of the real. We are not talking about coming to a kind of realism, as it was called classically, but rather of showing that all the moments of intellective knowing are radically and formally immersed in the real, and determined by the real itself as real impressively apprehended. The aspects of this determination therefore comprise the structure of intellective knowing of the logos. The real is not a point of arrival of the logos but rather the intrinsic and formal moment given in the primordial apprehension of sentient intellection. Therefore not only is it not a point of arrival which is more or less problematic, but rather it is the precise and radical point of departure, and the very structure of intellective movement. It is not just an intentional terminus. The logos is essentially and formally a modalization of sentient intelligence.

With this we have put the finishing touches on what I proposed at the beginning of this second part of my study, viz. the examination of the field structure of intellective knowing, i.e., the structure of the sentient logos. It is a structure determined by the real as merely actualized in sentient intellection. But as we shall see, this structure is the commencement of a progress within reality and directed toward the real qua moment of the world, understanding by ‘world’ the respective unity of the real purely and simply as real. The logos is a movement but not a progression. We are dealing with an enormous effort of intellection of what the real is, vaster at each iteration. This progression is what, as I see it, comprises reason. Reason is a progression from the field to the world. And as the field is the sensed world, reason is constitutively and formally sentient reason. What is this progression? That is the theme of Part III of this study.
PART THREE

INTELLIGENCE AND REASON
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this book we have analyzed what intellective knowing is. Intellective knowing is just the actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. Reality is a formality of what is impressively apprehended, i.e., is a formality given in the impression of reality. What we intellectively know in it is thus that what is apprehended is real.

The impression of reality is transcendently open. Reality is open in itself qua reality. And in virtue of this everything real is so respectively.

Reality is impressively open above all to the reality proper to each thing. Each real thing is its own reality. When we apprehend something real just insofar as it is its own reality, this intellective apprehension is the primordial apprehension of the real. In order not to encumber the expression I shall simply call “its own reality” by the term ‘real’; this has all been analyzed in Part I of the book.

The real is, moreover, impressively open to the reality of other real things sensed in the same impression of reality; each real thing is its own reality. When we apprehend something real just insofar as it is its own reality, this intellective apprehension is the primordial apprehension of the real. In order not to encumber the expression I shall simply call “its own reality” by the term ‘real’; this has all been analyzed in Part I of the book.

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Reason is founded in primordial apprehension and in all the affirmative intellections which the logos has intellectively known in sentient fashion. That might cause one to think that reason is a combination of affirmations, a reasoning process. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Reason is not a reasoning process. The difference between logos and reason is, in fact, an essential one. To be sure, both are movements starting from a real thing. But in the logos, this movement is from one real thing to another, whereas in reason, we are dealing with a movement from a real thing toward pure and simple reality itself. The two movements, then, are essentially distinct. I shall term this movement of reason a progression [marcha]. It is a progression from a real thing to pure and simple reality itself. Every progression is movement, but not every movement is a progression.

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[Roughly speaking, Zubiri is drawing a distinction between the truth about something and the whole truth about it. For the former, we say, “In reality, the situation is...”; Zubiri uses en la realidad to express the whole truth about something, in-depth knowledge of it. There is no corresponding English idiomatic expression, so “in reality itself” is used.-trans.]
This progression is not a process, but a structural moment of intellective knowing. It is not a type of "putting into action", nor is it progress toward an intellection of the real as such. No one, so to speak, "starts" to intellectually know reality by means of reason. We are, rather, dealing with a structural moment. To be sure, it is not a structural moment of intellective knowing as such; i.e., it is not a structural moment of intellection considered formally. Neither primordial apprehension nor logos are the progression in question, despite being intellecisions. But this does not mean that the progression is a type of summation of these previous structures, as if they were "uses" (arbitrary or necessary) of intellect; rather, it is just a modalization of intellection, a modalization of determinate structural character in the intelligence by the impression of reality. This modal determination is based structurally upon the two modalities of pure primordial apprehension and of logos. Only granting that we have im pregnatively known intellectively that something is real (primordial apprehension), and what this real thing is in reality (logos), only granting these two intellective moments is that moment of intellective progression into reality determined, that progression which is reason. Intellective knowing, by virtue of its structural nature, must of necessity progress, or rather, is already progressing since it is already reason through the very structure of the impression of reality given in primordial apprehension and in logos.

This is just what we must now study. The structural moment poses two groups of problems. In the first place, there are the problems concerning the nature of the progression of reason as such. In the second place, there are the problems concerning the formal structure of this new mode of intellection: that it is knowing. We shall examine these problems in two sections:

Section 1: The progression of intellective knowing.

Section 2: The formal structure of this intellection through reason: the formal structure of knowing.
As we have just indicated, the progression of intellective knowing is not a process but a structural progression founded upon the other structural moments of intellective knowing. But this does not go beyond being a vague indication, and moreover a negative one; it does not say what the progression is, only what it is not. We must delve into this problem of the progression in a positive way. Clearly, it is an intellective progression, i.e., this progression is a moment of intellective knowing itself. In progression one intellectively knows by progressing and one progresses by intellectively knowing. It is not, then, just a “progression of intellective knowing”, but a “mode of intellection”; it is what I call ‘intellective progression’. As intellective, it is a mode of actualizing the real. And this is decisive.

It is thus necessary to examine three problems: What is the intellective progression of intellective knowing qua progress? What is the progression of intellective knowing qua intellective? And, What is the formal object of this intellective progression? That is to say, we have:

Chapter 2. What is Progression?
Chapter 3. Progression as Intellection
Chapter 4. The Formal Object of Intellective Progression {16}
CHAPTER II
WHAT IS PROGRESSION?

Since we are dealing with a structural moment of intellective knowing, it is necessary to return to the root of the question even at the risk of repeating some ideas already studied. Intellection sentiently apprehends things in their formality of reality. And this formality, impressively sensed, is intrinsically and constitutively open as reality. Each real thing consists not merely in “being here”, circumscribed and limited to its own notes; rather, qua reality, it consists formally and precisely in a positive openness to something which is not, formally, the thing itself. This openness—let it be said in passing—does not consist in what, with regard to another order of problems, I am accustomed to call ‘open essence’ as opposed to ‘closed essence’. The difference there touches upon the structure of what is real, whereas in our problem the openness concerns the very character of reality. In this sense, the closed essences themselves are, as reality, open essences.

In virtue of this, the formality of reality has, besides its individual moment, a moment of openness toward something beyond the reality considered individually. That is to say, a thing, by being real, exceeds or goes beyond itself in a certain way. This moment of going beyond or excendence is grounded in the openness of the formality of reality. Every thing, by virtue of being real, is what it is; and considered according to its own reality, is in some way being more than itself.

Now, just on account of this character of excendence, the reality of each real thing is formally respective qua reality. The respectivity of reality is founded upon excendence. Everything real qua real is constitutively respective in its own, formal character of reality. Openness grounds excendence, and excendence grounds respectivity. Here I shall use the terms ‘excendence’ and ‘respectivity’ indiscriminately, and I shall also speak of respective excendence and of excedent respectivity.

Although what I am going to say of this respective excendence also concerns each real thing in its reality, nonetheless as it affects our present problem I shall refer primarily to other aspects of apprehension.

The first is the field aspect. Reality is open in itself and from itself towards other real things sensed or sensible in the same impression of reality. That is, openness determines, in respective excendence, a field of reality. The field is not a type of ocean in which things are submerged; nor is it primarily something which encompasses all real things. Rather, it is something which each real thing, through its own reality, opens up from itself. Only through this openness is the field something excendent and respective. Only because “there is” a field can this field “encompass” sensed things. But this field that there is, or rather that there is this field, is owing to the openness of each real thing from its own reality. Indeed, even were there no more than a single thing, this thing would yet open the field. It is fitting to repeat this idea, already studied in Part II, to bring the problem of Part III into focus.

But the formality of reality is also open insofar as it is the formality of reality pure and simple. This aspect, in which each real thing opens up the arena of pure and simple reality, is what constitutes the world. The world is not the conjunction of all real things (that would be the cosmos), nor is it what the word means when we say that everyone lives in his own world; rather, it is the mere character of reality pure and simple. I repeat what we just said about the field: were there but one single thing, there would still be a world. What happens is that with there being perhaps many—one would have to investigate—the world is the unity of all real things in their character of pure and simple reality.

Real things intellectively known in primordial apprehension and in field intellection are not just such-and-such real things. Upon intellectively knowing them, I do not intellectively know only that they are such-and-such; rather, upon knowing that, I also intellectively know, at one and the same time, that they are mere realities, that they are pure and simple reality. Now, reality as reality is
constitutively open, is transcendentally open. In virtue of this openness, reality is a formality in accordance with which nothing is real except as open to other realities and even to the reality of itself. That is, every reality is constitutively respective qua reality.

Thus all real things have, qua purely and simply real, a unity of respectivity. And this unity of respectivity of the real qua real is what constitutes the world. Reality is not a transcendental concept, nor is it a concept realized transcendentally in each real thing; rather, it is a real and physical moment, i.e., transcendentality is just the openness of the real qua real. And qua unity of respectivity, reality is the world.

Let us not, then, confuse world and cosmos. There may be many cosmoi in the world, but there is only one single world. World is the transcendental function of the field and of the whole cosmos.

Field and world are not, then, identical; but neither are they independent. Upon knowing intellectually and sentiently this real thing, I intellectually know, sentiently, at one and the same time, that this thing is a moment of the pure and simply real. In the field we already know the world intellectually. Conversely, pure and simple reality, the world, is as I just said, the transcendental function of the field. And in this respect—and only in this one—can one say that the field is the world as sensed. Therefore strictly speaking one should say that in an impressive way the world is also sensed qua world. But its impression of reality is the same as that of this real thing sensed in and by itself or sensed within a field. Nonetheless the two are not identical because the field is always limited to the things that are in it. If the group of things in the field is augmented or diminished, the field expands or contracts. On the other hand the world is, always and essentially, open. Whence it is not susceptible to expansion or contraction, but to distinct realizations of respectivity, i.e., to distinct transcendental richness. This transcendental richness is what we shall call “world making” or “mundification”. The field dilates or contracts, the world mundifies. The world is open not only because we do not know what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all because no thing, however precise and detailed its constitution, is reality “itself” as such.

Now, in this respect, intellectually knowing a real thing is [21] intellectually knowing it open to ... what we do not intellectually know, and perhaps shall never know, what might be in reality itself. Therefore intellecution of a thing qua worldly is not just a mere movement among things, but a progression toward the unknown and perhaps even toward meaninglessness or nothingness.

Our present question is to conceptualize what this progress is.

a) Above all, I repeat, it is a progression “from” the real, i.e., from an effective intellecution. This intellecution is not necessarily just the primordial apprehension of something; but it is always an intellecution in which we have already intellectually known—or at least have sought to intellectually know—what that real thing is in reality. The point of departure is the entire primordial apprehension of the real, and of what this real is in reality with all the affirmations which constitute this intellecution. The progression is then always progression from the great intellecutional richness of the real.

b) The real opens reality from itself in the impression of reality; it is the openness of the moment of reality. With that, this moment of reality is made autonomous in a dimension other than that of individuality. And being made autonomous has two aspects. One is the aspect of this reality by which real things constitute a field; it is the constitutive moment in which the logos moves. In this movement of the logos, the moment of reality has a very precise function: it is the medium of intellecution. But the moment of reality is autonomous in another respect. The impression of reality apprehends not only real things, but also that each real thing is pure and simple reality; it is openness not only to the field but to the world. A real thing is apprehended not according to what it is “in reality” but according to what it is “in reality itself”. One goes from real things and their field to the world: [22] this is the progression we are speaking of. In this openness, reality has been made autonomous: not only is it the medium, but it is also something intellecutionally known by itself. Reality, then, has another function which is very precise: it is the measure of what, in the world, the reality is which is going to be intellecutionally known. In fact, as one’s point of departure is real things and what these things are in reality, one progresses from these intellecutions while gathering in them another intellecution, more or less explicit, of what real being is. To be sure, it is a being-real which concerns the things included in the field and therefore encompassed by it. But this being-real goes beyond those real things qua “real”. Hence it follows that in the previous intellecution of these things, we have already intellecutionally known in some form what it is to be real. And then reality is no longer just the medium of intellecution but is the measure of what is going to be intellecutionally known as purely and simply real in openness. As this openness of the real qua real is the world, it follows that ultimately the field itself has been provisionally converted into the measure of what is going to be intellecutionally known in the open world, into the measure of what
is going to be intellectively known in the open world, viz. what a thing is in reality itself. To progress in this open world is to move ourselves into a “formal” intellection, rather than a “provisional” one, of what it is to be real. As the world is formally a world open from reality, real things intellectively known in the field seek to determine a progression of what things are in reality.

Thus progression is the movement which leads not from some real things to others, but from the field of all real things toward the world of pure and simple reality. The terminus of this “toward” in its new function has a complex character, as we shall see shortly. On one hand, it is a “toward” other real things outside the field; and thus progression on one hand will be an effort to expand the field of reality. But on the other hand, when we intellectively know, in the field of reality, what real things are encompassed by it, we have intellectively known—perhaps without realizing it—what it is to be purely and simply real. Then progression is a progression in a world which is open not only to other real things as signs, but also to other possible forms and modes of reality qua reality. And this is very important as well as decisive.

In summary, progression is not just a movement. Nonetheless movement and progress have an intrinsic unity: this unity is formally in the “toward” of the impression of reality.

This difference between movement and progression has a very precise character. The intellective movement of the logos is a movement quite well defined: it is movement of retraction and affirmative reversion within the things of the field. But progression is another type of movement. It is not movement within the field of reality but movement toward the real beyond any field at all. Therefore progress is a search for reality. It is intellectus quaerens. And because of this, though every progression is a movement, not every movement is progression, because not every intellective movement is a search for reality. To be sure, no movement is haphazard and chaotic. The movement of retraction and affirmation is grounded upon the actualization of what something already real is in reality among other things of the field, and is necessarily determined by said actualization. In progression, movement is grounded and determined in measured fashion by the previous intellection of pure and simple reality. One “affirms” what is, in the reality of the world, something already actualized in an apprehension that is primordial and in the field. One seeks reality within reality itself, beyond real sensed things, according to a measure of reality. It is a radical search in a world open in itself. Progression is being opened to the unfathomable richness and problematic nature of reality, not only in its own notes but also in its forms and modes of reality.

Here, then, we have what progress is: the search for reality. But this progression is intellective. And then we may ask ourselves not only what intellective progression is in itself, but what is the properly intellective part of this progression.
CHAPTER III
PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION

What is intellective knowing as search? Here we have the key question. Intellective knowing as search is not being in search of an intellection, but a search in which one intellectively knows while searching and by the search itself. This brings up a multitude of problems, because searching is clearly an activity of intellective knowing which should be considered from two points of view. Above all it is an *activity*, but not just any activity; it is an activity of *intellective knowing*. As I see it, this activity of intellective knowing *qua* activity is what should be termed *thinking*. But one ought to consider as well the activity of intellective knowing in the structure of its intellection. This act of intellection has its own intrinsic structure and constitutes a mode of intellection determined by the activity of thinking. Thus intellective knowing not only has the character of activity, but is also a mode of intellection as such. The activity determines intellection as such, and intellection in turn determines the activity. As a mode of intellection, thinking activity is no longer mere thinking but something different; it is *reason*. Reason is the intellective character of thinking. Thinking and reason are not the same, but *qua* neither are they independent. Rather, they are two aspects of a single act of intellective knowing as search. The activity of intellective knowing *qua* determined by a mode of intellection has, we may say, *intellective character*. But *qua* act which proceeds from an activity *qua* activity, this I shall term the *activity of intellective knowing*. That is what I expressed a few lines back when I said that reason is the intellective character of the activity of intellective knowing, i.e., of thinking.

In this manner we have before us two groups of problems which we must confront:

§1. The activity of intellective knowing as search, as activity: *thinking*.

§2. The intellective character of thinking activity: *reason*.

§1
ACTIVITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING QUA ACTIVITY: THINKING

Seeking, I said, is an activity of intellective knowing. And in order to understand it one must begin by conceptualizing what activity is. Only then can we say in what, properly, the thinking character of this activity consists. These are the two points with which we must occupy ourselves.

What is Activity?

I am referring now to the concept of activity in general. To reach the goal it is necessary to refer to notions about which we have been speaking since the beginning of the book.

Activity is a mode of action. But not every action is the action of an activity. Why? Action is always something carried out, and only that, regardless of the connection between the action and the one doing it; this itself is a problem with which we have no reason to become involved here. The carrying out of an act can take on at least two different forms, because action has, *qua* action carried out, two different aspects. On one hand it is, purely and simply, an action carried out which has “its” corresponding act. And then we say that the doer is simply in action; this is “being here-and-now in action”. Thus in the actions of seeing, hearing, walking, eating, intellectively knowing, etc., the corresponding “act” is produced in a formal way. By the fact of producing *qua* this action, the doer (animal or man) is acting in the sense of being in action. But something different can happen. It can happen that the doer is in action, but not in any action which yet has its full act or formal content; rather, the doer is in a type of continuing action and continues an action which unfolds in different stages. Then we say not
only that “he is here-and-now in action”, but that “he is here-and-now in activity”. Permit me to explain. Activity is not the carrying out of an action, it is not being in action, but being in the process of carrying out actions; activity is taking action, it is to be here-and-now in the process of action. Activity is not simply an action but an action which, I repeat, consists in being here-and-now taking action in a way more or less continual and continued. Taking action here does not refer to what is carried out—as if taking action meant that the corresponding act is being sustained, etc. Taking action does not refer to what is carried out, but only to the doer of the action. Someone can be acting in a dragged-out manner in a single action. This is not activity. Activity certain has something of action, but such action does not even its act without something more, something which leads to the act, because activity consists in being here-and-now in action. Activity which has something of action is, nonetheless, not by itself action with its act. This taking action, which is at one and the same time more than action from a certain point of view, and less than action from another (since by itself it does not have its complete act), this strange taking action, I say, is precisely activity. In activity one is involved in that action which is not only producing actions but producing them by taking action. All activity involves action (since it leads to actions), although not every action is carried out by a doer in activity. {29}

It is necessary to forcefully reject the idea that the superior form of taking action is activity. On the contrary, activity is only a modality of action, and ultimately is the successor of a full action. The fullness consists, in fact, of having its “act”. And activity is activity in the order of achieving this act. Thus, to be living or to be in movement is not activity, but simply action, because in them the doer is only in action. But on the other hand, looking from side to side or being in physical agitation are activities. Thus, being in action and being in activity are not the same. Activity is thus taking action; it is something on the order of that action which is the only thing which the “act” has, act in the double sense of being “the act” and of being its full, formal content. It is this which I term ‘act’ in the strict sense; and therefore I call this character ‘activity’. Activity is not the same thing as actuality. I call ‘actuality’ the character of act, whereas actuality consists, as I see it, in the real being present in itself qua real. To know intellectively is not formally actuality but actualization.

Now, searching is the activity of intellective knowing. It is what we term ‘thinking activity’. Let us then ask ourselves, In what does the thinking character of this activity consist?  

What is “thinking” activity?

Activity is not pure and simple action, but is taking action in relation to a formal content of its own. And here this content is intellective knowing. The activity of intellective knowing is what we formally term thinking. {30}

Thinking, to be sure, is not just about what things are from a point of view which is, so to speak, theoretical. One does not think only about the reality of what we call “things”; rather, one also thinks for example about what one must do, about what one is going to say, etc. This is true. But even in this order, that about which one thinks is what it might be that he is going to realize, what might that be that he is really going to say. In thinking there is always a moment of reality and therefore a formal moment of intellective knowing. Conversely, this intellective knowing is an intellective knowing in activity, not simple actualization of the real. In order to have simple actualization it is not necessary to have thinking, because the actualization is already, without further ado, intellective. But one thinks just in order to have actualization. This intellective knowing, which by virtue of being so is already actualization, but actualization in progression, in the form of taking, this intellective knowing, I say, is just the activity which we call thinking. In thinking one goes on intellectively knowing, one goes on actualizing the real, but in a thinking manner.

The character of thinking activity is determined by the real which is open in itself qua real. Only because the real is open is it possible and necessary to intellectively know it openly, i.e., in thinking activity. In virtue of this, thinking activity has some moments proper to it which it is essential to point out and conceptualize rigorously.

a) Above all, thinking is an intellective knowing which is open through the real itself, i.e., it is the search for something beyond what I already intellectively know. Thinking is always thinking beyond. If this were not so, there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of thinking. But it is necessary to stress that this beyond is a beyond in relation to the very character of reality. We are not dealing only with the search for other things—that animals do as well—but with searching for real things. {31} What the animal does not do is to investigate, so to speak, the reality of the real. But we investigate not just to find real things, but also to find in these same real things, already known intellectively before thinking, what they are in reality. And this is a form of the “beyond”. Thinking is above all “thinking toward” the “real which
lies beyond”. Now, three directions for the “toward” spring into view, determined by the progress toward the beyond. The beyond is, in the first place, what is outside the field of reality. Thinking is above all to go on intellectually knowing, according to this direction, what is outside the things we apprehend. Thinking is, in this direction, an activity “toward the outside”. In the second place, one could be talking about going to the real as a simple noticing, and go from it toward that which is noted in the real; the beyond is now a “toward what is noted”. In the third place, it can go from what is already apprehended as real toward what that real is from the inside as reality; it is a progression from the eidos toward the Idea, as Plato would say. Beyond is here a “toward the inside”. The “inside” itself is a mode of the “beyond” along the lines of reality. This is not in any sense a complete catalog of the primary forms of beyond, if for no other reason than that we do not always know toward which “beyond” the real may point and direct us. I have only sought to emphasize certain particular lines of special immediate importance.

b) Thinking, we said, intellectively knows, in activity, the real “beyond”. Therefore, in virtue of intellectually knowing in openness, thinking is an inchoate intellection. This is the inchoative character of intellective knowing as thinking. It is not something merely conceptual, but something which concerns the progress of intellective knowing in a very important way. Every case of intellective knowing through thinking, by virtue of being inchoate, opens a path. I shall return to this point and discuss it at length later. For now it suffices to emphasize that there are paths which in fact deviate from the reality of things. And this is because there are paths which do not seem to differ among themselves except very subtly, almost infinitesimally; it would be enough to just lean a bit to one side or the other to go onto one or the other of the paths. And this is just what thinking does. Nonetheless, these diverse paths, which inchoatively are so close, and which therefore can seem equivalent, may lead to quite disparate intellections when extended, intellections which may be absolutely incompatible. That initially slight oscillation can lead to realities and modes of reality which are essentially diverse. And the fact is that thinking is constitutively inchoate. A thought is never just a point at which one arrives, but also intrinsically and constitutively a new point of departure. What is intellectively known through thinking manner is something intellectively known, but inchoatively open beyond itself.

c) Thinking is not only open beyond what is intellectively known and in an inchoate form, but is an intellective knowing activated by reality qua open. How does this happen? Intellective knowing is just actualizing the real. Therefore the real intellectively known is something which is given as reality; it is a datum. What is this datum? The datum is above all a “datum of” reality. This does not mean that the datum is something which some reality beyond the given vouchsafes to us; rather, it means that the datum is the reality itself as given. To be a “datum of” reality is to be the “given reality” qua reality. Rationalism in all its forms (and on this point Kant accepted Leibniz’ ideas) always conceived that to be given is to be “given for” some problem, and therefore a datum given for thinking. This is Cohen’s idea: what is given (das Gegebene) is the subject matter (das Aufgegebene). [33] Intellection would be formally a thinking, and as such just a task. But this is impossible. To be sure, what we intellectively know of the real is a datum for a problem which is posed to us for thinking. But this is not the essential point of the question, either with respect to the idea of the “given” or the idea of the “datum for”. Above all, this is because in order to be a “datum for”, the given has to start by being a “datum of” reality. The real is, then, a “datum of” reality and a “datum for” thinking. What is this “and”, i.e., what is the intrinsic unity of these two forms of datum? It is not a unity which is merely additive; nor is it that the datum is a “datum of” and also a “datum for”. Rather, it is a “datum for” precisely and formally because it is a “datum of”. Why? Because the datum of reality gives us reality in its intrinsic and formal open character qua real. Therefore it follows that the “datum of” is eo ipso a “datum for” what is beyond the given. And then it is clear that rationalism not only has not taken account of the “datum of”, but moreover has a false idea of the “datum for”, because it believes that the reference to thinking is that for which the datum is given, and which constitutes it as a “datum for”. Now, this is wrong. The “datum for” is a moment of the actuality of the real in its openness “beyond”. There is therefore a double error in rationalism: in the first place, it stumbles over the “datum of”; and in the second, in having interpreted the “datum for” as a datum for a problem, whereas in fact the “datum for” is first and foremost a form of actualizing the field in its openness beyond and not the form of intellectively knowing the real. Because the “datum for” is a moment of field reality “beyond”, and only because of this, can it be a datum for a problem. The openness of reality qua merely actualized in intellective knowing is the intrinsic and radical unity of the two forms of datum, datum-of and datum-for. Ordinary language expresses this intrinsic unity of being a datum with an expression which is not only fortunate but which, taken rigorously, manifests the unitary structure of the two forms of datum: things give us pause to think. The real is
not only *given* in intellection, but it *gives* us pause to think. This “giving” is, then, the radical unity of the two forms of datum in the real. And this giving us pause to think is just intellectively knowing in thinking activity. Thinking activity is not only open to the beyond in inchoate form, but is constituted as such an activity by the real itself which was previously known intellectively. From this point of view, thinking activity has some quite essential aspects which it is necessary to stress.

1) Above all, regardless of what it is that things may give us pause to think, being an activity is not what is formally constitutive of intellection. In and by itself, intellective knowing is not activity. To be sure, intellective knowing can be found in activity, but it “isn’t” activity, and moreover the activity is subsequent to the intellective knowing. The primary intellection of the real in its double aspect of being “real” and of being “in reality” is not activity. Affirming is not activity but just movement; and not every movement is movement in activity. Affirming is not activity but movement. Movement will only be activity when the primary intellection, in virtue of what is already intellectively known as real, is *activated by what is intellectively known itself*. And it will be so precisely because what is intellectively known is open reality qua reality. To be in the action or process of intellectively knowing by means of sight is not to be in activity, but it can turn into activity. [35] Thinking, then, is not something primary but is consequent upon the primary intellection. What is primary, and indeed chronologically primary, is the intellection.

2) In virtue of this, thinking activity is not only not primary but does not even arise from itself. It has been commonly said (as in Leibniz and Kant) that thinking is a spontaneous activity, in contrast to sensibility, which can be merely receptive; thinking in that case would be spontaneity. But this is false for two reasons.

Above all, it is false because true human sensibility is not just receptive and not just a receiving of affections, but is the physical presentation of what is impressing as real, i.e., otherness, intellective sensibility. But that is not what is important to me now, which is rather to insist on the fact that thinking is not an activity which spontaneously arises out of itself. And it does not do so because the intelligence is constituted in activity only as a result of the datum of open reality. It is things which give us pause to think, and therefore it is they which not only put us into activity, but also determine the active character itself of intellective knowing. We are intellectively active because things activate us to be so. This does not mean that that activity does not have in and by itself a specific character (as we shall see below), which might easily lead to the error of believing that thinking is a spontaneous activity. But the truth is that it is not spontaneous; rather, primary intellection, and therefore the real itself, are what makes us, in a certain way, to be spontaneous. To give us pause to think is, in fact, something given by real things; but what the real things give us is just “to think”. In the first respect, thinking is not spontaneous; but it can seem to be so in a certain way, albeit erroneously, by virtue of the second respect. Without [36] things there would be no thinking; but with those things already intellectively known there is a specific activity, “to think”. Thought, one might say, proceeds from real things by the “having to think” which these things “give” us pause to think about. This is the radical point which has led to the error of spontaneity.

3) Thinking activity is an intellective knowing activated by the things which give us pause to think. And this, as I already indicated, is an intrinsic necessity of our intellection in a field, because the openness of their reality is that by which things give us pause to think. Nonetheless, this is inadequate. It is necessary to add that this openness is not simply the openness of respectivity in the world; rather, it is this same openness *qua* apprehended in the field manner. If this were not true, there would not be thinking activity. Simple respectivity in the world is the open character of reality itself. If intellective knowing were not sentient, this openness would be intellectively known, as is usually said, by an intuitive intelligence, as just a note of reality. In this case intellective knowing would not be of the thinking type. But the openness is given to us sentiently, i.e., within a field. Thus its intellection is “trans-field”, “beyond”, i.e., is a progression. And this progression is thus thinking activity. The possibility and necessity of thinking activity are then intrinsically and formally determined by sentient intellection.

In summary, thinking activity is not just a particular case of the activity of a living man; i.e., we are not saying that human reality is activity, and that therefore everything human—including thinking—involves an activity. This is false in two ways. First, not every action of a living man is the [37] result of an activity; as we have seen, action and activity are not the same. Activity is taking action, something different than doing an action. The life of a living man is *de suyo* action, that action in which the living being realizes and fulfills himself while being in possession of himself. But this action is not therefore ac-

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[This is the closest translation of the Spanish idiomatic expression *dan que pensar*. Zubiri is emphasizing the commonality of the word *gives, da*, in the two cases.—trans.]
tivity. It will be so only when the action is activated. Now, this can take place in many different ways, and that is the second reason why the conception of thinking activity as just a particular case of a presumed general activity is false. With regard to what concerns the intelligence, the activator of the activity is the real itself qua real; the real is the what arouses the taking of action, by virtue of being actuality in sentient intellection, and therefore open. And this taking, this activity, is thinking. As I said earlier, in Part I, it is not that life forces me to intellectively know, but rather that intelligence, by virtue of being sentient intellection, forces me to live thinking. Whence thinking activity forms part of the intellection of reality, not just intrinsically but also formally. As intellection is actualization of reality, it follows that thinking is a mode of actualization of reality. One does not think "about" reality but "in" reality, i.e., as already inside it and based upon what, positively, has already been intellectively known of it. Thinking is an intellective knowing which not only intellectively knows the real, but does so searching based on a previous intellection of reality and progressing in and from it. Thinking, as the activity of intellective knowing that it is, formally involves that which activates it, viz. reality. And it is not just that reality activates the intelligence in that form of activity which comprises thinking; but that intellectively knowing reality qua activating is an intrinsic and formal moment of thinking activity itself. {38} In virtue of this, thinking already possesses in itself, actually and physically, the reality in which and in accordance with which one thinks. This is what we are going to see.

{39}

§2

THINKING ACTIVITY QUA INTELLECTIVE: REASON

Thinking activity, thinking, has intellective character. I have already said that I call the internal structure of thinking intellection its ‘intellective character’. Through thinking, thinking activity acquires an intellective character which is determined in its intellection. Now, by virtue of its formally intellective character, thinking constitutes reason. Reason is the intellective character of thinking, and in this sense is the thinking intellection of the real. Thinking and reason are but two aspects of a single activity, but as aspects they are formally distinct: one thinks in accordance with reason, and one intellectively knows in thinking reason. The two aspects are not mutually opposed, as if we were dealing with the fact that some subjective mental activity (such as thinking) managed to reach the real (e.g. by reason) from which it was previously excluded. This is not the case. To be sure, I have a thinking activity which is merely psychical by which I can, for example, turn over my thoughts. But turning over thoughts is not thinking. Thinking is always (and only) thinking in the real and indeed already inside the real. One thinks and one knows intellectively while thinking in accordance with reason. It is this thinking intellection of the real, then, which should be called ‘reason’.

The real as previously known intellectively propels us, then, to know intellectively in another way, viz. to know intellectively while thinking. But that real from which we start is not just a point of departure which we leave behind; rather, it is the positive support for our progression in its search. Thinking intellection, in its {40} intellective character, is reason; it is essentially and constitutively a progression based upon an intrinsic support. It is a support in which we have already intellectively known the real. And in its intellective progress, reason must go on by newly actualizing the real in a cautious manner, i.e., by going over its steps again and again. And it is precisely on account of this that that the activity is called ‘thinking’ or pensare [in Latin], a word closely related etymologically to ‘weighing’ or pesare. Thinking has the intellective character of a repeated weighing of the real "in" reality itself in order to go “toward” the real which is inside of that reality. Thinking is weighing intellectively. One weighs reality; one weighs it over and over. And this intellective weighing of reality is just reasoning, explanation. Thus we speak of “weighty reasons". The reality which reason must achieve is not, then, naked reality—that was already done in primordial apprehension and also in the subsequent field affirmations. The reality which reason must achieve is reality weighed over and over. What then is that previous installation in the real? In order to answer this question, we must confront three serious issues:

1. What is reason?
2. The scope of reason.
3. Reason and reality.

*Readers should bear in mind that the Spanish word for reason, razón, like its Latin root ratio, has a broader meaning than just the reasoning process; it also encompasses what we in English would call ‘explanation’. This should be borne in mind throughout the remainder of the book.—trans.*
I

WHAT IS REASON?

We have just answered the question: it is the thinking intellection of the real. But this is just a generality. To make it precise, it is necessary to clarify that intellection in two of its essential aspects. This intellection, in fact, is mine above all. Of that there is not the slightest doubt. Reason is the formal character of an intellection brought about in thinking intellection. This means, then, that we are referring only to a mode of intellection, and therefore to something which concerns intellection itself as such. To speak of my reason means only that reason is something which modally concerns intellection.

Reason as a mode of intellection has three essential moments: it is in-depth intellection; it is intellection as measuring; and it is intellection as or while searching.

First moment. Thinking intellection is an intellection of something “beyond” the field of reality. I have already pointed out that “beyond” does not formally designate only other things which are “outside” of the field. “Beyond” is also that or those aspects of things within the field, but aspects which are not themselves formally in it. What, specifically, is this “beyond”? That is the essential point. One does not think about the “beyond” in some capricious way, because it is not the case that one intellectively knows things or aspects which are outside of the field “besides” having intellectively known field things. It is not, then, that there is an intellection on this side of the field and “besides” that another “beyond” the field. On the contrary, one thinks about the reality beyond precisely and formally because the things which are in the field are the very same things which “give us pause to think”. And this giving us pause to think is, on one hand, a being led to intellectively know what is “beyond”, but on the other consists in being led to the beyond by the inexorable force of the intellection of what is on this side, so to speak. And it is in this that the “giving us pause to think” consists. To give pause to think is a sensed intellective necessity, by virtue of which the things in the field direct us to what is beyond. The beyond is above all the “toward” itself as a moment of the impression of reality. But this “toward” is not just an additional moment. The “toward” is, in fact, a mode of sensed reality qua reality. Whence it follows that the real not only directs us to something other, but does so by virtue of being already real in that “toward” which it directs us. That is, the “toward”, as a mode of reality acquires, as we saw in Part II, the character of a “through” or “by”. Therefore the “beyond” is not something which is just other, but is other “through” being “on this side” what it is. It is not a deduction but the very impression of reality in the “toward” as a moment of what is on this side. And this character is the “through” as sensed physically. What is not in the field is intellectively known in order to be able to better know intellectually what is in it. And the “beyond” consists in a positive way in this: in being something to which that “on this side” precisely and formally leads us in order to be able to better know intellectually the “on this side” itself. Thus we have here just the opposite of a simple additional item. And in virtue of that, intellectively knowing the beyond is intellectively knowing what, ultimately, is on this side. That which gives us pause to think is what, ultimately, is intellectively known in the field. This “ultimately” can be the interior of each thing, but it can also be other things external to the field. Nonetheless, in both cases what is intellectively known beyond is always intellectively known precisely and formally as that without which the content of what is “on this side” would not be the reality that it is. This is intellective knowing in the “through”. And it is in this “through” that the “in-depth” consists. To go to the beyond is to get to the bottom of real things, to understand them “in depth”. And this “in depth” or ultimate nature, intellectively known, is just my explanation of them. Only by intellectively knowing this ultimate nature will I intellectively know the real things of the field. In-depth is thus not a type of indiscernible profoundity, but only the intellection of what, ultimately, real things are. Thus, an electromagnetic wave or a photon is what, ultimately, color is. Their intellection is thus intellection in profundity.

Now, reason or explanation is above all the intellection of the real in depth. Only as an explanation of color
is there intellec- tion of electromagnetic waves or photons. The color which gives us pause to think is what leads us to the electromagnetic wave or to the photon. If it were not for this giving us pause to think, there would be no intellec- tion of a beyond whatsoever; there would be at most a succession of intellec- tions “on this side”. And I am not referring only to the type of “beyond” discussed above, because the beyond is not just a theoretical concept, as are the wave and the photon. The beyond can also be what forges a novel; we would not create the novel if the real did not give us pause to think. The same could be said of poetry: the poet poetizes because things give him pause to think. And that which he thus thinks of them is his poetry. That what is intellectively known in this manner is a reality which is theoretically conceptualized, a reality in fictional form, or a poetic reality, does not change the essence of intellec- tion as reason. A metaphor is one type of reasoning about things, among others. What is intellectively known of the beyond is purely and simply the intellec- tion of what things “on this side”, in being intellectively known, give us pause to think. Therefore the intellec- tion of the beyond is reason or explanation; it is intellec- tion of the real in depth. But reason, explanation, has still other essential constitutive moments.

Second moment. Reason, as I said, is intellec- tion of the real in depth; but this reason is brought to fulfillment in the reality “on this side” which has already been intellectively known. This reality previously known is not a simple “medium” of intellec- tion, but something different. It is the “measure” of intellec- tion. The fact is that every reality is a reality which is constitutively measured qua real. What does this mean?

Everything real is constitutively respective qua real. This respective is the world. World is the unity of re- spectivity of the real as real. Everything real is, then, the world precisely and formally by being real, i.e., by its formal- ity of reality. In virtue of this, that worldly respectivity turns back upon each real thing, so to speak, in a very precise way: each thing is presented to us as a form and a mode of reality determined according to formal- ity in respectivity. This determination is just the measure. Thus reality is not just the constitutive formal- ity of the “in it- self”, of the de suyo; but rather the measure in accordance with which each real thing is real, is “in its own right”, de suyo. Measure is not the unity of relation of real things; on the contrary, measure is, in each thing, consequent upon its respectivity as such. Only because reality as reality is respective, and only because of this, is its formality a measure of its own reality. The real is reality but measured in its reality by its own formality of reality. So, rea- son is not just intellec- tion of the real in depth, but rather measuring intellec- tion of the real in depth.

This requires somewhat more detailed analysis. Every measuring is based upon a measurement standard or “metric” with which one measures. What is this metric? What is the intellec- tive measure of the real according to this metric? To answer these questions, it is necessary to recall that thinking intellec- tion, my reason, is an intellec- tion which is based upon what we have previously known intellectively in the field. Only by returning to this point of previous intellec- tion will we be able to investigate the questions A) What is the metric? And B) What is the intellec- tive measure of the real in depth?

A) My thinking intellec- tion, my reason, does not intellectively know reality as a medium but as something already known intellectively, in a positive way, in a prior field intellec- tion. This is an essential difference. If one wishes, reason intellectively knows reality itself not as light (that would be reality as a medium) but as a source of light (i.e., reality as measure). And this is a peculiar intellec- tion, because in it one intellectively knows reality by itself, to be sure, but not as some additional thing. Rather, one knows it as something which I shall term “re- ality ground”; reality is the grounding of thinking intellec- tion qua grounding. That is what I term a principle. The intellec- tion of formality is reality as a source of light, as a measure; this is the intellec- tion of reality as a prin- ciple. Under this aspect reason is intellec- tion as a mea- sureing principle of reality in depth. We shall continue to take a firmer grasp of the concept of reason as a mode of intellec- tion. To clarify it, let us state first of all what it is to be a principle; and secondly, investigate what the prin- ciple of thinking intellec- tion or reason is; and thirdly, clarify in a rigorous way the nature of this intellec- tion as principle. [46]

a) What is it to be a principal, and how is the prin- ciple given to us? Reality as a principle is clearly reality as ground; and as such, the ground is a “by” or a “through”. Now, to be a ground is always and only to be the ground of something else, of the field; it is, I repeat, a “by”. This other thing, qua grounded, is something to which the so- called ground is open; it is a “by” as open. And con- versely, the ground then has the formal and intrinsic mo- ment of openness. It is on account of this that it grounds; ground is above all foundation. But that is not all, be-

* [The Spanish word fundar is here translated as “to ground”, in accordance with normal English usage; however, this makes it impossible to track all derivatives of the word in Spanish, since some of them must be translated differently into English, such as fundación, “foundation”, which does not derive from “to ground”.—trans.]
cause being a ground is a very precise and determinate mode of grounding; a grounding principle is only one mode of ground-ability. Now, what grounds does so when it grants to what is grounded its own character of reality: a) from itself (i.e., from what is grounding), and b) when upon granting it the grounded reality is realizing itself precisely and formally by and in the reality of the thing doing the grounding. The ground passes fundamentally into the grounded. That which is grounding has not only grounded the real but is doing so intrinsically and formally. That which is grounded is then real in a fundamental way. It is in this that being principle formally consists, as I see it. A principle is not just a beginning, nor is it the mere “from where” (the hothen) as Aristotle thought; rather, it is that which is doing the grounding making itself real from itself, in and by itself, in the real qua real. The principle is so only inasmuch as it is intrinsically “being a principle”, i.e., making itself real as a principle.

How is the principle of intellection given to us? When that which is the ground is the very character of reality, i.e., when the ground is in-depth reality, then its intellection is, as I already indicated, very peculiar. Reality is no longer naked formality of reality; that naked formality we have intellectively known in every intellection since the primordial apprehension of reality. Reality is not now naked reality but reality qua grounding. How is this reality qua grounding given? To be sure, it is not reality “itself” as if it were an “object” (let me be permitted to use this word for the sake of clarity). A principle is not some “hidden” thing in what has the principle. If that were the case one would intelligently know this “object” and would “later” add to it a relation, which would therefore be something extrinsic to the object, viz. the relation of grounding another object. But such is not the case, because if one considers just reality “itself”, its being grounded is an intrinsic moment, not an added one. Reality “itself”, in fact, is here actualized, is here present to us, not like “the” realities, i.e., like an object-reality, but is actualized and present to us in itself and formally as ground-reality, or if one wishes, as the real ground. This is an essential difference. The ground is reality, but reality whose character of reality consists only in really grounding. In the object, the real is “put”, but as “against” (ob); opposite or contraposed to the apprehendor himself and to his apprehension. Here, however, the reality is not “put”, but is here and now “grounding”. Reality is not now actualized either as naked reality or as object-reality, but precisely as grounding. Reality is actualized now as real, but the mode of its actuality is as “grounding”, not as “being here-and-now present”, either in itself or against, “ob” something other. Therefore I call it ground-reality. This is not, I repeat, a relation added to its character of real, but its intrinsic and formal mode of being real. In the object, the real is actualized in the form of being “against” (ob)—as we shall see forthwith—, whereas here reality is actualized in its own way, that of really grounding. It is, if one wishes, a presenting of the real not as something which “just is there”, but as “being there as grounding”. This is the reality apprehended precisely as a principle, i.e., principle-reality. Its mode of actualization is to be actualized in the form of a “by”, as grounding.

b) Granting this, is reality the fundamental principle of thinking intellection? Definitely it is. Reality, in fact, is apprehended as reality constitutively open qua reality. If reality were not open there would be no thinking intellection because there would be no “beyond”. Reality itself would be only real things. But since reality itself is open, it is reality itself, previously known intellectively in sentient fashion, which thrusts us from itself “toward” the beyond in an intellective search; i.e., reality is grounding. But it is grounding which creates a foundation precisely because it is reality already actualized in a previous intellection; and it is in this reality that, formally, the real thing is being newly actualized. Through openness, then, reality is grounding and foundation of thinking intellection; it is its principle. Reality qua open is what gives us pause to think, and this giving is what constitutes reality as the principle of thinking intellection. The “datum-of” is the principle of the “datum-for”. This principle is therefore reality. But that must be clarified.

In the first place, we are dealing with reality not as naked reality but as ground-reality. In the second place, reality itself, which comprises this ground-reality, is not the moment of individual reality (qua individual) of each thing. We have already seen in Parts I and II that naked reality is the formality of reality. Formality is the mode of otherness of the de suyo, which has nothing to do with what Scholasticism called a “formal” object or Duns Scotus called ‘formality’. Formality is here the mode of otherness of mere stimulus. This de suyo—let us reiterate even at the risk of being repetitive—does not mean only the fact of existence. Rather, it means that both essence and existence, as in classical philosophy, pertain de suyo to the thing. Reality is not formally synonymous with either essence or existence, although nothing is real without being existent and having essence. This formality of reality has two moments. Above all, it has a moment which, for lack of a better word, I call ‘individual’; this is the formality of reality of each real determinate thing. But when various real things are apprehended, we intel-
lectively know that each of them determines that moment of reality, in accordance with which we say that each thing is in the field of reality. This is the field moment of the formality of reality. The formality of reality is thus not only individual formality but the ambit or scope of reality. It is a transcendental scope which encompasses all sensed or sensible things.

This field, qua physically real, is a medium in the intellection, a medium of intellection. The field of reality as medium is that in which something is intellectively known. This happens, for example, in the case of every affirmation. But it can happen that the reality is what leads to what is grounding, to the reality beyond, to the world of reality itself. Then reality is not a medium but ground-reality; this is the measuring principle of reality in the beyond. The field reality thus intellectively known is now more than a medium of intellection; it does not stop being a medium for the intellection of the beyond, but it is more than a medium because it leads to the measuring principle. It is unnecessary to repeat that this ground-reality is not an object-reality. This reality is that in accordance with which I intellectively know, in a thinking manner, the measure: in this consists its being a principle. Now, it is on account of this that reality as intellectually known as fundament reality is the principle of reason.

This principle is not a judgement. The conversion of the principle into a fundamental judgement is one of the most seriously flawed reincarnations in the history of philosophy. Aristotle called the intellectually known thing the principle of noein; thus, he tell us, the principle of trigonometry is the triangle. But shortly thereafter this principle is transformed into a primary judgement, in large measure by Aristotle himself, who made the judgement called the ‘principle of contradiction’ the principle or the arkhe of his metaphysics. And thus we find it in modern philosophy, above all in Leibniz and Kant, who take for ‘principles’ one or several primary judgements. They are primary because they announce something upon which every subsequent intellection is founded. In place of the triangle we now have a fundamental judgement. With this, the function of the principle becomes that of a primary rule or norm of every intellection. This is what has sent philosophy along the paths of mere logic. But it is unacceptable. A principle is reality itself previously known intellectually in field actuality, but now intellectively known as the ground-reality of every subsequent intellection. It is necessary to return to the original meaning of ’principle’: it is not a judgement but a prior intellection of reality itself. Naturally—and I shall return to this shortly—we are not concerned with this prior intellection qua intellection, but with what is intellectively known or actualized in it, to wit, reality itself. What Kant claims is false, viz. that reason is reason or explanation not of things but only of my knowledge of them.

This principle which is not judgement, I assert, is reality in its field moment: the de suyo of things within the field is what, in them, gives us pause to think. Thus the reality which reason intellectively knows is not naked reality, i.e., not reality such as it is intellectively known merely as formality of what is apprehended in sentient intellection, but is this same sentient formality in its field or ambient moment, apprehended in itself as ground-reality.

Therefore, though the content of the reality beyond is grounded upon the content of the reality on this side (perhaps as distinct from it), with respect to what concerns the character of reality, this character is physically identical on this side and in the beyond. Consequently the character of the reality of the beyond is not founded in re (as a Scholastic would say) in the thing on this side, but is physically the same thing as that res on this side. The world of reality is the same as that of field reality qua reality. It is not the sameness of an objective concept but the physical and numerical identity of the scope or ambient of the real. The only thing founded in re is perhaps its own content, but not its character as reality. The possible ground in re does not concern reality itself, only its content.

Field reality is reality “itself” in the field, reality itself in its structure on this side; reality “itself” of the world is that same reality in its structure beyond. The two structures are not independent. Their dependence is manifested in their same character. Field respectivity is the same as respectivity in the world, but, in a certain way, it is so qua sensed. And by virtue of this sameness field reality qua reality propels us to worldly reality. Then reality in the world is formally the ground of field reality; it is ground-reality. We shall see this in greater detail below. These structures are always extremely concrete; therefore they consist not only in an empty respectivity, but also in a content, however problematic it may be, which intrinsically pertains to the respectivity itself.

c) Let us clarify this idea a bit more. The ground-reality is that in accordance with which the thinking intellection measures; it is just what constitutes the being of a “principle”. In this respect, reason is intellection as a principle. To be sure, the principle which constitutes reason as a principle is what we can call the ultimate principle. Permit me to explain. Every thinking intellection is based upon something, and this something is by itself a
principle of intellec­tion. Thus, return­ing to the ex­am­ple of Aris­totle, the tri­an­gle is the prin­ci­ple of tri­go­no­met­ric in­tellec­tion. But this does not mean that in its turn, the tri­an­gle can­not be some­thing whose own in­tellec­tion is based un­der the in­tellec­tion of, for ex­am­ple, per­pen­di­cu­lar and an­gles. Then these lat­ter are the prin­ci­ples of in­tellec­tion of the tri­an­gle. This means that a prin­ci­ple can have its be­ing as a prin­ci­ple only provi­sion­ally. But what is it that con­stit­utes the be­ing of the prin­ci­ple of rea­son itself qua rea­son? We are not deal­ing only with tri­go­no­met­ric or some other type of rea­son, but rather with rea­son qua rea­son. Now, the prin­ci­ple of all the lim­ited prin­ci­ples of rea­son is “rea­lity”, rea­lity in its phy­sical and iden­ti­cal char­ac­ter. And in this sense, I say that rea­lity is the ut­ti­mate prin­ci­ple, ut­ti­mate in the sen­se that its in­tellec­tion is what con­stit­utes the prin­ci­ple of rea­son as such. This is the ut­ti­mate nature of be­ing a prin­ci­ple. It does not re­fer to an ut­ti­mate nature which is recur­rent in the sens­es of a causal se­ries or to any­thing of that na­ture. What then is rea­lity it­self as the prin­ci­ple of rea­son? [53]

To be sure, the prin­ci­ple is not “be­ing” nor there­fore “en­tity”, be­cause rea­lity is some­thing in prin­ci­ple prior to be­ing and all en­tity. And this is not some trivial­ity, as if we were deal­ing only with a change of words. Be­ing, as I see it, is al­ways and only ac­tual­i­ty of the rea­l it its re­spect­ivi­ty qua real, i.e., ac­tual­i­ty of the rea­l in the world. On the oth­er hand, rea­lity is for­mal­i­ty of the rea­l as real, i.e., the rea­l as some­thing de suyo. Rea­lity and be­ing are not the same. The proof is in the fact that be­ing has its own modes, which are not for­mally modes of rea­lity; an ex­am­ple, as I see it, is tempo­rar­ity. Mor­e­over, be­ing is found­ed un­der rea­lity and has its explana­tion there. There is no esse reale but only rea­tus in essendo. The prin­ci­ple of rea­son as such is, then, not be­ing but rea­lity. There­fore it is stric­tly false to think that be­ing is the ut­ti­mate in­stan­ce of things—that rather is “rea­lity”. I shall re­turn to this prob­lem at greater length.

This prin­ci­ple is not an ob­jec­tive, an­alog­i­cal, or uni­vo­cal con­cept. And this is be­cause we are not deal­ing with the case of rea­son find­ing it­self com­pel­led to in­tellec­tive­ly know the rea­l as some­thing which the ob­jec­tive con­cept of rea­lity makes ef­fective, a con­cept which would be found to be at var­i­ance with the di­verse cat­e­gories of things or pre­dicted un­i­vo­cally of them. Rea­lity is not an ob­jec­tive con­cept, but the in­tellec­tive ac­tu­al­i­ty of a phy­sical mo­ment of the rea­l, of its own for­mal­i­ty of field rea­lity. The field mo­ment of rea­lity is phy­sically rea­l. In­ssofar as it pertains to the field, it is a sensed mo­ment; but qua real it is al­ready an in­tellec­tive­ly known mo­ment. Rea­son is not thrust upon rea­l things by the con­cept of rea­lity; rather, phy­sical ac­prehension of rea­lity it­self makes one in­tellec­tive­ly know, phy­sically, “the” rea­lity in rea­son. And this is the prin­ci­ple of rea­son. There­fore rea­lity as prin­ci­ple is in rea­son not only ob­jec­tive­ly, but really. It is not some­thing which needs to be ac­com­plished by rea­son, as if we were deal­ing with some pass­ing from a con­cept of rea­lity to the rea­l part of things; rather, the fac­t is that rea­lity as phy­sical field is that which in­tri­n­sically and for­mally pertains to the in­tellec­tion of the rea­l in rea­son. This in­tellec­tion, this rea­son, is al­ready phys­i­cally in that field. Whence a prin­ci­ple is not that con­cept into which all oth­ers are res­olved; rather it is al­ready phys­i­cal rea­lity itself in its field mo­ment. This rea­lity as ground­ing prin­ci­ple of rea­son can also be called ‘rea­son’, but not by vir­tue of being a mo­de of in­tellec­tion, only in vir­tue of being a rea­l prin­ci­ple of this mo­de of in­tellec­tion. In place of an ob­jec­tive con­cept we have, then, the phys­i­cal rea­lity of what pertains to the field. Rea­lity qua field rea­lity is, in a cer­tain way, the ex­pla­na­tion or rea­son of rea­son it­self. There­fore this in­tellec­tion, I re­peat, does not con­sist in in­tellec­tive­ly know­ing how some­thing real­izes the ob­jec­tive con­cept of rea­lity, but rather in in­tellec­tive­ly know­ing how the phys­i­cally rea­l field is, qua rea­lity, some­thing deter­min­ate in each rea­l phys­i­cal thing; it is the in­tellec­tion of the rea­l it­self mea­sured by phys­i­cal rea­lity in its own na­ture as a field. Each rea­l thing, as rea­l, is a mo­de and for­m of rea­lity as in the world, i.e., it is rea­l as a for­mal in­divid­ual mo­ment in the field of rea­lity. There­fore to in­tellec­tive­ly know some­thing as rea­l in the field sen­se is not to in­tellec­tive­ly know it “under” the ob­jec­tive con­cept of rea­lity, but to in­tellec­tive­ly know some­thing “within” the phys­i­cal am­bit of rea­lity, within the field mo­ment qua for­mal­i­ty of rea­lity. Rea­lity is thus a prin­ci­ple not only of the in­tellec­tion of every­thing rea­l in the most pro­found sen­se, but the prin­ci­ple of rea­son it­self; it is the rea­lity of what pertains to the field, not as such but as being the prin­ci­ple measur­ing of the rea­l. In this re­spect—which is cer­tainly the most ra­dical—rea­son is in­tellec­tion pre­cisely as the prin­ci­ple of the rea­l. Hence the usual con­cept of rea­son, to wit, “fac­ulty of prin­ci­ples”, is for me false be­cause the plural “ prin­ci­ples” has no mean­ing un­less one un­der­stands by ‘ prin­ci­ple’ some­thing like “fund­mental judg­ment”. And this, as we saw, is wrong. A prin­ci­ple is not a fund­ment­al judg­ment, and there­fore there is only a sin­gle prin­ci­ple: rea­son. And be­cause of this, rea­son is not the fac­ulty of prin­ci­ples but in-de­pth in­tellec­tion of the rea­l through prin­ci­ples.

The rea­l, I said, is con­stitutively mea­sured qua rea­l. And it is be­cause of this that rea­lity has the char­ac­ter of prin­ci­ple, viz. that of be­ing its own mea­sure. The rea­l is that which is mea­sured in the field sen­se in its own for­mal­i­ty of rea­lity.
With what is this measuring brought about? With a canon. The intellection of the real in reason is not only via principles but also constitutively canonic, i.e., possessing a canon.

B) Canonic character of intellection via principles. We have intellectively known the principle, we have obtained it, in a prior field intellection of the real as real. This might seem poor, because the reality which we have intellectively known in the field manner is itself apparently poor and provisional. This is a question to which I shall immediately return. But it is in light of what we have learned about the principle that we are going to measure the real in the most profound sense, both in respect of its content as well as its mode of reality.

Consider some examples to clarify what I just said. In the most elemental field of reality we have intellectively apprehended that the material things in it are what we term ‘bodies’. In the progression beyond the field it has been thought for many centuries that the things “beyond” are also bodies—of another class, [56] to be sure, but still bodies. It required the commotion generated by quantum physics to introduce in a difficult but undeniably successful way the idea that the real beyond is not always a body. Elementary particles, in fact, are not corpuscles (neither are they waves in the classical sense, be we leave aside this aspect of them) but another class of material things. Borne along by the field intellection of things, we were disposed to intellectively know the things beyond the field as bodies, different perhaps, but when all was said and done, still bodies. The measure of the real was undertaken with a determinate metric: “body”. Now, the progress toward reality has opened up to us other real material things which are not bodies.

But this is not all. In the process of intellection of real things within the field there has been decanted into intellection not just the intellection that the real things are bodies, but also and above all the intellection that to be real is to be a “thing”, in the sense that this word has when one speaks, for example, of “thingness”. That was the measure of reality: progression beyond the field was brought about by thinking that the measuring reality is a “thing”. An intellection much more difficult than that of quantum physics was needed in order to understand that the real can be real and still not be a thing. Such, for example, is the case of person. Then not only was the field of the real broadened, but that which we might term ‘the modes of reality’ was also broadened. Being a thing is only one of those modes; being a person is another. Thus not only has the catalog of real things been changed, i.e., not only has a reality beyond the field been discovered, but the character of reality itself as a measure has changed, because a person is something different from a stone or a tree not just by virtue of his [57] properties, but by his mode of reality; the mode of reality of a person is different from the mode of reality of a stone or a tree: the measure of reality is not that of being a thing.

I have adduced these examples because they clearly show that progression is a search not just for new things but also for new forms and new modes of reality. Upon intellectively knowing the real in the field sense, we have not just intellectively known this or that thing, but also just what it is that we call ‘real’. These two dimensions are not independent. Their intrinsic unity is that with which the real is measured in thinking activity. The intellectual part of this activity consists first and foremost of thinking in accordance with an intellective measure. That reality which is already known intellectively is not a medium but a measure, both with respect to what concerns what is real and what concerns that which we call form and mode of reality. Now, that which is measuring is always reality in the profound sense. But the measurement is always brought about by some particular metric. Reality as the measuring principle is what I term canon of reality. Here I take the word ‘canon’ in its etymological sense. The Greek word kanon is formed from another Greek word kanna which is of Semitic origin (Akhadian qana, Hebrew qaneh) meaning a cane, which served among other things as a standard of measure. Reason, the intellectus quaerens, bears this canon in its intellection, and with it measures the reality which it seeks, at one and the same time as real thing and as mode of reality.

This canon is not a system of norms for measuring the intellection of the real. The concept of canon entered philosophy with Epicurus and was revived by Kant. For all of this philosophy, the canon was a group of norms (logical or of some other order). The canon would thus be a system of judgements which regulate the intellectual measurement of the real. But this, as I see it, is unacceptable, because it makes affirmative predication the very essence of intellection. And that is wrong. A canon is not a system of normative judgements but is, as the etymology of the word expresses precisely, a “metric”; it is not a judgement nor a system of judgements which regulate affirmative measurement. This “metric” is just what was previously known intellectively as real in its form and in its mode of reality. The thinking intellection goes off in search of the real beyond what was previously intellectively known, based upon the canon of reality already known. It is essential to reiterate the main point: a canon is not the canonic of Epicurus and Kant, but what the word meant when spoken in Greece, for example the canon of Polycletus.
This canon, in my opinion, has very precise characteristics which it is necessary to point out.

Above all, the canon is always concrete; it has the character of concreteness in an essential way. We have intellectively known the canon previously upon intellec
tively knowing the real in the field of reality. And already in that case, as I have said, we have intellectively known not just what each real thing is among others, but also—perhaps without realizing it—what it is to be real. Now to be sure, I intellectively know, in real things of the field, what in them is their being real. That is, this is an intel-
lection which is essentially concrete. And this is just the
canon of reality. We are not, then, dealing with the fact that in the field we have intellectively known in what be-
ing real consists in the abstract and in all of its generality; rather, we are dealing with the concrete mode in which what we intellectively know in the field is real. The
canon of reality is what, through reality, we have intellect-
ively known within the field. And this is an essential character of the canon. But it has still others.

In the second place, in fact, the canon does not have [59] a definite form of being a canon. On the contrary, there are many different modes of being a canon; there are
different modes of measuring. When speaking of a canon, we tend to think that it consists formally in being con-
ceptualized reality, perhaps concrete and limited, but al-
ways conceptualized. But this is not the case. The canon
can be conceptualized reality, but it is not necessary for it
to be so. It can be, in fact, an emotional measure, for ex-
ample, or a metaphorical measure, etc. The metaphor is
not only so in its content, but above all concerns its own
mode—metaphorical—of measuring the real. The canon
is not formally any of these natures; it is canon qua mea-
sure, regardless of the mode of measuring.

But this is not all. In the third place, the canon is essen-
tially an open canon. Inasmuch as we continue to intel-
lectively know more real things, the canon measuring
reality continues to change as well. And this happens in
two ways. The canon continues to change above all be-
cause what constitutes the field measure of reality has
been changing. For example, what the canon is after
having intellectively known “persons” is not the same as it
was when we intellectively knew only “things”. The
measuring reality, in its concrete condition and within a
determinate mode of measure, continues to expand or
contract, but always goes on changing. But there is an-
other sense to this variation, because the canon does not
only consist in being a concrete metric of measurement;
rather, things, when they are measured, turn out to be of
greater or lesser reality with respect to reality itself as

principle. Whence the canon itself remains open not just
on account of real things, but also by virtue of the charac-
ter of reality. [60]

In summary, the measure of the real in the intellec-
tion of reason has an open character which is rooted in
principles and canonic. It is rooted in principles because
it deals with reality as a principle; it is canonic because it
deals with reality as a canon. The two aspects are insepa-
rible: the principle is such for a canon, and the canon is
always a canon according to a principle. Their intrinsic
unity is a measuring moment of reason. In order to sim-
plify, I shall call it a ‘canonic principle’. Reason has a
first moment, that of being intellection in depth. It has a
second moment, that of being the canonic intellection
of this depth. But it has in addition a third moment, since
reason is formally and constitutively reason, by virtue of
being intellection in its quest mode.

Third moment. Reason progresses in measured
fashion towards an in-depth intellection. Therefore it has
this moment of being a quest for that which is going to be
intellectively known. This moment of quest can lead to a
mistake which it is necessary to root out. I have already
hinted at it before. The fact is that we are not dealing
with the quest for an intellection which we still do not
possess; we are rather dealing with a proper mode of in-
tellection, viz. the quest itself, quest or search as a mode
of intellection. Reason is formally intellectus quaerens,
i.e., inquiring intellection. It is inquiring itself as a mode
of intellection. Reason is only a mode of intellection; it is
not intellection pure and simple. Reason is formally and
structurally a quest or search, because reason is intellec-
tion of the real insofar as the real gives us pause to think.
Now, to intellectively know what gives us pause to think
and is giving us pause to think, is the very essence of the
search. Reason, then, is formally and structurally a
“search”. Thus to reason there pertains essentially not
just the moment of depth and the moment of measuring,
but also [61] its inquiring character. On this point phi-
losophers have usually gone astray. What is this formal
mode of intellectually knowing in the inquiring sense? I
shall begin responding to this question by pointing out
some essential aspects of the intellectual search.

A) Above all, reason is dynamic. The matter is
clear: reason is progression, and while not all movement
is progression, nonetheless all progression is movement.
Therefore reason has a formally dynamic structure. And
it is essential to emphasize this. Reason is not just a sys-
tem which is articulated in the nature of a principle and a
canon, as for example in the demonstration of a theorem.
This type of demonstrative system is, as we shall see, the
result of reason, but not what formally comprises reason. Reason is a progression; and the principle and canon of reason are the principle and canon of searching, of the search for reality in depth. If reality were totally and completely apprehended in primordial apprehension, there would be no need to speak of reason. Intellection is not inquiring reason because reality is intrinsically articulated in a fundamental form, but because this fundamental articulation, precisely by virtue of finding itself only in depth, must be an articulation which is sought after. It is not enough for us to move within the field of reality; rather, we must progress in depth beyond the field. The difference between what is on this side of the field and its ultimate nature is the difference which makes the dynamic moment a progression of reason. It is this progression which has a canonic principle.

B) This canonic principle is not proper to just any progression, but only to one which is formally intellective; it is an inquiring progress, and the canonic principle is the principle of inquiry. The canonic principle is a canonic principle of intellective search. Therefore this principle is not the canonic representation of the real. The canon does not measure the real in such a way that anything falling outside the scope of what the canon presents is declared non-real. The canon does not measure the real as representation, but on the contrary as a “direction” of search. Therefore it can happen, and in fact does happen—perhaps most of the time, as in the examples previously cited—that the real actually encountered is not like real things intellectively known in the field sense and presented in the canon. Nonetheless, the canon does not cease to function as a canon, since it is precisely by being directed by that representation that the thinking intellective search is able to find diverse realities in it. The canon is directional. Only by going to seek bodies is it that reason has been able to intellectively know something “material” which is not “corpuscular”. Reason is the directionality of a progression. To be sure, there would be no direction without representation; without intellection of bodies there would be no direction for searching beyond the field. But this representation does not consist in being the norm or measure of what, in fact, is real; but rather in being the direction of an in-depth search. All searching has a precise direction determined by a previous representation. To search is to go while opening for oneself a path in the light of the direction which has been marked out for us by what has already been presented. Reason is not a quiescent system of articulated strata, but a system of inquiry; it is directional reason. Reason is above all the direction of an in-depth search.

C) Reason as search is not just directional; by virtue of being so it is constitutively provisional. This is the provisionality of reason. Reason is always subject to possible canonic “readjustments” or “renovations”, which by virtue of being so are rational readjustments or renovations. Such readjustment clearly concerns the content of what is presented in the canon, regardless of the nature of this presentation, which may not necessarily be a visual image. But when all is said and done, the essential part of the matter is that the readjustment not only remakes the content of what is presented as real, but also the very direction of all subsequent search, of all subsequent reason; hence it is that the direction of reason is always provisional. Provisional does not mean that it is false; that is another question with which we shall deal later. Rather, it means that even if true, it is a truth which by its very nature will be not necessarily derogated, but superceded. The nature of this superceding depends upon the individual case. But it will always be the case that what is superceded, precisely because of its nature, is formally provisional.

Dynamic, directional, and provisional is how reason is formally inquiring. This inquiring character, as I have already said, is a moment of the proper mode of the intellection of reason.

Now, intellection is actualization of the real. Therefore if reason is inquiring, this inquiring is determined by the mode of actualization of the real. What is this mode by which it affects the inquiry? That is the question upon which it is necessary to focus after having analyzed some characteristics of inquiry. We have already seen that reason is intellection thrust “toward” what is beyond the field, i.e., in depth. This thrusting does not happen in a negative way; i.e., we are not dealing with a case of the field expelling us to some realm outside the field. On the contrary, the field thrusts us from the field, to be sure, but within and not outside of the real itself qua real. That is, the thrusting “toward” is a positive actualization of the reality beyond the field aspect of reality. The essential point of the question is this positive actualization. The field throws the intelligence in front of a real, but outside-the-field, reality. And this thrusting before itself, actualizing that toward which we are thrust, is just what the word problem (from the Greek, pro-ballo, to throw something “in front of”) means in its etymological sense. In a problem there is already an actualization, i.e., there is an intellection of reality; but this actualization is at the same time still not fully actual. This being-now-actual in a certain way without being so, or rather without being so fully, is the nature of the problematic. The problematic is not primarily the character of my progression, but is primarily...
the character of the actualization of the real. The real gives one pause to think. And this giving is precisely the problematic, something given by the real. Reality in the “toward” hurls me to a peculiar actuality of the real, to a problematic actuality. And this actuality of the real as a mode of actualization is what formally constitutes a problem. It is on account of this that problems are not created, but discovered or found. Only because the real is problematically actualized, and only because of this, intellection is—and must be—inquiring by intrinsic necessity. Inquiring is the mode of intelligently knowing problematic reality qua problematic. And this is inexorable. It is quite possible that, hurled by the real as problematic, we might retreat and not continue the intellection. There are millions of problems to which everyone can give a wide berth. But what is necessary is that we either stop before the problem or we give it a wide berth. And this necessity is just inquiring. Giving it a wide berth is a form of inquiring. The problematic determines an inquiring intellection as such. This [65] inquiring can have the negative aspect of giving something a wide berth, or the positive aspect of our taking up the problematic. This taking up can in turn have different modalities. Inquiry can be take up and resolve the problem. But this is not the general case, because there are perhaps radical problems which the strict intellection of reason cannot resolve. Then “taking up” means only treating the problem. The “treatment” of the problematic is already an incipient solution. But this solution can be something toward which the incipient treatment only directs us in a convergent manner; it is a convergence which most of the time would be only “asymptotic”. In every case what is formally essential to inquiring reason is to be a “treatment” of the problem.

In summary, reason is a mode of intellection which has three proper moments. It is above all an intellection in depth. In the second place, it is a measuring intellection, i.e., an intellection of the real precisely as principle and canonic. Finally, it is an intellection with an inquiring character. The intrinsic unity of these three moments constitutes reason as a mode of intellection. If we wish to reduce it to a formula, we might say that reason is intellection in which in-depth reality is actualized in a problematic way, and which therefore compels us to inquire through principles and a canon about the real in-depth. Let us not take this expression as a definition in the usual sense of the word, but as a descriptive expression of what reason is, and it is something toto caelo different from what is usually understood by ‘reason’. It would not be superfluous to pin down further the nature of this difference.

D) Philosophy has customarily limited itself to a conceptualization of intelligence as affirmation: to know intellec tively would be to affirm something of something—what many pages ago I termed [66] the logification of intellection. This idea runs parallel to another according to which reality and entity are identified, viz. the entification of reality. Both identifications are unacceptable; but what is now important to us, to clarify the problem of reason, is to concentrate on the logification of intellection. This logification has led to some concepts of reason which are vitiated at their very root. As we have already seen, according to these concepts, one understands by ‘reason’ the “faculty of principles”, i.e., the faculty of fundamental judgements. And this is false because a principle is not a judgement based on principle, but mere sentient actualization of reality as ground-reality. A principle has to be understood not in a concipient intellection but in a sentient intellection. Judgement is only one mode among others of this actualization, and therefore is something derived from it. In virtue of this, a principle is “reality” itself. And therefore reason is not the faculty of principles but intellection as principle. And that logification of intellection, I repeat, is what has led to certain concepts of reason which are, as I see it, unacceptable. Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can reduce these concepts to three.

Above all, there is the concept that reason is logical rigor. This concept, in a definitive way, has led to understanding reason as a reasoning process. Thus the process of reasoning would be the supreme form of logical rigor. This logical rigor caused reason to be conceived as something absolute. The idea, in various forms, has been circulating since Parmenides, Plato, and even Aristotle, and in modern philosophy culminates in Leibniz. The rigor of the reasoning process would be founded upon various kinds of rigorous evidence from the so-called principles of reason, i.e., in primary conceptual evidence, which for Leibniz were reduced to identities. Reason would be the organ of absolute conceptual evidence. [67] Hence, over and above sensibility, the absolute conceptualization of reason would float. Reason would be the canonic principle of the real, because a canonic principle would be a judgement of absolute conceptual evidence. If we go beyond what is apprehended sentimentally, it would of necessity be by means of rigorous logic. Now, all of this is unacceptable not only as an idea, but even as a description of the fact of intellection, because to know intellec tively is not to conceive and judge, but to sentiently apprehend the real as real; it is not “logical” but “sentient” intellection. And what carries us beyond the sentient apprehension of the real is not logical necessity, but the sentient actualiza-
tion of the real in the “toward”; it is the real “toward”, and not some logical necessity. The principle of reason is not concepts and primary judgements, but reality physically apprehended in the “toward”. Reason is not the organ of absolute evidence, but the organ of the progression of intellection in depth of the real already intellectively known sentiently.

According to a second concept, reason is not logical rigor but dialectical necessity; the logos logifies reason in the form of dialectic. This is Hegel’s idea. For Hegel, logical rigor consists but in seeing the real in the mirror or speculum of reason “itself”. Reality does not go beyond the “mirrored” or “specular” image of reason. Hence reason is speculative reason. The principles of reason are not a type of absolute conceptual evidence, but the unfolding of the speculative structure of reason. Reason is the unfolding of concepts. And the principle of this unfolding is not evidence but the intrinsic inconsistency of the concept. Reason cannot stop at a concept without seeing it dissolve into its opposite; then the original concept is recuped by incorporating into it this opposite, synthesizing a new concept from both, and so on ad infinitum. [68] The only consistent thing is then reason in its movement. Reason is movement, this movement is dialectical, and it consists in the turning of reason in upon itself; such would be the principle of reason under this concept. Reason would be speculative conceptual dialectic, in itself the very concept of the concept, i.e., Idea in the Hegelian sense.

But this is impossible. Reason is not movement within a concept; nor is it movement “in itself”; rather, it is a progression “toward the other”, intellection of the beyond. Reason is not a movement of concepts but a search within reality. Reason is inquiring, reason progresses. And this progression is not, to be sure, the result of some evidence, as Leibniz maintained; but neither is it the internal mobility of concepts. Reality is not the mirrored or specular image of reason. It is not the case that concepts are in themselves inconsistent; rather, it is reality itself which is intellectively actualized in problematic form. What moves reason is not the inconsistency of concepts, but the problematicism of concepts. And it is on account of this that intellection, whether inconsistent or not, is still of an inquiring nature. Inquiring is the intellection of the problematic as such. The progression of inquiring is, then, nothing but the progressive actualization of the real.

According to a third concept, reason is neither rigor of absolute evidence nor dialectical necessity. Reason would simply be organization of experience. This was Kant’s idea. The primary judgements of reason are not judgements about reality, but judgements about my intellection of experience. Regardless of how one interprets Kant’s philosophy (psychological, logical, or transcendental organization), reason must be the organization of these intellections. Such organization would have a precise [69] character, viz. totalization. The content of reason would not be the totality of the real but the logical totality of my intellections. Kant called these totalities (world, soul, God) Ideas. Reason is not the organ of absolute evidence nor the dialectic of the internal inconsistency of thinking; rather, it is purely and simply logical totalization. But this is unacceptable. And it is so for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is clear that reason is based upon what I have termed ‘prior intellection’. But these intellections upon which reason is based and to which I here refer are not intellections qua intellections, but the reality intellectively known in them. And since this intellection is sentient, it follows that reason is not the reason of intellections, but the reason of reality intellectively known in sentient fashion. In the second place, with regard to this sensed reality, reason does not organize its totalization, but its measure as open and in-depth. The presumed organization of experience is not the construction of a logically closed totality, because reality is in itself open qua reality. Reason is not organization but simply measuring as the principle and canon of the character of reality in depth.

The logification of intellection has led to three ideas of reason: organ of absolute evidence of being, organ of speculative dialectic, and organ of the total organization of experience. These conceptions are unacceptable at their root, because intellective knowing is not judging but sentimentally actualizing the real. Whence it is that reason does not rest upon itself, but is always just a mode of intellection. Reasoning, speculating, and organizing are three ways—among the many possible—of intellectively progressing in depth toward the beyond. And this progression is by its own formal nature grounded [70] upon a previous intellection, a sentient intellection.

With this we have examined with some care what reason is as a mode of intellection, i.e., what is my reason. But this is not enough to conceptualize what reason is, because the fact that the reason is mine is just an aspect of reason. In an essential way, reason has another aspect: reason is reason or explanation of things. What is this reason or explanation of things? That is what we must now examine.
On this point I will be much briefer, because the subject really belongs to the intellection of reality, to metaphysics; and here we are only dealing with intelligence. It is only with respect to intelligence that one can speak formally of reason, because reason is always a mode of intellection. But if this is true, what sense is there in speaking of the reason or explanation of things? We must address two questions: A) Reason as something about things, and B) the meaning of this reason or explanation.

A) Reason or explanation is about things. Let us return to the point of departure for this investigation. Intellection of the outside-of-field real is an intellection in progression toward reality itself as such, because reality as reality is formally open. This progression is an intellective activity. *Qua* activity, the progression constitutes thinking. *Qua* intellective, this activity is reason. Thinking is the activity of the intelligence, i.e., the activity determined by the actuality of reality *qua* open. It is, then, an activated activity; it is, in fact, [71] real things which give us pause to think. Reason is the intellective aspect of this thinking activity. That is, reason intellectively knows in things that by which they give us pause to think. In this intellection, real things do not just give us pause to think; they give something more: *they give reason or explanation*. It is of minor importance that sometimes, perhaps most of the time, they deprive us of reason or explanation. But we encompass both directions of giving and depriving in that which *a potiori* we call “giving a reason or explanation”. In intellective progression, real things begin by giving us pause to think, and end up by giving a reason or explanation. These are two different senses of “to give”. But their unity is the “giving” as such. And it is in this giving that the reason or explanation of things consists. To be sure, reason is only a mode of intellection. But as this mode is determined by real things themselves, it follows that *qua* determined by things, reason or explanation is about them. Reason, then, is given by them both in its initial moment as well as in its terminal moment. In virtue of this, a given reason or explanation *qua* given pertains to them; it is the reason or explanation of things themselves. The “of” does not mean that my reason is about things only in the sense that by being a mode of intellection it falls back upon them. This characteristic applies to all intellection and not just to reason. Nor are we dealing with an “of” which is genitive in the sense of propriety or pertinence, whose subject would be intellection itself. We are dealing with the fact that reason pertains to things themselves. The “of” is a genitive of propriety or pertinence but whose subject is real things themselves. It is they which “give”; and since what they give is “reason” or explanation, it pertains to things. Otherwise they would not give it. Reason or explanation is something given. This is essential; reason is not something which one “has”, but something which is “given” to us. Reason is intellection measuring reality. Now, things give us the measure of their reality; it is just in this that [72] reason or explanation consists. And this “given” is at one and the same time my reason and the explanation of things. It is at one and the same time the open character of the reality of the real. In this openness, the real gives us pause to think and gives reason or explanation, because only the open can “give”, and only in the open can one search and find. To be sure, the question here arises as to what this finding is. But we shall speak of that later. Reason or explanation, in summary, is something belonging to things.

B) But, in what form is reality something which gives? Reality is the *de suyo* of things. And this *de suyo* sets limits for the “giving”. To give reasons or explanation is then a moment of the *de suyo*; reality as canon principle of the in-depth inquiring intellection is a *de suyo*. But this is not sufficient for the question at hand. Reality, in fact, is something which *de suyo* “gives”; and it gives because it is open. Now this openness of the real has different forms.

Above all, the real is open *qua* reality, and it is therefore constitutively and formally respective. But reality is also open to real things *qua* grounding them. And we have previously explained what grounding is. Here openness is not just openness but an openness qualified as the *ground itself*, grounding openness.

But there is a third form of openness. Reality can be open not only by being respective, and not only by being grounded, but also by being *intellective actuality*. The intellectively known real is, as real, something *de suyo*, open therefore to being in intellective actuality. This intellective actuality can be at times just the primordial actuality of the real as real; this is primordial apprehension. But it can happen that intellective openness has the character of a principle, i.e., is an actuality in thinking intellection. [73] Now, I repeat, the intellective openness of the real as a principle is just reasons or explanation. And this openness is the basis for saying that reason or explanation is of things. Reality is not open to being reason or explanation by virtue of being naked reality, nor by merely being actualized in intellection; rather, it is open to being reason or explanation by being intellectively actualized in...
form as a principle, and therefore ultimately by being actualized in sentient intellec
tion. It is important to elaborate on this point, not just repeating it in different words,
by discussing it from the point of view of the explanation of things.

a) In the first place, there is the very idea of the reason or explanation of things. Philosophy has distin-
guished reason or explanation as explanation of being from the reason associated with knowing. But this distinction does not touch upon what, as I see it, comprises the fundamental aspect of reason. Reason is always reason or explanation of real things. Therefore in order to be able to speak of reason associated with knowing, it is necessary that a real thing be already present in its own character of reality. Now, that which is present is not naked reality but actualized reality. Between ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi there is, as I see it, the ratio actualitatis. And it is from this that reason is formally extracted, i.e., reason is extracted from actuality. Naked reality is but a “what”; it is that in which the real consists. This “what” can be actualized in different ways. When it is actualized in thinking intellec
tion, the “what”—that in which a thing consists—has actuality in a problematic mode; it is a “what” which problematically retains its full actuality, its full “what”, that full “what” toward which the real thing itself qua real has directed us. This full “what” is, then, its what “for”, its “because”. Reality actualized in the field manner, as reality, directs us as reality to that which must be its full actuality, to its “what-for” or “why”, as direction. The “toward” itself is reality in the form of “for”. The “for” is the very openness of the “toward”. Reason is always intellec
tion of a “what”, and therefore is intellec
tion of a “what-for” or “why”. Later I shall explain the structure of this which we call “what-for”. It is not so easy to conceptualize.

The “what-for” or “why” is not a question which I formulate more or less arbitrarily about the actualized real; rather the question at hand is inexorably determined by the mode in accordance with which a real thing is actualized. This mode of actuality of the real is reason or explanation. As a question, the “what-for” or “why” is the intellective of a mode of actuality of the real; it is the concrete positive aspect of the problematic. To be problematic is to be a “what” in the “what-for” or “why”.

b) But this is not all, because that problematic actuality is eo ipso intellec
tively known by searching. And this means that the actuality in “what-for” or “why” is actuality which, by being a search, turns out to be ordered to being found. The actuality of the real in “what-for” or “why” is always and only something found.

The “what-for” or “why” is not just something toward which I am thrust in my inquiring; rather, as a mode of actuality in the “toward”, it is something formally encountered in a search. This moment of the “being encountered” is a moment of actuality having positive character. This positive moment of the “what-for” qua encountered is what, precisely and formally, constitutes the “giving”. That things give us reason or explanation means that their actuality is actually found in them themselves, because we are not dealing with the case of finding by chance, by stumbling upon it, but with the formal character of something sought, i.e. of something found in a search. This positive character is therefore formally constituent of the reason or explanation of things; it is just their “giving”. We shall see shortly with greater precision in what this giving and this finding consists. But we can already say that they are moments of actuality.

c) But since it is actuality in that mode of “what-for”, there arises the question of what is the character of the “what-for” qua encountered.

Above all, the actuality in question is not an actuality of the real in the world, i.e., the actuality to which we now refer is not being. The “what-for” is not a “why is it” something or other. To be sure, it is impossible to refrain from expressing ourselves in the language which has already been created and therefore it is impossible to refrain from saying that the “what-for” or “why” is always just a “why something is”. But this is an ambiguous mode of expression. It could mean that the real is thus in its reality. And this is something which is extremely precise. But it might also mean that the real “is” thus in reality. And this is false as an idea of reason. Reason qua reason or explanation is not reason or explanation of being. Reason or explanation is always so of reality. Reason deals with reality and not being. Reason as principle of things is not “reason or explanation of being” but on the contrary “reason or explanation of this being”. Being is something which requires a principle and this principle is reality; reality is the reason or explanation of being. Reason is not the unfolding of being, as Hegel conjectured, but intellec
tion of reality as a principle actualized in a thinking manner as reality.

The actuality in “what-for” or “why” is not, then, actuality as being in the world, but intellec
tive actuality of reality. It is not just actuality of the real—that is proper to
all intellection. We are, rather, dealing with an actuality in its mode of “what-for” or “why”. And insofar as something is actualized as real in “what-for”, we say that its reality is a ground. The actuality of the real in “what-for” is the grounding. [76] Reason or explanation is of things because it is their grounding actuality. Qua searched for, actuality is found in “what-for” or “why”, and as such, this actuality is the ground.

Reason is, then, reason or explanation of a thing qua actuality in the “what-for”, found as a ground.

We have thus seen what reason is as a mode of my intellection and as explanation of things. But both aspects of reason have an essential unity. It is necessary to attend to this unitary aspect of reason.

3

The Unity of Reason

All reality known intellectively by thinking, i.e., all reality intellectively known in reason, is reality whose actuality is grounded on and by reality itself as principle and canon. The essence of reason is to be thinking actuality of the real. It is by being thinking actuality that reason is “mine”. By being thinking actuality it is essentially, like all actuality, actuality of the real, i.e., “of things”. The unity of reason as mine and as explanation of things is, then, in the fact that reason is thinking actuality of the real. Let us clarify the nature of this unity.

In Leibniz this unity is a unity which we might say is one of indiscrimination. For Leibniz, reason is always reason or explanation of being. And this explanation of being is indiscriminately explanation of what a thing is and that it is intellectively known. This unity is what the celebrated principle of sufficient reason expresses: everything which is has a reason why it is rather (potius quam) than is not. It is ultimately more than (77) indiscrimination; it is an identity. Whence every logical reason or explanation always has some metaphysical ramifications. Now, this is quite impossible. Ultimately, the principle of sufficient reason is insufficient. First, because it concerns a reason or explanation of being; but reason is not reason or explanation “of” being, but reason or explanation of “this” being. And Leibniz did not see the explanation of this being: reality itself. Secondly, it is inadequate because the presumed identity between reason or explanation of being and reason or explanation of things is quite capable of being rejected, not just as a theory but by the mere analysis of the facts of intellection. It virtue of this, logical explanation is not, purely and simply, real and metaphysical explanation. The reason of intellection is one thing, and the reason or explanation of real things quite another.

It was necessary to establish, then, some “discrimination” where Leibniz has not discriminated. And etymologically, ‘discrimination’ means “critique”. Hence the necessity for a critique of reason alone. That of course was Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The reason to which Kant refers is reason as Leibniz’ indiscriminate reason. Therefore the title of Kant’s book Kritik der reinen Vernunft should be translated not as Critique of Pure Reason but Critique of Reason Only. It is the critique of the purely logical ground of metaphysics, the critique of Leibniz’ logico-real unity. Kant’s critique as discrimination is perfectly justified; intellective reason is not the same as reason or explanation of reality. But does this mean that we are dealing with two reasons, split apart and separated as reason? That was Kant’s thesis. In contrast to the unity of reason, Kant set forth the simple duality of two reasons, incommunicado as reasons. But this, in turn, is impossible, because it is to pose the problem of reason along the lines of naked reality. Now, that is wrong. The reality upon which reason touches is not naked reality but actualized reality. And if it is indeed true that [78] reason as a mode of intellection is not the reason of naked reality (on this point, as I said, Kant is justified), still, when dealing with actualized reality, the question changes its aspect. Actualized reality does not cease to be real because it is actualized, even though its ambit of reality is immensely smaller than the ambit of naked reality, i.e., than the world. And as it is actualized in my intellection, it follows that the two reasons are not identical, as Leibniz claimed; but neither are they radically separated, as Kant claimed. The unity of reason is unity as intellective actuality of the real. And it is this which is the subject of the celebrated principle of sufficient reason. As I see it one should express the principle as: every reality, intellectively known in reason, is a reality whose actuality is grounded in and by reality itself. Actuality is, ultimately, actuality in sentient intellection, and reason is what the actualization of the real in sentient intellection gives us in the form of “by”. It is sentient reason. Conversely, as this unity is a unity which is only radical, the two reasons, though not split, still follow separate paths. The real can be intellectively known as real, but this intellection will never be a mere logical unfolding of an intellection. We shall see this in the next chapter.

In summary, reason is the actuality of the real in a thinking search. As what is actualized is formally real, it follows that the real thus actualized is formally in actuality of reason. In this sense one ought to say that every-
thing real is rational. But it is necessary to understand this statement correctly.

In the first place, we are dealing with the fact that the *actualized real* is inexorably found in the ambit of reason. *'Rational'* [79] means, first of all, to be in the ambit of reason. In this sense everything real actualized in intelligence is finally but ultimately incorporated into the ambit of reason. What happens is that not everything real “has” a reason or explanation: it could be based upon itself without being actualized.

In the second place, ‘rational’ does not mean that the actualized real has the internal structure of something conceptual. ‘Rational’ is not synonymous with ‘conceptual’; that was Hegel’s mistake. For Hegel, everything real is rational, and for him ‘rational’ means that everything has the structure of speculative reason, i.e., the structure of a concept. But that is chimerical, because ‘rational’ does not mean ‘conceptual’ but rather to be intellectively known in thinking actuality. And this intellection is not necessarily the logical intellection of the concept. Reason can actualize the real in a thinking manner in forms which are not conceptive. Moreover, it can actualize the real as being superior to every rational intellection.

In the third place, the rational is not just *what is actualized* in thinking intellection, but is rational because what is thus actualized enters *by itself* into the ambit of reason. Here ‘by itself’ means that we are not dealing only with an arbitrary operation of human intellection, but rather that the real is actualized as real in the form of “what-for” or “why”, i.e., it is already, by itself, actualized in the ambit of reason. We are not dealing with the question of whether reality in it is own internal structure, i.e., as naked reality, can be intellectively known by reason. And this is because we are not dealing with the *nakedly real* but with the *actualized real*. Moreover, within the realm of the actualized real itself, its content can be completely opaque to rational intellection. It is one thing for the real to be actualized in a “what-for” or “why”, another for its content to be able to assume different forms in what is actualized. And it does assume them. One is the [80] form of transparency; the real in reason can be *transparent* to reason. But it can also happen that the real is not transparent but *opaque*. Opacity and transparency are two modes in accordance with which the actualized is intellectively known as a “for-what” or “why”. Now, ‘rational’ here means only that the actualized real is by itself, i.e., by its very mode of actualization, the terminus of rational intellection. It does not mean that by being the terminus of rational intellection, that which is intellectively known necessarily has a character which is transparent to reason. Reason can intellectively know the real as opaque. In this sense the real, though rational in the sense of being by itself ensconced in the ambit of reason, can still have in its own structure moments which are not transparently knowable intellectively by reason. That is, the real can be, by itself, opaque. This is what, in common parlance, is termed *irrational*. The irrational is a characteristic of the real as intellectively known by reason itself. The irrational is not what “is not rational” but in a positive sense, what “is non-rational”. Irrationality is a positive characteristic of what is intellectively known in reason. In this sense, the irrational is *eo ipso* rational. The real, in itself, as naked reality, is neither rational nor irrational; it is purely and simply real. It is only one or the other when it falls into the ambit of reason, i.e., when it is reality actualized in thinking. Now, as the real *qua* actualized falls in the ambit of reason *for itself*, it follows that the real is real in a “what-for” or “why”. And only then can the answer to this question, the “for” or “because”, be irrational. Irrationality is reason giving the actualized real in reason; or rather, it is one of the modes which things have of giving reason or explanation of themselves. It is a type of reason or explanation given by things. The real is immersed by itself in reason, both by being about things [81] as well as by being one of my modes of intellection. And in this sense, and only in this one, everything real is rational.

I proposed to do a study of reason. And I have centered my reflections upon three questions: What is reason? What is the scope of reason? And in what, concretely, does the unity of reason and reality consist? We have already seen what reason is (both as a mode of my intellection and as a mode of reason or explanation of things, and in their essential unity, i.e., as actuality of the real in thinking intellection). Reason is, in all its dimensions, a mode of intellection. But not every intellection is, of itself, reason. Therefore it is necessary to inquire about the origin of this mode of intellection. That is what I have termed the ‘rise of reason’.

II

THE RISE OF REASON

As was inevitable, when examining what reason is we spoke at length about the rise of reason, covering the essential points. But it is fitting to recall in a systematic way all the things said on this topic, while at the same time covering certain points in more detail.
Reason does not rest upon itself, but has an origin. Here I understand by ‘origin’ or ‘rise’ that structural moment of reason by which it is, *qua* reason, something originated. We are not dealing with the genetic origin of reason, either in an individual or the species; rather, we are concerned only with the radically structural origin of it. Where does reason have its structural origin and what is its mode of origination? This is the question. In order to deal with it, let us proceed, as in so many other questions, step-by-step. [82]

1) Above all, reason is an activity, but an activity which does not arise out of itself. Modern philosophy has always conceptualized reason as an activity which arises out of itself, i.e., spontaneously. But this is impossible. Reason, in fact, is the intellective moment of thinking activity. Now, thinking is not a spontaneous activity. Thinking is certainly activity, but *activity activated* by real things. It is they which give us pause to think. Therefore reason, by virtue of being an intellective moment of an activated activity, is reason founded upon something given. And by this I am not referring to the fact that reason intellectively knows what is given as an object about which to think; i.e., I am not dealing with the fact that reason is an intellection which has an object that it did not “put” there. Rather, I am referring to the fact that reason, as a mode of intellection, is a mode determined by things and therefore is a mode of intellection imposed by them. Things not only give us that about which we think, but also the very rational mode of intellectively knowing them; the impose it, because upon giving us pause to think, they *eo ipso* determine this mode of intellective knowing which is reason. Reason, then, is not a spontaneous activity but an intellectual mode given by things. It has its rise, its origination, above all in real things inasmuch as their reality is what gives us to think, and what determines intellection in the form of reason. But that is not all. The origination has a root which is still deeper.

2) What is it that gives us to think? Real things, in their reality, give us pause to think. To do this, these real things have to be already present to us as real. Now, the mere intellective actuality of the real as real is intellection. Things give us to think because previously they were already intellectively known as real. Therefore reason [83] as a mode of intellection of what things give us pause to think is a mode of previous intellection of the real. In virtue of this, reason formally arises precisely from this previous intellection. Reason has its origin in things, but in things previously intellectively known as real. This is a deeper moment of the origin of reason. On account of it reason is not, as we shall see, a mode of intellection superrior to naked intellection; rather, reason is reason by virtue of being founded upon intellection and being a mode of it. Reason, by being intellection of what things give us pause to think in mere intellection, is an intellective progression determined by the inadequacy of this mere intellection. Only insofar as mere intellection does not intellectively know things adequately, only in this respect do things give us pause to think. And this thinking intellectively knows the reason of this “giving”. Reason is always subordinate to primary intellection. But its origination has a yet deeper root.

3) What is it in the naked intellectual apprehension of real things which gives us to think? To think is to intellectively know reality beyond the field, in depth. Therefore it is because real things are intellectively known in the field manner as real that they give us to think. Reason, by being a mode of intellection in depth, is formally *reason of the field*, i.e., reason determined in the field sense to be reason. The origin of reason does not lie only in the fact that the real previously known intellectively gives us pause to think; it has an origin which in a certain respect is still deeper: the field-nature of the previous intellection of the real. The field is a physical moment of the real, the sensed moment of the world, of the respectivity of the real *qua* real. Therefore the field is *eo ipso* a physical moment of the primary and adequate reason known real in its primordial apprehension, in its naked intellection. The field is not just a concept but is, I repeat, a physical moment of the real; and it is so precisely because respectivity within the world is a moment of reality itself as reality. That physical sense does not consist in being a “thing”—the field is not a thing which is intellectively known—but that in which and through which one intellectually knows one thing among others. Finally, this physical moment is not a “relation” but “respectivity”, formally constitutive of the real *qua* real. In this “fieldness”, the real is apprehended in a “toward”, within the field and beyond the field. And this intellection of the real in the field manner “toward” what is beyond is what constitutes reason as intellection in search of something. Reason is reason that is originally field reason. Reason has its origin not just by being something given by real things and not just by being a mode of some previous intellection; rather, it has an origin because it consists in being field intellection in search of something. But its origin has a yet deeper root.

4) The field, in effect, is the sensed world as world, the sensed respectivity in the “toward”. Now, to sense something as real is just sentient intellection. Sentient intellection is the intellection of which field reason is a mode. Sentient does not mean (as we have already seen) that its own object, primary and adequate, is sensible. If it
were no more than that, the unity of intellection and sensing would be merely objective, and in such a case intellection would be “sensible”. We are concerned with something much more significant, that intellection properly so-called is “sentient”. We are not concerned then with sensible intellection, but with sentient intellection. So, the intellection of the real within a field in [85] the “toward” as depth is reason; and as this intellection is sentient, it follows that reason is formally sentient reason. Reason senses reality in the “toward”, reality itself giving us pause to think. Its progression is a progression within a “toward” sensed, a sentient progression in the nature of the field real. Only because intellection is sentient, only because of that is it necessary to know intellectually, in the field manner, in reason; that is, reason is sentient. Reason has its origin not only by being something given by things, not only by being a mode of previous understanding, not only by being reason or explanation of what is in the field, but it has its origin primarily and radically by being a mode of sentient intellection, that is by being sentient reason. But it is necessary to clarify more the character of this origin, asking ourselves in what the formally sentient moment of reason consists.

5) The question cannot be justified further, because to say that reason is “sentient” seems to mean that what reason intellectively knows is something like the qualities sensed in a sensible perception. And that would be absurd. We are not dealing with anything like it at all. Reason is a mode of sentient intellection; therefore it is to sentient intellection itself that we must direct our attention in order to understand the idea in question. In what, formally, does the fact that intellection is sentient consist? What is the formally intellective part of sensing? To be sure, it is not in the nature of the sensed quality, i.e., not in the content of sensing; but rather in the type of its formality of otherness, in the formality of reality. The formally intellective part of human sensing is not in its content but in being an impression of reality. Intellection is one with sensing precisely and formally in the moment of otherness, in the moment of formality of sensing. The formal unity of sentient intellection is found in that the formal part (not just of the [86] intellectively known but of intellective knowing itself) is identically and physically the formal moment or formality itself of sensing, of impression. Therefore intellective knowing is sentient intellective knowing, and human sensing is intellective sensing. This unity is the impression of reality, which by being of reality is intellective and by being impression is sensed. The content of sensing is sensed reality only by being the content of an impression of reality. Now, reason is the mode of sentient intellection. And sensing the return to the world is how every impression of reality is transcendently open. This openness, as we have already seen, is dynamic in two ways. First, in the form of dynamism toward other sensed things (the field), and second in the form of a search (the world). Every impression of reality is qua formality an open impression, not only in the dynamism of distance but also in the dynamism of searching. To see the color green as something de suyo is to be inchoatively seeing it toward other colors, and toward other realities. To apprehend something sentimentally de suyo is a first step toward the world, a first primordial sketch of the search for the real in reality. As such, human sensing is already a primordial type of reason, and every form of reason is radically and primordially a mode of sensing reality. It is sentient reason.

Therefore reason as a search for the world in the field is not a question of concepts, nor even one of being, but a question of the impression of reality not qua impression of such-and-such a reality, but qua impression of mere reality, of pure and simple reality. Reason is a search for the world, an inquiring impression of reality. And now it is clear that the sentient part of reason does not refer to its own content, but to the impressive [87] character of that reality which reason intellectively knows in a particular way by progressing impressively in it; it is an impression of reality in progress. A transfinite number, an abstract concept, are not sensed qualities. But they are intellectively known as something real, and as such are constituted in the impression of reality as such. That reason is sentient means, then, that reason qua intellection is an intellective modulation of the very impression of reality. Intellection is mere actuality of the real in sentient intelligence; it is formally the impression of reality. And reason as a mode of intellective actuality is a mode of the impression of reality. Which mode?

In primordial apprehension or naked sentient intellection, sentient intelligence senses reality in itself and by itself in an impression as the formality of what is sensed. In the field intellection of the real which culminates in affirmation, the intelligence has the impression of reality of one thing among others, and the sensed formality then acquires the character of a field as the medium of intellection. But in reason, the intelligence has the impression of reality, of formality, as a measure of the real beyond the field in depth. Therefore strictly speaking reason not only moves “in” reality, but rationally “senses” the reality in which it moves, and senses rationally that it is moving therein. Reason does not search for reality but really searches for and dives into reality, precisely because it senses this reality and its own motion therein. The reality constitutive of reason is just reality in impression.
Therefore reason is not primarily something merely logical, but rather it intellectively knows reality with that coercive force proper to the reality in which it is, i.e., with the force of sensing reality. In its inquiring, reason senses reality inquiringly. (88) In the primordial impression of reality, intelligence senses reality as naked formality; in affirmation, intelligence senses the impression of reality as a medium of intellection of the real; in reason, the intelligence senses the impression of reality as a measure or ground of the reality beyond the field. They are three modes or forms of the impression of reality.

Now, the impression of reality has a physical unity in accordance with which it is the impression of reality formally, medially, and by measuring. These are not three "uses" of the impression of reality, but three intrinsically necessary "modes" by virtue of being modes of a single sentient intellection—by virtue of being, that is, three "dimensions" of the actualization of the real in sentient intellection. These three modes are not constituted owing to the impression of reality, but "in" the impression of reality; they are that in which the very impression of reality unitarily consists. They are not derived from the impression of reality, but are the three dimensions constitutive of the primordial impression of reality. Conversely, these three dimensions of intellection (primordial apprehension, affirmation, reason) are distinguished only in being modes of sentient intellection. Of these three dimensions, the first, to wit, the impression of naked formality, can be given without the other two, but the converse is not true. And this is because the second, affirmation, is something essentially founded upon the primordial impression of reality, and in turn reason essentially involves affirmative intellection. The unity of the impression of reality in these latter two dimensions is, ultimately, the "toward" of the naked impression of the formality of reality.

So when we say that reason is not only sensible but sentient, we are not talking about some sensualistic reduction of (89) affirmation and of reason, because "sensualism" means that the contents of judgement and reason are formally reduced to the contents of sensible impressions. And this is simply absurd. The fact is that in sensible impressions, philosophy has seen nothing but their content, and it has gone astray on the matter of their formal sensed moment of reality; i.e., it has not seen the impression of reality. Now, to reduce the contents of affirmation and of reason to those sensible impressions is absurd. But the formal moment of reality, the impression of reality, remains. And then to reduce the moment of reality of an affirmation and of reason to reality sensed in impression, to the impression of reality, is not sensualism. The moment of reality proper to affirmation and to reason is physically and numerically identical to the moment of reality impressively apprehended in primordial apprehension. We are not, then, dealing with a conceptual identity of that which we call 'reality' in the three modes of intellection, but with a moment which is formally physical and numerically the same in the three modes. The physical and formal unity of the moment of reality as impression is not therefore sensualism. It is, rather, sensism. And that is something quite different; it is one and the same impression of reality which in its physical and numerical sameness opens up the dimensions of affirmed reality and of reality in reason. Reason is sentient in this radical mode—and only there—, that of being a mode of the impression of reality.

The radical rise of reason is in the physically "unique" impression of reality. Reason is something which has an origin precisely and formally by virtue of being sentient. In virtue of this, I repeat, reason, like affirmation, is but a mode of intellection of primordial apprehension. Reason is not (90) something which by itself sits on top of everything sensed. On the contrary, reason itself is sentient, and rational intellection is a determinate mode of intellection of sentient intellection itself. Reason progresses in order to fill up insofar as possible the inadequacies of naked intellection. This progression, then, does not have supremacy over naked sentient intellection or primordial apprehension; it has, only in some respects, a certain superiority over it. This is superiority is only partial and within the narrow confines of reason. The progress of reason has a certain free and creative character with respect to the content of intellection. But it is, I repeat, a creation within very narrow confines. Nothing of what is intellectively known in reason is real without a ground—a ground which is necessary in principle—of what is intellectively known in primordial apprehension. But by virtue of being a ground, that which is intellectively known in reason is something real within that physical reality, something primary and unlikely to be lost of the impression of reality. Only primordial apprehension has radical supremacy in human intellection. The difference between naked intellection and reason is then given—and can only be given—in an intelligence which is sentient. It is what I call the 'unprescriptive parsimony of reason'. And this is its power.

In virtue of that, the origin of reason, its radical origin, is in its sentient character. Reason is an act which modally concerns the impression of reality.

But this does not yet exhaust the problem of reason. The impression of reality, in fact, is but a moment, the moment of otherness of what is apprehended, the moment
in accordance with which what is apprehended is, de suyo, what is present in apprehension. It is because of this that the real thus actualized is not only real but indeed has its own real content. The impression of reality is not a secondary [91] impression, but the formal moment of a single, unique impression of the real, of the impressive actuality of the real. Now, reason as a modulation of the impression of reality has thereby its own intelligently known contents, and does not leave them outside that impression. Reason is formally sentient by virtue of being a mode of the impression of reality; and on account of that, just like said impression, reason intellec tively knows the proper contents of the real. Together with its impression of reality, these contents comprise a mode which is proper not only to the impression of reality, but also eo ipso a mode proper to intellec tively knowing the real. Hence, having shown that reason modally concerns the impression of reality not only does not exhaust the problem of reason, but is the very point at which one poses the problem of what the rational intellec tion of the real consists. This is the problem of “reason and reality”, the last of the three great problems which we posed to ourselves after having examined what reason is and what its origin is.

III

REASON AND REALITY

1

The “Problem” of Reason

We have seen that reason is a mode of sentient intellec tion, and that therefore it is intrinsically and formally sentient reason. This reason, like all sentient intellec tion, is [92] constitutively a mere actualization of the real. Therefore reason is not something which has to “achieve” reality; rather, it is something which is already constituted as reason within reality. We have examined how reality functions, so to speak, in its three dimensions of formality, mediality, and measure. Now it remains only to clarify that structure from another essential direction, something which we have sketched out in the last few pages. Reality, in fact, is not only actualized in intellec tion, but moreover by virtue of being so has possessed us. We are possessed by reality. What is this possession? The reader should excuse the monotonous repetition of ideas, but it is convenient to summarize what has been said.

Possession is not exclusive to intellec tion as such; it belongs to all intellec tion to be sure, but it does so because intellec tion is sentient. It is, then, to sensing that we must turn out attention, but very briefly so as to recap what has been said in Part I. Sensing is sensing impressions of things, or rather, impressively apprehending things. An impression has three moments which are not independent, but which are distinct from one another within their primary and indestructible unity. An impression is above all affection of the sentient. But in this affection there is an essential second moment: presentation of something else in and through the affection itself; this is the moment of otherness. But impression has still a third essential moment: the force, so to speak, with which the other of otherness is imposed on the sentient. This force of imposition is just being possessed by what is sensed. The unity of the three moments—affection, otherness, and force of imposition—is what comprises the intrinsic and formal unity of what we call impression. [93]

Impressions are quite varied. But this diversity has a very precise characteristic with regard to our problem. The other which is present in affection has above all a content of its own: color, sound, heat, taste, etc.; but it also has (as I have already said) its own formality. This is the mode by which those kinds of content are present to us, i.e., the mode by which they are “other”. This formality is above all the formality of stimulation, the mode by which the other is formally other by triggering a response. The other is then merely a “sign”. But the other can be present as other not in relation to possible responses, but in relation to what is present de suyo; this is the formality of reality. What is present then is not a “sign” but “reality”. In these two types of impression, the other is imposed upon the sentient according to two different types of force of imposition. In the sign, the impression is imposed with the force of stimulation. In the formality of reality, it is with the force of reality. In the first case we have impression of a stimulus; in the second, impression of the real. Now, to apprehend something as real is what formally constitutes intellec tion. Therefore impression of the real is formally impression of a sentient intelligence.

Let us leave aside, for the moment, the content of this impression of the real, and attend only to the formality of otherness, which is what I have called impression of reality. If we call the act of intellec tively knowing noein, as has been done since the time of the Greeks, it will be necessary to say that even since then this noein has been inadequately conceptualized. To be sure, the act, the noesis, has been distinguished from that which is present in us, the noema. But nothing more; philosophy has gone astray on the matter of the impressive character of the noein, i.e., [94] on its formal unity with the aesthesis,
with sensing. The Greeks, then, and with them all of
European philosophy, failed to realize that intelligence is
sentient. And this has repercussions with regard to the
very concept of noesis and noema. The noesis is not
just—as has been said—an act whose terminus is merely
intentional; rather, it is in itself a physical act of appre-
hension, i.e., an act whose intentionality is but a moment,
the directional moment of the relational or apprehensive
aspect of what is intellec tually known in impression. On
the other hand, the noema is not just something which is
present to the intentionality of the noesis, but something
which is imposed with its own force, the force of reality,
upon the apprehendor.

In virtue of this, the noem is an ergon and therefore
its formal structure is Noergia. ‘Noergia’ means at one
and the same time that the noesis is relational, that it is
impressively apprehending, and that the noema has
the force of imposition proper to reality. This is the force
of impression of reality.

Sentient intellec tion is possessed by the force of rea-
ality; i.e., the real is impressed upon us in three different
ways. In the first place there is the force with which the
real, as formality of what is apprehended in and by itself,
is imposed as real. This is the primordial form of the
impression of reality. Reality primordially sensed is not
impressed upon us by any type of irrefutable evidence, but
by something more than evidence: by the irrefragable
form of being reality, by the primordial force of reality. The
possible evidence—it is not, though, strictly speaking evi-
dence—is but the expression of this primordial force.
However in the second place, it can happen that the real
is not sensed in and by itself, but only among other realities,
i.e., at a distance. Then the impression of reality [95]
adopts the form of an affirmation, and what is affirmed is
but the reality apprehended in the impression of reality at
a distance. What is apprehended is then imposed with its
own force, which is demand or exigence, the exigent force
of the real. Its noetic expression is evidence. Evidence
is not constituted by the mere presence of the evident, but by
the force of reality, by its exigent force. But the real, in
the third place, can be sentiently apprehended in depth.
This is the impression of reality in depth. Then reality is
impressed upon us with its own force, the coercive force
of reality in depth. Its noetic moment is just reason. Rea-
son, affirmation, and primordial apprehension are but
noergic modes of a single identical noergic impression of
reality. Reason is modalization of affirmation, and af-
firmation is modalization of primordial apprehension. In
turn, the otherness of the real in impression is imposed
upon us with its own force, first in the irrefragable force
of immediate formality, which is then turned into exigent

Evidence and later into the coercive form of reality. Af-
firmation and reason are but modulations of the impres-
sion of reality. They are noergic modes.

Reason, then, moves by its own force, by the force
with which the real itself is impressed upon us as if it
were a voice. This force is not some impulse in a vacuum.
Just the opposite: it is a force which moves us but which
constrains us to keep within the real. It is, then, a coer-
cive force. What is proper to reason or explanation is not
evidence nor empirical or logical rigor; rather, it is above
all the force of the impression of reality in accordance
with which reality in depth is imposed coercively in sen-
tient intellec tion. The rigor of a reasoning process does
not go beyond [96] the noetic expression of the force of
reality, of the force with which reality is being impressed
upon us, that reality in which we already are by impres-
sion. Therefore the problem of reason does not consist in
investigating if it is possible for reason to reach reality,
but just the opposite: how we are supposed to keep our-


selves in the reality in which we already are. So we are
not speaking about arriving at the state of being in reality,
but about not leaving it.

This movement of reason is not just movement.
Movement is dynamism, and moreover affirmation as
such is dynamic. Reason is a movement, but different
than affirmative movement; it is a movement of searching,
a progression. It is a progression which arises from and is
animated by the reality-ground, by reality in depth.

The progression itself is thus a movement in which
one does not seek to reach reality but to intellec tually
know the real content of the voice of reality, i.e., the real.
It is a search for what the real is in reality. The reality of
the real is not univocally determined; this is indeed just
the problematic of the real in the face of reason. In virtue
of it, the progression is a movement within reality itself
in order to describe what the real is in worldly reality just
through the coercive force of reality. This force consists
in constraining us so that the real which reason seeks is
intellec tually known as a content which does not draw us
out of reality. What does this mean? We are not talking
about maintaining ourselves in reality “itself” in some
general way, i.e., formally consubstantial with reason.
Even when what reason intellec tively “knows” turns out
not to be true, still, this not-truth is so within reality and
through it. In this regard, the coercive force is a force
which is formally constitutive of reason. Therefore when
I am speaking about maintaining ourselves in reality I do
not refer [97] only to something like a pretension of rea-
son, i.e., to the fact that reason consists in pretending to
move itself intentionally in reality. Rather, I refer to
something much more important, to wit, that reason, ef-
ffectively and not just presumptively, is already moving itself in reality. And this is absolutely necessary, with a physical necessity of the intellectively known itself, not of rational intellection qua intellection. What happens is that this is not enough. Without that formal and consubstantial immersion of reason in reality, there would be no rational intellection at all. But the problem lies in what reason can mean in its concrete form, because the voice of reality is a voice which cries out in concrete terms, i.e., it is the voice with which these real determinate things within the field constrain one to seek their reality in depth. Therefore they are a search and a coercive force which are both essentially concrete. One seeks the structure in depth of these concrete field realities, i.e., one tries to maintain himself in the in-depth reality of some very determinate things. And then it is quite possible that the immersion in reality, despite being consubstantial with reason, nonetheless draws us out of what these concrete things are in depth, and leaves us floating in a reality, physically real, but devoid of intellective content. It is not just a question of simply moving ourselves effectively in reality, but of not remaining suspended in it with respect to what concerns the determinate things in the field, whose in-depth intellection is sought.

It is to this concrete progression that we must now attend. The progression has a point of departure, viz. determinate realities within the field. In this progression reason has opened to its own ambit, one which is both distinct from the previous field and in-depth. Finally, in this ambit the intellection of reason in its own character takes place. Let us examine these three aspects of the progression of reason.

2

The Support for the Progression of Reason

First, let us consider the point of departure of reason. Reason is not an intellection which only comes after other pre-rational intellections. Reason is an intellection determined by the intellection of real field things. If this were not so, there would be no possibility of a human reason. The determinant of rational intellection is previous intellection of what is in the field. What is this previous intellection? To be sure, it is not intellection qua intellective act. Classical philosophy has seen reason above all from the point of view of an intellection composed of prior intellective acts. The typical rational intellection would therefore be reasoning: the composition of the logoi, the syn-logismos or syllogism. But as I see it, this is not always true, and furthermore is never what is essential. The idea that the essence of reason is the reasoning process is unacceptable. The essential part of reason is not to be the combination of previous acts of intellection. The essential part of previous intellection is not intellection as an act, but what is intellectively known in the act or in previous acts. Reason, in fact, is not a composite intellection but a new mode of intellection determined by what was previous intellectively known. It is in-depth inquiring intellection. This new mode of intellection is not necessarily a composition of intellections. Each intellection is merely actuality of something real; but since everything real is respective qua real, it follows that every intellection of the real is inquiringly referred, in depth, to other possible intellections. Reason consists in this formal referring process. Reason is not a composition of intellections; rather, there is composition of intellections because there is reason. That is, the process of reasoning not only isn’t reason, but moreover reason is the very possibility of all reason processes. This reason is the new mode of intellection. It is in this modal aspect, and only in this, that I say that reason starts from what was intellectively known in a previous intellection. What is this which was previously intellectively known?

The previously known is everything apprehended in the field manner. It is above all the real intellectively known in primordial apprehension. But it is also each thing which we have intellectively known at a distance in the field upon knowing what that thing is in reality. This intellection has two moments: the moment of simple apprehension and the moment of affirmation. I shall lump both moments together in the word ‘ideas’, in order to simplify the expression. That which has been previously known intellectively is, then, the field of the real and all the ideas and affirmations of what that real is in reality. These previous intellections do not have the character of “premises”, first because rational intellection is not just theoretic, and second because reason is not formally rationalisation. Reason, when carrying out a reasoning process, is only a type—and not the most important type—of reason or explanation. But third and above all, they do not have the character of “premises” because the intellective set of the real, and of the ideas and affirmations about what the real is in reality, does not now function like a set of judgements, but like a set of intellections. Intellecction is not formally judgement; just the opposite: judgement is what it is only being affirmative intellection. Now, affirmation does not function here like judgement, but like intellection, i.e., like intellective actualization of the real and of what this real is in reality. Affirmation itself is for our problem only a form of intellection.
Whether or not it is affirmative, the intellection of what this real thing is in reality is an intellection. And it is as intellection that affirmations and ideas now intervene. Up to now, “real” and “in reality” have been but two moments of the field intellection of real things. Here this previous intellection has a new function, one which is modal. It does not intervene by virtue of its own intellective structure (primordial apprehension, ideas, affirmations), but in a new mode. This new mode consists in being the intellective support of the real in depth. Together with the real and what it is in reality, we have here reality in depth, what the real is in reality. Correlatively, the intellection of the real in primordial apprehension and in affirmation is now the voice of reality in depth. This new function is, then, the function of being the voice of reality. That which was previously intellectively known then has the modal function of being that in which this voice resounds. In what was intellectively known in the field resounds the voice of what the real is in depth. This resounding has two aspects. On one hand, it is the sound itself, i.e., the notes of what the field reality, as reality and in reality, is in depth. And this is not some vague metaphor, because to be resonant is in this sense to “notify” reality in depth. And notification is a mode of intellection. But on the other hand, the resonance has a second aspect. Things not only notify, but are also that in which what is notified resounds. They are not just resonances of the real in depth, but also the (101) resonators themselves. And qua resonators, these real things take on that new modal function which is to be principle and canon. Principle and canon are neither premises nor rules of reasoning. They are the field reality as resonator of what reality is in depth. This is the full force—and also the limitation—of rational intellection, of the intellection of the voice of reality in depth. This reality in depth is actualized in intellection in its own way, in the form of the ambit of resonance.

3

The Ambit of Rational Intellection

Ambit is always, in one form or another, an open ambit with respect to the things in it. But the ambit of rational intellection is open in a very special way. Let us see how.

Every field intellection is an open intellection: What a real thing is in reality is not fully actualized even in intellection or primordial apprehension, because this apprehension apprehends the real in and by itself; whereas to intellectively know what this something is in reality is to intellectively know it “among” other real things. Hence, when we intellectively know this something as real, what it is in reality is left open precisely and formally because the “among” of its reality is left open. This intellection culminates in affirmation. Every affirmation, then, takes place in an open ambit. And its openness is just the openness of the “among”: only because something real is apprehended “among” other real things, only on account of this is this intellection open. This openness, then, (102) has a precise structure. It is an openness which is given only in the intellection of each thing, but with respect to other things actually apprehended already in the field in primordial apprehension. This “among” actualizes reality for us in the “toward”. And just on account of that, the intellection of what this real thing is in reality is a movement which goes from the real toward other realities, and from them to the first reality. This is affirmative movement.

But in rational intellection the openness is different. Let us recall once again what was said earlier. To be sure, the entire field reality (i.e., real being and what these real things are in reality) sends us beyond the field. But it is beyond the whole field, not from one thing in the field to something else in it. Therefore intellection is not a movement from one real thing to another, but a progression from every field reality toward an in-depth beyond. Thus intellection is a special mode of movement, viz. a search in reality. And as such, it does not know if it is going to find something in this in-depth beyond. This is the openness not of the intellection of a thing with respect to others within a field, but the openness of all the field reality to a world, i.e., to reality. The openness of the world is not an “among” but the “respectivity” of the real qua real. Whence it is that the openness of the ambit of rational intellection is in a certain way absolute. And precisely for this reason its intellection is not simple movement but searching. Affirmative movement is movement in a field, but the searching, the rational movement, is a movement in the world, in reality. It is in this that the in-depth or profound nature of the real formally consists.

This openness, precisely on account of being openness in the world, is above all openness to other real things, but it is or can be (103) openness to other functions and modes of reality as well. This openness is absolute, because no matter how much we find, the searching never exhausts the openness of the world. And this is the essential point. In contrast to Leibniz and Kant, we must say that reason is neither total nor totalizing; rather, it is constitutively open. And this is not on account of the internal limits to reason but the very character of the real as impressively sensed. Reality is open qua reality, be-
because its openness is but its constitutive respectivity. The task of reason is indefinite not only in the sense that it will never exhaust what concretely is proposed to it to intellectively know, but above all because what is intellectively known, viz. the real \textit{qua} real, is formally and constitutively open, and therefore never closed and exhausted. In this open ambit, in this world, is where the intellective search of reason takes place; it is searching in reality. What is the character proper to this inquiring intellection?

4

\textit{The Character Proper to Intellecitive Search}

We are dealing then with a search in a formally open world. But this does not mean that either the openness of the world or the search itself is not defined, because \textit{we are thrust into} the search for real field things, and upon them \textit{we support ourselves} in our search. Reason opens the ambit of intellecction by support is what constitutes the character proper to intellecctive search. In what does this support consist? And what is it that is thus intellecctively known? \textit{[104]} These are the two points which we must summarily analyze. The questions overlap partially, and hence some repetition is inevitable. But despite that, it is necessary to examine the questions separately.

A) In what does support consist? One might think that it consists in the ground; then to say that reason is supported in what was previously intellecctively known would mean that what is intellecctively known in reason is something which has its ground in what was previously intellecctively known in the field. If this were so, that which is intellecctively known by reason would be only something which \textit{de suyo} does not have reality; it would only be real insofar as it is grounded in some reality intellecctively known in the field manner. To use a medieval formula, this is the classical idea that what is intellecctively known in reason is by itself only objectivity—\textit{ens rationis}—; only insofar as it has a \textit{fundamentum in re} can it be said that what is rationally intellecctively known is real. Now, said this way, and including all of its ramifications, this is not correct as I see it, because it is a conceptualization in which fundament and support are identified, and that identification is wrong. Every rational intellecction has, in fact, two moments. One, that which is intellecctively known; another, the character in accordance with which the intellecctively known is intellecctively known as real. And these two moments are not formally distinct; rather, they have essentially different characters.

The moment of reality, as we have already seen, is consubstantial with reason. Therefore reason cannot set itself the task of \textit{reaching} reality, because it is already \textit{in} reality. And this means, above all, that what is intellecctively known by reason is not, in this respect, \textit{ens rationis} but \textit{realitas ipsa}. The reality in which reason moves is not based upon the reality of the field, but rather the reality itself of the field, in its physical numerical identity, is that in which reason moves. \textit{[105]} To be sure, as I have already explained at length, the reality in which reason moves is \textit{ground-reality}. And its function in rational intellecction is “to be grounding”. But grounding what? Why, just its content. The content of what is intellecctively known rationally is based upon the content of what is intellecctively known in the field manner. We shall see this forthwith. We earlier asked ourselves what a base or a support is. Support is always something formally “other” and also “prior” inasmuch as it conduces to the intellecction of something different, but something called forth by the prior. The content of what is rationally intellecctively known is based upon “the” reality in which reason moves consubstantially, i.e., without formal support. This character of support which the content has is therefore inscribed within the previous character of reality (when this character has as its function that of grounding). The character of reality is identical to the formality of the impression of reality. And therefore reason, even when it intellecctively knows what is most inaccessible to the senses, is always and only sentient reason because it intellecctively knows its contents within the moment of reality of an impression. The mode in which reality is grounding consists in being referred to the content of real field things as support of the content of what reason is going to intellecctively know.

What is this which reason intellecctively knows?

B) That which is intellecctively known in reason thus has its own content, which is formally and identically inscribed in the character of reality of the field. This character or formality is just the open ambit of reality \textit{qua} reality, an ambit already apprehended in the field manner. On the other hand, the content of what is going to be intellecctively known in this ambit is what is based only upon the content of the field intellecction. That content is not necessarily identical with nor is it \textit{[106]} necessarily distinct from what is intellecctively known in the field manner. What is different and new is the mode of intellecction. Thus, for example, in ancient physics intellecctively known elementary particles were corpuscles, i.e. something whose nature is identical to what bodies intellecctively known in the field manner are. But the fact that the corpuscle of field intellecction was a support and also a moment of intellecction in-depth—this constituted a new
mode of intellection. That which was intellectively known—the body—was the same, but it was different in its intellective function, i.e., the mode of intellection. The mode of rational intellection is just the mode by which reality itself is grounding the real. The mode of intellectively knowing a body is given. If one intellectively knows that what is in the world is a body, the content “body” is identical to the field content. But the fact that this content is a ground of the field, that is something new. What is new is that the field body, despite being a support of what is intellectively known rationally, might not be a ground of what is intellectively known. The particles (i.e., what is rationally intellectively known) are not bodies, but it is upon the body in the field that I have based myself precisely in order to intellectively know something which is not a body. Therefore in rational intellection reality itself is an open ambit in itself; i.e., an ambit which is open in the worldly sense, and moreover an ambit which leaves its mode of grounding free, so to speak, in openness, and therefore also leaves free the content of the grounded qua grounded. And this is what, ultimately, confers upon what is intellectively known in reason one of its own characters. Which one? Let us explain step by step.

a) Let us repeat: above all it is reality itself which imposes rational intellection upon us. This is the coercive force with which the impression of reality in depth is imposed upon us. All real things, we said, give us pause to think. [107] And this ‘give’ is the coercive force with which the intellectively real in depth is imposed upon us. Since the intellective moment of thinking is reason, it then follows that this mode of intellective knowing, reason, is something imposed by reality itself. Reality makes us intellectively know in reason.

b) But this which the real imposes upon us in depth—let us speak about it now from the opposite standpoint—is reality as mere ambit. And this being “mere ambit” has two faces. On one hand it has the most immediate face: forcing us to intellectively know the field real within the ambit as principle and canonic measure for grounding it. Under this aspect, what reality determines in intellection consists in reality adopting a rational form. That is, reality makes us to be in reason. The new mode of intellection is to be in reason. But to be merely an ambit also has another face. And this is that upon being in reality as mere ambit, its content as such remains indeterminate. Reality is imposed upon us with the force of having to endow it with some content. Now, it can happen that this content as real is given by real things which have been previously known intellectively; but the fact that this is a ground of the real in depth is something radically new, as we have said. On the other hand it can happen that the content is like that of field things. If being in reason is something imposed by reality, its rational content is never so; what the “grounding” structure of the real is, is not imposed. Whence it follows that the unity of the two faces of the imposition of reality is the necessary imposition of something which is what is not-necessary. This paradoxical unity is just freedom. The essence of reason is freedom. Reality forces us to be free. This does not mean that I can intellectively know just as I please, but that the determinant response of my intellection to the imposition of [108] the real in depth is to be necessarily free. I might not wish to intellectively determine the real in depth. That would be a negative act of reason, but still a negative act which is only possible through the free character of determining. The determination itself is not free, since it lacked nothing more, but its determining itself is free. Reality in depth is imposed upon us not in order to leave us in freedom, but to force us to be rightly free.

This does not happen in the same way in the case of reason and affirmation. Intellection of one real thing among others, the field intellection, intellectively knows—and I say it predicatively for greater clarity—that A is B. And this intellection, as we saw, is a movement in freedom. But the freedom is mediated by ideas (B) in order to apprehend the real thing (A). Affirmation is the realization of these free ideas (B) in the thing (A). In somewhat vague terms, we may say that B discharges a representative function: affirmation intellectively knows in a thing the realization of what is represented, an intellection which takes place in the medium of reality. On the other hand, the question changes when we are dealing with rational intellection, because then we are not talking about a field of reality but about in-depth reality itself, i.e., about the world. Intellection then falls back not upon the representative content of B but upon its grounding character. B now has a formally grounding function. Therefore the realization of B in A is now that of grounding A in B, whether realizing it or not. In virtue of this, the realization in depth is free in the sense that it freely creates the idea of the grounding character of B. Reason is not representation. In in-depth reality one deals with a realization but in the sense of grounding, and therefore something radically free. [109]

This unity (in freedom) of “the” open reality qua fundamented and of fundamenteed content, is a unity of radical indetermination which confers upon the rational its own character, viz. that of being creation.

Rational creation does not mean arbitrary intellec-
tion; just the opposite: it is always a creation based upon and directed by that which is intellectively known in the field manner, in a progression from the field real toward in-depth reality, toward what a thing is in reality. Therefore it is a creation within very strict limits. It is a creation which has a principle and a canon, and in turn principle and canon are but principle and canon of rational creation. Things of the field are apprehended as they are; in-depth reality is found through principle and canon. And I am not limiting myself to apprehending what is given to me; rather, I am compelled to forge reasons, i.e., the ground of what is given and affirmed, regardless of what it is. Reason is creative intellection through principle and canon. This does not mean that reason does not contain truth and error; that is another question. I here affirm that something intellectively known in creative intellection is that in accordance with which or with respect to which reason contains truth or error. And this intellection, I repeat once again, is not necessarily a “representative” creation, but it is always a creation, let us say functional, i.e., of the fundamental and grounding character, of reality. I shall refer to this fundamental and grounding character, intellectively known concretely, as ‘content’ in this book, and not representation as such.

What is this creating? In what does creation by reason consist? What are its modes? Let us review summarily what was said about these three points in Part II of the book.

c) As the grounding character of content is not univocally imposed by reality, one might think that what creative intellection does is to forge a “reason” or explanation in thought and attribute reality to it. Creation would then fall back formally upon the character of reality. As I see it this is not correct. Reality is physically consubstantial with reason. We are not dealing with an intentional consubstantiality but a physical one, and it is also formal and strict. To know intellectively and rationally is not to pretend that the content of this or that intellection is real, because reality is not a pretense of reality and still less a free pretense about it. The reality which reason intellectively knows is physically one and indentical with the reality intellectively known in every intellection preceeding the rational intellection. Reason does not have a pretense of reality but rather is already in reality itself. What reason pretends is that this reality has this or that determinate content, and therefore that this content, freely chosen, is a ground. We could call it grounding content. What is created is then not reality but the grounding content of in depth reality. In virtue of this, reason is not creation of reality but just the opposite: creation of the grounding content in reality.

In affirmation, a real thing A is actualized in the field B, and in turn the field B is realized in the real thing A. Realization and actualization are two unitary aspects of the intellecution of something in a field. Of these aspects, realization is founded upon actualization. Now, when intellecution of the real in depth takes place, it has these same characteristics, but most probably in a much more complicated form since we are no longer dealing with the field but with the world. Rational intellecution has two moments, viz. the moment of intellecution of reality itself [111] as grounding principle, and the moment of intellecution of a real determinate content as grounded upon that ground.

The first is the intellecution of in-depth physical reality as grounding principle. This physical reality is actualized in intellecution and its ideas; and its mode of being actualized, I repeat, is “to be grounding”. In turn the content of previous intellecutions (ideas) takes on the character of the content of the real in the world. This is the realization of the content of the idea. The unity of these two moments is just creation. The in-depth reality is actualized in what was previously intellectively known, and in this actualization reality acquires its free content; this latter has been realized.

Hence the importance of reason: it is physical reality itself, in its grounding free content, which is in play. We have already found ourselves in a similar situation when we were studying field intellecution. Field intellecution is an intellecution of the real as realization of something irreal. For just this reason the irreal inexorably has its “own” properties about which it is possible to debate. As I see it, this can only happen because the “created” is always and only the character of a content of physical reality itself. Physical reality actualized in a free system of ideas and previous affirmations can and does have more properties than those determined by the logical content of said ideas and said affirmations. And this is inexorable. Creation, then, radically and primarily concerns reason itself as intellecution of the ground of something in depth.

But then we see clearly that this intellecution [112] has, as I said a bit earlier, a second moment: the attribution of this “reason” or “explanation” freely created to a real thing. And this attribution is free. I can freely intellectively know that in-depth cosmic reality is the classical Hamiltonian ground, or the quantum field ground. And granting this, I intellectively know freely as well that a real field thing has in fact one or the other of those two grounding structures. This is the second moment of rational intellecution, viz. that from the various grounds which I have freely created, I freely choose one as the
ground of what I am trying to intellectively know in the
field. The creation of grounding reason is the actualiza-
tion of in-depth physical reality in what has been previ-
ously intellectively known. And this creation is prolonged
in an intellective knowing of a concrete real thing with
one or another ground: it is an actualization of the thing
in one or another of them. This actualization constitutes
the root of realization, the realization of the ground in
in-depth reality, and the realization of this ground in the real
thing which I want to intellectively know. Reason or ex-
planation, then, is first an intellection of the real ground,
and second an intellection of the fact that this ground is of
a real thing which one is trying to ground, a ground real-
ized in it. And these two moments taken unitarily in the
reality of this thing in the world constitute the free cre-
ation of reason. And here we have the essence of reason as
a free creation. In what, more concretely, does the ra-
tional character of this creation consist? That is the sec-
ond question.

d) The free creation of content, whatever its nature,
is supposed to have its own unity. It is not by chance that
the creation is conceptual. One can intellectively know
that that content has the “unity”—only apprehended po-
etically—of the metaphorical. It is not by chance that the
content has a \{113\} type of unity which was fixed in ad-
vance. The rational part of this creation consists in being
a creation in and of “grounding unity”, of whatever type.
When it is realized, this unity created by me takes on the
character of a real in-depth structure: the system of cen-
tauric notes becomes a centaur, etc. And this structural
unity is just grounding reason. The rational part of the
creation is, then, precisely in the structure.

There is a type of structural unity that discharges a
decisive function, viz. the structural unity which consists
in being a “construct” system, i.e., a system in which none
of its notes has its own reality as a note other than being
intrinsically and formally “of” the others. Being a con-
struct system is the very essence of the real qua real.
Whence its radical function. And it is on account of this
that we are going to concentrate our reflection upon this
structural unity. That system of notes should have, intel-
lectively, its own coherent unity. And this unity can be
established in many ways. The structural intellective
unity of the notes can consist, for example, in being a
definition. But it is not necessary that it be so. It can also
be a system of axioms and postulates. This system of axi-
oms and postulates is not just a system of definitions.

What is unique about this intellective unity qua structural
is being a “construct” unity. As intellective creation the
unity is above all just coherent intellective unity. And this
unity, I repeat, is not necessarily an intellection through
definition. And it is not in the first place because defini-
tion is not the exclusive way of constructing intellective
unities. Second, and especially, because definition is al-
ways a predicative logos. Now, predication is not the pri-
mary and constitutive form of the logos; before it there is
a propositional logos which is the nominal logos. I leave
aside for \{114\} now the fact that there is a form of logos
prior to the propositional logos, viz. the positional logos.
Now, the coherent intellective unity of the in-depth real is
the intellective unity in a nominally constructed logos,
i.e., in a nominal logos which affirms the notes in a con-
struct state. When the logos falls back upon notes which
presumably are ultimate and irreducible, we have the
radical logos of in-depth reality. This unity is freely cre-
ated.

The actualization of in-depth physical reality in this
unity confers upon it the character of being the content of
that in-depth reality. And in turn the coherent intellective
unity has been realized in the in-depth reality. In virtue
of this, the coherent intellective unity has acquired the char-
acter of primary coherent unity of the real: it is essence.
Essence is the structural principle of the substantivity of
the real. I have explained my views on these subjects at
length in my book Sobre la esencia\textsuperscript{1}. Essence is what
reason has sought in this case. And in this search reason
has freely created the essence, in the sense explained
above. This is not the essence of reality itself, but reality
itself in essence. Therefore the fact that the real has es-
sense is an imposition of in-depth reality itself. But
whether this essence has this or that content, however true
my in-depth intellection is, will always be an open ques-
tion. Every note, by being real, points to others in its
physical reality, so that rational intellection of essence is
constitutively open both insofar as my intellection never
terminates, and insofar as the intellectively known itself,
i.e., each note, in principle points to another. And we
shall never know the amplitude of this pointing. What, in
fact, does this amplitude mean?

Every real thing is a construct system of notes which
\{115\} constitute it, and which I therefore call ‘constitu-
tent’. But among these notes there are some which are not
grounded upon others of the system itself. And these
notes are then more than constituent; they are constitutive,
and what they constitute is the essence of the real thing.

\textsuperscript{1} English translation, On Essence, by A. R. Caponigri, Catholic University of America Press, 1983.
\[\text{[Zubiri is drawing an analogy with a grammatical feature of the Semitic}
\text{languages to which he frequently makes reference, the “construct state”}
\text{that describes a type of unity similar to that discussed here.—trans.]}\]
Their unity is, in fact, primary coherent unity. Now, amplitude is the difference between the constituent notes and the constitutive notes in the order of grounding of the in-depth real. And this is quite complex, because essence is what constitutes, as reality, the real thing of which it is the essence. And here is where the complexity of the problem begins.

The pointing, in fact, is grounded above all in the constitutive respectivity of the real qua real, i.e., is grounded in the fact that the real is constitutively in the world. This respectivity is what makes each thing not only real but constitutively a determinate form and mode of reality. In virtue of this, the reality of each essential note points to that which in the real thing in question is the radical and ultimate determinant of that mode of reality. Then ‘amplitude’ means the major or minor difference between some real notes and the ultimate and radical determinant in them of the mode of being in question. For example, the mode of being a person is radically different from the mode of being of any other apersonal reality. And this amplitude is opened up within the richness of these constitutive notes. However, ultimate they may be, the cells or cellular components of a human organism are not what determine that this organism have a ultimate mode of being personal.

But this is a relatively exceptional amplitude, because all other real things, and even people themselves, before being modes of reality, are moments in such-or-such respectivity; they are forms of reality. Each thing is respective not only to the world, to reality as such, but also to what other real things are in their physical suchness. This respectivity is no longer world but cosmos. This respectivity is what makes each thing not only real but constitutively a determinate form and mode of reality. And this cosmic respectivity determines a pointing not to modes of reality but to other real things, and to other forms of reality, to their structural notes. Then ‘amplitude’ does not mean the difference between some constituent notes and others which ultimately determine the cosmic respectivity of the thing and of its form of reality. Here the notes do not determine the mode of being of the real, but its formal inclusion in the cosmos.

Now, in both senses, the amplitude of the notes makes intellection of essence something constitutively open. This is not the place to investigate that question, because it isn’t the subject of the present book. I shall therefore limit myself to a summary indication of it.

Essence determines each real thing with respect to not only other real things but also to other forms and modes of reality. Each thing is “its own” reality. And this “its own” has two aspects. For one, it is a pointing to other forms and modes of reality; but for the other, it is the openness of that real thing towards its own reality. Only by virtue of the first aspect is respectivity pointing; by virtue of the second, it is constituting. Respectivity as pointing is grounded upon constituting respectivity. Constitutive notes, i.e., essence, make each thing “its own” reality, but within a prior unity which cannot be lost, viz. the cosmos. What is cosmos? One might think, following Aristotle, that cosmos is just an ordering, a taxis of things, the real. But one might also think that it is only the cosmos itself which has its own unity. Then {117} things would be parts or fragments of the cosmos, and therefore would not have an essence; only the cosmos as such would have it. Things would be only fragmentary essential moments of the cosmos. The unity of the cosmos would not be taxonomic but of a different character. In the case of the taxis the course of the cosmos would be a system of interactions of things. But if the structure of the cosmos is not taxonomic, then the course of the cosmos must be simply the variation of moments of a primary unity, something like the unity of the course of a melody. The moments of a melody are not found in interaction with other moments of it, and yet there is a melodic course which has a perfectly determinate structure. In this case the unity of the cosmos would not be taxonomic but melodic, following deterministic and statistical laws. The breakup of the cosmos into things which are really distinct does not, then, go beyond being a provisional breakup. And therefore the essence of each presumed thing is affected with a provisionality par excellence, with a radical openness.

What we have here, then, is how the intellection of that real in-depth moment is a constitutively open intellection in a creative sense. It is drawn from the sentient character of reason. Sentient reason must create what it is going to intellec-tively know by structural grounding and endow the real with this unity in order to convert it into primary coherent unity, i.e., into essence. And this, which culminates in the rational intellection of the essence of the real, completely characterizes all rational intellections: they endow reality with a freely created structural content by actualization of that reason in what is created.

How is this endowing brought about, i.e., how is the creative intellection of the real brought about? This is the third and last of the points which we must examine. {118}

e) Modes of rational creation. In its primary structure, as we said, reason is in-depth intellection of the previously intellec-tively known field reality. It is clear that, starting from what we might call ‘primary rational intel-
lections’, reason follows its line of progress in-depth beyond the field. We shall see this below. But what is important to us here about this moment is the constitutive origin of reason, and this origin is found in what was previously intellectively known. In the previously known, reason has not only its point of departure but its intrinsic support. This support is ultimately the principle and canon of intellec­tion with which reason measures in-depth reality. Reason is sentient. Its sentient part assures that what I intellectively know is reality; but the fact that this reality is the ambit of in-depthness or profundity is what opens up and constitutes the creative freedom of reason. This freedom concerns the content of in-depth reality. Insofar as I rationally know this content intellectively, reason is not of representative character but of grounding character; the content is created in order to endow reality with its concrete grounding character, because only from this latter does the content most proper to in-depth reality turn out to be “other” or even “opposite”. I have here given the name ‘representation’ to everything previously intellectively known, not in the sense of being just simple apprehensions as opposed to affirma­tions, but in the sense that all these simple apprehensions and all these affirmations are what “re-present” real and true reality. This representation serves as principle and canon of rational intel­lection, i.e., of the intellec­tion of the grounded character of content. But then it is clear, as I have already said, that although the grounding function is not formally the same as the representative function, [119] it is not completely independent of it. And this is because the fact that what has been previously known intellectively, the repre­sentative, can be the principle and canon of the ground indicates that this ground must have some support in that which is representative. The representative is the necessary base and support for reason, even though it may not be even close to adequate with respect to its grounding character.

Now, starting from this representation of what is effectively real in the field, rational creation tries to freely endow in-depth reality with its own grounding content. The mode of endowing is the mode of being supported in what was previously intellectively known for the free creation of the content of in-depth reality, i.e., it is the mode in which what was previously intellectively known gives reason or explanation of the real. What are these modes? As I see it, the endowing results in three principle modes.

First mode. In-depth reality can be endowed with a content in what I shall call free experience. In what does this free experience consist, and in what does the mode of endowing the in-depth reality in it with its own content consist?

First and most important, What is this free experience? Let us say what experience “is” here, what it “falls back” upon, “how” it does so, and in what this singular experience “consists”.

What does “experience” mean here? Leaving aside for later the strict and rigorous concept of what experience is, it will suffice for now to appeal to the normal and common meaning of what is generally understood by experience. ‘To experience’ sometimes means in a tentative way to test or assay. In our case, this testing “falls back” upon the content which I have apprehended. And this is possible just because reality as ambit leaves [120] the content indeterminate, and therefore is the ambit of free creation. “How” experience falls back testing what was previously intellectively known is by testing in the form of freedom. Finally, what is freely tested regarding the previously intellectively known content “consists” in a modification of it; we test or seek to modify its content freely, not to be sure along the lines of its physical reality, but along the lines of its intellec­tive physical actuality. Thus, for example, one takes the intellec­tion of something which in the field sense is a “body”, and freely modifies many of its characteristics, stripping it of its color, reducing its size, changing its form, etc. With this modification the body becomes a “corpuscle”. The effort of free modification of the actuality of already apprehended content is wherein free experience formally consists. Free experience, then, moves in the actuality of physical reality itself. And the freedom of this movement concerns its content, a free movement based upon the principle and canon of what has been previously intellectively known.

It is useful to position this concept of free experience with respect to other philosophical systems, above all with respect to the idea of the experience of the fictitious. John Stuart Mill thought that together with what is commonly called ‘sensible experience’ or ‘perceptive experience’ there is an experience of imagination, i.e., an experience which is commonly called ‘image’ as opposed to perception. Mill tells us that this image is not reality. The idea has been coopted by Husserl in what he calls ‘fantastic experience’, which falls back upon the content of every perception when its character of reality has been neutral­ized. Now, what I call ‘free experience’ does not coincide even remotely with either of these two conceptions. In the first place, that upon which the free [121] experience relies is formally reality. And this reality is the physical reality of what has been previously intellectively known. Therefore this experience does not rely upon nor remake the image in the sense of imaginary reality; nor does it
basing oneself upon what has been previously known intellectively has not only its own notes but in addition these notes have among themselves a more or less precise structural unity. Here I take the word ‘structural’ in its widest sense, viz. the mode of systematization of the notes. This structure is something which has degrees of depth, from the simple unity of a mere group of notes to the primary coherent unity of essence, passing through all intermediate degrees. Here, then, ‘structure’ means the formal unity of notes. Now, in order to give explanation of the real I cannot rely upon the notes of field things themselves, but only upon their formal structure, in their mode of systematization. The mode of endowing in-depth reality with formal structure is what I call hypothesis.

What is an hypothesis? What is the mode of endowing in-depth reality with content in this hypothesis?

‘Hypothesis’ is an expression which comes from the Greek hypothemē, to collect, to establish something below something else. This “establishing below” has two aspects. One is the aspect of what is thus established; the other, the aspect of the act of establishing it. In English we call the first aspect what is “supposed” about something, the other, ‘supposition’. These two are not the same. Supposition is an act of mine, the supposed a moment of the real. Things supposed about this or that actuation, situation, or creation are not suppositions. The supposed is not primarily supposed by virtue of being the terminus of a supposition; on the contrary, the supposition is so (124) because that which is supposed in it is something supposed. The supposed is always primary. The Greeks called the supposed hypothema, and the supposition hypothesis. In English and other modern languages, only the second survives. Therefore the word ‘hypothesis’ is somewhat ambiguous: it commonly leads to believing that an hypothesis is a supposition, but it can also be the supposed itself. In our problem, the supposed, that which
is "established below", is the formal structure of something. I therefore call it the 'basic structure'. Hypothesis is the basic structure as something supposed of the real. The mode of the notes of the real being "systematized" is just basic structure, as opposed to a mere "diversity" of notes. This is the primary and radical aspect of hypothesis. Hypothesis (in English or Spanish) is not, then, mere supposition. If by 'supposition' one understands every conceptualization to be admitted more or less provisionally, then everything rational would be an hypothesis. But hypothesis is first of all the supposed of something, its radical structure. It is a moment of reality, what is established as the base of something, its basic structure.

Now, in what was previously intellectively known, I can freely attend to its basic structure and to its notes. In this last sense of notes, modification is free experience. But the hypothesis does not formally consist in free experience; rather it consists in being endowed with basic structure. Thus I intellectually knew what is supposed about the real in question independently of its notes. And then I could rely upon them in order to endow the in-depth real with basic structure. And I can call this endowing 'hypothesis', but now in the sense of supposition: it is the supposition that the supposed of the in-depth real consists in this or that thing supposed or basic structure. This endowing does not consist in supposing that my supposition is real, but in supposing that the real in which I am already here and now present, prior to all [125] supposition, has one determinate basic structure and not another. Repeating once again the formula, I shall say that we are not dealing with a supposition or hypothesis of reality, but of reality in supposition or hypothesis. We are not dealing with hypothetical reality but with the hypothetical structure of the real in which I already really am. And in this lies all of the weight of the hypothesis, viz. in being what is supposed of the basic structure.

What is this matter of endowing the in-depth real with basic structure? What we are doing is to consider that the basic structure of the in-depth real is of the same nature as the basic structure of these or those field things. This is very different, as we shall see forthwith, from considering some field things as models of in-depth reality. Here we are not trying to model. We are trying to do something quite different, to homologize or make equivalent. The mode of endowing content to in-depth reality does not consist in endowing it with some model-notes, according to which the in-depth reality grounds something by being this or that model; rather, it consists in in-depth reality structuring the thing in question. To ground is here to structure. The structures of the in-depth real and of the field real are assumed to be homologous. This homology does not mean generalization. Generalization is an extension. And dealing with basic structures, there is to be sure a generalization, but one which is the consequence of a homology. Only because the structures are homologous can they be generalized. Therefore the equations of electrical potential are not a generalization of mechanical or thermal potential, but rather express a basic homologous structure, and only in this sense can one speak of generalization.

Let us take some more examples of homologies. A {126} social entity does not seem at all like an organism if we consider its notes; but since the beginning of the century it has been thought innumerable times in sociology that the basic structure of society, i.e., the mode of its "elements" being systematized is the same as the mode of systematization of the organs of a higher animal; this was the idea behind sociological organicism. Hence the idea of social "organization". This is the homology between the basic structure of in-depth reality of society and the field reality of living beings. It was also thought that the basic structure of the social is homologous not to that of living beings but to that of solid bodies; this was the idea of the in-depth reality of the social as "solidarity". Society is neither a dog (or other higher animal) nor a solid body; but it has been thought that the basic structure of in-depth social reality is homologous to the basic structure of a dog or of a solid body. Homology has intervened also in the physical sciences. Thus it is (or was) thought that elementary particles in some respects have structures homologous to that of bodies which rotate around an axis. But in elementary particles we are dealing only with homologous basic structures, because in these particles there is no rotation. Nonetheless, quantized angular momentum (without rotation) is attributed to these particles; this is 'spin'. It is precisely because we are not dealing with modeling but with what I here term 'homologizing' that, in my view, it has been said for decades that elementary particles are not "visualizable". This does not mean the triviality that they are not "visible", but that they do not have notes which are the same as those of field bodies. This is clear in the case of spin, which represents purely and simply the homology of two structures, the {127} rotational structure of field bodies and the rotational structure without rotation of the elementary particles. Descriptively, light does not at all seem like electricity or magnetism; but it is known that the basic structures of light are identical to those of electromagnetism as expressed in Maxwell's equations; this is the electromagnetic theory of light.

In summary, I can endow in-depth reality not with the notes of field things considered as models, but with a
basic structure (hypothesis) which is homologous to that of something in the field.

Still, this does not exhaust the modes of endowing in-depth reality with content.

**Third mode.** Rational creation relies upon field reality in order to endow in-depth reality with its own structure, as we have seen. This field reality, by virtue of being an ambit, is something different from its content. And that requires the field ambit to be a field of freedom for the intelligence. This freedom can refer to the notes which constitute field things, i.e., the freedom to be able to change them within their own lines. Freedom can also refer not to the notes themselves but to their mode of systematicatization, their basic structure, in order to take it independently of the notes themselves. There is yet one further and more radical step of freedom. It consists in the ambit being the field of freedom in order to completely construct its content by constructing notes and basic structure at the same time. Then rational intellection can endow in-depth reality with this content which is freely constructed.

What is this construction? In what does the mode of endowing in-depth reality with grounding content by relying upon free construction consist? [128]

That this is free construction we have already seen some pages back when speaking about the creational character of reason. Free construction is the maximum degree of creative freedom, and therefore it would serve no purpose to repeat the details of what has already been said; it will suffice to review some ideas. I freely construct on the basis of percepts, fictional items, concepts, and above all of affirmations. That which is thus constructed, is constructed in reality, in physical reality itself; this is field reality qua physical reality and identical to the formality of reality apprehended as impression of reality in primordial apprehension. It is this reality which is actualized in my free constructions. ‘Free’ does not here mean that the act of realizing is free as an act, but that the realization itself is what, qua realization, is free. Here freedom does not concern only the constructing act, but also the formal nature of what is constructed itself. Freedom in this context is not only freedom to modify notes or to homologize structures; it is freedom or liberation from everything to do with the field in order to construct the content of in-depth reality. This free realization is not production, but a realization along the lines of actuality. Realization independent of the field and of production is free construction. That from which one is free is not being real, since reality is primarily and ineluctably given in every intellection since primordial apprehension itself (and therefore in the field, in field reality). What is free is the realization of a content as content of the real. The real, then, is not a thing like the things immediately sensed, but neither is it just something mental; it is rather a free thing. Upon being de suyo a free thing consists in reality, in being freely this or that. The construction, then, is not freedom of reality, but reality in freedom. [129]

In this free action, I am to be sure relying upon the content of the field real as previously intellectively known. But it is a reliance which has a radically free character: I rely upon the content of field things only in order to make the break of liberation from that content. Although my free construction adopts models or basic structures taken from the field, nonetheless the free construction is not formally constituted by what it adopts; if it does adopt it, it does so freely.

The free construction can be brought about in different ways. It should not be thought that to be rational is synonymous with “theoretical” construction, so to speak. Any free creation whatsoever, a novel for example, is free construction. I do not call it ‘fiction’ because in every free construction, however fictitious it is, percepts, concepts, and affirmations come into play as well as fictional items. Any novel is riddled with concepts and affirmations. But I can also bring about a free theoretical construction. This construction is not a novel, but the difference—about which I shall speak forthwith—concerns the construction itself. Every free construction, whether theoretical or not, is qua construction of the same nature; it consists in constructing, in reality, a content with full freedom regarding the whole content of the field.

Granting this, How is the reality of this free content endowed? The mode in which the freely constructed intellectively endows reality with its own content does not consist in modeling or in homologies; it is instead a radical postulation. In-depth reality is actualized in what has been freely constructed by postulation. This I have already explained in Part II. It is not truth which is postulated but real content. And this is so whether dealing with theoretical or [130] non-theoretical construction. It is not postulation of reality but reality in postulation. One postulates what belongs to something [suyo] but not the de suyo itself. Postulation is the mode by which in-depth reality is endowed with a freely constructed content. Reality is actualized in my free construction, which latter is thus converted into the content of the real; a content however free one may wish, but always the content of the real.

That which is freely constructed and realized by postulation can remain on its own; it is creation by creation. This is proper, for example, to a novel. But that
which is freely constructed can be realized in the “ground-reality” as grounding the content of a field thing. Then that which is freely constructed is “grounded” content; it is theoretical postulation.

It is not difficult to adduce examples of postulation which are especially important and decisive. Above all, there is the rational intellection of the spatial reality of the perceptive field in its in-depth reality; this is geometry. All geometry consists in a free system of postulates (including the so-called axioms). In geometry one freely postulates that the in-depth reality of the space field has fixed, precise characteristics; this is the geometric space. The field space, i.e., perceptive space, is the pre-geometric space. Now, one postulates that this field space has, in its in-depth reality, fixed intrinsic characteristics which are quite precise. The existence of geometries with different freely selected postulates shows that the possibility of different contents applies to the in-depth reality of space, to geometric space. This diversity is more than meets the eye, because in my view, it discloses two things. First, it shows that we are always dealing with “space”, i.e., that we are always trying to give rational foundation to that which is the perceptive spatial field. This latter is not absolute space—that would be absurd—but neither is it a geometric space. Therefore I call it ‘pre-geometric space’. It is a space which does not possess strictly conceived characteristics, because when conceiving them it is necessary that this pre-geometric space become a geometric space. Geometric space is therefore an in-depth foundation of pre-geometric space. The diversity of postulates discloses that, above all, both spaces are in fact space, but that the pre-geometric space is different than the geometric space. In particular, it shows us in this way that Euclidean space is not, as has so often been claimed, “intuitive”, i.e., it shows us that Euclidean space is a free creation of geometric space. Second, the mutual independence of the diverse postulates shows the dissociation of structural aspects of geometric space. It shows us that, as the systems of postulates are distinct, essentially different and even separate aspects may apply to geometric space. These include conjunction, direction, and distance. This revelation occurs based on the simple fact that the systems of postulates are mutually independent. Topology, affinity, and measure reveal, both in their total independence as well as their possible conditional unity in some cases, that the intrinsic rational intelligibility of the in-depth reality of space comes about in a free construction. This is also revealed by the independence of postulatable structures within each of those geometries. The geometries are postulation; the intellection of in-depth reality of space is therefore free creation.

In physics, at the beginning of the modern age, there were two great free creative efforts to intellectively know rationally the in-depth reality of the universe. One consisted in the idea that the universe is a great organism whose diverse elements comprise systems by sympathy and antipathy. But this never had much success. The one which triumphed was the other conception. It was the free creation which postulates for cosmic reality a mathematical structure. That was Galileo’s idea in his New Science: the great book of the universe, he tells us, is written in geometric language, i.e., mathematics. For centuries this mathematicism took the form of mechanism, a free creation according to which universal mathematics is the mathematics of deterministic movement. But for the last century, physics has ceased to be mechanistic. The mathematical structure of the universe subsists independently of its earlier mechanistic form, which was too limiting. Mathematicism is not mechanism. And all of this is, without any doubt, a free creation for rationally intellectively knowing the foundation of all the cosmos. Its fertility is quite apparent. Nonetheless, the fabulous success of the idea of a mathematical universe cannot hide its character of free creation, of free postulation, which precisely by being free leaves some unsuspected aspects of nature in the dark.

Let us summarize what has been said. We were asking ourselves about the modes of free rational creation. We saw that there are three in particular. They rely upon three aspects of the field: the experience of notes, structure, and constructing. In these three aspects the creation which is of free character unfolds: free experience, free systematization, and free construction. By free experience in-depth reality is endowed with a model-like content. By free systematization in-depth reality is endowed with a basic structure. By free construction in-depth reality is endowed with a completely created content. The mode of ending in-depth reality with a consistent content by modifying certain field notes is what I call “modelizing”; the mode of ending in-depth reality with a content of basic structure which relies upon the field is “homologizing”; and the mode of ending in-depth reality with a completely constructed content is “postulating”. These three are the three modes of rational creation. They are but modes of moving ourselves intelligently in a primary, identical, and ineluctable formality of reality. And as this formality is intrinsically and formally given in the impression of reality, it follows that the three modes of rational creation are three creative modes of sentient reason.

With that we have finished the second step of our investigation in this chapter. We set out to analyze the
structure of the progression of intellection. For it we began by studying intellec
tive activity *qua* activity; this is thinking. We then asked about thinking activity *qua* in-
tellec: this is reason. And within reason we have seen, in the first place, what reason is; second, what is its ori
gin; and finally the unity of reason and reality. Now it remains for us to study the fourth essential point of our investigation: What is the formal object of rational activ-
ity?
Let us summarily retrace the line of argument thus far in this third part of our investigation, in order to be able to better focus upon its subsequent development.

We have seen that reason is the intellective moment of thinking activity. In other words, reason is not a simple activity of intellective knowing but an intellective activity. We have, moreover, seen what this means. Activity is not simply action, but rather being in action along the lines of that mode which consists in taking action. This activity, qua activity of intellective knowing, is what constitutes thinking. Thinking is the mode of action of intellective knowing determined by real things already intellectively known in a prior intellection; it is, then, an activated activity. And that which activates us in these already intellectively known things is the constitutively open character of reality itself. Qua activity, thinking activity is being in action, it is intellectively knowing that to which the things previously intellectively known are open. It is what we call “giving pause to think”. The real is giving us to think because it is really open and because thinking is constitutively open to reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically and formally involves the moment of reality, not just intentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what we call its intellective character. The properly intellective moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellective and structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previously intellectively known. This support is the reality of what is intellectually known through the field in its character of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection determined by the real itself.

This mode of intellection is inquiring intellection, a searching. Reason relies upon what has been previously intellectively known for this search. It is a search which goes beyond what is intellectively known in the field of the real, a “beyond” in all its aspects and dimensions; it is what I call ‘profundity’ or ‘reality in-depth’. In the intellection of in-depth reality, reality is not a “medium” of intellection, but a “measure” of field reality. The things of the field, then, are not at the back of reason. Just the opposite: they constitute the canonic principle by which intellection measures in principle the reality of the field itself.

This measurement has the formal characteristic of ground. In-depth reality is “ground-reality” or if one wishes, “fundamental reality”. Reason is thus intellection of the real in depth through a principle. This principle is not a system of truths or of rules, but reality itself in its physical character of reality. And as reality is constitutively open, it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. In this openness reason is going to intellectively know in-depth reality in a form which is dimensional, directional, and provisionally open; it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. This openness is the principle which in-depth reality is giving us to think because it is really open and because thinking is constitutively open to reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically and formally involves the moment of reality, not just intentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what we call its intellective character. The properly intellective moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellective and structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previously intellectively known. This support is the reality of what is intellectually known through the field in its character of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection determined by the real itself.

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This measurement has the formal characteristic of ground. In-depth reality is “ground-reality” or if one wishes, “fundamental reality”. Reason is thus intellection of the real in depth through a principle. This principle is not a system of truths or of rules, but reality itself in its physical character of reality. And as reality is constitutively open, it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. In this openness reason is going to intellectively know in-depth reality in a form which is dimensional, directional, and provisionally open; it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. This openness is the principle which in-depth reality is giving us to think because it is really open and because thinking is constitutively open to reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically and formally involves the moment of reality, not just intentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what we call its intellective character. The properly intellective moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellective and structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previously intellectively known. This support is the reality of what is intellectually known through the field in its character of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection determined by the real itself.

This mode of intellection is inquiring intellection, a searching. Reason relies upon what has been previously intellectively known for this search. It is a search which goes beyond what is intellectively known in the field of the real, a “beyond” in all its aspects and dimensions; it is what I call ‘profundity’ or ‘reality in-depth’. In the intellection of in-depth reality, reality is not a “medium” of intellection, but a “measure” of field reality. The things of the field, then, are not at the back of reason. Just the opposite: they constitute the canonic principle by which intellection measures in principle the reality of the field itself.

This measurement has the formal characteristic of ground. In-depth reality is “ground-reality” or if one wishes, “fundamental reality”. Reason is thus intellection of the real in depth through a principle. This principle is not a system of truths or of rules, but reality itself in its physical character of reality. And as reality is constitutively open, it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. In this openness reason is going to intellectively know in-depth reality in a form which is dimensional, directional, and provisionally open; it follows that reason itself is open qua reason. This openness is the principle which in-depth reality is giving us to think because it is really open and because thinking is constitutively open to reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically and formally involves the moment of reality, not just intentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what we call its intellective character. The properly intellective moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellective and structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previously intellectively known. This support is the reality of what is intellectually known through the field in its character of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection determined by the real itself.
cause reason is already in reality and it is in this being in reason in which the very principle of reason consists. And this is not just the principle, but also the foundation, of all of reason’s intellecuitive progress: reality is coercively imposed upon reason. What is a problem is the intellecuitive reality in its own fundamental content. This is what must be measured. And in order to deal with this problem reason actualizes reality itself in its previous intellecutions, a mode of [138] actualization which consists in considering them as foundation of the real. But as my previous intellecutions are mine, it follows that rational intellecution qua rational is a free creation. In this free creation the real takes on, in my previous intellecutions, its fundamental content. And in turn, this content is realized. That realization can assume different forms. It can be the realization of a content achieved through free experience, through basic structure or hypothesis, or in free construction; i.e., it can be modalization, homology, or postulation, the three forms of fundamentality.

Granting this, the structure of reason leaves a very precise question open to our analysis. That which is intellecutivo known is in-depth reality in its fundamental content. This intellecution is, as I said, a free creation which does not unfold from the field but relies upon the field in order to determine that content in a search. In virtue of this, a question arises: With respect to this in-depth reality, what is its content qua searched for? That is, What is the formal object of intellecuitive activity, the formal object of reason? Here we have the key question, a question which is much more complex than it might seem at first glance. A little reflection will reveal that this question unfolds in three groups of problems:

1. What is the character of the formal object of reason?
2. What is the formal unity of this object with the real which has determined it?
3. What, formally, is the determinant function of the real in reason?

These are the three points which we must quickly examine.

§1

THE FORMAL CHARACTER OF THE OBJECT OF REASON

Reason is an intellecution determined in one of the directions of the “toward” of the real, viz. the in-depth “to-ward”. This “toward” is, I repeat once again, a mode of reality itself, reality in its mode of “toward”. And when this “toward” is so in-depth, then the intellecution is reason. The formal character of reason is then the formal character of the terminus of this “toward”.

To be sure, by virtue of being a mode of reality, the “toward” itself has a terminus in reality itself, since we never left it. But this does not mean that the “toward” terminates in some real thing. The terminus qua terminus is a terminus in reality, and therefore pertains to it, even though not real by itself. What is this pertaining? It is not pertaining to reality as a determinate content. Strictly speaking, the terminus could be vacuous, i.e., the “toward” might be toward nothing. Nonetheless, it will always “really” be a nothing: it is therefore in reality like an echo, so to speak. The pertaining to reality does not, then, mean that its content is determinate, but merely that it is a “terminus”, something toward which one goes. This terminus is a terminus in reality, but not a determinate content of it. Being in reality without being formally a real content is just what comprises being something which is possible. The terminus of the “toward” is something formally possible. Here we have the formal character of the object [140] of reason, viz. possibility. That in which reason moves is the real, always and only as possible. What, to be more precise, does this possibility mean?

Taken from the negative side, the possible is that which lacks something in order to be fully real. But this not being real is limited to reality itself. And that limiting constitutes the positive aspect of the possible. Now, there are different modes in accordance with which the “not” is limited to reality. Here two are of special interest to us.

The first came to our attention when we dealt with the intellecution of what something real is in reality among other things. The first thing that intellecution does in these circumstances is not to abandon reality but to take within it a distance from the real. This is a movement of “stepping back” within reality. Such intellecution by stepping back constitutes simple apprehension. Its formal character, the formal character of the terminus of simple apprehension, is physical reality itself in its mode of “might be”. The real in the field is actualized in my understanding after stepping back as a real that “might be”. “Might be” does not consist in being either a condition or even a possibility in the strict sense. Percepts, fictional items, and concepts are not formally possible because they are already the real in stepping back from content. This is what I shall call the ‘unreal’. We have already seen what it is. ‘Unreal’ does not mean not having to do with reality, but having to do with it by freeing its content. From
the standpoint of reality, the unreal is really unreal; it is reality itself actualized in simple apprehension. From the standpoint of content itself, the unreal is what is realized in reality in the mode of “might be”. In what, precisely, does this mode consist? A content is unreal in the “might be” mode when the unreal content is intellectively known as a property or note of the real. This paper might be read considering the unreal content of the red as if it were a chromatic note of the paper. But the unreal can be of a different character, because I can realize in reality the unreal not as a note but as a ground. Then it is no longer what reality “might be”, but something different, what reality “could be”. This is the possibility of the real. The terminus of the “toward” is for now only a possible terminus. As such it is in reality like a “could be” of reality itself. It is a real possibility. The “might be” is reality in retraction. The “could be” is reality in being grounded. The difference between the “might be” and “could be” is not a difference between two modes of possible being, but between two modes of realization. The “might be” is not intrinsic possibility; it is a mode of something being realized as a mode. As a mode, the “might be” is the unreal mode (understanding ‘unreal’ here as reality in stepping back from content, and not what is understood grammatically by ‘unreal mode’). In contrast the “could be” is a mode of making possible, a mode not of being a note, but of being a ground. The difference between the unreal mode and the mode of making possible is not a difference between two possibilities, but the difference between unreality realized as a note (unreal mode) and unreality realized as a ground (possibilization). The unreal realized as ground is the truly possible part of reason, the “could be”. To preclude confusion between possibility and making possible I shall at times refer to cases of the latter as “the possibilities”, in plural.

My previous intellections are a basis, and upon this basis the intelligence actualizes what field reality could be in its in-depth reality. This is the formal character of the object of reason.

Reason is the intellective moment of thinking. Therefore it is necessary to say that intellective activity, i.e., thinking, always thinks about the real, but only about the possibilities of the real. One always and only thinks about possibilities. If I think about a stroll I am going to take, or in the trip upon which I am going to embark, or in what, in reality, is this thing which we call ‘light’, that about which I am formally thinking is the stroll I am going to take, or in the trip upon which I am going to embark, or upon the real possibilities for this which we call ‘light’ to be produced. The formal object of intellective activity is what the real could really be.

How is this “could be” inscribed in the real, i.e., how are possibilities intellectively known as possibilating in the real?

§2

THE UNITY OF POSSIBILITIES AS DETERMINANT OF THE INTELLECTION OF THE REAL

Naturally, we are only dealing with the order of intellection. We are not concerned with how the possibility is making possible reality in and by itself, but with how the intellection of possibilities is determining the intellection of the real in-depth. Now, this unity which is determinant of the possibilities in the intellection of the real has three essential aspects.

A) In the “toward” I do not just go “beyond”, so to speak, but rather the “toward” is a “toward” already internally qualified by that which throws me beyond. That which thus throws me is the intellection of field reality. And this reality determines the “toward” itself as a “toward” based on something intellectively known previously. And it does so in a twofold sense. First, field reality has its own content, and it is its notes which, upon throwing us "toward", qualify the mode of going toward in-depth reality. The “toward”, in fact, as a mode of reality, recovers all other modes, and these in turn recover the “toward”. Whence it follows not only that each of the modes of field reality throws us “toward” the beyond, but also that this same “toward” is internally characterized by those other modes. Not only that, but there is in this qualification a second aspect which is the “ground”, and that is that field reality not only throws us “toward” but also comprises the canonical principle {144} of intellection in this throwing. These two aspects are but that: aspects of the internal qualification of the “toward”. Now, its formal terminus is what in-depth reality could be, i.e., this formal terminus is possibility. And as the throwing “toward” is intrinsically characterized, it follows that the possibility itself in question is already in some way intrinsically characterized. And this is not some empty possibility, but a possibility which is really characterized qua possibility. Here ‘really’ means not only that this possibility pertains to reality, but that the reality itself characterizes by making possible that possibility. In other words, making possible is inchoate possibility. The “toward” is inchoate. And with inchoation we have the first respect in which making possible determines the intellection of in-depth reality. Reason does not move in the in-
finity of possibilities but in a chain of possibilities as yet inchoate; i.e., it goes on pointing out intrinsically and terminally toward what the possibility is going to make possible.

B) This “toward” has multiple routes precisely because it is recovering, as I just said, all of the content of the field things. As this content is multiple, so are the inchoate routes. That is, field intellect never goes “toward” a single possibility, but “toward” multiple possibilities. Each one of them is inchoate by nature. Hence it follows not only that reason moves in the realm of possibility, but that it moves among multiple possibilities. Reason must take them together; it has to take each “with” (cum) the rest. Therefore, the terminus of the “toward”, more than a mere possibility, is co-possibility. And this intellection of the possible as “with” (cum) is just what constitutes co-legere, “take with”, “take together”, to deduce or infer. The multiplicity of possibilities to-ward which we are sent determines that mode of intellection which is colegere, “taken together ” or inferred. In its etymological sense, colegere is very close to the verb ‘to collect’. And here we have the second aspect in accordance with which possibility determines the intellection of the real in-depth: taking together or inferring. The word does not mean ‘to deduce’ in this context, but the determining of the mode of realizable possibilities, perhaps inchoately. Deduction is but one mode of inferring among others. Inferring designates but a mode of intellection, viz. that of intellectually knowing one or more possibilities when co-intellectively knowing the rest. It is the cum as a mode of intellection. Reason intellectually knows in-depth reality in a mode which is constitutively inferential. It infers diverse inchoate possibilities, diverse things that are inchoate. And by this inferential cum, the diverse possibilities can be intellectually known as more than merely inchoate; they can be intellectually known as a real ground for making possible. What does this mean?

C) The cum of mere inferring has, as I pointed out, a meaning quite close to that of collecting. But it is much more than just collecting. The fact is that one of the many diverse possibilities is possibility of the real, and therefore these possibilities are open because reality itself is constitutively open. Hence the cum of the different possibilities constitutes an ambit in which each possibility, by being open to others, can incorporate them. Then the cum shows us its true nature, viz. mutual “im-plication”, or plication”. And on account of this implication, the possibilities are not only multiple; they constitute a system. Now, the determination of in-depth reality as realization of a system of possibilities mutually implied or com-plicated is precisely explication. This is the third aspect of the intellicative determination of in-depth reality. To intellectually know in-depth reality in a rational manner is to intellectually know it in explication. Conversely, to explicate is to intellectually know in-depth reality as a realization of a system of possibilities.

In summary, rational intellection moves among real possibilities, which intellectually determine the in-depth reality in a way which is inchoative, inferential, and explicative. But we must go one more step, and that is to investigate how the real itself leads to possibility.

§3

DETERMINANT FUNCTION OF THE REAL IN REASON

Reality previously intellectually known in the field throws us toward in-depth reality. Of this throwing we have studied the terminus toward which we are thrown and the mode in which we are thrown. Now, we ask ourselves for the point of departure of the throwing. We are going to be thrown by field reality. This throwing “toward” possibility takes place, as we have seen, in a “toward” which is internally characterized. This characterization is the inchoate nature of possibility as the intellection of in-depth reality, of the intellection of what the reality could be. But then it is eo ipso a possibility which is inchoatively present as such in the field intellection itself. This field intellection is sentient, as is reason itself. Therefore, that possibility is actually present—albeit inchoatively—in the sentient intelligence. Now, this sentient being here-and-now present of the possibility qua possibility, i.e., the sentient presence of what in-depth reality “is capable of being” qua “could be”, is formally what constitutes suggestion. The real ambit of co-possibility is the ambit of suggestion, the ambit of suggestions which are co-suggested. The intelligence then has to opt for one of the different suggestions, and begin its intellection progression. The “toward” of the throwing is, then, a concrete suggestion. I shall forthwith explain this at greater length. Suggestion is not a psychical phenomenon or anything of that nature; rather it is a structural moment of reason itself qua reason. In field intellection not only are things present which are intellectually known, but also in them the suggestion is present of what they could be in-depth.

I said that reason can opt for one among many sug-
gestions. But it can also opt for none of them. Then rea-
son invents new possibilities. But this invention, inasmuch
as it is a rupture of the lines of suggestion, would
not have been possible other than by suggestion itself. If
one wishes—and speaking a bit paradoxically—among
the possible suggestions there is that of not attending to
any of them. Field intellection gives us the canonical
principle of the intellection of in-depth reality, and the
suggestion in which it can be intellectively known. But
what reason intellectively knows can be opposite to its
canonical principle and to every positive suggestion.

In virtue of this, a canonical principle and a system
of suggestions is the concrete structural figure of that
search qua search which is rational intellection.

This concrete figure is essential to reason. Reason is
not a mode of intellection specified only by its formal ter-
minus in the abstract. The rational mode of intellection
has, on the contrary, a precise modal structure, viz. its
concreteness. The concreteness is not individuation, so to
speak, of a general structure; rather, it is a moment which
intrinsically and formally touches the very structure of
reason. To be sure, it is not essential to reason to have
this or that concrete figure; but it is structurally essential
to reason to have concreteness. Reason is not something
which “makes itself concrete”, but something which “is
concrete” in and by itself. And I am not referring to rea-
son as movement about one real note from each human
reality; in (149) this sense reason does not make an ex-
ception for any of their notes. Everything real is in this
sense individual in and by itself. I am referring to reason
not as a structural note, but to its own mode of intellect-
tively knowing the real. This structural concreteness has
a formal root in the two moments which constitute the
search. One is the moment of being a principle: the can-
onical principle is not “the” field reality in abstract, but
what the field intellection in all of its concretion (reality
and canonical principle) has extracted in its being thrown
Another is the thrust into concreteness of the direction
of intellection search, viz. the suggestion. Canonical prin-
ciple and suggestion are, in their intrinsic concreteness,
structural moments of rational intellection. What is this
concreteness?

This structural concreteness has a precise formal
character: it is what constitutes the forma mentis. Reason
has a strict and rigorous structural figure in its very mode
of intellective knowing. What is this forma mentis? Let
us explain the expression.

In the first place, we are dealing with “mind” or
mens. What is this mens? Mind is not formally identical
to intelligence. Etymologically it proceeds from an Indo-
European root men- which meant, among other things,
impetus, ardor, passion, etc.; that is, it expressed animated
movement. But as I see it, this is not all, because it is not
a movement, as for example the movement of passion; as
simple movement this passion is not just something men-
tal pure and simple. The movement itself is mental only
if it bears as its weight some type of intellection of the
trajectory and the terminus of that movement. That is, the
movement which mens signifies is always movement in-
asmuch as it has an intrinsic intellective weight. The
force of the mens (150) has as its own formal character
the intellective weight; it is the force by which movement
itself is intellectively understood and determined. Con-
versely, intellection is mens only when it is intellective
motion. Now, this movement is just the throwing. There-
fore mens is intelligence in throwing. To be sure, it is a
throwing as the very mode of intellection. We are not
dealing with what moves us to intellectively know, but
with the intellective movement itself. And as the intellec-
tive movement in throwing is just reason, it follows that
there is an internal implication between reason and mens.
Thus “mind” expresses the concrete character of reason.

In the second place, this mens has a form or figure,
viz. forma mentis. In what does it consist? It does not
consist only in the trajectory determined by intellection
and its principle, i.e., it does not consist in the form of
movement of intellection. It is something more. It is that
form but distilled to its essence, so to speak, in the intel-
lection qua “thrustable”. The form in question is not just
the figure of an act, but the figure of a mode of our being
involved with the intelligible. Being involved is what
“habitual mode of behavior” means in this context. The
figure which we seek is but the habitual mode of behavior
of intellection in its thrust. It is essential for reason to
have a figure or form as the intellective habitual mode of
behavior of being thrust.

In the third place, this habitual mode of behavior is
supposed to be formally determined by the “toward” itself.
Intellection, in fact, can have many habitual modes of
behavior or modes of being involved with things. Here
two types are of interest to us. Some habitual modes of
behavior or modes of being involved, for example, can be
due to individual as well as social differences. They are
determined by the mode of being of man, and constitute
the figure or form of the thrust by being the figure or form
(151) of the man thrown. Hence it follows that the habi-
tual mode of behavior remains qualified, it has qualities,
but these qualities have an origin extrinsic to what reason
formally is; they have their origin, for example, in being
Greek or in being Semitic. But there are other types of
thrust, whose difference is founded upon the intrinsic na-
ture of the “toward” itself \textit{qua} “toward”. Reason then is also qualified, but its qualities have their origin in the intrinsic nature of reason itself; for example, the difference in throwing “toward” the real in a poetic manner as opposed to the scientific manner. These are not modes which the intellection “has”, but modes of what the intellection “is”. The two types of habitude qualities (let us call them ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’) are not identical. Within a single intrinsic mode of the “toward”, for example within the poetic “toward”, many modes of creating what we call ‘poetry’ fit; the primitive Sumerians understood something different by ‘poetry’ than did the poets of classical Greece. And similarly within the intrinsic “toward” proper to science, there are diverse modes; that which a primitive Sumerian or Akkadian understood by explanation of the world, that which a Greek understood by it, and that which we understand by it, are completely different things. Now, the \textit{forma mentis} is constituted by the intrinsic and formal mode of the confronting or thrusting toward the real, by the mode of the “toward” \textit{qua} “toward”, and not by the modalities which this sending or searching can have as an extrinsic function of the modalities of that which one seeks. This is the difference, to use an example, between a poetic figure or explanation of the real, and a theoretical figure or explanation of the real (this does not go beyond being one example among many). \textit{(152)} It is a difference of a different order than that which exists between the modes of creating science, and between the modes of creating poetry, according to anthropological characteristics. The \textit{forma mentis} consists in this case in the difference between doing science and doing poetry.

These three aspects, viz. being intellective action, being habitual mode of behavior of motion, and being intrinsic and formal habitual mode of behavior of this motion, constitute together what I understand by \textit{forma mentis}, the concrete figure which intellection adopts in its formal mode of being thrown to the real, in the mode of sending as such.

Now, this concept has a very precise name, \textit{mentality}. It is not primarily a psychological, social, or ethnic concept, but a structural one. I am referring, to be sure, to what mentality is formally. Mentality is the intrinsic and formal aspect of the habitual mode of behavior of throwing toward real things; for example, the theoretic mentality. So I am not referring to the qualities which mentality can have, and in fact does have by virtue of determinate external factors of psychological, social, etc. origin. And it is important to emphasize this because usually one uses ‘mentality’ in reference to theoretic mentality as well as to the “Semitic mentality” or the “feudal mentality”. And as I see it, this is not correct. The Semitic and the feudal are certainly things which qualify or characterize mentality, but they confer a determinate quality upon something which is already a mentality, i.e. the mentality as a mode of our being intellectually involved with things. To be Semitic is not a mentality but a quality which qualifies something which is already a mentality, for example, upon “doing science”, etc. But the fact that it is scientific does not “qualify” the mentality already given; rather it is the moment which intrinsically \textit{(153)} and formally “constitutes” it. But that everyday concept lacks a third aspect, the most radical part of the \textit{forma mentis}, the aspect formally constitutive of the habitual mode of behavior of going to the real. The so-called ‘Semitic mentality’ is Semitic by virtue of being the mentality proper to “the” Semite; but it is not a mentality which is “in itself” Semitic—something which formally makes no sense, even though we all use the expression. The modes of conceiving things which a Semite has are not formally Semitic concepitive moments. Being Semitic certainly affects one’s concepts and confers upon them qualities of their own; but these are not formally their qualities, because these qualities do not depend upon the structure of the conceiving itself, but rather upon the mode of being of the Semite. It is on account of this that the so-called mentality of the Semite is not Semitic \textit{qua} mentality; it is only the mentality of the Semite. On the other hand, the theoretic mentality is theoretic “in itself” \textit{qua} mentality; it is not a mentality “of” a scientist but a mode of intellection of the real, a mode intrinsic to reason. The difference between scientific and poetic intellection is significant; they constitute two mentalities, the scientific and the poetic. These two are strict mentalities. The Semite or the Greek, on the other hand, qualify these two mentalities with qualities of extraintellective origin; their origin is in the mode of being of the Semite and the Greek. It is for this reason that they do not constitute mentalities properly so-called. That is the strict and formal concept of mentality. But this does not mean that the everyday expressions ‘Semitic mentality’, ‘Greek mentality’, etc., should not continue to be used. The only important thing is to dispel the error of the concept of mentality latent in these expressions. It is not the same to speak of mentality when referring to Semitic mentality as to speak of it in connection with scientific mentality. The first is proper \textit{(154)} to a sociology of knowledge; the second pertains to a philosophy of the intelligence.

And it is of this mentality, strictly understood, that I say it is structurally essential to reason; it is reason’s intrinsic and formal concretion. Reason is concrete, and its concretion \textit{qua} reason is mentality. There is not, nor can
there be, reason without mentality; whatever there could be without mentality could not be reason. The same occurs in the field intellection of the real. To see this piece of paper and affirm that it is green is not a question of mentality. The mentality appears only when one goes in depth beyond the field in order to know what the foundation of greenness is. Only intellection in-depth has the concreteness of mentality. To the concrete determination of the formal terminus of in-depth intellection, i.e., to the concrete determination of the formal reason or explanation of what is intellectively known, there corresponds the concrete determination of reason *qua* intelligent throwing, i.e., mentality.

As mentality is the concretion of the sending as such, its intrinsic and radical roots are the canonic principle and suggestion. Neither these moments nor for that matter the mentality itself, are limited to the dominion of the theoretic. I have been saying this all along. Suggestion, for example, suggests not only what the theoretic nature of the intellectively known is in depth, but above all recounts the very lines of intellection. It can suggest the creation of concepts; but it can also suggest metaphoric, poetic, or any other type of depth. And similar things should be said of the canonic principle. The unity—at times ineffable—of metaphor has as principle the qualities already apprehended in field intellection; but their roles as principles can be quite varied. This line of intellection (155) is just the line of the “toward” as such. The differences are not only in that from which we are thrown and in that to which we are thrown, but also in the very type of trajectory which we are going to follow, i.e., in the lines of the “toward” of intellection. Mentality should be understood in the light of this vast range, which encompasses not only the content, but also the very lines of intellection. Different are the mentalities of the scientist, the poet, the politician, the theologian, the philosopher, etc. And this, I repeat, is true not just by virtue of the “content” of their reason but above all by the “line”, by the habitual mode of behavior in which reason progresses, thrust out in its search. Mentality is just the formal concrete habitual mode of behavior of rational search; it is the concreteness of the “toward” as such.

*   *   *

In summary, we have already examined in this section what progression is (Chapter I): progression is search. We saw next what its intellective structure is (Chapter II). Progression is a thinking activity, whose intellective moment comprises reason, i.e., the intellection by principles of what the real is in depth. The formal object of this intellective activity is possibility, i.e., what in-depth reality could be. This possibility determines the intellection of in-depth reality in an inchoative form, one which is collective and explicative. And that is possible precisely because field reality, previously intellectively known, gives us a canonic principle and a system of suggestions. It is the ultimate root of the structural concreteness of reason, of its constitutive mentality.

Granting this, rational intelligence intellectively knows (156) in-depth reality. What is the structure of this intellection? Here we have the question which we must examine in Section 2.
SECTION 2

STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL INTELLECTION: KNOWING

The inquiring intellection, reason, is a special mode of intellection. Intellection, as we already know, is the apprehension of something real as just actualized as real in that apprehension. The inquiring intellection is a mode of intellection of the real actualized in a special way. This mode of intellection is what we call knowledge [conocimiento]. The structure of intellection and this sense of knowing might seem obvious to modern philosophers; it was accepted without discussion by Kant. But as we shall see, that identification is untenable. Therefore Kant’s Critique suffers from a radical inadequacy. Prior to a critique of knowing, Kant should have elaborated a critique, or at least a philosophy of intellection as such. Hence in the final analysis Kant’s Critique is inadequate. Kant understands intellection as knowing in the sense of “being familiar with”. In the final analysis, however, he does nothing but pull together an identification which had been in circulation for many centuries. But Kant also believed—again, without calling it into question—that at bottom knowledge in the sense we are discussing is synonymous with science. This double equation (intellection = knowledge; and knowledge = science) determines the progression of thought in the Critique. But this double equation is incorrect. Intellection is not knowledge, nor is the structure of knowledge science. Therefore, in order to conceptualize the nature of rational intellection rigorously, we must pose two questions to ourselves:

I. What is knowledge [conocer]?

II. What is the formal structure of knowing [conocer]?

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1 [Zubiri is drawing a distinction here between inteligir, ‘intellective knowing’, and conocer, ‘knowing’ in the more usual sense.—Trans.]
CHAPTER V
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

In the foregoing pages we have discussed what rational intellection is. Now, knowledge [conocimiento] is what formally constitutes rational intellection. In order to conceptualize knowledge it is worthwhile to briefly recount what has already been said in order to frame the question adequately.

Above all it is necessary to eliminate a false but very current idea, that knowledge is substituting concepts of reality for sensible representations. According to this theory, sensible impressions are mere empty representations of reality, and the intellection of reality is only in knowledge, above all in scientific knowledge. But that is not true, because sensible impressions are not representations but presentations. That which is representation is scientific knowledge; but representation not in the sense of substitution of impressions by other intellections (vorstellen), but in the sense of re-explaining that which is already present (dar-stellen). In this sense (and only in this one) is knowledge re-presentation, i.e., rational re-actualization.

With this mistake eliminated, let us continue with the problem.

Rational intellection is intellection above all. As such, it is the apprehension of something as real, an apprehension in which the real itself is just actualized. This intellection has two moments. Everything real, in fact, has an individual and a field moment. Upon apprehending something as real one apprehends its reality in accordance with both moments but in a different mode. If one attends more to the individual moment, then intellection is apprehension of the thing as real. But if one attends to what the real thing is in a field, it is then apprehended as actualized in the field manner, among other things similarly actualized. And then apprehension does not intellecively know only that a thing is real, but also what this real thing is in reality. These are the two moments of intellection, viz. intellecively knowing something as real, and intellecively knowing it as being, in the field sense, something “in reality”. They are the two moments of pure and simple intellection.

But it can happen that a real thing, together with the field which it determines, thrusts us beyond this field reality toward reality “itself” as reality beyond the field, i.e., to the world. This beyond is not the beyond of one thing toward others—that would be an intra-field beyond. We are dealing with a “beyond” of a real thing and of its whole field toward reality itself as reality; i.e., we are dealing with a beyond which is beyond the field and toward the world. This beyond is not a beyond the “subject” (so to speak), because in this sense in field intellection we are already installed beyond what that interpretation would take for the subject in field intellection, and we continue being so in every intellection. This “beyond”, the whole field, can be so in different directions: toward the inside of things, toward other extra-field things, etc. But we are always dealing with going toward the world as the ground of what a real field thing is. Thus we are not considering a thing with respect to others of the field, but rather we are considering each thing as a mode of grounded reality. Qua ground, I have called extra-field reality ‘reality in depth’. Now, intellection of the real in depth is certainly intellection, but not just intellection; rather, it is a special mode of intellection, the “grounding” mode. Reality is not actualized in this intellection as something more than is there; rather, it is actualized in a mode which consists formally in being actually grounding. ‘The ground’—as I have already said—is here taken in its widest sense. It is not identical with ‘cause’. To be a ground is not necessarily to be a cause; a cause is only a mode of grounding. There are others, for example, physical law, i.e., the mode by which the real happens based on reality, and is being so taken. The ground is all that which determines from itself, but in and by itself, that which is grounded, so that this latter is the realization of the ground or foundation in what is grounded. Being grounded makes of in-depth reality the principle of this mode of intellection. It is the principle which measures
not what something is in reality with respect to other things which are sensed in the field manner, but measures its ground or foundation in reality. The intellection of the real in-depth is intellection as principle and measure; it is rational intellection. Now, the intellection of something in its in-depth reality, i.e., rational intellection, is what formally constitutes knowledge [conocimiento].

Knowledge is intellection in reason. To know what a thing is, is to intellectively know its in-depth reality, to intellectively know how it is actualized in its own ground or foundation, how it is constituted “in reality”, as a measuring principle. To know green does not only consist in seeing it, or in intellectively knowing that it is in reality one determinate color among {162} others. Rather, it is intellectively knowing the ground or foundation of greenness in reality; intellectively knowing, for example, that it is an electromagnetic wave or a photon of some determinate frequency. Only having intellectively known it thus do we really know what the real green is; we have intellection of the greenness, but in reason. The reason or explanation of green is its real ground or foundation.

Whence arises the radical difference between knowledge and intellection. Knowledge is intellection by virtue of being apprehension of the real as real. But it is only a special mode of intellection because not every intellection is knowledge. To intellectively know without intellectively knowing the reason or explanation—this is not knowledge. Intellection is always an actualization of the real, but there is only knowledge when this actualization is a ground. That is intellection in reason.

This might make one think that mere intellection is inferior to knowledge, so that it would be necessary to inscribe intellection within knowledge; intellection would then be, formally, a rudimentary knowledge. But, the truth is just the opposite: it is necessary to inscribe knowledge within intellection. And with this, intellection does not formally consist in rudimentary knowledge; rather, knowledge receives all of its richness and its value from being an intellection. Knowledge is only a sketch of subsequent intellection. And there are several reasons for this.

In the first place, intellection is not knowledge; it is intellection which, through its sentient deficiency, determines knowledge. Intellection is an actualization of the real. But if the real, for example this color green, were exhaustively actualized in my intellection, there would be no opportunity of speak of knowledge. Full intellection of the real, i.e., its full {163} actualization, would make knowledge radically unnecessary. We would then have intellection without knowledge. On the other hand, the converse is impossible: one cannot have knowledge without intellection, without actualization of the real. There is only knowledge when the insufficiency of intellection requires it. This insufficiency stems from the sentient moment of intellection. Without sentient intellection there is not nor can there be knowledge.

In the second place, intellection and knowledge are different but not independent. In what sense? We have already indicated it: intellection is what determines knowledge. Sentient intellection calls forth knowledge. In order to make up for the insufficiency of intellection, intellection needs to determine not another intellection, but another mode of the same intellection; i.e., what is determined is an expansion of intellection. Knowing is an expansion of intellection. It is intellection, i.e., actualization of the real as real, but an intellection which actualizes rather what that thing already actualized as real is really; it is actualization as search. And herein consists what an expansion is, viz. An inquiring actualization of what is already actual. Therefore, knowledge is not only different from mere intellection; it is an expansion of that intellection. But there is more.

In the third place, in fact, knowledge is not only expansion of intellection and therefore something based upon it; in addition, knowledge consists, in principle, in bearing us to a greater intellection, to a greater actualization of what is known. Intellection is actualization of the real, and therefore knowing is but a leading to actualization. Knowledge is not just an expanded actualization but an expansion which leads to a new actualization of the previously actual. Knowledge does not {164} rest upon itself but upon the intellection of what preceded it and upon the intellection to which it leads us. The final terminus of all knowledge is an actualizing of the very reality previously intellectively known, an actualizing of it in its in-depth reality. If it were not for this, knowledge would be but a mental game. Hence all knowledge is the transition from one intellection to another intellection. It is an intellection in progress. Knowledge is intellection seeking itself.

As anchored in intellection, as expansion of intellection, and as transition to a new intellection, knowledge is an intellective mode which is formally inscribed in mere intellection. To intellectively know is not a rudiment of knowing. Intellection is not formally a rudimentary knowledge; rather, it is knowledge that is the sketch of an inquiring intellection qua intellection. To know [conocer] is not a primary intellective phenomenon, as if the essence of intellective knowing [inteligir] were to know [conocer]. On the contrary, the essence of knowing
**What is Knowledge?**

[conocer] is intellecually knowing. Knowing is not the *status possidens* of intellection; only intellection itself is that. Therefore every theory of knowledge must be grounded upon some previous conceptualization of intellection, and not the other way around, as if to intellec tally know were to know [conocer]. Some think that to know [conocer] is better than to intellec tally know. But this is not correct. That which is intellec tally known in knowing [conocer] is certainly more than what is just known in mere intellection; it has a richer content. But to know [conocer] is not just elaborating an intellec tally known content; rather, to know [conocer] is intellec tally knowing that this content is real, i.e., actualizing this content in the real. Only at this price do we have knowledge. And this reality is given to the knowledge by mere intellection, and it is to that that all knowledge leads in order to be knowledge. All knowledge is [165] always and only an elaboration of an intellection. And this elaboration is just reason or explanation. Knowledge is, then, intellection in reason, i.e., intellection of the real in its in-depth reality.

On this point it is necessary to contrast this concept of knowledge with others which I deem incorrect because they do not have an adequate concept of what it is to be a fundam ent.

By ‘knowledge’, Kant understands every objectively grounded judgement. And we have already seen that this is unacceptable because to intellec tally know in the affirmative sense is not by itself knowing. At the very least the ground is necessary. For Kant, this ground is deter mining the objectivity of affirmation (and it does not matter that this objectivity, for Kant, has transcendental ideality). But this is not what formally constitutes the fundam ent in knowledge. The ground is “ground-reality”, and not determining the objectivity of a judgement. Kant has cast the problem of knowledge along the lines of judgement and judging. And this is wrong, for at least two reasons. First, identifying knowledge with judgement is an extreme logification of reason. To know is not formally to judge. And second, the ground in question is not the determining objective of the judgement but the ground-reality. Knowledge naturally involves judgements, but not every judgement is knowledge. It is only knowledge when the judgement is a judgement of in-depth reality. Field judgement is not knowledge.

The Greeks employed the inchoate verb *gignoskein*, to know, with many meanings. That which is important to us here is the one which encompasses strict and rigorous knowledge, and which in the Greeks culminates in what they called *episteme*, strict knowledge, a word which is almost (and only almost) synonymous with ‘science’. [166]

Plato, in the *Thaetetus*, criticizes the last of the three definitions of strict knowledge (*episteme*) which the interlocutor proposes: true opinion with logos. Here ‘logos’ means reason. Reason, then, would be that which, in this definition, formally constitutes the specific part of knowledge. Plato criticizes this definition, but he understands by ‘reason’ what in all likelihood his interlocutor understands, viz. the elements of which something is composed. After his criticism, Plato left open and without express solution what logos is in a more radical sense. Understandably Plato himself said that this dialogue is of the *peirastikos* type, i.e., an attempt or effort, as we would say today. The fact is that ultimately Plato, in his critique, wishes to point out another meaning of the logos, with which he will be occupied in the *Sophist*: the logos which enuntiates not the “elemental” being but the “intelligible” being. That is to say, the logos which Plato asks of knowledge is the intellection of intelligible being, of the Idea. The rest will be only “true opinion”. Now, it is not this which we have discovered as reason in our analysis. Reason is not judgement of “intelligible being” but of “in-depth reality”. Above all, there are not two beings, the being of the sensible and the being of the intelligible, but a single being, the being of the real. Moreover, we are not dealing with being but with reality, and not with intelligent reality but with in-depth reality. Therefore, whatever the meaning of that “true opinion” to which Plato alludes, such true opinion cannot be counterposed to truth *simpler*, to the truth of the intelligible, because there is no dualism of sensing and intellec tally knowing; rather, there is only the formal and structural unity of sensing and of intellec tally knowing in sentient intellection. Whence it follows that reason itself is sentient; and that to which it bears us sentiently is in-depth reality. [167]

This in-depth reality, this reality ground, is not what Aristotle thought either, viz., the cause. At the beginning of his *Physics*, Aristotle tells us that we believe we know something (*gignoskein*) when we know its cause. Knowing would thus be specified and constituted by the apprehension of causality. But this concept is, as I see it, too restrictive. Every cause is a ground, but not every ground is necessarily a cause. And I do not refer to knowledge such as mathematics, whose grounds are not causes in the strict sense, but rather principles. I refer to something deeper; I think that regardless of what a principle may be, it is necessary to conceive of it from the standpoint of the ground, and not the other way around. I explained this above. Causes and principles do found; but on this account are not grounds. To ground is a very precise mode
of founding.” To ground is certainly to be a principle, but to be a principle is not just to be that “from which” (hothen) something comes, but that which from itself and by itself is realized in what is founded. Then and only then is a principle a ground. To know is not to know causes, nor to know principles which found, but to know grounds, to know “fundamentally”. But Aristotle thought about strict knowledge, about episteme, about science. And for him, the object of science is what always is as it is, without being able to be in any other way. Now, this concept is even more restrictive than that of causal knowledge. And neither episteme nor causal knowledge are knowing formally, because not every ground is causality. To know a friend in depth is not a question of either causality or of scientific necessity. To know a friend well is not to have a detailed account of his life, nor to know the motives of his actions and reactions, but to intellectively know these motives as a manifestation [168] within his form and mode of reality, of an in-depth reality.

Let us add, finally, that ‘in depth’ is not synonymous with the ultimate. Everything ultimate naturally has depth, but not everything with depth is ultimate. There are degrees of “in depth”, even an infinite number of them; indeed, it has an unfathomable depth. To know something in depth is not to know it in its ultimate reality. Moreover, intellection in depth is a fact; but the access to the ultimate is constitutively a problem which is always open, even to infinity. It is because of this that intellection in depth is not synonymous with absolute intellection. Ground-reality is not absolute reality. That was Hegel’s great mistake. The progression toward what is in depth is not the unfolding of an absolute knowledge. In depth-ness is always an open dimension, and therefore reason is not absolute knowing but open intellection in depth. Thus, just as the field of the real is constitutively open, in the same way the in depth “toward” to which the field sends us is a “toward” which is also constitutively open. Therefore Hegel started from a false premise, thinking that the real (he said “the Idea”) is the closure of the absolute, so that each reality would be but a moment of this ultimate closure. But that is unacceptable, because reality is “constitutively” (and not just in fact) open. Moreover intellection itself, as mere actualization of the real, is also constitutively open. One cannot assume, along with Hegel, that each level of consciousness is just a progressive manifestation (phenomenon) of the absolute as spirit, i.e., an unfolding toward absolute knowledge. The progression of the intellect is not, nor can it be, a “phenomenology of the spirit”.

In summary, that which specifies intellection, making of it knowledge, is in-depth reality. And this [169] in-depth reality does not consist in either objective ground (Kant), or in intelligible entity (Plato), or in causality, still less in necessary causality (Aristotle), or in the absolute (Hegel). In-depthness is the mere “beyond” as “ground-reality” in all the multiple modes and forms which this beyond can assume. Causality or the principles of a deductive form of knowledge are not thereby excluded, nor are the possible steps toward an absolute reality. What is excluded is the idea that something of sort formally constitutes the in-depth reality in which reason is installed by the movement of intellection as thrown from the field to the beyond.

Let us summarize what has been said so many times. Reason is (1) inquiring intellection of reality; (2) intellection in depth, of worldly reality, i.e., intellection of reality “itself”; (3) intellection which is formally measuring as principle and canon of the reality of the real, in accordance with sensed suggestions. The three formulae are identical; they expound the three moments whose intrinsic and formal unity is the very essence of reason. To know is to intellectively know the real in accordance with these three moments, i.e., knowledge is intellection in reason. This reason is a modalization of sentient intellection, and is therefore sentient reason. Knowing is, then, the work of sentient reason. What is the formal structure of this knowledge? [170]

[Zubiri is here drawing a distinction between “to found”, fundar, and “to ground”, fundamentar. “To found” means “to establish”, whereas “to ground” means to be the ultimate foundation of, the principle support of, the in-depth explanation of something.—trans.]
CHAPTER VI

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

Knowledge is intellection in reason. Since the meaning of this formula has already been explained, we see immediately that knowledge not only is not identical to intellection, it is not identical to science either. Science is but one mode of knowledge among others. Therefore, when we ask about the formal structure of knowing, we ask for something much more radical than if we were to ask what science is. We are asking, what is the formal structure of rational intellection of reality “itself”?

How does one know? This is the question which we must now address, viz., the formal structure of knowing.

In the first place, what one wishes to know is something already intellectively known in the field manner. And what we wish to intellectively know is its in-depth reality. Therefore, based upon canonic principles, we situate, so to speak, the field real upon the base of in-depth reality. This “upon the base” is what I shall call the ‘moment of objectuality’. What an object is is not in-depth reality but a field thing. A thing is converted from field reality into an object. In-depth reality is not an object but a ground. But this is inadequate, because in the second place, based upon canonic principles, suggested by the field, we must fix the mode of possible access to the in-depth part of the field real. In depth reality is a ground, but not in a vacuum; rather, it is a very concrete ground in each case. Therefore it is essential to fix the mode in which we may have access to this ground, which is going to be the ground of the determinate field thing. This manner is just the way of access, i.e., the method. But this too is inadequate, because in the third place, it is necessary that, having advanced by this path, we try to find the ground for which we are searching. This is the moment of rational truth. Objectuality, method, and true encounter: these are the three moments whose unity constitutes the formal structure of knowing.

This structure is not identical to a scientific structure, because it is not necessary that the unity of the three moments of knowing have “scientific” character. Objectuality is not necessarily identical to what a scientist understands by object, viz. a fact. A scientific fact is not the same as objectuality; rather, being a scientific fact is but a mode of objectuality. In the second place, the method is a way of access. It is not something identical to the scientific method. The scientific method is “a” way of access to in-depth reality, but not every way of access is a scientific method. Finally, a true encounter is not the same thing as scientific confirmation, for at least two reasons. First, it is not because it is necessary to understand this presumed scientific confirmation with respect to the true encounter, and not the other way around. And in the second place, it is not because there is no implication that we will in fact actually reach this true encounter; it may perhaps not always be possible. Science is not, as Kant thought, a Faktum, but an effort, not just with respect to its content, but above all with respect to the very possibilities of its existence—something completely different from the conditions of possibility of a science already achieved, such as the science about which Kant spoke. Science in accordance with the three constitutive moments of rational intellection is essentially a problematic knowledge, viz. a knowledge which seeks to take on the form of experimental facts, of a precise method of experimentation, or of the grounding of verifiable truths. This tripartite intention is characteristic of science. And it is on account of this that science is, qua knowledge, a problematic knowledge. And this problem of science is inscribed in the formal structure of knowing as such. This structure has then three moments: objectuality, method, and true encounter. But as stated, they do not go beyond being vague expressions. In what, precisely, do they consist?
§1

OBJECTUALITY

As I have already indicated, the intellection of a real field thing in its in-depth reality situates that thing upon this in-depth reality as its base.

This in-depth reality is not what is by itself known in the intellection. We are sent “towards” it, and installed in it by field reality itself as reality; in-depth reality, as such, is not what is known. What is known is the real field thing. In order to avoid monotonous repetition of the adjective ‘field’, I shall speak of a real thing or simply of a thing. The in-depth reality is not something intellectively known as if it were some great thing; rather, the mode of this in-depth reality being actualized is, as we have seen, “to be grounding”; it is ground-reality. Therefore in-depth reality is the real ambit of grounding. Now, the first thing that we do in order to know a real thing already given to us is to situate it upon that ambit as base. That which is “in-depth” is, in this case, a “base”. And before this base, the real thing, which was among others in a field, leaps out at us as grounded in its in-depth reality. The thing therefore suffers a type of transformation, from being in the field to being upon the base, to being grounded. In this new condition, the real thing qua jumping out at us is what we call ‘object’. The real thing has been transformed into a real object. This is the first moment of rational intellection, viz. objectuality. It is necessary to conceptualize with great care what this objectuality is and in what the transformation of the real thing into real object consists.

I

WHAT IS OBJECTUALITY?

To be sure, objectuality is not objectivity. Objectivity is something which concerns an affirmation. But objectuality concerns not an affirmation but the very mode of actualization of a thing. Objectuality is “a” mode of actualization of a thing. An object is not, then, objectivity. But neither is it a mere actualized real thing. Object is not identical to real thing. Not every real thing intellectually known as real is by that alone the object of a possible knowledge. A real thing is an object only when it is actualized “upon the base” of grounded reality. A thing intellectually known in accordance with grounded reality is in reality in the field, and is certainly a real thing, but it is not formally an object. It becomes so only when it is actualized upon the base of grounded reality. Being an object is neither objectivity nor a real thing, but rather has its own structure. And then we may ask ourselves in what this actualization consists, and in what being an object formally consists.

The expression ‘object’ has, like almost all important expressions, different meanings which it is necessary to carefully distinguish.

In the first place, being an object does not consist in being something which we are going to intellectively know. That an object is synonymous with what we are going to intellectively know echoes the classical idea of the formal and material object. And this is wrong. This classical conceptualization nourishes itself ultimately upon the identity of the real thing and of an object, adding perhaps that the real thing is going to be the terminus of an intellection. And this is not the case, because being an object is not, formally, just being the terminus of an intellection. One must add, at the least, in what mode the thing is the terminus of intellection.

Then one might be able to think, in the second place, that an object is that which we propose to ourselves to intellectively know. An object would then be “pro-posed” reality; it would be “pro-positum”. This has a very wide meaning which would take us outside of intellection. Restricting ourselves to intellective pro-posing, object would be what is proposed as something to be intellectively known. It would be the real thing actualized in the form of pro, whose etymological sense is “in front of”. As a mode of actualization, object would consist in being present, in being a positum. But put in front of me, i.e. in the form of pro, the real thing would be before me, i.e., a pro-positum. But this is not the case. Above all, because this concept does not conform to the object of rational intellection. There are also, as we have seen, propositional judgements, and in addition predicative judgements, in which a thing is proposed for subsequent determination. Thus, when we affirm that A is B, the A is proposed to be affirmed as B. But it is not for that reason that it is formally an “object”. To be sure, every rational intellection involves, or at least can involve, affirmations. But then it is clear that to intellectually know A in its in-depth reality is not the same as to intellectively know A as subject of predication of a field note B. The A on the other hand is actualized in rational intellection not as a pro, but in a different way. Every object is pro-positum, but not every pro-positum is an object. Therefore it is necessary to go one step further.

In rational intellection a thing is not actualized...
among others in the field, but rather is actualized over the base of in-depth reality. There are, then, two moments: being placed-before and being over a base (the base of the world). In these conditions a real thing is certainly placed, is a positum, but is not so in the form of pro.

When a real thing is projected over the base of in-depth reality, is as if jutting out from this base. Thus the thing acquires something like its own bulk, which we have to intellectively know not as something complete in itself, but as something whose bulk we must keep in order to intellectively know it in-depth. When it so juts out, the thing presents itself as a positum, but as a positum whose outline, so to speak, must be overcome in order to go to its base. This actualization is not actualization in pro, but actualization in ob. The thing is no longer something pro-posed, but something op-posed; it is an ob-positum. And this is to be an object, viz., to be actualized as ob. To be able to be proposed, the object starts by being op-posed. Here ‘opposed’ does not refer to some obstacle; ‘object’ is not ‘objection’. The opposed is not like a mountain which separates and divides; rather, it is like the depth of a port which must be maintained in order to be able to go in the other direction to the beyond. The ob consists in a jutting such that by its own nature, it is sending us to something beyond, to in-depth reality. It is an ob formally sending us “toward”. Ob is not a simple being in front of, a being in front as raised, a being opposed between its actualization in a previous intellection and the actuality of grounding, but rather a being raised by sending us formally to this actualization. The ground, which is in-depth reality, must keep the presumed (178) sufficiency of the bulk of the thing. In-depth reality is grounding in the form of keeping something which is opposed and is sending; it is actualization in ob.

But this does not yet suffice, because even if the ob is correctly understood, one can still misunderstand what it is to be an object. An object can, in fact, have two meanings. One is that which proceeds from the ob itself; this we have already explained. Another meaning is that which proceeds from the second part of the expression [-ject]. An object would be that which is actualized as ob, but as something which is (under) lying; it would be a jectum. Here the accent is not on the ob but on the jectum. The object would be something which “is here”; it is a keimenon, something lying, as Parmenides said; a hypo-keimenon, a sub- or under-lying, as Aristotle said. The ob-jectum would be the correlate of a sub-jectum. The difference would be between the ob and the sub, but the reality itself would in both cases be a jectum, something lying. This conception of object has run throughout the history of philosophy since Parmenides. It has, for example, its supreme expression in Kant, who conceptualized the object only in terms of natural science. Now, this is impossible. To be sure, there are—or at least it is not excluded that there can be—objects lying about. But there are many realities which are actualized in the form of ob and which are not “lying”, which are not a jectum. For example, persons as such, life, society, and history are not something jectum. Their mode of reality is different than being “lying” reality. They have or can have intellective actuality in ob, but they are not jectum. In this sense, then, object would be what we today call ‘thing’. But the actuality in ob is not necessarily actuality of a jectum. Therefore, while the word ‘object’ may be linguistically inevitable, it is fitting that a new word be employed (179) to preclude confusion of the two meanings of ‘object’. This word must express the actuality in ob, but not as a jectum. For this it will be necessary to express simple reality, simple real being, without jectum though possibly using the verb ‘to be’. In Latin the verb esse has as particle sens, which does not survive except in compounds such as praesens, the present, absens, the absent, etc. Now, it remains to create a word along similar lines, something like ob-sens, the absent. Neither in Latin, the Romance languages, nor in English does such a word exist. German has the word Gegenstand, which means the same as our word ‘object’. Gegen expresses the ob, and stand expresses the sens, object along the lines of opposition. This would be perfect if German did not understand stehen as a mere being here, i.e., as a jectum. Thus the Kantian tradition has identified Gegenstand with objectum. It would have been better to say Gegenseiend, because reality can be ob and not be a jectum. Object would thus be not the ob-jectum but the ob-sent. And to lie would be only one mode among others of esse. This is not the time to emphasize the difference between being and reality; however very soon we shall see the importance of this distinction. Here we are only trying to pin down the notion of object a bit more. For this I have gone to the expression ob-sent, not in order to continue using it but only to clarify the ideas we have been discussing. I shall continue, then, using the word object but only in the sense of absent.

In summary, being an object formally involves the real thing (whether “lying” or not) being actualized in the form of ob. This ob has two essential characteristics which it is necessary to carefully point out.

A) In the first place, ob is a categorial characteristic. What does this mean? ‘Category’ does not designate a “class” of things. We are dealing not with a class of things but with “modes” (or forms, (180) which here comes to the same thing) of an intellectively known thing.
In every intellection one declares the mode in accordance with which the thing is present. To declare in Greek is expressed by *kategoreo*, and the declaration is called *kategoria*. Category is, then, as I see it, the mode of a thing’s being present *qua* declared in intellection.

Now, to be an object, i.e., objectuality, is above all a category of actualization; it is the mode by which reality is actualized as “ob”, regardless of its real content. It is the essentially categorial characteristic of the *ob*. This we have already seen in Part I.

But to be present as “ob” has still a second essential characteristic.

B) In the second place, “ob” has a characteristic of positivity. What does this mean? In intellection the real is present as real regardless of its form of actualization. I can describe this being present as the formal constitutive moment of the intelligible real; it is the actualization of the real. But I can describe the being present as a moment proper to intellection itself. And then I shall say that what is present is actualized in a form such that, by virtue of being mere actualization, its relationship to the intellectual act itself is to be “merely” actualized. The real in intellection is actualized and is nothing more than actualized. What is present determines its intellectual actualization based on itself, and it is based on itself as it is actualized, and only actualized, in its mere presenting itself. Now, to be “only actualized” in its being present is what comprises being a *positum*. It is the characteristic of positivity. *Positum* is what is present insofar as its actualization is, with respect to the presented itself, only a being actualized in its presenting itself. That is, being a *positum* has three moments: being here-and-now present, being only here-and-now present, and being only here-and-now present in and [181] through its presenting itself. Through the first moment, the *positum* is something apprehended. By the second moment, the *positum* is opposed, if I may be permitted the expression, to what may be its interpretation or intellectual elaboration, for example, to the theoretical, to the speculative, etc. Through its third moment, the *positum* is a simple observable thing in the intellection. We are not trying to go beyond what is present to a thing which is manifested in what is present, but to take what is present in and by itself in its mere presenting itself. It is necessary to take these three moments in their formal and intrinsic purity. In order to comprehend this, it will be useful to position this concept of positivity face to face with two other kindred ideas.

Above all, the fact that the actualized does nothing but be here-and-now present might cause one to think that this being here-and-now present is, *qua* being, just “being here”. This is false. It would be once again to identify just being present with a *jectum*. The ‘being’ to which we refer does not concern the presented but the presentation. What is present can be what is most opposed to the “being here”, what is most opposed to a *jectum*. The most radical course of a person’s life, or a reality which consisted only in happening, do not for that reason cease to be present, and only present, in an intellection. Positivity does not mean “staticness”—if I may be permitted the expression.

But it is not just that being present does not mean being a *jectum*—something which, when all is said and done, is easy to comprehend; rather, there is another more subtle dimension in the concept of positivity. One might think, in fact, that being present, being only present, and being so as presenting itself, is the same as saying that what is actualized thus is just what we call a *fact*. Positivity would be a characteristic identical to “facticity”. But this is absolutely wrong.

To see that, let us ask what a fact is. [182] Certainly the fact is a *positum*. But the converse is not true; not every *positum* is a fact. And the proof is that, in order to certify that something is a fact, one usually calls it a “positive fact”, which indicates that the positivity cannot be understood based upon the facticity, but rather that the facticity, i.e., being a fact, must be understood based upon the positivity. Insofar as it is a *positum*, the fact is something which is present, which only is present, and which is so in the presenting itself. Although the word affects only the third moment of the *positum*, for greater clarity we shall call the *positum* an observable. Therefore *positum* is a characteristic of the real actualized as observable. But not everything intellectively observable is necessarily a fact. In order to be so it must fulfill a necessary condition, viz., that the *positum*, besides being observable, must by virtue of its own nature be observable by anyone. And it must be so “by virtue of its own nature”. This requires special attention. “Observable by anyone” does not mean that there are various people who have observed it. Even if there were only one person who had done so, this observable would be a fact if what is observed has the nature of being observable by anyone. Thus, it could be that an historical fact might have had but one witness. If an authentic document reaches us to the effect that this fact has occurred, and if what is thus witnessed is by its nature observable by anyone who could have understood it, then what is witnessed by this single observer is a fact, *in casu*, an historical fact. On the other hand, if what is observed is something which, by virtue of its nature, is not observable by more than one person, then what is observed is certainly something real, it is a *positum*, but this real thing, despite being real, is not properly speaking a fact.
This is the case with some moments of my intimate personal life. It is not just that I observe them, but that [183] no one other than I can observe them. Thus these realities are not, properly speaking, facts. It was just this, as I see it, that was the true reason why Wundt’s nascent experimental psychology did not admit the purely introspective as a fact. I leave aside the fact that expression, on the part of the person, can be considered as a fact; that is a different question, which Wundt’s successors resolved affirmatively. Conversely, there can be positive realities which are perfectly observed by many persons, and yet these positive realities cannot be called ‘facts’ if, by virtue of their own nature, they are not observable by everyone. Thus, for example, we have the apparitions of Christ before the fifty, according to St. Paul’s testimony. Even though Christ may have been seen by the fifty, and even though their testimony be true, these apparitions thus observed would not therefore be a fact, because the presumed reality could not be observed by all other persons who happened to be there, but only by those select fifty. It would be positum, but not a fact. These apparition of Christ, in fact, by virtue of their nature, could not have been observed by just anyone, but only by those graced with them. ‘Fact’, then, is not synonymous with present reality; rather, the real positum, I affirm, is only a fact if by its own nature it can be observed by anyone. Every fact, then, must be positum, but not every positum is a fact.

To be sure, from the very first pages of this book I have repeatedly stated that I wish to attend to the facts, for example the fact that we sentiently apprehend the real. But this does not contradict what I just said, because what is a fact is sentient apprehension; what is apprehended in its real and positum character is not necessarily [184] a fact. The color green sensed is a fact; this does not mean that, without further ado, the color green is a fact. In order to be so it is necessary to add that what is apprehended can be apprehended by anyone. And in this case that is so. The green apprehended is real; it is a positum, but if one says no more it is not a fact; it is only a fact if one says that by its nature it can be apprehended by anyone.

Moreover, not every fact is necessarily what we call a scientific fact. This is a problem which unleashed a spirited discussion at the beginning of this century. A fact is only a type of “posited” reality; the scientific fact is, in turn, only a type of fact. In order for a fact to be a scientific fact, what is observable by anyone has to be, in a certain way, “fixed”. A scientific fact, I believe, is a fixed fact. Fixation is always and only the characteristic of a fact not just by virtue of being observable by anyone, but as a fact observed in a special form, viz. as referred to a system of previous concepts. These concepts can be either from natural science, historical documents, etc. Without this fixation, we would have a mere fact, to which the name brute fact was given at the beginning of the century, as opposed to scientific fact, which as I see it is the conceptualized and fixed fact. If we take a bobbin, copper wire, an electrical cell, and an iron bar, we shall see that under certain conditions the bar oscillates and its oscillation can be measured on a suitable scale. In this case the scientific fact is the electrical impedance of the bobbin and wire. But that is not the brute fact. The brute fact would be, for example, the observation of the oscillations of the iron bar. Within an historical tradition it is quite possible that the traditum may perfectly well be a fact, yet there is no documentary fixation. It would not then [185] be a scientific fact. This is the sum total of the difference that there is between what we might call a living tradition and a tradition with documentary continuity. Strictly speaking, the scientific fact is the clarification of reality apprehended as a function of previous concepts. But we shall not now delve into this problem as it would distract us from the matter we have been discussing.

To summarize, positum is the actualization of something in its being present, in its being just present, and in being so in its being present itself. It is not a characteristic of apprehended reality either as jectum, or fact, or as scientific fact.

Now, the “ob” has a characteristic which is not just categorial but also of a positum. To be “ob”, objectuality, is positivity. That something is an object, in the sense of objectuality, is not something which is determined by me, but is something determined by the real itself in its being present. I have indeed said that the “ob” is constituted when a real thing is projected upon the base of reality. But this projection does not have its roots in me, but in the very mode of reality’s being presented, i.e., in its “toward”. It is not I who projects a real field thing upon the base of reality, but rather it is that reality itself which, when sentiently apprehended, has the moment of a “toward” the in-depth. The real is projected from itself into its own being presented; it is projected, I must stress, and it is not I who projects it. Therefore “ob” is a positum. Once again, the matter in question is not that objectuality is a fact, and still less a scientific fact, but that in its real character is the reality itself which sends us to the in-depth, regardless of the nature of its content.

But it is necessary to avoid another mistake. I have said, in fact, that rational intellellection intellectually knows the real as [186] the object of a search, i.e., we are dealing with an inquiring intellellection. And searching is not
searching for a *positum* but a *quaesitum*. This is true; nonetheless, let us think a bit longer about it. What is searched for in rational intellection is the ground of a real field thing. For this reason it comes to that positive projection which we call “ob”. But neither in-depth reality as such, i.e., the ambit of grounding, nor the real as real object are the sought-after goals. What is sought after is the ground of the real object in in-depth reality. The “ob” and the “for” are just *positum*. What is sought is the foundation of the “real-ob” in the “for”.

Summarizing, the field real acquires the characteristic of a real object in rational intellection. Its objectuality consists in what I called being *ob-sent*. And this objectuality has two essential characteristics: categorial character, viz. the “ob” is a category of actualization; and positive character, viz. the “ob” is a *positum* for the real itself. The categories of actualization are something *positum*, and every *positum* is so above all categoriality. In the “ob” the unity of both characteristics is formally given.

But this is leading us to the second point, which is, in what precisely does the transformation of a real thing into a real object consist?
APPENDIX

THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORIES

‘Category’ does designate a “class” of things, as is usually assumed. The list of categories is not the supreme classification of things. We are not dealing with “classes” of things, but with “modes” of the intellectively known thing. Recalling what has been said already, let us repeat that in every intellection one states the mode in accordance with which a thing is actually present. In Greek, ‘to state’ in this sense is kategoreo, and therefore what is stated is called a category.

The problem of the categories goes back to Aristotle, who was in turn inspired by Plato. For Plato and Aristotle, to intellectively know is to declare or affirm that what is intellectively known “is”. That is Parmenides’ old thesis. Intellection is logos of being, logos ousias. In the logos one states the modes in accordance with which what is intellectively known “is”, i.e., one states the modes of being. How? The logos is a complexion or weaving (symploke) of the thing about which one is affirming (the on), and of what one is affirming or predicating of it. The characteristics of being, stated in this predicative weaving, are the categories. For Aristotle, then, the categories are the supreme modes of entity as such. (I need not stress that here I take the word ‘mode’ in its most general meaning and not as something different from a form of reality). Thus, strictly speaking, it would be false to say that “green” is a quality. Green is a note just like sonorous, heavy, warm, etc. But the manner in which green determines this paper consists in making of it a “which”. Quality is not the green itself, but the way in which the green determines the being of this paper. As this determination is declared in predication, i.e. in the predicate, it follows that the predication, this mode of being which we predicate as a quality of the modes of being, is stated in the predication itself. Now, the different types of statements of the modes of being in predicates are just the categories. A quality is not a note but a category. To be sure, they are but supreme genera of what can be predicated of being. They are not predicates, in the sense of notes, nor are they predicable, nor would they be what the medieval philosophers called predicamenta. And this was decisive: the categories, we are told, are founded upon the structure of the logos; they constitute its formal (logical) structure and are the base of all our grammar (noun, adjective, preposition, etc.). This conception has run throughout European philosophy (Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc.).

If one studies it carefully, however, this concept starts from two presuppositions: that intellection is affirmation, is logos; and that what is intellectively known is being. That is what I termed “logification of intellection”, and “entification of reality”. To intellectively know is to affirm, and what is intellectively known is entity. The unitary convergence of these two presuppositions has in large measure determined, as I said, the character of European philosophy.

But these two presuppositions are, in my view, untenable.

A) It is thought that what is intellectively known is “being”. But that is not the case; what is intellectively known is not being but “reality”. We have already seen that before; being is an actuality of the real (in the world), an ulterior actuality (to reality itself), an ulterior but oblique actuality. Being is ulterior and oblique actuality of the real as reality. It is necessary to repeat these ideas at this time.

B) The logos, affirmation, is but a mode of intellection, not to be sure the only or most radical one. Indeed, the predicative logos itself is not the only type of logos; first there is the positional logos and the propositional logos. Only then is there a predicative logos. Classical philosophy has logified intellection, so that the theory of intellection has been converted into Logic. But that leaves out the essence of the logos, which consists just in being a mode of intellection, i.e., a mode of actualization. One cannot “logify” intellection, but on the contrary must “intelligize” the logos. All of this has been previously explained.
Hence the categories are neither predicates, nor predicables, nor *predicamenta* of being, but the modes of a real thing as merely actualized in intellection *qua* modes stated about it. The categories are primarily and radically modes of a real thing stated about its mere actualization, in its mere intellection; they are not modes of real things *qua* affirmed in some logos. They are categories neither of entity nor predication; rather they are categories of reality which is merely actualized in intellection. This is a concept of category which differs from the classical one.

But the real actualized in intellection has two aspects. One is the aspect given to the actualized real *qua* real; the other is the aspect given to the actualized real *qua* actualized. Hence, what is stated in intellection is on one hand the modes of reality, and on the other the very modes of actualization. By the first aspect, the categories will be modes of reality actualized *qua* reality. By the second aspect, the categories would be modes of reality actualized *qua* actualized. In contrast to classical philosophy, it is necessary to introduce two systems of categories: 190 categories of reality and categories of actualization. These two systems of categories, naturally, are not independent but have an intrinsic and radical unity. Let us quickly examine the following three points: 1. Categories of reality; 2. Categories of actualization; 3. The intrinsic and radical unity of the categories.

1. Categories of Reality. Following the thread of the logos, Aristotle views the categories as manners of determination of the subject; ultimately this is therefore a vision which goes from outside to inside. The essence of what is not a subject would be in fact to inhere, or as Aristotle says, to be an accident. The same happens with Kant and even Hegel. The only difference lies in the fact that for Aristotle the logos does nothing but *declare* an already determined subject, whereas for Kant and Hegel (albeit in a different form, we prescind from the matter), what the logos does is to *constitute* the subject affirmatively. But always one deals with a vision from outside to inside. Now, the real is not a subject but a system. It is a construct system: each note, by virtue of being a “note of”, involves the system as a whole of which it is a note, and therefore consists in the actuality of the system in said note. The essence of a note is not “to inhere” but to “cohere”. In virtue of this, the system is a *unity* which is actually present in each note, making of it a “note of”. This is the essential point.

Now, this unity of the system is an “in”. The real is an *intus*. The notes are only that in which the system is projected from itself, from the *intus*. The *intus* thus also has a moment of “ex”; it is just the “from itself”. Whence it follows that the real is not only *intus* but also an *ektos*, an *extra*. This is a vision from inside to out. And then what has traditionally been called ‘categories’ is not the way in which a subject is determined 191 by the notes predicated of it, but the formal respects by which the “in” is projected onto an “ex”. And it is this formal respect which I call *dimension*. The categories are not the pronouncement of the characteristics of being in the logos, but the pronouncement of the real in intellection. I call them ‘dimensions’ because in each one is, in a certain way, the system in a proper formal respect, i.e., its reality *qua* reality is measured. These dimensions are not only numerically different (as happens, for instance, in geometry), but also qualitatively different. Moreover, they mutually imply each other. This is an essential observation. By being formal respects of actualization, these dimensions are inscribed, so to speak, in a formal, primary respect, the respect by which things are de suyo in apprehension. The dimensions are thus inscribed in that primary formality which is “reality”.

But this actualization of the real takes place in intellection.

II. The categories of actualization. There reality has *modes of actualization* which are not identified with the characteristics of reality, i.e., with its dimensions. Therefore one ought to speak of categories of actualization or of intellection. The name matters little; the essential point is not to confuse these categories with those other categories which are the dimensions of reality. Now, *qua* intellective actualization the categories are neither predicates nor predicables nor *predicamenta*; they are simply modes of actualization of the real declaimed in intellection.

What are these categories of actualization? They are, as we have been seeing, five, because there are five modes 192 by which reality is actualized in intellection.

A) Intellection is, above all, nothing but the mere actualization of the real in the intelligence. It is the radial category of actualization, the category of the “in”.

B) There is another mode of being present, of the real being actualized intellectively. It is not the case that the real ceases to be actualized “in”, but that it is reactualized in affirmative intellection. Something already intellectively known as real is in addition intellectively known as real based on other things; this is affirmation. It is therefore a reduplicative actualization. The A already actualized as real becomes intellectively known as being really B. This is the category of the “re”, of “re-duplication.” This category is, in a certain way, general
because there are different forms and modes of “re”.

a) A real thing is intellectively known based upon others “among” which it is. The real thing is then actualized in the intellection of these other things. We have already seen this: the “among” has, among other aspects, an aspect proper to a thing actualized as such. It is a “re” but “among”. This is the category of “among”.

b) One intellectively knows in this “among” that the thing is actualized, but as a function of other things. In this functionality, the real thing is actualized in that mode which we call “by”. “By” is the functionality of the real qua real. It is a “re” but “by”. This is the category of the “by”.

c) Finally there is another mode of actualizing what is intellectively known as “among” and as “by”, and which consists in the thing being present “among” and “by”, but now not with respect to other things, but as the projection of the real only as a moment of the world. This projection actualizes the real in the form of “ob”. The “ob” is a category.

“In”, “re”, and in turn “re” as “among”, as “by”, and as “ob”, gives us the five categories, the five modes of intellective actualization of the real qua intellectively known.

Since these categories are modes of presentation, they apply both to the field as well as to the world, although in different forms. But the “among” in the field is not identical to the “among” in the world, nor is the “by” in the field identical to the “by” in the world. But that is another question.

Each one of these categories comprises different categorial modifications. Thus, actualization as “in” comprises all the modes by which what is sensed is present to us. We already saw, in Part I, that the essential difference of the senses is not in the qualities which are sensed, but in the very mode by which the sensed qualities are present to us as real. Similarly, the “re”, as a mode of “among”, comprises different forms: the modes of intentionality of the “re”, etc. Finally “by” and “ob” can assume different forms. These five categories of actualization are not independent of the categories of reality; they constitute the categorial unity of the intellection of the real.

III. Unity of the categories of reality and of actualization. This unity has two aspects.

A) Above all, both the categories of reality as well as the categories of actualization constitute a “system”, the system of the categories. This is obvious with respect to the categories of reality. The categories of reality constitute a system. But it is less obvious that the categories of actualization also constitute a system. Hence it must be clearly stressed. Every “re” actualization is essentially based upon an “in” actualization; otherwise it would not be re-actualization. Only as “in” can something be actualized among others. In turn, this unity of the “in” and of the “re” is what [194] points to reality as a “by”. Finally, by just projecting the “in” and the “re” upon in-depth reality, the real is actualized as “ob”. Here the systematic character of the categories of actualization is apparent.

B) But taken together, the categories of actualization and the categories of reality reveal an intrinsic and radical unity, the unity of actualization. We are not dealing with actuity, but with actualization. This unity, by virtue of being of actuality, is determined by reality because every actuality is always and only actuality of reality. The modes of actualization, then, are determined intellectually by the real itself. To be sure, intelligence has its own nature. But we have already seen that this nature is actualized in and by the actuality of a real thing, intellectively actualized. Therefore this actuality is certainly common to the real thing and to the intellection itself, but this commonality is modally determined by the real itself; in virtue of this, the actualization is not only a common actuality for the real and for intellection, but in addition this commonality has an intrinsic and formal character; it is a commonality in which the real itself grounds it. It consists in being a commonality determined by the real of which it is the actuality. Intellection is certainly an actuality; but qua intellection it is just actuality “of” the real. And therefore the actuality common to a real thing and its intellection is determined by the mode in which the “of” is present to the intelligence. And as the real qua real is transcendental, it follows that the common actuality of intellection and of what is intellectively known is a commonality of transcendental nature. Kant said that the very structure of the understanding confers transcendental content (transzendenten Inhalt) to what is understood. [195] That is not true. Transcendentalism is not a characteristic of the understanding but of intellection as determined by the real itself in common actuality by the real. This actuality is, then, not only common but transcendental. It is, if one wishes, common transcendental actuality. That is to say, the actuality is something common in which intellection is respectively open to the intellectively known real. And it is for this reason that intellection itself is transcendental. This commonality of actuality is not transcendental as a conceptual moment, but neither is it transcendental because it constitutes the real as object. It is transcendental, above all, because by being common,
the intellection is open to reality in the same openness by which the real is open to its actuality in intellection. Therefore there is transcendental commonality. In virtue of this, transcendentality as respective openness of the reality of the real is determinant by virtue of the respective openness of intellection as such. And it is for this reason that intellection itself is transcendental. Intellection is transcendently open to other intelllections. The diverse intelllections do not constitute an “edifice” by virtue of being lumped together, i.e., because to one intellection others are “added” which outline, organize, or amplify it; but on the contrary all of this takes place, and does so necessarily, by virtue of the transcendently open nature of each intellection. Transcendentality as respective openness of intellection is the radical foundation of every “logic” of intellection.

The categories of reality and of actualization have, then, an intrinsic unity with respect to two characteristics: systematic unity, and unity of transcendental commonality.

IV. Special consideration of the category of the “ob”. The “ob” has a formally categorial characteristic. To be object [196] is a categorial mode of actuality. Let us prolong our reflection on this idea of object which is essential for the problem of knowing.

Above all it is necessary to avoid the mistake of confusing object and objectuality. The categorial aspect of actualization is the being actualized “as object”; it is not the character by which what is present as object can constitute one or several objects. Object and objectuality are not the same.

Kant’s celebrated categories are modes of being of objects, the diverse moments which constitute that which we call “an object”. Therefore they are, like Aristotle’s categories, categories of content, very different than the categories of actuality. Since Kant was, like Aristotle, oriented toward the predicative logos, he takes up the idea of categories as modes of unity of predicate with subject. Kant’s novelty is in affirming that this unity is not an affirmative unity consequent upon the object, but on the contrary the unity of predicate and subject is what makes the intelligible have its own unity in virtue of which it is an object. The object is constituted as this or that object by a function identical to that by which affirmation itself is constituted, which is then the ground of objectual unity. And it is in this that, for Kant, the categories consist: they are modes in which the diversity of intuition is unified as objects of intellection. The categories would thus be transcendental modes of representation. But this is untenable for a variety of reasons. In the first place, intellicative knowing, and especially rational intellicative knowing, is not representing. The radical function of reason is not to be representative but to be grounding. To be sure, this intellection will involve representations, or at least can involve them in most cases; but the formal function [197] of reason is not to represent but to present. The categories are not modes of representing but modes of presenting. And in the second place, it is clear that Kant’s idea of what is represented would figure in the different categories of the “re”. And this is not sufficient to constitute the “ob”.

Kant has posed for himself the problem of the constitution of objects, but he stumbled over the problem of objectuality as such, over the “being-ob”. And the fact is that by ‘object’ Kant understands the content of objects. It doesn’t matter for this problem that such content is merely formal; one is always dealing with a content. Now, objectuality is not a content but a mode of actualization of a content. One is not dealing with “an object” but with “objectuality”.

And on this point, Kant is in agreement with Aristotle; he takes the problem of the categories along the lines of the categories of the content of reality. They have a different meaning for categories of reality, but they agree upon some characteristics which for both of them constitute the system of categories of reality, viz. Being a priori, closed, and universal. For Aristotle and Kant—above all Kant—the categories of reality constitute the a priori warp and weft of what is categorized. This is not the place to discuss that important problem in detail. But from here on I want to let it be settled that the categories of content are not an a priori system, but the modes of what has usually been called the ‘transcendental function of suchness’, of the real considered as suchness. Hence they depend upon the real and are not a priori conditions of the real. In the second place, the categories of reality are not closed systems, because the transcendental function is in itself an essentially open function. The real can be constituting not just other real things, [198] i.e., not only a diversity of suchness, but can also go on constituting other modes of reality qua reality. For this reason the transcendental order is an order which is open dynamically. And finally, in the third place, the system of content categories is not universal. Aristotle determined his categories as modes of substance, but above all along the lines of sensible substance. Kant molded his categories upon the things which constitute the object of Newton’s physics. And this is manifestly unilateral, both in the case of Aristotle and that of Kant. One cannot extend the content categories of physical things, whether substances or sensible objects, to all other types of reality. Therefore the universality of the content categories is not achieved by changing the concept.
of reality, for example by saying that the reality of things, which are here, form the order of some cosmic movement. The fact is that in any case whatsoever, and regardless of how rich our chain of concepts is, the system of the content categories is not, as I see it, universal. Each type of knowledge has its own content categories. It is impossible to reduce the categories of the historical and the personal to the natural, etc.
II

TRANSFORMATION OF A FIELD THING INTO A REAL OBJECT

In view of the foregoing, this point will be dealt with briefly. The object, i.e. the objectual reality, is not an interpretation or anything of the sort; it is the terminus of apprehension. [199] A real thing is a *positum*, but upon the base of in-depth reality; therefore the real thing acquires a character of “*ob*”. That transformation is, then, of categorial order, of categories of actualization. We are not trying to elaborate a representation but to actualize another mode of presentation. For this reason, I repeat, the transformation of a real thing into a real object is categorial. The real field thing, actualized now as real “*in*” primordial apprehension, and “*re*”-actualized in the field manner “among” others and “*by*” others in the form of affirmation, is now projected upon the base of in-depth reality, upon an ambit actualized in turn as “*by*”, i.e., upon an ambit with the nature of a ground. The “field” of the real thing is open to a “*world*” in which it is grounded. Then and only then does the real field thing acquire the character of real object. *The *ob* is but the actualization of a field thing as a world thing.* Only in this actualization is there an “object”, i.e., in the rational intellection, in knowledge. That which is intellectively known rationally is an object. This modalization is just modalizations of this radical structure.

In virtue of this, the transformation of a real thing into objectual reality has precise characteristics:

\( a \) It is a transformation not in the mode of representing the real, but in its mode of being present. Objectuality is the terminus of a transformation only of categorial actuality. [200]

\( b \) It is a transformation along the lines of the “*toward*”; the field “*toward*” is transformed into a “*toward*” the in-depth.

\( c \) This transformation is determined by the real itself, because the “*toward*” is a mode of reality. The field real in its “*toward*” is what presents to us that real in its “*toward*” the in-depth.

What is the character of this transformation? The transformation concerns, at one and the same time, intellection and the real thing. With respect to intellection, the transformation does not consist in a change in the act of intellection *qua* act. It is a transformation which determines, in intellection, something which is less than an act but more than mere capacity. This modalization is just what constitutes actility. An object is not the terminus of a representation but the terminus of an intellelctive attitude. The transformation consists, then, intellelctively, in the change of act into attitude. The “*ob*” is intellectively constituted as a terminus of an attitude.

This transformation also concerns the real. The “*ob*” refers. The “*ob*” is a mode of actuality, and therefore, like every actuality, it is always just actuality of the real. The categorial “*ob*” presents us not “an” object, but a res objecta, a res in “*ob*”. In virtue of this, that which is actualized in this new attitude, i.e. what is going to be intellectively known rationally, is not the res objecta as objecta, but the res objecta as res. “*The *ob*” only has the character of referring, and it refers to the reality of which it is actuality. In the intellective attitude the real itself is actualized in “*ob*”; but it is always an actualization of the real. The transformation, then, falls back upon the actualization in an attitude. Knowledge, I repeat, is not a representation of things, but an actualization of them in that new attitude of the “*toward*”. [201]

In this attitude, the real is objectually projected onto the in-depth base, i.e., it is actualized as worldly reality. This projection, and therefore the knowledge itself, can be of quite varied nature. That I said before. Knowledge is not just science, nor is it principally science. There are other modes of knowledge, for example poetic knowledge, religious knowledge, etc., just as there are also other known realities which are not things, for example one’s own or someone else’s personal reality. Now, knowledge is not principally theoretic; it is not because it is not radically theoretic. The radical aspect of knowledge is in the attitude of the “*toward*” determined by the real itself, an attitude in which the real is actualized in an “*ob*”. The rest is but modalizations of this radical structure.

Here then is what objectuality is, and what the attitude which determines the transformation of the real thing into real object is.

This objectuality is only a categorial correlate of an attitude, in which the real is actualized in an “*ob*” by projecting it—and only projecting it—upon the world as an ambit of grounding. This real was previously actualized as “*in*” and “*re*”. Therefore its projection upon the ambit of grounding leaves open the intellection of the ground of that objectual reality as a moment of the world. That is to
say, knowledge is always intrinsically and formally an open problem. It is not sufficient that the field real is actualized for us as object. It is actualized for us as object precisely in order for us to intellectively search for its in-depth nature. For that it is necessary that this nature be accessible to intellection. How? That is the second point of the formal structure of knowing: after the constitution of objectuality, the access to the ground of the real.
THE METHOD

It is by projecting the field real onto the base of in-depth reality, onto the world, that we seek the rational intellection of field things, i.e., their knowledge. Knowledge is search. Let me reiterate that we are not dealing with the search for some intellection, but rather with an intellection which qua intellection is inquiring, which is inquiring itself as a mode of intellection. Since to be an intellection is to be a mere actualization of the real, it follows that the search is an actualization brought to completion in that mode of actualizing which is inquiry. Even though I have said all this before, I repeat it here because it is something essential for the subject which we are about to examine.

Where does one search for that actualization? We have already seen where: in the world. World is the respectivity of the real qua real. And it is in this sense that it is something beyond the field. The field is respectivity, but it is just sensed respectivity, the sensed world. To go beyond the field is to go from "field" to "world". This world is not, formally, something sought, but something given. The world is given not as something which is there "facing" me; rather, it is given in that mode of reality which is the "toward". It is for this reason that the world is formally something "beyond" the field. In the world thus actualized is where one seeks that which we wish to rationally know intellectively, that which we wish to know.

What is it that one seeks in the world? One seeks the real considered with respect to the world. Worldly reality is actualized precisely as a "to be grounding". The world is thus the ambit of grounding. And it is just on account of this that the world, that which is beyond the field, is in-depth reality. In-depthness does not consist in any kind of mysterious root, but in being the "for" of the field itself qua worldly. Therefore that which one seeks in this progression from the field toward the worldly is the ground of the field. Ground, as I have already said many times, is not necessarily a cause, but the mode in which that which is grounding grounds, from itself, the grounded and formally passes into what is grounded. Cause is only a mode of ground. The ground is therefore, ultimately, the world in a real thing. What one seeks is, then, this ground. One does not seek the world, but the ground of the real in the world, transforming the field reality into objectual reality. Neither does one seek an object. World and object are not what is problematic. What is problematic is always just objectual reality qua reality in the world. This problematic business is what one seeks, viz. the ground of this determinate field thing.

In virtue of this a question arises: How does one seek that which is sought, that is, the ground of the world? This "how" is strictly and formally an intellective mode. Now, the "how" of the search for the fundament in the world is what constitutes method. A method is how one forges a way, a way toward the ground. A method is therefore the way of knowing as such. The necessity and nature of the method is not just a type of human necessity. It is that, but this necessity is founded upon an essential moment of reality, upon the constitutive openness of the real, merely in its respectivity. As ambit of respectivity, the world is open; therefore, as a moment of respectivity of each real thing, reality is open in each thing. And the "how" of the search for the ground is set in this very openness; it is that which transforms the intellective movement into a progression among the real. Method is a way. Neither the world nor the real object is a problem, as I said; the problem is the way from the real object to its ground.

Thus it is necessary to ask ourselves: what, precisely, is a method? And what is its intrinsic and formal structure? These are the two points which we must examine.

Here we ask ourselves in what method consists. We are not interested in what a particular method is; that we shall see later. What we are now interested in is what comprises a method as a moment of rational intellection, i.e., what comprises the methodic moment of reason.

I

WHAT IS METHOD?

‘Method’ is not synonymous with what is usually called the ‘scientific method’. To be scientific is but a possible modalization of what it is to be a method. Method is something more radical; it is the way of access. The concept of “way” or “path”, hodos, was probably introduced into philosophy by Parmenides. But for method, just being a way or a path is not sufficient. It is necessary that the path be “among and through” the forms of reality. The path must be a path which is meta [after]. Only then will we have that which constitutes the method. Method is a problem because it is not univocally determined. And not being so is precisely why there is a meta, i.e., a forging of a way. [205]

What is this method qua intellective? That is the essential question. The matter is not resolved just by saying
that method is a way of access. It is necessary to clarify the intellective character of the method itself.

For this let us recall, once more, that it is a forging of a way, that is how intelligence opens in order to go from a real field thing to its worldly ground. The path is traced between two points: the real field thing and its worldly ground. Clearly one is dealing with the real thing and with its real ground, real but intellectively known, actualized, in intellection. Therefore the method is the way of access from one actualization of the real to another. As we said, knowledge is intellection seeking itself. And what is sought is a new intellective actualization of the same real field thing. It is quite possible that the content of the ground may be something which in some way is numerically distinct from the field thing; but it is always just intellectively known as a ground of the field thing. Therefore we are dealing, strictly speaking, with a new actualization of the field thing; it is actualized not as in a field but as in the world. That it is actualized as worldly is not the same as that it is actualized as being here-and-now in the world. This last would be “being” in the traditional sense. Here we are dealing just with reality qua respective in that respectivity which constitutes the world. And since all actualization is of reality, it follows that ultimately what is done is to intellectually know the real more profoundly or more in-depth. That is, method is a way into reality. The moment of reality is decisive. To be sure, we are dealing with actualized reality, but actualized as reality. Method is a forging of a way into reality itself towards a more profound reality. Here, ‘intellection’ is taken in its most radical sense, its primary sense, as the mere actualization of the real. Therefore, we are not dealing with any special actualization, as for example that of judgement, but of mere actualization regardless of its mode. Mere actualization does not exclude any special actualization, but neither can it be identified with any. Method is the way from an actualization of the real (the field actualization) to another actualization of it, actualization in the world; and it formally consists in going from one to the other by actualizing the real from its first actualization towards the second. And this process is inquiring intellection qua intellection; it is a going by intellective knowing. Anticipating an idea which I shall expound forthwith, I will say that knowledge starts from an actualization of the real in primordial sentient apprehension, and terminates in an actualization in a physical trial or test, i.e., a sentient trial or test of reality. The road which runs from the first to the second is just that of inquiring reason, and qua road, it is method. Method, I repeat, is an inquiring actualization of reality.

Despite the inconvenience, it was essential to repeat this because the idea of method lends itself to serious confusion. Generally one understands by ‘method’ the path which leads from one truth to another, understanding by ‘truth’ a true judgement; therefore the method would be a reasoning process which goes from one true judgement to another. But to me this is untenable for three reasons.

a) In the first place, method is not the way from one truth to another but from an intellectively known, actualized reality to another actualization of it. Method is not the way of truth, but the way of reality. To be sure, we are dealing with actualized reality; but it is always reality. Therefore method as path is a path not in the truth of knowledge, but in reality. (207)

b) In the second place, the intellection which comes into play here is not a judgement. To be sure, actualized reality is a truth. But it is not the truth of a judgement. The intellection in which method consists is the intellection of the real as real truth, not as logical truth. In method there are judgements, clearly; but it is not judgement but real truth which determines the methodic character of intellection.

c) In the third place, the way, the method itself, does not consist in being a reasoning process. It is not the access of a true judgement to another true judgement, because what is sought is not another judgement but another actualization. The identification of method with reasoning—which has run throughout the last centuries in all works on logic—is in my view untenable. People have fallen into this trap on account of what at various times in this study I have called the “logification of intellection”. But it is impossible. To be sure, method is a way, and moreover is a way which must be followed; it is something to be pondered or reflected upon. But it is so in the etymological sense; it is a “pondering” and not a logical “discourse”. Logical discourse, the discourse of reasoning, is but a type of “pondering”. Moreover, reasoning as such is not method. Reason has its own laws, just as does the structure of judgement. But these structural laws are not method. Method, to be sure, must conform with the structural laws of logical intellection. But this conformity neither is nor can be a method which leads to knowledge, i.e., to a new actualization of the real. The laws of logic, logic as a whole, is the organon of knowledge, but it is not a method. And in order to understand this, it suffices to cite two cases in which normal logic is accustomed to identify method and reasoning, viz. deduction and induction. (208)

Deduction, we are told, is the method of some sciences, for example, mathematics. But in my view, this is
untenable, and not just because there is a special type of reasoning called “mathematical induction”, but because deduction concerns the logical structure of mathematical thinking, but not the actualization of the mathematical real. For this, rigorous deductions are not enough; rather, it is necessary “to make” the deduction by operating, transforming, constructing, etc., “within mathematical reality”. Only this is mathematical method; logical deduction is not. Therefore deduction by itself is not method but logical structure, and furthermore is not the method of the mathematical. There is no deductive method; there are only deductive structures of judgements, in the present case, of mathematical judgements. Mathematical reasoning, deduction, is a logical structure, but not a mathematical method.

The other instance where there typically is confusion of method and reasoning is the reverse of the previous one. It consists in making induction into an inductive reasoning process. And this is impossible, not just in principle but also in fact. Never has construction of an inductive reasoning process been carried out. To do so, the first requirement is to devise what is usually called the ‘principle of induction’. And this, in fact, has never been done satisfactorily, not even by invoking probability theory to exclude random experimental errors. Therefore in fact no inductive reasoning process exists. On the other hand, induction exists as a strict and rigorous method. One starts from the real as actualized in facts and goes by repetition (in accordance with the Law of Large Numbers) from the experimental results to a general statement. This statement pronounces the actualization of the ground. I leave aside whether the statement is or is not true. We shall consider that problem later. The only thing I wish to stress here is that the inductive method is a method, but not a reasoning process.

In mathematics we have a deductive type of reasoning which by itself is not a method; in induction we have a method which by itself is not a reasoning process.

This does not mean that in rational intellection there are no reasoning processes. There are and there must be necessarily, just as there are judgements. To pretend that the opposite is true would be, rather than an impossibility, something just stupid. But neither judgements nor reasoning processes are what formally constitute method. A reasoning process is a logical structure which method has to respect. But that is a question of logic. And logic by itself is never, nor does it pretend to be, the font of truth.

On the other hand, method is essentially—or at least pretends to be so—the font of truth, given that it moves in reality. Therefore a philosophy of intelligence is not a logical tract. Only logic is occupied with reasoning. The philosophy of intelligence is not, but is instead essentially occupied with method.

Method as a way is an intrinsic and formal moment of rational intellection. As such, it is always and only a way into reality, whether given reality or postulated reality.

With this we have clarified in some fashion our first point, viz. to be method is to be inquiring actualization qua inquiring; it is actualization as a way, a way of the ground of the field real. It is an intellicative progression into reality, not a logical progression into truth. What is the structure of this method? That is the second point which I set forth.

II

STRUCTURE OF THE METHOD

We will not discuss a particular method but rather study the structure of the methodic moment of rational intellection. This methodic moment is comprised of three essential steps.

I

System of Reference

Above all, in order for there to be knowledge it is not enough that there be a real object which one is going to know and someone to intellectually know it. No knowledge would be possible with just this. It is absolutely necessary that the intellection be brought to fruition by intellectually knowing the real object as a function of other real things which were previously intellectually known in the field, i.e., by referring that object to these real things. It is absolutely essential to understand this because it is a point which is usually passed over. No knowledge exists if one is not intellectually knowing through a system of reference. And with this we have the first step of all method: the establishment of a system of reference. It is necessary not just in fact, but as being something formally constitutive of method.

We already encountered something similar when we studied field intellection. To intellectually know what a

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1 Mathematical induction is, in fact, a strictly deductive method of reasoning.—trans.
real thing is in reality is something which cannot be done except by intellectively knowing the real thing “from” other things of the field. But the field “from” is not identical to what I have here called ‘system of reference’. In both cases one deals with a “toward”, to be sure. And herein consists the similarity of the two “froms”. But their respective characters are radically different. In field intellection the “toward” is a “toward” between the things of the field, and therefore we intellectively know what one of those real things is in reality from or with respect to others in the field. In field intellection one intellectively knows what something “is in reality”: therefore it is ultimately an intellection of verification or substantiation. The “from” is a chain of substantiations of what the real thing “could be”. And if there is construction, it is always a construction of what would be substantiable. On the other hand, in rational intellection one does not intellectively know what something “is in reality”, but that “by which something is really in reality itself, in the world”. Thus the things from which one intellectively knows this “by” are not a chain of substantiable “could be’s” but just a system of reference from which one goes to what “could be”. The double meaning of the “toward” thus establishes a double mode of intellection: the intellection of what something is in field reality and the intellection of that by which something is real in the world, of what something is in universal reality itself. The first we intellectively know “from” a chain of substantiable things; the second “from a mere system of reference”.

What is this system of reference? And What is its character?

Above all, the first question must be answered. We saw that rational intellection is based upon what was previously intellectually known, and this support is just the canonic principle of intellection. Now, this canonic principle is what constitutes the system of reference.

Naturally, this canonic principle is not, by itself, univocally determined. But it always has to have something, and something determined by the field. And this is now the essential point. The principle can be and is quite varied; that we shall see forthwith. But its being a principle has a precise formal character, that of being determined in accordance with the field. Therefore it is ultimately the field itself, in its field totality, that constitutes the system of reference for intellection of the world. Now, the field is a principle by virtue of its moment of reality. The field reality is the system of reference for worldly reality insofar as that field reality is reality. And this is obvious, because field and world are not two strata numerically independent—the field, as I said, is the sensed world. Now the field, what is sensed of the world, is the system of reference for the active intellection of the world. Therefore all the “naivete” of reason always reduces to the same thing: to thinking that the world is formally identical to what is sensed of it, to the field. The field would then be the formal structure of the world. And it is on this that naivete depends. The field is not by itself the structure of the world, but merely a system of reference. And it is so because the field is real. What happens is that it is only real in the field sense. And it is on account of its moment of reality that this field reality constitutes a principle of rational intellection. This field, as a system of reference, then has a moment upon which I wish to again insist. We are not dealing, in fact, with the field real giving us just an “idea” of what reality is. It does give us that, to be sure; but that is secondary (because it is derivative) for our problem. Nor are we dealing only with a “concept” of reality, because the field as a system of reference is not formally a concept of reality; rather it is the field “reality” itself in its own physical nature of reality. It is the physical reality of the field which, qua physical, constitutes the system of reference for the intellection of that same reality, intellectively known in the worldly sense. That intellection is therefore an activity which intellectively moves in reality itself.

Granting this, what is the character of this system of reference? To be sure, it does not have representative character. It certainly involves a system of representations, because field things are already “present” and it is based upon them that we seek to present the ground. In this respect, and only in this one, they are a “representation” of this ground. But its formal function qua system of reference is not representative, because these representations do not present the ground by being representation; rather, they present it only “by” grounding the sensed thing, even if to do so they destroy all the content of the representation. The representation thus has a double function: representative and directional. Only this latter makes it a system of representation. The system of reference supplies representations, but the reference itself is not in the nature of a representative. This directional function has a very precise nature. It is what I previously called ‘grounding function’. The grounding function, the function of the “by”, has directional character, and moreover has nothing but directional character. The representations in fact can lead to a “by” which revokes the representation or even leaves all possible representative content in suspense. Knowing is never representing.

What is this directionality? And what is its cognitive status?

a) Rational intellection is, as we saw, an ac-
tivity, activated by the real, but nonetheless activity. Therefore the “toward” of rational intellection is an active “toward”, which actively goes toward the in-depth. The system of reference consists only in the tracing out of the concrete direction of the “toward” of activity. Before I called what has been previously intellectively known ‘support’; now we see that support consists in being directional reference. Directionality is concreteness of the worldly “toward” of activity.

And this is essential. Knowledge is, above all, precision and exactitude, but it is a directional line. We are not dealing formally with precision and exactitude along the lines of concepts and expressions. It is quite possible that with concepts and expressions which are not univocally realized representatively, we still mark out a very precise direction. In such a case, those concepts and expressions are only partial indications of the in-depth reality, but according to a direction which is very precise in itself. That happens, for example, in quantum physics. The concepts of particle and wave are but partial representations of some aspect of the in-depth real. Their function lies in the fact that this partiality is inscribed in a precise direction which goes beyond it. Not just “complementarity”, as Bohr thought, it is “superceding”. The same could be said of other types of knowledge, for example the knowledge of personal realities and of living realities in general. The concepts and expressions of which we make use are but aspects within a direction which is very precisely determined not just toward what we seek to intellectually know, but includes the direction of what we already intellectively know.

b) Whence the cognitive state, so to speak, of rational intellection. Knowledge is not a system of [215] concepts, propositions, and expressions. That would be an absurd type of conceptualism, or rather logicism, which is ultimately just formal. Moreover it would be field intellection but not knowledge. Knowledge is not just what we know and what we say, but also, and in the first place, what we want to say. Language itself is not, for the effects of intellection, something merely representative. And I am not referring to the fact that language has another dimension than that by which it is the expression of what is intellectively known. This is obvious, and a triviality. What I am now saying is that precisely as expression of rational intellection, and within this intellection, language has, besides a possible representative function, a function which differs from the merely representative. Therefore the cognitive status of the system of reference is not to serve as an explicit intellection, but something different. Anticipating some ideas that will be expounded below, I will say that in rational intellection and its expression, we are not trying to make explicit the realization of representations, but to experience a direction, to know if the direction taken is or is not of suitable precision. What the system of reference determines is not a making something explicit, but an experience. If that were not true, knowledge would never have its most valued characteristic: to be a discoverer, a creator.

Hence the error which, as I see it, most radically vitiates logical positivism.

In the first place, knowledge, i.e., rational intellection, is not a system of logically determined propositions. That would be at most—and not always—the structure of field intellection, but in no way the structure of rational intellection. Rational intellection, knowledge, is not formally field intellection but worldly intellection. Positivism is only a conceptualization—and an incomplete one—of field intellection, but it is blind to worldly intellection, whose essential structural character is directionality. Knowledge is an intellection directed to the world from a system of reference. The formal structure of knowledge does not reduce to the formal structure of the logoi, but involves the essential moment of a directional reference. Statements with univocal meaning are not enough. Let us leave aside, for now, what logical positivism understands by ‘verifiable’.

In the second place, this direction is the direction of a progression. Inquiry pertains to the essence of knowledge. We are not dealing with a progression toward knowledge but with the fact that knowledge itself is intellective progression; the progression is just its own mode of intellection. Positivism limits itself to the logical statements of this intellection. But those statements are only its logical expression; they do not constitute the formal structure of the knowledge which is intellective progression.

In the third place, this progression is creative. Logical positivism is blind to this third, creative dimension of knowledge, because creating is not stating new propositions but discovering new directions of intellective progression. It is for this reason that the cognitive status of rational intellection is not to be a “univocal” manifestation but a “fertile” direction toward the worldly real. This fertility is not a consequence of rational intellection but a formally structural moment of it.

To be sure, I believe that today philosophy, perhaps more than ever, must have conceptual precision and formal rigor. Modern philosophy is in this regard the source of a great deal of confusion which gives rise to erroneous [217] interpretations. I have strongly emphasized this:
the reconquest of exactitude and precision in concepts and expressions is necessary. But this does not in any sense mean that such analysis, which is the function of logic, is the structure of knowledge, because the world does not have a logical structure but rather a real respectivity. And only because of this is knowledge what it is: the progression toward the system of reality.

The inquiring activity of rational thinking makes its second essential step within this system or reality.

2

Formal Terminus of the Methodical Activity

What is the formal terminus of this methodical activity? We have already seen the answer: it is what a field thing “could be” in the world. The formal terminus of cognitive activity is the ground of the real as possibility. For the effects of rational intellection, the ambit of grounding, the world, is in the first place the ambit of the possibilities of the ground. The world is certainly reality, the respectivity itself of the real as real. But this reality, for the effects of knowledge, is only the ambit of intellec-

tion of the ground. And as intellection is actualization, it follows that the actuality of the world in intellection is actualization of all the possibilities of the ground. But this requires further clarification.

Consider the matter of possibilities. They are real possibilities, i.e., possibilities which are comprised as such in the intellection of the real world (not a redundancy). What are these real possibilities? Above all, they are possibilities in the sense that they are that which the real perhaps “could be” in the worldly sense. That we have already seen. We are not dealing with a mere “might be” but with a “could be”, i.e., with a positive mode of the making possible of the real. The real is not just what it is, but is something modally real constituted from its own ground, based on its own, intrinsic, and formally real possibilities. As possibilities, they are in themselves something unreal; but the unreal, realized as a ground of reality, is the very possibility of the real, what intrinsically and formally is making it possible. The real is something essentially possibilitated. It is not that possibility is prior to reality, but that the mode of reality of the worldly is to be possibilitated real; possibility is only a mode of reality. Why? Because of its own insertion into the world. In this sense, possibility is not prior to the real, but a modal moment of its worldly respectivity. It is because of this that I speak of possibilitation rather than possibility.

But this possibilitation also has another essential aspect. Every intellective actualization is so of reality, but at the same time is intellective. Now, with respect to a rational intellection, the intellection itself is activity. Hence it follows that the possibility of the “could be” is at one and the same time the possibility of the “could be” of the real thing and the “could be” of the intellection. This intellection is an inquiring activity. Therefore, in this second aspect, the possibilities take on the character of what we call the ‘possibilities of my activity’, something completely different from my potencies and faculties. The system of reference, I said, is the concrete outline of the “toward”. Activity provisionally appropriates to itself some possibilities as possibilities of what a thing could be; and upon doing so, accepts a concrete outline of its inquiring progression as a moment of its own activity. In the course of history, man not only has discovered what things are and could be in the worldly sense; but also the possibilities based upon which my intellection can take on a new form of rational intellection. We have intellective possibilities which the Greeks did not have. It is not just that they did not know many of the things we know, but that they were not able to know them as we can and in fact do know them. The two moments are different. With some intellections we intellectively know different possible grounds of a real thing. Conversely, there are possible grounds which cannot be intellectively known other than by illumination of new possibilities of intellection. The possible, as a formal moment of rational intellection, of knowledge, is at one and the same time what a thing could be (what its own ground is), and what my possibility of knowing is, not in the sense of being the terminus of an activity, but in the sense of being possibilities which this action formally has in itself as action. Possible is unitarily “the possible” and “the possibilities”.

How is this possible actualized? The unity of the two aspects is actualized in that structural moment of intellec-
tive activity which is the sketch or outline. Rational intellection intellectively knows what is possible (in its two aspects), referred to the system of reference. And this reference is what constitutes the sketch. To put it more radically, ‘sketch’ is the conversion of the field into a sys-
tem of reference for the intellection of the possibility of the ground. The sensed possibility, qua sensed, is, as we saw, suggestion. The sensed possibility as system of reference is sketch. Naturally, every sketch is founded upon a suggestion. Nonetheless, suggestion and sketch are not identical. Sentient intellection as such suggests. But sketch is suggested only if sentient intellection is in a state of activity. It is the moment of activity which distinguishes sketch from suggestion. Only a sentient intelli-
gence knows by sketch; the sketch is only for knowledge. Conversely, a sentient intelligence can only know by sketching. In our problem, sketching is an act which is purely and formally intellecutive, and this activity is a mode of intellecution; it is intellecution activated by the real itself. Consequently, we are not here dealing with a human activity “applied” to intellecution, or anything like it. Activity is intellecution activated by the real, and the sketch, as an act of this activity, is something formally intellecutive—indeed, it is the very intellecution of the possible ground. The ground is only knowable to us by sketching, because the sketch is the concrete form of illumination of possibilities (real ones and of intellecution). An activity that sketches is the only place where one can actualize reality as a possibility both real and of intellecution. Sketching is a form of intellecutive knowing.

How does one sketch the actuality of the real in its possibility? The possibilities are not sketched other than by confronting the field real in intellecutive activity, i.e., intellecively knowing the field as real worldly object. The confronting is what on the one hand converts the real into something that can be grounded, i.e., it is what constitutes the real upon the base of its possibility. But there is something more. Possibility thus illuminated has its own content. This content qua possibility is always something constructed; it is construction. (I am not speaking of construction in the sense of group theory). The sketch of possibilities is always just a constructed sketch. No intellecutive possibility [221] as such is purely and simply given. It may be received if entrusted to us; that is the problem of history as transmission. But that is another question. What is here important to us is that what is entrusted is a construction. It could likewise be that the construction consists only in accepting as possibility the real which is encountered. But even in this case, clearly what is encountered is converted into a possibility, i.e., is something constructed; immediate construction if one wishes, but still construction. In this construction, each of its moments is a possibility. Therefore the construction is properly construction of a system of possibilities. The system of reference is for the construction of a system of possibilities. Each possibility is only making possible within a system together with the rest. We already saw this when dealing with possibility as formal terminus of rational intellecution. The possibilities are not added together but rather “co-possibilitate”. And this “co-” is the system. Therefore every alteration of a possibility implies in principle, if not the alteration, then the reconsideration of the all the rest. The crisis of a possibility puts the entire system in crisis.

This system of possibilities is not univocally determined. Therefore its constitution is a free construction. All of its intrinsic limitations follow from this, limitations with respect to its capacity to lead to the sought-after ground. That capacity is “fecundity”. The system of possibilities, by virtue of being freely constructed, is of limited fecundity. But it has still another limitation: it is a system selected from among others. In virtue of this, the system is of limited “amplitude”. When the ground for a system of possibilities is known, this knowledge is limited in fecundity and amplitude. Hence its constitutive openness. [222] All knowledge, by virtue of being an intellecution with a system of possibilities freely constructed from a system of reference, is an open knowledge, not just in fact and because of human, social, and historical limitations. Rather, it is open qua knowledge through intrinsic necessity, to wit, by being intellecution as sketch. And this is a moment which is formally constitutive of rational intellecution as such.

The second step of the method is the sketch of this system of possibilities from a system selected as the reference. But the method as a way seeks to lead to an end, viz. intellecution of the ground of the real. This is the third step of method, the final step. The first is the establishment of a system of reference; the second is the sketching of possibilities; and the third is the intellecution of the possibilitating ground of the real.

Method As Experience

How does one intellecively know the possibilitating ground of the real as worldly reality? When one intellecively knows this ground, the knowledge has reached its terminus. This is the problem of the access to what one seeks to know. Method is nothing if it does not lead to a real and effective access. Now, with the proviso that I shall explain myself further below, let me say that access is, formally, experience. Knowing begins with a system of reference from which one sketches a system of possibilities which permit one to experience what a thing is as worldly reality. To clarify this we need to conceptualize what experience is, what [223] one finds in experience (i.e., the experienced), and what is the mode of finding it. That is, we seek the concept of experience, the object of experience, and mode of experience.

A) What is experience? Experience is not a univocal concept. When we speak of experience, generally we think in terms of what is called ‘sensible experience’.
And this is extremely ambiguous, because the expression has different meanings, all completely acceptable for a language, but not identical in conceptualization either to “sensible” or to “experience”, as we shall see. What do we understand by ‘sensible’? And above all, What do we understand by ‘experience’?

A first meaning for ‘experience’, and one which is very general, is perception, aisthesis, i.e., sensing, and hence the sensed qualities. In this sense experience is opposed to what would be intellective apprehension. The so-called ‘sensualism’ thus philosophically understands that experience is perception (external or internal, it matters little). To have an experience of something would be to perceive it. But this is absolutely unacceptable. If I may be permitted the expression, to experience is not to sense. And this is true in a very radical sense. In the first place, sensing does not only sense qualities but also that these qualities are real. We have not only an impression of green (strictly speaking it is impossible to only have the impression of green), but also the impression of green as real. Sensualism has seriously gone astray with respect to this matter. What is sensed in experience is not only a quality but also its formality of reality. Therefore human sensing is intellective, since apprehending something as real is the formally constitutive part of intellective sensing. Moreover, in the second place, not even understanding sensing as intellective sensing is it acceptable to identify [224] experiencing and sensing. To be sure, without sensing there is no experience; but to sense is not formally to experience. In sensing, what is sensed is something fundamentally given. Now, what is experienced is not something given but something achieved—achieved certainly by sensing, but still achieved. The sensible is just the experienciable, but is not formally experienced. The moment of achievement is essential to experience. What does this moment mean?

One might think that experience consists in the experience of “one thing”, and not simply of some quality. It might be that this thing is a quality, but be that as it may, it might be the terminus of an experience only insofar as that quality is considered as a thing. Now, anything real, considered as a thing, even in the most stable of cases, is something variable and fleeting. Experience would not be just sensing, but that habitude of sensing something as fixed and stable. Sensing senses quality (I add, real quality), but experience might be a mode of sensing something “itself”. This is the concept of experience which Aristotle crafted and which he called empeiria. Aristotle thought that the constitutive moment of experience is the mnème, retention; thus the reiteration of perception, the retained perception, would be experience. But this is inadequate. Experience is not necessarily that which Aristotle called empeiria, because what is perceived and retained is not only the quality but, as I keep repeating, the formality of reality. Aristotle definitively separated the sensible and the intelligible, and therefore never conceptualized that intellective sensing whose formal moment I have called ‘impression of reality’. Experience is not just empirical sameness. The empeiria is only [225] a mode of experience. And the proof is the fact that we speak of people who have much or little experience of a thing or situation. The sameness in question is hence not a mere empirical retention of qualities nor of a real quality; rather, what is retained must be just a real thing intellectively known (retentively if one wishes) as real, not in each of its perceptive phases, but as real in the worldly sense. The experiential moment is not, then, empirical retentiveness, but something different. What? That is the third concept of experience.

When we speak of not having experience or of having much or little experience of something, we are not referring to the diversity of perceptive acts of a thing, even if perceived as real; rather, we refer to that mode of apprehending it (including perceptively) which consists in intellectively knowing it in depth. The achievement which constitutes experience is an achievement of reaching this depth, not the moment of retentive sameness. By reaching this depth, the thing is actualized as worldly reality. Therefore, in order to know what experience is, we must say what reaching this depth is as a mode of intellective actualization.

So we are dealing with an actualization, but not as mere actualization. That would be just sentient intellective apprehension, not experience. Something more than naked reality is needed; it is the real which actualizes what “really” is. Therefore, we actualize its reality as referred to other things which open an ambit within which the thing takes on its possible respect to these other things. And in order to intellectively know what we seek to intellectively know, the indicated things are those which outline, in intellective apprehension, the characteristics of that real thing. As such, this outline is thus something unreal in itself. Now, this unreal thing has to be [226] intellectively known as inserted in the real thing; only thus will it be the outline of it. And this insertion can have two different modalities.

a) The unreal can be inserted into the real by being actualized in the real as a realization. This is the realization of the unreal in the real. Intellelction then consists in intellectively knowing what the real thing is in reality. To realize is to intellectively know the reality of the “could be”. It is in this realization that being a manifestation consists. It is the intellection of the real in the field sense.
b) But the unreal can be inserted and actualized in the real in a different way, by testing if it is inserted. This is not manifestation, i.e., it is not mere realization, but testing. We then intellectively know by testing what the real thing is in depth. What is this testing? It is not, formally, just an assay or experiment. It is something else.

In the first place, it is testing of reality. This reality is not naked reality nor a realization, but the reality of the thing as a moment of the world. Reality here is not of the field but of the world. It is not the realization of a “might be” but of a “could be”. Because of this, as we shall see, such realization is testing. Testing rests upon the “beyond”.

In the second place, this is a physical testing. We are not dealing with a thought experiment, or anything of that nature. We are dealing with a “physical” testing. It is something not thought but carried out. It is “to do” the testing. And this exercise has an essential character. It is something carried out, but the carrying out itself is a mode of intellection of the real in its worldly character. Qua exercised, it is something physical, and qua intellective it is intellection in a process of forging a way by carrying out the testing. This forging [227] of a way is that intellection moment which we call discernment. Physical testing is, then, a discerning exercise.

In the third place, physically and of reality, testing is just that: testing. The real thing has been converted into a real object, has been actualized in an “ob”.

moments which we have described previously: the moment of resting upon the in-depth real, and the moment of being something physical. In virtue of this I shall say that experience is physical testing of reality. Experience is not just sensing the real but sensing the real toward the in-depth. Experience is not just empeiria, nor is it a mere retentive fixing of sameness, but an outlining and physical fixing of in-depth reality. Experience as testing is the insertion of an outline or sketch into in-depth reality.

Here we have the essence of the methodic encounter with real: experience. It is paradoxical result. We started, [228] in fact, from the field which is the sensed world, sensed respectivity. And now we end up with a physical testing of reality, i.e., with an act of sentient reason. What is sensed, is it world or field? The question constitutes the paradox to which I earlier alluded. Now, as it deals with a discerning intellection, the question cannot be thus formulated. The field is not the formal structure of the world; that would be “naivete”. In rational intellection the world takes on the character of grounding the formal structure of the field. And this is just the opposite of naive. The field is the world as sensed. Now, what we have achieved thus far is the sensed as world. In this initial progression we have gone from the field to the world. In the final direction we have come back from the world to the field once again. For this we have taken the round-about route via the unreal as sketch. This is the essence of experience: to intellectively know what is sensed as a moment of the world through the sketched “could be”.

What is it that we formally experience in experience?

B) What is experienced as such. Experience is based upon a real thing in accordance with its “could be”, and what is experienced is then what I have provisionally called ‘insertion’ or ‘realization’ of the “could be”, i.e., of something unreal, in the field real. This insertion has a precise cognitive character, because we are not dealing only with experience as a testing activity of mine, but above all—and in the first place—with the fact that in this insertion the real is actualized. Now, what is actualized of the real is just the “could be” as its ground. And the “could be” as ground of the real is only a form of what we call ‘for’ or ‘by’. And this ‘for’ in the form of “what for” is the formal object of knowledge. We already said that [229] this formal terminus is the “could be”. But to state it now with greater precision, the formal object of knowledge is the “could be” inserted or realized in the real, i.e., the “could be” as inserted into a “for”. This is what, rigorously, constitutes the terminus of experience; it is the experienced as such. In order to rigorously conceptualize
it, we must clarify two points: what the “for” is in itself, and how the “for” is experienced. I already expounded all this at the beginning of Part II of the book; let us review some of those ideas.

a) What is the “for”? To properly conceptualize it, let us recall once again that rational intellection is referentially grounded in the real as intellectually known in the field manner. And the field real is what sends us beyond itself. This sending is what, together certainly with correctness, but with greater rigor, we call “giving us pause to think”. We have already seen that the real not only is “given” as real in sentient intellection, but that this “given from” the real is given to us together with the “given for” thinking; the intrinsic unity of these two “givings” is just the “giving us pause to think”. The real, by being real, is what gives us pause to think. And it gives us pause to think, as we said, because reality is intrinsically open, i.e., it gives us pause to think, it sends us because it is open. Therefore it is necessary, above all, to conceptualize in what that moment of openness of the real consists, understood in the field manner, in accordance with which the real is inexorably giving us to think. What is it in the real, intelectively known in the field manner, which formally gives us to think?

When the real is apprehended sentiently in a field, it is among other real things of this field. And in this apprehension we apprehend what each of them is from others. To be “in reality”, we said, is the intrinsic and formal unity of the individual moment and of the field moment of the formality of the real. Now, this unity constitutes what I have called functionality of the real. Its expression is the “for”. Fieldness is not some summation of field things, but the fact that the field itself is formally functional rather than additive. A thing is certainly real in and by itself, but it is “in reality” what it is only as a function of others. Naturally I am not thereby referring to the notes which the real has, but to its reality. The real, by virtue of being field reality, is only real as a function of the other field things. Here the term ‘functionality’ is taken in its widest sense, and therefore with no allusion to the many diverse types of functionality which may emerge.

Every real thing actualizes its reality in the field manner as a function of other real things. Nothing is actualized in the field manner in a way which is so to speak monolithic; it is actualized only together with other things, after them, outside of them, on the periphery of the field, etc. And all of these determinations constitute so many modes of functionality. That the thing is in a field is, then, a radical characteristic of its functionality. Conversely, functionality is formally a mode of inclusion in fieldness. Now, it is not a functionality which is primarily concerned with the content of the notes of the real, but their proper actualization as real. It is the functionality of the field real quae real. Functionality is fieldness itself as a determining moment of the individual part of each reality. “Among” is the expression of fieldness. This fieldness, by virtue of its exceeding, encompasses various real things; but prior to this and for it the field includes each one of them, so that one has an aspect of constitutive functionality. For determining a field, the real determining thing itself, upon determining the field, is included in it. Functionality is then fieldness itself not as encompassing but as including.

Therefore functionality does not consist in one thing depending upon others, but is rather the structure of the whole field precisely and formally because it is a structural moment of each of the things in it. In virtue of this, functionality does not consist in A depending upon B; rather, what is functional is the field unity of A and B as reality. The field reality itself is with respect to A reality of functional character.

This functional field actualization is given in the unity of all the modes of sensed reality. But said functionality is only intelectively known in and by itself in that field moment which is the “toward”. Functionality by itself is actualized as a “toward”, i.e., is actualized in each thing in its “toward” reality. Field things are functional in the “toward”. The actualization of this functional aspect is what I call “for”.

b) This “for” is strictly experiential. To see this it suffices to recall some points from what has already been said.

aa) Human sensing is an intelective sensing, and therefore what we men sense are all sensible qualities, but in their formality of reality. Sensing, for the purposes of a philosophy of intelligence, is above all impression of reality. Reality, then, is not something conceived or inferred, etc., but something impressively given in strict formality; it is the de suyo, the given. And it is given “physically”. Every subsequent intellection which is physically given moves physically in this physical reality. [232]

bb) Now, when this reality is actualized in the field manner, the real presents that moment which is functionality. Functionality, I repeat, does not consist in a real thing referencing another; it is rather an intrinsic moment of the impression of reality. Functionality, in fact, is the inclusion of the real in its field, impressively determined. And this field is “its own” [suyo], i.e., it belongs to the
The “for” is experientially accessible because it is formally the impressive way of the “toward”.

ee) What happens is that sensing by itself is not experience. What is sensed is by its own nature experientiable. In what does the experiential of the “for”, already sensed, consist? The “for” is sensed; in other words, it is not only accessible but is already physically accepted in intellection. But this “for” has a complex structure. (234) That the “for” is formally sensed does not mean that its diverse structural moments are sensed equally. The “for”, in fact, is a determination of that which is real in the field manner. The field real is a sensed “what” which sends us beyond the field, i.e., beyond its own field “what”, toward a worldly “what”. There are, then, two “what’s: the “what” of the real field thing, and the worldly “what” in itself. The first “what” is sensed in the field manner; but the second “what” is not sensed, so to speak, but is a “what” created in a free construction, a “what”, therefore, which is sought in what “could be”. These two “what’s have an intrinsic unity: the unity of the “for”. The second “what” is that by which the first is what it is, i.e., is its “what for?” The expression “what for?” has an internal ambiguity. It is on the one hand something toward which we are sent by the field “what”; it is on the other that by which the field “what” is what it is. It is owing to this second aspect alone that the “what for?” should apply. Hence the “for” is something inexorably given in its “toward” form. On the other hand it is a “for” which inexorably moves in worldly reality. Born of reality qua field, the rational “what for?” is determined, with respect to “for”, by the coercive force of in-depth reality. Reality coercively imposes that there be a “for”, whose worldly or in-depth terminus, the worldly “what”, is freely intelligently known. The actualization of this force of imposition in freedom is just what I have called so many times the ‘insertion of the unreal, of the “could be”, into the real. The “for” bears us from field reality to worldly reality, and makes us revert toward field reality in a free “what”; this is just “experience”. The “what” is sensed, but not (235) by virtue of this is the “what” itself experiential; the worldly “what” is not sensed; but as it points us coercively toward the sensed, it is experienced. This pointing is the testing of the worldly “what for?” in the field “what”. The testing consists in trying to make of the world something formally sensed, i.e., in intelligently knowing the world as sensed. The necessity of a “what for” or “why” is something sensed: it is the “for”. But the “what” is in that “what for” something created. The coercive reversion from in-depth reality toward field reality is experience, testing.

Hence it is that the “what for?” is strictly experien-
tiable. The worldly “what” arises from the sensed “for”, and is inscribed in that sense along the lines of the “for”. What is not given is what this “what for?” is. That there should be a “what for?” is by no means a logical necessity; rather, it is something real, given sentiently. And in this given “for”, the free creation of rational intellection in the form of experience, of physical testing of reality, comes into play. It is, as I said, the experience of the insertion of the worldly “what” into the “for”. Testing is to test how the world fits into the field. It is testing of field reality from the standpoint of in-depth or worldly reality.

This experience of the “what for” has, then, a complex structure in virtue of the distinction between its two moments: the moment of the “what” and the moment of the “for”. Therefore, when one affirms that the object of knowledge is the “what for”, one states something not univocal but ambiguous. This has given rise to philosophical conceptualizations which as I see it are inadequate, if not completely false. That is what I now wish to explain summarily.

B) The experienced “what for?” as object of knowledge. To know something, we said, is to have an intellection of [236] what something is for, i.e., why it is what it is and how it is. What is this “what for”? We answered the question some pages back. But if we return to formulate the question again, it is because philosophy has conceptualized the “what for?”, the object of knowledge, in a way which as I see it is incorrect, and which has had profound repercussions. In order to clarify what I think on this subject, it will suffice to recall quickly what has been explained here in order to contrast it with these other conceptualizations.

For Aristotle, the “what for?” or why of something is its cause. To know something, he tells us, is to know its cause or causes. The “what for?” is, then, formally causality. Cause is all that which exercises a productive or originating influence of the so-called ‘effect’, not only efficient but also material, formal, and final; or viewed from the standpoint of the effect, it is a characteristic in accordance with which the effect is something really produced by its cause. Causality is, then, originating production. This causal order is, for Aristotle, something given in our sensorial apprehensions. The object of knowledge would then consist in going back from given causes to higher causes via a reasoning process.

With Hume, modern philosophy initiated a thoroughgoing critique of this conception. Causality, Hume tells us, is never given to us; neither is the influence by which the pulling of the rope produces the ringing of the bell. Causality is not given; only mere succession of events. Therefore any attempt to achieve strict knowledge moves in a vacuum. That, as Kant would say, is skepticism. Kant accepts this critique, but contrasts it with the Faktum of science, which lives on causes. And as causality is not given, it follows that for Kant, causality is only our mode of constituting an object as the terminus of universal and necessary judgements. [237] Causality is not something given, but something produced by the understanding in the order of knowing, in order for us to know. Causality is not a mode of producing things, but a mode of judging objectively about them. This is the dawn of all transcendental idealism.

But as I see it, this entire discussion rests upon two fundamental ideas, to wit, that the “what for” or “why” is causality, and that causality is not given in our sentient apprehensions. Now, both of these ideas are ultimately false.

Above all, the “what for” or “why” is not causality; it is functionality. And functionality, as we have already seen, is not dependence of one thing upon another, but the very structure of the field of reality. The “what for” is not an originating or productive influence; it is only the mode by which something is really what it is. At most, causality would be a mode of functionality; that is not our problem. But it is not the only mode, nor even the primary one, because functionality is not causal dependence. If I say that in a gas, the product of the volume and pressure equals the temperature multiplied by a constant, this does not mean that volume, pressure, and temperature are linked as causes. What, in this case, would the causes be? The question does not make sense. The only thing affirmed here is the functionality of the three terms. And this functionality includes the three at once. We are not dealing with a case of one term dependent upon another, but functionality as field structure. And physical laws are primarily laws of functionality. In the example cited, we have Gay-Lussac’s law. Science does not have causes as its object but functional “what for’s” or “why’s”. The “what for?” or “why?” is not, then, necessarily causality. [238] It is formally worldly functionality, i.e., the functionality of the real qua real. As I see it, in this problem it is necessary to replace the notion of cause by the more general notion of functionality of the real qua real.

This is all the more so given that the Aristotelian notion of cause is somewhat restricted. Permit me to explain. Aristotle understood by ‘cause’ that which produces a distinct entity. When he wishes to explain the causality of a cause he introduces the now classic distinction of the four causes: efficient, final, material, and formal. Now if, from this point of view, we consider as an example the counsel which one person gives another, it is not clear into
which of these four types of cause this case falls. It seems clear to us that a shove, however modest, falls under efficient causality. But on the other hand, if we try to apply the idea of the four causes to an act of advising a friend, we are struck by grave doubts about the possible type of causality of the advice. This points up the fact that Aristotle’s celebrated theory of causality is strictly formed around “natural” realities. Aristotle’s causality is a theory of natural causality. As I see it, one must rigorously introduce a theory of personal causality, next to Aristotle’s natural causality. I emphasized this point most recently in my course given at the Gregorian University in 1973. Personal causality is of a very different kind than natural causality. Thus the two type of causality are not univocal but at best analogous. In virtue of this it is necessary to introduce a theory of causality which is both natural and personal, within a broader conception, that of the functionality of the real qua real. Because of this I pointed out in Part II that one cannot metaphysically refute occasionalism, but I left aside the question of human actions. The fact of the matter is that the personal type of causality, even though very in-depth, does not enter into natural causality. The distinction between agent, actor, and author of human actions does not figure in the Aristotelian theory of causality. To be the author of an action is not just to produce it, and no more. It is more, much, much more than some occasionalist functionality. But it is not, on account of this, a strict cause in the Aristotelian sense; it is, strictly speaking, something quite above all Aristotelian causality.

Moreover, is it true that the “what for” or “why” is not given in this sensible apprehension? This is the second of the two fundamental ideas which it is necessary to examine in this problem. Since Aristotle, philosophy has understood that sensing, as a mode of apprehension of things, is comprised of impressions in which what is apprehended is only the so-called ‘sensible qualities’. Now, as I see it, this is not correct. The senses sense qualities, but they sense them as real, and therefore as functional in the impression of reality.

Granting this, the conceptions of Hume and Kant turn out to be false from the start.

Hume thinks that the “what for” or “why” is causality, and that causality is never given in sensible apprehension. But this is quite ambiguous, because sensible apprehension is not just apprehension of quality but apprehension of a mode of reality, of formality, i.e., it is an act of sentient intellection. And one of the modes given in impression is the mode of reality as “toward”. Now, in this mode we are given, as we have seen, functionality. In virtue of this, the functionality of the field real is given in intellecual sensing. The “succession” to which Hume appeals is not the succession of two impressions, but an impression of successive reality. Therefore the succession is already a mode of functionality. Now, functionality in its worldly “toward” is just the “for”. The “for” is then something given. What is never given, and which must be sought—almost invariably with little success—is the “what” of that by which the field and its contents is as it is. But the “for” as such is given in human sensing, in the impression of reality. All of Hume’s critique, I repeat, is based upon the idea of sensing as mere apprehension of qualities. And this is wrong: sensing is “also” impression of reality. In virtue of this, there is no sensing “and” intelligence, but only sentient intelligence. Therefore Hume’s critique is radically false, as false as Aristotle’s conception of the matter. Aristotelian causality is not given; neither is any originating influence. But what is given, and formally so, is the functionality of the real qua real. To summarize: (1) The object of knowledge is not causes but “what for’s” or “why’s”; (2) They are “what for’s” insofar as they are “for”; and (3) this “for” does not concern knowledge but sensed reality qua actualized in sentient intellection.

This same idea comprises the introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Causality, he tells us, is not given in any sensorial impression; in virtue of this, it is above all a synthesis of impressions. But it is a synthesis whose function is to make objective knowledge possible, i.e., the universal and necessary judgement, and in this sense causality constitutes an a priori of knowing. It is, as Kant says, a synthetic a priori judgement. Now, this is untenable for the same reason as Hume’s critique: at bottom there is the absence of the idea of sentient intelligence. What is sensed is never a mere sensible quality, but the sensible quality in its reality in impression; and to this impression of reality there pertains, intrinsically and formally, its functionality. One of those modes of impression of reality is the “toward”. The “toward” is a sensed mode. This mode is not, therefore, a synthesis, but rather pertains to the very structure of the formality of reality in impression. It is a moment of sensing itself, in each quality. In virtue of it functionality is a sensed moment and one given in each impression. Each real sensed quality is sensed in and by itself as something functional. Sensed functionality is not synthesis but the structural respectivity of each quality by virtue of being real. Hence functionality is not something which primarily concerns objective judgement; rather, it pertains to sensing itself, to the impression of reality. As such, it is not something a priori of the logical apprehension of objects, but a mo-
ment given in the sentient impression of reality. Causality is not the formal object of knowledge, only functionality is so. And as such, it is not a synthetic a priori judgement, because it is not a judgement at all (rather it is the sensed “toward”); nor is it synthetic (the “toward” is not synthesis but a mode of reality); nor is it a priori (but something “given” in the impression of reality). It is the functionality of the real, qua real, given in the impression of reality.

In summary, the object of knowledge is the “what for” or “why” experienced as “for”, i.e., worldly functionality. And this “for” is something given sentiently in the impression of reality qua “for”. What is sought is the “what” of the “for”. And this is just the problem of science. Science does not comprise a system of judgements but is the experience of the worldly “what” as such.

We have then examined what experience is, and what is the [242] corresponding experienced object. Let us now investigate the third question which I enuntiated: the modes of experience.

C) Modes of experience. We have seen that experience is not mere sensing, either as sensible perception or as empeiria; rather, it is that same sensing but insofar as in it the testing of the freely constructed “could be” is brought about. It is ultimately the testing of a “could be” in a “for”. And this experience, thus conceived, is what may have different modes; they are modes of testing. We are not now trying to determine what these modes are, but to conceptualize in what this modalization as such consists.

Now, experience is the terminal moment of method. Method, as we saw, has three phases: establishment of a system of reference, sketching of possibilities, and experience. This experience has different modes, i.e., there are different modes of physical testing of reality. And as testing is always a function of the system of reference and of the possibilities of the “could be” which we are sketching out, it follows that the modes of experience, as modes of testing, comprise the diversity of methods as such. Therefore I shall treat of the modes of experience as modalizations of method, i.e., as modalizations of the way of access from field reality qua reality to in-depth reality.

The first moment of the method is the establishment of the system of reference. This system of reference is the field of reality. And this field, as we have already seen, is not just a field of real perceived qualities, but of perceived realities in all of their fullness, whether or not they are elemental qualities. These realities are of different categorial natures as much for what concerns the categories of reality [243] as for what concerns the categories of their intellective actualization. Field intellection not only intellectively knows reality actualized “in” sentient intellection, but also the “re”-actualization in the form of a judgement. For its part, the actualized real in these two forms has its own categories of reality. As I said, the categories of thing, person, life, societal living, historical unfolding, etc., are not the same. The categorial nature of the field of reality is quite rich. It is not constituted by a unique category but by a great categorial diversity within its actualization as well as its reality. And in accordance with each category, things are present in all of their great variety.

Reality, actualized categorially according to an “in” and according to a “re-”, is projected upon the base of the worldly ground, and then acquires the character of an “ob”. The “ob” is not separation but rather a pointing to the ground. And as the categories of reality of field things are quite varied, it follows that the formal character of the “ob” is equally quite varied. The objectuality of a thing is not the same as the objectuality of a person, of a life, etc. There are many modes of being an object because there are many modes of actualization of the real in an “ob”. Hence, wherever one looks, the field of reality is multi-form. And as this field is just the system of reference of what is actualized in the “ob”, it follows that by its own nature the system of reference is not univocal but constitutively plural. The system of reference is determined ultimately by the nature of the “ob”, by the mode in which the field real is object. And this mode is what makes of field reality a canonical principle. The determination of a canonic principle is constitutively modal. Hence the [244] establishment of the system of reference is inexorably modalized. Each type of reality and of actualization constitutes a possible mode of referential system. In its very root, then, method is formally modalized. And these different modalities constitute an ambit of free choice. Depending on whether one adopts one or another reference system, the road embarked upon, the meta of the methodos, will always be a “way”, an opening of a path, but of a different “mode”. And this is essential. It is not the same to have “things” as a system of reference as to have “persons”, or other types of field reality. The knowledge of the whole field as a worldly moment will be completely different in the two cases. Ultimately, each type of knowledge, as we have already said, has its own categories and its own ways. This diversity of modes of actualization, I say, is the terminus of free choice. Only by a free choice do some field things take on the character of canonic principle. The modalization of objectuality grounds, by free choice, the modalization of the canonic principle constituting the system of reference.
But modalization also affects the other two moments of method, the sketching of possibilities, and the physical testing of reality.

The second moment of method, in fact, is the sketching of possibilities. A sketch is, as we have already seen, the conversion of the field of the real into a system of reference in order to intellectively know sentiently and actively the “could be” of the ground of the field. Clearly, every sketch is based upon sentient intellection of possibility, i.e., is based upon a suggestion. But a suggestion is a sketch only when it is the suggestion of activity of sentient intellection. And this activity of sketching is the free construction of real possibilities, [245] of the “could be”. Only as a system of possibilities sketched out based upon a system of reference can we intellectively know the field real as a moment of the world. Now, the system of reference is just that: a system of reference. The sketch constructed upon this reference, by being a free construction, can therefore have quite different modal characteristics. Above all it can be a sketch of possibilities in conformity with what is already determined in field intellection by its own representative content. For example, it may be a system of bodies linked by the laws of Newtonian mechanics, or a system of vital forces, or a system of personal agents, etc. But it is not necessary that this always be the character of the sketch. I can, in fact, sketch a system of possibilities not in conformity with field reality but in fact contrary to it, e.g. a system of particles which are mechanically indeterminate, or a system of persons that is “fatally” determined. Then the sketch has not the character of conformity, but a character of contrariety with respect to the system of reference. Between the two modes one finds the extremely rich gamut of sketches which are not contrary to field reality, but merely diverse with respect to it. This diversity in turn can have the character of mere difference within the plane of possibilities offered in the system of reference, as for example when it was initially thought that in wave mechanics one was dealing with a classical wave equation. But the diversity can also have the character of going beyond the possibilities of the system of reference, for example when Einstein defined his law by means of the proportionality of Ricci’s tensor and of mass-energy, which went beyond the difference between classical gravity and inertia. Ultimately, this is what takes place in [246] quantum mechanics, whose equations go beyond the difference between wave and particle. Whether one deals with conformity, contrariety, or diversity (differential or a going beyond), the sketch has thereby acquired an essentially modal character. The modalization of objectualization inexorably implies this modalization of the sketch of possibilities. Each mode of objectualization opens different modalities of sketching. And as the objectualization is in itself something modal, it follows that the method acquires, in its second phase, a modalization of second degree, so to speak.

Hence it follows that the third moment of method, the physical testing of reality, i.e., the experience of the “for”, is essentially modal. It is a modalization of third degree. We are not dealing with different ways of making experiences within the categorial, but the different modes of experiential intellection of the real in its sketch. These modes depend upon the two modalities which we have examined: the modalization of objectuality (the different modes of the “ob”) and the modalization of the sketch itself (the different modes of the “could be”).

The physical testing of reality, i.e., experience, is very different in the modal sense. There are sketches of possibilities which in a certain way come to mind. And at that point, the physical testing of reality has a quite precise modal character. Every method is the “way” [via] from the field in “ob” toward what, in the worldly sense, “could be”. Now, when we say that this “could be” comes to mind, it is something which we encounter when we objectualize the field in “ob”; this is the ob-vious. Many of the great rational intellections have been accomplished with this modal character of being obvious. Thus, it was obvious that field reality was worldly and obeyed Newton’s laws. [247] ‘Obvious’ means something that jumps out at us. Therefore it does not lose its character of obviousness. It was so obvious that atoms were regulated by Newtonian mechanics that no one was able to think otherwise about it. It would only have appeared as something ‘obvious’ had someone cast doubt upon it. And until the third decade of this century, no one did. Only at that moment did it seem that this fact was obvious, but nothing more than obvious.

Obviousness is a mode of experientiation. But there are other quite different modalities. All of them have the common characteristic of not being obvious. The “ob” does not always simply lead us to the terminus of the path [via]; rather, it generally only opens to us a difficult road toward it. The “ob” is presented as something successively more difficult to pass; it is not the obvious but the difficult. The difficult is not obvious, it is just viable. And precisely in order to probe this viability, we resort to an experience, a physical testing of a rich and complex reality. The viability is, with respect to the obviousness, the second great modal difference of experience.

This experience of the viable can assume different modes in turn:

a) Above all, the field real can be physically tested in
a way which consists in forcing it to show its in-depth nature to the one experiencing. The physical testing of reality then consists in what we call an experiment. Not every experience is an experiment, but experiment is always the first mode (first in my exposition) of experience. What is an experiment? An experiment rests in principle upon the whole of the field real. This field reality comprises not only “things” (in the inanimate sense), but also living beings (regardless of their real nature), and even men. I can experiment with [248] everything in the field, i.e., I can force everything in the field to show me its reality. The experiment has three essential moments. It is in the first place a provocation of reality. In the second, it is a provocation from a sketch of possibilities. And finally, it is a sketched out provocation, but as a mode of intellection. However natural this third moment seems, it is necessary to stress it because the first two moments might lead one to think that an experiment consists in a manipulation of reality. This manipulation exists, but experiment does not consist in that. The experiment consists in intellectually knowing, in a manipulative way, the real. This intellection is not added to the manipulation; rather, the manipulation itself is a mode of intellection. Hence the concepts elaborated in this intellection are, as I have already said, formally experimental concepts or formally conceptual experiments. Therefore experimentation does not formally consist in a manipulation, but in a mode of intellectually knowing the real in a manipulative way. It is intellection in manipulation, not intellection of what is manipulated. Hence the discontinuity between observation and experimentation, which is so often stressed, disappears. To be sure, I cannot manipulate the stars, but I can study them experientially from a sketch of intellection possibilities. And in this formally intellectional sense, every observation is an experiment. The observation is not a passive registering of events. Therefore—and in this merely intellectional sense—what is experimented upon in an experiment is something “made intelligible”. It is a thing “made” or factum in a double sense: in the participial sense (of being something which is the terminus of a making or doing) and in the nominal sense (of being a fact as actuation of the real). The formal object of this element is therefore a “fact”. [249] There is no experimental fact which is disconnected from the intervention of the experimenter; every experiment is a provocation of the real. What happens is that this intervention can assume different modal characteristics in turn. It can be an intervention which forces reality to show itself such as it is with complete independence from our intervention: this is the “fact” of classical physics. But it can happen that the very intervention of the experimenter pertains to the content of the fact. In such case the fact is real, there is no doubt of it, but it is not totally independent of the experiment itself; this is the case, for example, with the experiments of quantum mechanics. We are not dealing with intervention of a knowing subject (qua knowing) into known reality, as Heisenberg thought, but with an intervention of the experimental “manipulation” in the content of what is experimented; it is a manipulating intervention. The fact is actualized in sentient intellection although it may not be independent of the manipulation. In any case, the experiment is an experience of reality as fact in the sense already explained. And these facts can be not just physical but also biological or human; I can experiment with men or with living beings.

b) There is another mode of experience which consists, not in making a thing show us its own nature by some provocation of ours, but in the attempt to be present, so to speak, at the vision of the real achieved based on its own interiority. To be sure, the merely material reality of an atom or molecule is not viable in this form; but it is something possible and real when dealing with living realities and above all human realities. This being present is grounded upon an installation of the one experiencing in [250] the experiential; it is what I call compenetration. Life in general, and above all human life, is subject to the physical testing of reality, not just as an experimental fact, but as reality in compenetration. Naturally we are not dealing with some physical penetration, but of being compenetrated with what makes one experience. It is what is expressed upon saying, for example, that someone sees through the eyes of another. It is a type of perikhoresis, not of reality but of the modes of actuating, and of conducting oneself. It is a difficult operation; one always runs the risk of projecting the nature of the one experiencing upon what is experienced. But be that as it may, this is an authentic mode of rational intellection, an authentic mode of physical testing of reality. Compenetration is a rigorous mode of experience. To be sure it is not experiment; but without excluding experiment, compenetration actualizes, in a worldly way, the real in the intellection of the one experiencing. There is no better knowledge of a person than that which is achieved by being compenetrated with him. And this extends to all of the dimensions of human life. Moreover, it extends to merely animal life and up to a certain point, to vegetable life as well. When all is said and done, we describe the life of an animal by realizing with some difficulty the experience of compenetrating with it given the limits of its biological constitution. I said that this extends to all dimensions of human life. Thus, for example, leaving aside the problem of its truth, there is, as a mode of physical testing of reality, a strict historical experience. For an
Israelite of the first century before Christ, everything which happened to his people was but a series of episodes of an historical experience of Yahweh’s alliance with Israel, to the point that, as is well known, it was the unique way which led Israel to the idea of Yahweh as creator of the world. \([251]\) This is the Pentateuch. Compenetration here adopts the form of a great historical experience. In it, to be sure, one does not experience Yahweh in Himself, but one knows what Yahweh is in His people by being compenetrated with Him. Israel is not only the people in whose history the prodigious actions of Yahweh have taken place, but a people whose whole history, even in the commonest happenings and day-to-day events, formally consists in being the historical experience of Yahweh. The same can be said, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, of sociological knowledge.

c) There is still another type of physical testing of reality. There are, in fact, postulated realities. These realities have not been postulated by some simple occurrence, but by the suggestion of field reality. Mathematical reality is not a part or moment of field reality; it has nothing to do with this latter by virtue of its content. But this new reality, \textit{qua} reality, would not be postulated if reason did not already move in field reality \textit{qua} reality. It is this physical reality \textit{qua} reality which constitutes that about which the content is postulated. Therefore what is postulated is not postulated about truth, but about the content of reality in postulation. Here, field reality \textit{qua} reality is a system of reference by which reality itself has a content independent of its field content. And this independence is just a referential mode, the mode of my referring to field reality “independently”. This independence compels us to sketch a free system of postulates or axioms (I need not now discuss the difference between them). These postulates are then the postulated determination of the content of reality, a reality numerically identical with field reality \textit{qua} reality. They constitute, by postulation, the \([252]\) sketch of the content of the new reality. We are not talking about truths which I state freely, but of real characteristics which I sketch freely. Postulation is a mode of realization of content, not a mode of affirmation. In virtue of this, when I logically deduce necessary consequences (including necessary and sufficient consequences) from these postulates, the conclusion has two essentially different moments. To be sure, they are inseparable up to a certain point (I shall forthwith tell what that point is), but they are never formally identical. The first moment is the only one which is generally designated clearly because it is of greater apparent relief; this is the moment by which the affirmation is a necessary conclusion from the axioms, from what has been postulated. But it is not the only moment; there is another. And it is essential to point out that other moment forcefully. When I say, in the conclusion of an argument, that \(A = B\), I do not simply pronounce the truth of my affirmation, but a real property of the mathematical object. If one wishes to speak of “seeing”, I see in the conclusion not only that I have to necessarily affirm that \(A = B\), but that I see that \(A\) “is really” \(B\) with necessity. This moment is not simply a moment of truthful intellection, but of apprehensive intellection of mathematical reality as such. What happens is that I see this reality as something which necessarily must be seen as such. It is the physical necessity which leads me to see reality in its logical necessity; but the logical necessity in and by itself is not reality. If an intelligence were to intelligently know, in an exhaustive way, the law of gravitation, it would not be limited to seeing in the movement of a body something which must occur thus in truth; besides this necessity, and just on account of it, it would see the real movement of the body. And this same thing happens with \([253]\) mathematical reality. I do not just succeed in deductively determining what is understood as \(A\) must be \(B\), but also in seeing that the \textit{very reality} of \(A\) is necessarily being \(B\). If this were not the case, mathematics would be a pure logic of truths. And that is impossible because mathematics is a science of reality. So much so, indeed, that Gödel demonstrated (as I have often remarked) that what is postulated has properties which are not deducible from the postulates nor can they be logically refuted by them. The fact is, as I see it, that they are real properties of mathematical reality, and their apprehension independent of the postulates is a point in which the apprehension of reality does not coincide with logical intellection. In every mathematical method there is, then, a double moment: the moment of necessary truth of an affirmation, and the moment of apprehension of reality. One’s necessarily affirming that reality is thus is not opposed to the fact that the moment of reality is formally distinct from the logical necessity of my affirmation. To be sure, they are two moments of a single, unique act; but as moments they are different. And in them the moment of logical necessity is not primary because the postulates in turn do not consist in logical affirmations but in postulations of the content of reality. It is reality, then, which has the first and last word in all mathematical intellection.

These two moments, the moment of truth and the moment of apprehension of reality, nonetheless have an intrinsic unity. It is what I call \textit{testing-together} [comprobar] or \textit{verifying}. As I see it, verification does not consist in verifying if my affirmation is verified; that does not need to be verified in mathematics. What is verified is not the truth of my affirmation but the very presence of
reality \((254)\) apprehended through a way of logical deduction. It is the testing or verifying of reality through the “together” of truth. Truth is not verified, but rather reality in its truth; we apprehend “reality in truth”. This might make it seem that the method has consisted of a reasoning process. But this is not true because all reasoning processes depend upon something prior to the reasoning itself, upon the postulation of the content of reality. Method is a path into postulated reality, an oriented path in accordance with logical rigor. But if this demonstrative rigor, by being impossible, did not lead us to apprehend the reality of \(A\) as “being” \(B\), we would not have mathematics. The unity of the two moments of the intellec-
tion of postulated reality is, then, what we call ‘verification’. The physical testing \([probación]\) of reality is now verification \([com-
probación]\). Here we have the essence of what, paradoxically, but very exactly, should be called the ‘experience of the mathematical’. The mathematical is the terminus of a physical testing of reality, of experience.

To be sure, there are postulated realities which are not mathematical; they constitute the ambit of the reality of fiction. But I need not insist upon them because however they are seen, they have the two moments of internal coherence of the feigned, and of apprehension of its reality in fiction. They are, in this sense, the terminus of verification, in explicit form.

Every postulated reality has, then, a mode of experience its own, verification.

d) But there is still another mode of experience, the mode which concerns the nature of my experiencing my own reality. It is the experience of myself.

Above all, What does ‘experience of myself’ mean here? To be sure, we are not dealing with the mere apprehen-
sion of my reality; that happens, as we have already seen, due to sentient intellec-
tion \((255)\) of a general sense of corporeal existence. Nor are we dealing with a mere affirmation of what I am or am not in reality, i.e., with a mere judgement of field intellec-
tion. To say that what I really am in the field of my violent reactions, perhaps being a timid person, is not a rational intellec-
tion of what I am as wordly reality. We are dealing, then, not with a mere apprehension of my reality, nor with a judgement of what I am in reality, but with an intellec-
tion of what my reality is as a form of reality, i.e., with a rational intellec-
tion, with knowledge. This form of reality has the two moments of being a mode of reality proper \(qua\) reality; it is the moment through which I intellec-
tively know that I am a person. But there is a second moment which constit-
tutes not so much a mode of reality as a modulation, a mode of that mode of reality; it is what I call ‘personality’, as opposed to merely being a person, which I call ‘per-
soneity’. Thus, for example, I can say that a person is a good or bad person, because he really has this or that set of qualities which modalize his personality. To intellec-
tively know this it does not suffice to point out that now he acted well, or that now he does not give in to temptations. It is necessary to transcend the order of actions and even temptations, in order to go to the mode by which he is, ultimately, this person.

This is something which I need to investigate. As St. Augustine said, \(quaestio mihi factus sum\), I have be-
come a question for myself. For this knowledge I need a method, a way that in the reality in which I already am, I am led to my own formal in-depth reality in a physical probing of my own reality. We are dealing with a way by which I achieve, in myself, the discernment of some \((256)\) modalities of reality as opposed to others. This is achieved in the physical probing of my own reality, in an experience of myself. As the probing that it is, this experi-
ence consists in an insertion, into my own reality, of a sketch of possibilities (perhaps of something unreal) of what I am. The experience of myself is a knowledge of myself.

The idea that experience of myself as a mode of re-
ality consists simply in a type of report or examination of my own reality is chimical. By intrinsic necessity, every exami-
nation of myself is oriented and inscribed in a system of reference. When one speaks of a confession of himself, the concept of confession is not necessarily univocal. What St. Augustine understood by confession is not the same as what Rousseau understood by it. For St. Augustine, to confess to oneself is to know, to have an experience of what I am in my in-depth reality with re-
spect to a very precise system of reference, viz. the refer-
ence to what God has realized in me and I in God. On the other hand for Rousseau, confession is the knowledge of what I am “naturally”; the system of reference is now na-
ture. God and nature are here two systems of reference among many others, without which there could never be any confession.

This system of reference leads to a sketch of what I ultimately am. For example, it might be the sketch of a certain vocation: Do I or do I not have that vocation?

For this I need to probe the insertion of this sketch (in the foregoing example, of this vocation) into my own reality. Ultimately there is no more than a single physical probing of this insertion, viz. trying to conduct myself by intimately appropriating what has been sketched. That insertion can be positive or \((257)\) negative. The insertion is then an attempt at appropriating to myself something
along the lines of the sketch of possibilities which I have wrought. *Self-appropriating* is the radical mode of experience of oneself, the radical physical probing of my own reality. To know oneself is to probe oneself in self-appropriation. There is no abstract “know thyself”; I can only know myself along the lines of this or that sketch of my own possibilities. Only the sketch of what I “might be” inserted into me as self-appropriation, only this constitutes the form of knowing oneself. Clearly, it is a appropriation in the order of actualization of my own reality. This discernment of oneself is a difficult operation; it is discernment in probing and self-appropriation.

In summary, then, there are four fundamental modes of experience: experimentation, compenetration, verification, and appropriation. They are not methods like the physical, psychological, sociological, historical, and other “methods”; rather, they are modes of methodic intellection, i.e. modes by which we intellec-tively know, by means of a way, the real, regardless of what the “methods” may be in the usual sense of the word. Every “method” can imply various of these “modes”. The unity of the modes is not, then, the unity of “a” method, but something more radical and fundamental, viz. the unity of experience. In virtue of it we say that men have much or little experience, i.e., that they have realized, to a different degree, the physical probing of what reality ultimately is.

With this we have examined the two primary moments of the structure of knowing: objectualization and method. It is now necessary to tackle the more important theme relating to our problem: the truth of our knowledge of the depths of the real.
RATIONAL TRUTH

Rational intellection, i.e., knowledge, is a search going beyond the field to its ground, that is, toward what “could be” as worldly reality. In this search the field takes on the character of object, and the search itself is a way, an opening of a way to discovering the ground, a method which is based upon the field reality as a system of reference with respect to which the intelligence sketches a system of possibilities that ultimately one tries to subject to a physical probing of reality in that intellective moment which constitutes experience. In this experience, rational intellection finds that reality coincides or does not coincide with the sketch of possibilities. This encounter is the truth of rational intellection; the opposite is error. In what follows, unless the contrary is indicated, I shall only speak of truth; error can only be understood with respect to truth. And truth as encounter is the essential part of rational intellection. What is this truth, i.e., what is the truth of reason? We need to determine, then, the essence of the encounter. And that will lead us to discover the major characteristic of the intrinsic structure of knowing. The problem of the truth of reason thus unfolds in three successive steps:

1. What is the truth of reason as encounter?
2. What is its formal essence?
3. What is its intrinsic structural moment?

I

THE TRUTH OF REASON

Let us take a few steps back, to the beginning of our investigation. Intellection, I said, is the mere actualization of the real in intelligence. This reality can be considered under two aspects. I can consider reality as a formality proper to a thing itself; this is the problem of reality. But I can also consider reality qua actualized in intellection. Then the actualized real is just truth. Truth is, then, the real itself qua actualized in intellection. It is the real itself which confers its truth upon intellection. I have called this giving of truth truth-making. And this truth-making has, as we have seen, different modalities. Above all, reality (unless otherwise indicated, I shall employ ‘reality’ and ‘real’ as equivalent in our problem) can be actualized in and by itself in its naked reality. The real makes truth in accordance with its own otherness of reality. Throughout this study, I have called that mode of actualization real truth. It is the radical, primary, and essential form of truth as such, the mere being actually present of the real in intellection.

But there are other forms of truth-making. The real, in fact, is not actualized only in and by itself; it is actualized as real but with respect to other real things. The real, then, makes truth, but it gives truth not only to the intellection of the real itself but to that intellection in which one intellectionally knows the real thing among other things of field reality. Real truth is a simple truth, not in the sense of uncomplicated or elemental, but in the sense that there is simply “one” reality, however complicated it may be, yet one which is intellectionally known in and by itself indivisibly. The other form of truth-making constitutes dual truth, because there is the real thing and some other respect in which the real thing is intellectionally known. The intellective actualization of the real thing is now dual. In it the two moments of the intellection of the real should coincide unitarily in the unity of actualization of the thing. The real thing makes truth, but in coincidental form. All dual truth is essentially a coincidental truth, a coincidence between real truth of a thing and the intellection of this thing “from others”.

This coincidental truth can in turn have three essential characteristics. In the first place, it can be a coincidence of the real and of a simple apprehension. Then we say that the real is authentically this or that; for example, that it is authentic wine, because there is a coincidence between the liquid which I am really apprehending and the simple apprehension of the wine. The real makes truth here in that form of giving dual truth which is authenti-

But in the second place, it can deal with a coincidence between the real and the mode in which the real must be understood with respect to the field, i.e., a coincidence between the field real and its affirmative intellection. The real now makes truth like something which dictates or pronounces its truth. Its truthifying is veridical. Intellection is then a conformity more or less adequate of what is affirmed and the field real.

But there is still a third form of coincidental truth not usually distinguished from the previous ones. In it, the field real is formally actualized not in an act (either
apprehensive or affirmative, but in an activity of worldly searching. The coincidence is then an [261] encounter or finding in the field real of that which is sought in the world, to wit, of its ground. Coincidental truth is now truth in finding. The real is actualized and makes truth in the form of a finding. To be sure, this truth contains authenticity and veridictance, just as veridictance contains authenticity. But this intellection in finding is not just authenticity or veridictance; rather, it formally consists in being authenticity and veridical in finding. And this finding is an irreducible mode of truth because it is not a moment extrinsic to intellection; rather, it pertains to it intrinsically and formally. All truth of affirmation in fact has an intrinsically and formally dynamic character, as we saw. But the third type of truth which we are studying is not simple dynamism; rather, this dynamism has its own character, that of dynamism of inquiry, or in progression. The inquiry, and therefore the finding, then pertain intrinsically and formally to truth in encounter. St. Augustine tells us (De Trin., IX,1): “Let us seek like those who have not yet found, and we shall find like those who have yet to seek, because when a man has finished something, he has but begun.” Now, this expresses not only a limitation which in fact human knowledge possesses. It also expresses something much more serious, viz. the formal character of knowing proper to it. The limitation of knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is something derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of rational intellection, from knowing as such, since it is inquiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is formally inquiring, only because of this must one always seek more and, finding what was sought, have it become the principle of the next search. [262] Knowledge is limited by being knowledge. An exhaustive knowledge of the real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of the real without necessity of knowledge. Knowledge is only intellection in search. Not having recognized the intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as inquiry is what led to straying with respect to this third form of truth, and to subsuming all truth under the truth of affirmation. That is not the case; inquiry is a mode of intellection, the mode of rational intellection; and truth is not only conformity but also encounter. It is not the same thing to affirm something about what is in the field as to encounter what which is in the field is in the worldly sense. It is not the same to intellectually know what something is “in reality” as to know what something is in reality “itself”. The difference is that between conformity and encounter. And as what is encountered is or is not what is sought, it follows that the real now has a mode of making truth which is its own, its own mode of actualization; this is verification. Verification is the proper and exclusive form of the truth of rational intellection.

Authentication, the veridical, and verification: these are the three forms of dual truth, of coincidental truth. The truth of reason, and only it, is verification.

He we have the first step of our investigation, that of determining in what the truth of reason, the truth of encounter, consists: the truth of reason is verification. But this leads to a second step, i.e., to asking ourselves in more detail what the formal essence of encounter is, what the formal essence of verification is. As this encounter takes place in experience, the formal essence of verification is but the problem of the truth of experience.

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II

THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IN ENCOUNTER

The truth of reason consists, then, in the real making truth in the form of verification. The truth of reason is encounter, but not a haphazard type of encounter such as a collision with reality or a stumbling upon it. Rather, it is the encounter with something which is sought. This search is not some flailing about in a vacuum, so to speak, but the search for something which has already been intelligently mapped out. The encounter as such is verification. In order to determine that in what, essentially, truth in encounter consists, we must pose three questions: What is verification? What is the formal structure of verification? And In what does the order of rational truth consist?

1st Question. What is verification? Verification is clearly encountering or finding something which one is already seeking. To understand what verification is, let us proceed, as in so many other problems, step by step.

Above all, let us recall what it is which is sought, and that is the ground of the field real as a moment of the world, i.e., of the respectivity of the real qua real. This fundament is intellectively known in a sketch of possibilities of what the real “could be” in the worldly sense. What one seeks is then, formally what has been sketched out as real.

This encounter takes place in the real by submitting it to a physical testing of reality, to experience. As what is sought is something sketched, it is clear that the encounter consists not in being a mere manifestation, but in being the fulfillment of what was sketched out. Encounter is fulfillment of a sketch. We are not dealing with some
mere conformity, [264] more or less adequate, with the real; rather, we are dealing with the intellection of the real as realization of a sketch. This is the fulfillment of what “could be” in what “really is”. Fulfillment is the mode proper to inquiring intellection.

Fulfillment is the mode in which the real makes truth in intellection, viz. fulfilling what has been sketched out. And it is because of this that the fulfillment has verification for its own essence. Verification is a “making true”, verum facere. And this requires a special reflection.

In the first place, what is this facere, this making or doing? The facere is not, here, a poiesis, nor is it a praxis, or an agere, because what the facere designates here is not an actuation but an actualization. We are dealing, in fact, with a facere proper to a ground. Now, a ground, as we saw, is what grounds the real with respect to itself, passing formally into what is grounded. We are not dealing with a temporal passing, but one of a merely actual nature. It therefore consists in constituting the real thing itself, in actuality, i.e., it is the intrinsic and formal constitution of the actuality of the thing itself. It is a formally grounding passing. It is here a moment of intellectual actuality of the real. Intellectively knowing itself is now activity, and ultimately, intellectual activity is the actuality of the moment constitutive of the real qua actualized from the depths of itself.

In the second place, what is made in this making is the verum in fulfillment. What is made is the intellectual actuality of the fulfillment itself. It is not, I repeat, a making in the sense of producing or anything like that; rather, it is a making of actuality. And this actuality has its own character—let us say so once again—that of being actuality in fulfillment. If this were not so, we would have simple [265] conformity. And conformity is not, formally, something sought after, but fulfillment is so by virtue of its essence. The real not only “is” actualized, but is actualized as something “grounding”.

In the third place, this facere of the verum not only concerns what is intellectually known, but also the intellection itself qua rational. The verum facere, verification, is a “co-happening” in actuality, a “co-happening” of the constitution of the grounded real and of intellection as the ground. And this “co-” is just the modality of coincidence in rational intellection. Coincidentiality is now “co-happening” or “co-constitution”. Intellecution itself is then grounded qua intellection, which is not only in conformity with the real but also is a conformity grounded qua intellection. Rational intellection has grounded truth.

In the fourth place, it is a coincidence determined by the real itself. Coincidence is a mode of actuality, and as such is actuality of the real. The intellective aspect is, then, grounded upon the real formality of a thing itself. And this unity of actuality, grounded upon the real, is what constitutes the fact that things give us ratio or explanation. The form in which the real makes truth is that facere which consists in giving ratio or explanation. Fulfillment, verification, consists formally in giving ratio. Whence knowledge consists in being the intellection of things insofar as they give us ratio. That formula appeared early in this study of reason; but now we see in what, radically, this giving of ratio consists. Knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, is not a system of propositions, but an intellectual activity in which the real makes truth in its ground; it consists in things giving us ratio or explanation. And [266] science itself as a system is the more or less necessary system of the “giving ratio” of the things which it investigates. In experience, the real is giving us (or taking away from us, which comes to the same thing) ratio. Experience has as an intrinsic and formal moment, that of making truth; and verification is but the giving of ratio, i.e., is the intellectual constitution of the ground as such.

How does the real verify the ratio? A difficult problem. This is the second question which we have posed with respect to verification, viz. the structure of verification.

2nd Question: The formal structure of verification. Verification has a complex character. To analyze it, let us recall what has already been explained.

Above all, verification always has the character of necessity. It is necessary that the real be or not be grounded in something which “could be”. Necessity is a character of verification because it constitutes the character of its own emergence. Then one might be tempted to think that this necessity is independent of experience, because experience only shows us facts. But this, as we have already seen, is false. Experience is inscribed in the impression of reality. And the impression of reality has as a structural moment that of the “toward”. Intellective knowing as “toward” is, then, an intellective necessity, the necessity in accordance with which the real is itself bearing us from the field to the world. It is a datum of the real itself qua real. The necessity of grounding, then, takes place in the necessity of the intellectually known real; it is not just a fact. And this surely leaves open the question of whether this necessity leads to a final positive terminus; this we shall see soon see. But neither is that necessity a merely logical one. We are not dealing with the stating of
{267} some proposition, for example, the principle of causality or of sufficient reason, and trying to make clear that these propositions are evident and hence “must be applied” to the field real. This is, as I see it, untenable, above all because no one has ever been able to state those presumed principles with a univocal formula. So it is not surprising that no one adduces rigorous proofs that they are evident. Hence we are not dealing with application of these principles to field reality. The necessity of going to what is in the world is not a piece of evidence but is given in the intellection of the field real as real. And this functionality, projected upon that to which it impels us in the “toward”, is the very actuality of the “for”; it is a datum and not a necessary judgement. It is a moment of a sentient reason.

But verification does not just have that moment of radical necessity. Verification, by virtue of its nature, must be something possible in principle; this is its character of possibility. This has at times seemed clear. Nonetheless, it is not something clear even with regard to those conceptions for which grounding is a logical necessity, because the fact that it may be necessary to go toward a ground does not mean that, without further ado, it must but possible to find it in either a positive or negative sense. It is necessary, then, to determine the precise point in which the said principle takes place in the real. And that is the question. As I see it, this point is none other than one in which the field real has thrust us from the field to the world; it is just the real and physical identity of the moment of reality in the field and in the world. In virtue of this, if I intelletively know field reality, not as sensed in the field manner, but according to the formality of reality of a field thing, then I am already in the moment of reality which constitutes the third great characteristic of verification. This is the third character, or rather, the third group of characters of verification.

Above all, one must make an essential distinction. We have already seen it, but now it is necessary to set it down because it is here that it acquires its full meaning. The “for” is a “what for” or “why”. And the “what for” or “why” has two moments. One is the moment of the “for” itself. And this is a datum of the impression of reality. The other is the moment of the “what”; that which we force to be the worldly “what” of the field. The first moment does not require verification; only the second does so. How is it verified, how does one find, in the experience of the world, the worldly “what” which we have sketched out? This is the question exactly.

Let us say at the outset that the question which we have just formulated does not have, nor can it have, a univocal answer. Verification is a dynamic moment of rational intellection. Hence it is not a quality which the sketch has or does not have, but the quality of a progression which takes us to a verification. Verification is an essentially dynamic quality; it is always and only to go verifying. And this “to go verifying” is what constitutes experience. It is not the manifestation of a fact. The dynamic character is, together with necessity and possibility, the third great characteristic of verification.

This characteristic has many of its own modes.

In the first place, what is sketched has to be sufficient for grounding what in the field. This is the moment of sufficiency. It is what, from a merely logical point of view, was encapsulated in the idea of sufficient reason—something impossible, as we have seen.

This sufficiency has in turn complex characteristics.

a) Verification consists in what was sketched out having at least confirmable consequences in the field. The sketched-out “what” is not verified in and by itself, but only in its consequences. Immediate verification, if it exists, is quite exceptional. If the consequences are not verified in the field, the sketched-out “what” would not be true. On the other hand, if the qualities of the field are the same as those of what is sketched out, we may say that what is sketched out has verification. I shall forthwith pose a matter for reflection with respect this.

b) There are times when what is sketched out is not something whose consequences are strictly necessary in the field. It might happen that there is at least a concordance between the sketch and the field reality. This is a verification, but of another order than that of the consequences.
c) It might happen that in the process of going to verify, the “could” can show different aspects, each of which taken by itself is not sufficient in any of the two senses explained; but if there are many different aspects, the unity of all of them is nonetheless convergent with respect to the outcome. Then there is a verification by convergence. Although it may seem strange, almost all of our rational intellences, even those most solidly established, have this character of verification by convergence; the more the convergence, the better the verification. This is an essential form of verification. The convergence is not a type of substitute for verification; it is verification in convergence.

Consequence, concordance, and convergence are the three modalities of what I have called ‘sufficiency’. Without sufficiency there is no verification.

But in the second place, verification has another line which is not simply identified with that of sufficiency. The world, in fact, is the respectivity of the real qua real. On the other hand, the field is just what is sensed of the world. Hence reality qua worldly is something much richer than field reality; the world strictly exceeds with respect to the field, and does not just exceed the field with respect to the real things sensed in it. Now, exceeding is a possible line of verification; it is the moment of exceeding of verification, because the sketch of the worldly “what”, in virtue of being worldly, exceeds what is of the field. This means that, in principle, the sketch contains more properties of the real in the field itself than those which are strictly sensed in its mere field intellation. Hence the sketch contains “new” properties of the real. In general, only a rational intellation which leads to the discovery of new verifiable properties has strict scientific value. Thus the electromagnetic theory of light led to the discovery of new properties of light; the relativistic and ondulatory theory of the electron led to the discovery of the first form of antimatter, the positron, etc. Rational intellation does not ground what is of the field except by exceeding it. This is the line of exceeding proper to rational verification.

To be sure, neither the line of sufficiency nor the line of exceedence is absolute verification, but only a progression toward a verification off in the distance. No moment of it, by itself, has absolute value; it is rather a provisional verification. Here ‘provisional’ does not mean that it is going to be rejected or absorbed, because neither rejection nor absorption are formal characteristics of the verifying progression. The strictly formal character of verification does not consist in being opposed to error. The formal character which is of interest to us here is quite precise: it is adequacy. Provisionality consists in but partial inadequacy. The possible rejection or superceding or diversification in verification is formally inscribed in the compass of adequation. It is a characteristic which is intrinsically and necessarily inherent in verification, both with respect to sufficiency and with respect to exceeding. Verification is a “going verifying”. It is not a quality which something has or does not have; but a quality which consists in becoming more adequate to the real. It is the dialectic of adequation. Adequation as limit of dynamism has appeared already in the problem of the truth of judgement. However here we are not dealing with mere dynamism, but with that special dynamism which consists in progression. And then the dynamic intellection takes on, in the progression constituting reason or explanation, its own characteristic: verification in scrutiny. This should not seem strange to us. Human reason is sentient reason. It senses that its progression takes place in reality. And here is the terra firme of that intelllectual progression. But it senses the different states of this progression just like so many other scrutinies. And scrutiny, as we have already seen, is a mode of intellation of the real: the scrutiny of reality gives us reality itself qua scrutinized-reality”; i.e., reality in the mode of the scrutinizable. Sentient reason is, ultimately, reason which moves in scrutiny, and what it scrutinizes is, formally, the adequacy of verification. The dialectic of adequation is progressive scrutiny of verification.

Having reached this point (sufficiency, exceedence, scrutiny), it is necessary to focus our reflection upon these three aspects of verification thus understood.

a) In the first place, the verification of reason has two aspects which must be very carefully distinguished. This is the point to which I alluded previously, and about which I said some reflection is needed. Because, what is it that is verified? What was sketched out is what is verified, something which bears us from the world to the field; it is precisely in this that verification consists. This verification is experience, something quite different, as we said, from sensible perception as from experiment. But then the fact that what has been sketched discharges two functions comes to our attention. On the one hand, reason leads to an affirmation about the field real, an affirmation which can be verified both along the diverse lines of sufficiency as well as along the line of exceeding. Thus, I can verify that the wave “reason” or “explanation” of light leads to interference, which is to be sure verified in experience; and I can verify that the gravitational “reason” or “explanation” of masses leads to certain movements of the stars, something also verified observationally. But what is it which is verified? What is verified is the reality
of the interference and the reality of the movements recorded in celestial mechanics. But the question does not end here, because these same phenomena may be grounded upon principles different than those of the wave theory of light, or the gravitational laws of Newton. And this is, in fact, the case. The photonic theory of light also gives a complete explanation of interference, and the relativistic theory of gravitation likewise gives a complete explanation of celestial movements. Thus it follows that it is one thing to verify, in experience, the fulfillment of what has been sketched, and something quite different to verify that the explanation or reason adduced is the unique and true one. One thing is the verification of what has been predicted or explained, something else the verification of the explanation itself. Now, this latter is not verifiable. One can verify the truth of what is explained or predicted, but one cannot verify the explanation itself which is advanced. If it were possible to verify both in a single experiment, we would have some type of critical experiment, an experimentum crucis. But such experiments practically do not exist. One can demonstrate that quantum mechanics does not contain nor admit hidden parameters, but one cannot demonstrate that only quantum mechanics can give a physical explanation of elementary particles. It is one thing to verify the truth to which reason leads, and something else to verify the explanation itself which leads to these truths. And this latter is not verifiable. There are only two possible exceptions to what I have just said. The first is that the explanation chosen is such that by its own nature it is the only possible one; then the verification of the truth of the explanation would be, at one and the same time, the verification of the explanation of the truth. There is another exception, in a certain way more attainable. It is the case in which the sketch to be verified consists only in the affirmation of the reality of something unknown. That is what happens when reason sketches out, for example, the existence of a nerve cell. The verification (microscopic image) of the reality of this cell verifies the two directions of the explanation. But in general verifying the sketches of reason does not mean verifying the explanation of their truth.

b) In the second place, the immense majority of rational intellections are not absolutely verifiable even in first of the two senses which I just described. Precisely because it is progressive, verification always admits of degrees. In what situation do these gradual verifications arise, i.e., what is the physical testing of reality in the immense majority of cases, not to say in nearly all of our rational intellections? To understand this, it is necessary to point out a very precise character of verification. Verification, as I said, is not necessarily adequate, but adding now that verification is never totally excluded because verification is not a quality which something has or does not have; rather, there is only the ongoing process of verification. Hence the inadequacy does not entail complete abolition of verification. What has been sketched out, precisely because it is more or less adequate, can be more or less verified. This is expressed in a very precise distinction. Adequate verification is verification which in a certain way is total. There is no doubt that then the inquiring intellect encounters the real as the complete fulfillment of what has been sketched out; the real then is, with respect to what has been sketched out, something strictly rational. The way or path which has led us to the real is just the way of the rational. Experience is here experience of the real as rational. But when verification is inadequate, the sketch is not complete. Experience is only the fulfillment of some aspects or moments of what has been sketched out. It is not that what has been sketched out has parts, but that the totality of what has been sketched is more or less firm in the physical testing of the real. And in this sense, what has been sketched is not composed of parts, but of partialities. Of them, some are fulfilled and others not. This partiality is a mode of verification; it is not full verification, but just partial. And this partiality shows that what has been sketched is not the “way” or via of the real, but is something in some way “viable”. Now, rational intellect of the viable, the inadequate fulfillment of what has been sketched in the physical testing of reality, is just what constitutes the reasonable. The reasonable is a mode of the rational; it is not the strict rational, but the viable rational. The reasonable is strictly and formally the viable. There are verifications which are more or less viable than others, more or less reasonable than others. The intellective progression in worldly reality, which in its dynamic phases scrutinizes the real, is in general a progression or experience of the reasonable. Insofar as something is being verified reasonably, it tends constitutively to the strict rational. In the limit of this constitution the explanation or reason of truth and the truth of reason or explanation would coincide. When there is but approximation to this limit these two are only reasonably coincident.

c) Finally, it is necessary to emphasize an essential possibility: that not every sketch is verifiable. To be sure, the progression of reason always takes place in physical reality, whether field reality or worldly reality. But what has been sketched out in this progression may not be verifiable. The “what” of the “what for?” is then like an empty space. What is unverifiable shows reality as empty. The unverifiable has two essentially different aspects. A
sketch can be \[276\] unverifiable in the sense that in the physical testing of reality the real expressly excludes what has been sketched. Then the unverifiable has the sense of refutable. We are not dealing with a logical refutation, but with a negative experience. But there is a second degree of irrefutability, so to speak, and that is what is neither refutable nor irrefutable; this is a suspended experience. What, then, more precisely, is unverifiability? To be sure, negative experience fully enters into the line of verification; it is a strict verification of non-truth. Negative experience is a crucial experience of falsehood. And it is because of this, rigorously speaking that there are no strict negative experiences. The problem thus centers around suspended experience: What is its unverifiability? One might think that it is a suspension originating in the absence of verification. But this is not the case. It is necessary that there be not absence but impossibility of verification. Mere absence would give us the sketch as unverified, but not as unverifiable. The unverifiable is what, by its own nature, is taken away from verification, i.e., from a physical testing of reality. For this the experience of the unverifiability itself is necessary; that is, we need the verification of unverifiability, because the experience in question is not the suspension of experience but a suspended experience. Now, the sketch which we are trying to deal with is not a simple occurrence; it is a sketch articulated in a suggestion. The sketch is born from mere suggestion; it is not identified with mere suggestion but is always positively or negatively articulated in a suggestion. Hence the suspended experience of a sketch means a reduction of the sketch to what has suggested it, a reduction of the sketch to suggestion. But then it is clear that the suspended experience cannot consist in \[277\] not sketching what has been suggested, but in taking the suggestion itself as the source of a new sketch. Then the unverifiable does not close us off from intellec tion; rather, what it does is to open up for us other possible types of verification, a new intellec tion, a progression of a new type. This is the most radical form of the dialectic of reason: the dialectic of verification as such.

Verification is dialectic not only by virtue of its moment of progressive adequacy, but also and more radically by its intrinsic characteristic: it is a progression from the verifiable and the unverifiable toward new sketches. This is the dialectic “suggestion-sketch”. Rational intellec tion is a process of sketching in and from a suggestion, and returning from the sketch to the suggestion for new sketches. It is dialectic of sentient reason. It is not a psychological process but an intrinsic and formal moment of rational intellec tion as such. Indeed it is the very mode of intellec tive knowing, intellec tive knowing in the dialectic progression of “suggestion-sketch”.

With this, we have summarily analyzed the formal structure of verification. Verification has the character of necessity, of possibility, and of dynamism. In itself, verification has a moment of sufficiency (consequence, concordance, convergence) and a moment of exceeding. In both moments it is a verifying process which is more or less adequate, recognizing that verifying the truth of reason or explanation is not the same as reason or explanation of truth, and that verification can adopt the form of the strictly rational or of the reasonable, or even of the unverifiable, as a dialectical moment of intellec tion. Rational intellec tion has the dialectical structure of sentient reason. Naturally, in this distinction, what has already been verified constitutes an essential moment, that of progress. \[278\]

Let us return to the point of departure for this analysis. Verification is the mode by which the real makes truth in the thinking intellec tion. The truth of this intellec tion is rational truth. This truth is the truth of the field real as worldly reality; rational truth is truth which is formally worldly. Hence, rational truth not only is truthful but also constitutes the truth of a world; it is—please excuse the expression—an order. Here ‘order’ is not ordering but a zone or region. What is the order of rational truth? Here we have the third of the three questions which we posed to ourselves in the study of the essence of truth in encounter. The first was, what is verification? The second was, what is the formal structure of verification? Now we pose the third question: in what does the order of rational truth consist?

3rd Question: The “order” of rational truth. Rational truths constitute an order, the order of reason, because reason is the intellec tion which, in its progression, intellec tively knows the field real as a moment of the world. Now, the world is the real as such, and therefore its unity is essentially and formally respective; the world is the respectivity of the real as real. Therefore, every rational truth, by virtue of being worldly, is formally respective. This is the order of reason. If we wish to conceptualize with some rigor what this order is, we must confront at least two serious problems: in the first place, what is the characteristic of this order as “rational”? And in the second, in what does this order as “order” consist?

1. The characteristic of truth qua “rational”. The truth of rational intellec tion qua rational is distinguished, as we have seen, from the truth of field intellec tion. \[279\] The latter concerns real things in the field of reality, whereas rational truth concerns the very world of the real.
And it is necessary to carefully pin down the character of this difference, especially since its mere mention can suggest the difference—classical since Leibniz’ time—between truths of fact and truths of reason.

For Leibniz, a truth of reason is formally and constitutively necessary; it cannot be other than it is, and it is impossible to think the opposite of it. Therefore the truth of reason would be eternal truth. On the other hand, a truth of fact is a truth about something which can be otherwise; its opposite is possible. Therefore it is contingent truth.

But this conception is, as I see it, untenable, even leaving aside the fact that an eternal truth requires an eternal intelligence, which the human intelligence certainly is not. But I repeat, even leaving aside this point, the radical difference is not that between fact and necessity, but between reality in a field and reality in the world, which is something quite different. For Leibniz, truth is always a question of being objective, i.e., of objective concepts; and its being is intellectively known in that form of affirmation which is identity. Truth is always mediated or immediate identity of concepts. Now, this is wrong. Truth is not a question of objective concepts but of reality. And reality is always something primarily and radically given, something merely actualized in intellection. Hence Leibniz’ distinction between truths of fact and truths of reason, between necessary truths and contingent truths, is false.

In the first place, let us consider the so-called ‘truths of fact’. Above all, Leibniz (and on this point, all philosophical tradition [280] before him) fails to distinguish the two types of truth in what he vaguely calls ‘truth of fact’. And this is because there are truths of fact such as, for example, the truth that this book occupies such-and-such space on my table; but there are also truths of fact which concern the structure of cosmic reality, for example, the truth of gravitation. The first are factual truths; the second are what I call factual truths. The cosmos is not a fact but rather a theater, the fact of facts, that in which every fact exists. Certainly it is not something absolutely necessary, but neither is it something properly contingent. Moreover, without delving further into the subject, what is decisive is that both the factic as well as the factual are, for the effects of my intellection, something intellectively known sentiently in the field of reality. The essential point is not that they are contingent (that would be a problem of reality), but that their intellection is of the field. Now, field reality, regardless of how much it may be of the field, and of how much it is sensed, is “reality”. Therefore the so-called ‘truth of fact’ is the truth of field “reality”. Thus reality is intellectively sensed, and what is sensed is so in the formality of reality. We are not, then, dealing with truths of fact but truths of field reality. In what is of the field, reality is given. It is not a question of concepts but of reality. Reality, even if of fact, is not synonymous with contingency; rather, it is the formality of what is apprehended. In virtue of this, reality is not a “mere” fact, but a constitutively necessary formality. In turn, the most necessary truth of the world is in some mode and some form the truth of something sensed in the field manner. Therefore what is sensed does not therefore cease to be intellectively known in necessity.

In the second place, are the presumed truths of reason [281] eternal truths in Leibniz’ sense? Clearly not. Leibniz cites as truths of reason the supreme logical principles (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle), and mathematical truths. But are these truths grounded in nothing other than our mind? No, they are not. They are grounded intrinsically in “given” reality. Mathematical truths are certainly necessary, but their necessity depends upon postulates, and hence upon reality given in and by postulates. Ultimately mathematical truths are anchored in something given. And therefore they could perfectly well be another way. The postulates are, in fact, freely chosen. It would suffice for me to change the postulates, and mathematical truth would be different.

The same thing happens with the supreme logical principles. These principles, in fact, are structural principles of affirmation. And what logic does is to intellectively know affirmation as such. But here a serious error comes up not just in Leibniz but in almost all of philosophy, culminating in Hegel. Indeed, How do I intellectively know the principles of every affirmation? It is usually said, for example, that the principle of non-contradiction regulates the very intellection of every affirmation; that is, that it is the principle not only of affirmation qua something affirmed, but also of intellection itself as an act of affirmation. And this is, as I see it, incorrect. When I intellectively know affirmations as such-and-such affirmations, these affirmations are the thing intellectively known; and these things certainly have a character of non-contradictory necessity, i.e., they have non-contradiction as their structural character. But the question does not end here, because these affirmations, with all their structures including non-contradiction, must be intellectively known by me in a distinct act; otherwise we would have logos, [282] but not logic. Logic is founded in the intellection of the logos as something intellectively known. Now, it is easy to think that this intellection of an affirmation is in turn an affirmative intel-
lection. If this were true, there would be an infinite regress: the principle of non-contradiction of intellectively known affirmations would also be the structural principle of their intellection, and so on ad infinitum. And here, as I see it, is the mistake. The intellection of my affirmation is not, in turn, an affirmative intellection; rather, it is a primordial apprehension, therefore anterior to all affirmations. In more general terms, intellective access to the logos is not in turn a logical access. Hence, for the effects of intellection, the necessity of the principles of affirmation is not in the concepts but in the intellectual reality of my affirmations. This reality is, then, something given and not something conceived. Logical truths are not necessities of concepts but characteristics of given reality. If one cannot think the opposite of them, it is not because their truth is eternal, but because intellectually known reality itself as reality, i.e., affirmation qua affirmed, is what cannot be any other way.

Granting this, the essence of the so-called “truth of reason” is not to be the truth “of reason” but “rational” truth, which is something different. And it is rational truth because it concerns the world of reality (including therein affirmative intellections as acts). Every rational truth is a truth of reality, because it is a truth of worldly reality. And I am including in worldly reality the cosmic itself. To be sure, the world and the cosmos are not identical. The world is the respective unity of the real qua real; the cosmos is the particular respectivity of the worldly real. But for the effects of intellection; cosmos and [283] world coincide; they are that “toward” which field reality directs us. In this “beyond” world and cosmos coincide. Because of this I have here spoken simply of “worldly reality”. One might say that the cosmos as such is not necessary. But that is just what I am saying, that rational truth does not consist in being truth of reason but in being worldly and cosmic truth of the field real. The worldly is not just the cosmos, but the cosmic is formally worldly; it is a particular kind of world. And the field real as a simply worldly moment or as a cosmic moment (i.e., as something factual) is always the terminus of rational truth. Necessity and contingency are not characteristics of truth, but of reality.

Therefore it is not the case that two types of truth exist, viz. truths of reason and truths of fact. Every truth is always just a “truth of reality”. What happens is that this reality is either reality sensed as of the field, or worldly and cosmic reality. But in both cases we are dealing with one and the same reality qua reality. Field reality impels us from itself, in its mode of “toward”, to the worldly; and the worldly is intellectively known in the field real as the finding and fulfilling of a sketch. And this finding is rational truth. It has nothing to do with the idea that the order of rational truths is an order of absolute necessity. My sketch is always a freely constructed sketch. When I seek its verification, it might be that we find it to be unverifiable, and not always because the sketch was false, but because it is not necessarily true that everything real is rationally verifiable. The real might rest upon itself. And then the real enters into the zone of reason but in order not to constitute itself as real there in reason. But this does not invalidate what [284] we have said, because the field real is what leads us to the worldly. And that is good enough. We are not dealing with the case that all of the real qua real is necessarily of rational structure; it suffices that something real, to wit, the field real, has this structure. To think that everything real necessarily has its “explanation” not only is an hypothesis, but moreover a falsehood. Thinking about what Leibniz thought about, to wit, the reality of God, what must be said is that God is above all reason and explanation; to affirm, as is usually done, that God is the explanation of Himself constitutes an empty logification of divine reality. God is absolute reality; but even in the worldly sense, it is not certain that every reality has a rational explanation. A free act does not; rather, freedom is what puts reason or explanation into what is going to happen. But freedom itself is beyond explanation. It is, if one wishes, the explanation of the unexplainable. The truth of rational intellection then essentially overcomes the duality of fact and reason.

One might say that metaphysical truths are necessary. We shall not here seek to define what the metaphysical is; it suffices to indicate that the metaphysical is the order of the real qua real, i.e., the order of the transcendent. Now, the transcendent is not something conclusive and a priori; it is something given in impression (the impression of reality), and it is something open, and dynamically open. Metaphysical truths are only stages of the intellective progression toward the truth of reality.

In summary, then, the duality of truths of fact and truths of reason does not exist, only the duality of field truths and worldly or rational truths. Both are true not of concepts but of reality, i.e., of a formality actualized in [285] intellection. Rational truth is simply worldly truth.

But these rational truths constitute an “order”. It is not, to be sure, the order of absolute necessity of conceptive essences, in Leibniz’ sense; but it is a strict order. In what does it consist?

2. The order of rational truths qua “order”. Rational truths, I say, constitute an order. That I indicated earlier. Rational truth, in fact, is the truth of the real as a
form of reality. Each thing is not just real, but constitutes “a” form of being real, i.e., one form among others because reality is constitutively respective, and this respectivity is the world. Therefore a real thing as a moment of the world is “a form” of reality, it is “its” form of reality. It does not matter, in this problem, that the respectivity in question is cosmic in addition to worldly. The cosmic, as we have already said, is the suchness of the world, a particular kind of world, the suchness or particularity of worldly respectivity; therefore, ultimately, what is decisive is the respectivity itself of the world. In virtue of this, all worldly reality, when it is multiple, sends us back, in its own character of reality, to other forms of reality, because no form is self-contained, but only respectively to another. And therefore all truth about a worldly reality, i.e., all rational truth, sends us back qua truth to other rational truths. Therefore rational truths constitute an order, the order of the rational. This order has two essential characteristics.

In the first place, the rational is not just the explanation or reason of what is of the field. Explanation is primarily and radically explanation of field reality. Without this, and without being for this, {286} there would be neither reason nor explanation, nor rational truth. This has never been emphasized enough. The rational is constituted as the terminus of a progression in which, impelled by the field real, we go in search “toward” the world, i.e., toward the form of reality which has that field thing as a moment of the world, in reality. Reason or explanation, then, is primarily and radically reason or explanation of what is of the field. It has a precise origin; it does not rest upon itself, and this origin is, as we have seen, in what is of the field. But this means that the rational has two faces: one, which opens onto the field thing of which it is the explanation. But since this reason or explanation is worldly respectivity, it follows that reason has a second face: that which opens onto other forms of reality, i.e., other explanations. By being the reason or explanation of a field thing, reason is, in a certain way, going beyond itself. Therefore the order of reason has a characteristic of exceeding with respect to the field of which it is the reason or explanation.

This characteristic appeared before when we dealt with verification, and still earlier, when we dealt with the field of the real. Therefore in order to pin down our ideas, let us once again quickly review what exceeding is. To exceed does not mean that that to which it is applied is a contraction of what is exceeding, but that, on the contrary, exceeding is an expansion of the characteristic of reality. It is an expansive constitution, and not a contractive one, of the character of reality. This expansion has two fundamental moments. Above all, it is an expansion of the character of reality of each real thing as primordially apprehended; it is a character which befits everything real thus apprehended. It is the exceeding by which each real thing determines a field, the field of the real. This is the field exceeding. But there is a second moment, that by which the whole field of the real leads us toward the world; the field real is {287} now intellectively known as a form of reality in the world. This is worldly exceeding. In turn, this worldly expansion, this expansion of the field in the world, has two aspects. One is that aspect by which intellection as a form of reality, i.e., rational intellection, upon being the explanation of a field thing, discovers (or can discover) in the field real more properties than those which, in the field manner, we have so far intellectually known. It is an exceeding with respect to properties. But the worldly exceeding has, together with the first aspect, a second one: the expansion of each explanation to other explanations. And this second aspect of worldly expansion is what is now of interest to us. Through the first aspect, worldly exceeding is an exceeding of explanation with respect to the field; this exceeding is therefore entirely contained in the respect which reason or explanation shows to what is of the field. But the exceeding of which we now speak is an exceeding within the rational itself, within the world of reality. It is impossible to discover the explanation of a real thing by itself, because if it is an explanation it is so of more than that one thing; it is an explanation within the worldly unity of other explanations. By virtue of its own essence, explanation of the real is exceeding in the worldly sense.

And here a second essential characteristic of the order of rational truth shines through, because the aforementioned exceeding is not simply a numerical addition to reason or explanation, but an exceeding which is constitutive of and essential to all reason. It is not that “one” explanation leads us to “others”, but that each explanation is so only “in and by” that which leads us to others. That is to say, explanation by its exceeding constitutes not an additive order but a formal and constitutive one; it is a system. Explanation is formally and constitutively systematic. Rational truths as such constitute a system. This means, {288} first of all, that every explanation is sketched based on others. In field intellection we see that each thing is intellectively known based on others. Now, in rational intellection, each explanation is intellectively known based on others. Conversely, every explanation leads, in and by itself, to others, and is only an explanation in unity with them. Therefore every rational intellection leads intrinsically and formally to its own superceeding in others. And then, this makes something decisive
clear to us. Explanation, as we saw, is an intelletucal sketch of what a real thing “could” be as a form or moment of the world. Each explanation is a “could”; if I may be permitted a risky expression (which I previously purged to preclude confusion) I can say that each explanation is a “possible”. Now, the systematic unity of explanations is then a unity of “co-possibles”. The whole world of the rationally intelletucally known is the unique and true explanation of field reality. The sketch, we say, is drawn based on a system of reference. This system of reference is the field of the real. Now, what is sketched, the adequate explanation of the field real, is the unity of the world. The field is the system of the sensed real, and the world is the system of the real as a form of reality. The “could be” is the ground of the real. Therefore the system of the world is just the ground of the unity of what is of the field.

And here it is necessary to avoid four errors which may readily come to mind.

The first concerns the “could be”. The “could be” is something possible. But I have just indicated that this latter is a risky expression because it is ambiguous. The order of possibles can be understood as the order of the essences which eternally rest upon each other. Reality would then be a derivative of these possibles; that was Leibniz’ idea. But it is wrong. The possibility of the “could be” is not the essence of [289] the real, anterior to the real itself, but the field reality itself which, as physically real, is a “reality”, but “toward” the world. Be the world as it may, it is always just a structure of reality given in the field manner. Therefore the rational is not the possible, but the real in its intrinsic and physical emergence from itself; hence it is a moment within the real itself. It is not a question of whether the possible is real, but the real itself as realization of its form of reality. This is not something anterior to the real, but an intrinsic constitutive moment of it. The possible is the real’s intrinsic nature of being possible. Ultimately, the possible is a moment reduced from the real itself. Only the real is a ground of the possible. Having inverted these terms is the first mistake which I have sought to avoid.

The second mistake concerns that moment of unity of the rational through which every explanation is an explanation based upon others. It is here that the systemic character of the rational is most readily apparent. But this “based upon”, and therefore the system itself, isn’t that “based upon” which from time immemorial has been called the “reasoning process”. The system of the rational is not, formally, a reasoning process. Leibniz said that pure reason is the “linking of truths”, the linking of reasoning processes. And Wolf expresses the same thing when he says that “the” reason is the faculty of perceiving the nexus of universal truths. Universality here expresses the character of a reasoning process. But as I see it, we are not concerned with that. The system is the unity of respectivity of the world. Therefore, the fact that every explanation is understood based upon others does not mean that it is deduced from them. It means rather that every explanation refers to others, regardless of what the mode of referral may be. The referral itself is the systemic character of the world, and not the other way around. The reasoning process is founded upon [290] the respective character of the world, the respective character of realityrationally known intelletucally. Only because the world is systematic unity, and only because of this, can there be, in some cases, a reasoning process. The essential unity of the world is not, then, reasoning; it is the real unity of respectivity.

And this brings us to the third mistake. As each rational truth intrinsically and formally refers to another, one might think that the order of rational truth is the totality of rational truths. That was Kant’s idea: reason, for Kant, is the organization of experience, but in and by itself it is the logical totality of the truths of the understanding, what he called ‘Idea’. The object of reason, for Kant, is not things but the truths which I have understood about things. But this is untenable. Reasoning is based upon truths already known, and this is possible thanks to the fact that truths have a unity which is conferred upon them by being truths of the world. The unity of the world, as I just said, is the foundation of reasoning. And this unity is not, therefore, the total system of truths but the principal unity of respectivity. The order of rational truths does not have the character of totality but of respectivity. And respectivity is not necessarily totality; a constitutively open respectivity cannot be totality. The unity of respectivity is the intrinsic and formal principle of all rational order. This order is not, then, totality even as Idea.

This puts us face to face with a final mistake, the fourth, which it is essential to dispel. One might think, in fact, that the order of rational truth is the unity of true reality as such. Then the order of rational truth would not be “totality” as Kant thought, but the order of a primary unity of the real as such; it would be [291] the order of the “ab-solute”. And this order would be but the development or unfolding of the absolute. The absolute would then be reality unfolding or developing itself, i.e., the reality which not only is in itself, but is in itself and for itself; the absolute would be spirit. That was Hegel’s idea. But such is not the case. Even leaving aside the subject of
the identity of reason and reality in Hegel—that is not our
topic at the moment—it is necessary to point out that the
unity of the rational order is not the unity of the absolute.
A real thing, intellectively known rationally, is a thing as
a form of reality. Now, it is certain that the transcendental
order is an order which is open dynamically. But this
does not mean either that the constitution of each real
thing in the world is a movement, or that the transcen-
dental dynamism is an unfolding. ‘Movement’ is not syn-
onymous with unfolding; there is only unfolding or develop-
ment when the movement consists in actualizing
something which, previously, was virtually in what is
moved. But in the constitution of forms of reality, we are
not dealing with something which is being configured, but
with the fact that each thing is being configured as a form
of reality. It is not that the absolute is configured or con-
figures itself, but that what is configured is each real
thing. Thus there is no unfolding. And furthermore,
there is no unity of the absolute. The different forms of
reality have no other unity than that of respectivity.
Therefore the order of the rational is not the order of the
absolute but the order of the world. Reality have no other unity than that of respectivity.

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unity of the rational is not the unity of the absolute.
The different forms of reality have no other unity than that of respectivity. Therefore the order of the rational is not the order of the absolute but the order of the world. Reality qua reality is not the same thing as absolute reality. Each real thing is not a moment of a great thing, of the absolute, but only a moment respective to other realities. The order of the rational is neither a Kantian totality nor a Hegelian abso-

lute; it is simply a world.

With this we have completed our second step to
conceptualizing truth as an encounter or finding. The first step was analyzing what truth is as an encounter; this was “verification”. The second has been to determine
the formal essence of this mode of truth. That we have
done by confronting three questions: What is verification?
What is the formal structure of verification? And In what
does the order of reason or explanation consist? We must
now take a third and final step: determining what we
might call the intrinsic character of truth as an encounter,
i.e., the intrinsic character of rational truth, of the truth of

knowledge.

III

THE INTRINSIC CHARACTER OF RATIONAL
TRUTH

It is first of all necessary to pin down the meaning of
the question we wish to answer. We have seen that ra-
tional truth is verification. It is a mode of truth-making
with a special character, a mode by which the real, already
apprehended as real, gives its truth to the thinking activ-
ity; i.e., it is a mode by which the real gives us reason or
explanation. We have seen what the formal essence of
verification is. Verification is the truth-making of the real
in an inquiring intellection, i.e., it is in a sketch. To ver-
ify is to find the real; it is a fulfillment of how we have
sketched what the real could be. In this finding and in
this fulfillment the real is made actual (facere) in intel-
lection (verum). And in this consists “veri-fication”. And
it is in this truth-making that rational truth consists. Now,
that verification in a sketch intrinsically involves two as-
pects: finding and fulfillment. Up to now we have been
made to see the character of rational truth [293] as a truth
which has those two moments: finding and fulfillment.
But those two moments are different, and each imposes its
own stamp upon truth. Hence their unity is what consti-
tutes the intrinsic nature of rational truth. What, ulti-
ately, is this intrinsic character of rational truth, i.e., the
intrinsic unity of finding and fulfillment? This is the
question now facing us.

To answer this question it is above all necessary to
focus on each one of the two moments of verification, that
of finding and that of fulfilling. Let us repeat, then, what
has already been said but in a more systematic way. Only
then will we be able to confront the question of the inter-

nal unity of these two moments, i.e., the intrinsic charac-
ter of rational truth.

To do this with some degree of clarity, it is necessary
to repeat certain ideas expounded earlier at greater length.

1. Verification as finding. Truth consists, formally,
in the mere actualization of the real in intellection; and
this actualization is truth. The actualized real, then,
makes truth. We have seen that there are two essential
forms of truth: real or simple truth, also referred to as
elemental truth, and dual truth, that which consists in the
coincidence of the aspects of dual actualization. There is
dual truth when those two moments coincide; it is what I
have repeatedly called ‘coincidental truth’. And this coi-
ncidental truth in turn assumes three forms: authentication,
veridictance, and verification. Now, we are not dealing
with a simple classification of truths, but with a unitary
structure, i.e., each form of truth presupposes the previous
one and is founded upon it. Every coincidental truth of
authentication is grounded upon real truth, and involves
[294] in an authentication sense real truth itself. Every

truth of veridictance is founded upon the truth of authenti-
cation, and involves in a veridictance sense the truth of
authentication, and therefore real truth. Every truth of

verification is founded upon the truth of veridictance and
formally contains this truth in a veridictant way; hence it
involve veridictance in a verifying way, as well as authentication and real truth. I shall later return to this subject at length. But it was necessary to sketch it here with regard to rational truth, since every rational truth is founded upon a truth of veridictance, i.e., formally contains one or several affirmations, and with them, a real truth. Now, here is where one finds the irreducible novelty of rational truth with respect to the truth of veridictance. Since rational truth formally involves affirmations, one might think that rational truth consisted in that fact that when my affirmations about the real meet the real, they conform to it. Rational truth would thus be simple truth of veridictance. This is the idea behind all of classical philosophy. But rational truth is not that. To be sure, rational truth formally involves affirmations, but does not consist in “being” in conformity with the real. Certainly without that conformity, there would not be rational truth. But rational truth is not mere conformity. Rational truth is the “finding” of conformity; but the finding in itself is not conformity but something which involves conformity, albeit in a new way, viz., confirmation. The rational truth of affirmation does not consist in conformity of what is affirmed with the real, but in the confirmation of what is affirmed by the real. Every rational truth is sought, and is the inquiry for something which has been sketched out. And the finding is not simple conformity with the affirmation sketched with the real, but the “confirmation” of the sketch by the real. If there were no sketch, there would be no finding, nor for that matter rational intellection. It is on account of this that finding is something different than simple agreement or simple conformity.

But let us understand this correctly. The word ‘confirmation’ can have two meanings. It can mean a type of ratification of a true affirmation: one already has a secure truth, and seeks to ratify this truth by another route. Confirmation would then be ratification of a truth already affirmed as true. But finding is not confirmation in this sense, for a very simple reason: prior to the finding, what is affirmed is not affirmed as true, but as a simple sketch of truth. Then ‘confirmation’ means something more radical than ratification; it means giving the character of secure truth to what has been sketched as true. What has been sketched out is secure “with” the found real. This is the “with” of confirmation. It is not ratification of a truth but the very constitution of truth. Confirmation is finding insofar as it gives security. Finding is not a chance stumbling upon what is sought, but rather constitutive confirmation, constitution of the security of what has been sketched in and by the real. It is not ratifying confirmation.

Now, the real is actualized in confirmation. Simple “af-firmation” becomes “con-firmation”. Here we have rational truth as finding. Veridictance “is manifested” in conformity; verification “confirms” in finding. Reason not only affirms but confirms in finding. Reason is not formally reason because it affirms, but rather affirmation is formally rational because it constitutes the truth of an encounter or finding in constitutive confirmation. The sketch is the affirmation of what “could be”. Rational intellection is the confirmation of the “could be” in and by what it is. The finding is a moment of inquiring intellection of what the real “could be” in the world. And because of this it is intellection of a real thing in its ground; it is grounding intellection. This ground is what constitutes in-depth reality, where in depth formally consists in establishment in the world. Rational intellection is in-depth intellection of the real actualized in its ground. All of these formulae are identical. And their intrinsic formal identity is just the essence of rational intellection as finding in constitutive confirmation.

This is verification as finding.

It is not easy to choose an adequate designation for this finding which is constitutive of rational truth. Nevertheless, it is necessary or at least extremely convenient to have one, for greater clarity in what I am now going to expound. For it, let us consider that every confirmation involves affirmations. And the affirmations have always been considered as proper to the logos. Then one might be able to call rational truth ‘truth of a logos’, i.e., logical truth. This is extremely risky because it might easily lead one to maintain the idea that the rational part of truth is the subject of logic; rational truth would then be a truth which is logically founded. And that would be a serious error, one which I have repeatedly pointed out in the course of this book. The fact is that the expression ‘logical truth’ has two meanings. It can mean that the truth of the logos is logical in the sense that the essence of the logos consists in predicative affirmation. Now in this sense, to say that rational truth is logical truth is a great falsehood. It is what, since the very beginning of the book, I have called logification of intelligence. Rather, one must (297) follow the opposite path, viz. seeing in the logos the mode of intellective actualization of the real. The logos must be understood with respect to intellection; this is the intelligization of the logos. In such case, ‘logical truth’ means truth of the real actualized in the logos. Then, clearly, rational truth is logical truth because verification is a mode of truth-making in a twofold way which involves the logos. Naked reality is not actualized in intellection as logos. Rational truth, on the other hand, is not actualized formally as logos, but involves logos. Now,
it is in this sense, and only in this precise and exclusive sense—I insist upon these adjectives—that I say that by being dual actualization in confirmation, rational truth is logical truth in the sense of truth of a reality which in one of its aspects makes truth in logos. This is not the best expression, but lacking a better one I shall employ it in the final pages of this chapter to designate not “the” rational intellection but only an aspect of it, that aspect by which rational intellection involves affirmations, i.e., involves logos. This is truth as finding.

But here is where the second moment of verification appears. Truth is finding of something which is sought through sketching. Then verification is not just confirmative finding but fulfillment of what has been sketched. And this is the essential point.

2. Verification as fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? Of what has been sketched out. But, what is it, formally, that has been sketched out? In what does the fulfillment consist, and what is then the character of truth as fulfillment?

a) What the sketched out is formally. Although we have already dealt with this question, let us here recall the ideas that are essential for the subject at hand. Rational intellection is (298) actuality of the real not in an act of intellection but in intellective activity. It is intellective activity “toward” the grounding real, in a “toward” determined by the real itself apprehended as real already, and which is what we now seek to understand in its ground. It is in this moment of the “toward” that one intellectively knows the real in thinking actuality; and therefore reality is intellectively known then as reality. But the real itself, intellectively known as worldly reality, is formally given by that mode of the real that is the unreal. The unreal is then entirely inscribed within reality. This inscribing has two moments, or if one wishes, two aspects. On one hand we say that reality is actualized in an intellection, though not in an intellection which is necessarily empty, but in one which concretely consists in what, without reservation, I have called (as we commonly say), “my ideas”. Through this actualization of reality in “my ideas”, their content is intellectively realized as mere content of the idea in reality. These two moments taken together constitute the unreal. In themselves, the ideas are “a-real”. They are realized through the actualization of reality in them. Therefore the unreal, by reason of the ideas, is a free creation of mine; and in virtue of that, I say that creating does not consist in giving reality to my ideas but in giving my ideas to reality. The unreal is inscribed, then, entirely within reality by those two moments of actualization and realization. For the purposes of our problem, this inscribing can have two modes. One consists in the fact that the unreal is what the real “could be”. It is, as we saw, an intellection of the real in drawing back. The “could be” is inscribed in reality in a very precise way, in the unreal mode (not in the grammatical sense but in the sense which I just explained). But the unreal can be inscribed in the real in another form, viz. the unreal as (299) reality of what the real “could be”. This “could be” is not a mere abstract possibility, but something different and much more positive: it is intellection in potential mode (I repeat the same thing here I said with respect to the unreal mode). The “could be” is not, in itself, “possible”, but “possibilant”, making possible. Therefore this “could be” is not intellectively known in a movement of drawing back, but in a sketching out of a progression toward the ground of the real. What is formally sketched out is, then, the possibilitation of the real qua possibil- tant. And this possibilant or making possible is an internal system of fundamental moments, i.e. their intellection is a “construction” of possibilitation. To facilitate this expression, let us here employ the word ‘possibilities’, in plural, as opposed to what is merely “possible”.

Let us now ask ourselves what it is that these possibilities possibilitate. The sketch, as I said, is above all a construction of what the real “could be” in its in-depth reality. Therefore the possibilities possibilitate, above all, the real in its worldly reality. The actualization of the world in intellective activity is actualization of possibilities of a ground. It is not that these possibilities come before the real, but that they are the very ground by which the real is a moment of the world.

But these possibilities are not limited to being possibilities of the real, because this system of possibilities is freely sketched out, freely constructed. In virtue of this, the sketching activity is appropriation of the possibilities in a free option. This is the essence of the sketch as intellection. With it, the possibilities are not only what possibilitates the real, but also what possibilitates, at one and the same time, the real and my thinking intellection of the real. In this aspect they are my possibilities; what possibilitates the real (300) is constituted in possibility from my thinking. Upon being appropriated by me, the possibilities which possibilitate the real in the world possibilitate at one and the same time my rational intellection. Neither primordial apprehension of reality, authentication, nor veridictance are the terminus of appropriation. Verification, on the other hand, is formally the terminus of appropriation. One appropriates, I repeat, the possibilities of the real in intellection. Now, just on account of this, rational intellection is not just sketching; it is fulfillment of what is appropriated.
b) What is fulfillment? My rational intellection is, then, first and foremost actualization of the real in accordance with my sketched out possibilities. And this actualization is just the essence of fulfillment. Neither authentication nor veridictance are, formally, fulfillment. But verification is formally fulfillment, because we are not dealing with the fact that what is fulfilled may be the outcome of an intellection which is sought. This search, qua search of an intellective act, can be common to every intellection whatsoever regardless of its formal nature. But verification, as I have already said, is not the search of intellection, but intellection which is formally inquiring, intellection in the process of searching. Inquiry pertains to the formal content of the intellection itself. And this is exclusive to rational intellection. Neither authentication nor veridictance are intellection in inquiry. Neither of these two intellections consists in appropriation of sketched out possibilities. But verification does. The fulfillment of what has been appropriated is not a characteristic either of act or of activity, but the actuality of what has been intellectively known in that activity qua possibility of its own actualization. Intellection is actualization of the real in intelligence. And when the intellection is rational, then the real is actualized in the form of a fulfillment of a sketch. This fulfillment itself consists in realizing the possibilities sketched out and appropriated. Therefore this actualization is what, with complete semantic and etymological rigor, should be called fulfilled actualization.

Now, intellective actuality is strictly common to what is intellectively known and to intellection itself. That we have already seen. Insofar as it is actuality of the real intellectively known in the fulfilled way, it comprises the very essence of rational truth. Therefore rational truth qua truth is the fulfillment in the real of what has been appropriately sketched out by intellection itself. This is the essential difference between conformity and confirmation. The fulfillment, and only the fulfillment, is confirmation. And conversely, confirmation is fulfilled actuality. And because of this rational truth qua fulfillment has its own intrinsic character.

c) Character of truth as fulfillment. We have seen that as finding, rational truth has a logical character in a very precise sense, which I have already explained, in the sense of actualization in a logos. In this respect rational truth is logical truth. Now, as fulfillment, rational truth has a different character, inseparable from the former but different from it. In fact, rational truth as fulfillment is the realization of possibilities. And every actualization of possibilitant possibilities, whether intellective or not, has a very precise character. On one hand, it is realized actualization by a potency (let us call it that) of things, and by a potency of mine, the intellective potency. In this sense that realization is a fact. But on the other hand, when the sketch of a possibilitant possibility mediates between a simple potency and actualization, the realization is more than a fact, it is a happening. The realization is at one and the same time fact and happening; but being a happening is not formally the same as being a fact. While every happening is a fact, not every fact is a happening. The fact is actuation; the happening is actualization. The fact is actuation of "potencies"; the happening is realized actualization of possibilities. As it is in the realization of possibilities that the essence of the historical consists, it follows that the character of rational truth qua happening is what formally constitutes the very essence of the historical part of this truth.

Now, rational intellection, by being fulfillment, is formally historical, since fulfillment is realization of possibilities. Rational truth has this character of historicity. Historicity is an intrinsic character of rational intellection, of rational truth. But as we had to clarify in what the character of rational truth consists as finding, to avoid serious errors, so we must now clarify the fact that rational truth is historical.

That rational truth is historical does not mean in any way whatsoever that rational truth pertains to history. That is to say, it does not mean that rational truth has history. Clearly it does so, and to affirm that is a triviality. But “to be” history is not to be “historical”. Neither does it mean that rational truth, besides having history, is historically conditioned. It is obvious that this is so, as we see in science, for example. Not in just any epoch can the same experiments be sketched out, etc. But here we are not dealing with that; we are not dealing with the fact that rational truth has history nor with the fact that it is historically conditioned; rather, we are dealing with the fact that rational truth is formally historical in itself inasmuch as it is truth. That means, first of all, that its historicity is an intrinsic and formal character of rational truth qua truth.

But even with all this, it is necessary to clarify concepts still more. On the one hand, one must shun thinking that rational truth qua truth is true of something historical. This, as is obvious, is radically false, because the real qua real does not have to be historical. Some galaxies, a star, or a mathematical object are not historical realities qua realities. Therefore when the real is historical, rational truth is doubly historical: it is historical because the real in this case is something historical; moreover, it is historical by virtue of being a rational actualization. Only
this latter is what is proper to rational truth qua truth. That rational truth is historical does not, then, consist in its being true of something historical. But neither does it consist in being a truth which, qua truth, depends upon intellective knowing itself qua act of mine. And this is so for two reasons. In the first place, intellection is not necessarily historical, and even if it were, this historicity of my act does not pertain to the formal content of the rational truth. In the second place, the historicity of intellection does not consist in the vital unity of intellective action and of all the vital structures, regardless of the mode in which this vital unity and its concretion may be understood. However much one stresses this vital aspect of the historicity of the intellective act, it is still an extrinsic aspect to the truth of what is intellectively known as true, since it is an historicity of intellective actions qua actions. All of this pertains to the order of activity. The historicity with which we are now dealing is on the other hand a formal characteristic of rational truth qua truth, and pertains to the order of actuality. And it does not consist in thinking that what is actualized is always historical reality, nor in thinking that the very mode of intellective action is historical. That rational truth is historical qua truth consists in the actualization of the real in intellection being fulfilled actualization. Historicity is here a mode of actuality. It is not a mode of activity.

But this is not all, because in turn this formal and intrinsic historicity does not consist in being merely a dynamic characteristic. To be sure, every truth of veridictance is, as we saw, a dynamism of conformity toward adequation. But rational truth is not just a movement of a phase of conformity of truth to another phase; rather, it is the fulfillment, in each of these phases, of its progression. Intellecutive progression is a sketch of possibilitant possibilities; its actualization is fulfilled intellective actuality. And it is in this that rational truth formally consists. It is an actualization of possibilities, an actualization of the “could be”. And the historicity of rational truth does not, therefore, consist in movement, either temporary or temporal, of an actuality; rather, it consists in a mode of constitution of the actuality of the real, in being actuality made possible, a fulfilled actuality. In this respect rational truth is formally and intrinsically historical truth.

Therefore: (1) Historicity here is a mode of actualization, not a mode of action or actuity; (2) this mode is fulfillment, not dynamic conformity. That is the meaning of the expression, “historicity is actualization, fulfilled actuality; rational truth is fulfilled truth”.

In summary, rational truth has on the one hand a character of finding; it is logical truth. On the other, it has a character of fulfillment; it is fulfilled truth, historical truth. What is the unity of these two characteristics? That is the last question which I posed.

3. The unity of rational truth. This unity is essential. To see that, we must recall once more that the truth of rational intellection is a truth of inquiring intellection. But this, while necessary, is not sufficient; we must pin down the intrinsically unitary nature of rational truth in this intellection. Only by occupying ourselves with these two questions will the unity of rational truth be clarified.

A) Rational truth, truth of an inquiring intellection. Rational truth is, as we have seen, logical and historical. But this “and” can give rise to a fatal error, because one might think that rational truth is at once logical and historical. In such case, the “and” would be a copulative “and”. This is not completely wrong, but it is not correct, either, because rational truth is not at once logical and historical; rather, it is indivisibly, i.e., at once logical truth and historical truth. Logicity and historicity are two aspects which are not just indivisible, but mutually co-determining of the unity of rational truth. The “and” then means intrinsic indivisible unity.

a) To see what this means, let us recall the outcome of our previous analysis. As truth of inquiring intellection, rational truth is truth as sketched out. And the truth of a sketch is verification, i.e., consists in the real truth-making, in the real giving of truth, in a sketching intellection. This verification is finding and fulfillment, not along the lines of a copulative “and”, but in a radical way in each of those two moments. The real as sketched out is found in fulfilling, and is fulfilled by finding. Finding is confirmation, and fulfillment is making possible. Therefore something is confirmed by making possible and is made possible by confirming. The real makes truth in a possibilitant confirmation and in confirming possibilitation. The unity of rational truth consists in the identity of both of these formulae. Each of the two (historicity and logicity) intrinsically and formally involves the other indivisibly. That is, rational truth is historically logical (fulfilling), and is logically historical (finding). Such is the intrinsic and formal unity of rational truth. The logical portion of rational truth consists in historical fulfillment; and the historical portion of rational truth consists in logical finding. This is the radical and formal identity of the logical and the historical in every rational intellection. It is an identity which shines through in the sketching characteristic of rational intellection as such, i.e., in inquiring intellection as such. Sketching is the manner of intellective knowing in the inquiring sense. The unity of the logical
and of the historical in rational truth shines through, I repeat, in the inquiring character of this intellection. Each form and mode of reality has its own rational truth. ‘Rational’ does not mean something proper to conceptualization or to some theory, but is purely and simply the found real as confirming its intrinsic possibilitation.

b) But, In what, positively, does this unity which thus “shines through” consist? We have already answered: in being actuality. Verification is a mode of actualization, i.e., a mode of truth-making. The unity of the logical and of the historical in rational intellection is found, then, in the moment of actuality. What actuality are we talking about? The actuality of the truth-making of the real in thinking activity. Now, this is the formal definition of reason. The identity of the logical and the historical which shines through in the sketch is [307] the very essence of reason. The logical and the historical are “one” indivisibly because they are indivisible moments of that mode of intellection which is reason. It is reason itself which, intrinsically and formally is logico-historical or historico-logical. Now, reason is sentient intelligence activated by the real itself. In sentient intellection one senses reality in the field manner in its diverse modes; therefore one senses, in the field manner, the real in that mode which is the “toward”. And this “toward” has an “intra-field” aspect, through which the intellection takes on a dynamic character. But this “toward” also has a “trans-field” aspect; this is the “toward” of the whole field of reality toward reality simpliciter, i.e., toward the world. The field is the sensed world. There are not two independent “toward’s”. The worldly “toward” is the actuality of the field real, but as “problem”. Worldly reality is the problem of field reality. The actuality of the world has the concrete form of “problem”. A problem is not a “question” but a mode of actualization; it is the actuality of the real as hurled into the intellection (from the Greek ballo, to hurl). And this hurling has a very precise structure: it is the trans-field “toward” of intra-field reality. A problem is just the mode of actualization of the reality of the world. It is not that worldly reality itself is a problem, but the mode in which this reality is given to us as real in actuality.

In virtue of this, intellection takes on the character of progression. This “toward” is what I have called “giving one pause to think”. Therefore inquiring intellection is sentient intellection in action. That is, reason is a modulation of sentient intellection and therefore is constitutively sentient reason. By virtue of being so, reason is inquiring and sketching. And in virtue of this, it is a logico-historical reason [308] (or historico-logical) because it is intellecctual actuality of reality in the form of a problem. The unity of the logical and the historical in rational truth is then but the very unity of sentient reason. Only a sentient reason intellecctually knows worldly reality as a problem, because reality as a problem is but reality sensed in a worldly “toward”. And it is because of this that there is and must be inquiry and hence sketching. In virtue of that, rational intellection is intrinsically logical and historical, precisely and formally because it is intellection of sentient reason, i.e. because it is the actuality of worldly reality as a problem. The unity, I repeat, of the logical and the historical in rational truth—and only there—is but the unity of sentient reason. And this unity consists in being sentient intellection activated by the real. This intellection is measuring. Reason is the intellection of measure of the reality of things. And therefore sentient reason is a measuring intellection of the reality of what is of the field in the world. And in this intrinsic and formal unity of sentient intellection, activated in measuring intellection, consists intellection as sketching; and therefore in it consists the intrinsic and formal unity of the logical and of the historical in rational truth. Rational truth is historical and logical, because it is the actuality of the real as a problem, a problem which activates sentient intelligence, making of it sentient reason.

We asked ourselves what the actuality of the real in rational intellection is. It is the thinking actuality of the real; it is actuality in sentient reason, i.e., it is formally actuality of the real as “problem”. It is in this moment of thinking actuality of the real in sentient reason, in the actuality of the real as “problem”, [309] that the unity of rational truth consists. The identity of the logical and the historical consists in the actuality of reality as a problem. An intellection of the real as problem is essentially and constitutively an inquiring sketch of the measure of the real in the world of reality and is therefore logico-historical.

c) But it is necessary to go one step further. Reason is an activity of sentient intellection activated by the real itself intellecctually known in that intellection. And the actuality of the real in this intellecctive activity is just reason, as I have said. Therefore, as I said, the actuality of the real in reason, i.e., the actuality of reality as a problem, is a modulation of the actuality of the real in sentient intelligence. And as the proper part of sentient intellecction is to give us an impression of reality, it follows that the actuality of the real in sentient reason is but a modulation of the impression of reality. What is this modulation?

In sentient intellection of primordial apprehension, we formally apprehend the real, and we impressively have
the real itself as real. Therefore as this intellec-
tion is ac-
tivated by the sensed real in a “toward”, the thinking in-
tellectual activity, reason, is already in the real. The real
is not something which must be achieved by reason; rea-
son already moves, formally and radically, in reality.
Therefore I say once again, reason does not consist in go-
ing to reality, but in going from field reality toward
worldly reality, in going toward field reality in depth.
And this “in depth” consists in ground-reality. Reason is
identically in-depth intellecition and grounded intellec-
tion. This grounded “in depth” is apprehended in the form of a
“toward” from sensed reality itself in sentient intellec-
tion. Therefore sentient intellecition, as we already saw when
dealing with the origin [310] of reason, gives us the mo-
ment of reality in impression in three modes. The pri-
mary and radical mode is reality as mere otherness of
what is sensed as something de suyo. It is reality as for-
mality. But this reality has, intrinsically and formally, the
moment of the field “toward”. Thanks to it, reality is the
medium in which dynamically we intellectively know
what is of the field. It is the impression of reality not as
simple formality, but as mediality. But the “toward” sends
us toward what is trans-field, toward the worldly. And in
this other aspect, reality is not just a medium of intellec-
tion but the in-depth ground which mediates the simple
reality of the real. This is the impression of reality not as
formality and mediality, but as measure. That modulation
is just reason. In this intellecition, things already appre-
hended as real give us the measure of their reality. Such
is the very essence of reason, viz. to intellectively know
the measure of the reality of real things. Reality given in
impression of reality is formality, mediality, and measure.
These are not, as I already said, three uses of the impres-
sion of reality, but three modes of a single impression of
reality. Reason is a modulation of the impression of rea-
libity, and therefore it moves, radically, in reality and is
determined by it not just by the demand for evidence (that
would be proper only to mediality), but by what I have
called the coercive force of the real.

And here is the radical and formal unity of the logi-
cal and the historical in rational truth: it is, I repeat, the
actuality of the real as “pro-blem”. This unity is what
constitutes sentient reason. In fact, reason consists in
measuring the reality of things; in it real things give us
the measure of their reality. But reason measures reality in
accordance with [311] canonic principles which are
sensed in the field manner. As canonic and measuring,
the principle is logical. In and of itself, the canonic prin-
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knows the measure of the reality of what is sensed, and is the intellection which consists in intellectively knowing rationally. Now, as rational truth is intrinsically and formally logico-historical, it follows that every knowledge as such is intrinsically and formally logico-historical.

It is so in the strict sense which we explained when dealing with rational truth. Therefore to affirm that all knowledge is logico-historical intellection is not in any sense whatsoever that which is usually called historicism. Historicism consists in conceptualizing knowledge and its truth as a more or less relative moment, as a truth more or less relative to history understood as movement. Therefore it consists in affirming that the truth of knowledge is relative to a moment of history. And this is unacceptable, because the historicity of knowledge is not a movement but an intrinsic and formal characteristic of intellection itself qua logically true. That we have already explained. Knowledge is truth as sketched and is therefore intellection fulfilled in finding. Hence, if indeed it is true that knowledge “has” a history, it does so only because knowledge “is” formally true in fulfillment. Therefore the unity of the logical and the historical in rational intellection is what formally constitutes knowledge.

a) This brings us to stress the very idea of knowledge. Up to now we have arrived at three ideas of knowledge; and these three I have employed indiscriminately. But to finish the discussion, it is now fitting to examine the radical unity of these three ideas. We said that knowledge is in-depth inquiring intellection; it is intellection of the ground, and it is intellection in reason. Now, these three ideas are identical; each just makes the previous one explicit. Knowledge is in in-depth inquiring intellection. This means that activity by the real itself—apprehension in sentient intellection—goes from the field real to the worldly real. And herein consists profundity: it is the worldly base of the sensed real. This base is formally reality, since the world is reality simpliciter. But it is not something which “is there”; rather, the mode of being there is to ground: reality qua worldly is “ground-reality”. The base is nothing but grounding reality. Knowledge as in-depth intellection is grounding intellection. Therefore to say that knowledge is grounding intellection is but to make explicit the formula by which knowledge is in-depth intellection. In-depthness is just the nature of the grounding. And what is this grounding? It consists in the sensed real as a moment of the world, as a moment of reality simpliciter. And then ground-reality is just the measure of the reality of the real. And this measure is just what we call ‘reason’. Therefore knowledge is intellection in reason, in measure. And this just makes explicit the character of the ground and hence of profundity. The three formulae, then, are not three expressions of a fundamental identity; each, in fact, just makes the previous one explicit. Hence we can always use the third as a summary of the first two: knowledge is intellection in reason. And the identity of these three formulae is precisely knowledge, inquiring intellection.

b) I say “intellection ‘in’ reason”, and not “intellection ‘with’ reason” because reason is but a mode of intellection, i.e., a mode of mere actuality of the real in sentient intellection. Reason is not something added to intellection (that is what the “with” would express), but a modulation of intellection (just what the “in” expresses). Hence the essence of knowledge is found in the modulation of making the real true. Consequently, knowledge is not a judgement or a system of judgements, but formally a mode of actuality of the real in intellection. The idea of knowledge must be conceptualized as a mode of truthifying, as a mode of actuality, of that mode of actuality of the real which is the “pro-blem”. I repeat, a problem is not an intellectual question but a mode of actuality of the real. Only because reality is actualized as a problem, only because of that can there be and must there be questions. It would be a serious error to conceptualize reason in the mode of logos, and above all in the mode of predicative logos. That would be a logification of knowledge. On the contrary, the logos itself (in all of its forms, including the predicative), is but a mode of the intellective actuality of the real. Therefore one must conceptualize knowledge as a mode of truth-making, to wit, a truth-making of the real in the actuality of a “pro-blem”, and not as a judgement or system of judgements, which has been the great error of all of modern philosophy, above all Kant.

c) To know is then a mode of actuality of the real, a mode of truth-making. Therefore it is, as I said, a modulation of sentient intellection. Hence all that knowledge has of intellection, and therefore of truth, it owes to being a modulation of a previous intellection, ultimately to being a modulation of the primordial apprehension of reality. From this latter it receives all of its possibility and all of its scope as truth. Primordial apprehension is not a rudimentary knowledge; rather, knowledge is intellection subsequent to primordial apprehension. Knowledge is born from an insufficient intellection and terminates in an ulterior intellection. Thus, from the point of view of the content of what is intellectively known, the content of knowledge can be at times—though not always—richer than the primary intellection, and richer than the primordial apprehension. But the entire scope of knowledge, what makes knowledge be knowledge, is the moment of reality of what is known. Now, this moment is not produced by
knowledge itself, but is given to it \textsuperscript{316} in and by primordial apprehension, by primary sentient intellection. It then follows that knowledge is not only grounded in intellection, but is also subordinated to it. Knowledge is, then, as I just said, merely \textit{subsequent} to the intellection of primordial apprehension. An intellection, a complete primordial apprehension, will never give rise to knowledge, nor will it require any knowledge whatsoever. Knowledge as a mode of intellection, i.e., of mere actuality of the real, is essentially inferior to primary intellection, to the primordial apprehension of the real. Knowledge is, as I said, a modulation of this intellection. And this intellection is, as I have just reiterated, mere actuality of the real; and therefore knowledge is a modulation in a problem of the actuality of the real. And this actuality thus modulated is unitarily, intrinsically, and formally, logico-historical actuality. Hence it follows that far from being the supreme form of intellection, knowledge is, by being rational actuality of the real, of a logico-historical nature) an intellection which is inferior to the mere intellection of primordial apprehension.

Knowledge is, I repeat, the successor to primordial apprehension, and this character of successor consists precisely and formally in being a logico-historical actualization of reality actualized as a problem.

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Here, then, we have the intrinsic character of rational truth. Rational truth is an intrinsic and formal thinking actuality of the real as a problem. It is then a truth of logico-historical nature. This actualization is reason. Reason consists in the intellection of the sentient measure of \textsuperscript{317} the reality of real things. And this mode of intellection is what constitutes knowledge. It is because of this that rational truth is logico-historical truth. And as such it is a modulation subsequent to an intellection; hence the unity of truth. The primary form of truth is real truth. When it is distended in the field, reality is actualized in a dual fashion. This dual actuality is actualization in the form of authentication and veridictance. Authentication and veridictance are real truth itself actualized in the field manner, i.e., distended. Finally, as the duality is also trans-field, real truth itself is actualized in the form of verification. Each form of truth formally includes the previous ones, and therefore always formally includes real truth.

Intellection begins in primordial apprehension, and founded therein is activated in cognizant reason, whose rational truth formally consists in reversion to that primordial apprehension, from which indeed it never left. Reason is sentient reason; it is a modulation of constitutionally sentient intellection. From this it is born, therein it moves, and therein it concludes.

In the same case it is, as we saw, logos by virtue of being sentient. This already manifests how much inquiring reason, like the field intellection of the logos and the primordial apprehension of reality, despite their essential intrinsic differences, still constitute a profound unity, the unity of sentient intellection. In this way, the analysis of the modulation of intellection puts before our eyes the profound unity of that intellection. From it we started. Therefore at the end of our analysis it would be good to return to the unity of intellection as the general conclusion of the entire study. \textsuperscript{318}
Throughout the course of this study we have examined what sentient intellection is and what its modulations are, viz. primordial apprehension of a real thing, intellection of a real thing among others in a field (field intellection, logos), intellection of each thing already apprehended in the field but actualized now as a moment of the reality of the world (reason). In the first modal form, a real thing is actualized for us in and by itself as real; in the second, we move toward an actualization in logos, where the now-real thing is in reality; in the third modalization what the real thing is in reality is actualized for us as a moment of the world, i.e., we intellectively know the measure of the reality of that thing qua real. Reality in and by itself, what it is in reality, and the measure of its reality: here we have the three modes of sentient intellection of each thing.

In these three modes, each one of the last two is based upon the previous one and formally includes it without being identified with it. This means that intellection has a peculiar unity; and it will be necessary, then, to say in what this unity formally consists. But that is not enough, because this unity confers upon intellection a unitary quality, so to speak. We do not have intellection on one hand and diverse modalities on the other; rather, in every case, we have intellection as a whole, because its diverse modalizations are imposed by the real itself from its primordial apprehension. What does this unity mean? We must, then, examine two questions: the unity of intellection as a problem, and the intrinsic structure of this unity of intellection. Those are the themes of the two chapters comprising this General Conclusion.
CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF INTELLECTION

It is necessary to pin down, with some rigor, what the unity of intellect is in itself.

It is not some unity of stratification. Primordial apprehension, logos, and reason are not three strata of intellect, even if one adds that each is based upon the previous one. Nor are we dealing with the fact that we apprehend something as real and then advance to a higher level, that of what sensed things are in reality, and then finally we ascend to pure and simple worldly reality. Primordial apprehension, field intellect, and rational intellect are not three levels or strata which comprise some type of geology of intellect. Such a conception is nourished upon the idea that each intellect, i.e. the primordial apprehension, the field intellect, and the rational intellect each has its own complete unity, independently of the unity of the other two modes of intellect. Hence intellect would move in each of these planes without having anything to do with the other two. The most that could be said is that each stratum rests upon the previous one, in a way which is ultimately extrinsic; each plane would have its own exclusive structure. Strictly speaking, we would then be dealing with three unities; the unity of intellect would then be purely additive. But this is incorrect; each one of those things we called ‘strata’ not only presupposes the previous one as support, but includes its intrinsically. Primordial apprehension is formally present and included in the logos, and both intellecions are formally present and included in reason. They are not three unities but a single unity. And the fact is that we are not dealing with three planes of intellect but three modalities of a single intellect. They are three modes and not three planes. To be sure, each mode has its own irreducible structure. It would be false to attribute to primordial apprehension the structure of the logos or of reason. But by being modalities of a the same intellective function, they confer a precise structure upon this unity. What is it?

One might think that because there are three distinct modalities, they would at least be successive modalities. We would then be dealing with three successive modes of intellect. As modes they would be modes of something like an underlying subject, of the intelligence. First we would apprehend something as real. Later, conserving this apprehension, we would intellectively know what this real thing is in reality, and finally, conserving the real and what it is in reality, we would intellectively know it as a moment of the world. But this is not correct, because field intellect does not come after primordial apprehension but is determined by it. And this determination has two aspects. On one hand, there is the moment by which primordial apprehension determines the logos. However, primordial apprehension is not just prior to the logos but is logos incoactively, albeit only incoactively. We are not dealing with mere anteriority but with inchoateness. But there is another aspect. What is determined, logos, then involves primordial apprehension as something in which this latter unfolds. So there is not just anteriority but inchoation and unfolding. The same must be said, mutatis mutandis, of reason: logos, and therefore primordial apprehension, determine rational intellect, which is then incoactively determined by these two intellecions as an unfolding of them. The modes are not merely successive but have a more radical unity.

One might think, finally, that these three modes, thus mutually implicated, at least comprise a lineal unity. That is, we would be dealing only with a trajectory of that which we could vaguely call ‘intellective knowing’. But the fact that there is a trajectory is not the same as this trajectory constituting the formal essence of the three modes of intellect. Each mode not only unfolds the previous one and is incoactively in the following one, but is formally included in the following one as well. This formal character I have been stating monotonously, but without emphasizing it. Now we must occupy ourselves with it, because if matters are this way, then it is clear that in virtue of this inclusion, the prior mode is in some way qualified by the following one. Each mode has its own intrinsic structure, but by virtue of being formally in-
cluded in the following one, it is thereby affected by it. So we are not dealing with just any type of trajectory of intellective knowing, but with a growing, a maturation. There is a trajectory of intellective knowing, but it is grounded upon something more refined, in a maturation. The trajectory is only a derived and secondary aspect of maturation itself. The unity of the three modes is the unity of a maturation.

This is a structural unity. Maturity enriches, but that is because it is necessary to mature. For what? To be fully what it already is. This need for maturity is thus an insufficiency. In what way? Not, to be sure, with regard to reality simpliciter—that has been grasped since primordial apprehension, since the first mode. But the real thus apprehended is doubly insufficient; it does not actualize to us what a thing is in reality or what it is in reality itself. Without primordial apprehension, there would be no intellection whatsoever. Each mode receives from primordial apprehension its essential scope. Logos and reason do no more than fill the insufficiency of primordial apprehension; but thanks to this apprehension—and to it alone—they move in reality. Modal maturation is not formally constitutive of intellective knowing, but its inexorable growth is determined by the formal structure of the first mode, of primordial apprehension of sentient intelligence. Sentient intellection, in its mode of primordial apprehension, intellectively knows, in impression, reality as formality of a thing in and of itself. This impression has different moments. In its moment of "toward", it actualizes the respectivity of each real thing to other sensible things and to worldly reality. This respectivity is constitutively essential to the impression of reality. Therefore, although it is not formally constitutive of intellection, it is nonetheless something structurally determinant of the other two modes. This structure is then something which enriches the impression of reality, but does so not qua reality but in its respective terminus. But then it does not go beyond the impression of reality; rather, it determines that impression as logos and as reason. Logos and reason are incremental fulfillment of something that cannot be lost and is present as a font, the impression of formality of reality. This is the radical unity of the three modes of intellection. But that is not enough, because we may ask, in what does the formal unity of this impression of reality, in its modal determinations, in its maturation, consist? Here is the question which we must treat as the conclusion of this entire study.
CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITY OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

Sentient intellection is, formally, a mere actualization of the real in accordance with what the real is suo. This formal structure determines the actualization of what the real thing is in reality, and of what it is in reality itself. These two actualizations modalize the formal part of intellection. In this modalization, the act of intellection and also intellective knowing itself are modalized, as well as the intellective state in which we are. What is the nature of the modalized act? What is the nature of modalized intellective knowing itself? What is the intellective state in which we find ourselves, in this modalized fashion? We must then expound three essential questions:

§1. The unity of the act of intellection.
§2. The unity of intellective knowing itself.
§3. The state in which we find ourselves intellectively.

§1

THE MODAL UNITY OF THE ACT

The formal structure of intellective knowing, I must reiterate, consists in mere actualization of a real thing as real in sentient intellection. But ulteriorly, this same thing gives rise to two intelllections: the intellection of what the apprehended is in reality (logos), and the intellection of what that which is in reality, is in reality itself (reason). So as not to make the expression unduly complicated, I shall forthwith designate both intelllections with a single expression: the intellection of what a thing “really” is. ‘Really’ here encompasses both “in reality” and “in reality itself”. Therefore we shall deal with both intelllections as if they were a single one as distinct from primordial apprehension. These two intelllections, the primordial apprehension of reality and the intellection of what really is, have the unity of being actualization of the same real thing. But they are not merely two actualizations; rather, the second is a re-actualization of the first. And this is the decisive point. Actualization determines the re-actualization, but then this latter re-actualizes, and in turn determines the first actualization. The primordial intellection of the real is then on one hand determinant of the reactualization. But in turn this re-actualization determines in some way the first actualization. This is the very essence of the “re-”. It is a “re-” in which one expresses the formal structure of the unity of the two intelllections. What is this structure?

To be sure, we are not dealing with an effort to do a representation of a real thing, because intellective knowing is not representing but reactualizing. Intellective knowing is always presenting, i.e., having what is intellectively known present. Intellection is making something “to be here-and-now present” insofar as it “is here-and-now”. Therefore the second intelllection, by being reactualization, determines another mode of presentation. Of what? Of the same real thing. This is re-actualization. How? In every reactualization we return from the second actualization to the first. And in this reversion consists the unity of the “re-”. How?

Reactualization is “re-turning”. That is, with the second intelllection in hand we return to the first. Given the photon, we return to the color green. And in this returning, the second intelllection involves the first. We intellectively know the color green from the photon, returning to this real color green from what it really is. Therefore the first intelllection is as if encapsulated or enclosed in the second. The apprehension of the green is comprehended by virtue of the photon. Comprehending is not merely apprehending, but encompassing something. Here, ‘to comprehend’ has the etymological sense of comprehendere. Comprehension is what is going to constitute the mode of a real thing being newly present. It is a peripheral circumscription, so to speak, of the primordial
apprehension of the real. This comprehension of a real thing incorporates what it really is; the photon is incorporated into the color green. And this incorporation has a precise name, viz. comprehension: we have comprehended and not just apprehended the real green. Here the word ‘comprehension’ does not have its etymological meaning but rather its ordinary one, that of understanding something. The “com-prehension” of a real thing, [330] from the intellection of what it really is, makes us understand or comprehend what that real thing is. The “re-” of reactualization and its dependence on the real already actualized in primordial apprehension is what “comprehension” is. The unitary act of this intellection is then comprehension.

What, to be more precise, is this comprehension? It is fitting to address this question with some rigor.

To do this, it is convenient to conceptualize comprehension in this sense vis-à-vis other senses. To be sure, it is not what medieval philosophy called a comprehensive science, viz. the intellection of all that is intelligible in an intellectively known thing, because what we usually call ‘comprehending’ is not this total comprehension. And the fact is that we are but dealing with a mode of intellection according to which something really is.

Nor are we dealing with a logical moment of the so-called comprehension of notes as opposed to the extension of their possible subjects.

Nor does ‘to comprehend’ here mean what, in Dilthey’s philosophy, has been called Verstehen of a personal experience as opposed to the explication of it and of its content. For Dilthey, comprehension falls back upon personal experience and upon what is experienced in it. For him, personal experiences, be they explained as they may, are not thereby comprehended. Only will they be so when we have interpreted their meaning. To comprehend is, for Dilthey, to interpret the meaning, and conversely a meaning is interpretation of personal experience. With the law of gravity we do not comprehend the mortal fall of a man, i.e., whether it is suicide, accident, homicide, etc. Things are explained, experiences are comprehended and interpreted.

But this not adequate.

To comprehend is not to interpret; rather, to interpret is only a mode of comprehending. Moreover, as a mode of [331] comprehending it does not encompass all real things, but just some, the personal experiences of which Dilthey speaks. Now, even considering personal experiences, comprehending is not interpreting their meaning. The formal terminus of comprehension of a personal experience is not a meaning. In the idea of personal experience there is a possible ambiguity. The experience is reality. And what is comprehended is not the meaning of that reality but the reality of that meaning. The meaning is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience. What is comprehended is not the personal experience of reality but the reality of the personal experience. Meaning is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience. What is comprehended, I repeat, is not the personal experience but the reality of the personal experience qua reality; it is, if one wishes, the personal experiential reality, the fact that this reality has, and must have, a meaning. Then the ultimate difference, assumed by Dilthey, between explication and comprehension disappears. The problem of comprehension as such remains intact only with the problem of interpretation. Moreover, it is not just personal experiences—personal realities—which are comprehended; the same applies to all realities. Every reality intellectively known in primordial apprehension can be, and in principle must be, re-intellectively known in comprehension.

This limiting of comprehending, of Verstehen, to meaning can take on different characteristics, as seems to have happened in Heidegger. I say “seems to have happened” because the matter is not clear with respect to him. On the one hand, for Heidegger, Verstehen is interpreting. Despite all of the changes in it that one may wish to consider, it is the same idea that one finds in Dilthey, and in Rickert as well. On the other hand, Verstehen is at other times employed by Heidegger as a simple translation of intelligere, as for example in the beginning of his great work.’ Now, this is untenable. Intellectus is not comprehension but intellection. And [332] apart from any historical and translation problem, ‘to comprehend’ is not synonymous with ‘to intellectively know’; comprehending is only a mode of intellective knowing. There are millions of things which I intellectively apprehend, i.e., which I apprehend as real, but which I do not comprehend. In such cases there is intellection without comprehension.

Comprehension, then, is not comprehensive science or notional comprehension, nor interpretation of meaning. It is a special mode of intellective knowing. And then we must ask ourselves what comprehending is.

We have already given the answer: in comprehension one turns to apprehending something already apprehended as real, in light of which we have apprehended what it really is. There are, then, three intellective actualizations of the same reality. In the first place, there is

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1 [Being and Time—trans.]
the intellecutive actualization of a thing as real, viz. the primordial apprehension of reality. In the second place, there is the intellecutive actualization of what a real thing is really, viz. modal intellecction in logos and reason. In the third place, there is the intellecutive actualization of the same real thing (which was already apprehended in primordial apprehension), but modally incorporating into it what has been actualized in the intellecction (logos and reason) of what it really is. This third actualization is comprehension. Comprehending is apprehending the real based on what it really is; it is intellecively knowing how the structure of a thing is determined based on what it really is. It is just the act of intellecction as unitary and modal.

The question therefore consists in our saying precisely what the formal object of comprehension is. This question turns into two others: what is it that comprehension incorporates, and in what does the incorporation consist?

1. What does comprehension incorporate into primordial apprehension of the real? When a real thing is apprehended in primordial apprehension as real, it is intellecively actualized in the formality of reality, both in its individual moment as well as in its field and worldly moments. The individual moment radically determines the field and worldly moments; without individual real things, there would be neither field nor reality nor world. But in turn, what is of the field and what is of the world, once determined, determine the individual. In virtue of this, the individual, field, and worldly moments comprise a unity which is not additive but rather is a structural unity of determination. In order to intellecively know this unity one may follow two different paths. In the first path what is individual determines what is of the field and what is of the world. The individual is not lost, but absorbed into the field and worldly moments, as a determinant of them. As we have seen, this intellecction of the individual as determinant of the field and of the world is what constitutes the intellecction of what, really, the individual real thing is. To intellecively know what something is really is to intellecively know what the individual real thing is in the field of reality and in the world.

But this is not the only possible path for intellecction. I can also intellecively know the individual thing as determined in turn by that field and world moment which the individual thing itself has already determined. Then the structural unity takes on a different intellecctual character. Upon intellecively knowing what the individual really is, the structural unity is intellecively known in the real, but only “materially”: we have intellecively known in what the real consists as structured. But upon intellec-
ble. I shall return to this point forthwith. Because of this imperceptibility, the point has generally remained unnoticed. But that this difference is only "almost" imperceptible expresses the fact that it is nonetheless a real difference.

In summary, the formal terminus of comprehension is the nature of structuring. To comprehend is to intellectively know the nature of the structuring of the real as real, to intellectively know in the real as its own internal moment, the manner in which what really is determines the structural notes of a thing. The nature of structure is internal determination. The structural unity of what is comprehended is therefore the formal unity of "real" and "really". The intellection of this formal unity is what is incorporated into the real based on intellection of what this piece of paper is in reality. To comprehend is to "see" how what something really is, is determining, or has determined, the structure of that real thing. But, in what does this incorporation itself consist? That is the second question we must address.

2. In what does incorporation consist? Incorporation is not, to be sure, some "addition", because what the real really is, is intellectively determined by the real itself; therefore we are not dealing with an addition to the real of something from outside. Nor is this a mere "application". We are not trying to intellectively know what something really is and then apply that intellection to the concrete real which I have in my intellection. It is not a case of application but intrinsic determination of the notes according to what they really are. To intellectively know it I must intellectively know, in a thing, how its notes are issuing forth, so to speak, from what a thing really is. This is just what I have called 'the nature of structuring'. The nature of structuring does not consist merely in possessing a structure, but in intellectively knowing this structure, possessed intrinsically, as a mode of reality. And here is the difficulty. Clearly, intellection of the nature of the structuring of the real stems from intellection of the real. And as intellection is actualization, it follows that that from which it stems, and that where the nature of the structuring is intellectively known, is just that actualization. To incorporate, then, means first of all to form a body, to constitute in a certain way the corporeity of the actualization of the real. But this is not enough, because in the second place, what corporealizes this actualization is just the nature of the structuring. And in order to reach intellective knowledge of it, we have had to go to the field and worldly moments of the real, distancing ourselves in a certain way from its strictly individual moment. It is in this distancing that we intellectively know what the real really is. Now I turn from this distancing to the individual thing. This turning is the return in which I intellectively know what the thing was in its structuring nature, i.e., I intellectively know how what it really was constitutes the very nature of the structure of the real. But then it is clear that the return consists not in a mere "returning" to the real, but in intellectively recovering, from what a thing really is, its structure and its notes. And therein consists the corporeity of actualization; it is recovery of the fullness of the real. This fullness consists just in nature of the structuring. Therefore the incorporation is neither addition nor application but recovery. In distancing from the real, I have intellectually known its structure; in the return, I have recovered what was left at a distance, viz. its nature as structuring. To comprehend a thing is to recover its notes and its nature as structuring from what it really is. It is to intellectively know how the photon determines these green notes.

Comprehension consists in this. Its formal object is the nature of structuring, and the mode of actualization of this nature is recovery. With this we have intellectually known something more than before. It is not, strictly speaking, "more", but rather "better"—better actualization. And this is what was lacking in the primordial apprehension of reality, viz. comprehension. If we call primordial apprehension 'intuition'—though very inappropriately, as we saw—it will be necessary to say that intuition simpliciter is not comprehension. Bergson always believed that intuition was comprehension. That was, in my view, one of his two serious methodological errors. Intuition is something which must be recovered for there to be comprehension. Comprehension is not intuition, but recovery of what was intuited based on what really is. The richness of intuition, an undeniable moment of it, tends to hide its poverty of comprehension.

Intellection is apprehension of the real, and therefore every intellection, even comprehensive intellection, is a maturation of primordial apprehension. And what matures in this maturation is ultimately comprehension itself. Therefore full intellection is comprehensive apprehension.

This is the unitary structure of modal intellection as act; it is the actualization which goes from the "impression of reality", by means of the intellection of what "really" is, to the {338} intellection of the recovery of the real based on what really is.

This comprehension is not just a fact; it is a necessity. And it is so because the real is always intellectively known in sentient intelligence. Comprehending is, in man, comprehending sentiently, i.e., impressively. And this is what is manifested in some of the characteristics of comprehension, about which a few words are appropriate.
1. That comprehension is intrinsically and constitutively limited. Comprehension, as I said, is not the comprehensive science of all that is intelligible, as Medieval philosophy thought. We only comprehend something about something. And this is true in various senses.

Comprehension is limited insofar as it can only take place in definite directions, because what something really is, is also directionally definite. Comprehending something as interiority, as manifesting, or as actuation of something, are all different. What comprehension is in one direction may not be, and in general is not, comprehension in another. Even limited to one direction, comprehension is gradual. One can comprehend more or less, better or worse. There is, then, a limitation not only by reason of direction but also by reason of amplitude.

2. Moreover, there are differences by reason of the level to which one takes the intellection. Comprehending a real thing such as a dog at the biochemical level is not the same as comprehending it at the phylogenetic level, or at other levels. Comprehending man at the phylogenetic level is different than comprehending him socially, and so forth.

3. But above all, it is necessary to stress that there are different types of comprehension. One of them is causal explanation, or explanation by means of laws. Against Dilthey it must be said that explanation itself is a mode of comprehension. Another mode is interpretation, which is not limited to meaning but includes the reality of the personal experience, etc. But the most important thing is that there are types of comprehension different from causal explanation and interpretation. As I see the matter, it is essential that we introduce a type of what we might call ‘personal causality’. The classical idea of causality (the four causes) is essentially molded upon natural things; it is a natural causality. But nature is just one mode of reality; there are also personal realities. And a metaphysical conceptualization of personal causality is necessary. The causality between persons qua persons cannot be fitted into the four classical causes. Nonetheless, it is strict causality. As I see it, causality is the functionality of the real qua real. And personal functionality is not the same as “meaning”. Persons find themselves functionally linked as personal realities, and this linking does not consist in “meaning”. I cannot here delve into this great problem of causality; suffice it to state the problem briefly so that we are able to see that comprehension can assume different types.

All of these differences of limitation, level, type, etc. are not just differences of fact, but are radically constitutive; they have their roots in the formally sentient character of our intellection. The necessity of comprehending the real is determined by sentient intellection. Comprehending is always and only recovery, in intellection, of a real thing’s nature of structuring as sensed reality.

Here we have the unity of modal intellection as act: it is the act of comprehension. And after having examined the unity of this act as a modal act, we must ask ourselves what intelligence modalized as a function of intellection knowing is, and what intellection knowing as modally constituted is.

§2

THE MODAL UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING

This is the problem which concerns not the act of intellection but intellection knowing itself as such. To employ a common expression, we could say that we are dealing with the modal unity of the intellection faculty. Comprehension is the proper act of this modalized intelligence. Now, intelligence thus modalized is what should be called understanding. The act proper to understanding is just comprehending, i.e., understanding what something really is. As I see it, intellection knowing and understanding are not the same. I call the capacity of apprehending something as real ‘intellection knowing’. There are thousands of things that we intellectively know, i.e., which we apprehend as real but do not understand what they really are. Understanding is intellection knowing something real such as it really is. In Spanish and in some other languages (but not all) we have the two words ‘intellection knowing’ [inteligencia] and ‘understanding’ [entendimiento]. In contrast, Latin itself has only a single word, intellectus, to designate intellective knowing and understanding. Understanding is, then, the intellection knowing which understands what something, already apprehended as real, really is; i.e., what a thing is in reality (logos) and in reality itself (reason), the real thing understood in both the field manner and considered in the worldly sense. This understanding is not, then, the same as intelligence. A posteriori we may designate logos and reason with the single word ‘reason’, given that field, and therefore the logos, are the world as sensed, i.e., sentient reason. Then in order to conceptualize what understanding is, it will be necessary to trace it out with respect to it what reason is and what intellective knowing is.

1. Understanding and reason. By primordial apprehension, I apprehend a thing in its formality of reality.
And this formality, by being respective, brings us to understand the thing as a moment of the field and of the world. We thus intellectively know what the thing is really, and this intellection is reason. If I now intellectively know that same real thing based on what it really is, i.e., based on reason, I shall have a much richer intellection of the thing; I shall have understood it. Therefore understanding is the modal outcome of reason. For classical philosophy and for Kant, reason is the supreme form of intellection, because reason, in their view, must be the faculty of principles—assuming that a principle is a fundamental judgement—and that therefore reason would be a synthesis of judgements of the understanding. On that basis, reason would be something grounded in the understanding. But such is not the case; understanding something is only to intellectively know it based on what it really is, based on reason. Understanding is then the outcome of reason and not a principle of it. Understanding is the supreme form of intellection, but only along modal lines, because a principle is not a fundamental judgement but reality itself. This reality is not the patrimony of reason, but comes to it from the primordial apprehension of naked reality. Therefore understanding is the outcome of reason but only along modal lines. This brings us to the question of staking out the boundaries of understanding vis-à-vis not just reason but also naked intellection.

II. Understanding and intelligence. We understand what something really is, i.e., understanding presupposes intelligence, because the apprehension of something as real is just intelligence. The real thus apprehended, by being respective, really leads to other real things both of the field and of the world. What is apprehended itself has a content, but also has the formality of reality, of the de suyo. This formality is thus apprehended in sentient intelligence. But its content is insufficient. Whence the necessity to go to what the thing really is. We do not go to reality, but to what the real really is. The root of this new intellection is, then, the insufficiency of the content. But with respect to the formality of reality, primordial apprehension, naked intelligence has an essential and ineluctable prerogative. From the point of view of its content, the intelligence is partially grounded in what the understanding may have investigated. But from the point of view of reality, understanding is grounded in the intelligence. Without naked intelligence there would be no understanding. Neither would there be reason. For traditional philosophy as well as for Kant, understanding is the faculty of judging. But this is not the case. Understanding is the faculty of comprehending. For Hegel, on the other hand, reason would be the principle of all intellection, not just along modal lines, but also in the direction of naked intellection. This is a conception which ignores the problem of the modal unity of the intelligence in which the primordial apprehension of reality situates us.

In this way, ultimately, intellection has two sources. One, which is primary and supreme, is naked sentient intelligence; the other is modalized intelligence, understanding. They are not two faculties, but rather understanding is the supreme modalization of intelligence. The unity of the two dimensions is the respectivity of the real. Understanding is but sentient intelligence modalized in the field direction (logos) and in the worldly direction (reason).

§3

THE UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING AS AN INTELLECTIVE STATE

Every act of intellection leaves us in an intellective state, i.e., in a state of intelligence itself. Which state? That is the difficulty. To address it, we must examine three points: What is a state? What is being in an intellective state? And What are the diverse intellective types of this state?

I. What is a state? A state is always a mode of being and “staying” determined by something. It is necessary to return the idea of a state; as a difficulty, it has been absent from philosophy now for many centuries. Precisely on account of this it is necessary to conceptualize carefully what we understand by ‘state’ in this problem. For psychology, a state is a quiescent mode in which the human subject stays by virtue of an affection of things or the other moments of his psyche itself or other persons. A state is how he “is”. This is the concept of a psychological state. Here we are not dealing with that concept of state, for two reasons. Above all, we are not dealing with it because what is in a state, in the problem of concern here, is not a human subject but intelligence qua intelligence; this idea can only be extended to man as a whole insofar as he can be in turn determined by intelligence. In this respect, the state to which I am referring is more restricted than the psychological state. But that is not enough, since we are not just dealing with a mere restriction of it. And that is because—here we have the second of {345} the two reasons to which I just alluded—we are not dealing with intelligence as a structural not of human reality, but with intelligence in accordance with its formal structure, i.e., intelligence qua intellectively knowing. And in this respect the state to which we are referring is not more re-
stricted than the psychological state, but is a state which has nothing to do with it; it is merely an intellective state, the state of intellection itself considered formally. What is this intellective state \textit{qua} state? It is just a being or “staying” in what is intellectively known. It is not being or staying psychologically affected as a subject, but a being situated in what is intellectively known, a being situated which in Spanish we express by saying, for example, “We agree that ...”: It is not a quiescent state but rather an acquiescent one, so to speak.

In what does this being or standing in what is intellectively known consist? That is the question of what the intellective state is, not just \textit{qua} state but \textit{qua} intellective.

II. What is an intellective state? What an intellective state is depends upon what is intellectively known. Now, what is intellectively known as such is reality. Therefore an intellective state is a staying or being situated in accordance with the real insofar as the real is, with whatever desired degree of elementality and provisionality one wishes, the “law of the real”. This staying or being situated is at one and the same time of the real and of intellection. These are not two different “staying’s” or “being situated’s”, but a single one in which the real and the intelligence are together. By being a staying or situation of the real, this staying or being situated is intellective. By being of intellection, it is a state. They are not two stayings or situations, but a single “being situated together”. And this unity is clear: the real is situated in intellection and intellection itself is grasped in the real. This is what I call retentivity. The real retains, and in this retention (346) the real is constituted \textit{qua} retentive, its intellective actuality as a retained state.

This retentivity has precise characteristics. 1) It is retention \textit{by} the real. We are not dealing with the question of what, for example, retention by a stimulus sensed as a stimulus is. Rather, we are concerned with retention by the real as real. 2) It is retention \textit{in} the real, not a retention in this or that thing, according to its importance, for example; rather it is a retention in the real \textit{qua} real. We stand in reality. 3) It is retention by the real and in the real, but only in the actualized sense. We are not dealing with a retention along the lines of actuality, only actuality. And for this reason the retention is formally intellective, since mere actualization of the real \textit{qua} real in intelligence is just intellection.

Intellective activity is, then, an intellective \textit{retained staying} by the real and in the real as such.

Granting this, let us ask ourselves in what form we are retained in intellection. Staying intellectively retained by the real and in the real as such is just what, strictly speaking, we call knowing [saber]. Knowing is staying intellectively retained in what is intellectively known. Every apprehension has its own force of imposition, and this imposition in the intellective state is knowing. Let us fix some of its characteristics.

Knowing is not an intellection \textit{simpliciter}. That would be a very vague notion. Knowing is not an \textit{act} but a \textit{state}, a staying retained in the sensed explained above. This must be stressed. And precisely for this reason, its most exact linguistic expression is the perfect tense, the \textit{per-fectum}, something intellectively known in a terminal way. In Latin \textit{novi}, in Greek \textit{oida}, and in Vedic \textit{veda}: these terms do not simply mean “I know”, but (347) strictly speaking something more like “I have it known”, “I already know it”, etc. They are present perfect expressions, or perfect expressions in the sense of present. Thus, among the epithets of Agni in the Rig Veda is that of being \textit{jata-vedas} (456,7 and 13); Agni is he who knows all that has been born (from the verb \textit{jan}-). For the Veda, things are not “entities” but “engendered things”, “products”, or “born things”, \textit{bhuta-}, \textit{jata-}. Differentiated in the various Indo-European languages there appears the root \textit{gen-}, to be born, to engender, which gave rise to the Vedic \textit{jan-}, the Greek \textit{égnon}, and the Latin \textit{novi}. Now, he who has known the “engendered things” is he who has \textit{veda}. Knowing comes designated in the perfect. As an infinitive, Latin expresses knowing with the verb \textit{scire}. I believe that its primary meaning is perhaps “to cut”, and I think that it is found in the verb \textit{scire} as knowing in a definitive or cutting way, i.e., as designation of a conclusive state, of conclusivity. The idea of conclusivity is perhaps the meaning of \textit{scire}, viz. finding oneself in a conclusive state (by cutting).

This state as expressed in \textit{oida} and \textit{veda} is designated by a single root \textit{veid-} which directly means ‘vision’. Knowing would thus be a state of having already seen something. But this is a great limitation; knowing is a state of intellection, and intellection is not just vision. Even in the case of vision, we do not refer to vision as an act of the eyes but to intellective vision. Only because of this has the root associated with seeing been able to mean knowing. It is a vision which is not optical, but to my way of thinking, a vision of sentient intellection. And as I

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\[1\] In the original Spanish, the verb \textit{quedar} can mean ‘to be’, ‘to stand’, ‘to be situated’; it is here translated as the latter. The expression Zubiri refers to in Spanish is \textit{quedamos en que...}, which is an idiomatic one that translates into English as “We agree that ...”.—trans.

\[1\] I.e., Sanskrit. -- trans.]
have expounded at length, I believe that all of the senses are moments of a single sentient intellect. Therefore it is not strange that the state of knowing comes designated in Latin, and above all in the Romance languages, with a root connected to \( \text{scire} \) the root word for pleasure, \( \text{saper} \). Knowing [saber] is more tasting [sabor] than seeing. Whence the word \( \text{sapientia} \), wisdom [sabiduria].

With various roots we thus have, in Latin, a single idea, the idea of an intellective state expressed in a gradual progression from \( \text{scire} \), knowing, through \( \text{scientia} \), science, to \( \text{sapientia} \), wisdom. German expresses this same progression with a single root taken from the visual: \( \text{Wissen} \) (knowing), \( \text{Wissenschaft} \) (science), \( \text{Weisheit} \) (wisdom).

Just as the root of \( \text{scire} \) can mean, as I see it, conclusively, I think that \( \text{scire} \) is what most closely approximates that conclusive intellectual state which consists in standing intellectively retained in the real by the real as such. Knowing is, then, a state and not an act. It is a state, a standing, and an intellective state: a standing, retained in the actualized real. It admits of various types.

III. Diverse types of knowing. We are dealing with states, and so it is not a question of enumerating the different forms of knowing, but of qualitatively differentiating some modes of intellectuation.

1) Above all, there is naked intellectation, the primumordial apprehension of reality. It is a sentient intellectation, and for that very reason it leaves us in a certain state. Its content is more or less rich, but with respect to what concerns the formality of reality its richness is maximal. In this intellectation we stay, first of all, not in this or that thing. That in which we formally and moreover ineluctably stay is in naked reality. By simple intellectation, that in which we stay is in reality. This is a radical and primumordial knowing: the intelligence is retained in reality by reality itself. This is the impression of reality. All other intellectations and everything in them which is actualized in them to us is owing to the fact that we are in reality. \[349\]

2) Granting that, the real thus apprehended gives rise to the intellectation of what that real is really, viz. logos and reason. The intellectation of a real thing, based on what it really is, is the second type of knowing. It is staying in having intellectively known what a thing really is. Knowing is then not a staying in reality, but a staying in what the real really is. This is the second type of knowing, viz. knowing not as being in reality but knowing as being in the respectivity of the real. In turn, this second type of knowing is diversified in accordance with what each thing really is. And here the differences can become enormous.

Thus, in Greece, the first form of intellectation of respectivity was \( \text{discerning} \). This was, ultimately, the direct idea of Parmenides. Knowing is not taking one thing for another. In the final instance error would be confusing what a thing is with something which it is not, with something else. As recognized by Plato this idea was philosophically elaborated by him in a distinct and richer form. Knowing is not determined only by discernment but as a distinct and richer form of respectivity, the \( \text{definition} \). Now knowing is not only not confusing one thing with another but is in turn \( \text{defining} \). Finally Aristotle received this conceptualization and elaborated it further: knowing is not only discerning and defining, but also—and above all—\( \text{demonstrating} \), in the etymological sense of “showing from where”, showing the internal necessity of the fact that things must be as they are. In Aristotle, this demonstrating has different moments: rigorous reasoning, the intellectation of principles upon which one is based, and the sensible impression of that to which they are applied. What happens is that these three moments do not have the same root. The first two are ascribed to \( \text{nous} \), to intellectual knowing, but the \( \{350\} \) third to sensing. This is the radical dualism of intellectual knowing and sensing. Hence these three moments have run as dissociated throughout the course of the history of philosophy, precisely because they are found radically dislocated in the contraposition of intellectual knowing and sensing. Now, it is, on the contrary, necessary to conceptualize their radical unity, viz. sentient intellectation. It is from there that the three moments of discerning, defining, and demonstrating ought to be differentiated. For this reason those three acts are clearly diverse, but they are only three intellective modalities anchored in a single formal structure of sentient intellectual knowing. Clearly they are not anchored directly in it in the same way. Sentient intellectual knowing thus determines two types of intellectation and therefore of knowing: the intellectation and knowing that something is real, and the intellectation and knowing of what this real thing is really. Only sentient intellectation determines the duality between real and really. Now, discerning, defining, and demonstrating are not, for the purposes of our problem, three sufficiently distinct intellectations, but only the three modes of intellective knowing of what something really is.

3) But there is yet a third type of knowing, that in which we stay comprehensively in reality. It is a type of intimate penetration into a real thing from which we know that it really is. The state of knowing is now the state in which we stay retained in the real by the real itself as intellectively known in comprehension. It is properly the state in which we stand by virtue of the understanding.
Thus we have the three great types of knowing: being in reality, being in what the real is really, and being comprehensively in reality.

Let us repeat once again: the object of knowing is not objectivity or being; the object of knowing is reality. The intelligence is not the faculty of the objective nor the faculty of being; it is the faculty of reality. This reality is not something distinct from what impresses the senses. Reality is a formality of the otherness of what is sensed; it is the de suyo. As the formality that it is, it is something impressively sensed; it is impression of reality. As the faculty of reality is the intelligence, it follows that the impression of reality is the act of an intelligence which apprehends the real in impression; it is a sentient intelligence. Human intelligence is sentient intelligence. It is not a conceiving intelligence or anything of that sort. To be sure, our intelligence conceives and judges; but that is not its formal act. Its formal act consists in sensing reality. Conversely, human sensing is not a sensing like that of animals. An animal senses what is sensed in a formality which is merely a stimulus. Man, though he senses the same thing as the animal, nonetheless senses it in the formality of reality, as something de suyo. This is an intellective sensing. Sentient intelligence is not a sensible intelligence, i.e., an intelligence directed to what the senses offer to it; rather, it is an intelligence which is structurally one with sensing. Human intelligence senses reality. It is not an intelligence which begins by conceiving and judging what is sensed. Philosophy has counterposed sensing and intellective knowing, concentrating solely upon the content of certain acts. But it has gone astray with respect to formality. And here is where intellective knowing and sensing not only are not opposed, but despite their essential irreducibility, constitute a single structure, one which, from wherever one looks, should be called ‘sentient intelligence’ or ‘intellective sensing’. Thanks to it, man stands unmistakably in and by reality; he stands in it, knowing it. Knowing what? Something, very little, of what is real. But, nonetheless, he is retained constitutively in reality. How? This is the great human problem: knowing how to be in the midst of reality.

The analysis of this structure has been the theme of this prolix study of sentient intelligence.
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“All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for, aside from their utility, they are loved for their own sake, and that of sight above all others.” Thus Aristotle begins Book I of his *Metaphysics*, posing in rawest form the “problem of knowing”, one of the most serious of philosophy and one of the most persistent throughout its long history. What can we know? And how can we know it? Such are the questions which Plato sought to answer in Book VII of the *Republic*, Aristotle in his *Organon*, Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*, Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Hegel in his *Logic*, Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*, and many others. Today the subject finds itself in a situation even more disquieting than in any previous epoch. The bibliography on the “critical problem,” epistemology or the theory of knowledge, is overwhelming. But not so the solutions which, starting with the preface to this book, Xavier Zubiri describes as conceptivist and in the final analysis, idealistic…

In the full maturity of his philosophy, Zubiri takes up the question with exceptional vigor and rigor. In a continual dialog with the philosophical tradition, Zubiri goes page by page describing the act of human intellection, dismantling the cluster of hypotheses and theories that underlie the so-called “problem of knowledge.” Upon finishing the book, the reader is conscious of the tangled maze upon which rest the most classical theses, and the heap of pseudo-problems which make approach to the subject so difficult—tantamount to the approach to reality itself. Shunning both naiveté and prejudice, Zubiri succeeds in describing in what the human act par excellence, intellection, consists. And he does so by recourse to a purely descriptive procedure…

—*from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part I.*

Ever since the time of Parmenides, philosophy has sought to resolve the problem of the relation between intelligence and reality on the very point which is the central theme of this work, the “logos,” whose most classical expression is the “judgement.” Zubiri is squarely opposed to this tradition, which according to him leads to a formalistic logicism that distorts the role of the intelligence and impedes access to reality. He affirms the preeminence of intellection over logos. Intelligence…merely actualizes things insofar as they are “real.” Logos is an ulterior mode of intellection which allows us to express what real things are “in reality”.

—*from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part II.*

…this work definitively confronts the most classical themes of the philosophy of knowledge: what is knowing? In what does reason consist? What is the method of knowledge?…Knowing things as real does not mean that we know what they are “in reality”—logos—and still less what they are beyond apprehension, i.e., “in reality itself”…By means of reason, human intelligence seeks to know what things are “in reality itself,” as Zubiri says. Only at this level does intellection become authentic knowledge. This knowledge, moreover, is never complete; it is always open and problematic…

—*from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part III.*